On 28 July 1995 the Belgian Government adopted a note on its policy for the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference as a subject for consultation with the Belgian Communities and Regions at the Interministerial Conference on Foreign Policy in September. The note was finally approved by the Council of Ministers on 13 October 1995 and submitted for discussion to the Belgian Chamber and Senate, with a view to enabling the government to decide on the position it would adopt at the Intergovernmental Conference. The points of view expressed in the note are only an initial expression of the Belgian view for the whole IGC, which will be adjusted and corrected piece by piece as negotiations progress, in close contact with the Belgian Parliament, Communities and Regions.
As a fundamental aspect of Belgium's European policy the Belgian Government thinks it should be a priority of foreign policy to seek to develop the European Union on a federal basis, as part of a socio-economic model in which economic growth goes hand in hand with social progress. Specifically, the Belgian Government believes that Economic and Monetary Union should be backed up by stronger social protection, laws to safeguard a high degree of environmental protection and practical harmonization on taxes. The Belgian Government also favours maintaining European integration on a Community, not intergovernmental, basis, arguing that the Community method is a better way of reconciling efficiency through majority decision-making with effective protection against the abuse of power. The government thinks that European integration is a way of enabling all the Member States to exert a real influence in a world in which globalization continues apace. The government has announced that during the IGC it will be guided primarily by its wish to consolidate the Union. To this end it has announced the following guidelines:
The Belgian Government thinks consolidation should enable the European Union to continue to expand without risking dissolution or compromising European and Monetary Union. With this in mind, and with regard to the institutional adjustments required for expansion, Belgium assumes that each country will have to be able to identify itself in the decision-making process which will thus need to improve its efficiency. The new Member States will have to accept the Community patrimony in its entirety and share all of the Union's objectives, if necessary by setting up a multi-speed arrangement managed by the Commission.
A challenging issue for the IGC will, in the Belgian Government's view, be the need to consolidate the European Union before expanding it. It takes the view that political union, the political structure essential for Economic and Monetary Union, remains incomplete in the aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty and its development needs to be encouraged by the IGC to ensure that the completion of Economic and Monetary Union proceeds in parallel with the search for ways to develop political union and social Europe. The development of the European Union should therefore be based on the Community's existing achievements and on the Union Treaty, whose imperfections must be put right. The aim must be to safeguard the prosperity and welfare of European citizens, promote internal security within the European Union and strengthen the Union's position towards the outside world.
On further enlargement the Belgian Government thinks that the Union should first adapt its working methods and that the Union's policies cannot be extrapolated unconditionally as regards their substance. Belgium thinks that the Community patrimony, structural policies and the CAP are the result of an essential solidarity and fundamental equilibria within the European Union, and that the new Member States will have to adapt to this patrimony. Belgium also thinks that the IGC is not the forum for discussing renegotiation of the Union's system of finance and that enlargement must be incorporated not by dismantling any existing policies but by introducing special transitional measures in the final accession Treaties.
On future challenges facing the Union, the Belgian Government supports a separate approach to each issue as the best way of ensuring success. It mentions the following: transition to the third stage of Economic and Monetary Union; review of the Structural Funds; the CAP; the system of financing; the accession of new Member States; development cooperation policy and Mediterranean policy. The Belgian Government's policy paper also addresses the issue of ratifying the results of the IGC. It believes it would be unacceptable for one or more MemberStates to be allowed to hold up progress on European integration towards an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, for which it believes thought must be given to the political and institutional choices that are bound to arise if the results of the IGC negotiations are not unanimously endorsed. It also thinks that the 1996 IGC should culminate in a readable Treaty, and as its contribution to the transparency of European integration, without wishing to affect the Community patrimony, it puts forward the idea of recasting the present Treaties in a single text.
