

Policy Department External Policies

WORKSHOP SUMMARY

THE FUTURE
OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY:
TOWARDS A WHITE BOOK
ON EUROPEAN DEFENCE
HELD ON
THURSDAY 6 MARCH 2008

SECURITY AND DEFENCE



EBPOΠΕЙСКИ ПАРЛАМЕНТ PARLAMENTO EUROPEO EVROPSKÝ PARLAMENT EUROPA-PARLAMENTET
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DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES OF THE UNION DIRECTORATE B - POLICY DEPARTMENT -

Workshop Summary

"The future of the European Security Strategy: towards a White Book on European Defence"

held on

Thursday 6 March 2008, 10.00-12.30

Summary

On 6 March 2008, the Policy Department in DG EXPO organised a Workshop on behalf of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE) entitled "The future of the European Security Strategy: towards a White Book on European Defence". The Workshop was well attended which reflected a growing interest in the topic in light of the upcoming French Presidency and the European Council decision in December 2007 to task the High Representative Javier Solana with reviewing the landmark European Security Strategy. The Workshop also provided an occasion for the SEDE Chairman Karl von Wogau to outline the European Parliament's record on the topic and for the Rapporteur Mr Helmut Kuhne to seek feedback on the key ideas in his report on "The implementation of the European Security Strategy and ESDP". The substance of the Workshop followed the central themes of the SEDE report, the expected outcome of Mr Solana's review of the ESS and a discussion on the expected new initiatives on defence under the French Presidency.

This Workshop also provided the occasion for the author of a study commissioned by SEDE to present the key findings. This Workshop Summary provides an overview on the issues raised during the Workshop. It is not intended as a verbatim reproduction of the event. The summary and programme is used as a means to disseminate the Workshop presentations which should be useful to those interested in the details of the presentations as well as those who were unable to attend.

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3.1 Presentation on "The Future of European Security" by Professor Mary Kaldor , London School of Economics and Coordinator of Human Security Group
3.2 Presentation on "The Future of the European Security Strategy: towards a White Book on European Defence" by Professor Jolyon Howorth , Jean Monnet Professor of European Politics, University of Bath, UK, Visiting Professor of Political Science, Yale University
3.3 Study on "Pooling of EU Member States Assets in the Implementation of the ESDP" by Dr Jean Pierre Maulny , Deputy Director, Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques (IRIS), Paris



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DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES OF THE UNION

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND DEFENCE with the support of the POLICY DEPARTMENT

Workshop on

"The future of the European Security Strategy: towards a White Book on European Defence"

Thursday 6 March 2008, 10.00-12.30 Room 5G-2, European Parliament, Brussels

Draft Programme

10.00-10.05	Introduction by Mr Karl von WOGAU , Chairman of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE)
10.05-10:15	Presentation by Mr Helmut KUHNE, Rapporteur, SEDE
10.15-12.20	Professor Álvaro de VASCONCELOS, Director of the EU Institute for Security Studies (tbc) Professor Mary KALDOR, Centre for the Study of Global Governance, London School of Economic and Coordinator on Human Security Group Professor Jolyon HOWORTH, Jean Monnet Professor of European Politics, University of Bath, UK, Visiting Professor of Political Science, Yale University Dr Jean Pierre MAULNY, Deputy Director, Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques (IRIS), Paris Discussant: Mr Michael Matthiessen, Personal Representative, of the High Representative, for parliamentary affairs in the field of CFSP and ESDP. Debate: Mr Helmut KUHNE and SEDE Members and Experts
12.20-12.30	Concluding Remarks by Dr Karl von WOGAU

2. Workshop Summary

2.1 Opening remarks by the Chairman Mr Karl von WOGAU

There are elements of the European Security Strategy (ESS) that have not been implemented, but there are also questions, like security of energy supplies, which the document fails to address. We need to see what our common interests are in the EU and how the strategy, once redefined, could be implemented. The question of how we should proceed with the strategy has developed in recent months. In the European Parliament we have the opportunity to make good use of this period of time to reflect on the ESS and its implementation as well as to reflect on what has been achieved and propose concrete recommendations.

