Index 
Texts adopted
Wednesday, 13 June 2018 - StrasbourgFinal edition
Composition of the European Parliament ***
 Insolvency proceedings: updated annexes to the Regulation ***I
 EU-Iceland Agreement on supplementary rules for external borders and visas for 2014-2020 ***
 EU-Switzerland Agreement on supplementary rules for external borders and visas for 2014-2020 ***
 Implementation of the remaining provisions of the Schengen acquis relating to the Schengen Information System in Bulgaria and Romania *
 Cohesion policy and the circular economy
 Further macro-financial assistance to Ukraine ***I
 Negotiations on the modernisation of the EU-Chile Association Agreement
 EU-NATO relations
 Cyber defence

Composition of the European Parliament ***
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European Parliament legislative resolution of 13 June 2018 on the draft European Council decision establishing the composition of the European Parliament (00007/2018 – C8-0216/2018 – 2017/0900(NLE))
P8_TA(2018)0249A8-0207/2018

(Consent)

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the draft European Council decision (00007/2018),

—  having regard to the request for consent submitted by the European Council in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 14(2) of the Treaty on European Union (C8-0216/2018),

—  having regard to its resolution of 7 February 2018 on the composition of the European Parliament and to its proposal for a decision of the European Council annexed thereto (1),

–  having regard to Rule 99(1) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the recommendation of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (A8-0207/2018),

1.  Gives its consent to the draft European Council decision;

2.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the European Council and, for information, to the Commission and to the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

(1) Texts adopted, P8_TA(2018)0029.


Insolvency proceedings: updated annexes to the Regulation ***I
PDF 238kWORD 45k
Resolution
Text
European Parliament legislative resolution of 13 June 2018 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council replacing Annex A to Regulation (EU) 2015/848 on insolvency proceedings (COM(2017)0422 – C8-0238/2017 – 2017/0189(COD))
P8_TA(2018)0250A8-0174/2018

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2017)0422),

–  having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 81 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C8‑0238/2017),

–  having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 23 May 2018 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to Rules 59 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Legal Affairs (A8-0174/2018),

1.  Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

2.  Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;

3.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments;

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 13 June 2018 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2018/... of the European Parliament and of the Council replacing Annexes A and B to Regulation (EU) 2015/848 on insolvency proceedings

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Regulation (EU) 2018/946).


EU-Iceland Agreement on supplementary rules for external borders and visas for 2014-2020 ***
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European Parliament legislative resolution of 13 June 2018 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion on behalf of the European Union of the Agreement between the European Union and Iceland on supplementary rules in relation to the instrument for financial support for external borders and visa, as part of the Internal Security Fund, for the period 2014 to 2020 (09228/2017 – C8-0101/2018 – 2017/0088(NLE))
P8_TA(2018)0251A8-0196/2018

(Consent)

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the draft Council decision (09228/2017),

–  having regard to the draft Agreement between the European Union and Iceland on supplementary rules in relation to the instrument for financial support for external borders and visa, as part of the Internal Security Fund, for the period 2014 to 2020 (09253/2017),

–  having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Article 77(2) and Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a), of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C8‑0101/2018),

–  having regard to Rule 99(1) and (4) and Rule 108(7) of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the recommendation of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A8-0196/2018),

1.  Gives its consent to the conclusion of the agreement;

2.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and of Iceland.


EU-Switzerland Agreement on supplementary rules for external borders and visas for 2014-2020 ***
PDF 239kWORD 41k
European Parliament legislative resolution of 13 June 2018 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the Union, of the Agreement between the European Union and the Swiss Confederation on supplementary rules in relation to the instrument for financial support for external borders and visa, as part of the Internal Security Fund, for the period 2014 to 2020 (06222/2018 – C8-0119/2018 – 2018/0032(NLE))
P8_TA(2018)0252A8-0195/2018

(Consent)

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the draft Council decision (06222/2018),

–  having regard to the draft Agreement between the European Union and the Swiss Confederation on supplementary rules in relation to the instrument for financial support for external borders and visa, as part of the Internal Security Fund, for the period 2014 to 2020 (06223/2018),

–  having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Article 77(2) and Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C8-0119/2018),

–  having regard to Rule 99(1) and (4), and Rule 108(7) of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the recommendation of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A8-0195/2018),

1.  Gives its consent to the conclusion of the agreement;

2.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and of the Swiss Confederation.


Implementation of the remaining provisions of the Schengen acquis relating to the Schengen Information System in Bulgaria and Romania *
PDF 234kWORD 42k
European Parliament legislative resolution of 13 June 2018 on the draft Council decision on the putting into effect of the remaining provisions of the Schengen acquis relating to the Schengen Information System in the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania (15820/1/2017 – C8-0017/2018 – 2018/0802(CNS))
P8_TA(2018)0253A8-0192/2018

(Consultation)

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Council draft (15820/1/2017),

–  having regard to Article 4(2) of the Act of Accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania, pursuant to which the Council consulted Parliament (C8‑0017/2018),

–  having regard to Rule 78c of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A8-0192/2018),

1.  Approves the Council draft;

2.  Calls on the Council to notify Parliament if it intends to depart from the text approved by Parliament;

3.  Asks the Council to consult Parliament again if it intends to substantially amend the text approved by Parliament;

4.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council and the Commission.


Cohesion policy and the circular economy
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European Parliament resolution of 13 June 2018 on cohesion policy and the circular economy (2017/2211(INI))
P8_TA(2018)0254A8-0184/2018

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Treaty on European Union, in particular Article 3, and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in particular Articles 4, 11, 174 to 178, 191 and 349 thereof,

–  having regard to the Paris Agreement, Decision 1/CP.21 and the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) to the UNFCCC, and the 11th Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP11) held in Paris, France, from 30 November to 11 December 2015,

–  having regard to Articles 7(2) and 11(2) of the Paris Agreement, which recognise the local, subnational and regional dimensions of climate change and climate action,

–  having regard to the new UN Sustainable Development Goals, and in particular goal 7: to ‘ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all’ and goal 11: to ‘make cities inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable’,

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006(1) (hereinafter ‘the Common Provisions Regulation’),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1301/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on the European Regional Development Fund and on specific provisions concerning the Investment for growth and jobs goal and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1080/2006(2),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1304/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on the European Social Fund and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1081/2006(3),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1299/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on specific provisions for the support from the European Regional Development Fund to the European territorial cooperation goal(4),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1302/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 amending Regulation (EC) No 1082/2006 on a European grouping of territorial cooperation (EGTC) as regards the clarification, simplification and improvement of the establishment and functioning of such groupings(5),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1300/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on the Cohesion Fund and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1084/2006(6),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002(7),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 16 January 2018 entitled ‘Monitoring framework for the circular economy’ (COM(2018)0029),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 26 January 2017 entitled ‘The role of waste-to-energy in the circular economy’ (COM(2017)0034),

–  having regard to the Commission report of 26 January 2017 on the implementation of the Circular Economy Action Plan (COM(2017)0033),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 14 December 2015 entitled ‘Investing in jobs and growth – maximising the contribution of European Structural and Investment Funds’ (COM(2015)0639),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 2 December 2015 entitled ‘Closing the loop – An EU action plan for the Circular Economy’ (COM(2015)0614),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 2 July 2014 entitled ‘Towards a circular economy: A zero waste programme for Europe’ (COM(2014)0398),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 2 July 2014 entitled ‘Green Action Plan for SMEs: Enabling SMEs to turn environmental challenges into business opportunities’ (COM(2014)0440),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 3 March 2010 entitled ‘Europe 2020 – A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’ (COM(2010)2020),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 13 February 2012 entitled ‘Innovating for Sustainable Growth: A Bioeconomy for Europe’ (COM(2012)0060),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 10 July 2012 on ‘Smart Cities and Communities – European Innovation Partnership’ (C(2012)4701),

–  having regard to the study commissioned by the Commission of December 2017 entitled ‘Integration of environmental concerns in Cohesion Policy Funds (ERDF, ESF, CF) – Results, evolution and trends through three programming periods (2000-2006, 2007-2013, 2014-2020)’,

–  having regard to its resolution of 16 February 2017 on investing in jobs and growth – maximising the contribution of European Structural and Investment Funds: an evaluation of the report under Article 16(3) of the Common Provisions Regulation(8),

–  having regard to its resolution of 13 September 2016 on European Territorial Cooperation – best practices and innovative measures(9),

–  having regard to its resolution of 6 July 2016 on synergies for innovation: the European Structural and Investment Funds, Horizon 2020 and other European innovation funds and EU programmes(10),

–  having regard to its resolution of 9 July 2015 on resource efficiency: moving towards a circular economy(11),

–  having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2015 on green growth opportunities for SMEs(12),

–  having regard to the Smart Islands Declaration of 28 March 2017,

–  having regard to Rule 52 of its Rules of Procedure, as well as Article 1(1)(e) of, and Annex 3 to, the decision of the Conference of Presidents of 12 December 2002 on the procedure for granting authorisation to draw up own-initiative reports,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Regional Development and the opinion of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (A8-0184/2018),

A.  whereas local and regional authorities, which are the most conversant with the local and regional issues and are key actors for an effective implementation of cohesion policy, are also at the forefront of the transition to a circular economy; whereas a European multi-level governance model, built on active and constructive co-operation between the different levels of governance and stakeholders, together with adequate information and active involvement of citizens, is key to the achievement of this shift;

B.  whereas cities represent just 3 % of the Earth’s surface but house more than half of the world population, consume over 75 % of the global resources, and emit 60-80 % of greenhouse gas emissions and whereas 70 % of the global population is expected to move to cities by 2050;

C.  whereas the transition to a stronger, more circular economy is both a great opportunity and a challenge for the EU, its Member States and its citizens, to modernise the European economy and guide it in a more sustainable direction; whereas it is, in particular, an opportunity for all European regions and local authorities, which are the tier of government closest to local communities; whereas it brings possibilities for development and growth to the European regions and can help them build a sustainable model that achieves economic development, transform existing sectors, improve their balances of trade and industrial competitiveness with enhanced productivity, create new, high quality, well-paid jobs and new value chains;

D.  whereas around 60 % of EU waste is currently not recycled and whereas great cost benefits and business opportunities could be created from exploring and introducing new circular business models for the benefit of EU SMEs;

E.  whereas achieving the Paris Agreement targets requires a shift to a more circular economy and is a vital contribution to the development of an economic model that has not only profit as its goal, but also protection of the environment;

F.  whereas cohesion policy offers not only investment opportunities to respond to local and regional needs through the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESI Funds), but also an integrated policy framework to reduce developmental disparities between the European regions and to help them address the multiple challenges to their development, including through support for resource efficiency and sustainable development, as well as territorial cooperation and capacity building and also to attract and promote private investment;

G.  whereas the current legislative framework for cohesion policy does not mention the transition to a circular economy as an objective, and whereas sustainable development is a horizontal principle for the use of the ESI Funds, as defined in Article 8 of the Common Provisions Regulation as well as in the Common Strategic Framework (Annex I), which will enable the link between existing instruments in support of circular economy projects to be strengthened;

H.  whereas many of the thematic objectives set for the ESI Funds to comply with the Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, as well as the related ex ante conditionalities, are relevant to the objectives of a circular economy;

I.  whereas Article 6 of the Common Provisions Regulation makes it mandatory for operations supported by the ESI Funds to comply with applicable Union law and national law relating to the application of Union law, including especially environmental law;

J.  whereas one of the aims of the circular economy is to reduce waste going to landfill and whereas the securing and remediation of legal and illegal landfills in the Member States should be regarded as an absolute priority;

K.  whereas China banned imports of scrap plastics and unsorted paper waste from 1 January 2018, and whereas that ban will create recycling challenges for the Union, which will need to be dealt with at regional and local levels;

Role of cohesion policy in promoting the circular economy

1.  Welcomes the efforts of the Commission to support the circular economy through cohesion policy, notably via outreach activities to assist EU Member States and regions in the uptake of cohesion policy funds for the circular economy;

2.  Notes that, according to the Commission report on the implementation of the Circular Economy Action Plan, EU support for the 2014-2020 period for innovation, SMEs, the low-carbon economy and environmental protection amounts to EUR 150 billion and many of these areas are contributing to the achievement of a circular economy;

3.  Notes that the analysis of the outcome of the negotiations concerning the partnership agreements and European Social Fund (ESF) operational programmes for the current programming period showed that the ESF has been used to support actions for introducing greener models of labour organisation, and actions in the green sector;

4.  Notes, however, that, as underlined in a study commissioned by the Commission, the current policy framework does not allow the full contribution of cohesion policy to the circular economy to be captured; in this respect, points to the fact that the definition of the existing ‘Intervention Field’ categories used for financial allocations does not cover the circular economy as such;

5.  Urges the Commission to implement the planned circular economy measures, observing good regulatory practice, and stresses the need to monitor the implementing measures;

6.  Stresses the need to implement the Commission’s commitment to a monitoring framework for the circular economy(13) with a view to increasing and evaluating progress achieved in the transition to a circular economy at EU and Member State level, while reducing the administrative burden;

7.  Calls on the Commission to take extraordinary action to remediate areas used for the illegal discharge and landfill of hazardous waste, which is adversely affecting the health and economic and social well-being of the populations concerned;