The policy paper also devotes a chapter to the issue of adequate decision-making at the appropriate level. On subsidiarity, the Belgian Government thinks the principle should never result in the systematic ossification or erosion of Community law. In its view the present subsidiarity mechanisms are working properly. It regards subsidiarity as essentially a principle of good administration and thinks a more positive wording of the present definition would be desirable, based on the criteria of need, efficiency and proximity. It also states its conviction that, on the basis of the constitutional provisions of the various Member States, the same principle applies within their own internal legal systems, and announces that at the IGC it will endeavour to convince the other participants of this view. Any renegotiation of the subsidiarity definition will only be possible if it does not affect the operation and further development of European integration and if the distribution of the Member States' internal powers is not subjected to control by the Court of Justice.
On relations between the European Union, Belgium as a federal Member State and the Belgian Communities and Regions, the Belgian Government considers subsidiarity to be an essential principle for such relations, which takes physical form in the Committee of the Regions of the Union, enabling the Communities and Regions to speak directly on certain issues relating to the European Union. The government also points out that Belgium was the first Member State to make practical use of the opportunity under Article 146 of the Maastricht Treaty to be represented on the Council by ministers who were not members of the national government, and that this has taken practical shape in Belgium in a cooperation agreement on representation within the European Union, concluded between the Federal State and the Communities and Regions. On matters in which the Communities and Regions have exclusive responsibility under the Belgian Constitution, their governments will be participating, under the coordination of the Belgian Foreign Ministry, in the negotiations at the IGC, and all the parliaments in Belgium will be involved on an equal basis in the progress of the negotiations.
On the division of powers, the Belgian Government considers that such powers should be delimited to make the Union more efficient, transparent and democratic, but that to draw up a fixed and rigid 'catalogue of powers' would be hard to reconcile with the dynamic and evolving nature of European integration. It also thinks that a 'specific list of powers' would not add anything substantially new to the Union's aims and responsibilities as they emerge from the Treaty and the case law of the Court of Justice. It will try to ensure that the Union does not exceed the aims and powers allocated to it by subsequent recourse to the Court. The Belgian Government also thinks that Article 235 of the Treaty should be maintained to safeguard the dynamic and evolving nature of European integration. It is in favour of moderate use of the article and of involving Parliament in its application. It opposes any tendencyto misuse Article 235 as a way of taking decisions by a unanimous vote on subjects for which the Treaty specifies a qualified majority. It thinks that revision of the Treaty should not involve the abolition of any field of activity of the Union or of specific sectors like civil defence, energy and tourism. At the request of the Belgian Communities and Regions, it will in due course be putting to the IGC specific proposals to amend the Treaty articles on education, professional training, young people, culture and the media, public health, environmental policy, transport policy and, possibly tourism and sport.
To secure a sustainable level of prosperity in Europe, the government wants a common minimum threshold for social security, taxation and the environment, for the social protocol to be incorporated in the Union Treaty, institutional confirmation of the results of the social dialogue, upward harmonization of social security provisions, the insertion of social convergence criteria, the insertion of social and environmental clauses in the common commercial policy, the definition and specification of the universal service, the fight against poverty and social exclusion. Belgium also considers that the Union's decision-making capacity should be boosted so as to contribute more efficiently to economic revival, greater competitiveness and the promotion of employment. So it proposes adopting measures to develop the trans-European transport, energy and telecommunications networks, encourage the distribution of work and underpin social policy. It also wants special attention to be given to small businesses and for the European Union to recognize in the Treaty itself the concept of, and opportunities for action provided by, public service. On Economic and Monetary Union, Belgium considers that the agreements should be fully implemented in a process that would make European integration irreversible. Once the final phase of Economic and Monetary Union takes effect, it says, there will also be a need to maintain macroeconomic convergence between the Members of the Economic and Monetary Union. Finally, it believes that the 'temporary monetary cohabitation' of the single currency with the other national currencies must not damage the single market and that action must always be taken to ensure that all the Member States of the European Union eventually fulfil the conditions for accession to Economic and Monetary Union. On other policies, the paper highlights two institutional consequences of establishing a common minimum threshold in the social, environmental and fiscal field. On the first, the Belgian Government comes out in favour of extending qualified majority voting in the Council to social, ecological and fiscal matters. On the second, on the structure of the Union, it thinks that the balance between the rights and duties of the Member States should be maintained and that all the Member States which benefit from the advantages of the single market should accordingly also apply the European social, ecological and fiscal rules in full, in order to avoid the risk of downward competition in the social, ecological and fiscal area, which would threaten the single market itself. For these reasons the Belgian Government rejects the idea of 'Europe a la carte'.