2.2 Helmut KUHNE, SEDE Rapportuer

"The EU is an established actor in security policy and we [the EU] are now in an ideal position to bring major partners, including the US, China and Russia, together to adress international issues, such as Iran".

A White Book on European Defence could provide a common framework for discussion not only amongst the member states and EU institutions, but also provide a framework for a debate between the national parliaments and the wider public. This would contribute to democratic scrutiny and debate, which is absolutely essential in the development of any European security and defence policy. The EU's ESDP has largely developed successfully since December 2003. There are however limits, mainly in form of capability shortfalls, which the EU is facing and which we should take a closer look at. A strategy is all about setting goals, analising the situation and looking at the way to achieve these goals. In the past this process has often been more reactive, and passive in nature, and so the question I am posing to our experts today is to what extent is there a relationship between strategies and unplanned developments and how do we incoporate this into our policy planning?

We should also address the question of Human Security and its relation to EU missions. Can it serve as a form of legitimisation of missions where there are contradictory issues present within the mission, like for instance in the case of Chad?

2.3 Mary KALDOR,

"The European Union needs to adopt a disctinctive European way of security that is different from traditional national security approaches and different from the War on Terror (...) we use the term 'human security' to describe this disctinctive approach, which put humans at the heart of security"

This year will be a critical year for the EU security strategy not only because of announced plans of the French Presidency, but also beacause of the critical events, which are taking place around the world. The greatest challenge for the EU is posed by Kosovo, which will be a test case for the ESS. Other issues include developments in Iraq and Afghanistan and a fundamental rethink of NATO operations, which will become indispensable, and which EU should be involved in. "The European Union needs to adopt a disctinctive European way of security, it needs to develop capacities that combine military forces with police, legal specialists and other types of emergency service". Moreover the idea at the heart of EU security is also crucial for mobilizing public support.

In the Barcelona and Madrid reports we use term 'human security' to describe this distinctive approach to security, which as the very name implies puts humans at the centre of focus. The three aspects of this concept which need to be emphasised are: it refers to the security of individuals and communities, not states and borders; it encompasses the interrelatedness of security, by involving both freedom from fear and freedom from want (not securitization of development); thirdly, it entails blurring of the internal and external aspects of security.

The six principles that should guide the implementation of human security are:

- The primacy of human right
- Legitimate political authority
- A bottom-up approach
- Effective multilateralism
- Integrated regional approach
- Clear and transparent political direction

In the case of Kosovo, implementation of the above listed principles would mean concentrating firstly on people on the ground, both Albanians and Serbs, and not on the Kosovo final status. In the case of Afghanistan it would mean that security of individuals and their communities would take priority over fighting the Talibans.

The human security concept sometimes receives criticism from two persepctives, on the one hand it is accused of being a cover for European neo-imperialism, or on the other hand it is described as being too soft. I would disagree with both criticisms ebcuase in fact "The European Way of Security is a hard security policy, it is about protecting individuals and communities under conditions of crisis, in a multilateral framework and with the use of military forces which is distinct from either conventional warfighting or peacekeeping."

Is it relevant for the European Union? In fact there are elements of the human security concept already being implemented by the EU, but there is still a need for a more explicit committeent to human security. Firstly, the six principles are interlinked and should be followed jointly. Secondly, EU needs more coherence in action, at least at the conceptual level. And thirdly, there is often a gap between operational and political levels, with the latter often remaining out of sync with the real strategic culture, operating in more traditional terms. Is it utopian? It does mean a paradigmatic shift in conceptualizing security, but it is in fact more realistic and would be more effective as a way of dealing with current crises than a traditional security approach which relies upon the classic use of force or simply adds civilian capabilities to military peacekeeping.

2.4 Jolyon HOWORTH

"For the EU to generate a viable grand strategy, its member states would have to agree on the broad outlines of the Union's future. It is not clear in 2008 that such an agreement is likely (...) nevertheless, the world around is changing fast and the challenges derivering from the tectonic shifts of 11 September 1989 and 11 September 2001 will not go away."

