In this, its first official document on the IGC, the United Kingdom states its position on the British perspective on Europe, the present European defence policy situation and the institutional and defence policy adjustments needed in the context of the CFSP or second pillar. In the document the United Kingdom declares that its membership of the European Union is irrevocable and that it intends to play a leading role in its future development. It establishes that the United Kingdom's position with regard to European defence at the IGC will be based on five key factors:
On the basis of these key elements, the United Kingdom's proposals basically refer to the following areas:
Firstly, the adoption of a realistic assessment of the tasks which Europeans can and must tackle. However, these tasks must not include territorial defence,which is a NATO prerogative. In view of this, no proposal should prejudice NATO's capacity to carry out small-scale operations for which it must continue to be equipped.
Secondly, the development of practical agreements needed to organize, mount and control European military operations. The British proposals regarding this are as follows:
Thirdly, the document comes out in favour of establishing a more clear and efficient decision-making mechanism. In this context, the basic ideas expressed in the memorandum are as follows:
Finally, the Memorandum presents the British view that new institutions are not needed and that the debate should focus on military realities and not institutional abstractions; Britain does not want the WEU to merge with the European Union, since it considers that membership of each, like the status of the individual countries which are members of them, is separate. Both the WEU and NATO should therefore continue to act on an intergovernmental basis and the WEU, not the European Union, should be the basis for cooperation on European defence. In fact, the tasks which should depend on European cooperation in defence matters, according to the British document, are, basically, crisis management, the application of sanctions and embargoes and humanitarian missions, generally in support of the United Nations or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
This (very didactic) memorandum contains the first statements on the IGC by the UK Government, and was submitted to the national Parliament on 12 March 1996. In its introduction, the document stresses the importance of the UK's role as a leading fierce in the EU for its own national interests. The UK sees the Union as more than a free trade area: it is the basis for democratic consolidation and prosperity throughout Europe and it is a means to the overcoming of the historic divisions which disfigured the continent during the cold war, contributing to the consolidation of peace. Enlargement is seen as a historic responsibility for Europe and as in the UK's long-term interest. After referring to the present climate of uncertainty and doubt afflicting the Union, the UK Government rejects any moves towards a political union leading to the inexorable transfer of powers to supranational institutions, the erosion of the national parliaments and the gradual creation of a 'United States of Europe'. The UK expressly rejects this model of the future of Europe, and expresses its determination to safeguard the powers and responsibilities of the nation-states that are the Treaty's signatories. From the British viewpoint, the national parliaments should remain the core element of democratic legitimacy. The text goes on to set out the British approach to the IGC, expressing the UK's willingness to contribute to the success of a Conference, on the assumption that it will consolidate an EU conceived as a union of nations cooperating on the basis of agreements freely entered into and adopted by the national parliaments of the Member States. The position of the UK Government will at all times be based on the detailed analysis of Britain's interests. On the matter of flexibility, the Government considers the question of differentiated integration, taking the view that the EU needs to accept a certain degree of flexibility or 'variable geometry', while not falling into the trap of a two-speed Europe with a hard core centred on certain Member States or certain policies. The UK realizes that in certain areas certain Member States will integrate deeper or faster than others, but it also feels that such policies will only become Union policies when they are agreed by all the Member States; no Member State should be excluded from an area in which it wishes to participate and for which it is qualified - in other words, Union policies must be open to all the Member States.
The text outlines the challenges with which the EU will be faced in the next few years, and considers the scope of the Conference, conceived as an important first step towards responding some of these challenges and preparing the Union for the forthcoming enlargement. The British Government considers that, rather than substantially amending the Treaty, the best course is to develop improved policies for achieving its existing objectives: an example here is the CAP, which the UK insists should be liberalized. The UK Government insists that any revisions to the Treaty must be adopted by all, and therefore proposes a pragmatic and realistic approach during the negotiations. After recalling the procedural mechanism for the IGC, as established in the Treaty and the successive European Council decisions, the British document sets out a detailedlist of the main subjects which the UK Government hopes will form the IGC agenda: the legislative process; qualified majority voting; the presidency; the new Community policies; the number of commissioners; the role of the national parliaments; the powers and procedures of the European Parliament; the Court of Justice; a general examination of the CFSP; defence; the third pillar; European citizenship, human rights and non-discrimination; employment and social protection; openness and transparency; fraud and financial management; budgetary matters; the common fisheries policy; and animal welfare.
