EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

2004 *2009*

Committee on Transport and Tourism

PROVISIONAL
2006/2213(INI)

7.2.2007

DRAFT REPORT

on the implementation of the first railway package
(2006/2213(INI))

Committee on Transport and Tourism

Rapporteur: Michael Cramer

PR_INI

CONTENTS

Page

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on the implementation of the first railway package
(2006/2213(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the implementation of the first railway package (COM(2006)189) and the accompanying Commission staff working paper (SEC(2006)0530),

– having regard to Directive 2001/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2001 amending Council Directive 91/440/EEC on the development of the Community's railways[1],

– having regard to Directive 2001/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2001 amending Council Directive 95/18/EC on the licensing of railway undertakings[2],

– having regard to Directive 2001/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2001 on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of charges for the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification[3],

– having regard to its resolution of 15 June 2006 on the deployment of the European rail signalling system ERTMS/ETCS[4],

– having regard to Rule 45 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Transport and Tourism (A6-0000/2007),

A. whereas the first railway package is intended to revive the rail industry by creating an integrated European railway area, and to speed progress in the modal shift of freight traffic from road to rail,

B. whereas Parliament, at first reading on the third railway package, asked the Commission to submit reports on the impact of the first and second railway packages,

C. whereas the transport sector is responsible for almost 30% of all the EU's CO2 emissions, and whereas accordingly there is a need to boost the shift of traffic from environmentally harmful road transport to the railways, which have a less damaging impact on the climate,

D. whereas moves towards a modal shift and to optimising intermodal chains have as yet proved unsatisfactory, and whereas the first railway package has not yet delivered the desired results,

---

1 OJ L 75, 15.3.2001, p.1.
2 OJ L 75, 15.3.2001, p.26.
3 OJ L 75, 15.3.2001, p.29.
4 Texts adopted, P6_TA(2006)0275 .

E. whereas the underlying conditions for competition between rail, road, air and maritime transport inevitably bound to have an impact on the performance of each mode of transport, and whereas any debate on the efficiency and competitiveness within each mode must start from the issue of fair competition between them,

F. whereas the existing competition conditions place the railways, in spite of their excellent environmental credentials, at an extreme disadvantage, not only because there is a mandatory EU-wide toll on all trains and all routes on the network in the form of route prices with no upper limit, but also because electrified railways are indirectly included in emissions trading via power prices and because diesel locomotive fuel is subject to petroleum tax,

G. whereas environmentally harmful road transport is given preferential treatment because the EU-wide system of tolls, with their fixed maximum limit, is levied on a voluntary basis, only on motorways and only for lorries, with no internalisation of external costs,

H. whereas air transport, which causes three or four times more damage to the vitally important stratospheric ozone layer by its CO2 emissions than road transport or industry, is given preferential treatment over rail thanks to its exemption from kerosene tax and from VAT on international air tickets, and because it will not be included in emissions trading before 2001-2012; whereas the Netherlands taxes kerosene on its (admittedly few) internal flights, as do the USA and Japan; whereas a tax on all flights within the EU would generate EUR 14 billion per year, which could supply the funds needed for the modernisation of the railways in Europe,

I. whereas inland waterways transport, unlike the railways, is also exempt from petroleum tax and VAT and is not subject to either route pricing or tolls, although it uses heavy fuel oil, which is the most polluting fuel,

J. whereas the toll on lorries in Switzerland is four times higher than that in Germany, is levied on all roads and for all lorries, is accompanied by a permanent ban on night and weekend driving for lorries and a halt to work on trans-Alpine motorways, and the income it yields is spent principally on the two rail tunnels; whereas this toll has shown remarkable success in generating a shift of traffic from road to rail and is an example of the greatest interest for EU transport policy, particularly since the improved efficiency of freight transport by road has increased costs to the consumer by only 0.5%,

K. whereas the EU, in its agreement with Switzerland and in the Alpine Convention, has signed transport protocols, thus ensuring that the shift of more trans-Alpine freight traffic to the railways will form part of the EU's future transport policy,

L. whereas experience with the degree of market opening and the number of firms entering the market has been very varied, both within and outside Europe, in smaller and larger, old and new Member States; whereas competition has proved its worth in the areas where it has been introduced and smaller rail undertakings have often successfully filled niches which larger firms regarded as unprofitable,

