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DRAFT REPORT

on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (based on
the Annual Report from the Council)
(12562/2011 – C7-0000/2012 – 2012/2138(INI))

Committee on Foreign Affairs

Rapporteur: Arnaud Danjean

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MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (based on the Annual Report from the Council)
(12562/2011 – C7-0000/2012 – 2012/2138(INI))

The European Parliament,

- having regard to the Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy, in particular the part concerning the European Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (12562/2011 – C7-0000/2012),
- having regard to the report of the High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission to the Council on the CSDP of 23 July 2012,
- having regard to the Council conclusions on the CSDP of 23 July 2012,
- having regard to the Council conclusions on the CSDP of 1 December 2011,
- having regard to the Ghent Initiative on military capabilities launched at the informal meeting of EU Defence Ministers in September 2010,
- having regard to Article 36 of the Treaty on European Union,
- having regard to paragraph 43 of the Interinstitutional Agreement of 17 May 2006 between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on budgetary discipline and sound financial management¹;
- having regard to Title V of the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
- having regard to the European Security Strategy entitled ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, adopted by the European Council on 12 December 2003, and to the report on its implementation entitled ‘Providing Security in a Changing World’, endorsed by the European Council on 11-12 December 2008,
- having regard to its resolution of 10 March 2010 on the implementation of the European Security Strategy and the Common Security and Defence Policy²,
- having regard to its resolution of 23 November 2010 on civilian-military cooperation and the development of civilian-military capabilities³,
- having regard to its resolution of 11 May 2011 on the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty⁴,

¹ OJ C 139, 14.6.2006, p. 1.

² OJ C 349, 22.10.2010, p.63

³ OJ C 99, 03.04.2012, p. 7

⁴ Texts adopted, P7-TA(2011)0228

- having regard to its resolution of 14 December 2011 on the impact of the financial crisis on the defence sector in the EU Member States¹,
 - having regard to Rule 119(1) of its Rules of Procedure,
 - having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A7-0000/2012),
- A. whereas significant changes are taking place in the geostrategic context in which the CFSP and CSDP operate, owing in particular to the upheavals in the Middle East (revolutions, conflicts and regime change in Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Syria ...), the emergence on the international scene of new players with regional or even global ambitions and the reorientation of US defence policy priorities towards the Asia-Pacific area;
 - B. whereas, at the same time, threats to global security are growing because of uncertainties linked to the attitudes of States engaged in programmes which dangerously encourage nuclear proliferation, the escalation of local crises in the EU's neighbourhood with major regional implications, such as the current Syrian conflict, the vagaries of the transition process in the Arab countries and its security dimension (Libya, Sinai ...), the evolution of the Afghan-Pakistan area in view of the prospect of the withdrawal of NATO troops and increased terrorist threats in Africa, in particular in the Sahel, the Horn of Africa and Nigeria,
 - C. whereas the European Union has a duty to respond by speaking with one voice and acting in a spirit of solidarity between Member States,
 - D. whereas the Common Security and Defence Policy, which forms an integral part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, whose aims are set out in Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union, endows the Union with an operational capability based on civilian and military means,
 - E. whereas the CSDP has the potential to contribute to peace and stability in the world through its missions and operations that form part of the EU's comprehensive approach to a country or region, including through multilateral cooperation in international organisations - in particular the United Nations - and regional organisations, in compliance with the UN Charter,
 - F. whereas the Lisbon Treaty has introduced innovations to the CSDP, but these are still far from being fully exploited,
 - G. whereas, since 2003, the European Union has launched 20 civilian missions and 7 military operations in the context of the ESDP and then the CSDP and 12 civilian and 3 military operations are currently under way,

A STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR THE CSDP

A new strategic framework

¹ Texts adopted, P7-TA(2011)0574

1. Stresses that the EU should be a global political player on the international scene in order to promote international peace and security, to protect its interests in the world and to ensure the security of its citizens; believes that the European Union should be able to assume its responsibilities when confronted with international threats, crises and conflicts, especially in its neighbourhood;
2. Emphasizes in this regard the need for the EU to assert its strategic autonomy through a strong and effective foreign, security and defence policy enabling it to act alone if necessary; emphasizes that this strategic autonomy will remain illusory without credible military capabilities; recalls that this strategic autonomy is being built with due respect for existing alliances, while maintaining a strong transatlantic link, as stressed in Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union;
3. Is concerned about the prospect of strategic decline facing the EU, not only through the downward trend in defence budgets, but also because of the relative and progressive marginalisation of its crisis management instruments, in particular the military ones; believes that the Union must seek to not delegate its security to others;
4. Notes that, despite the continuing validity of its assertions and analyses, the European Security Strategy, which was drawn up in 2003 and finalised in 2008, is beginning to look outdated, since a strategic vision formed in 2003 is no longer sufficient to understand today's world; calls therefore on the High Representative / Vice-President of the Commission and the Council rapidly to present a White Paper on the Security and Defence of the EU, which precisely defines the EU's strategic interests and takes account of changing threats and the development of relations with our allies and partners, but also with emerging countries; stresses the importance of such a strategic framework to guide the external action of the Union European, channel the foreign policies of Member States towards common goals and also guide the medium and long-term strategic planning of the civilian and military capabilities to be developed and acquired within the context of the CSDP;
5. Welcomes the report of the High Representative / Vice-President of the Commission on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP which is partly devoted to security and defence issues; insists, however, on the need for a more ambitious vision of the future of the CSDP; calls on Member States, with the support of the High Representative / Vice-President of the Commission, to use to its full potential this instrument which is enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty in a context in which many crises persist, including on Europe's doorstep, where U.S. disengagement is increasingly evident;
6. Welcomes the contribution made by the Weimar initiative, which was supported by Spain and Italy, to revitalise the agenda of the CSDP and the impetus it has given in the three key areas, namely institutions, operations and capabilities; calls for these countries to honour the commitment they have made to continue to hold an ambitious vision of the CSDP;

The CSDP at the heart of a comprehensive approach

7. Emphasizes that the strength of the European Union compared to other organisations lies in its capacity to mobilise a whole range of political, economic and humanitarian

instruments to support its civilian and military crisis management operations and that this comprehensive approach gives it a unique and widely appreciated flexibility and efficiency;

8. Believes, however, that the implementation of a comprehensive approach must not contribute to a marginalisation of the CSDP; emphasises that the CSDP, through these operations, must remain the EU's preferred crisis management instrument, as it is the only one able to impart political credibility and visibility to the Union's actions, while allowing political control; considers that, in a context of crisis, the task of the other external action instruments is to support CSDP operations, subsequently, in the longer term, to take over when the situation on the ground so permits and the political urgency has passed;

Implementation of the Lisbon Treaty

- 9. Recalls that the Lisbon Treaty introduced a number of significant innovations in the CSDP that have yet to be implemented:
 - the Council may entrust a mission to a group of States in order to preserve the Union's values and serve its interests;
 - permanent structured cooperation may be established between Member States that meet higher military capability criteria and have made more binding commitments in this matter in respect of the most demanding missions;
 - a mutual assistance clause and a solidarity clause have been introduced by the Treaty;
 - the European Defence Agency is entrusted with important tasks in developing the military capabilities of Member States, including strengthening the industrial and technological base of the defence sector, formulating a European capabilities and arms policy and implementing permanent structured cooperation;
 - a start-up fund should be set up for preparatory activities for missions which are not charged to the Community budget;
10. Urges the High Representative / Vice-President of the Commission to provide the necessary impetus to develop the potential of the Lisbon Treaty so that the European Union enjoys the full range of possibilities for action on the international scene within the framework of its comprehensive approach, whether through its 'soft power' or through more robust actions where necessary, and always in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;
 11. Welcomes the extension of the missions that may be carried out within the framework of the CSDP compared to previous 'Petersberg' missions, as specified in Article 43 of the Treaty on European Union; notes, however, that this ambition has not been reflected in the

decisions taken since the creation of the EEAS;

CIVILIAN AND MILITARY OPERATIONS

12. Emphasizes that the CSDP is intended to intervene in crises, including in context of high-intensity conflicts, with high political visibility and be ambitious enough to have a real impact on the ground;
13. Notes that 15 operations are currently under way, namely 12 civilian and 3 military; welcomes the launch of 3 new civilian operations in the summer of 2012 in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP Nestor), Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger) and South Sudan (EUAVSEC South Sudan) and the planning of a civilian mission to support border controls in Libya; considers that these missions are a first sign that the the CSDP's agenda is being revitalised;
14. Regrets, however, that with the exception of EUTM Somalia, no new military operations have been launched since 2008, even though a number of crises could have warranted EU intervention, including in Libya and Mali; encourages, in this context, the intensification of ongoing planning for possible military operations;