The nature of the fundamental drivers behind ESDP is not of political will or ambitions of states and individuals, but of powerful, tectonic events, which emerged from history and geography. Therefore there is a limit to which any one political leader, today the French President, can push this policy in a particular diretion. Even if he has some chances, given France's input to the project, the main obstacle lies in conflicting views on the very nature of the EU, which differ in France from the other major EU power, the UK. While the latter perceives the EU as a *process*, the former sees it as a *project* (implying vision, political and *finalité*). "One thing is certain: the EU cannot become a strategic actor unless it becomes much clearer on what the Union is." This question is strongly intertwinded with the EU's future borders, as their geographic limitations will obviously have a crucial influence on the character of the Union-as-strategic actor. The international system is in major flux and what the EU needs is to engage with these regional and global shifts in a lucid and proactive manner."It needs, in short, a 'grand strategy'. It cannot be achieved merely by pragmatism or muddling through. Decisions need to be taken."

The main elements of such grand strategy should include the following:

- a new, more balanced and comprehensive <u>relationship</u> with the <u>US</u>, with a direct bilateral EU-US strategic forum, which should be urgently established,
- urgent assessment of the EU's strategic priorities in its <u>neighbourhood</u>, which present multiple challenges for stabilisation, followed by a definition of objectives and slection of the optimum intruments to meet these challenges,
- assistance in the creation of what Giovanni Grevi has called <u>"inter-polarity"</u>- a combination of interdependence and multi-polarity. In facing the wider world, which is turning into a multi-polar space involving both traditional state actors and emerging regional regimes (such as the EU itself), it is therefore important to persuade the other major players, including India and China, that interdependence among the major poles represents a positive sum game in which everybody wins,
- shifting geopolitical weight whereby there is a subtel shift towards a <u>post-Westphalian order</u>, not in the sense of *invalidating* state actors, but in the sense of transcending balance of power mentalities, international institutions and international law, with new demands such as the need for pursuign strategies based upon effective multilateralism etc. "And this is what distinguishes ESDP: European Union is doing IR differently, in a post-Westphalian manner."
- a clear assessment of the <u>balance between military and non-military</u> instruments in delivery of such a grand strategy.

President Sarkozy has announced that a joint debate on such a grand strategy will be a priority for the French presidency in the second semester of 2008. Apart from the obstacles posed by the above mentioned disagreement on the very nature of the EU, Mr Sarkozy also faces the challenge of his own shrinking political and economic capital. Nevertheless it is worth taking a closer look at what the French are preparing, in particular in relation to the national *Livre Blanc* and its role in the future of European defence.

One of the the most significant aspects discussed in this context is France's reintegration into NATO's integrated military command which it left in 1966. France's return to NATO will however involve hard bargaining over the restructuring and tranformation of the Alliance. "The key issue will be that of the ongoing relationship between US grand strategy, which features a support role for NATO, and the emergence of a clear EU strategic vision." Currently, while Americans and

Europeans share similar security objectives, they too often disagree on the means to achive them.

On ESDP, note that French intentions include several initiatives aiming to consolidate this policy area. This includes, making its European partners think strategically as an absolute priority for the French, who believe strongly that Europeans cannot keep on relying on an ally which is "overstretched in many parts of the world and for which Europe hardly figures on the strategic radar screen." Promotion of EU strategic thinking includes several major proposals:

- developing an <u>EU operational HQ</u> in Brussels even though it has been controversial since it was first introduced in 2003, a permanent EU OHQ seems to have won support from the US, whose view on this issue appears to be more and more pragmatic. EU operational HQ is increasingly needed for civ-mil crisis management missions, for which demand around the world is very strong.
- the "Big- 6" proposal- creating a kind of *Directoire* on ESDP between France, the UK, Italy, Spain and Poland, each contributing 10,000 men to a 60,000 strong strategic force, which would act as a pioneer group, setting example for the others. This proposal is however very unlikely to be supported by the countries involved.
- <u>Franco-British cooperation</u>- and the incoming St Malo II between Mr Brown and Mr Sarkozy. This cooperation was essential at the launch of ESDP in 1998 and it seems it still has valuable potential today mainly due to very pragmatic financial reasons. However the basic problem remains in overcoming the very different strategic visions of the two leading countries.
- <u>defence spending</u>, the benchmark for the "Big-6", which is to set an example for the others, will be 2% of GDP. The fact is however that encouragement alone will not solve the problem. Compared to the US, the EU is currently spending 50% of what the US spends on defence, while proportions of R&D spending are even lower. Yet, the strategic ambitions of the EU are far more limited than those of the US, therefore the key lies in far more rational spending rather than in increased spending.