M. whereas enlargement from 15 to 25 and now to 27 Member States has brought countries into the EU whose rail structures in some cases differ markedly from those in the "old"

Member States, which entails different types of opportunities and risks for the rail sector; whereas EU enlargement and the EU Neighbourhood Policy are presenting new challenges for the EU in shaping an appropriately differentiated rail policy,

N. whereas, since access to the networks was opened, rail freight traffic has increased by 60% in the UK, by 42.5% in the Netherlands and by 25% in Germany, while in France, where the national railways are effectively still free of any competition in the freight sector, it has fallen by 28%; whereas this also has an impact on jobs and on the quality of the service offered, not to mention the climate, since the freight lost to the railways is now transported by road,

O. whereas this is not unconnected to the fact that there are 274 licensed freight operators on the rail network in Germany, while in France there are only 5, not to mention countries such as Finland and Slovenia, where the state monopoly still faces no competition at all,

cf. Table 1: Licensed Rail Freight Transport Undertakings in the EU

P. whereas fair and transparent charging on the rail infrastructure is an essential precondition for any competition in this sector; whereas Directive 2001/14/EC, while it makes marginal cost the underlying principle of charging, allows for discretion in levying charges, which leads in effect to widely differing charging systems and levels of charge in the Member States; whereas the differing levels of investment by the Member States in the rail sector are passed on as differences in charging by infrastructure operators,

Q. whereas past experience and the current intensity of competition show that the rail system works even if network and operation are separated in a regulated manner,

R. whereas single wagonload traffic, with a share of over 50%, is an important component of European rail freight traffic on which many of the rail companies' customers rely,

S. whereas the available statistics on rail accidents, while still incomplete, show a positive trend in rail safety even since the opening of the freight transport market; whereas the Member States which have opened their markets most decisively show no worsening in safety; whereas it has become too difficult to obtain safety certificates in practice as a result of implementation problems, lack of transparency and organisational and administrative restrictions,

Conditions for intermodal competition

1. Recalls that – given growing traffic volumes, rising emissions and limited energy resources, as well as thousands of road accident victims – reviving rail transport is a key objective of EU transport policy, and calls on the Commission to take account of this fact in implementing the first rail package;

2. Considers that the "Eurovignette 2" directive is no more than a small initial step towards fair intermodal competition: fair competition is not possible when the levying of charges is mandatory throughout the EU for all trains on all rail routes, while road tolls in the EU have an upper limit, are charged only on a voluntary basis without internalisation of external costs, only on motorways and only for lorries; calls, therefore, on the

Commission to submit a directive by 2008 (cf. Article 1(9) of Directive 2006/38/EC) in which the Eurovignette is adjusted in line with the rail route pricing system, tolls are made mandatory for all lorries over 3.5. tonnes on all roads in the EU without loopholes, and external costs are internalised;

cf. Table 2: Levels of Rail Charging

3. Calls on the Commission to translate the principles of the transport protocols of the agreement with Switzerland, and of the Alpine Convention, into corresponding measures for the shift to rail of trans-Alpine freight transport;

4. Considers that ultra-long lorries ("Gigaliners") further undermine the competitive position of the railways; fears that the licensing of such lorries throughout Europe would ruin single wagonload traffic and combined transport, and therefore rejects any such measure;

5. Notes that competition between rail and air transport is distorted; considers that exemption from kerosene tax and from VAT on international air tickets should be placed on the agenda as a matter of urgency at international and EU level; further considers that, in view of the "taxi prices" for flights between major European cities, the resulting additional cost of EUR 1-2 per 100 air km would be affordable by passengers and must not be seen in isolation from the much higher costs – billions of EUR – engendered by climate change;

6. Considers it incompatible with the objective of European transport policy for Member States to charge very high route prices on the rail freight network, while at the same charging no tolls for lorries on the roads; calls on the Commission to authorise the co-financing of road-building only where a lorry toll is also levied;

Conditions for intramodal competition

7. Stresses that the interoperability of rail traffic must be further improved so as to enhance the competitiveness of the railways; calls in this connection for ERTMS to be installed rapidly and without gaps on the six corridors on which the EU, through its coordinator Karel Vinck, has reached agreement with the railway undertakings (A: Rotterdam-Genoa; B: Naples-Berlin-Stockholm; C: Antwerp-Basle/Lyon; D: Seville-Lyon-Turin-Trieste-Ljubljana; E: Dresden-Prague-Brno-Vienna-Budapest; F: Duisburg-Berlin-Warsaw);

