


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NATO AND CIVIL PROTECTION

SPECIAL REPORT

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SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR

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GLOSSARY OF THE MAIN ABBREVIATIONS

AWACS: Airborne Warning and Control System; aircraft equipped with special radar capable of detecting air traffic over large distances and at low altitudes; AWACS aircraft can perform a range of duties from air surveillance to air support and reconnaissance

CBRN: chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear

CBRN Battalion: NATO Multinational Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Battalion; it is a high readiness, multi-national, multi-functional Battalion, able to deploy quickly to participate in the full spectrum of NATO missions; the Battalion, in which 13 NATO members participate, should provide a Nuclear Biological Chemical capability, primarily to deployed NATO joint forces and commands, to allow them to operate in a CBRN-free environment; it can perform such functions as CBRN reconnaissance, identification, monitoring, assessment and decontamination

EADRCC: Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response and Coordination Centre; the Centre is NATO's "24/7" focal point for co-ordinating disaster relief efforts among member and partner countries; based at NATO Headquarters in Brussels; it is staffed by five secondees from NATO and partner countries and three members of NATO's International Staff

EAPC: Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, political decision-making body, which brings together NATO member and partner countries

NAC: North Atlantic Council, the main political decision-making body within NATO

NAEW&CF: NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force; formal designation for NATO's fleet of AWACS aircraft, in which 14 countries participate; the fleet comprises 17 Boeing AWACS E-3A radar aircraft and three cargo planes; it is one of the few military assets that are owned and operated by NATO

NRF: NATO Response Force; highly ready and technologically advanced force made up of land, air, sea and special forces components committed by NATO member countries for six-month rotations; the force is able to deploy at 5 days' notice and sustain itself for operations lasting 30 days; it should comprise 25,000 troops when it reaches full operational capability at the end of 2006

OCHA: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; it is the UN body responsible for the co-ordination of humanitarian relief efforts; its Headquarters are in New York and Geneva

PAP-T: Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism; framework document for co-operation between NATO and partner countries in the fight against terrorism; the plan provides for political consultation on several topics and contains a menu of activities for practical co-operation, which partner countries can choose from

PfP: Partnership for Peace; NATO's main framework for co-operation with partner countries, based on a programme of practical bilateral co-operation between individual partner countries and NATO

SCEPC: Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee, the main decision-making body within NATO in the area of civil emergencies; the Committee is made up of representatives from the national civil emergency administrations and from the national delegations at NATO Headquarters

WMD: weapons of mass destruction

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The bombings in Madrid and London, the devastating consequences of the tsunami in South East Asia, of Hurricane Katrina in the United States or of the earthquake in Pakistan, are only a few recent reminders of how important and relevant the issue of civil protection has become. Civil protection, or policies for the protection of civilian populations against disasters and other emergencies, has indeed gained a new prominence and meaning with the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the global threat of terrorism.

2. As the main forum for collective security and defence in the Euro-Atlantic area, NATO has adapted to this new security environment and attempted to respond to the new demands for civil protection. NATO has been engaged in disaster response since the 1950s. However, since the terror attacks in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, the Alliance has had to rethink its role in response to terrorism and the use of WMD. This has led to the development of new concepts and strategies, as well as a reassessment of NATO's tools and operations.

3. The expanding role of NATO in the protection against civil emergencies is a component of NATO's current transformation, a far-reaching process that should shape the future of the Alliance for the years to come. Some have already indicated that they see the Alliance turning into a global security agency or a global provider of security services. There is no doubt that NATO's role in civil emergencies needs to be discussed as part of these general reflections on the future of the Alliance. Should NATO, as a political-military alliance, be at all involved in the protection of populations against civil emergencies? What is NATO's comparative advantage in this field? What should be the aims of NATO's involvement? Which instruments should the Alliance use for the achievement of these aims?

4. Looking at the current situation, it is difficult to identify one comprehensive and all-inclusive NATO policy regarding civil emergencies. Much more, the Alliance seems to have built over the years, through a flexible *ad hoc* approach, several clusters of expertise. These clusters range from the protection of civilian populations against natural and man-made disasters, to the fight against terrorism, including the potential use of WMD.

5. This flexible, *ad hoc* approach has led to some overlap with other aspects of NATO's policies and programmes, raising questions regarding the interactions and boundaries between these different activities. Moreover, NATO's engagement in this field also raises the issue of co-operation with other key international players, particularly the United Nations and the European Union.

6. Underlying all these reflections is the broader issue of civil-military relations and how the new security environment has led national and international actors to rethink interactions between the civilian and military spheres. Civil emergencies are a natural area of interaction between civilian and military authorities. NATO, as a political-military Alliance, has in a way contributed to the redefinition of civil-military relations through its increasing engagement in civil emergencies.

7. The Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security has developed a strong focus on the issue of civil protection. Following last year's special report on the early identification of the nature of a WMD attack by terrorist, your Rapporteur would like to focus this year on the complex network of policies and instruments that give NATO a role in civil emergencies, and examine what the prospects are for NATO's future role in this field. This report will start with an overview of NATO's objectives and instruments in dealing with two main categories of emergencies: natural and manmade disasters on the one hand, terrorist activities on the other. It will then examine how NATO's intervention in civil

emergencies fits into the broader picture of the Alliance's transformation, and of the initiatives taken by other international organisations. Finally, it will present some reflections as to NATO's future role.

II. NATO'S ROLE IN CIVIL PROTECTION: GENERAL FRAMEWORK AND TOOLS

A. OVERVIEW OF NATO'S ENGAGEMENT IN THE AREA OF CIVIL PROTECTION

8. Civil protection has never been a central task for the Alliance. NATO was created as a military alliance for the defence of Allied territory and populations against military attacks, not against civil emergencies. However, Allied nations realised early on that improving the protection of civilian populations against civil emergencies could contribute to the achievement of NATO's overall strategic goals. Co-operation against civil emergencies appeared as just another expression of Allied solidarity and a means of enhancing collective security. This conviction has been reinforced with the growing threat of terrorism and the proliferation of WMD. Military attacks have taken a new form as guerrilla warfare and suicide bomber outrages have become more frequent in recent years. As a result, NATO's role in civil emergencies has been progressively defined and developed.

9. This role has initially focused on assisting member nations in responding to natural and manmade disasters, such as chemical and toxic spills, avalanches, floods, earthquakes, extreme weather, fires, etc. Since the end of the Cold War, it has adapted to emerging needs and threats and additionally has included the civil effects of terrorism and of the use of WMD. Moreover, NATO's engagement now covers all the various stages of emergency planning: early warning and prevention, preparedness, response and recovery.

10. NATO's geographical area of operation has also been extended. Whereas in the early period, the Alliance could only intervene in the Euro-Atlantic area with very few exceptions, it has more recently been called to assist partner and even non-partner countries.

11. Finally, the Alliance has developed new ways to intervene in these various scenarios. Like in the early days, NATO's actions still very much rely on co-ordinating national assets, but they also increasingly involve the use of NATO assets. Overall, NATO is now engaged in civil emergencies through three types of actions: 1. assisting member and partner countries in improving their national capabilities; 2. providing a framework for co-ordinating national efforts; 3. occasionally mobilising NATO's existing common capabilities to assist member and partner countries.