France is making a major contribution to an important debate on the strategic future of one of the EU's most successful initiatives. "But the EU's main challenge is the definition of this different way of doing IR that we have all spoken about. It is a very different approach to International Relations and that is its distinctiveness."

2.5 Àlvaro de VASCONCELOS

"the more the EU is involved in current difficult conflicts the more antagonism it will create and therefore we will need to give more attention to give to our policy options and to make sure that our actions are clearly linked to our values and principles"

The core of the European Security Strategy revolves around *effective multilateralism* and five years after the document was drawn up we should be able to assess how effective or ineffective this multilateralism has been. The discussion launched today by the Institute for Security Studies is not intended to revise the strategy, but at defining EU common interests and strategic options. And even though a certain tendency of renationalisation of the European strategy is visible today, the former

should not be just a sum of national interests of the member states, but should have EU at its heart.

First and foremost we should ask ourselves what does it mean that the European Union is a global and international actor and what are the basic principles that should guide our policy? This major question has a number of strategic and security implications. Secondly, we should discuss the character of any security concept for the EU. Should it be broad and encompass a whole spectrum of issues ranging from development to hard security measures? There is a tendency nowadays to consider everything in terms of security. Human issues are important regardless of their security relevance and it is not always the best way to deal with all international and human issues arguing that they have security dimension. Priority should be given again to politics. "It is considered today as of secondary importance compared to security, but it is politics that should guide our security." And the question that follows is the relationship between the foreign policy and the security policy of the EU.

While according to the Treaty the latter is clearly a part of the former, the dramatic developments which have taken place in the field of ESDP, have placed this policy far above the foreign policy of the EU. The debate over the relation between those two has been contaminated by the US National Security Strategy, which recognises terrorism as an existential threat with all the corresponding and dramatic consequences on the understanding of security. We should go back to the debate on what is the real relation in the EU between foreign policy concept and security policy concept. This should be followed by a debate on the challenges.

Five years after the ESS was drawn up and after the failure of US strategy in the war on terror we should review the relationship between terrorism and other security challenges. Looking at the EU missions we can clearly see that these are not antiterrorism missions, but missions for the protection of civilians, which also has a number of security implications.

The fourth important issue is the question of developing effective multilateralism in a world which is becoming more multi-polar. Failure to address some very difficult international issues in the last 5-8 years has been caused by the absence of the US in the game. It may change with the new American administration, but will the combined soft power of the EU and the power of the US be enough to solve most international issues? Or has the world changed in a way not foreseen clearly in the 2003 ESS? "We need to think how to engage with new global actors, we need to think how to multilateralise this emerging multi-polarity."

The three main implications, which need to be addressed, concern:

- EU relations with NATO- whereas it is important for the EU to develop its own idea of the role of NATO and its future, in the context of above mentioned multipolarity it is important how the Alliance and the EU are perceived by *other* players. "NATO should avoid being perceived as the alliance of the West against the rest." An important issue will be also a debate on Art. 5, which many member states are keen on re-opening.
- crisis management missions- as the demand for such missions dramatically grows it is important not only to develop our own capacities, but also to bring on

board third countries, who are more and more interested in playing a role in the crisis management.

• practical implementation and capacity building- including the link with the political implications of member states' involvement in different operations. There is a need for politics to return to the top, but in terms of how the EU is perceived and how we would like it to be seen the idea of the "Big 6" is rather troublesome. We need to be able to give a European perspective to our involvement internationally.

European engagement in Afghanistan results in Europe being perceived differently. "Europe is no longer seen simply as a soft power, its perception is changing as it becomes more involved in major geopolitical affairs".

2.6 Jean Pierre MAULNY

"We have to look at our common security needs and spell out what the EU ambition is, what role the EU wants to play on the international scene, and better define our methods of action. A concept of Human Security could perhaps be a major contribution to the revision of the European Security Strategy".