8.  Underlines the role played by the EU’s Framework Programme for Research and Innovation Horizon 2020 and by the LIFE Programme 2014-2020 in funding innovative projects and in supporting waste reduction, recycling and reuse projects which are relevant to the circular economy;

9.  Appreciates that several regions have used their smart specialisation strategies to set priorities related to the circular economy and guide their investments in research and innovation through cohesion policy towards this objective, playing a fundamental role in supporting investments and infrastructure that meet the needs of SMEs; calls on the regional authorities to use this good practice as a common modus operandi and to implement these smart specialisation strategies;

10.  Welcomes the creation of a European Resource Efficiency Excellence Centre for SMEs, as well as the Circular Economy Finance Support Platform;

11.  Reiterates its view that the circular economy goes beyond waste management and includes areas such as green jobs; renewable energy; resource efficiency; the bio-economy; agriculture and fisheries policies, with their bio-based industries aiming to replace fossil fuels; water management; energy efficiency; food waste; marine litter; air quality improvement; research and development and innovation in related fields; acknowledges, however, that waste infrastructure is a crucial element for reducing linear patterns of production and consumption and that it is necessary to support innovations in the field of eco-design in order to reduce levels of plastic waste;

12.  Recalls that the basic problem that must be resolved first is the secondary materials market, as if raw materials cost less than recycled ones it is clear that the drive towards the green economy has slowed down considerably and that the use of structural funds could be lost in a vicious circle; considers, in this context, that certain ad hoc laws (such as the upcoming Commission proposal on single-use plastic products) and appropriate EU-level taxation as part of the own resources of the next multiannual financial framework can make a decisive contribution to moving towards a circular economy;

13.  Emphasises the fact that on average recycled materials only satisfy around 10 % of the EU demand for materials; recognises, with regard to new developments on global markets, especially China’s recent ban on scrap plastics and unsorted paper waste, the new potential for regions and local communities to invest into recycling infrastructure, create new greens jobs and tackle the current challenges that the EU faces;

14.  Highlights the existence and importance of the ex-ante conditionalities on ESI Funds related to, in particular, the objective of preserving and protecting the environment and promoting resource efficiency; points especially to the one on ‘promoting economically and environmentally sustainable investments in the waste sector’; regrets, however, the negligence of waste hierarchy and lack of sound environmental assessment of long-term outcomes of investments under the ESI Funds;

15.  Calls for coordination and greater cooperation between regions, SMEs and other public/private entities in order to launch new smart specialisation thematic platforms, in particular between the agri-food, energy and industrial sectors;

16.  Emphasises the importance of applying waste hierarchy as a prerequisite for achieving a circular economy, as well as the need for greater transparency in the supply chain, so that end-of-life products and materials can be monitored and recovered efficiently; furthermore recognises a negative trend of investment of ESI Funds into lower levels of the waste hierarchy, in particular mechanical biological treatment (MBT) facilities and incineration, which in some cases leads to overcapacities and long-term technological lock-in, thus jeopardising the achievement of EU recycling targets; recalls that encouraging the business community to follow the hierarchy should generate additional materials in the resource stream as well as offering potential outlets for their use in manufacturing;

17.  Recalls the new waste targets for 2025, 2030 and 2035 established in the review of EU waste legislation and underlines that the achievement of these targets requires political commitment at the national, regional and local levels as well as economic investments; calls on the Member States to make full use of available Union funds in support of such investments and underlines that these will generate significant returns in terms of economic growth and job creation;

18.  Underlines the importance of regional projects to process residual waste that is entirely non-recyclable for the purpose of producing sustainable second-generation biofuels, after careful separation or separate collection in line with the waste hierarchy;

19.  Calls on the Commission to ensure that all definitions relating to waste comply with the Waste Framework Directive and that comparable data are available on progress made by Member States and local and regional authorities;

20.  Underlines the importance of the Urban Innovative Actions initiative, which has so far approved eight innovative circular economy projects in urban authorities for ERDF funding and calls on the Commission to monitor and evaluate their implementation in order to formulate wider circular economy policies;

The circular economy as a driver for sustainable and regional development

21.  Stresses the importance of the partnership principle and the important role of all stakeholders, in particular regional and local authorities and the non-governmental sector, including SMEs and social economy enterprises, during the drawing-up of partnership agreements and operational programmes; calls for a genuine involvement of partners in policy processes, with the creation of cross-cutting partnerships, and for circular economy-related objectives to be adequately incorporated into programming documents; encourages the Member States to develop their own national strategies in this field in coordination with the EU approach to the circular economy; points to the leading role that local government can play in achieving the circular economy;

22.  Stresses the importance of the role of public-private partnerships in the design and planning of new products and services that take life cycle into account, with a view to implementing the four design models that could be used under a circular economy: designing for longevity; designing for leasing/service; designing for reuse in manufacture; designing for materials recovery;

23.  Stresses the need to change and adapt the current strategies and market models to accompany the regions in the transition towards this more sustainable form of economy, while at the same time boosting economic, industrial and environmental competitiveness;

24.  Calls for the implementation of the circular economy within the framework of the coordinated multilevel governance and partnership principle, with full transparency, the involvement of local communities and broad public participation;

25.  Highlights the need to promote greater cooperation between all the stakeholders involved in circular economy processes;

26.  Notes that projects related to the circular economy which have received cohesion policy support have brought greater benefits to more developed regions; recognises the limited administrative capacity of less developed regions and therefore calls on the Member States’ national authorities and the Commission to use all existing possibilities to provide expert assistance and to strengthen the capacity of these regions to help them increase their efforts, and to create conditions for achieving technological leapfrogging by implementing more projects that meet circular economy principles and by developing partnerships and closer cooperation with stakeholders such as materials experts, chemists, manufacturers and recyclers, particularly within the framework of the ‘Industry 2020 in the circular economy’ initiative;

27.  Emphasises the estimates that a shift to biological raw materials and biological processing methods could save up to 2,5 billion tonnes of CO2 equivalent per year by 2030, thus increasing markets for bio-based raw materials and new consumer products several-fold; underlines the utmost importance of sustainable management of natural resources and the preservation of biodiversity while transforming resources into bio-based products, materials and fuels;

28.  Considers that the bioeconomy is essential for regional and local development, since it increases cohesion between regions through its potential to create jobs and growth in rural areas; calls for greater use to be made of ESI Funds for the implementation of existing innovations, through policies to encourage stakeholders, while further fostering innovation in the development of bio-based, biodegradable, recyclable and compostable materials produced from sustainably managed biofeed stocks; recalls that consistent implementation of the bioeconomy may also solve the problem of food waste; calls for better cooperation between national, regional and local authorities in creating systems and platforms that connect different actors from the food production, transportation, retail, consumer and waste sectors, as well as other concerned stakeholders, thus achieving greater synergies to create efficient solutions;

29.  Points out that, in addition to local, regional and national authorities, incentives should also be given to consumers themselves, who should be constantly informed and encouraged to change their consumer behaviour in respect of waste management and production, recycling and issues involving sustainable solutions in their everyday lives;

30.  Calls for better, easier and more transparent access to finance for local and regional authorities, including through the strengthening of their administrative capacities and through heightened cooperation with the EIB, within the framework of the European Investment Advisory Hub, to enable increased investments in green jobs, waste management, smart specialisation, further development of rural areas including as regards the necessary infrastructure and environmentally friendly technologies, the shift from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources and the local energy transition, including energy efficiency, decentralised distribution of energy, clean energy innovation and the circular economy; welcomes the fact that the EIB has provided over the past five years about EUR 2,4 billion in co-financing for circular economy projects for waste management, water management or agricultural research and development; stresses the importance of better coordination of the ESI Funds and the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) in the field of the circular economy, also with a view to ensuring that programmes include a regional approach and make better use of regional potential for sustainable energy sources;

31.  Calls on Member States, regions and local authorities to encourage the establishment of and support for reuse and repair networks, in particular those operating as social economy enterprises, to extend the life of products through reuse, repair and reutilisation, by facilitating the access of such networks to waste collection points, and by promoting the use of ESI Funds, economic instruments, procurement criteria, or other measures in this sense;

32.  Stresses that the life cycle sustainability of reuse and recycling also depends on energy consumption in transport; underlines that this applies particularly to rural areas where longer distances between points of collection and processing sites have to be covered; urges the Commission, the Member States and regional authorities to take the life cycle approach into account in their circular economy strategies for rural areas in order to avoid negative overall environmental and climate impacts;

33.  Points out that, out of a sample of 32 operational programmes reviewed for a study on the integration of environmental concerns in cohesion policy funds, nine address the circular economy and six green jobs; welcomes the existing efforts made by national and regional authorities but at the same time calls on Member States to better integrate the circular economy in their operational and regional programmes and partnership agreements; urges that support be granted to the regions to ensure as smooth as possible a transition to the circular economy;

34.  Calls on the Member States to ensure that the circular economy is suitably incorporated into educational programmes and vocational training and re-training as an interdisciplinary subject so as to shape new attitudes which will then help to define new business models and create new jobs;

35.  Calls on the national and regional authorities in charge of preparing operational programmes to more closely integrate the circular economy into territorial cooperation programmes, particularly in cross-border cooperation programmes, in order to implement cross-border solutions that can generate more efficient and cheaper results;

36.  Believes that the future planning of ESI Funds in the next programming period should be better coordinated with the national energy and climate plans for 2030, by using similar indicators to the ones contained in the Regulation on the Governance of the Energy Union when possible; asks for an ambitious and coherent strategy for Member States in order to fulfil the already existing mandatory targets at EU level on climate mitigation;

37.  Calls on Member States to seize the opportunity to further integrate the circular economy into their current operational programmes during the period of revision; believes that Commission should facilitate this process while providing assistance to Member States in analysis of the current state of play and possible areas where the circular economy and its principles could be applied and added;

38.  Considers that the role of the European Territorial Cooperation (ETC) in addressing challenges related to the implementation of the circular economy should be further enhanced; calls on Member States to foster cross-border cooperation, in particular through ETC, to implement circular economy projects; furthermore, stresses the importance of finding sustainable solutions through pre-accession agreements with non-Member Sates to tackle the ongoing challenges, especially in the domain of air pollution;

39.  Stresses the untapped potential of the on-going macro-regional strategies to help address challenges related to the implementation of the circular economy, not only in the Member States but also in third countries located in the same geographical area; stresses that those strategies should focus on priorities that would support the creation of a market for secondary raw materials for the Union; calls for the development of EU cooperation initiatives with neighbouring countries;

40.  Reiterates its views on the importance of adequate capacity building and maintenance in local, regional and national public authorities, which is also highly relevant for the transition to a circular economy; points to the important role technical assistance can play in this field; recognises that regions and urban areas play a vital role in promoting ownership of the bottom-up energy transition and are most suitable for testing and implementing integrated energy solutions in direct connection to citizens; stresses the role that ‘smart cities’ initiatives can play in the circular economy by promoting green technology models as part of sustainable urban development strategies; underlines that sustainable and ‘circular’ cities are an instrument for an effective circular economy;

41.  Stresses the importance of Green Public Procurement as a driver of the circular economy, with a potential market of an estimated EUR 1,8 trillion annually delivering public works, goods and services(14);

42.  Stresses the need for an energy regulatory framework that encourages citizens and energy communities to participate in the energy transition through the right to self-produce and consume, as well as through continued support schemes, guaranteed priority grid access and priority dispatch for renewable energy;

43.  Encourages regional and local authorities to further invest in educational programmes, in vocational training and requalification of workers, as well as in public awareness-raising campaigns about the benefits and advantages of all actions with the aim of implementing the circular economy through cohesion policy projects, thus increasing citizen participation and influencing consumer behaviour; underlines, in this connection, the potential of the ESF; stresses that it must encourage young entrepreneurs to move towards the circular economy, especially in regions with low levels of income and growth; underlines also that the circular economy is an opportunity for rural areas to counter depopulation, to diversify their economies and to gain security against risks; points out, in this respect, that rural areas are in need of incentives for the transition to sustainable value chains; stresses the importance of developing a specific strategy for island regions;

44.  Encourages the Commission to promote the use of Community-Led Local Development (CLLD) and Integrated Territorial Investment (ITI) to help local stakeholders combine funding streams and plan local initiatives targeted at the circular economy;

45.  Notes that 80 % of marine litter is from land-based sources; thus emphasises the importance of tackling of land and marine littering through local and regional action that has both environmental and human-health benefits; calls on Member States, regions and local authorities to focus their efforts on preventing the generation of land litter;

46.  Calls on the Commission to consider, in the context of the European Semester, the impact on the calculation of government deficits of regional and national investments co-financed through ESI Funds in projects related to the circular economy;

47.  Welcomes the proposal to revise Drinking Water Directive 98/83/EC, which will facilitate the transition to a circular economy by reducing plastic waste from bottled water, involving major energy savings and efficient management of drinking water resources;

The circular economy in post-2020 cohesion policy

48.  Calls on the Commission, for the next programming period, to develop a relevant tracking methodology with appropriate indicators to allow for a better monitoring of the contribution of cohesion policy to the achievement of a circular economy in order to offer a more precise picture of environmental and socio-economic conditions;