The Western Balkans

15. Recalls the political and symbolic importance of the EU engagement in the Western Balkans, which remains a credibility test for the Union; calls on the High Representative / Vice-President of the Commission and the Council to reassess the EU's security contribution in the region;
16. Welcomes the results of the first civilian EUPM mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina which ended on 30 June 2012 and which, in parallel with the EUFOR Althea operation, has contributed to the dialogue between the constituent entities of the country as well as the consolidation of the rule of law;
17. Notes that the EUFOR Althea operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was launched in 2004, has seen a steady decline in its staff complement and supports therefore the reorientation of its mandate towards the capacity-building and training of the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina;
18. Welcomes the positive role played by the EULEX Kosovo mission, which is operating in a difficult political environment, to help this country establish the rule of law and a judicial, police and customs apparatus free from all political interference, in line with internationally recognised, as well as European, best practices; recognises, however, that much remains to be done if EULEX is to fully accomplish the missions assigned to it and enjoy the full confidence of the population, especially the Kosovo Serb community; calls on the mission to answer with the greatest care and rigour the questions raised by the Council of Europe report on the veracity of allegations of organ trafficking and to implement, with the States concerned, a witness protection programme so that rigorous judicial proceedings can establish the facts;

19. Notes that the presence of KFOR remains essential to ensure security in Kosovo, and that many questions continue to be raised about the effectiveness and future of coordination between the NATO military mission and the EU civilian mission; calls therefore on the High Representative / Vice-President of the Commission to report regularly on the progress of the EULEX mission, the extension of whose mandate until June 2014 is to be welcomed, as well as on the results and relations with the NATO military apparatus;

The Horn of Africa

20. Welcomes the new EU strategy for the Horn of Africa, which implements the comprehensive approach to tackle piracy and its underlying causes, and the leading role played by the Union on security issues in the region, which enhances the EU's visibility and credibility in crisis management;
21. Note that currently three operations (EUNAVFOR Atalanta, EUTM Somalia and EUCAP Nestor) are deployed for the benefit of the region and stresses the need to continue the coordination of the EU's intervention with efforts by the international community, first and foremost the African Union, to ensure that Somalia once again has a functioning State;
22. Welcomes the launch of the EUCAP Nestor mission to build up maritime capabilities in Djibouti, Kenya and the Seychelles and support the rule of law in Somalia (Puntland and Somaliland initially) by developing a coastal police force and a judiciary;
23. Demands that the Nestor EUCAP mission be coordinated with other initiatives relating to maritime security, such as MARSIC and MASE, which are financed by the Instrument for Stability and the European Development Fund, respectively; recommends the extension of the EUCAP Nestor mission to other countries as soon as they meet the necessary conditions;
24. Pays tribute to the vital contribution made by the EUNAVFOR Atalanta operation in combating piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the western Indian Ocean and approves the extension of its mandate until December 2014; approves also the extension of the scope of this mission to include Somalia's coastal zone and territorial and inland waters; calls on Member States to provide adequate air and sea resources for this operation and encourages commercial vessels to continue to apply best navigational practices so as to reduce the risk of attack; welcomes the contribution by the Netherlands to operation Atalanta in the form of an on-board protection team intended to ensure the safety of humanitarian convoys and encourages other Member States to make this type of contribution;
25. Declares that piracy is akin to organized crime and that it is important, for the sake of freedom of trade and the protection of an essential maritime passage, to disrupt the economic profitability of this activity; calls on the Commission and the Council to take all necessary measures to ensure the traceability of the financial flows generated by this activity and facilitate exchanges of information between EUNAVFOR Atalanta and Europol ;
26. Highlights the positive role played by EUTM mission in Somalia, in close cooperation with Uganda, the African Union and the United States, to train more than 3 000 Somali

recruits, some 2 500 of whom have already been reintegrated in the Somali security forces; estimates that the mission has contributed in particular to improving the situation in and around Mogadishu by strengthening the security forces of Somalia and AMISOM;

27. Approves the extension of the mandate of the EUTM Somalia mission until December 2012 and the focus placed on the command and control capabilities, specialized capabilities and self-training capabilities of the Somali national security forces with a view to the transfer responsibility for training to local players; notes that the European Union will be obliged to pursue its training efforts beyond 2012 and, in this context, calls on the EEAS to explore the possibility of transferring all or part of this training to parts of Somalia that are under the control of the authorities in the light of the improvement in the security situation;
28. Emphasizes that the model of the EUTM operation, which, for a relatively modest outlay in terms of funding, material and human resources, has given the EU a major regional role in East Africa, could be replicated in other areas, particularly the Sahel;