8. Urges the Commission to extend the good example set by state aid for rolling stock, made possible in connection with the installation/improvement of ERTMS in trains, to noise reduction in goods trucks, as this will enable savings to be made in infrastructure investments;

9. Recognises that illegally subsidising passenger rail transport at the expense of rail freight transport through very high route pricing is a factor which ruins the competitiveness of rail freight transport; notes that such action by rail undertakings is a direct result of the under-funding of these undertakings by the Member States; calls, therefore, on the Commission to take all legal steps to prevent this illegal practice;

10. Calls on the Commission to take action against subsidy practice whereby EU transport aid flows into Member States which use it almost exclusively to fund their road networks

while neglecting the railways; considers that, in the event of co-financing, at least 50% of the appropriations should be allocated to the railways;

11. Supports the Commission in its efforts to promote the trans-European rail freight network still further and looks for support to be given in particular to refurbishing the networks in the new Member States;

12. Calls on the Commission to draw up a plan for promoting the restoration of rail connections to industrial undertakings and ensuring that links are no longer destroyed;

Regulation of the separation between network and operation

13. Considers the separation of railway infrastructure and operation to be a key issue of rail policy, given the central role of infrastructure operators for the rail industry, and in this connection regards it as absolutely essential to create an independent and transparent regulating body with adequate funding;

14. Considers that the purely formal separation of these functions is not sufficient, as is shown by the numerous complaints by undertakings entering the market which are in competition with old-established state railway undertakings; their complaints have included the following:

- access to the network or to a favourable route could not be granted because this route had already been allocated to the rail undertaking belonging to the dominant group;

- their wishes could not be met since points had previously been extended and/or passing loops dismantled;

- low-speed stretches of route (speed limits) had been ordered – for no good reason – in order to undermine competitors’ security of connections;

- it was not possible to purchase second-hand locomotives because they had already been scrapped, or because potential buyers were prevented from doing so by national rail undertakings;

- route prices were excessive because reductions were granted to major customers, though these favoured only the parent group;

- route prices were drastically increased after a former state railway undertaking was purchased;

- route prices were raised at such short notice that it was not possible to take them into account in pricing, while the railway undertaking belonging to the dominant group was notified in advance;

- their potential competitors were given confidential commercial information;

- cross-subsidisation within dominant groups was not prevented, because parts of the route prices they paid flowed into the holding company instead of being used to benefit the infrastructure, which not only improved their results but also enabled them to provide their service more cheaply on the market;

- non-state undertakings often pay higher energy prices than group subsidiaries, even if energy supply as integrated into the holding company, and this distortion of competition has even been ruled by the Frankfurt Regional Court to be permissible;

- railways which do not belong to the group have to pay higher prices to use the infrastructure necessary for energy supply (power mains);

- licensing, particularly of locomotives, is regulated differently from one country to another and each Member State requires a separate licence for its own network, which is not only very time-consuming but also prohibitively expensive;

- despite clear instructions to the contrary, the allocation of routes is not handled separately from the main group;

15. Stresses, therefore, that only an actual separation into two completely independent institutions can reliably reduce potential discrimination, and regards it as necessary to prescribe such a separation by EU law; notes that the system should be designed in such a way that the infrastructure operator has an economic incentive to make full use of the network's capacity or to allow new service providers to use it; such an incentive might, for example, consist in making some of the route charges available to the infrastructure operator for investment purposes;

16. Considers, in view of the experiences of some Member States, that the railway infrastructure – including network, stations, power supply and marshalling yards – must remain publicly owned;

17. Calls on the Commission to ensure that the de facto separation of network and operation is guaranteed in all cases, and that all facilities and services listed in Annex II of Directive 2001/14 are allocated to the network operator, so that it can make them available to all rail traffic undertakings on a non-discriminatory basis;

18. Notes that the entry into the market of new service providers in the single wagonload traffic sector is dependent on the efficient operation of marshalling yards; regards it as necessary for marshalling yards to be neutrally operated in order to ensure that all undertakings are dealt with without discrimination, and calls on the Commission to consider amending EU law to this effect;

