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on the implementation of the European Security Strategy in the context of the
ESDP
(2006/2033(INI))

Committee on Foreign Affairs

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MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on the implementation of the European Security Strategy in the context of the ESDP (2006/2033(INI))

The European Parliament,

- having regard to the European Security Strategy adopted by the European Council on 12 December 2003,
- having regard to the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, signed in Rome on 29 October 2004,
- having regard to the Presidency conclusions of the European Councils of 16/17 June and 15/16 December 2005, and in particular to the Presidency reports on ESDP,
- having regard to its resolution of 14 April 2005 on the European Security Strategy¹,
- having regard to its resolution of 2 February 2006 on the annual report from the Council to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of CFSP, including the financial implications for the general budget of the European Communities - 2004²,
- having regard to Rule 45 of its Rules of Procedure,
- having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A6-0000/2006),

General considerations

1. Recognises that the European Security Strategy of December 2003 contains an excellent analysis of the threats to the modern world and states the fundamental principles of the EU's foreign policy; emphasises, however, the need to monitor its implementation on a regular basis, in order to be able to react to geopolitical developments;
2. Notes that, as stated in the European Security Strategy, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime represent nowadays the main threats facing the European Union and its citizens; emphasises that the increasing worldwide competition for sources of energy, as well as natural disasters and the security of the Union's external borders, must be taken into consideration in the further development of the European Security Strategy;
3. Points out that the task of the European Foreign and Security Policy is to protect the citizens of the Union from those threats, defend the justified interests of the Union and promote the objectives of the Charter of the United Nations;
4. Considers that the geopolitical challenges have evolved considerably since the adoption of the European Security Strategy in 2003, necessitating its revision in 2008 at the latest; is of the opinion that the Strategy should be revised every 5 years and that it should be debated in the European Parliament and the Parliaments of the Member States;
5. Stresses that the European Union must be in a position to:
 - (a) defend itself against any conceivable opponent, either jointly with its allies or, if necessary, alone;

¹ OJ C 33 E, 9.2.2006, p. 580.

² *Texts Adopted*, P6_TA(2006)0037.

- (b) secure peace in its geographical neighbourhood;
 - (c) carry out rescue operations for citizens of the Union and humanitarian interventions under a mandate of the United Nations anywhere in the world;
6. Emphasises that, in the event of an attack by the armed forces of a third country on the territory of the Union, NATO remains the guarantor of common security for most countries of the Union; also regards NATO as the appropriate forum for transatlantic dialogue on security issues;
 7. Welcomes the European Union's emphasis on strengthening civil and military cooperation in crisis management, and recommends that the Civilian and Military Cell and the Operations Centre be upgraded to become a European Headquarters for carrying out civil-military missions;
 8. Considers that the Union currently has at its disposal only a small number of armed forces ready for deployment outside its territory; therefore demands that the European Union concentrate its capabilities on its geographical neighbourhood, particularly the Balkans;

Homeland security

9. Points out that the first task of any security policy is to secure one's own territory; acknowledges that Europe's citizens expect from a European defence policy, first and foremost, the protection of their personal security;
10. Points out that the EU has to secure its external borders, protect its vital infrastructures, eliminate terrorist funding networks and fight against organised crime; in this regard, calls on the Commission and the Member States to develop a system of integrated management of the Union's external borders;

Preventive measures

11. Takes note that the national security strategy of the United States incorporates an assumption that pre-emptive military action may be necessary to prevent terrorist attacks;
12. Considers, on the other hand, that the European Security Strategy, while assuming that the first line of defence may lie outside the Union, suggests that preventive military action is admissible only in the event of an immediate and clearly identifiable threat; emphasises that, in taking such action, the EU should as a matter of principle seek a mandate from the United Nations;

Chain of command, equipment and armaments

13. Is of the opinion that soldiers will be exposed to unnecessary risks if their chain of command, equipment or armaments do not meet the requirements of the operation; considers it particularly important, therefore, to ensure that the units to be placed under EU command are adequately equipped;
14. Takes note that, in multinational operations, the use of different – and often incompatible – equipment and armaments by the participating units leads to extra costs and reduced efficiency;

Intelligence

15. Criticises the particularly serious fact that the battle groups currently under development do not all have the same access to airborne and space-based intelligence, and regrets that

the output of the national satellite intelligence-gathering systems Helios, SAR–Lupe and Cosmo-Skymed are not available to all Member States on a common basis;

16. In order to meet these shortfalls:
 - (a) strongly requests that the battle groups under development receive common or at least compatible equipment in the fields of intelligence and telecommunications;
 - (b) demands that the next generation of satellite intelligence-gathering systems be integrated into a European system whose output would be available for military, police and disaster-management purposes;
17. Points out that NATO is currently developing the airborne intelligence-gathering system AGS, (Airborne Ground Surveillance) in addition to the national systems that already exist or are under development; considers it desirable that this system be made available within the framework of the Berlin Plus arrangements for the EU battle groups as well as for the surveillance of external borders and in response to large-scale events;