The Belgian paper also refers to questions of the third pillar, the ' Union of Law and Security'. In this respect it thinks that the intergovernmental method has shown its limits and that every avenue must be explored for applying the Community method in the third pillar. Specifically, it favours transferring to the first or Community pillar those matters linked with Community powers, such as the asylum and visa policy, which is connected with the free movement of persons; and customs cooperation on the fight against drugs, which is linked with the free movement of goods. It proposes that the other subjects should continue to come under the third pillar and that intergovernmental cooperationon justice and home affairs should apply more efficient methods, based as far as possible on the Community methods of the first pillar. In the Belgian view, this would mean extending the Commission's right of initiative on judicial cooperation to the civil sphere, customs cooperation and police cooperation; extending majority voting; stepping up the European Parliament's role wherever the Council adopts decisions of a legislative nature and/or takes decisions by a majority vote; and the obligatory powers of the Court of Justice. Here the Belgian Government is prepared to accept transitional periods and to distinguish between the legislative and operational spheres; it favours transfrontier access to justice for the European citizen and integration of the Schengen Agreement into the European Union.
The Belgian Government paper deals with the European Union's foreign policy in a chapter entitled ' A Union with a decisive voice and impact in the world at large'. As regards the Community's external economic policy, it welcomes the results obtained by using the Community method and is in favour of the Union's external economic policy continuing in the same Community tradition as at present while also setting an example for other fields of foreign policy. It would like to strengthen and extend the Commission's foreign policy powers to the service industries and will oppose any attempt to disrupt the unity of the Union's foreign representation as provided at present by the Commission. As regards cohesion between the pillars of the Union, from the point of view of the cohesion of the Union's foreign representation the Belgian Government says one of its aims will be to bring the pillars closer together and eventually to merge them.
As regards the common foreign and security policy, the Belgian paper deals mainly with the way policy is prepared and promoted. It expresses the hope that the Commission will continue to make full use of its right of initiative, which should be cultivated into a full-scale agency for progress. To this end the Commission should not just use its own resources and powers but should also draw upon the cooperation and assistance of the Member States. In particular, the Belgian Government will endeavour at the IGC to strengthen the Commission's right of initiative by adding a Treaty provision under which Commission foreign policy proposals must be adopted by a qualified majority in the Council. On the process of adopting decisions the Belgian Government supports the view that CFSP decisions should be adopted by a qualified majority vote. It points out that the introduction of the majority system for decision-making does not mean that a Member State will be compelled against its will to take active part in any action that would involve the use of military resources. It starts from the principle that all the Member States are politically and financially involved in a common decision. As regards putting the CFSP into practice the Belgian Government thinks that the IGC should endeavour to strengthen the CFSP instruments, especially the joint action instrument introduced by the Maastricht Treaty. It regards the Commission as the Union agency par excellence capable of providing for joint application of resources in a joint action framework. Only the Commission is capable of providing the essential continuity of action and coordination with other Union activities in the Community sphere. However, it does not give the Commission exclusive implementing powers for the CFSP or propose setting up a large-scale administrative apparatus, but points out that the diplomatic network, experience, personnel and resources available in each of the Member States should be fully utilized in a joint approach, with the Commission acting as a catalyst and coordinator. The Belgian Government also favours wider application of Community funding of the CFSP. On the issue of the legal personality of the Union, Belgium thinks that such personality is essential to carry out any joint activity with efficiency. In place of separate responsibility between the European Community and the European Union, the Belgian Government proposes a formula giving the Union specific powers to conclude Treaties, for instance by means of a Treaty provision empowering the European Union to conclude agreements with third parties within the context of joint actions.