12. As a result of these various processes, NATO's intervention has increased from limited and sporadic operations to an established and significant set of policies and instruments. However, even today, it is bound by the same underlying principles. The primary responsibility with regard to civil emergencies lies with national authorities. NATO's role in this area is only secondary and subsidiary and rests primarily on national assets. Its justification lies in the contribution that NATO's intervention in civil emergencies makes to the achievement of the Alliance's overall strategic goals. Moreover, NATO's intervention is driven by the needs of its members and partners. In this sense, NATO's role in civil emergencies is generally said to be needs-driven and stems from the "added value" that the Alliance can bring to the management of crisis situations.

13. Within NATO, civil protection is dealt with mainly as part of the broader concept of "Civil Emergency Planning" (CEP). As defined in the NATO Handbook, "[t]he aim of Civil Emergency Planning in NATO is to co-ordinate national planning activity to ensure the most effective use of civil

resources in collective support of Alliance strategic objectives.” The Handbook defines 5 main types of operations or scenarios in which NATO could be called to intervene in civil emergencies:

1. supporting Alliance military operations under Article 5;
2. supporting non-Article 5 crisis response operations;
3. supporting national authorities in civil emergencies;
4. supporting national authorities in the protection of their populations against the effects of WMD;
5. co-operation with Partners in the field of CEP.

14. NATO’s CEP policies thus include two dimensions: how the Alliance can use civil resources to support its own military operations (objectives 1 and 2 above); and how Alliance assets can assist national authorities to protect their population against emergencies (objectives 3 through 5). In the former situation, the “customers” of NATO CEP are NATO militaries in operations; in the latter, the “customers” are national civilian authorities as well as national militaries. The first aspect is beyond the scope of this report; it is one aspect of civil-military relations within the Alliance, but does not relate to what is defined here as “civil protection”. On the other hand, the second aspect corresponds to NATO’s main contribution to civil protection. However, as this report will show, NATO’s role in civil protection is not limited to its activities in the field of CEP. Other NATO programmes and activities, including purely military assets, also enhance the protection of civilian populations against emergencies. All these are represented in the diagram in the appendix.

15. NATO’s main forum in the area of civil emergencies is the SCEPC, which reports directly to the NAC. The Committee meets at least twice a year in plenary session and regularly in permanent session. Countries are usually represented by the heads of their national civil emergency planning organisations for plenary sessions and by members of national delegations at NATO Headquarters in permanent sessions. Parallel meetings are held at EAPC format to allow participation from partner countries.

16. The Committee is supported by the CEP Directorate and made up of eight technical civil emergency planning boards and committees dealing with various aspects of emergencies: ocean shipping, civil aviation, inland surface transport, industrial production and supply, food and agriculture, post and telecommunications, medical matters, civil protection. These regularly bring together national government, industry experts and military representatives to assist NATO decision-makers and nations to develop and maintain arrangements for effective use of civil resources.

17. The NAC and SCEPC have adopted a series of concepts and strategies, which reflect and endorse the evolution of NATO’s role and instruments with regard to civil emergencies. In the field of natural and man-made disasters, the main documents include the NATO Policy on Disaster Assistance in Peacetime and the Enhanced Practical Co-operation in the Field of International Disaster Relief. In the field of terrorism and WMD, the main documents include the Civil Emergency Planning Action Plan and the PAP-T. These are all examined in greater detail in the following chapters.

18. Finally, the main operational framework in the area of civil emergencies is the EADRCC. Military assets, such as NATO’s AWACS, the NRF and the Multinational CBRN Battalion have also been engaged in some of NATO’s most recent operations in the field of civil emergencies.

19. The following sections will examine in greater detail NATO’s programmes and activities regarding two main types of emergencies: natural and man-made disasters on the one hand, terrorism and WMD on the other. However, if the Alliance has indeed developed certain specific tools for each

one of these categories, other mechanisms are the same for both. This reflects the fact that, despite obvious differences, these two types of emergencies require many of the same preparedness and response capabilities.

B. NATO'S PROGRAMMES AND ACTIVITIES FOR THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS AGAINST NATURAL AND MAN-MADE DISASTERS

20. NATO's programmes and activities for the protection of populations against natural and man-made disasters focus mainly on assisting member and partner countries with *disaster response*. Some activities also aim at improving member and partner countries' *preparedness* capabilities.

NATO's engagement in disaster response

21. NATO has been engaged in disaster response since as early as the 1950s, but the end of the Cold War opened new prospects. The first step was taken in 1992, when NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs agreed to the possibility of involving NATO out-of-area if requested by a relevant international organisation (mainly the United Nations OCHA) or by a member state acting on behalf of a stricken state. In 1995, the Policy on Disaster Assistance in Peacetime was revised to allow for discussion of disaster assistance within the newly created North Atlantic Cooperation Council (later the EAPC). In December 1997, it was Russia who proposed to the SCEPC the creation of the EADRCC, which was endorsed by EAPC ministers in May 1998 and inaugurated on 3 June 1998. The creation of the EADRCC was accompanied by the publication of a new policy document on "Enhanced Practical Co-operation in the Field of International Disaster Relief".

22. Still today, the EADRCC is the main pillar of NATO's engagement in disaster response. However, in accordance with NATO's subsidiary role in civil emergencies, priority is given to member states and to relevant international organisations, particularly the United Nations. The EADRCC is thus used only if called upon, and its role is restricted to co-ordination rather than direction. Participant countries contribute on a voluntary basis; they are not obliged to use the EADRCC framework for their offers of assistance.

23. The Centre is a fairly small structure, headed by the Director of CEP and staffed through personnel seconded by NATO and partner countries. It also includes one permanent liaison officer from the UN-OCHA. In 1999, the Centre established four functional desks, working on situation, assistance, transportation, and general policy.

24. The main responsibilities of the Centre in the event of an emergency include, in close consultation with UN-OCHA and other international organisations, co-ordinating the responses of EAPC countries to disasters occurring in the EAPC area and acting as the focal point for information sharing on requests and offers for disaster assistance. The EADRCC has a standing mandate to this effect and, when activated by one participant country, it can immediately start to operate without the need for further approval. On a longer-term basis, the EADRCC is in charge of ensuring the continued development of the Alliance's disaster-response capabilities and facilitating the speedy deployment of national assets by encouraging arrangements on issues such as visa, border-crossing, transit, the status of deployed personnel and assets, etc. NATO also organises regular field exercises, in co-operation with other international organisations, in order to promote interoperability of NATO-related assets.

25. The EADRCC has been engaged in many emergency situations since its creation. The latest operations include flood in Algeria, Bulgaria, and Slovakia in February and April 2006. Two other

recent operations deserve special attention: NATO's intervention in response to Hurricane Katrina in the United States in August 2005 and NATO's assistance to Pakistan following the earthquake in Kashmir in October 2005. In both operations, NATO's response to a natural disaster has combined a traditional intervention of the EADRCC with a military component, through the use of the NRF in particular.

26. On 3 September 2005, the United States requested relief support to cope with the devastating aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. The EADRCC co-ordinated responses to this request by 39 NATO and partner countries. The aid provided included food supplies, bottled water, water purification units, medical supplies, tents and camp beds, generators, water pumps, ships, helicopters, financial contributions and forensic teams.

27. Moreover, on September 8, the NAC approved a NATO transport operation to help move donations from Europe to the United States. The Council decided to commit the NRF and the NAEW&CF to the relief effort and approved the use of transport aircraft to deliver the aid. NATO established an air-bridge between the Ramstein air base in Germany and Little Rock, Arkansas. From 12 September to 2 October 2005, twelve NATO flights delivered almost 189 tons of relief goods. The operation was completed on 2 October 2005.