49.  Points out that considerable support for the completion of the transition to a circular economy is also being provided by other programmes, such as LIFE, COSME and Horizon 2020; stresses the need to improve synergies between the above-mentioned instruments in order to achieve the goals set out in the Commission’s Circular Economy Action Plan;

50.  Calls on the Commission, in the context of the new legislative proposals for the future cohesion policy framework, to develop appropriate ex-ante conditionalities related to the achievement of a circular economy; considers that circular economy strategies should be developed in partnership with the national, regional and local authorities and economic and social partners;

51.  Calls on the Commission to ensure that the Horizon 2020 programme devotes even greater attention and funding to innovation and research projects in the area of the circular economy;

52.  Stresses the importance of stepping up cohesion policy support for sustainable urban and rural development, and calls for a more prominent role to be given to circular economy-related objectives in this context; calls for innovative urban and rural actions in this field to be continued and calls on the Commission to make maximum use of lessons learnt in the 2014-2020 period when preparing proposals for the future; calls for a flexible, tailor-made approach in the implementation of the Urban Agenda, providing incentives and guidance to fully seize the potentials of cities in implementing the circular economy;

53.  Calls on the Commission to make the European Circular Economy Stakeholder Platform a place to exchange best practices to make the best possible use of cohesion policy resources for the transition to a circular economy;

54.  Emphasises the interdependence of the circular economy and climate mitigation, and thus calls for greater spending in circular economy- and climate-related investments in post-2020 cohesion policy; moreover stresses that in the next multiannual financial framework (MFF) climate-related expenditure in general should be increased in comparison with the current one;

o
o   o

55.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

(1) OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 320.
(2) OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 289.
(3) OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 470.
(4) OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 259.
(5) OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 303.
(6) OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 281.
(7) OJ L 298, 26.10.2012, p. 1.
(8) Texts adopted, P8_TA(2017)0053.
(9) Texts adopted, P8_TA(2016)0321.
(10) OJ C 101, 16.3.2018, p. 111.
(11) OJ C 265, 11.8.2017, p. 65.
(12) OJ C 353, 27.9.2016, p. 27.
(13) Commission communication of 16 January 2018 entitled ‘Monitoring framework for the circular economy’ (COM(2018)0029).
(14) ‘Buying green! – A handbook on green public procurement’, 3rd Edition, European Commission, 2016.


Further macro-financial assistance to Ukraine ***I
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Resolution
Text
Annex
European Parliament legislative resolution of 13 June 2018 on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council providing further macro-financial assistance to Ukraine (COM(2018)0127 – C8-0108/2018 – 2018/0058(COD))
P8_TA(2018)0255A8-0183/2018

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2018)0127),

–  having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 212(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C8-0108/2018),

–  having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to the Joint Declaration of the European Parliament and of the Council adopted together with Decision No 778/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 August 2013 providing further macro-financial assistance to Georgia(1),

–  having regard to the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 29 May 2018 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on International Trade and the opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A8-0183/2018),

1.  Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

2.  Approves the joint statement by Parliament, the Council and the Commission annexed to this resolution;

3.  Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;

4.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 13 June 2018 with a view to the adoption of Decision (EU) 2018/... of the European Parliament and of the Council providing further macro-financial assistance to Ukraine

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Decision (EU) 2018/947).

ANNEX TO THE LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

JOINT STATEMENT BY PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL AND THE COMMISSION

The Parliament, the Council and the Commission recall that a pre-condition for granting macro-financial assistance is that the beneficiary country respects effective democratic mechanisms – including a multi-party parliamentary system – and the rule of law, and guarantees respect for human rights.

The Commission and the European External Action Services shall monitor the fulfilment of this pre-condition throughout the life-cycle of the Union's macro-financial assistance.

In light of the unfulfilled conditions on the fight against corruption and the related cancellation of the third instalment of the previous programme of macro-financial assistance under Decision (EU) 2015/601, the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission underline that further macro-financial assistance will be conditional on progress in the fight against corruption in Ukraine. To that effect, the economic policy and financial conditions of the Memorandum of Understanding to be agreed between the European Union and Ukraine shall include inter alia obligations to strengthen the governance, the administrative capacities and the institutional set-up in particular for the fight against corruption in Ukraine, notably regarding a verification system for asset declarations, the verification of companies’ beneficial ownership data and a well-functioning specialised anti-corruption court in line with the recommendations of the Venice Commission. Conditions on combating money laundering and tax avoidance shall also be considered. In line with Article 4(4), where the conditions are not met, the Commission shall temporarily suspend or cancel the disbursement of the macro-financial assistance.

Further to regularly informing the European Parliament and the Council of developments relating to the assistance and providing them with relevant documents, the Commission shall, upon each disbursement, report publicly on the fulfilment of all economic policy and financial conditions linked to this disbursement, in particular those concerning the fight against corruption.

The European Parliament, the Council and the Commission recall that this macro-financial assistance to Ukraine shall contribute to values shared with the European Union, including sustainable and socially responsible development leading to employment creation and poverty reduction, and a commitment to a strong civil society. The Commission shall accompany the draft Commission Implementing Decision approving the Memorandum of Understanding with an analysis of the expected social impact of the macro-financial assistance. In accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 this analysis will be submitted to the Member State Committee and shall be made available to the Parliament and the Council through the register of committee proceedings.

(1) OJ L 218, 14.8.2013, p. 15


Negotiations on the modernisation of the EU-Chile Association Agreement
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European Parliament recommendation of 13 June 2018 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the negotiations on the modernisation of the EU-Chile Association Agreement (2018/2018(INI))
P8_TA(2018)0256A8-0158/2018

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to Articles 2 and 3 and to Title V, in particular Articles 21 and 36, of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), as well as to Part Five of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

–  having regard to Article 218 of the TFEU,

–  having regard to the existing Association Agreement between the Republic of Chile and the European Union,

–  having regard to the launch on 16 November 2017 of negotiations between the European Union and Chile on a modernised association agreement,

–  having regard to the Council’s adoption on 13 November 2017 of the negotiating directives for this agreement,

–  having regard to the Joint Declaration of the 25th meeting of the EU-Chile Joint Parliamentary Committee of 22 January 2018,

–  having regard to its recommendation of 14 September 2017 to the Council, the Commission and the European External Action Service on the negotiations of the modernisation of the trade pillar of the EU-Chile Association Agreement(1),

–  having regard to its resolution of 13 September 2017 on EU political relations with Latin America(2),

–  having regard to the EU-CELAC Civil Society Forum Declaration of 11 May 2015 entitled ‘Equality, rights and democratic participation for the peoples of Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean’,

–  having regard to Rules 108(4) and 52 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A8-0158/2018),

A.  whereas Chile and the EU are united by shared values and close cultural, economic and political ties;

B.  whereas Chile and the EU are close partners in tackling regional and global challenges, such as climate change, international security, sustainable development and global governance;

C.  whereas Chile is a strong advocate of democracy and human rights, free and open trade and multilateralism; whereas it is also a key member of the Pacific Alliance, the Organisation of American States (OAS), and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), and a high-income country and OECD member;

D.  whereas Chile has been a major player in regional affairs, for example as a guarantor country in the Colombian peace process and the Santo Domingo talks between the Venezuelan Government and opposition; whereas Chile withdrew from the Venezuelan talks as the minimum conditions for democratic presidential elections and institutional normalisation were not reached;

E.  whereas a Framework Participation Agreement for Chile’s participation in EU crisis management operations has been in place since January 2014; whereas Chile participates in EUFOR ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as a number of UN peacekeeping operations, reflecting its commitment to global peace and security;

F.  whereas the recent parliamentary and presidential elections have once again demonstrated the stable and mature nature of Chilean democracy; whereas Chile has benefited from strong economic growth and has been one of South America’s fastest-growing economies in recent decades; whereas reform efforts in the country are still ongoing;

G.  whereas the recent decriminalisation of abortion under certain circumstances has demonstrated an increased openness in Chilean society towards the empowerment of women and girls;

H.  whereas in the 2016 Human Development Index, Chile is placed in the category of very high human development and ranks as the first Latin American country and number 38 in the world, above seven EU Member States;

I.  whereas the existing Association Agreement has been instrumental in deepening EU-Chile political relations and substantially increasing trade and investment flows; whereas continued respect for the rule of law and a stable legal and political framework enables both Chile and the EU to exercise free enterprise and fosters an adequate investment environment that includes safeguards on the principle of legal certainty;

J.  whereas the EU and Chile have concluded more ambitious and comprehensive agreements with other partners in recent years; whereas a modernisation of the EU-Chile Association Agreement therefore has the potential to significantly deepen the existing relationship, including relations in the areas of foreign affairs and security;

K.  whereas the future Association Agreement between the EU and Chile must fully reflect the transformative nature of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the role of international development cooperation towards the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs);

L.  whereas an updated Association Agreement, together with the agreements with Mexico and Mercosur that are currently being (re-)negotiated, would reinforce the EU’s role as a key ally of Latin America, at a time when other players are increasingly trying to gain influence in the region, such as China and Russia;

M.  whereas the EU-Chile Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) has repeatedly expressed its support for the modernisation of the Association Agreement, most recently in the Joint Declaration adopted at its 25th meeting on 22 January 2018;

1.  Recommends the following to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR):

General principles

Multilateralism and regional and international cooperation

Political dialogue and cooperation

Institutional provisions

   (a) to considerably strengthen cooperation between Chile and the EU, two like-minded partners in an environment of new uncertainty in international relations, on the basis of our shared values and principles of democracy, the fight against climate change, ensuring gender equality, the rule of law, good governance, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms;
   (b) to ensure that the modernised agreement with Chile is ambitious, comprehensive and balanced, delivering tangible benefits for the citizens, businesses and economies of both sides; to ensure that it is a frontrunner among the most advanced agreements the EU has concluded with third countries;
   (c) to strengthen the human rights dimension of EU-Chile cooperation in the light of the 2016-2020 EU-Chile human rights strategy; to include a joint commitment to the protection and promotion of human rights, fundamental freedoms, gender equality, and the rights of minorities, such as the LGBTI community, and indigenous people, with enforceable mechanisms for monitoring, regular reporting and dispute settlement; to encourage Chile to find a solution to matters with the native Mapuche people and other indigenous people; to continue the practice of including a human rights clause in all future Association Agreements; to continue the regular dialogue between the EU and Chile on human rights, with the aim of strengthening the institutional framework and public policies to promote human rights, including through multilateral cooperation;
   (d) to encourage Chile to ensure due process of law and fair judicial proceedings in full accordance with international standards;
   (e) to aim to foster sustainable socio-economic development, fight poverty and reduce inequality levels in the light of Chile’s commitment to attaining the SDGs under the 2030 Agenda;
   (f) to support Chile in improving educational standards and educational programmes, ensuring people with the lowest incomes have full access to higher education; to strengthen the link between universities and the labour market, bridging skill mismatches and promoting youth employment;
   (g) to encourage the protection of social and environmental rights, and to ensure an effective implementation of the conventions of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the eradication of forced and child labour;
   (h) to strengthen dialogue and cooperation on regional and global challenges, such as organised crime, drug trafficking, rising inequality, migration, terrorism and climate change, including the implementation of the 2030 Agenda; to support cooperation between the EU and Chile on the management of migration and to establish readmission mechanisms, including for stateless persons and nationals from third countries;
   (i) to recall the importance of the multilateral agenda and that any bilateral negotiation must not undermine the ambition to achieve progress multilaterally;
   (j) to contribute to the strengthening of multilateralism and international cooperation in order to promote international security and tackle global challenges effectively; to enhance coordination on the positions taken by both sides in international organisations and fora;
   (k) to encourage Chile to continue supporting regional integration and cooperation schemes, most importantly the Pacific Alliance, in view of its encouraging results as a real and active driver of economic integration between the members of the region, but also UNASUR and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC); to examine the possibility of the EU gaining an observer status in the Pacific Alliance;
   (l) to provide for meaningful regular dialogue on all matters of relevance, building on and extending the existing formats; to mobilise available resources through the Partnership Instrument (PI) with a view to achieving strategic objectives;
   (m) to provide for a close cooperation in the area of security and defence, particularly regarding conflict prevention, crisis management, maritime security, disarmament and non-proliferation; to enable an enhanced participation of Chile in EU common security and defence policy (CSDP) missions and operations;
   (n) to allow for increased cooperation in the fight against terrorism, organised crime and cybercrime, and on the prevention of radicalisation and cross-border crime, without undermining civil liberties and fundamental rights; to take action in the context of the global fight against terrorism by stepping up mechanisms, measures and bodies for global and regional cooperation in accordance with international law and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations;
   (o) to enhance cooperation on the fight against corruption, money laundering and tax evasion; to include provisions on tax good governance and transparency standards that reaffirm the parties’ commitment to implementing international standards in the fight against tax avoidance and tax evasion;
   (p) to recall that corruption undermines human rights, equality, social justice, trade and fair competition, thereby impeding economic growth; to include specific sections outlining clear and strong commitments and measures to combat corruption in all its forms and to implement international standards and multilateral anti-corruption conventions;
   (q) to facilitate mobility between the EU and Chile; to enhance youth and student exchanges, scholarship programmes and training courses, including through the ERASMUS+ programme; to make further efforts towards the full mutual recognition of academic qualifications and the modernisation, accessibility and internationalisation of higher education;
   (r) to promote the transfer of scientific and technological knowledge and step up cooperation in the field of research and cooperation, making full use of existing programmes, such as Horizon 2020;
   (s) to promote and strengthen relations in the field of international cooperation, building on the Memorandum of Understanding on International Cooperation signed in 2015; to create innovate mechanisms that broaden and strengthen triangular and regional cooperation with third parties within and outside Latin America through programmes such as EUROsociAL+ and Euroclima+, and cooperation on drug policies such as COPOLAD;
   (t) to develop a methodology to show the effects of the modernised agreement on men and women and to use its results as a basis for designing policies to achieve gender balance;
   (u) to reaffirm the joint commitment to the Paris Climate Agreement and to the 2030 Agenda, and to provide for close cooperation between the EU and Chile on environmental protection and the fight against climate change; to strengthen the partnership regarding technical and policy cooperation in key environmental areas, including CO2 emissions in international transport, the conservation of biodiversity, and sustainable production and consumption; to encourage enhanced cooperation on the circular economy in order to improve resource efficiency, a sustainable use of natural resources, eco-innovation and water management; to increase support for projects to mitigate the effects of climate change;
   (v) to strengthen cooperation on research and development and on the use of the EU Copernicus programme in the field of satellite earth observation data for environmental purposes;
   (w) to foster cultural cooperation and to support diaspora both in Chile and the EU, with the objective of supporting foreign investments in both the EU and Chile;
   (x) to reaffirm access to water as a human right;
   (y) to ensure that the Association Agreement is built upon strong parliamentary participation, strengthening the current provisions and mechanisms of cooperation to enable increased input into and scrutiny of its implementation, notably through the existing inter-parliamentary format of the JPC; to provide for the possibility of the JPC requesting relevant information on the implementation of the Association Agreement;
   (z) to ensure the appropriate involvement of civil society both during the negotiations and in the implementation phase of the Association Agreement, including but not limited to the Joint Consultative Committee; stresses the need to establish an institutionalised mechanism to enable political dialogue involving civil society organisations in both regions;
   (aa) to keep Parliament immediately and fully informed at all stages of the negotiations, in line with Article 218(10) of the TFEU; this includes providing Parliament with negotiating texts and minutes of each negotiating round; welcomes, in this regard, the decision of the Council of 22 January 2018 to publish the negotiating mandate given to the Commission and the VP/HR in November 2017;
   (ab) to take the recent publication of the negotiating directives as an important precedent and to commit to publishing all negotiating directives for international agreements in the future;
   (ac) to expedite the negotiations on the Association Agreement with a view to enabling its ratification by Parliament before the end of the current European legislature;
   (ad) to ensure respect, at all levels, for the long-standing practice of not provisionally applying the new agreement until Parliament has given its consent;