On the common European defence policy the Belgian Government favours bringing the WEU as far as possible into line with the Union, with a view to eventual integration. Indeed, phased integration is regarded as the best opinion, carried out in a series of stages starting with the operational and institutional role of the WEU (developing its operational capacities; administrative rapprochement between the WEU and the European Union; rapprochement between Member States and the WEU observer countries; coordination of WEU action under the CFSP, particularly with regard to the provisions on joint action and Community financing). In addition, following enlargement the Belgian Government refers to the option to introduce a principle of explicit solidarity in a new Union Treaty, though without giving automatic security safeguards, a requirement to consult in the event of threat and arbitration in the event of a conflict between Member States.
The paper examines the institutional questions when discussing the Union's transparency and efficiency. Broadly speaking, the Belgian Government thinks it essential to strengthen and expand the Union's role and powers throughout the scope of application of the Union Treaty, not only with regard to the roles of the Commission, Parliament and Court of Justice but also in calling for the Council to take its decisions by a qualified majority as a general rule. The Belgian Government believes the decision-making process itself should be more efficient, transparent and democratic and proposes, as major improvements, extending majority voting to policies relating to the single market (social policy, the environment and taxation), extending Parliament's right of codecision and simplifying a number of existing procedures.
As regards Parliament itself, the Belgian Government thinks that the call for greater democratic legitimacy will mean giving the European Parliament a bigger role. It does not share the view that legitimacy resides in the national parliaments, Council of Ministers or the European Council. To improve the European Parliament's present operation, the Belgian Government proposes the following measures: simplifying the present parliamentary procedures, reducing them to the codecision, assent and consultation procedures; making Parliament's right of codecision a general rule by extending its field of application to every case in which a decision is taken by a qualified majority; and scrapping the unanimity requirement in cases where codecision already applies. The Belgian Government also wants to consider in detail the possibility of applying the principle of general codecision to the budget procedure, in order to remove the distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure.
On the role of the Member States' parliaments, the Belgian Government notes that these already exert a de facto influence on the decision-making process and the activities of the Union, in practice through their control over what are effectively national members of the Council (i.e. the Ministers), and through the information and consultation process (in Belgium through regular joint meetings between European and national MPs in the European Affairs Committee ofthe Chamber of Representatives, a formula which it recommends to the other Member States). The Belgian Government considers that the relinquishment of sovereignty concerns the parliaments as much as the governments of the Member States and need not involve a democratic deficit or a loss of control and that, finally, closer involvement of the Member States' parliaments in the day-to-day running of Europe is primarily a matter of internal organization in each of the Member States, rather than a question of setting up additional structures at European level. It also favours strengthening the European Parliament's democratic control as the best way of remedying the democratic deficit.
On the Commission, Belgium is a convinced supporter of its central role and considers that general application of the Community method (which Belgium recommends) will improve efficiency and transparency in the European Union and give the Union institutions a clearer role, strengthening and extending the central and crucial role of the Commission throughout the European Union. In particular, the Belgian Government gives its unstinting support to full exercise and extension of the right of co-initiative in the field of the second and third pillars.
On the Council, the Belgian Government expects to oppose any proposals for expanding the Council's powers to the detriment of the Commission. It believes that general introduction of decision-making by a qualified majority is the best way of improving the decision-making process and achieving greater operational efficiency throughout the Union. It supports the view that, under the first pillar and in fields relating to social policy, the environment and taxation, the Council should, in principle, take its decisions by a qualified majority. Unanimity should only be required to amend the Treaty, the language system and accession. On the second and third pillars the Belgian Government proposes that wherever possible decisions should be adopted by a qualified majority. It opposes upholding the Ioannina Agreement designed to lower the threshold for vetoing a decision adopted by a qualified majority.