28. Pakistan was struck by a devastating earthquake on 8 October 2005. On 10 October 2005, NATO received a request for assistance from Pakistan, and on 13 October another request from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The EADRCC immediately started co-ordinating donations from NATO and partner countries. The NAC then approved a major air operation to ship to Pakistan supplies provided by NATO and partner countries, as well as by UN agencies. A total of 160 flights were organised from Germany and Turkey and delivered some 3,500 tons of aid to Pakistan, including large quantities of tents, blankets, stoves, medical supplies, etc.

29. The second pillar of NATO's intervention in Pakistan involved the deployment of the NRF. The Deployable Joint Task Force, also known as the NATO Disaster Relief Team, was deployed to Pakistan on 24 October for a 90-day mission. The NRF Headquarters co-ordinated and directed all NATO land and air operations within Pakistan. This included five helicopters dispatched to the earthquake-affected area for the transport of supplies to remote mountain villages and the evacuation of victims. It also included medical assistance with a sophisticated 60-bed field hospital and mobile medical personnel. Finally, it included a team of engineers assisting with the reparation of roads and the building of shelters, schools and medical facilities in the area around Bagh. A total of about 1000 personnel were engaged in the relief effort, including engineers, medical personnel and supporting staff. The operation was terminated on 1 February 2006.

30. If the Katrina operation represented a relatively limited intervention for the NRF in a NATO member country, the operation in Pakistan was a much broader and complex effort, involving the deployment of the NRF outside of NATO's traditional area of operation, in a less friendly environment. Nevertheless, both operations highlight a growing willingness of Allied nations to dispatch military assets in response to natural disasters, which raises a number of issues, some of which are examined in the following sections of this report. These operations have also provided a live test for the co-ordination of NATO civil and military assistance in these situations, which will certainly provide valuable lessons for future interventions. It has to be noted however, that, unlike the EADRCC, which has a standing mandate to intervene as soon as a participant country activates the mechanism through a request of assistance, the use of NATO military capabilities requires the prior authorisation of the host nation and approval by the NAC.

NATO's engagement in disaster preparedness

31. If the development of NATO's engagement in civil emergencies has been most spectacular in the field of disaster response, NATO is also strongly involved in the promotion of long-term preparedness, through programmes meant to improve member and partner countries' knowledge and capabilities.

32. Several Science for Peace projects within the Security Through Science programme have been developed in the field of CEP. Projects typically bring together scientists and end-users from research laboratories, industry, and university to work on applied R&D projects. One group of projects aims at increasing knowledge of natural disasters and reducing their impact. For example in the field of earthquake sciences, the project on "Seismic Assessment and Rehabilitation of Existing Buildings" aims at finding new ways to strengthen buildings to make them more resistant to earthquakes. The project on "Assessment and mitigation of seismic risk in Tashkent (Uzbekistan) and Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan)" aims at improving analysis of earthquakes and assessment of damage in the two countries, based on the experience gathered from earthquake assistance in Turkey.

33. Finally, NATO's partnership programmes devote an important part of their activities to civil emergency planning. Details of these programmes are examined further in this section.

C. NATO'S PROGRAMMES AND ACTIVITIES FOR THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS AGAINST TERRORISM

34. The fight against terrorism and WMD is a comparatively new area of the Alliance's engagement. Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism adopted at the Prague summit in 2002, sets four main objectives for the Alliance:

1. anti-terrorism (i.e. defensive / passive measures to reduce the vulnerability of forces, individuals and property);
2. consequence management;
3. counter-terrorism (i.e. offensive / active measures);
4. military co-operation with member, partner and other countries, as well as with international organisations.

35. Within this broad framework, the Alliance's activities for CEP in the fight against terrorism and WMD follow three complementary approaches:

1. reinforcing national capabilities to enhance the preparedness of NATO member and partners;
2. providing a framework for co-ordinating disaster response;
3. occasionally using NATO military assets to help prevent terrorist attacks or the proliferation of WMD.

Enhancing national preparedness

36. The main document regarding civil preparedness in the event of a terrorist attack using WMD is the CEP Action Plan adopted by Heads of State and Government at the Prague summit in 2002. The Action Plan calls for the establishment of an inventory of national capabilities (such as medical assistance, radiological detection, identification laboratories, aero-medical evacuation capabilities), as well as the development of interoperability for response services through exercises and the adoption of standard operating procedures. The plan also encourages the adoption of border-crossing

arrangements for relief teams, equipment and supplies. Finally, it suggests the development of non-binding guidelines or minimum standards, which nations could follow in the areas of planning, training, and equipment for civilian response to WMD.

37. An Updated Action Plan for the Improvement of Civil Preparedness for possible terrorist attacks with CBRN weapons was approved at the meeting of the SCEPC in April 2005. This plan encompasses a host of measures to improve the preparedness of individual countries and of NATO as a whole to respond rapidly and effectively to the consequences of terrorist attacks with CBRN weapons. Specific issues include better disaster response co-ordination, the protection of critical infrastructure, and support to victims of a potential attack.

38. Co-operation with partner countries in the fight against terrorism has also been stepped up, but achievements are still limited and unequal. These issues are studied in the following chapter.

39. Finally, NATO's science programmes have also been mobilised towards enhancing Alliance and partner countries' capabilities in the fight against terrorism. Since 2004, the Security Through Science Programme has put a strong emphasis on "Defence Against Terrorism" projects, aiming at improving CBRN detection capabilities, the physical protection of CBRN materials, the destruction, decontamination and medical response to a CBRN incident. In addition, NATO organises seminars and workshops on issues such as critical infrastructure protection, eco- and cyber-terrorism, border security, etc.

40. CBRN detection is the focus of two recent Science for Peace projects. The "New biosensor for rapid detection of the anthrax lethal toxin" was approved at the beginning of 2005 and is expected to run over 36 months with a total budget of 258,000 euros. The project should lead to the production of a new commercial detection kit for anthrax. Another research project, approved in April 2005, focuses on the detection of dirty bombs. It is a two-year 275,000 euros project, co-directed by a scientist from the Netherlands and one from Russia, which aims at developing a new device for the simultaneous detection of explosives and of radioactive materials, combining three detection methods into a single man-portable device. The device is not yet ready for production; however researchers anticipate that, once operational, it could be used for the analysis of suspicious luggage after x-ray screening at airports and analysis at the checkpoints of critical infrastructure facilities, such as nuclear and conventional power plants.

Co-ordinating emergency response and consequence management

41. On the operational side, the EADRCC's mandate has been extended to the response to a terrorist attack, including attacks with WMD. For now, the EADRCC has never been called upon after a terrorist attack and it seems unlikely that a member nation would activate the Centre's mechanisms, unless it was overwhelmed by the attack. This could be the case in particular for incidents involving the use of CBRN agents. To this effect, the EADRCC has compiled a confidential inventory of national CBR consequence management capabilities, which allows member and partner countries to register assets that they might be willing to make available to a stricken country. The inventory was revised in 2006 and now includes 15 categories of assets, from detection equipment and decontamination teams to medical supplies and shipping capabilities.