2.  Instructs its President to forward this recommendation to the Council, the Commission and the Vice‑President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and to the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Chile.

(1) Texts adopted, P8_TA(2017)0354.
(2) Texts adopted, P8_TA(2017)0345.


EU-NATO relations
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European Parliament resolution of 13 June 2018 on EU-NATO relations (2017/2276(INI))
P8_TA(2018)0257A8-0188/2018

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Treaty of Lisbon,

–  having regard to the North Atlantic Treaty,

–  having regard to the European Council conclusions of 20 December 2013, 26 June 2015, 28 June and 15 December 2016 and 9 March, 22 June and 15 December 2017,

–  having regard to the Council conclusions of 18 May 2015 and 14 November 2016 on the common security and defence policy, of 6 December 2016 on EU-NATO cooperation, of 6 March, 18 May and 17 July 2017 on the EU Global Strategy, and of 19 June and 5 December 2017 on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by the EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016,

–  having regard to the document entitled ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy’, presented by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) on 28 June 2016,

–  having regard to the Joint Declaration of 8 July 2016 by the Presidents of the European Council and the Commission and the Secretary-General of NATO, to the common set of 42 proposals endorsed by the EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and the progress reports of 14 June and 5 December 2017 on the implementation thereof, and to the new set of 32 proposals endorsed by both Councils on 5 December 2017,

–  having regard to the outcome of the meetings of the Foreign Affairs Council (including defence), held on 13 November 2017 and 6 March 2018, relating specifically to EU-NATO cooperation,

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 November 2016 to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the European Defence Action Plan (COM(2016)0950),

–  having regard to the joint communication of the Commission and the VP/HR of 10 November 2017 to the European Parliament and the Council on improving military mobility in the European Union (JOIN(2017)0041) and the associated Action Plan presented in March 2018 (JOIN(2018)0005),

–  having regard to the defence package presented by the Commission on 7 June 2017,

–  having regard to the NATO Secretary-General’s Annual Report 2017, released on 15 March 2018,

–  having regard to NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA) Resolution No 439 of 9 October 2017 on closer NATO-EU cooperation,

–  having regard to NATO PA Resolution No 440 of 9 October 2017 on the European defence industrial base,

–  having regard to the report of 8 October 2017 of the Defence and Security Committee of the NATO PA on NATO-EU cooperation after Warsaw, including its annex contributed by the European Parliament,

–  having regard to its resolution of 13 April 2016 on ‘The EU in a changing global environment – a more connected, contested and complex world’(1),

–  having regard to its resolution of 22 November 2016 on the European Defence Union(2),

–  having regard to its resolutions of 23 November 2016 and 13 December 2017 on the implementation of the common security and defence policy (CSDP)(3),

–  having regard to its resolutions of 14 December 2016 and 13 December 2017 on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy(4),

–  having regard to its resolution of 16 March 2017 on ‘Constitutional, legal and institutional implications of a common security and defence policy: possibilities offered by the Lisbon Treaty’(5),

–  having regard to Rule 52 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A8-0188/2018),

A.  whereas our values, such as liberal democracy, multilateralism, human rights, peace, development and the rule of law, on which the EU and the transatlantic bond are founded, as well as the rules-based international system and European unity and cohesion are challenged in an era of geopolitical turbulence and rapid degradation of the strategic environment;

B.  whereas the West’s two major organisations, the EU and NATO, are making progress on enhancing their cooperation in facing complex challenges, risks and threats, both conventional and hybrid, generated by state and non-state actors, coming mainly from the East and the South; whereas the accumulation of crises destabilising the European neighbourhood creates both internal and external security threats; whereas neither organisation has the full range of tools to tackle these security challenges all on its own and each would be better able to address them in cooperation with the other; whereas the EU and NATO are indispensable for ensuring the security of Europe and of their citizens;

C.  whereas EU-NATO cooperation should not be considered a goal in itself but a way to achieve shared security priorities and goals through complementarity of missions and available means; whereas EU Member States and NATO allies have one single set of forces; whereas together they can make efficient use of resources and mobilise more effectively a broad range of existing instruments to respond to security challenges;

D.  whereas NATO is a military alliance and the EU is not; whereas the EU is a global strategic actor and a security provider with a unique and wide array of instruments and tools at its disposal to deal with current challenges in a comprehensive manner via its various policies; whereas, according to the objectives of, and in the wake of, the Global Strategy, the EU is enhancing its responsibility for its own security and defence and its role as a partner for international peace and security as well as its ability to act autonomously, while also strengthening its contribution to NATO and fostering closer cooperation;

E.  whereas NATO has the primary responsibility for the collective defence of its members; whereas it takes note of the NATO guideline for allies to spend 2 % of their GDP on defence within a decade to maintain an appropriate defence capability; whereas NATO, as the key security partner of the EU, remains an essential guarantee of the interoperability of the allied forces’ capabilities and of the coherence of their procurement efforts;

F.  whereas the actions of the EU and NATO should be complementary in the security dimension, to better address new, unprecedented and multifaceted security challenges; whereas common areas between the two organisations also call for closer and more efficient cooperation;

G.  whereas the EU and NATO, both engaged in crisis management, would be more efficient in that activity if they were to act in a truly coordinated manner and make the most of their expertise and resources; whereas, as a follow-up to the EU Global Strategy, the EU is strengthening its joined-up approach to external conflicts and crises as well as responding to threats and challenges along the internal-external security nexus, using civilian or military means;

H.  whereas at the NATO Summit in Warsaw in 2016, the Alliance and the EU outlined areas for strengthened cooperation in light of common challenges to the east and the south, including countering hybrid threats, enhancing resilience, defence capacity building, cyber defence, maritime security and exercises; whereas 42 measures to advance NATO-EU cooperation in agreed areas were approved by NATO foreign ministers in December 2016 and further areas of joint work were agreed in December 2017;

I.  whereas an EU-NATO partnership is needed to counter hybrid threats, including in countering misinformation and disinformation and bolstering resilience; whereas there needs to be a clear distinction as regards the remit and political strategies of the two institutions;

J.  whereas there is an upsurge in Russia’s activities; whereas, while the risk of weakening the transatlantic link and solidarity between the EU Member States persists, their common, strategic approach with regard to Russia needs to be reinforced; whereas both the EU and NATO are concerned by Russia’s more assertive military behaviour; whereas political manipulation and cyberattacks are also causes of concern; whereas the EU has reacted to the Russian interference in European internal affairs violating international law and norms; whereas resilience is, and will continue to be, a key element of collective defence;

K.  whereas the Southern neighbourhood is facing unprecedented instability and represent a strategically important challenge to both EU Member States and NATO members, especially those located on the front line;

L.  whereas cyber-attacks are becoming increasingly common and sophisticated; whereas in 2014 NATO established cyber defence as part of the Alliance’s core tasks of collective defence and in 2016 recognised cyberspace as an operational domain, next to land, air and sea; whereas the EU and NATO can complement each other’s efforts; whereas enhanced cooperation between EU Member States in the area of cybersecurity should be promoted and, in that area, there needs to be a coordinated approach by all EU Member States;

M.  whereas in December 2017 NATO and the EU decided to boost their cooperation in the fight against terrorism, primarily by increasing information exchange and improving national resilience;

N.  whereas both the EU and NATO use the same transport infrastructure in Europe, a key factor in rapid military deployment, and whereas military mobility was recently identified as a priority area of cooperation between the two organisations;

O.  whereas, according to latest polls of the Pew Research Center, public support for NATO is strong and it is rising in most NATO Member States;

A more substantive partnership

1.  Is convinced that the EU and NATO share the same values in pursuit of international peace and security, that they face similar strategic challenges and, given their overlapping membership of 22 members, that they have converging security and defence interests, including the protection of their citizens against any threats; considers that the strategic partnership between the EU and NATO is fundamental for addressing these security challenges; underlines that EU-NATO cooperation should be complementary and respectful of each other’s specificities and roles;

2.  Underlines openness and transparency in full respect of the decision-making autonomy and procedures of both organisations, as well as inclusiveness and reciprocity without prejudice to the specific character of the security and defence policy of any Member State, as important principles of the EU-NATO strategic partnership; stresses that cooperation with non-NATO EU Member States and non-EU NATO members is an integral part of EU-NATO cooperation;

3.  Is convinced that for its members, NATO is the cornerstone of collective defence and deterrence in Europe; is also convinced that a stronger EU with a more effective CSDP, through multiple projects between Member States and capable of honouring the provisions of Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union, by which Member States can request assistance, contributes to a stronger NATO; underlines the fact that EU-NATO cooperation must also take into account the security and defence policy of those six EU Member States which are not NATO members and of those seven NATO members which are not EU members;

4.  Strongly believes that effective responses to the full spectrum of security challenges require strategic vision, further structural adaptation and a combination of hard and soft power instruments for both the EU and NATO; underlines that time is of the essence for strengthening the EU-NATO partnership, taking into account the differences between both organisations;

5.  Notes that, while a common European strategic culture should be further developed, achieving common threat perception will have a positive impact; is of the view that the Union must work to strengthen its strategic autonomy; encourages the EU Member States therefore to find, in cooperation with the EU institutions, a shared understanding of the evolving threat environment and continue efforts such as joint briefings, civil emergency response training and shared threat assessments; welcomes recent efforts in that direction;

6.  Stresses that European citizens, recognising that purely national responses to terrorism and insecurity are insufficient, expect the EU to protect them from these threats and that close cooperation between the EU and NATO would allow Member States to be more complementary and more effective;

7.  Emphasises the need to strengthen EU-NATO cooperation on missions and operations, at both the strategic and tactical level;

8.  Stresses that the EU-NATO strategic partnership is equally fundamental for the EU’s evolving CSDP and for the future of the Alliance, as well as for EU-UK relations after Brexit;

9.  Considers that the potential of EU-NATO relations can be further exploited and that further development and deepening of the partnership should not be limited to a common response to crises outside Europe, particularly in the neighbourhood, but also to crises on the continent;

10.  Underlines the need for working together on prevention, analysis and early warning by means of effective information sharing aimed at countering emerging threats with common actions;