On the legislative process, the UK white paper begins by considering the principle of subsidiarity. The UK Government says it will put forward proposals for the entrenchment of this principle in the Treaty. It will also press for the Commission to undertake more systematic consultation of business circles, the national parliaments and other interested parties before introducing legislative proposals. Concerning the ' sunset clauses', the UK proposes that Commission proposals should be automatically withdrawn if they are not adopted within a given time-limit. It also supports the proposal concerning greater use of this type of clause in Community legislation with a view to providing for its automatic expiration or review after a certain time. On deregulation, the UK says it will insist on this in the context of Community legislation, some of which should be revised while certain specific directives should be amended or repealed. Concerning the opinions of the Court of Justice on the legal basis of legislation, the UK Government considers that the Council should consult the Court beforehand in cases where one or more Member States are in disagreement with the legal basis recommended by the Commission for the adoption of a particular measure. There is no specific proposal on commitology. Concerning the limitation of Community action, the UK Government raises the possibility of limiting the scope of Community action in certain areas, with a view, in particular, to prevent the application of health and safety legislation to social policy or of fiscal measures to the internal market or the environment. On the implementation of legislation, the UK will put forward proposals aimed at improving the monitoring and implementation of Community legislation, including: annual reports by the Commission on its control activities; clearer procedural rules for complaints; a more systematic approach to implementation on the Commission's part; and improved use of Article 171 of the Treaty. On the hierarchy of acts, the UK Government does not favour introducing a distinction between different categories of Community legislation which would allow certain types of act to be adopted by the Commission with minimal Council supervision.
On qualified majority voting, the UK Government in principle supports retaining the principle of protecting national interests deriving from the 'Luxembourg compromise'. However, on the subject of the criteria for obtaining a majority, it favours increasing the influence of the Member States with larger populations, for various reasons of democratic legitimacy. It proposes a system of weighting of votes under which the four largest Member States would continue to have the same number of votes while the smaller Member States would have a reasonable degree of influence in the system as a whole. The UK therefore supports changing the existing total number of votes, rather than introducing a second voting criterion. On the scope of majority voting, the UK opposes any extension of qualified majority voting, on the grounds that unanimity is not incompatible with effective decision-making and is the best means of preserving vital national interests.
The text also considers the subject of the Council Presidency, expressing a preference for the 'presidential teams' option under which three or four Member States would jointly occupy the presidency for a year or even longer. This system is felt to be particularly suited to the second (CFSP) pillar, where the presence of one of the larger Member States with global foreign policy interests would confer greater credibility on the EU's external representation. On the mater of new Community powers, the UK does not favour including chapters on energy, civil protection and tourism in the new Treaty.
On the number of commissioners, the UK Government considers that further enlargement will make it impossible to retain the present system, and that a balanced solution should be agreed on at the IGC. The white paper here merely lists the various suggestions, such as: that the larger Member States would have the automatic right to a commissioner while the smaller Member States would not have this privilege; that there should be two classes of commissioner, voting and non-voting; or that not all the commissioners would have a specific portfolio. On the role of the national parliaments, the UK, seeing them as still constituting the main element of democratic legitimacy in the Union, proposes a higher profile for them. It suggests, variously, that: the main points of Declaration No 13 (attached to the Treaty of Maastricht) on the role of the national parliaments should be made legally binding by being incorporated into the Treaty; or there should be a minimum period for the national parliaments to examine Community texts, especially legislative proposals, except for the most urgent cases; or the national parliaments should be given a more important role in third-pillar matters.