42. Moreover, an increasing number of field exercises and seminars are devoted to terrorist incidents, focusing in particular on the high-end scenario involving the use of CBRN substances. Such was the case for example in a recent exercise organised in Ukraine in October 2005, in co-operation

with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Another CBRN exercise is planned for May 2007 in Croatia.

Using NATO military assets for early warning and prevention

43. In recent years, NATO has increasingly used some of its military capabilities in support of civilian defence against terrorism. These have focused mainly on early warning and prevention of terrorist attacks. For instance, NATO AWACS aircraft were deployed immediately following the terrorist attacks on 9/11 in the United States to help defend North America against further attacks. AWACS aircraft have also been deployed to protect major public events, including high-level political summits or sports events. For example, the 2004 Athens and 2006 Turin Olympic Games or the 2006 football World Cup have all received AWACS coverage. Elements of NATO's CBRN Defence Battalion were also deployed in Athens to protect against potential CBRN attacks. Finally, elements of the Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) in the Mediterranean were used for maritime surveillance along the Greek coasts. All these interventions illustrate the type of occasional and targeted military support that NATO can provide to member and partner countries for the prevention of terrorism. This aspect of NATO's intervention will be examined further in the next chapter.

D. CIVIL PROTECTION AS PART OF NATO'S PARTNERSHIPS

44. CEP represents an important and growing component of NATO's partnership programmes. It is the largest non-military component of NATO's PfP activities. It also represents an important share of NATO's partnerships with Russia and with Ukraine. Finally, it has been included in co-operation frameworks with Mediterranean Dialogue countries and participants in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. However, the level and intensity of co-operation varies according to the area and the category of partners.

45. For all partners, co-operation in CEP for natural and man-made disasters is relatively well developed and efficient. Scientific co-operation through the science programmes also provides broad opportunities for participation of partner countries in projects aimed at enhancing emergency preparedness and response capabilities. Co-operation on terrorism preparedness is a relatively more sensitive area, and CBRN defence even more so.

46. Co-operation with PfP countries is relatively well established. Partners participate in the SCEPC and are thereby closely associated to the decision-making process on all the main issues relating to CEP.

47. In the field of natural and man-made disasters, partnership programmes and PfP activities focus on enhancing crisis management legislation, civil-military co-operation, disaster prevention, and humanitarian assistance capabilities. Many Science for Peace projects also include partner countries or are specifically tailored for their needs, such as the earthquake project for Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. On the response side, the main operational framework is the EADRCC, which was intended from the start as a tool to co-ordinate requests for and offers of assistance by NATO member and partner countries in the event of a natural or man-made disaster. Since the creation of the EADRCC, partner countries have been the primary recipients of assistance, but they have also actively contributed to assistance efforts.

48. Co-operation with EAPC countries in the fight against terrorism is co-ordinated through the PAP-T. The objective of this plan, adopted by Heads of State and Government at the Prague summit in 2002, is to increase co-operation in preparing for possible terrorist attacks on civilians, including with

the use of WMD. The PAP-T provides a set of programmes for political consultation and practical co-operation in the fight against terrorism, which can be tailored to the individual needs and interests of each country. Areas of co-operation include information sharing, preparedness and consequence management. However, implementation of the PAP-T has been relatively slow. The Istanbul summit in 2004 recommended a review of the implementation of the PAP-T, and initiated a reflection on an intensified set of co-operative measures in the fight against terrorism.

49. The EAPC's mandate also calls for co-operation on WMD-related issues. The CEP Action Plan, which was recently enhanced and updated, provides the basis for an inventory and voluntary harmonisation of national capabilities. A number of science programmes, including partners, are also devoted to the civilian side of CBRN technology. Finally, a number of field exercises have been organised on WMD-related scenarios. However, overall, concrete achievements have been limited. One main reason is the lack of a clear mandate for the Alliance in this area, as well as the sensitivity of the issues and potential risks involved.

50. Co-operation with Ukraine and Russia follows approximately the same features. NATO and Ukraine signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Civil Emergency Planning and Disaster Preparedness in 1997 and created the Ukraine-NATO Joint Working Group on Civil Emergency Planning and Disaster Preparedness. Within this framework, Ukraine and NATO have agreed to broaden practical co-operation in CEP. Flood assistance has been an important pillar of this co-operation, as a result of recurring emergencies in the Transcarpathian region of Ukraine. Ukraine's recent rapprochement with NATO is also leading to stepped-up co-operation in the fight against terrorism, including Ukraine's participation in Operation Active Endeavour.

51. NATO and Russia have also signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Civil Emergency Planning in 1996, whose implementation is monitored by an Expert Group on CEP and Disaster Relief. Since 2002, NATO's co-operation with Russia also focuses more and more on the fight against terrorism. The NATO-Russia Council has established an *ad hoc* working group to analyse various aspects of the terrorist threat in NATO countries and in Russia and examine possible areas of practical co-operation. In December 2004, following a series of terror attacks in Russia, including the tragic siege of a Moscow theatre in October 2002 and culminating in the massacre in Beslan, the NATO-Russia Council adopted an Action Plan on Terrorism to co-ordinate practical co-operation under the Council. The plan, which covers the prevention and fight against terrorism, as well as consequence management, should provide an adequate framework for enhancing co-operation between NATO and Russia, shifting from mere consultations, analysis and joint exercises to genuine mechanisms for practical co-operation. An important step towards enhanced operational co-operation has been taken with Russia's participation in Active Endeavour.

52. The NATO-Russia Council also decided to initiate practical co-operation on protection from CBRN agents and is currently reviewing specific opportunities for co-operation. Russia, together with Hungary, has presented an initiative to create a rapid reaction mechanism under the authority of the NRC to be deployed in the event of natural or man-made disaster or of a terrorist event. Nevertheless, co-operation with Russia in this field as in others remains difficult. It is also complicated by this country's regular insistence on extending co-operation with NATO on a multilateral basis, that is between NATO on the one side and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation on the other, which NATO has formally excluded until now.

53. Finally, co-operation with countries of the Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Co-operation Initiative is most difficult and limited. Mediterranean Dialogue countries can request and contribute assistance through the EADRCC process. They can also choose to participate on an individual basis

to selected PAP-T activities. The 2004 Istanbul summit made proposals to expand and strengthen practical co-operation in a number of priority areas including combating terrorism and WMD and disaster preparedness. It also invited Mediterranean Dialogue countries to participate in operation Active Endeavour and three countries – Algeria, Morocco and Israel – have already expressed interest. However, the Alliance is looking at ways to improve practical co-operation. Within a group of countries, which includes a non-declared nuclear power, Israel, the most delicate issue is certainly co-operation against the proliferation of WMD.

III. CIVIL PROTECTION AND THE ALLIANCE'S TRANSFORMATION

54. The Alliance is currently undergoing a far-reaching process of transformation. Many of its dynamics are already under way and aim mostly at adapting the Alliance's military to the challenges of the current security environment. However, the process of military transformation has also had broader implications, particularly in the field of civil protection. Two important aspects of this process are particularly relevant in this regard, the development of the Alliance's military capabilities on the one hand; the growing engagement of the Alliance in disaster relief and anti-terrorist operations on the other.

A. CIVIL PROTECTION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATO'S CAPABILITIES AND ASSETS

55. The major pillar of NATO's transformation process relates to the development of NATO's capabilities and assets. The initiatives taken in this field aim specifically at reinforcing military capabilities in operations, and focus both on enhancing national capabilities and developing NATO assets. However, in many areas, these initiatives have been used to enhance CEP directly or indirectly.