11.  Considers that the EU-NATO Joint Declaration and the subsequent implementation actions mark a new and substantive phase of the strategic partnership; welcomes the tangible results in the implementation of the Joint Declaration, in particular regarding countering hybrid threats, strategic communications, coherence of output in the respective defence planning processes and maritime cooperation; encourages further progress and welcomes the new set of actions that were added on 5 December 2017, in particular those regarding counter-terrorism, military mobility and women, peace and security; welcomes the change in the culture of engagement and the smooth functioning of staff-to-staff cooperation in the implementation of each action; reiterates that although the process itself is governed by institutions, the success of the implementation of agreed common goals and actions depends on the sustained political will of all Member States; welcomes in this context the engagement also of Members of both the EU and NATO and emphasises that successful implementation of the Joint Declaration depends on the political will of all Member States throughout; considers it important to strengthen a better EU-NATO cooperation and dialogue and to ensure political will and proper resources for continued implementation and further improvement of cooperation; looks forward to a new EU-NATO declaration to be adopted at the NATO Summit in Brussels on 11-12 July 2018;

12.  Notes the regular common briefings delivered by the VP/HR and the NATO Secretary-General in the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council and NATO’s North-Atlantic Council (NAC), respectively, and continued regular meetings between the EU’s Political and Security Committee and the NAC;

13.  Welcomes the re-affirmation of US commitment to NATO and European security; recalls the fact that the EU and the United States are key international partners and that this partnership is also asserted through NATO; underlines the value of bilateral relations between EU Member States and the US; strongly believes that strengthening EU-NATO cooperation reinforces the transatlantic bond and that NATO’s ability to fulfil its missions is linked to the transatlantic relationship; notes, therefore, that recent political developments could have an impact on the strength of the transatlantic relationship; notes that the US, which generally encouraged and welcomed the substantive developments in EU defence, should continue efforts for a better understanding of European strategic interests, including the development of European defence capabilities; stresses that the EU’s efforts to achieve strategic autonomy strengthen the Alliance’s security environment;

14.  Welcomes NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence in NATO’s Eastern flank; welcomes NATO’s deployment of four multinational battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, being led by the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany and the United States respectively; considers that EU-NATO cooperation should be further strengthened on the Eastern and Southern flanks for the security of both organisations and that Russian penetration also into Eastern flank countries, by hybrid or conventional means, should be prevented and countered appropriately; underlines that the current infrastructure in Europe, which is mainly West-East oriented, should be complemented by the development of a new North-South dimension, responding to the requirements for military mobility; stresses that efforts on military mobility should contribute to the effective implementation of CSDP missions and operations and to the Alliance’s defence posture; considers that roads, bridges and railroads should be upgraded so as to allow for the fast deployment of military personnel and equipment;

15.  Emphasises in this regard the importance of improving NATO’s rapid reinforcement capabilities through improving EU and national infrastructure, removing bureaucratic and infrastructural barriers to the swift movement of forces and by pre-positioning military equipment and supplies, which enhances our collective security;

16.  Welcomes the launch of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO); stresses its potential to strengthen the European contribution within NATO; believes that it can increase synergies and effectiveness, and that it is a crucial step for improving EU security and defence capabilities as well as the potential performance of the European NATO members, and is convinced that a stronger EU and NATO reinforce each other;

17.  Highlights PESCO’s complementarity to NATO and that it should be a driver for further EU-NATO cooperation in the development of capabilities as it aims to strengthen the EU’s defence capacities and, in general, to make CSDP more effective and relevant for responding to today’s security and military challenges; emphasises the importance of transparency and communication about PESCO to the United States and other NATO members in order to avoid any misconceptions;

18.  Underlines that the next EU-NATO Joint Declaration should insist that the capabilities developed multinationally by EU Member States, including under PESCO, and NATO members be available for both EU and NATO operations; highlights that the recent decisions by the EU (Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), PESCO, European Defence Fund (EDF)) aimed at ensuring that Europeans take greater responsibility for their own security contribute to strengthening NATO, as well as ensuring fair transatlantic burden-sharing, while keeping in mind the objective of together addressing common security challenges, avoiding unnecessary duplication and developing coherent, complementary and interoperable defence capabilities; considers that the development of common standards, procedures, training and exercises should be considered an important enabler for more efficient EU-NATO cooperation;

19.  Notes that after Brexit, 80 % of NATO’s defence spending will be non-EU and three out of four battalions in the east will be led by non-EU countries;

20.  Urges the EU and NATO to organise regular strategic level exercises with the participation of the top political leadership of both organisations; welcomes, in this regard, the Estonian exercise EU CYBRID 2017 where, for the first time, the Secretary-General of NATO participated in an EU exercise;

Main areas of cooperation

21.  Notes that security threats have become more hybrid and less conventional, and that international cooperation is required to tackle them; calls for the EU and NATO to further build resilience and to develop shared situational awareness of hybrid threats; encourages the EU and NATO to coordinate their crisis response mechanisms in order to provide coherent responses to hybrid threats; welcomes the recent joint inauguration of the Helsinki-based Hybrid Centre of Excellence by the NATO Secretary-General and the VP/HR and encourages EU Member States to create Hybrid Excellence Centres, drawing on the example of the centre in Helsinki; welcomes in this regard the separate but parallel exercises, PACE17 and CMX17, which were held in 2017 and through which EU and NATO staff respectively tested their respective procedures for communicating and sharing information during an unfolding fictitious hybrid threat; applauds the concerted action by Western allies in response to the suspected Russian chemical attack in the UK;

22.  Considers that the forthcoming EU-NATO Joint Declaration should welcome the progress made and call for the practical implementation of all the proposals adopted by both institutions; believes that more efforts are needed with regard to the implementation of the many commitments already made;

23.  Believes, in this context, that the initiatives to strengthen the Europe of Defence should benefit both organisations, thereby enabling EU Member States to strengthen their strategic autonomy and to be able to intervene militarily together in a credible way; recalls that these initiatives are complementary to those of NATO;

24.  Considers it important also to ensure the implementation of the principles of inclusiveness, reciprocity and full respect of the decision-making autonomy of both organisations, as provided for by the Council conclusions of 5 December 2017;

25.  Welcomes the successful 2017 parallel and coordinated crisis management exercise, which provided a useful platform for sharing best practices; looks forward to examining the lessons learned as well as to continued cooperation on joint exercises between both the EU and NATO, including the EU-led exercise planned in 2018;

26.  Notes that current procedures for sharing classified information between the two organisations remain cumbersome and inefficient; considers that both organisations face similar strategic challenges and, implicitly, will be dealing with the consequences together; believes that – by building mutual trust – cooperation in the exchange of classified information and intelligence analysis must be improved, including in the field of counterterrorism; emphasises that the EU will have to increase its capacity by providing more EU staff with security clearance, dedicated training for working with classified information and by investing in secure communications; is of the opinion that fostering reciprocity and a ‘need-to-share’ approach to the exchange of appropriate information would also benefit missions and operations of both organisations; is of the view that the Parallel and Coordinated Intelligence Assessment could be used in fighting hybrid threats more effectively together;

27.  Invites the EU and NATO to enhance their cooperation on strategic communication, including by strengthening the partnership between the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence and the European External Action Service (EEAS) StratCom division;

28.  Welcomes the new EU Hybrid Fusion Cell and its interaction with NATO’s Hybrid Analysis Cell in sharing situational awareness and by exchanging analysis of potential hybrid threats;

29.  Is convinced that cooperation and the exchange and sharing of information are crucial in the area of cybersecurity and recognises the progress that has been made in this area; stresses the need to improve cyber incident prevention, detection and response; invites both organisations to coordinate their monitoring activities and to exchange cyber defence-related data where appropriate, thereby facilitating EU-NATO intelligence efforts; encourages the EU and NATO to enhance their operational cooperation and coordination and to foster interoperability by sharing best practices on means, methods and processes used to attribute cyberattacks; considers the increase of information sharing between the EU and NATO a priority in order to enable the identification of all responsible cyberattack sources and the carrying out of consequent legal actions; considers it important also to harmonise training activities and to cooperate on Research & Technology in the cyber domain; welcomes the arrangement between the EU’s Computer Emergency Response Team and the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability; believes that within the new mandate frame of the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA), new activities related to cyber defence cooperation can capture NATO’s interest;

30.  Considers it important to ensure the complementarity and avoid unnecessary duplication of maritime capacity-building efforts in order to safeguard maritime security more efficiently; welcomes increased EU-NATO operational cooperation and coordination, including the sharing of situational awareness based on the experience gained in the Mediterranean and the Horn of Africa, thus seeking further opportunities for mutual logistical support and information exchange between the staff of both organisations concerning operational activities, including activities relating to irregular migration;

31.  Welcomes enhanced tactical and operational cooperation, including through direct links between NATO’s Allied Maritime Command and Frontex, as well as between Operation Sea Guardian and EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia, helping the EU and its missions to stem irregular migration and to counter illegal trafficking networks, including the illegal trafficking of arms; notes that NATO can provide, upon request, logistical support and other capabilities such as re-fuelling at sea and medical support; notes that this follows successful EU-NATO cooperation between Operation Ocean Shield and EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta in combatting piracy off the Horn of Africa;

32.  Encourages further EU-NATO synergies in the field and further improvements, particularly in the coordination of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) efforts;

33.  Reiterates that the EU initiatives aimed at strengthening European security and defence should also help ensure that those EU Member States which are members of NATO meet their NATO commitments; considers that being both an EU Member State and a NATO member should not be detrimental to any state; similarly, stresses that certain EU Member States’ non-membership of NATO should mean that they have different European Defence Union obligations; stresses that EU Member States should be capable of launching autonomous military missions also where NATO is not willing to act or where EU action is more appropriate;

34.  Welcomes the continuing trend of increased defence spending among NATO members; encourages all EU Member States which are also members of NATO to make substantive progress towards achieving expenditure of 2 % of GDP on defence, with 20 % of this on major new equipment; considers that EU Member States committed to NATO’s defence spending guidelines should consider allocating a specified sum, within the 20 % guideline on procurement, towards research and development in order to guarantee that a minimum expenditure is made towards innovation, which in turn can create a ‘spillover’ of technologies to the civil sector;

35.  Recalls the appeal of the EU-NATO Joint Declaration of Warsaw to members to ‘facilitate a stronger defence industry and greater defence research’; strongly believes that the members of the EU and NATO need to cooperate and seek synergies on strengthening and developing their technological and industrial base in order to respond to capability priorities, notably through the annual coordinated defence review and the defence planning process of NATO; considers it important that effective and balanced transatlantic defence technological and industrial cooperation should be a strategic priority for both organisations; supports the measures envisaged under the EDF to encourage joint research and development of European capabilities; considers that increased commitment to research and capability planning can lead to more efficiency;

36.  Reiterates the need to ensure coherence of output and timelines between the EU’s Coordinated Annual Review on Defence, the Capability Development Plan and the respective NATO processes, such as the NATO Defence Planning Process; highlights the need to ensure that the multinational initiatives in capability development of both the EU and NATO are complementary and mutually reinforcing; underlines that the capabilities used in CSDP and developed under PESCO remain owned by the Member States, who can also make them available to other frameworks;

37.  Stresses the need to address, in close cooperation between the EU and NATO, the physical and legal obstacles to the swift and rapid movement of military personnel and assets within and beyond the EU in order to ensure, whenever necessary, frictionless movement of equipment and forces across Europe, including the usability of critical infrastructure such as roads, bridges and railroads, notably through the implementation of the action plan presented by the VP/HR and the Commission on the basis of the roadmap developed by the EU Member States in the framework of the European Defence Agency; urges EU Member States to quickly follow up and make use of the momentum that has been generated so far; stresses the need for compatible defence capacities to facilitate EU- and NATO-wide deployment and cooperation; recommends to the EU and NATO to address also the mobility of non-EU NATO forces on the European territory;

38.  Considers that the EU and NATO should do more together to bolster the resilience, defence and security of the neighbours and partners of both organisations; strongly supports the fact that assistance to neighbouring and partner countries for building their capacities and fostering resilience, including on counterterrorism, strategic communication, cyber defence, ammunition storage and security sector reform, is a common objective, particularly in three pilot countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova and Tunisia);

39.  Recalls that it is in the interest of both the EU and NATO to address security issues in both the Western Balkans and in the EU’s Neighbourhood and cooperate in certain particular areas; welcomes EU and NATO efforts to provide political and practical support to countries in the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe and the South-Caucasus; suggests that EU Member States continue these efforts to ensure continued democratic development and security sector reform; underlines that cooperation between the EU and NATO and the Western Balkan countries is pivotal in addressing security threats to the continent as a whole;

40.  Stresses the importance of the principles enshrined in the Vienna Document, in particular the principle of openness and transparency; welcomes in this regard the openness of EU and NATO military exercises and joint exercises to international observers;

41.  Reiterates the important role of women in CSDP and NATO missions, in particular in dealing with women and children in conflict areas; welcomes the fact that both the EU and NATO have recognised this important role; recommends that the EU and NATO proactively promote gender diversity in their structures and operations;

42.  Emphasises the need for the EU to ensure a close security and defence relationship with the United Kingdom after Brexit, acknowledging that the UK will remain a lead contributor to European defence as both a NATO member and European nation, while no longer being a member of the EU;

o
o   o

43.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Council, the Commission, the VP/HR, the Secretary-General of NATO, the EU agencies in the security and defence fields, the governments and national parliaments of the EU Member States and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

(1) OJ C 58, 15.2.2018, p. 109.
(2) Texts adopted, P8_TA(2016)0435.
(3) Texts adopted, P8_TA(2016)0440 and P8_TA(2017)0492.
(4) Texts adopted, P8_TA(2016)0503 and P8_TA(2017)0493.
(5) Texts adopted, P8_TA(2017)0092.