The Sahel

29. Expresses its utmost concern at the development of a zone of instability in the Sahel, characterized by criminal activities and armed operations by radical terrorist groups which are undermining the territorial integrity of States in the region and whose actions could lead to the establishment of a permanent zone of lawlessness in part of the territory of Mali;
30. Emphasizes the security threat that this poses for Europe as a whole; calls in this context, on the High Representative / Vice-President of the Commission and the Council rapidly to fully implement the EU strategy for the Sahel adopted in June 2011 and to take appropriate security measures, if necessary by having recourse to CSDP missions, to help States in the region strengthen their capabilities in the fight against organised cross-border crime and terrorist groups;
31. Welcomes the launch of the EUCAP Sahel mission designed specifically to help Niger deal with these security challenges; notes that this mission falls squarely within the framework of the overall strategy for the Sahel, but regrets that it involves only one country while other countries in the region, especially Mali, have a pressing and vital need to build up their capabilities and respond to threats to their territorial integrity;
32. Calls for planning to continue for an operation to support, in conjunction with ECOWAS, the restructuring of the Malian armed forces in order to improve the effectiveness of its security forces and enable the country to regain control over its territory;

Libya

33. Believes that the Libyan crisis could have been the appropriate opportunity for the EU to demonstrate its ability to act, including militarily if necessary, in full compliance with UN Security Council resolutions, when faced with a major crisis in its back yard which directly affects the stability of its environment; regrets that the lack of common political will among Member States and an ideological reluctance to see the Union deploy its own

capabilities have relegated the Union to playing a secondary role ;

34. Calls on the High Representative / Vice-President of the Commission to draw all the appropriate lessons from the crisis in Libya both regarding the decision-making process within the EU and regarding NATO military intervention, in terms of capabilities, but also and most importantly, in terms of political consistency and solidarity between Member States and the relationship between the European Union and its CSDP, on the one hand, and NATO, on the other;
35. Believes that the EU has an important role to play in the process of institutional transition in Libya, in particular in the demobilisation and integration of members of revolutionary brigades, in the reorganisation of the armed forces and assistance in controlling land and sea borders; regrets that the EU contribution in the security sector is slow to materialise, and that difficulties in planning and implementing this contribution are leaving the field open to bilateral initiatives of doubtful visibility and consistency; supports the acceleration of planning for a civilian mission to assist border controls;

South Sudan

36. Notes the launch of the EUAVSEC South Sudan mission to strengthen the security of the Juba airport; wonders, however, about the wisdom of having recourse to a CSDP mission to secure that airport, given that such a mission could have been carried out by the Commission through its Instrument for Stability;

Democratic Republic of the Congo

37. Emphasizes the importance of the Democratic Republic of Congo for peace and stability in Africa and supports the action of MONUSCO to protect the civilian population in the east of the country;
38. Welcomes the European Union's efforts within the framework of its two missions - EUSEC RD Congo and EUPOL RD Congo - to consolidate the rule of law in this country; notes, however, that these two missions are too small given the magnitude of their respective tasks and that the active collaboration of the Congolese authorities is needed to achieve tangible results;

Afghanistan

39. Welcomes the EUPOL Afghanistan mission which aims to establish a civilian police force and a judicial system to allow Afghans to shoulder most of the responsibility for these tasks in the context of the reconstruction of the Afghan State; stresses that this mission, which is due to remain there until 31 May 2013 and could be extended until 31 December 2014, forms part of the overall efforts by the international community to allow Afghans to take control of their destiny, after the withdrawal of NATO troops in 2014; calls on the High Representative / Vice-President of the Commission and the Council to carry out in-depth discussions, also involving the European Parliament, on the progress of the Union's comprehensive arrangements and the EUPOL mission, especially in the context of post-2014 Afghanistan;

The Palestinian Territories

40. Considers that the EUPOL COPPS Palestinian civilian police training mission, whose purpose is to assist the Palestinian Authority in building the institutions of a future Palestinian State in the fields of law enforcement and criminal justice under Palestinian management and in accordance with best international standards, is a success; notes that this mission forms part of European Union efforts to establish a Palestinian State co-existing peacefully with Israel;
41. Notes, however, that the EUBAM Rafah mission has suspended its operations since Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip and supports therefore a reduction in its staff complement, while stressing that its continued presence in the region demonstrates the willingness of the European Union to contribute to any action that might facilitate the dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians; regrets that the Israeli government has not authorised the head of the EUPOL COPPS mission also to head the EUBAM Rafah mission and that the headquarters of this mission is located in Tel Aviv and not in East Jerusalem;