Civil-military crosscutting initiatives in the field of natural and man-made disasters

56. The major event that has prompted a reassessment of the range of possible Alliance interventions in the field of natural and man-made disasters is the progressive coming to life of the NRF. The Katrina relief effort represented the first use of the NRF in a crisis response operation, although it was not the NRF's first ever deployment. The Pakistan operation built upon the lessons of this first deployment and involved a much larger and complex operation, with a local component outside the Alliance's traditional area of operation. Moreover, in both cases, NATO's engagement combined the traditional provision and co-ordination of national assets through the EADRCC with the use of elements of the NRF.

57. The NRF's mandate includes the response to civil emergencies, and its characteristics as a rapidly deployable, expeditionary force make it a particularly useful asset in the event of a major disaster. One can easily imagine that with the NRF reaching its full operational capacity in the autumn of 2006, there will be more opportunities for the NRF's involvement in such scenarios. Thus, the latest major NRF exercise in June 2006 in Cape Verde, named Steadfast Jaguar, included one scenario involving the evacuation of residents of the island to protect them from the likely eruption of the local volcano.

58. However, many issues remain regarding the use of the NRF for disaster relief. First, the engagement of the NRF on the territory of the Alliance poses the problem of legal restrictions existing in some NATO countries – most notably in the United States – regarding the use of the military in

domestic civil emergencies. Another problem highlighted by the operation in Pakistan was the issue of common funding for the NRF. This problem affects not only disaster relief operations but also all engagements of the NRF. However, it is likely that member nations will be wary of engaging the NRF in disaster relief operations when other cheaper options are available. Until a satisfactory solution is found to the funding issue, some nations have proposed circumventing this problem by applying spending for relief operations to their budget for international development aid. It remains possible however that member states might be reluctant to engage the NRF too often for civil emergencies, as this would make the force unavailable for any urgent military necessity.

Civil-military crosscutting initiatives in the field of terrorism and WMD

59. Many NATO initiatives aimed at developing the Alliance's military capabilities in the fight against terrorism and WMD have incidentally contributed to civil protection, either by enhancing civilian capabilities at the same time as military capabilities, or through their impact on the global fight against terrorism.

60. The first example is again the creation of the NRF. As mentioned earlier, the NRF has already been used for securing several major public events. More broadly, the NRF's mandate includes the possibility of involvement in counter-terrorist operations. The same "dual-use" opportunities exist for NATO's CBRN Defence Battalion. The Battalion's main mission is to provide the Alliance – more specifically the NRF – with rapidly deployable and efficient CBRN defence capabilities in the event of an attack on NATO troops using WMD. However, in addition, the CBRN Battalion can also be engaged in support of civilian authorities, for example for the protection of major public events, as was the case for the 2004 summer Olympics in Athens. Similar principles apply for another more traditional NATO asset, the AWACS aircrafts, which have also been involved in several terrorism prevention operations. However, here again, one should mention that national restrictions regarding the use of the military in civil emergencies could limit the use of the NRF or the CBRN Battalion in NATO countries.

61. A series of initiatives focus on improving the national and NATO capabilities against WMD. The 1999 WMD Initiative, supported by the WMD Centre at NATO Headquarters, represented the first significant effort to define and develop NATO's role in preparing and defending against the threat of WMD. The Prague summit further approved five CBRN defence initiatives, including a deployable CBRN analytical laboratory, a CBRN event response team, a virtual centre of excellence for CBRN weapons defence, a biological and chemical defence stockpile and a disease surveillance system. The Prague Capability Commitments also include a section on CBRN defence. Finally, the 2004 Istanbul summit brought about an enhanced programme of work for defence against terrorism, whose goal is the development of cutting-edge technologies that will help allied militaries defend against terrorist threats in operations. Among the 10 areas of co-operation are defences against improvised explosive devices, protection of aircraft, helicopters, harbours and ports against attacks, detection, protection and defeat of CBRN weapons and critical infrastructure protection. Many of these initiatives aiming at improving military capabilities also have civilian applications or generally enhance civilian efforts against terrorism and WMD.

62. Another important area of improvement of NATO's capabilities relates to intelligence and information sharing. This remains a sensitive issue within the Alliance. Member countries are still very reluctant to share intelligence in a multilateral format or grant NATO with a multinational intelligence capability. In this context, the establishment of a Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit at NATO Headquarters was a first useful step towards enhancing NATO's role as a framework for sharing knowledge and analysis of the terrorist threat.

63. Finally, NATO's science programmes contribute to the overall effort towards enhancing the Alliance's long-term capabilities. As mentioned above, the Security Through Science Programme has been recently refocused on projects aimed at improving preparedness and response capabilities for natural or man-made disasters and terrorist attacks. Many of these projects lie at the intersection of civilian and military interests and could lead to the development of "dual-use" technologies.

B. CIVIL PROTECTION AND NATO'S OPERATIONS

64. A growing number of the Alliance's military operations can be said to serve civil protection purposes – response to natural disasters or prevention of terrorism. This trend is partly driven by the process of military transformation: many recent operations rely on the new assets and capabilities developed as part of NATO's transformation process. However, at the same time, this growing number of non-traditional operations also raises fundamental questions regarding the Alliance's mandate and missions. This in turn could give a new and broader dimension to the transformation debate.

65. First, recent disaster relief operations in response to Hurricane Katrina or the earthquake in Pakistan have led some to wonder whether NATO was turning into a humanitarian relief organisation. Even before Katrina and Pakistan, the EADRCC's involvement in 1998-1999 in the refugee crisis in Kosovo already represented a step towards NATO's humanitarian engagement.

66. NATO's officials at all levels have denied that the Alliance has any intention of turning into a humanitarian relief organisation and insist on the basic differences between humanitarian operations, which involve a long-term and complex effort, and disaster relief, which entails short-term assistance. Recently, commenting on the operations in Pakistan, NATO's Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, stated: "Of course, NATO is not a humanitarian organisation. But if we are asked for assistance, and if we have the means to do so, then it is our duty to help. It is another contribution to an international order that is based on values."

67. Nevertheless, some observers see in NATO's increasing readiness to engage in disaster relief operations an indication of the possible evolution of the Alliance towards a global security agency or global provider of security services. They argue that NATO's engagement in disaster relief operations should be considered as part of a broad debate on NATO's transformation, which should not be limited to the issue of military transformation, but should also include a redefinition of NATO's missions. As put by Mark Joyce, in a recent article in the International Herald Tribune, NATO's intervention in Katrina or Pakistan could provide the basis for an "incremental transformation" of the Alliance. A more radical vision was developed in 2005 by the former Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar, who called for a new mission for NATO focusing on the fight against terrorism and WMD, and the development of a "homeland security dimension" within the Alliance.

68. Allied nations are far from agreeing on such a far-reaching redefinition of NATO's mission. This is understandable in view of the current problems faced by the NATO operation in Afghanistan. However, as demonstrated by the above-mentioned statement of NATO's Secretary General, some circles within the Alliance seem to push for a new approach whereby, as far as its assets and capabilities allow, NATO should be ready to intervene in any situation worldwide if requested to.

69. A similar evolution towards a broadening of NATO's mandate can be observed regarding terrorism-related operations. Besides the short-term and occasional operations organised to prevent terrorist attacks during major public events, the Alliance has also launched large-scale anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism operations.

70. Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean is one of the flagship operations in the fight against terrorism and WMD. This maritime surveillance and escort operation was deployed in October 2001, as a direct result of the 9/11 attacks in the United States and of the Alliance's subsequent declaration of Article 5. The mission's goal is to collect information on, detect and deter terrorist activity and protect trade routes in the Mediterranean. In this sense, it contributes broadly to the protection of civilian populations in the Euro-Atlantic area, while allowing the Alliance to acquire a better understanding of the terrorist threat. Moreover, the mission was also directly used for the protection of populations during the 2004 summer Olympics in Athens. The mandate of the mission has been progressively broadened and strengthened. The scope of it has also been extended to cover the entire Mediterranean. Finally, participation in the mission has come to include partner countries, most recently Ukraine and Russia.

71. NATO's operation in Afghanistan is also a perfect example of the Alliance's growing engagement in the global fight against terrorism. NATO's take-over of the International Security Assistance Force in August 2003 aimed at assisting with the stabilisation and reconstruction of the country, thereby reducing the danger of it becoming again a safe haven for terrorists. In this sense, it reflects the idea promoted in particular in the United States that the prevention of terrorism requires tackling the threat before it reaches the borders of the Euro-Atlantic area. However, as demonstrated by the debate over NATO's engagement in Iraq or the extension of the mission in Afghanistan, some members of the Alliance are strongly opposed to any attempt to turn NATO into a counter-terrorism organisation.

72. As the previous chapters have demonstrated, the process of transformation of the Alliance has had an indirect impact on NATO's engagement in civil protection. The development of new military capabilities, which have proved useful for the prevention and response to civil emergencies, has facilitated NATO's involvement in such operations. In turn, the growing role of NATO's military assets in support of civil protection raises questions as to the need for a re-definition of the Alliance's priorities and missions. This is why we recommend that NATO's future role in civil protection should be considered as part of the broader debate on NATO's transformation.

73. There is however no consensus among Allies for a major re-thinking of the Alliance's role in civil protection or for an expansion of NATO's role in disaster relief or anti-terrorism. This is due mainly to diverging visions among Allies regarding NATO's role in the current security environment. Whereas some countries would like NATO to remain a traditional military alliance focusing on collective defence of Allied territory against attacks, others push for NATO's transformation into a global security agency, which would use its unique assets to assist with crisis situations wherever and whenever needed. The lack of consensus on NATO's future role in civil protection has led the Alliance to intervene on an *ad hoc* basis. This approach has sometimes resulted in overlaps with other organisations engaged in civil protection activities, mainly the United Nations and the European Union.

IV. CO-OPERATION WITH THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

74. NATO's two main international partners in the field of civil protection are the United Nations and the European Union. Co-operation with the former is relatively well established, whereas with the latter, many issues remain unresolved.

A. CO-OPERATION WITH THE UNITED NATIONS

75. The United Nations plays a leading role in disaster response. The rules and procedures regarding NATO's engagement in civil emergency recognise the United Nations' leadership and organise the close co-ordination of NATO actions with relevant UN authorities. In the event of a disaster in which NATO considers taking action, the EADRCC systematically consults with the UN-OCHA, which maintains a liaison officer in Brussels. UN-OCHA is primarily responsible for disaster assessment and for assisting the stricken country with co-ordinating relief operations. The EADRCC acts as a liaison between UN-OCHA and NATO capitals. This aspect of UN-NATO co-operation has been tested many times and functions well.

76. However, other questions arise, when, at the request of the United Nations or the stricken country, the Alliance plays a more prominent role in relief operations, including through military means. NATO's operations in Pakistan provided for such an opportunity. On 13 October 2005, the EADRCC received a request from the UNHCR to assist with the delivery of 10,000 tents, 104,000 blankets and 2,000 stoves from Turkey to Pakistan. Other UN agencies also requested NATO's assistance. As a result, NATO's air bridge to Pakistan was mostly dedicated to delivering UN assistance. Some 130 flights out of a total of 160 were used to deliver 2,300 tons of relief goods provided by the United Nations agencies.

77. The Pakistan operation also provided a second test for UN-NATO co-operation, when NATO decided to deploy the NRF to assist with relief efforts on the ground. Operations were co-ordinated through UN-led cells, under the supervision of the UN Disaster Assessment and Co-ordination teams. In particular, the UN Humanitarian Air Service directed all deliveries of assistance through air operations by the Pakistani military, other foreign militaries (United States, Australia) and NATO.

78. Both organisations assessed co-operation in Pakistan as unprecedented and largely positive. Nevertheless, the Pakistan operation also demonstrated where potential sources of tension can arise. First, there is always some reluctance on the part of humanitarian organisations (UN agencies or NGOs) to co-operate with the military. The presence of foreign military also raises the question of acceptance from the local population, particularly in zones of conflict like Kashmir. Finally, in a situation where several national and international players are involved and acting in an emergency mode, the issue of leadership and command can sometimes create tensions. Ultimately, the host country – as far as it is still capable to do so – should direct relief efforts. Tension could arise if the United Nations and NATO disagree on the way to implement the host nation's directions. If such cases have happened in Pakistan, there is, however, no indication that they resulted in any serious impediment to relief efforts.

79. These and other lessons learned from the Pakistan operation prompted the United Nations to consider a revision of the existing guidelines for civil-military co-operation in disaster relief, which are incorporated in two major documents: the 1994 Oslo Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA) in Disaster Relief and the 2003 Guidelines on the Use of MCDA to Support UN Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies. Moreover, both organisations are currently engaged in negotiations for the adoption of a comprehensive framework agreement on UN-NATO cooperation.

B. THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

80. Responsibilities for civil protection do not constitute a unified block within the European Union, but involve the participation of different players, according to diverse and complex procedures. Civil protection remains primarily a national responsibility. In line with the principle of subsidiarity, the Union's institutions can only intervene as far as they enhance and complement national policies. Therefore, the Union's policies for civil protection have tended to focus on the following missions: cross-border co-operation, co-ordination of national efforts, information sharing and external aspects (relations with third countries and international organisations).

81. The Union's civil protection mechanisms are for now split across the different pillars. Some instruments belong to the first pillar – common policies. This includes the European Commission's mechanisms for disaster preparedness and response, as well as some common policies relating to the fight against terrorism (e.g. terrorism financing). Other instruments belong in the second pillar, which deals with all security and defence-related aspects, including interventions in third countries. These areas remain the responsibility of member states under the umbrella of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Finally, the third pillar – Justice and Home Affairs – includes some counter-terrorism instruments and policies (e.g. border control, police and justice co-operation, etc), for which the Union plays a co-ordinating role.

82. The Community Action Programme created in 1999 provides the main policy framework for projects aimed at enhancing the prevention, preparedness and response capabilities of member states to natural and man-made disasters. This was complemented in 2001 by the Community Mechanism for Civil Protection (CPM), which allows for reinforced co-operation on a voluntary basis in assistance interventions. The Mechanism's main operational tool is the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC), which is run by the Commission's Directorate-General for the Environment. The MIC is the Union's equivalent of NATO's EADRCC. Its main function is to provide a platform for matching requests and offers of assistance in the event of a disaster occurring inside or outside the territory of the Union. It is also tasked with providing relevant real-time information. 30 countries currently participate in the MIC (EU member states, Bulgaria, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Romania). Recently, the MIC was used to monitor EU assistance in response to the Tsunami in South Asia; Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in the United States; the earthquake in Pakistan; forest fires in Portugal, and floods in Romania, Bulgaria and Algeria.