Cyber defence
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European Parliament resolution of 13 June 2018 on cyber defence (2018/2004(INI))
P8_TA(2018)0258A8-0189/2018

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

–  having regard to the document entitled ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy’, presented by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) on 28 June 2016,

–  having regard to the European Council conclusions of 20 December 2013, 26 June 2015, 15 December 2016, 9 March 2017, 22 June 2017, 20 November 2017 and 15 December 2017,

–  having regard to the Commission’s communication of 7 June 2017 entitled ‘Reflection Paper on the Future of European Defence’ (COM(2017)0315),

–  having regard to the Commission’s communication of 7 June 2017 entitled ‘Launching the European Defence Fund’ (COM(2017)0295),

–  having regard to the Commission’s communication of 30 November 2016 on the European Defence Action Plan (COM(2016)0950),

–  having regard to the Joint Communication of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 7 February 2013 to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace (JOIN(2013)0001),

–  having regard to the Commission staff working document of 13 September 2017 entitled ‘Assessment of the EU 2013 Cybersecurity Strategy’ (SWD(2017)0295),

–  having regard to the EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework of 18 November 2014,

–  having regard to the Council conclusions of 10 February 2015 on cyber diplomacy,

–  having regard to the Council conclusions of 19 June 2017 on a framework for a joint EU diplomatic response to malicious cyber activities (‘cyber diplomacy toolbox’),

–  having regard to the Joint Communication of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 13 September 2017 to the European Parliament and the Council on Resilience, Deterrence and Defence: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU (JOIN(2017)0450),

–  having regard to ‘Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations’(1),

–  having regard to Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union(2),

–  having regard to the work of the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace,

–  having regard to the Commission’s communication of 28 April 2015 entitled ‘The European Agenda on Security’ (COM(2015)0185),

–  having regard to the Joint Communication of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 6 April 2016 to the European Parliament and the Council on the Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats – a European Union response (JOIN(2016)0018),

–  having regard to its resolution of 3 October 2017 on the fight against cybercrime(3),

–  having regard to the Joint Declaration of the Presidents of the European Council and the Commission and of the Secretary-General of NATO of 8 July 2016, to the common sets of proposals for the implementation of the Joint Declaration endorsed by the EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017, and to the progress reports on the implementation thereof of 14 June and 5 December 2017,

–  having regard to its resolution of 22 November 2012 on Cyber Security and Defence(4),

–  having regard to its resolution of 22 November 2016 on the European Defence Union(5),

–  having regard to the Commission’s proposal of 13 September 2017 for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on ENISA, the ‘EU Cybersecurity Agency’, and repealing Regulation (EU) No 526/2013, and on Information and Communication Technology cybersecurity certification (‘Cybersecurity Act’) (COM(2017)0477),

–  having regard to its resolution of 13 December 2017 on the Annual Report on the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)(6),

–  having regard to its resolution of 13 December 2017 on the Annual Report on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)(7),

–  having regard to Rule 52 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A8-0189/2018),

A.  whereas cyber and hybrid challenges, threats and attacks constitute a major threat to the security, defence, stability and competitiveness of the EU, its Member States and its citizens; whereas cyber defence clearly incorporates both military and civilian dimensions;

B.  whereas the EU and the Member States face an unprecedented threat in the form of politically motivated, state-sponsored cyber attacks as well as cyber crime and terrorism;

C.  whereas cyber space is widely recognized as the fifth operational domain by the military enabling the development of cyber defence capabilities; whereas debates are held whether to recognize cyber space as the fifth domain of warfare;

D.  whereas the mutual defence clause, Article 42(7) of the TEU, provides a mutual obligation of aid and assistance by all means of power in case of an armed aggression on a territory of a Member State; whereas this shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States; whereas the solidarity clause, Article 222 of the TFEU, complements the mutual defence clause by providing that EU countries are obliged to act jointly where an EU country is the victim of a terrorist attack or a natural or man-made disaster; whereas the solidarity clause implies the use of both civilian and military structures;

E.  whereas while cyber defence remains a core competence of the Member States, the EU has a vital role to play in providing a platform for European cooperation, and in ensuring that these new endeavours are closely coordinated at an international level and within the transatlantic security architecture from the start, to avoid gaps and inefficiencies that mark many traditional defence efforts; whereas we need to do more than enhance our cooperation and coordination; whereas we have to ensure effective prevention by stepping up the ability of the EU to detect, defend and deter; whereas a credible cyber defence and deterrence is needed to achieve effective cyber security for the EU while ensuring that those states that are least prepared do not become easy targets of cyber attacks, and whereas a substantial cyber defence should be a necessary part of the CSDP and the development of the European Defence Union; whereas we are in a situation of permanent shortage of highly qualified cyber defence specialists; whereas close coordination on protecting armed forces against cyber attacks is a necessary part of the development of an effective CSDP;

F.  whereas EU Member States are often subject to cyber attacks conducted by hostile and dangerous state and non-state actors against civilian or military targets; whereas current vulnerability is due mainly to the fragmentation of European defence strategies and capabilities, allowing foreign intelligence agencies to repeatedly exploit the security vulnerabilities of IT systems and networks essential to European security; whereas Member State governments have often failed to inform relevant stakeholders in good time to allow them to address vulnerabilities in their products and services; whereas these attacks require urgent reinforcements and the development of European offensive and defensive capacities at civilian and military levels in order to avoid the possible cross-border economic and societal impact of cyber incidents;

G.  whereas the lines between civil and military interference become blurry in cyber space;

H.  whereas many cyber incidents are made possible by the lack of resilience and robustness of private and public network infrastructure, by poorly protected or secured databases and by other flaws in the critical information infrastructure; whereas only few Member States take responsibility for the protection of their respective network and information systems, and the associated data, as part of their respective duty of care, which explains the overall lack of investment in training and state-of-the art security technology, and of the development of appropriate guidelines;

I.  whereas the rights to privacy and data protection are laid down in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and in Article 16 of the TFEU, and are regulated by the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation, which entered into force on 25 May 2018;

J.  whereas an active and efficient cyber policy is one that is capable of deterring enemies as well as of disrupting their capabilities and pre-empting and degrading their ability to attack;

K.  whereas several terrorist groups and organisations use cyber space as a low-cost tool for recruitment, radicalisation and the dissemination of terrorist propaganda; whereas terrorist groups, non-state actors and transnational criminal networks use cyber operations to raise funds anonymously, gather intelligence and develop cyber arms to wage cyber terror campaigns, to disrupt, damage or destroy critical infrastructure, to attack financial systems and to pursue other illegal activities that have implications for the security of the European citizens;

L.  whereas the cyber deterrence and defence of Europe’s armed forces and critical infrastructure have become crucial issues in debates about defence modernisation, Europe’s common defence efforts, the future development of armed forces and their operations, and the strategic autonomy of the European Union;

M.  whereas several Member States have invested substantially in setting up well-staffed cyber commands to meet these new challenges and improve their cyber resilience, but much more needs to be done as it is becoming more and more difficult to counter cyber attacks at Member State level; whereas the cyber commands of the respective Member States vary in their offensive and defensive mandates; whereas other cyber defence structures vary broadly among the Member States and often remain fragmented; whereas cyber defence and deterrence are activities that can best be tackled cooperatively at European level and in cooperation with our partners and allies, as its operational domain recognises neither national nor organisational boundaries; whereas military and civilian cyber security is closely related, and more synergy between civilian and military specialists is therefore needed; whereas private companies have substantial expertise in this field, raising fundamental questions about governance and security, and about the ability of states to defend their citizens;

N.  whereas there is an urgent need to strengthen the EU’s capabilities in the field of cyber defence, given the lack of a timely response to the changing cyber security landscape; whereas rapid response and adequate preparedness are key elements in ensuring security in this area;

O.  whereas both Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF) are new initiatives with the necessary scope to foster an ecosystem that can provide opportunities for SMEs and start-up companies, and to facilitate cooperative projects in the cyber defence domain, and both will contribute to shape the regulatory and institutional framework;

P.  whereas Member States participating in PESCO have committed themselves to ensuring that cooperation efforts on cyber defence – such as information sharing, training and operational support – will continue to grow;

Q.  whereas among the seventeen projects selected for PESCO, two projects are in the field of cyber defence;

R.  whereas the EDF needs to support the global competitiveness and innovativeness of the European defence industry, by investing in digital and cyber technologies, as well as to facilitate the development of smart solutions by providing opportunities for SMEs and start-up companies to participate in this effort;

S.  whereas the European Defence Agency (EDA) has launched a number of projects to meet Member States’ need to develop their cyber defence capabilities, including projects on education and training such as the Cyber Defence Training and Exercises Coordination Platform (CD TEXP), Demand Pooling for Cyber Defence Training and Exercise support by the private sector (DePoCyTE) and the Cyber Ranges project;

T.  whereas there are other ongoing EU projects on situational awareness, malware detection and information sharing (the Malware Information Sharing Platform (MISP) and the Multi-Agent System For Advanced persistent threat Detection (MASFAD));

U.  whereas capacity-building and training needs in the area of cyber defence are substantial and increasing, and are most efficiently met cooperatively at EU and NATO levels;

V.  whereas CSDP missions and operations, like all modern organisational endeavours, are deeply reliant on functioning IT systems; whereas cyber threats to CSDP missions and operations can exist at different layers, ranging from the tactical layer (CSDP missions and operations) and operational layer (EU networks) to the broader layer of global IT infrastructure;

W.  whereas command and control systems, information exchange and logistics rely on classified and unclassified IT infrastructure, especially at the tactical and operational level; whereas these systems are attractive targets for malicious actors seeking to attack missions; whereas cyber attacks may have serious repercussions for EU infrastructure; whereas cyber attacks against, in particular, the EU’s energy infrastructure would have serious repercussions, and must therefore be guarded against;

X.  whereas it is well understood that cyber defence should be duly considered at all stages of the planning process for CSDP missions and operations, that it requires constant monitoring, and that adequate capabilities need to be available to mainstream it fully into mission planning and to continuously provide the necessary critical support;

Y.  whereas the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) network is the only European training provider for the CSDP structures, missions and operations; whereas, according to current plans, its role in pooling European training capacities in the cyber domain is to be increased substantially;

Z.  whereas the Declaration of NATO’s 2016 Warsaw Summit recognised cyber space as a domain of operations in which NATO must defend itself as effectively as it does in the air, on land and at sea;

AA.  whereas the EU and NATO have contributed to improving Member States cyber defence capabilities through dual-use research projects coordinated by the EDA and NATO, and by improving Member States cyber resilience through support provided by the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA);

AB.  whereas in 2014 NATO established cyber security operations as part of its collective defence, and in 2016 recognised cyber space as an operational domain together with land, air and sea; whereas EU and NATO are complementary partners in building their cyber resilience and cyber defence capabilities; whereas cyber security and defence is already one of the strongest pillars of cooperation between the two, and a critical field in which both have unique capacities; whereas in the EU-NATO Joint Declaration of 8 July 2016 the EU and NATO agreed to a broad agenda of cooperation; whereas four out of 42 proposals for closer cooperation concern cyber security and defence, with further proposals aimed at addressing hybrid threats in a broader sense; whereas this has been complemented by a further proposal regarding cyber security and defence presented on 5 December 2017;

AC.  whereas the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Information Security (UNGGE) has concluded its last round of deliberation; whereas even though it was unable to produce a consensus report in 2017, the 2015 and 2013 reports apply, including the recognition that existing international law, and in particular the Charter of the United Nations, is applicable and is essential to maintaining peace and stability, and to promoting an open, secure, peaceful and accessible ICT environment;

AD.  whereas the recently launched framework for a joint EU diplomatic response to malicious cyber activities, the EU cyber diplomacy toolbox – aimed at developing the EU’s and Member States’ capacities in order to influence the behaviour of potential aggressors – foresees the use of proportionate measures within the CFSP, including restrictive measures;

AE.  whereas different state actors – Russia, China and North Korea among others, but also non-state actors (including organised crime groups) inspired, hired or sponsored by states, security agencies or private companies – have been involved in malicious cyber activities in pursuit of political, economic or security objectives that include attacks on critical infrastructure, cyber espionage and mass surveillance of EU citizens, aiding disinformation campaigns and distributing malware (Wannacry and NotPetya, etc.) limiting access to the internet and the functioning of IT systems; whereas such activities disregard and violate international law, human rights and EU fundamental rights while jeopardising democracy, security, public order and the strategic autonomy of the EU, and should therefore lead to a joint EU response, such as using the framework for a joint EU diplomatic response, including the use of restrictive measures envisaged for the EU cyber diplomacy toolbox, such as, in the case of private companies, fines and restricted access to the internal market;

AF.  whereas such large scale attacks against ICT infrastructure have been made several times in the past, including in Estonia in 2007, in Georgia in 2008 and, currently almost on a daily basis, in Ukraine; whereas offensive cyber capabilities are also being employed against EU and NATO Member States at an unprecedented scale;

AG.  whereas cyber security technologies, relevant to both the military and the civilian domain, are ‘dual-use’ technologies that offer many opportunities for developing synergies between civilian and military actors in a number of areas, such as encryption, security and vulnerability management tools, intrusion detection and prevention systems;