19. Calls on the Commission to adapt the rail systems currently confined within national borders in such a way that each rail undertaking which meets the necessary legal and technical requirements in a Member State is permitted to operate across the whole European network (cross-acceptance), thus promoting not only trans-European but also regional cross-border traffic; this will also eliminate the advantages of road and air transport where these have existed for many years;

20. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and Commission.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

The first railway package was intended to lay the foundations for the modal shift of freight transport from road to rail. The national monopolies were to allow competition, access to networks was to be opened up and a start was to be made on the modernisation of the rail network in Europe, which had been neglected for decades. A shift from road to rail is also necessary for safety, environmental and economic reasons if Europe is not to suffocate in traffic jams and exhaust fumes and if it is to reduce the enormous number of accidents on its roads.

In view of the alarming predictions in the report by World Bank economist Nicholas Stern, the dangers of climate change are coming increasingly in to public view. It is becoming ever clearer that global warming cannot be halted without a change in transport policy.

The problem can be simply illustrated by the example of a yoghurt pot. By the time it has reached supermarket shelves, a strawberry yoghurt has travelled almost 10 000 km on our roads – and yet still only costs around EUR 0.40 in spite of its long journey. Transport has a high cost for the environment and thus for the public – on the road and in the air – but is not a cost factor for business. The result is a constantly growing transport sector. Heavy traffic on German roads has tripled since the 1980s. Between 1993 and 2000 the number of air passengers in the EU rose by around 10% a year.

These increases are also a reason why emissions of CO2, with its devastating effects on the climate, have not fallen but have risen by at least 1% per year between 2000 and 2004. Emissions of this pollutant have increased by almost 25% since 1990. In air transport they have doubled. In the EU, mobility causes just under 30% of all CO2 emissions.

One reason for this state of affairs is that the opening of the railway networks to freight transport has not had the desired effect. This is partly due to the way in which the rail industry is organised, but is mainly the result of unfair competition between the various modes of transport, to the detriment of the environmentally friendly railways.

On the development of the shares of the various modes of transport, the Commission gives the following forecast:

http://ec.europa.eu/transport/transport_policy_review/doc/2006_3167_brochure_en.pdf

(Source: Keep Europe moving - Mid-term review of the European Commission's 2001 Transport White Paper , S. 36)

The development of the modal split from 1995 to 2005 in the freight sector is shown from the following Commission table:



Source: ENERGY & TRANSPORT IN FIGURES 2006
Part 3 : Transport
European Commission DG for Energy and Transport
in co-operation with Eurostat

In the rail sector in Europe it is mandatory for tolls to be levied on all trains on all rail routes in the form of route prices. And yet for its keenest and most polluting competitor, road transport, however, tolls are charged mostly only on motorways and as a rule only for lorries above 12 tonnes. There is an upper limit on these tolls, external costs may not currently be internalised, and toll charging is voluntary.

In order to prevent environmentally harmful lorry traffic from receiving yet more support, it is essential that ultra-long lorries ("Gigaliners") of 60 tonnes and upwards should not be permitted. Licensing such lorries throughout the EU would completely ruin single wagonload traffic, which accounts for 50% of all rail freight traffic.

Some EU Member States give little or no state funding to railway companies, so that these in turn are forced to charge high route prices for freight traffic in order to finance passenger traffic. Since these states also charge no tolls on their roads, this policy is tantamount to a direct attack on rail freight transport. The Commission is aware of this practice and regards it as unlawful, but does not see how it can change it.

At the same time, however, EU funds flow into countries which use them almost without exception to fund road-building and while allowing their rail networks to decay. The decline of the rail sector is particularly alarming in the new Member States.

In Switzerland, on the other hand, the modal shift has succeeded. A lorry ban is in place there at weekends and at night. The lorry toll is four times higher than in Germany and applies to all roads and all lorries over 3.5 tonnes. Toll receipts are invested in the modernisation of the railways, and at the same time work on trans-Alpine motorways has been halted. The heavy traffic levy, introduced in 2001, resulted in the transfer of petroleum transport back from the roads to the railways. Before the introduction of the tolls, 70% of petroleum was carried by road, now 70% goes by rail. There has been no shift in Switzerland from motorways to other major roads, nor from larger to smaller lorries. And consumer costs still rose by only 0.5%.