French intentions to revise the ESS as expressed by President Sarkozy, with the French White Book contributing to this process, should be carefully considered. After all, the EU is a union of 27 members, and the White Book on French defence is a wholly different exercise than any re-discussion of the ESS. Whereas ESDP has been developing around the so-called Petersberg Tasks, French defence concerns a whole range of military action including collective defence. The French White Book will also reflect a French concept of security, which apart from defence entails different aspects of internal security like natural disasters and pandemics. Such a security concept may not necessarily go down very well in the whole Europe.

The *Livre Blanc* will of course have implications for European capabilities, through for instance the scaling down in the number of French troops. Also armaments programs based on current cooperation might be affected, therefore there is a clear need for a debate with France's European partners.

On the other hand, the question of France's reintegration in the NATO integrated command structure is strongly linked with French domestic politics, which Europeans should keep in mind. We should also keep in mind the fact that France is already a part of the Alliance to a great extent.

When it comes to European defence, it is true that discussion with the British is necessary, as there are major differences such as in case of EU planning cell, which the UK strongly opposes. But other member states should also be involved and the idea of the pioneering group of six member states makes no sense as it could bring a kind of isolation within the EU. After all the whole point of the permanent structured cooperation is integration of the EU and "it would be a shame not to include the expertise already possessed by EU member states who specialises in key areas".

2.7 Discussion

Firstly we need to take-stock of were we stand now and surely a discussion with the wider public will only contribute positively to the development of the ESS. As Mr Solana has been reported as saying, "we have moved with the speed of light" in the field of CFSP and ESDP since 2003, when the ESS was drawn up. However we shouldn't limit ourselves to defence issues only. It was clearly stated in 2003 that ESS is more than defence, it advocates a comprehensive approach to security and this has become a mark of the EU and the ESS.

ESDP should not be driven by individual people or states, but by a larger scale of change. The problem is however that member states have different, often competing long term visions. How can we deal then with the swift changes in the world? The EU is already engaging more than any other in linking the concept of interdependence with the emerging multi-polar world, trying to involve third parties in solving international challenges. Combining civilian and military forces is what distinguishes our approach from others, but do we have enough resources?

Mr von Wogau, while agreeing with the experts, expressed fears of many that what now may seem as a post-Westphalian system may soon turn into pre-Westphalian world, leading to calls for the EU to undertake a greater role in dealing with the consequences. Mr Onyszkiewicz stressed the need to correct the virtual absence of NATO in both American and European strategies, and suggested we need to reflect on a redefinition of 'aggression' (in the light of Art. 5 of the Washington Treaty and the assistance clause in the Lisbon Treaty). Ms Gomes agreed with the importance of Human Security, which she called crucial in wining public support for ESDP. Ms Gomes also argued for a greater involvement of women in security policy at all levels reflecting our commitment to UNSC 1325.

3. Presentations and Studies (for the studies/briefings see the Policy Department's intranet site at http://www.expo.ep.parl.union.eu/expo/cms/cache/offonce/pid/184 and the European Parliament's website at:

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/studies.do?language=EN

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3.1 Presentation on "The Future of European Security" by **Professor Mary Kaldor**, London School of Economics and Coordinator of Human Security Group

This year will be a critical year for the European Union's security strategy. First, it is very important that the security strategy planned for the French Presidency builds on the European Security Strategy agreed in December 2003 and does not revert to more traditional conceptions of security. Secondly, the ESDP mission to Kosovo will be the largest ever deployed and the EU's success in preventing violence and promoting peace and democracy in Kosovo as well in South East Europe as a whole will be a test case for the European approach. A failure in Kosovo would mean a serious setback for the multilateral achievements of the 1990s. And thirdly, there is likely to be a fundamental rethink of the way operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are being conducted in the near future. Even though this does not, at present, directly concern the EU, the European Union has to be ready to offer a contribution to a different solution should the need arise.

The European Union needs to adopt a distinctive European way of security that is different from traditional national security approaches and different from the War on Terror. And it needs to show that its distinctive approach can work in Kosovo and South East Europe and can potentially be applied elsewhere. The European Union needs to make a contribution to global security and it needs to develop capabilities that combine military forces with police, legal specialists, and other types of emergency services. This is different from either a traditional focus on the military defence of borders or from a war-fighting method of dealing with terrorism. In the Barcelona and Madrid reports, we use the term 'human security' to describe this distinctive approach to security.