On the Court of Justice, the Belgian Government favours strengthening the role of the Court by scrapping all the limits imposed on its jurisdiction in the new fields of cooperation under the Treaty, particularly as regards cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs. On the Court of Auditors, with a view to stepping up the fight against fraud, it favours strengthening the Court's role by giving it powers to inform the national parliaments directly in the event of national fraud concerning European resources. It intends to take a positive attitude to any initiatives to improve the legal instruments for combating fraud in the Community and is in favour of stepping up cooperation between the European and national courts of auditors. It claims consultative powers for the Committee of the Regions in relation to the European Parliament and favours compulsory consultation of the Committee of the Regions in the case of Community policies which, in certain Member States, are administered by the communities, regions or local authorities, particularly with regard to vocational training, the environment and regional planning. It also believes there is a need to require the Council and Commission to give reasons for disregarding opinions handed down by the Committee of the Regions. On the Economic and Social Committee, the Belgian Government thinks the Committee's role should be maintained and increased.
On particular aspects of cooperation between the institutions, the Belgian Government refers first to the question of commitology. It appears to believethat where the Council is involved in implementation, and especially where it reserves the right of a final decision in the commitology procedure, Parliament should also be involved. As regards the hierarchy of legislative acts, the Belgian Government considers that this primarily provides an opportunity to introduce Community framework legislation to be backed up by national law. In its view this method has the advantage that the European Parliament can concentrate on essentials and leave the details of implementation to the Member States.
The Belgian paper also raises the issue of European citizenship. In addition to making full use of the Treaty's present provisions, the Belgian Government would like to increase the number of citizens' rights, mentioning in particular accession by the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and other conventions which define fundamental rights and freedoms including the Social Charter, and incorporation in the Treaty of a list of fundamental rights and freedoms.
It also mentions the option of limited extension of the present list of rights and obligations in the Treaty as regards the fight against racism and xenophobia, and favours introducing a mechanism to impose penalties, including the suspension of membership, on any Member States which do not fulfil their obligations with regard to democratic freedoms and human rights.
With the aim of avoiding future vetoes, the Belgian Government favours flexibility in the approach to European integration. It is against any solutions involving the organization of a 'Europe à la carte', on which it considers that any blockages must be surmounted in accordance with the system laid down by the Treaty. This means that the Member States can only make progress by consent. The government accordingly considers that at the IGC the Member States must try to reach agreements and arrangements that will facilitate a decision in this direction. Opposing a single-core or multi-core Europe, the Belgian Government thinks the option to proceed with differentiated integration deserves taking seriously, on the basis of the following principles: differentiation is not an end in itself but a last resort to protect the progress of integration from any veto; it should create a 'traction effect', meaning that the arrangements must allow all the Member States to catch up with the leading bunch; the target scope of differentiation must be carefully selected and suited to the task; institutional derogations must be confined to the minimum; the efficient operation of the market must not be compromised; and the key to differentiation must be placed in the Commission's hands as the independent institution and guardian of the common interest, with the Council deciding the issue by a majority vote.