On the European Parliament, the UK Government considers that this institution should obtain greater public support and develop its role through the responsible exercise of its existing powers, in particular its powers of control over Community spending. Parliament can contribute to the campaign against fraud and maladministration, and improve its monitoring of the details of expenditure submitted by the Commission. The UK does not favour new powers for the European Parliament: this is because it considers that in a Union of nation states the European Parliament cannot claim to replace the fundamental role of the national parliaments, and because, in the view of the UK Government, it has not shone in responsibly exercising its new post-Maastricht powers (examples here being the appointment of the European Ombudsman, the temporary committees of inquiry, and full participation in the legislative process via the codecision procedure, in all of which Parliament has been sluggish in using its powers effectively while showing a certain tendency to exercise them irresponsibly, endeavouring to force the Council to accept institutional changes not directly related to the legislation in question).
On the Court of Justice, the UK Government considers that its workings need improvement. The UK puts forward the following options, in the context of limiting the retrospective effect of the Court's decisions: a Member State should only be considered responsible for damage caused by a serious and manifest failure to fulfil its obligations; there should be national time limits for all cases based on Community legislation, except in cases where a Member State's failure to comply with a directive represents a serious and manifest breach of its obligations; there should be an internal appeal procedure; there should be improved procedures for the rapid modification of Community legislation which had been interpreted in a manner diverging from the Council's intentions; a procedure should be instituted for urgent and highly sensitivecases; a provision should be incorporated in the Treaty clarifying the application of subsidiarity in the interpretation of Community legislation. The UK Government says it will shortly submit a memorandum setting out its proposals on the matter in detail.
The document goes on to examine the CFSP. The British view is that it is in the UK's national interest that the EU Member States should be able to speak and act together as far as possible on the international stage in situations where they have common interests. The UK therefore favours a CFSP leading to joint action on the basis of joint analysis and joint policy. However, it is expressly stated that the CFSP must in no circumstances become an exclusive policy replacing national policy; accordingly, whenever British interests are involved, the UK Government will insist on maintaining its capacity of action. The UK will therefore not accept any type of compromise obliging it to adopt collective decisions it does not agree with. At the IGC, the UK Government will press for a more active and effective, but still intergovernmental CFSP. With a view to developing coordination between Member States at the planning, analysis and implementation stages of joint policies in this field, the UK White Paper sets out some specific proposals (in Annexes B and C). These include holding more regular meetings of the Political Committee (responsible for preparing interministerial decisions) and strengthening the CFSP secretariat. The UK would be willing to consider the idea of appointing a single person to represent the Union's external policy to the outside world in the context of the CFSP, considering that such a figure should be fully responsible to the Council and should represent the collective viewpoints of the Member States, rather than taking autonomous decisions. On the CFSP decision-making process, the UK Government stresses that the CFSP's main weakness has been at the stage of formulation and implementation of political initiatives, while there has been no major problem in the decision-making process. The UK does not accept the view that the unanimity rules concerning CFSP decisions are an obstacle to its development, and will oppose any reform of the CFSP involving the introduction of voting methods which do not take account of the basic concerns of the individual Member States. The British view is that if there is no collective will to act in the Union there is no point in trying to force action with artificial voting procedures. The UK also feels that the CFSP will only carry genuine international weight if it represents an actual joint position, rather than a mere majority view.
The White Paper also considers defence matters. Here the text refers the reader to the UK memorandum of 2 March 1995 on European security questions and the IGC, whose Annex D is formed by the White Paper itself. The UK Government reaffirms that the IGC should reinforce the role of NATO as the cornerstone of the European security system, while also enhancing the potential contribution of all the European countries to global and regional security. The UK believes that defence stands at the very core of national sovereignty, and that the most suitable system is the existing one based on NATO under which final decisions are always adopted by consensus and national governments are responsible to their home parliaments. The UK considers that there are no suitable subjects for decision at EU level, and that the Member States must be free to act in the defence of their own national interests in this area. It does, however, believe that the countries of Europe should be able to act in smaller-scale peace-keeping, humanitarian or crisis management operations which are not big enough to warrant UN intervention. The UK Government sees the WEU as the most suitable forum for this, since the intergovernmental treaty on which it is based statesthat defence policy decisions must be adopted unanimously, thus ensuring that they remain what they should be, namely decisions of the sovereign member states. The EU as it stands is not able and does not have the resources to play such a role; the UK Government does not believe that the Commission, the European Parliament or the Court of Justice should play any role in the adoption of defence decisions. The British position is that the WEU should remain as a separate organization with its own Treaty, and that its operational capacities should be developed to enable it to act effectively in peace-keeping, humanitarian and other crisis management operations of limited scope. This is the main priority of the UK presidency of the WEU over the first half of 1996, in line with the measures and procedures proposed in the above-mentioned memorandum of 2 March 1995.