AH.  whereas the development of cyber technologies will in the coming years affect new fields such as artificial intelligence, the internet of things, robotics and mobile devices, and all these elements may also have security implications for the defence domain;

AI.  whereas the cyber commands established by several Member States can make a substantial contribution to the protection of vital civilian infrastructure, and whereas cyber defence-related knowledge is often equally useful in the civilian domain;

Capability development for cyber defence and deterrence

1.  Underlines that a common cyber defence policy, and a substantial cyber defence capability, should constitute core elements in the development of the European Defence Union;

2.  Welcomes the initiative of the Commission for a cyber-security package to foster EU cyber resilience, deterrence and defence;

3.  Recalls that cyber defence has both military and civilian dimensions, and that this means that an integrated policy approach, and close cooperation between military and civilian stakeholders, is required;

4.  Calls for a coherent development of cyber capacities across all EU institutions and bodies, as well as in the Member States, and for providing needed political and practical solutions to overcoming the remaining political, legislative and organisational obstacles to cooperation on cyber defence; regards regular and enhanced exchange and cooperation between relevant public stakeholders in cyber defence, at EU and national level, as crucial;

5.  Strongly emphasises that, in the framework of the emerging European Defence Union, the cyber defence capabilities of Member States should be at the forefront and, as far as it is possible, integrated from start to ensure maximum efficiency; urges, therefore, the Member States to cooperate closely in the development of their respective cyber defence, using a clear roadmap, thereby feeding into a process coordinated by the Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the EDA with a view to better streamlining cyber defence structures across the Member States, implementing available short-term measures urgently and fostering the exchange of expertise; is of the opinion that we should develop an European secure network for critical information and infrastructure; recognises that strong attribution capabilities are an essential component of effective cyber defence and cyber deterrence, and that effective prevention would require the development of substantial further technological expertise; urges the Members States to increase financial and personnel resources, in particular experts in cyber forensics, in order to improve the attribution of cyber attacks; underlines that such cooperation should also be implemented through the enhancement of ENISA;

6.  Recognises that many Member States consider possession of their own cyber defence capabilities to be at the core of their national security strategy and to constitute an essential part of their national sovereignty; stresses, however, that owing to the borderless nature of cyber space, the scale and knowledge required for truly comprehensive and effective forces ensuring the goal of strategic autonomy of the EU in cyber space is beyond the reach of any single Member State, requiring, therefore, an intensified and coordinated response on the part of all Member States at EU level; notes, against this background, that the EU and its Member States find themselves under time pressure regarding the development of such forces, and need to act immediately; notes that due to EU initiatives such as the digital single market, the EU is well placed to take a leading role in developing European cyber defence strategies; reiterates that development of cyber defence at EU level must enhance the EU’s capability to protect itself; welcomes, in this regard, the proposed permanent mandate of, and strengthened role for, ENISA;

7.  Urges the Member States, in this context, to make the best possible use of the framework provided by PESCO and the EDF to propose cooperation projects;

8.  Takes note of the hard work done by the EU and its Member States in the field of cyber defence; notes in particular the EDA projects on cyber ranges, the Cyber Defence Strategic Research Agenda and the development of deployable cyber situation awareness packages for headquarters;

9.  Welcomes the two cyber projects to be launched in the framework of PESCO, namely the Cyber Threats and Incident Response Information Sharing Platform and the Cyber Rapid Response Teams and Mutual Assistance in Cyber Security; stresses that these two projects focus on a defensive cyber policy that builds on the sharing of cyber threat information through a networked Member State platform and the establishment of Cyber Rapid Response Teams (CRRTs), allowing Member States to help each other to ensure higher level of cyber resilience and to collectively detect, recognise and mitigate cyber threats; calls on the Commission and Member States to build on the PESCO projects on national CRRTs and on mutual assistance in cyber security by establishing a European CRRT tasked with coordinating, detecting and countering collective cyber threats in support of the participating Member States’ efforts;

10.  Notes that the EU’s capability to develop cyber defence projects hinges on its control of technologies, equipment, services, data and data processing, and on its reliance on a trusted industry stakeholder base;

11.  Recalls that one aim of the effort to improve the homogeneity of command systems is to ensure that the available command assets are interoperable with those of non-EU NATO countries, as well as with those of occasional partners, and to guarantee a smooth exchange of information so as to speed up the decision-making loop and keep control of information in a cyber-risk context;

12.  Recommends that ways be found to complement NATO Smart Defence projects (e.g. the Multinational Cyber Defence Capability Development, the Malware Information Sharing Platform (MISP) and the Multinational Cyber Defence Education & Training (MNCDE&T));

13.  Recognises the developments being made in areas such as nanotechnology, artificial intelligence, big data, e-waste and advanced robotics; urges the Member States and the EU to give particular attention to the possible exploitation of these areas by hostile state actors and organised crime groups; calls for the development of training and capabilities aimed at protecting against the emergence of sophisticated criminal schemes such as complex identity frauds and the counterfeiting of goods;

14.  Emphasises the need for more terminological clarity about security in cyber space, as well as for a comprehensive and integrated approach, and joint efforts, to counter cyber and hybrid threats, to detect and eradicate online extremist and criminal safe havens, by strengthening and increasing information sharing between the EU and EU agencies such as Europol, Eurojust, EDA and ENISA;

15.  Underlines the growing role of artificial intelligence in both cyber offence as well as defence; urges the EU and the Member States to pay special attention to this area, both in the course of research and in the practical development of their cyber defence capabilities;

16.  Strongly emphasises that with the deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles, whether armed or not, additional measures should be taken to reduce their potential cyber vulnerabilities;

Cyber defence of CSDP missions and operations

17.  Emphasises that cyber defence should be considered an operational task for CSDP missions and operations, and that it should be included in all CSDP planning processes to ensure that cyber security is constantly considered throughout the planning process, thereby reducing cyber vulnerability gaps;

18.  Recognises that planning a successful CSDP mission or operation requires substantial cyber defence expertise as well secure IT infrastructure and networks, both at operational headquarters and within the mission itself, in order to conduct a thorough threat assessment and provide adequate protection in the field; calls on the EEAS, and on the Member States providing headquarters for CSDP operations, to strengthen the cyber defence expertise provided to EU missions and operations; notes that there is a limit to how well any CSDP mission can be prepared to protect itself from cyber attacks;

19.  Stresses that all CSDP mission and operation planning needs to be accompanied by a thorough assessment of the cyber threat-landscape; notes that the threat taxonomy prepared by ENISA provides a suitable template for such an assessment; recommends the creation of a cyber-resilience assessment capability for CSDP HQs;

20.  Recognises, in particular, the importance of keeping the cyber footprints and attack surfaces of CSDP missions and operations to the necessary minimum; urges the planners involved to take this into account from the start of the planning process;

21.  Acknowledges the EDA Training Needs Analysis, which has brought up major shortfalls in cyber defence skills and competencies among decision makers, not only in the Member States, and welcomes the EDA initiatives on senior decision maker courses within Member States in support of CSDP mission and operation planning;

Cyber defence education and training

22.  Notes that a streamlined EU cyber defence education and training landscape would significantly mitigate threats, and calls on the EU and the Member States to increase their cooperation in education, training and exercises;

23.  Strongly supports the Military Erasmus Programme and other common training and exchange initiatives aimed at enhancing the interoperability of the armed forces of the Member States and the development of a common strategic culture through an increased exchange of young military personnel, bearing in mind that such interoperability is necessary among all Member States and NATO allies; believes, however, that exchanges for training and education in the field of cyber defence should go beyond this initiative and include military personnel of all ages and from all ranks as well as students from all academic centres of study on cyber security;

24.  Stresses that there is a need for more experts in the cyber defence domain; calls on the Member States to facilitate cooperation between civil academic institutions and military academies to bridge this gap with a view to creating more possibilities in the field of cyber defence education and training, and to devote more resources to specialised cyber operational training, including on artificial intelligence; calls on the military academies to integrate cyber defence education into their curricula, thereby helping to increase the cyber talent pool available for CSDP mission needs;

25.  Calls on all Member States to sufficiently and proactively inform, raise awareness and advise companies, schools and citizens about cyber security and the main digital threats; welcomes, in this regard, cyber guides as a tool to guide citizens and organisations towards a better cyber security strategy, boost cyber security knowledge and improve cyber resilience across the board;

26.  Notes that, given the need for more specialised personnel, the focus of the Member States should not only be on recruitment of competent armed forces personnel, but also on the retention of needed specialists;

27.  Welcomes the implementation – by 11 member states (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden) of the Cyber Ranges Federation project – of the first of four cyber defence projects launched under the EDA Pooling and Sharing agenda; calls on the other Member States to join this initiative; calls on the Member States to promote greater mutual availability of virtual cyber defence training and cyber ranges; notes, in this regard, that the role of ENISA and its expertise should be also considered;

28.  Believes that such initiatives contribute to improving the quality of education in the cyber defence field at EU level, in particular through the creation of wide-ranging technical platforms and the establishment of a community of EU experts; believes that European armed forces can broaden their appeal by providing comprehensive cyber defence training to attract and retain cyber talent; stresses the need to identify weaknesses in the computer systems of both the Member States and the EU institutions; recognises that human error is one of the most frequently identified weaknesses in cyber security systems, and calls, therefore, for regular training of both military and civilian personnel working for EU institutions;

29.  Calls on the EDA to launch the Cyber Defence Training and Exercise Coordination Platform (CD TEXP) to support the Cyber Ranges Federation as soon as possible, with a focus on strengthening cooperation on harmonised requirements, fostering cyber defence research and technology innovations, and collectively assisting third countries in building their capacities to create resilience in cyber defence; calls on the Commission and the Member States to complement these initiatives with a dedicated European centre of excellence for cyber defence training to provide expert training for the most promising recruits, in support of the participating Member States’ cyber training;

30.  Welcomes the establishment, within the ESDC, of the Cyber Defence Education, Training Exercise and Evaluation Platform (ETEE) with a view to upscaling the training and education opportunities within the Member States;

31.  Encourages more exchanges of situational awareness through table-top cyber exercises and the coordination of respective capability-development efforts in order to achieve greater interoperability and better prevention and response to future attacks; calls for such projects to be conducted with NATO allies, the armed forces of EU Member States and other partners with extensive experience in countering cyber attacks in order to develop operational readiness, common procedures and standards to comprehensively face different cyber threats; welcomes, in this regard, the EU’s involvement in cyber exercises such as the Cyber Offence and Defence Exercise (CODE);

32.  Recalls that resilient cyber space requires impeccable cyber hygiene; calls on all public and private stakeholders to conduct regular cyber hygiene trainings for all members of their staff;

33.  Recommends that the exchange of expertise and lessons learned be increased between the armed forces, police forces and other state bodies of the Member States actively involved in the fight against cyber threats;

EU-NATO cooperation on cyber defence

34.  Reiterates that, on the basis of their common values and strategic interests, the EU and NATO have a special responsibility and capacity to address the increasing cyber security and cyber defence challenges more efficiently, and in close cooperation, by looking for possible complementarities, avoiding duplication and acknowledging their respective responsibilities;

35.  Calls on the Council, working with other relevant EU institutions and structures, to consider ways of providing, at soon as possible, Union-level support for integrating the cyber domain into Member States military doctrines, in a harmonised manner and in close cooperation with NATO;

36.  Calls for the implementation of those measures that have already been agreed upon; calls for new initiatives to further cooperation between EU and NATO to be identified, taking into account as well the possibilities of cooperating within the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD COE) and the NATO Communications and Information (NCI) Academy, which aim to increase cyber defence training capabilities in IT and cyber systems, as regards both software and hardware; notes that this could include a dialogue with NATO on the possibility of the EU joining the CCD COE with a view to increasing complementarity and collaboration; welcomes the recent creation of the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats; urges all relevant institutions and allies to regularly discuss their activities in order to avoid overlaps and encourage a coordinated approach towards cyber defence; believes that it is crucial to stimulate, on the basis of mutual trust, the exchange of cyber threat information among the Member States and with NATO;

37.  Is convinced that increased cooperation between EU and NATO is important and useful in the area of cyber defence as a means to prevent, detect and deter cyber attacks; calls, therefore, on both organisations to increase their operational cooperation and coordination, and to expand their joint capacity-building efforts, in particular in the form of joint exercises and training for civilian and military cyber defence staff and through the participation of Member States in NATO smart defence projects; considers it vital that the EU and NATO step up the sharing of information in order to enable the formal attribution of cyber attacks, and consequently enable the imposition of restrictive sanctions to those responsible; urges both organisations to cooperate more closely as well on the cyber aspects of crisis management;

38.  Welcomes the exchange of concepts for integrating cyber defence requirements and standards into the planning and conduct of missions and operations with the aim of fostering interoperability, and expresses the hope that this will be followed up by more operational cooperation to ensure the cyber defence aspect of respective missions and the synchronisation of operational approaches;

39.  Welcomes the arrangement between the EU’s Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-EU) and the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC), aimed at facilitating the exchange of information, logistical support, shared threat assessments, personnel acquisition and the sharing of best practices, all to ensure the ability to respond to threats in real time; stresses that it is important to encourage information exchanges between CERT-EU and NCIRC and to work towards increasing the level of trust; believes that there is an assumption that information held by CERT-EU could be of use to cyber defence research and to NATO, and that this information should therefore be shared, provided that full conformity with EU data protection legislation is ensured;