83. The Union's intervention following the tsunami in South East Asia in the winter of 2004/2005 revealed a number of weaknesses in the functioning of the Civil Protection Mechanism. This prompted the Commission to propose a number of initiatives in order to enhance the Mechanism. The core proposal aims at the creation of a European Rapid Reaction Capability, which would rely on rapidly deployable standby pools of equipment and/or personnel – so-called "modules" – supplied by one country or several countries together. This formula represents a compromise between those member states which favour the establishment of an actual civil protection force of the European Union – as suggested in a report from former French Commissioner Michel Barnier – and those which oppose any attempt at bringing civil protection entirely under EU responsibility. Other initiatives aim at improving the Commission's early warning and situation assessment capabilities, as well as better defining the division of tasks and responsibility between the different institutions for interventions in third countries.

84. Nevertheless, some serious issues still remain. One relates to the transport of assistance to the field of a disaster. EU member states are responsible for arranging the transport of their own assistance and only a few of them own strategic airlift capabilities. This resulted for instance in two EU member states requesting the use of the NATO air bridge to ship their relief goods in response to the Pakistan earthquake. The Commission's proposal only encourages member states to pool their

transport resources together, but does not provide for any common action. A second related issue is the role of the military in responding to natural disasters. The European Union has never engaged military assets in response to a natural disaster and there is still no clear EU arrangement to organise the intervention of the military in support of civilian assistance. Member states are only encouraged to inform the Union of the military assets that they are willing to volunteer in the event of a disaster.

85. The European Union has also progressively developed a set of instruments and policies for combating terrorism. The most significant initiatives have been adopted in the first and third pillars, to improve border, police and justice co-operation in the Union. Landmark programmes include the European Arrest Warrant, Europol and Eurojust. In December 2004, the Council approved a Conceptual Framework on the ESDP Dimension of the Fight Against Terrorism, which details the potential roles of the EU civil and military crisis management capabilities in four aspects of the fight against terrorism: prevention, protection, consequence management, and support to third countries. First steps in this direction have included the creation of a database of military capabilities available in the member states in the event of a terrorist attack, as well as a Situation Centre (SITCEN), which analyses intelligence transmitted by member states' agencies and provides an assessment of pan-European threats. However, in the field of ESDP, the European Union's role in the fight against terrorism is still nascent and essentially prospective.

86. Most recent efforts have focused on drawing potential scenarios for the Union's response to major emergencies, as well as guidelines for interactions between all relevant players: member states, Commission, Council, and Presidency. The main product of this effort is a Manual on EU emergency and crisis co-ordination, adopted by the Council in June 2006, which, on the basis of a scenario involving a major emergency (multiple terrorist attacks or large pandemic), details every step of the Union's response, including internal co-ordination in Brussels and communication with pre-identified national contact points.

87. Some of the EU's instruments, in particular police and justice co-operation in the fight against terrorism, provide it with unique tools, which have no equivalent within NATO. However, many other current or planned mechanisms duplicate the Alliance's own tools. The MIC, as we have said, can be seen as an equivalent of the EADRCC. In the event of a disaster, countries that are members of both mechanisms thus have to choose which one to use for their requests and offers of assistance. Both organisations have their own early warning systems, their inventories of national capabilities and their own mechanisms for sharing information and communicating during crisis. Finally, both NATO and the EU are considering a role in the future for the protection of critical infrastructures. Yet, there is for now no structured division of labour and framework for co-operation between NATO and the EU either in the field of natural disasters or in the field of terrorism. Some contacts exist at the inter-governmental level, but institutional rivalry remains strong. Moreover, there is literally no institutional dialogue between NATO and the European Commission and other EU institutions are very reluctant to allow any such contacts in the near future. The current situation, in which both institutions develop their own mechanisms independently from each other and with only minimum co-ordination, is clearly not satisfactory. Overlaps will only increase as the Union develops its military capabilities. The following chapter examines some ways of rationalising NATO's role, while taking into account developments at the EU level.

V. CONCLUSION: RATIONALISING NATO'S ROLE IN CIVIL PROTECTION

A. NATO'S CONTRIBUTION TO "CIVILIAN CIVIL PROTECTION"

88. NATO has been providing civil protection for over 50 years now through civilian programmes such as CEP, the EADRCC and others. These programmes have focused primarily on the co-ordination of assistance in the event of a natural disaster. The Alliance has also promoted initiatives to improve the preparedness of member and partner countries to disaster and terrorist attacks (e.g. promotion of new technology, training and exercises, interoperability of emergency services, etc). However, since these activities are not central tasks for the Alliance, and the European Union is now developing similar initiatives, it seems reasonable to ask to what extent NATO's role in this area is justified.

89. First and foremost, the Alliance, in this area as in others, provides a unique forum for transatlantic dialogue. As NATO's common statement following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in the United States has demonstrated, shows of solidarity between Allies are particularly valuable when it comes to the protection of their own populations. Even if NATO's mechanisms are not always activated, a continued dialogue is necessary to achieve common threat assessments and develop common approaches to civil protection. Although the US-EU dialogue tackles some of these issues, NATO remains an irreplaceable forum for building transatlantic consensus and solidarity.

90. The Alliance has also developed unique expertise in assisting partner nations with preparedness and response to natural disaster and terrorist attacks. As mentioned earlier, CEP represents the largest non-military component of NATO's PfP activities. As part of its security sector reform programmes, NATO has encouraged the reorganisation of civil emergency services for better efficiency of action and better democratic control. It has provided a broad framework for co-operation between neighbours on a relatively non-controversial issue, thereby contributing to confidence-building in tension-prone regions such as the South Caucasus.

91. Finally, the EADRCC has largely demonstrated its capacity to provide a useful framework for co-ordinating disaster assistance in NATO member and partner countries and beyond. Training programmes and operations of the EADRCC also provide a forum for testing and improving the disaster response capabilities of NATO nations and their interoperability in operation. The EADRCC has not yet been called to intervene in response to a terrorist attack, and it seems relatively unlikely to happen in the near future, except maybe in the event of a major emergency, which would completely overwhelm the emergency services of one nation.

92. It remains however that, under NATO's current mandate, civil protection is not a core task for the Alliance. Unless the Washington Treaty or NATO's Strategic Concept are revised in the radical manner that some – including Mr Aznar – have suggested, which is very unlikely in the current circumstances, NATO is not in a position to do much more than it already does. Some have suggested for instance that the NAC meetings regularly include participation from Ministers of Interior of NATO nations. In the current context, such an initiative would certainly raise strong opposition from a number of NATO members, which favour either a greater role for the European Union (e.g. France), a leading role for the UN (e.g. Nordic countries), or simply the primary role of individual nations (e.g. the United Kingdom) in this area.