In defining human security, I would like to draw attention to three aspects of the concept. First, the term refers to the security of individuals and the communities in which they live as opposed to the security of nations or blocs. Secondly, the term encompasses the interrelatedness of security; it involves both 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want'. Thirdly, human security entails a blurring of the internal and external aspects of security. We are used to thinking of internal security in terms of the security of individuals and communities involving police, fire and ambulance services, etc. and external security in terms of national and bloc security largely involving the military. Human security means that we think of external security in terms of the security of individuals and we deploy a mixture of capabilities traditionally used for separate internal and external tasks. In this sense, human security is very appropriate for the EU where external policy has always been an extension of the EU's internal methods of integration.

In the Madrid and Barcelona reports, we emphasised the importance of implementation. We proposed human security forces for Europe involving a

combination of military and civil elements and we proposed a set of principles which would guide the way these forces would be used. Even though human security does involve military forces, they are used in quite new ways, more akin to law enforcement than to traditional war-fighting. In all the debates about external interventions, the concern has been with ends, the conditions under which such interventions may be legal or legitimate, much less attention has been paid to means, how such interventions might be conducted. The six principles we propose are both about ends and means. They include:

1. The primacy of human rights

The first principle is the safety, dignity and welfare of individuals and the communities in which they live. This is the main challenge rather than military victory or the temporary suppression of violence. Both civilian and military initiatives have to put the protection of civilians before the defeat of an enemy. This means addressing not only immediate physical threats but also material needs.

2. Legitimate political authority

A legitimate authority is trusted by the population and is responsible for law and order and respect of human rights. This principle means that any outside intervention must strive to create a legitimate political authority provided by a state, an international body or a local authority (a town or region). It must provide the conditions for a political process through which such an authority can be built and it must assist the promotion of law and justice as well as the authority's ability to guarantee material well being.. And it must itself be viewed as legitimate both locally and within the international community as a whole.

3. A bottom-up approach

Intensive consultation with local people is required, not just to "win hearts and minds" and in order to gain better understanding, but also to empower vulnerable communities so that they themselves can create the conditions for peace and stability. This means involving civil society, women and young people, and not just political leaders or those who wield guns.

4. Effective multilateralism

This is related to legitimacy and distinguishes a human security approach from neocolonialism. The European Union should work alongside other international and regional agencies, individual states and non-state actors. Human security means a commitment to work in the framework of international law, creating common rules and norms and solving problems through rules and co-operation. It also means a better division of tasks and greater coherence.

5. Integrated Regional Approach

There is a tendency to focus on particular countries when dealing with crisis. Yet insecurity spills over borders through refugees, transnational criminal networks and so on. The EU has to recognise the importance of integrating systematically regional dialogues and action in neighbouring countries into its policies for crisis.

6. Clear and Transparent Political Direction

When the European Union intervenes externally, it must do so with clear legal authorisation, transparent mandates, and a coherent overall strategy. In addition, where European security units are deployed there needs to be close linkage between policy-makers and those on the ground, with the former having ultimate control over operations, and all EU external engagements should be led by civilians.

What would it mean to apply these principles in concrete situations? In Kosovo, it would mean that debates about status take second place to the priority of finding ways in which both Serbs and Albanians can feel safe living together. This would mean NATO forces together with the EU mission need to focus on protecting both Serbs and Albanian at risk of ethnic cleansing and trying to maintain public security instead of protecting borders. It would also mean helping to provide alternative sources of electricity and jobs for Albanians and alternative sources of income for Serbs who are currently dependent on Belgrade and have no option than to obey Belgrade's dictates even if they might prefer to stay in Kosovo and live with their erstwhile neighbours.

In Afghanistan, to take another example, it would mean that the security of individuals and their communities would take priority over fighting the Taliban. This is not to say that communities should not be protected from the Taliban but that the current strategy of defeating the Taliban by force kills and injures civilians, thereby risking NATO's legitimacy and contributing to the Taliban's ability to recruit more people. Putting the emphasis on the security of individuals would mean that air strikes that cause civilian casualties would be unacceptable and it would mean that local reconstruction and security go hand in hand. A human security approach would also mean greater emphasis on working with civil society especially human rights groups and women's groups to establish the legitimacy of Afghan institutions. It would mean more emphasis on the role of the United Nations as opposed to NATO, working together with Afghanistan's neighbours (Pakistan, Iran, Uzbekistan) and establishing a clear transparent civilian commander of all international operations.