Competition with air transport is also discriminatory. The tax exemption for kerosene – introduced more than half a century ago as a financial boost to help the infant air transport industry get started – currently permits airlines to transport their customers at a “taxi price” between major cities.

Not all countries give preferential treatment to air transport, with its harmful effects on the climate. The Netherlands, for example, taxes kerosene on its (admittedly few) internal flights just as the USA and Japan do. A tax on all flights in the EU could generate EUR 14 billion, which would be a way of raising the funds needed to modernise the railways in Europe. In many cases, even now in the 21st century, connections between (for example) the old and the new Member States are not even up to steam-engine speed, and are sometimes twice as slow.

A kerosene tax would result in a cost to the consumer of EUR 2 per 100 km of air travel, which would also be quite acceptable, particularly when compared with the cost of billions which would be incurred by doing nothing and this allowing unchecked climate change. Until 2010-2011, air transport is also exempted from the emissions trading system, while the railways are included in the system via the electricity price.

Water transport is also given extremely preferential treatment, even though it is often unavailable owing to high or low water or ice – on the Elbe this has been the case for between 200 and 300 days a year over the last 30 years. Water transport is one of the worst CO2 polluters, as it uses heavy fuel oil, which is the dirtiest type of fuel. Internal waterways transport in Europe is exempted from emissions trading and from petroleum tax: the use of the rivers is free. There are no route pricing or tolls for water transport.

Quite apart from these considerations, it was correct and necessary to adapt the railway systems which were confined within national borders, to open up networks, and create a uniform or at least interoperable European rail network.

A formal separation between railway infrastructure and railway operation has now taken place in all Member States of the EU. Whether in specific cases this was merely a formal rather than a genuine separation is another question. However, only by means of a real separation will it be possible to create fair competition and completely rule out discrimination against non-state railway undertakings.

The only guarantee of this is a clear separation of network and operation into two totally independent institutions. This state of affairs exists clearly in the UK, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands. Where network and operation are in different hands but under a single (holding company) roof, the potential for discrimination is enormous. Admittedly it also depends on the supervisory authorities and regulators whether and to what extent this potential is exploited. However, what Hartmut Mehdorn, head of Deutsche Bahn, has said, remains true: "The one who controls the network is the master of business". In any case a clear and strict separation of network and transport is more efficient than all other arrangements, which have to be constantly supervised.

Since in many cases there is no effective separation between network and operation, it is no surprise that many rail undertakings which are in competition with the state railways complain of unequal treatment and obstacles. These relate, inter alia, to access to routes and route pricing, the purchase of used locomotives and trucks, cross-subsidising within dominant rail groups and the licensing of rolling stock.

Accordingly a clear separation between the operational infrastructure and the transport undertaking needs to be enshrined in an EU directive. The de facto separation of network and operations must at any rate guarantee that all the installations and services listed in Annex II to Directive 2001/14 are allocated to the network operator, so that it can make them available without discrimination to all rail undertakings.

Single wagonload traffic still accounts for well over 50% of European rail freight traffic. If the railways were to cease carrying this traffic, their existence would be in jeopardy. A number of European industries such as the steel, paper, chemical and petroleum industries, as well as to some extent the motor industry, are dependent on single wagonload traffic, which cannot be replaced by other modes of transport. It is therefore important to make this sector more economical.

Again, the best way to achieve this would be to create the conditions for intermodal competition. First and foremost it is necessary to open up access to marshalling yards – and not just formally, as is provided in European law. The directive must be amended to guarantee that marshalling yards are operated in a neutral way, in other words that shunting and all subsidiary services are supplied neutrally by the infrastructure operator for all railways and not just those belonging to the main group.

In the UK and in Estonia it was initially the infrastructure that was privatised. This mistake later had to be remedied and the infrastructure transferred back to state ownership at an enormous loss. This experience demonstrates the importance of the principle that infrastructure must in future remain in public ownership.

To improve the competitiveness of the railways, interoperability on the rail system must also be enhanced and put into practice more rapidly. This includes installing the European rail signalling system ERTMS as quickly as possible on the six main freight traffic corridors, extending it to neighbouring routes when they are modernised, and automatically fitting it to locomotives newly licensed in the EU.