Concerning the third pillar, the UK Government believes that all matters relating to action against terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking and illegal immigration should continue to be dealt with under this intergovernmental pillar, and that unanimous decision-making should continue to apply, with the Member States cooperating on an intergovernmental basis within a single institutional framework. The UK considers that the role of the Commission, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice in these matters should remain as it is, i.e. strictly limited. The White Paper also includes a number of suggestions aimed at improving the efficiency of third-pillar cooperation (see Annex E). The UK Government favours, for instance, simplifying the structure of the preparatory work for the Council, but opposes other reforms which might affect the nature of the third pillar, such as a greater role for the Community institutions. It also opposes transferring any third-pillar areas to the Community pillar.
On European citizenship, human rights and non-discrimination, the UK Government does not believe the EU is an appropriate forum for the protection of fundamental human rights, and opposes introducing a general non-discrimination clause covering gender, sexual orientation, race, religion, age and disability. In general, the UK is concerned that the creation of new rights might lead to the need to establish new duties, something which it does not favour on the grounds that the EU is not a state as such.
On employment and the social protocol, the UK Government says it will oppose any extension of the Community's powers in the field of employment. It will not accept incorporation of the Maastricht social chapter, on the grounds that this would undermine competitiveness and destroy jobs. The UK Government fears that if the social chapter became part of the Treaty the UK could find its views ignored in a large number of directives on working conditions, with enormous potential financial and employment costs. The UK will, accordingly, not give up its opt-out clause, and does not believe it can be forced to do so.
On openness and transparency, the UK is willing to cooperate in the interests of progress in these fields; it points out, however, that total openness could lead to the real negotiations being conducted in the corridors - precisely the opposite effect to that intended. The UK Government favours simplifying the Treaty, and proposes the deletion of all its obsolete articles. It argues, nonetheless, that many of the proposals for simplification of the Treaty raise problems because they could, in some cases, change its substance or alter the institutional balance. On fraud and financial management, the White Paper recalls the work under way in this field and Britain's contribution to it, andargues that the reform of certain key policies, especially the CAP, will be vital if the campaign against fraud and maladministration of funds is to succeed. On the budgetary provisions, the UK feels it would be premature to amend them at the IGC, as the Community is to review its financing as a whole before the end of the century. On the common fisheries policy, the UK Government accepts the need for its existence, but believes that the IGC should re-examine its implementation, and, in particular, overfishing in European waters and the equitable allocation of quotas. Finally, the White Paper contains references to animal welfare, concerning which it advocates inclusion of a principle in the Treaty, possibly on the basis of the declaration approved at Maastricht calling for Community legislation in all relevant sectors to pay particular attention to animal welfare.
In conclusion, the UK Government announces its intention of making numerous proposals to the IGC and maintaining a constructive and realistic approach throughout on the basis of the UK's national interests. The White Paper includes a number of annexes: Annex A (containing the agenda for the 1996 IGC), Annex B (a series of measures for improving the efficiency of the CFSP), Annex C (on the workings of the CFSP and the role of the Council Secretariat), Annex D (containing, as referred to at the beginning of this chapter, the memorandum of 2 March 1995 on European security and the IGC) and Annex E (a summary of the UK's proposals for improving the working methods of the third pillar).
Europaen Parliament, last revised: 18 September 1996
URL : http://../igc/en/pos-en.htm