Answering the Critics

Two contradictory sets of criticisms have been raised in relation to the concept of Human Security. The first is about the concept itself, and can be found within the wider public debate. Some critics worry that it is a cover for neo-imperialism and a way to justify liberal interventionism and a new European militarism. Others argue that far from being hawkish, the concept lacks teeth and is too 'warm and fuzzy' or 'soft'.

The European Way of Security is a hard security policy. It is about protecting individuals and communities under conditions of crisis. Sometimes this involves the use of military force and can be even more risky than conventional war-fighting.

What distinguishes human security operations from neo-imperialist interventions is both the multilateral framework and the way that military force is used, which is distinct from either conventional war-fighting (defeating insurgents) or peace-keeping (separating warring parties). Military force is used to protect individuals, to create the basis for a rule of law, and to arrest those who violate the law. Specifying the conditions under which military forces are used would help to assuage the fears of those who are concerned about European ambitions to become a super power.

The second set of criticisms is about the relevance of the Human Security concept for the European Union. This criticism comes mainly from official elites who claim either that 'We're doing human security; we just don't call it that', or on the other hand that 'Human Security is too lofty and ambitious; it is not practical or realistic'.

In our case studies that we have undertaken of ESDP missions, we found that there are, indeed, elements of a human security approach in much of what the EU does. The EU has pioneered civilian crisis management and has developed the concept of civil-military co-operation. It has often emphasised bottom-up consultations, as in the DRC mission, for example, or human rights monitoring as in Aceh. Indeed, our vcase studies demonstrated that a learning process is underway.

However our studies also suggested three broad conclusions that imply the need for amore explicit commitment to human security. First, the principles are interlinked and that, while one principle, say human rights, is respected, this can only be sustained if it is linked to all the other principles, say legitimacy of political institutions or multilateralism. Secondly, there is often a lack of coherence in EU agencies. While it is difficult to establish institutional coherence in any large organisation, it is much easier to establish conceptual coherence, a common narrative which explains the overall mission. And thirdly, there is often a gap between what hardworking people are doing on the ground in terms of protection and empowerment and what happens at a political level. At a political level, say in the Middle East, what the EU can do is often constrained by the overall War on Terror, or as in Africa, by domestic political considerations which dictate an rapid exit strategy when longer missions might be more meaningful.

That is why we believe that the European Union needs to make some kind of public declaration that it adheres to principles of this kind both at a political level as a strategic narrative of what the EU stands for, and at the level of implementation, as an organising frame. The proposed restatement of the security strategy during the French Presidency is an ideal moment for such a declaration.

Is it utopian to suggest that human security might provide a discursive and operational framework for what the EU is trying to do? The challenge is cognitive as much as practical. Human security does require a transformation in ways of thinking. Traditional concepts of security are deeply embedded in Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence and any alternative appears utopian. Yet, from the research we have undertaken, it seems clear that a human security approach is actually more realistic as a way of tackling current crises and would be more effective than a traditional

security approach that emphasises the classic use of military force, or simply adding civilian capabilities to military peacekeeping. That is why it is so important to spell out a European Way of Security.

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3.2 Presentation on "The Future of the European Security Strategy: towards a White Book on European Defence" by **Professor Jolyon Howorth**, Jean Monnet Professor of European Politics, University of Bath, UK, Visiting Professor of Political Science, Yale University



Drivers behind ESDP

- EU as international actor
- Consequences end Cold War
- Franco-British trade-off St Malo
- 9/11: US strategic revision
- ESDP not driven by states or individuals
- By powerful tectonic forces
- Still in play

ESDP:rapid shifts

- HHG (large numbers) to HG'10 (BGs)
- Military assumptions; civ-mil reality
- Focus on B+; now secondary
- ESDP autonomy; Berlin + in reverse
- Institutions as "wiring diagrams"
- Institutions as dynamic agents

The Nature of the EU

- EU as process (pragm, reg.tn, expansion)
- EU as project (vision, pol.will, finalité)
- UK/French visions differ substantially
- EU cannot be strategic actor without knowing what it is...
- Debate on strategy linked to finalité
- Borders define the actor

EU as Strategic Actor

- International system in major flux
- EU needs lucid analysis for impact
- GS = "calculated relationship of means to large ends" (Gaddis)
- Cannot be achieved by muddling through
- Relations w. US; Neighbors;
- Wider world:
 - Unbalanced multi-polarity vs. "interpolarity"

Towards post-Westphalia?