Even though the organisation of the market in the rail sector is not the main issue, the introduction of competition on the European railways may be said to have proved worthwhile. In those Member States which have not hindered but promoted the development of intermodal competition in rail freight traffic, the railways' market share has considerably increased. The best example for this is the UK, with a 60% increase in rail freight traffic since the reforms. The opposite is the case in France, for example, where the national railways, with practically no competitors for freight transport, are constantly losing transport volume and market share.

Small rail undertakings have often taken over traffic on routes which the old-established state railways had declared unprofitable and closed.

Although the networks have been open for cross-border freight traffic since 1 January 2006 and for all freight traffic since 1 January 2007, there are 275 freight traffic undertakings running on the German rail network and only 5 in France.

Competition has had a positive effect in the smaller Member States too. In the Netherlands, there are currently 10 railway undertakings operating, which has resulted in rail freight traffic increasing by 42.5% between 1999 and 2006. In Germany the increase during the same period was 25%, whereas in France, where the national network was compartmentalised to protect the national rail undertaking and its employees, traffic fell by 28%. This also had effects on jobs and quality – and, of course, on the climate, since the freight lost to rail is now transported in France by road!

In the light of the above, it is alarming how dilatory many states have been in implementing the first railway package.

Tables 1 and 2

Access to rail infrastructure

Country	No of RUs running on the network (active licences)	No of <u>freight</u> RUs running on the network (active licences)	Authorized applicants (are there any, and if yes, who are they?)
Austria	15	5	There are currently no authorized applicants in Austria
Belgium	4	4	There are currently no authorized applicants in Belgium
Czech Republic	19	13	There are currently no authorized applicants in the Czech Republic
Denmark	15	8	There are currently no authorized applicants in Denmark. Danish legislation on the operation of rail traffic does, however, provide for authorized applicants to apply for a license to carry out domestic or international passenger or freight traffic in Denmark.
Estonia	23	20	The Ministry of Transport for domestic transport and owner of rolling stock in specific cases.
Finland	1	1	There are currently no authorized applicants in Finland
France	7	7	There are currently no authorized applicants in France
Germany	352	274	Regional authorities, shippers, forwarders of combined transport
Italy	40		Train-path: RU; capacities: every private or public association
Latvia	9	4	There are currently no authorized applicants in Latvia.
Lithuania	8	7	There are currently no authorized applicants in Lithuania. Applicants may be only Railway Undertakings (RUs) or international RUs groups.
Netherlands	24	10 (Railion has 70% market share)	In the NL there are 2 types of AA: 1) public entities with the right to organise public rail transport (examples are several provinces in NL) although the public entities - in their role of Authorized Applicant - have the right to require capacity/train paths they usually ask the respective railway operators to do so. 2) shippers - some large shipping companies are preparing to act like an AA. So far they did not. There is a certain need for ProRail that these shippers will change their behaviour in order to avoid double or even triple capacity requests for the same shipment contracts between a shipper and a railway company.
Norway	10	5	There are currently no authorized applicants in Norway

Poland	60	46	
Portugal	2	1	Applicants may be “Licensed rail transport companies or international groups of rail transport companies and other individuals or companies with a public service or commercial interest in acquiring infrastructure capacity for rail service operations including public authorities under Regulation (EEC) No. 1191/69 of the Council as well as shippers, forwarders and combined transport operators”
Slovenia	1	1	Local authorities, public service enterprises, shippers, road transport and combined transport undertakings
Spain	4	?	3 companies are authorized. The Spanish law allows it (art 31) for shippers, forwarders, combined transport operators...and Public Administrations (as Regions or Local Authorities). Some Companies, as Transfesa, have got (inside its Group) both kind of access rights (licence as RU and aut.appl.)
Sweden	22	15	Public Transport authorities can act as AA. Can only be used nationally, a problem that may be raised internationally to make it possible for AA to use the international network which would increase the interest to become an AA.
Switzerland	51 (16 on standard gauge)	15 (8 on standard gauge)	Forwarders
United Kingdom	27	7	Any person or public authority in charge of public transport or having a commercial interest



Source: ECMT (2005)

Source: European Commission DG Energy and Transport - 2006