The Belgian Government also raises the issue of enlargement as a factor for prosperity and security in Europe. It points out that accession negotiations should start on completion of the IGC and the results of the Conference should be taken into account during negotiations. It assumes that enlargement is not in question and that the Union's achievements cannot be diluted. At the same time, enlargement cannot proceed at the expense of consolidation of the Union. In the Belgian Government's opinion the IGC must prepare the decision-making process to face the two-fold challenge of a larger number of Member States and a greater diversity between them. On preparations for enlargement, the Belgian Government considers that the applicant countries should make similar efforts to comply with the conditions for accession laid down by the Copenhagen EuropeanCouncil in June 1993 with regard to arrangements for democracy and the market economy. The European Union should also be preparing for enlargement, and here the paper proposes transitional mechanisms for a limited period and subject to certain criteria. On the institutional side, the paper raises the question of the number of MEPs at the European Parliament, though without taking a view. On the Commission, the Belgian Government favours the principle of one commissioner per Member State in the current phase of European integration and rejects the idea of 'regional commissioners', i.e. a smaller total number of commissioners, with the large countries having one each and other commissioners each representing a regional grouping of smaller Member States. On the Council, the Belgian Government considers that an enlarged Union's capacity for decision-making can only be safeguarded by expanding qualified majority voting, not only on Community matters but also on the CFSP and cooperation on justice and home affairs. With regard to establishing super-qualified majorities, it thinks that such majorities can only be accepted for decision-making in cases where the Commission has a non-exclusive right of initiative, i.e. the CFSP and cooperation on justice and home affairs. On the other hand, in cases where it does have an exclusive right of initiative, there is no reason to raise the qualified majority above the present level (71% of the total vote in the Council, or 62 out of 87 votes). On the weighting of votes in the Council, the Belgian Government considers that in the course of enlargement, and provided this is accompanied by consolidation of the Union, as part of a global institutional package, the possibility of weighting of votes should be considered, for example by a slight increase in favour of the large Member States. On the presidency system, the Belgian Government is not in favour of changing the present system although it does believe it worth spelling out the role of the presidency in the Treaty in order to highlight its Community function. On the Court of Justice, Belgian is prepared to consider certain formulas with a view to enlargement, and supports the idea that the IGC should consult with the Court on its reform. Finally, on the language system, the Belgian Government does not want to change the arrangements in the Union's institutions and bodies even in the event of enlargement, to ensure that Union citizens will always be able to use their own language and receive a reply in their own language, in their relations with other citizens. The Belgian authorities are generally in favour of maintaining the Union's multilingual approach.
This memorandum was adopted on 7 March 1996 by the Prime Ministers of Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, accompanied by the three Foreign Ministers, at the summit held in The Hague on that day.
The three governments affirm their unswerving commitment to defending the irreversible nature of the progress already achieved in European integration, and propose that this process should continue on the basis of close cooperation between states which voluntarily share their sovereignty and have, to this end, transferred certain powers to the common institutions. On enlargement of the Union, they consider that widening and deepening should be accompanied by differentiation. The three governments accordingly submit the proposals that follow.
The first aspect considered is the general approach and objectives of the IGC. With regard to the deepening of the Union, the three countries feel that the IGC should give close attention to this subject, including the question of employment, with a view to creating a climate of confidence facilitating the transition to the third stage of economic and monetary union (which subject is, however, not on the IGC agenda). They consider that enlargement must go hand in hand with the deepening of the European integration process, on the grounds that a stronger Union will provide a more solid basis for taking in new member states. With respect to differentiation, the three countries would accept a differentiated approach provided it does not lead to the disintegration of the Union; they consider an 'à la carte Europe' to be unacceptable. They believe that any differentiation should fulfil the following criteria: it must be compatible with the objectives of the Treaty on European Union, as shared by all the Member States; it must be only a last-resort solution, with suitable provision for non-participating countries to be able to join at a later stage; it must not imply any questioning of the acquis communautaire or the correct functioning of the internal market; the single institutional framework must be retained; and the Commission must play a central role in the application of the criteria and arrangements for differentiation.