40.  Welcomes the cooperation between the two organisations on cyber defence exercises; notes the participation of EU representatives in the annual Cyber Coalition Exercise; recognises the progress that the EU’s participation – via the Parallel and Coordinated Exercises (PACE) 17 in NATO Crisis Management Exercise 17 – represents, and welcomes, in particular, the inclusion of a cyber defence component; urges both organisations to intensify these efforts;

41.  Urges the EU and NATO to organise regular strategic level exercises with the participation of the top political leadership of both organisations; welcomes, in this regard, the Estonian exercise EU CYBRID 2017 where, for the first time, the Secretary General of NATO participated in an EU exercise;

42.  Notes that there is substantial scope for a more ambitious and concrete cyber defence cooperation programme that goes beyond the conceptual level of cooperation in the context of specific operations; urges both organisations to implement, in practice and effectively, all that already exists, and to present more ambitious proposals for the next review of the implementation of the Joint Statement;

43.  Welcomes the NATO Industry Cyber Partnership (NICP), established in 2014, and calls for EU engagement in cooperative NICP efforts with a view to connecting the NATO-EU cooperation effort with that of industry leaders specialised in cyber technologies with the aim of advancing cyber security through continued collaboration, with particular focus on: training, exercises and education for NATO, EU as well as industry representatives; EU and industry inclusion in NATO Smart Defence projects; collaborative information sharing and best practices for preparedness and recovery between NATO, EU and industry; pursuit of jointly developed capabilities for cyber defence; and collaborative responses to cyber incidents when and where appropriate;

44.  Notes the ongoing work on the Proposal for a Regulation revising ENISA Regulation ((EU) No 526/2013) and laying down a European ICT security certification and labelling framework; calls on ENISA to sign an agreement with NATO to increase their practical cooperation, including the sharing of information and participation in cyber defence exercises;

International norms applicable to cyber space

45.  Calls for mainstreaming cyber defence capabilities into the CFSP and the external action of the EU and its Member States as a cross-sectional task, and calls for closer coordination on cyber defence between the Member States, the EU institutions, NATO, the United Nations, the United States and other strategic partners, in particular as regards rules, norms and enforcement measures in cyber space;

46.  Regrets that, after several months of negotiations, the 2016-2017 UN Group of Governmental Experts (UNGGE) was unable to produce a new consensus report; recalls that, as recognised by the 2013 report, existing international law and the United Nations Charter in particular – which prohibits the threat or use of force against the political independence of any state including coercive cyber operations intended to disrupt the technical infrastructure essential to the conduct of official participative procedures, including elections, in another state – applies and should be enforced in cyber space; notes that the 2015 UNGGE report lists a set of norms of responsible state behaviour, including the prohibition for states to conduct or knowingly support cyber activities contrary to their obligations under international rules; calls on the EU to assume a leading role in the ongoing and future debates on, and implementation of, international norms in cyber space;

47.  Notes the relevance of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 as a basis for a debate and as an analysis of how existing international law can be applied in cyber space; calls on the Member States to start analysing and applying what the experts have stated in the Tallinn Manual, and to agree on further voluntary norms of international behaviour; notes, in particular, that any offensive use of cyber capabilities should be based on international law;

48.  Confirms its full commitment to an open, free, stable and secure cyber space, which respects the core values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and where international disputes are settled by peaceful means on the basis of the UN Charter and principles of international law; calls on the Member States to promote further implementation of the common and comprehensive EU approach to cyber diplomacy and existing cyber norms, and to draw up, together with NATO, EU-level criteria for, and definitions of what constitutes, a cyber attack so as to improve the EU’s ability to quickly come to a common position following an internationally wrongful act in the form of a cyber attack; strongly supports the implementation of the 2015 UNGGE report’s voluntary, non-binding norms of responsible state behaviour in cyber space, encompassing respect for privacy and the fundamental rights of citizens, and the creation of regional confidence-building measures; supports, in this context, the work of the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace to develop proposals for norms and policies to enhance international security and stability and to guide responsible state and non-state behaviour in cyber space; endorses the proposal that state and non-state actors should not conduct, or knowingly allow, activity that intentionally and substantially damages the general availability or integrity of the public core of the internet, and therefore the stability of cyber space;

49.  Recognises that a majority of the technological infrastructure is owned or operated by the private sector and that close cooperation, consultation, and inclusion of the private sector and civil society groups through multi-stakeholder dialogue is therefore essential to ensuring an open, free, stable and secure cyber space;

50.  Recognises that, owing to difficulties in enforcement, bilateral agreements between states do not always bring expected results; considers, therefore, that building coalitions within groups of like-minded countries willing to generate consensus constitutes an effective way of complementing multi-stakeholder efforts; stresses the important role that local authorities have to play, in the process of technological innovation and data sharing, when it comes to stepping up the fight against crime and terrorist activities;

51.  Welcomes the adoption by the Council of the framework for joint EU diplomatic responses to malicious cyber activities, the so-called EU Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox; supports the possibility for the EU to take restrictive measures against adversaries attacking its Member States in cyber space, including the imposition of sanctions;

52.  Calls as well for a clear proactive approach towards cyber security and cyber defence, and for the strengthening of the EU’s cyber diplomacy as a cross-sectional task in the EU’s foreign policy and its capacities and instruments across the board, so that they can effectively reinforce EU norms and values, as well as pave the way for a consensus on rules, norms and enforcement measures in cyber space globally; notes that building cyber resilience in third countries contributes to international peace and security, ultimately making European citizens safer;

53.  Considers that cyber attacks such as NotPetya and WannaCry are either state directed or are conducted with the knowledge and approval of a state; notes that these cyber attacks, which cause serious and lasting economic damage as well as pose a threat to life, are clear breaches of international law and legal norms; believes, therefore, that NotPetya and WannaCry represent breaches of international law by, respectively, the Russian Federation and North Korea, and that the two countries should face commensurate and appropriate responses from the EU and NATO;

54.  Calls for Europol’s Cybercrime Centre to become a focal point for law enforcement divisions and government agencies dedicated to cyber crime, the primary responsibility of which would be to manage the defence of both the eu. domains and critical infrastructure of the EU networks during an attack; emphasises that such a focal point should also be mandated to exchange information and provide Member States with assistance;

55.  Emphasises the importance of the development of norms regarding privacy and security, encryption, hate speech, disinformation and terrorism threats;

56.  Recommends that each Member State embrace the obligations to assist any other Member States under cyber attack and to ensure national cyber accountability in close cooperation with NATO;

Civil-military cooperation

57.  Calls on all stakeholders to reinforce knowledge transfer partnerships, implement appropriate business models and develop trust between companies and defence and civilian end-users, as well as to improve the transfer of academic knowledge into practical solutions, in order to create synergies and port solutions between the civilian and military markets – in essence a European single market for cyber security and cyber-security products, based on transparent procedures and in respect of EU and international law, with the view to preserving and strengthening the EU’s strategic autonomy; notes the pivotal role that private cyber-security firms play in early warning and attribution of cyber attacks;

58.  Strongly emphasises the importance of R&D, in particular in the light of the high-level security requirements in the defence market; urges the EU and the Member States to give more practical support to the European cyber security industry and other relevant economic actors, to reduce bureaucratic burdens, in particular for SMEs and start-ups (key sources of innovative solutions in the area of cyber defence), and to promote closer cooperation with university research organisations and large players with a view to reducing dependencies on cyber security products from external sources and to creating a strategic supply chain inside the EU to enhance its strategic autonomy; notes, in this context, the valuable contribution that can be made by the EDF and other instruments under the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF);

59.  Encourages the Commission to integrate cyber defence elements into a network of European cybersecurity competence and research centres, also in view of providing sufficient resources to dual use cyber capabilities and technologies within the next MFF;

60.  Notes that the protection of public and other civil critical infrastructure assets, in particular information systems and associated data, is a vital defence task for Member States and, in particular, for the authorities in charge of information systems security, and that it should be part of the remit of either the national cyber defence structures or the said authorities; stresses that this will require a level of trust, and the closest possible cooperation, between military actors, cyber defence agencies, other relevant authorities and the affected industries, which can only be achieved by clearly defining the duties, roles and responsibilities of the civilian and military actors, and urges all stakeholders to take this into account in their planning processes; calls for more cross-border cooperation, with full respect for EU data protection legislation, on law enforcement related to taking down malicious cyber activity;

61.  Calls on all Member States to focus national cyber security strategies on the protection of information systems and associated data, and to consider the protection of this critical infrastructure as part of their respective duty of care; urges the Member States to adopt and implement strategies, guidelines and instruments that provide reasonable levels of protection against reasonably identifiable levels of threat, with costs and burdens of the protection proportionate to the probable damage the parties concerned risk facing; calls on the Member States to take appropriate steps to oblige legal persons under their jurisdictions to protect personal data under their care;

62.  Recognises that, owing to the changing environment of cyber threats, a stronger and more structured cooperation with police forces could be advisable, especially in some critical areas, e.g. when tracking threats under headings such as cyber jihad, cyber terrorism, radicalisation on line and the funding of extremist or radical organisations;

63.  Encourages close cooperation between EU agencies such as EDA, ENISA and the European Cybercrime Centre in a cross-sectoral approach aimed at promoting synergies and avoiding overlaps;

64.  Calls on the Commission to develop a roadmap for a coordinated approach to European cyber defence, including an update of the EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework to ensure that it remains fit for purpose as the relevant policy mechanism for achieving the EU’s cyber defence objectives, in close cooperation with the Member States, the EDA, Parliament and the EEAS; notes that this process has to be part of a broader strategic approach to the CSDP;

65.  Calls for cyber security capacity-building through development cooperation, as well as constant education and cyber-awareness training, taking into account that in the coming years millions of new internet users will go online, most of them in developing countries, thus strengthening the resilience of countries and societies vis-à-vis cyber and hybrid threats;

66.  Calls for international cooperation and multilateral initiatives to build stringent cyber defence and cyber security frameworks to counter state capture by corruption, financial fraud, money laundering, the financing of terrorism, and to tackle the challenges posed by cyber terrorism and by cryptocurrencies and other alternative payment methods;

67.  Notes that cyber attacks such as NotPetya spread quickly, thereby causing indiscriminate damage, unless there is widespread resilience globally; believes that cyber defence training and education should form part of the EU’s external action and that building cyber resilience in third countries contributes to international peace and security, ultimately making European citizens safer;

Institutional reinforcement

68.  Calls on the Member States to engage in more ambitious cooperation in the cyber domain within PESCO; suggests that the Member States launch a new PESCO cyber cooperative programme with a view to supporting quick and effective planning, command and control of present and future EU operations and missions; notes that this should lead to better coordination of operational capacities in cyber space, and may lead to the development of a common cyber defence command when the European Council so decides;

69.  Repeats its call on the Member States and the VP/HR to present an EU white book on security and defence; calls on the Member States and the VP/HR to make cyber defence and deterrence a corner stone of the white book, covering both the protection of the cyber domain for operations laid down in Article 43 TEU and the common defence laid down in Article 42(7) TEU;

70.  Notes that the new PESCO cyber cooperative programme should be led by high-ranking military as well as civilian staff from each Member State, on a rotating basis, and be accountable to the EU ministers of defence, in the PESCO format, and to the VP/HR, in order to foster the principles of trust among the Member States and the EU institutions and agencies when sharing information and intelligence;

71.  Repeats its call for the creation of an EU Council on Defence based on the existing EDA ministerial Steering Board and the PESCO format of the EU ministers of defence, in order to guarantee the prioritisation and operationalisation of resources, and effective cooperation and integration, among the Member States;

72.  Recalls the need to ensure that the European Defence Fund is kept on, or even boosted in the next MFF, with a sufficient budget earmarked for cyber defence;

73.  Calls for increased resources to modernise and streamline cyber security and intelligence dissemination between the EEAS/European Union Intelligence and Situation Centre (INTCEN), the Council and the Commission;

Public-private partnerships

74.  Recognises that private companies play a key role in preventing, detecting, containing and responding to cyber security incidents, not just as providers of technology but also as providers of non-IT services;

75.  Recognises the private sectors role in preventing, detecting, containing and responding to cyber security incidents, along with its role in stimulating innovation in cyber defence, and calls, therefore, for enhanced cooperation with the private sector to ensure shared insights of EU and NATO requirements and assistance in helping to find common solutions;

76.  Calls on the EU to perform a comprehensive review of software, IT and communications equipment and infrastructure used in the institutions in order to exclude potentially dangerous programmes and devices, and to ban the ones that have been confirmed as malicious, such as Kaspersky Lab;

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77.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the EU agencies in the fields of defence and cyber security, the NATO Secretary-General and the national parliaments of the Member States.

(1) Cambridge University Press, February 2017, ISBN 9781316822524, https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316822524.
(2) OJ L 194, 19.7.2016, p. 1.
(3) Texts adopted, P8_TA(2017)0366.
(4) OJ C 419, 16.12.2015, p. 145.
(5) Texts adopted, P8_TA(2016)0435.
(6) Texts adopted, P8_TA(2017)0493.
(7) Texts adopted, P8_TA(2017)0492.

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