Telecommunications

18. Considers that, in the telecommunications field, it is necessary to develop a joint system for the command of multinational units; therefore expresses the view that the equipment used by the military, police and emergency services should comply with the same technical standards, as is the case, for example, in Finland;

Border surveillance

19. Remains particularly concerned about the incompatibility and quality of border surveillance equipment and reiterates its demand for industry to present a coherent proposal to remedy this situation;

Budget

20. Demands that expenditure on military equipment and armaments be adopted in budgets which are subject to parliamentary control; is therefore of the opinion that parallel budgets and mechanisms, which cannot be effectively supervised either by national parliaments or by the European Parliament, should be avoided;
21. Notes that the European Union budget contains various headings with security aspects such as appropriations for crisis management, the security of external borders and vital infrastructures, security research and implementation of the Galileo and GMES programmes;
22. Urges, in particular, that the budget available for crisis management missions, security research and Galileo be further increased;
23. Demands also that appropriations for military crisis-management operations be financed from the European Union budget;
24. Criticises the fact that, due to the ATHENA mechanism and other ad hoc mechanisms financed by the Member States or even the European Development Fund, the European Parliament is not in a position to exercise any budgetary scrutiny over ESDP military operations; points out that there is also a need for transparency in civil-military operations (such as police missions) which fall within a grey area between ad hoc arrangements and CFSP budget financing;
25. Consequently, calls for a new budgetary methodology to enhance transparency in ESDP

spending and to support the development of the military and civilian capabilities needed to fulfil the aims of the European Security Strategy:

- (a) in an initial phase, which should start in 2007 and not exceed two years in duration, the Council should draw up a budgetary document reflecting the commitments made by the Member States to fulfil the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 and the Military Headline Goal 2010 and based on the existing catalogues (requirements catalogue, force catalogue and progress catalogue);
- (b) in a second phase, the Member States should commit themselves to ESDP through a virtual 'budget' in which they would commit funds on a multi-annual basis to finance the equipment and personnel needed for ESDP operations. This document, whilst not legally binding, would nevertheless become an important political document next to the EU/EC budget, and would indicate what the Member States are prepared to spend on ESDP. It should facilitate "burden sharing" between the Member States by securing greater transparency as regards military spending, and should be jointly debated by the European Parliament and the Parliaments of Member States on an annual basis;

Common security and defence equipment market

26. Is of the opinion that, in order to develop a Common security and defence equipment market, it is necessary to make less extensive use of the defence-related derogation contained in the Treaty establishing the European Community (Article 296); moreover, considers it necessary that the work of the European Defence Agency be stepped up, and that joint security research be intensified;
27. Regards the establishment of a code of conduct on defence procurement by the EDA as a first step, but not a sufficient one; also looks forward to the interpretative communication from the Commission on the application of Article 296 and a Directive on defence procurement; insists that the practice of offsets and 'juste retour' should be abolished;
28. Calls for the 1998 Code of Conduct on Arms Exports to be given the force of law in all Member States; is of the opinion that the decision as to which countries of destination meet the criteria of the code of conduct should be taken on a common basis; in addition, requests that intra-Community transfers of defence equipment be simplified;

Defence and Security Union

29. Considers that the EU is in the process of building a Defence and Security Union covering external security as well as various aspects of internal security and natural disaster management with the following elements:
 - (a) the commitment of the Member States to be able to:
 - deploy 60 000 soldiers within 60 days and sustain them for one year for peacekeeping and peacemaking operations, and to build up 13 battle groups deployable at short notice;
 - develop capabilities for civilian crisis management in the areas of police operations, the rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection;
 - (b) a European structure of command consisting of a Political and Security Committee, a Military Committee, a Military Staff and a Civilian and Military Cell with an Operations Centre;

- (c) the European Gendarmerie Force;
 - (d) the European Defence Agency;
 - (e) Europol and the European arrest warrant;
 - (f) common rules for arms procurement and arms exports;
 - (g) European security research within the framework of the 7th Research Programme;
30. Is of the opinion that the Defence and Security Union should be completed by the inclusion therein of the following elements:
- (a) a common system of satellite and airborne intelligence and common telecommunications standards, to be at the disposal of the military, the police and the disaster management services;
 - (b) the establishment of a common market in the field of defence;
 - (c) a European budget covering not only the civil but also the military aspects of security;
 - (d) an EU minister responsible for foreign affairs, assisted by a Deputy in charge of security and defence policy and a Council of Ministers for defence;
 - (e) a mutual assistance clause;
 - (f) adequate parliamentary scrutiny by the Parliaments of the Member States and the European Parliament;

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31. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Parliaments of the Member States and the Secretaries-General of the United Nations, NATO, the OSCE and the Council of Europe.