The second point dealt with in the Benelux countries' memorandum is the deepening of Union policies. Firstly, on the matter of fundamental rights, it argues that the Treaty should contain provision for sanctions, which could extend to the suspension of certain rights linked to membership, and should also include explicit reference to the protection of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the European citizen, equality between men and women and action against racism and xenophobia. Secondly, on the question of equality of languages and diversity of cultures, stress is laid on the need to retain the existing principle of the equality of all the Community languages and to respect and promote cultural diversity in the Union in the development of the common policies. Thirdly, with respect to Community policy, it is argued that the priority objectives should be the completion and consolidation of the internal market and more decisive action in favour of employment. To strengthen the internal market, the text proposes developing certain flanking policies, including, in the first place, the creation of a common social core for all the Union's citizens, starting with the integration of the contents of the social protocol in the Treaty with a view to applying them in all the Member States. Further proposals include greater integration of environmental policy with the other Community policies and action in the direction of harmonization on tax matters. On employment, the memorandum, while not denying the primary responsibility of Member States, proposes that the Treaty should contain explicit reference to the complementary role of the Union in promoting employment, with new provisions to this effect. In particular, it is proposed that employment policy coordination between Member States should take the form of annual Commission recommendations to be adopted by the Council, with especial stress being laid on measures to improve the operation of the labour market and promote mobility, training actions, action to remove the obstacles blocking the impact of growth on employment, measures to alleviate labour costs and measures to improve access to the labour market for the less-favoured. It is also considered that the Community should make a greater contribution to job-creating investment in the Member States, and that a committee for employment should be set up to examine the subject and make suitable proposals. The document insists that the social protocol should be incorporated in the TEU, in the interests ofgreater responsibility and active contribution on the part of the social partners.
Concerning the Union's foreign policy, the memorandum considers that it must be coherent; the Union's external action should be united, with a single institutional framework. It therefore proposes an enhanced role for the Commission in representing the Union to the world, and a review of the ruled governing the Commission and Council's activities and relations in the field of foreign policy. The text also, concretely, favours strengthening the CFSP: concerning its formulation, it proposes, firstly, that the Commission should make full use of its existing powers of initiative, and, secondly, that an analysis and planning unit should be set up to create close links between the Member States, the Commission, and, possibly, the WEU secretariat; such a unit could be directed by a senior official, appointed by the Council with the Commission's agreement, and would deliver opinions to the Council and Commission. The memorandum also proposes bolstering Member States' ability to reach agreement at the meetings of the Political Committee by setting up a standing group. On the CFSP decision-making process, it wishes to see alternatives to the unanimity rule, proposing as formulas 'partial consensus' or a reinforced qualified majority, decision-making by qualified majority for certain CFSP areas (to be determined), and decision-making by qualified majority for Commission proposals. Concerning implementation of the CFSP, it is proposed that the Commission should implement joint actions which are to be realized at ground level or are closely bound up with first-pillar activities, while the Council and Commission could appoint special representatives who would be responsible for carrying out 'special' CFSP decisions and would report to the Council on the relevant missions. It is further proposed that the Presidency, in cooperation with a reinforced CFSP secretariat (involving either the Commission or the above-mentioned special representatives) should be responsible for implementing decisions requiring contacts, statements of position, diplomatic negotiations and political dialogue. Finally, the Benelux governments consider that as a rule the CFSP should be funded from the Community budget, with due regard for its specific nature.
On the subject of defence and WEU-EU relations, the Benelux memorandum supports the development of a Union defence policy and the integration of the WEU into the EU's second pillar. This integration of the WEU into the EU should be phased in, and the 1996 IGC could adopt a decision of principle and set a timetable for full integration. While the merger is being carried out, there should be a swift institutional dovetailing of the two organizations, to enable the WEU to implement Council decisions under the CFSP having military implications. The three countries consider that the second pillar of the Treaty of Maastricht should in future include the Petersberg missions and collective defence, while admitting that the practical implementation of the latter will remain a matter for the Atlantic Alliance, with which the Union is called on to establish specific links in the defence field. They also wish to see the rapid development of the CJTF project under the aegis of NATO, as a vital element for the realization of joint European actions with military implications. At all events, the three countries consider that the decision-making process should be such that no country is obliged to take part in a military operation against its will; at the same time, they argue that countries not wishing to participate should not be able to stop the others from going ahead or impede the financial solidarity required by a joint action. Finally, the three countries wish to see closer European cooperation in the arms industry.