93. Nevertheless, there is room to improve NATO's current contribution to "civilian civil protection". First, in terms of prevention, the Allies need to enhance their dialogue on the nature and seriousness of the threats. In a recent study on NATO's role in the fight against terrorism, the Atlantic Council of the United States (ACUS) advocated greater and re-focused NATO involvement in intelligence activities, taking into account the reluctance, which we have already mentioned, of some NATO states to share intelligence across the whole Alliance. The report concludes that "the highly adaptive nature of the terrorist threat requires frequent adjustments in ways of thinking and responding. NATO can

provide unique added value by focusing on improving understanding of terrorist modes of operation and intelligence problem-solving, rather than on the exchange of actionable intelligence that involves highly sensitive sources and methods. Such intelligence is better handled and shared through bilateral arrangements”, i.e. between individual nations. NATO, through its Science programmes, could also play a more active role in promoting research and development into new CBRN detection capabilities. In terms of preparedness, NATO could enhance its partnership programmes, particularly with partners from the Mediterranean and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

94. Another fundamental requirement is a closer co-operation with the EU on all these issues. Regarding the civilian contribution to civil protection, the EU undeniably has a comparative advantage over NATO, because it is mostly a civilian organisation. Many EU initiatives have no equivalent within NATO and clearly constitute a niche of European expertise. These are in particular all aspects of border, justice and police co-operation in the fight against terrorism. In the areas where EU and NATO initiatives overlap, such as programmes and mechanisms for disaster prevention and preparedness, co-ordination and a clear division of labour between both organisations would be highly desirable to avoid duplication. In the current context, NATO has proved better suited for large operations, including in far-away places, whereas the EU could provide a useful framework for intra-EU operations. Moreover, the European project of “civil protection modules” could allow for the development of reinforced co-operation between a limited number of interested countries. Such types of co-operation already exist among several European countries.

95. Potential areas for improved co-operation between NATO and the EU could also include joint threat assessments, for example through the joint meetings of the NAC and the Political and Security Committee; joint financing of science and technology programmes; joint training programmes and exercises. Both organisations should also maintain and improve their co-operation with the UN in disaster relief operations.

B. NATO’S CONTRIBUTION TO “MILITARY CIVIL PROTECTION”

96. In recent years, NATO has increasingly engaged its military assets in civil protection tasks, either directly in support of one member or partner, or to enhance security in the Euro-Atlantic area in general. This is where the debate on NATO’s role in civil protection becomes more controversial, because it raises two important questions: first, why should national militaries be involved at all in civil protection; second, why is NATO the appropriate forum for co-ordinating the military contribution to civil protection in the Euro-Atlantic space?

97. The participation of the military in civil protection missions is not obvious. There are in fact many different approaches to this issue among NATO and EU member states. Traditionally, the responsibility for the protection of civilian populations from disasters and other emergencies lies primarily with individual states and their civilian authorities. In most countries, the Ministry of Internal Affairs is responsible for civil protection, whereas in a number of others (e.g. Ireland, Spain, Sweden, Lithuania, Denmark), civil protection falls under the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence. Moreover, in some countries, the military is largely prohibited from intervening in domestic emergencies – usually for historical reasons (e.g. the United States), whereas in others (e.g. France), the military is regularly called to support civilian emergency response efforts.

98. In the context of the global fight against terrorism, differences of opinion have also appeared across the Atlantic between those countries which consider that terrorism requires a military response (war against terror) and those which consider that is an issue of law enforcement (i.e. police and justice). The United States have been at the forefront in promoting the first thesis, arguing that in the

current context, in which the terrorist threat comes both from inside and outside one nation's borders, there should be a growing interconnection between homeland security – the civilian contribution to civil protection; and homeland defence – the military contribution to civil protection. Interestingly, the United States therefore tend to promote a military response to terrorism abroad, while federal authorities are restricted, for constitutional reasons, in their use of the military for protection against terrorism at home.

99. Even if many Allies disagree with the broad implications of this thesis, there is undeniably a tendency in recent years to consider the potential contribution of the military to civil protection. This follows a growing recognition that the current transformation of Allied militaries provides them with tools that could prove useful in enhancing civil protection. This idea is explicitly conveyed in the US Department of Defense's Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support of June 2005, which states: "Our adversaries consider US territory an integral part of a global theater of combat. We must therefore have a strategy that applies to the domestic context the key principles that are driving the transformation of US power projection and joint expeditionary warfare".

100. Debates and differences on these issues have been exacerbated within NATO, as demonstrated in the discussions over the extension of NATO's engagement in Afghanistan or the Alliance's role in Iraq. As there is no agreement on clear guidelines for NATO's military role in support of civil protection, NATO's involvement has until now been mainly resource-driven and *ad hoc*, instead of needs-driven and strategically thought out. Member states, recognising that NATO is developing military capabilities, which could prove useful for enhancing the security of citizens in the Euro-Atlantic area, have engaged those military assets in various operations.

101. As a result, NATO has developed a number of niche areas of expertise: border security / early warning (e.g. Operation Active Endeavour); prevention of terrorism and WMD (e.g. protection of major public event through AWACS, the NRF or the CBRN Battalion); disaster relief (e.g. Katrina or Pakistan). It has also tried to engage partners to participate in some of these efforts (e.g. participation of Russia and Ukraine in Active Endeavour).

102. However, in this area also, it is doubtful whether Allies would agree to extend NATO's mandate far beyond what it is already doing. NATO support to disaster relief operations is generally less controversial. Member states have recognised that NATO's rapid reaction and projection capabilities could prove particularly useful in response to major disasters. One issue remains however regarding whether NATO's military assets should be used for more than mere support functions (e.g. strategic airlift). In this sense, the Pakistan operation, which represented a relatively long engagement of the NRF on the ground, provided an interesting test of NATO's capacity to assist with relief missions on the ground and co-ordinate effectively with civilian authorities and other international relief organisations. It also raised the issue of funding for the NRF, which will need to be addressed in the near future. Lessons learned from this experience should help answer some of the questions regarding the role of the Alliance's militaries in disaster relief. Engagement of the Alliance in anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism operations will also most likely continue to raise serious debate within the Alliance, unless an agreement is found on the Alliance's role in this area.

103. Meanwhile the EU is also developing its military capabilities and doctrines for the use of EU assets in response to natural disasters and terrorist attacks. These developments already raise questions of co-ordination vs. duplication with NATO. Although the Union's experience with military support to civilian operations is still relatively limited, the Union's comparative advantage, at least in theory, lies in its ability to gather under one institutional roof civilian and military assets. In practice, this has proved slightly more complicated because different EU institutions are responsible for both

aspects and cross-pillar co-ordination has not always been extremely efficient. Nevertheless, it remains that the EU has the potential to combine military assets with unique civilian expertise. The Union could therefore claim a comparative advantage for multi-purpose civil-military operations in the field of civil protection, at least for intra-EU operations.

104. Alternatively, some observers and NATO officials have floated the idea of a “reverse Berlin plus agreement” between both organisations, allowing NATO to use the Union’s civilian capabilities in response to civil emergencies, but this proposal has not been met with great enthusiasm within EU institutions. One could imagine a scenario in which the EU, when needed, would deploy its civilian experts (e.g. the rapid reaction modules), using the type of military support it lacks for the time being (e.g. NATO’s strategic airlift capabilities). This, however, would require a major shift in the current attitudes of both organisations towards each other. In the near future, it seems more likely that the division of labour will depend on the location and scale of a disaster, with the EU claiming leadership for intra-EU crises, and NATO for larger crises in third countries, where effective projection capabilities would be required.

APPENDIX
CIVIL PROTECTION IN NATO

The diagram below illustrates the main NATO programmes and activities, which contribute to civil protection.