- Transcending b.of p. mentalities
- Foster internat institutions & law
- Implement effective multilateralism
- Human rights & human wrongs
- Role for constructive non-state actors
- Perspective on destructive n.s.a.s
- Dealing with causes of despair

Grand Strategy & French Presicy

- Sarkozy sees EU g.s. as urgent priority
- Livre Blanc as French contrib.n to EU WP
- "réflexion approfondie", "choix décisifs" "sans préjugé/tabou"
- Fr. volontarisme & political will ...vs
- Witney's « iron law » of defence reviews
- Needs: vision; political capital; means

French reintegration NATO

- Break w. Chirac's jousting?
- France wants full/proactive role in NATO
- Two conditions:
- Wholesale restructuring
 - No problem w. Fr. return; but overall review?
- Concurrent empowerment of ESDP
 - Two Pillars approach...

Afghanistan

- Bucharest announcement likely
- Trade off between Helmand & East
- France fights with US in hot spots
- Against the "real" enemy: al-Qaeda
- Helps tip overall balance Afghan/NATO
- Political capital for main battle: ESDP

Global NATO?

- NATO #1= US commitment to Euro-security
- NATO #2 = EU commitment to US g.s.?
- France supports aim in Afghan (not means)
- Refuses NATO as "global policeman"
- Clashes likely: enlargement; global partners; NSC; NRF
- Ami, allié non-aligné...

Consolidation ESDP

- EU Strategic thinking vital
 - Dependency neither healthy nor possible
- Operational Planning HQ
- Big-6 proposals
- Franco-British Cooperation
- Defence Spending
- Collective Defence

Operational Planning

- Hot potato since Nice: France's reasons:
- EU needs OHQ for EU-only missions
- Increasing need for civ-mil c.m.m.s
- Global demand for c.m.m.s
- National PJHQs will soon prove inadequate
- EU won't restrict self to BG-size missions
- Multiplication capacity = positive sum game
- UK resistance; US tilting towards accept?

Big-5 proposals

- Fr, Ger, UK, It, Pol, Sp = core/pioneer group
- 60,000 armed force (10,000 each)
- Linked to permanent structured cooperation
- French & UK views of p.s.c. very different
- B-G concept allows all to be involved
- Resistance to Big-6: London, Warsaw, Rome after elections?

Franco-British Cooperation

- 2 yr "secret agenda" March '08 summit
- Motivation financial not strategic
- Joint defence research fund (€100m)
- Co-op: missiles + 12 tech areas (radars, energetics)
- Sub-systems (combat veh; aero-engine, drones
- In-service equip support; joint out-sourcing
- Brown's political courage?
- Incompatible long-term vision?

Defence Spending

- French exhortation towards 2% GDP for Big-6 ... and the rest
- US R&d €67bn; EU = €9bn
- Greater inputs from "easy riders"
- All must spend more
- BUT: EU ambitions only 15% of US?
- Rationalisation/pooling first port of call

Collective Defence

- Sarko "fight for a common defence policy"
- EU must be able to defend itself
- Shift in French discourse? No details
- What role for NATO?
- Lisbon Treaty art 28A.2 = hypothesis
- No EU consensus likely
- How hard will France push?

Conclusions

- ESDP arose from ongoing tectonic forces
- World outside changing very fast
- Strategic response requires EU coordination
- French proposals attempt to launch debate
- Much depends on NATO evolution
- Grand bargain between US & EU?
- Complementarity possible
- EU must rise to challenge of c.m.m.s

3.3 Study on "Pooling of EU Member States Assets in the Implementation of the ESDP" by **Dr Jean Pierre Maulny**, Deputy Director, Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques (IRIS), Paris

See additional study EP/EXPO/B/SEDE/FWC/2006-10/Lot4/07, PE 381.407