The memorandum also considers cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs. After noting the advantages of the Community approach for effective decision-making in this field, given the binding nature of such decisions and the built-in democratic and legal controls, it proposes, in the first place, the transfer to the first (Community) pillar of all matters related to freedom of movement and immigration policy, especially asylum and visa policy, with a set of clear objectives and a precise timetable. However, for a certain number of subjects related to the criminal law and police matters, such as action against crime and drug trafficking, the text argues that the third pillar offers a provisional framework for cooperation, and proposes a number of measures to make this cooperation more effective. Firstly, as far as the preparation of decisions is concerned, the Council and Commission should agree on the multiannual programmes of work and on when and by whom proposals should be submitted, the Commission should have the joint right of initiative on all third-pillar matters, the European Parliament should have the right to be consulted on all proposals of a legislative nature, and the national parliaments should be consulted sufficiently early before the Council reaches a decision. Secondly, with respect to the decision-making process, it would be desirable to return to the notion of the directive as it exists under the first pillar, thus conferring binding character on the decisions adopted, where necessary, and to consider in what fields decisions could be adopted by qualified majority vote or by some kind of 'consensus minus' formula. Thirdly, as regards implementation, which, given the nature of the cooperation concerned, falls to the Member States, uniform interpretation of the rules should be ensured by giving the Court of Justice the necessary powers in this field, on lines similar to the preliminary procedure provided for in the TEU. Finally, on the subject of the Schengen agreement, the Benelux countries consider that the cooperation provided for under it should be incorporated in the TEU.
The third part of the memorandum concerns the institutional aspects. The Benelux countries favour strengthening the effectiveness of the Union's decision-making and administrative processes, and evoke the questions of subsidiarity and transparency. On the first count, they call for greater application of the principle of subsidiarity, seen not as a pretext for dismantling the acquis communautaire but as a means of determining clearly when and why it is necessary for the Union to act. They also favour greater participation of the national parliaments in Union affairs, while considering that each Member State may apply the principle in accordance with its own constitutional practices. On transparency, the three countries favour strengthening the public's right to information, greater publicity for the Council's decisions where it acts as legislator, the simplification of the Treaties with a view to legibility, and an improvement in the quality of Community legislation. With respect to the Commission, they believe that its role should be consolidated and its powers strengthened, given its status as the motor organ of the Community. It should retain its sole right of initiative under the first pillar, and should have enhanced prerogatives as regards implementation. It should also play a greater role in the third and second pillars. This means increasing the political responsibility of the Commission and its members to Parliament; its budgetary responsibility should also be increased, in particular via an enhanced role for the Court of Auditors. There should be only one Commissioner per Member State. On the subject of the European Parliament, the three countries believe that the codecision procedure should be extended to most of the legislative fields where qualified majority voting applies. They favour simplifying the codecision procedure as far as possible, and reducing the number of procedures to three:opinion, assent and codecision. In the field of the second and third pillars, Parliament should be more closely associated with the decision-making process, on the basis of sufficient information provided in due time by the Commission and Council. The Commissioners should also be more responsible to Parliament. Concerning the Council, the three countries feel that its effectiveness should e increased and its working methods improved, and call for greater use of qualified majority voting. They consider that in an enlarged Union the threshold for a qualified majority should remain at around 70% of the votes, and suggest the use of a democratic criterion to ensure that the qualified majority corresponds to a majority of total population. They also favour improving the workings of the existing system of rotating presidencies in the interests of greater continuity. On the Court of Justice, they oppose any reduction in its powers, favouring, rather, widening its field of cooperation in the areas of justice and home affairs. Finally, with regard to the Court of Auditors, they feel that its powers should be enhanced, in cooperation with the equivalent national bodies, in the context of the campaign against fraud and the protection of the Community's financial interests.
Europaen Parliament, last revised: 18 September 1996
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