Georgia

42. Emphasizes the positive role played by the EUMM Georgia observation mission, particularly in supporting dialogue and the restoration of confidence-building measures between the parties, but regrets that this mission is still not allowed to visit the occupied territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia;

Iraq

43. Notes that the EUJUST LEX-Iraq mission, whose mandate has been extended until 31 December 2013, is the first EU integrated 'rule of law' mission aimed at contributing to the establishment of a professional criminal justice system in Iraq based on the rule of law; notes, however, that Iraq is still far from being stabilised, as evidenced by the regular attacks in the country, a situation aggravated by a highly uncertain regional context;

Learning from experience

44. Notes the importance of learning from the experience of missions and operations conducted within the framework of the CSDP and commends the work done in this direction by the CMPD and the EUMS; calls on the High Representative / Vice-President of the Commission to report to Parliament on the results of this work;

CAPABILITIES AND STRUCTURES FOR CONDUCTING OPERATIONS

45. Notes that EU civilian and military operations still suffer all too often from problems of force generation, and that the credibility of the CSDP is at stake in the absence of credible capabilities; calls therefore on Member States to remain mobilised to provide quality personnel and equipment;
46. Notes that the crisis management structures within the EEAS remain under-staffed, both on the civilian and military side, which affects their ability to respond and contributes to a

degree of marginalisation of the CSDP; calls on the High Representative / Vice-President Commission to address this situation as soon as possible; emphasises the direct link that must exist between the High Representative / Vice-President of the Commission and the CSDP crisis management structures;

Civilian capabilities

47. Highlights the difficulties faced by Member States in providing a sufficient number of qualified and trained staff for civilian CSDP missions;
48. Notes the extension of the Civilian Headline Goal 2010 beyond that date and welcomes the adoption of a multiannual civilian capability development programme; calls on Member States, particularly the ministries concerned, to mobilise to implement it;
49. Recalls in this respect the Council conclusions of 21 March 2011 on the priorities regarding civilian CSDP capabilities and considers that they are still just as relevant, namely:
 - to draw in sufficient numbers of qualified and trained personnel;
 - to develop adequate enablers for missions including a finalised goalkeeper; more flexible preparatory measures; better mechanisms for equipping civilian missions (including the establishment of a permanent warehouse solution);
 - to pursue the implementation of preparatory activities for civilian missions, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaty on European Union;
 - to strengthen the assessment of impact and implementation of lessons learned;
 - to strengthen cooperation with third countries and international organisations.

Military capabilities

50. Notes that Member States, for financial, budgetary and political reasons alike, both related and unrelated to the eurozone crisis, are undergoing a phase of reducing or, at best, merely maintaining their levels of defence spending and notes that this situation is having a negative long-term impact on the credibility of the European Union and its Member States as major players on the international scene, not only in respect of a traditional ally such as the United States, but also vis-à-vis emerging countries such as China, Brazil or Russia;
51. Emphasizes that the proliferation of external operations in recent years, whether in Iraq, Afghanistan or Africa, including Libya, has represented, and continues to represent, a significant financial burden for States that have participated - or are still participating - in these operations; notes that these costs have a direct impact on the attrition and premature wear and tear of equipment, but also on the willingness of States to engage in CSDP operations, given the constraints on their budgets and capabilities;
52. Stresses that, in terms of absolute value, spending in the combined European defence budgets of all Member States compares favourably with that of the major emerging

powers and that the problem is thus less a budgetary than political one, ranging from the definition of a European industrial and technological base to the pooling of certain operational capabilities;

53. Notes that military action in Libya, which was initiated by France and the United Kingdom with the support of the United States and subsequently pursued by NATO, has highlighted the ability of some European States to engage in high-intensity conflicts, but also the problems they face in conducting such activities over a period of time, due in particular to a lack of basic capabilities such as air-to-air refuelling, intelligence gathering and precision-guided weaponry;
54. Recalls its resolution of 14 December 2011 on the impact of the financial crisis on the defence sector in the Member States of the European Union and emphasises that its recommendations are relevant for developing the military capabilities of Member States in a spirit of resource sharing and pooling;
55. Welcomes the initial progress made by the European Union's 'pooling and sharing' initiative and pays tribute to the work of the European Defence Agency (EDA) which has identified 11 priority areas for action; stresses in particular the progress achieved in four areas: air-to-air refuelling, maritime surveillance, medical support and training; calls, however, for this initiative to be provided with a strategic framework;
56. Supports in particular the project for mid-air refuelling, which also has an acquisition component; insists that Member States should maintain the European character of this initiative and believes that OCCAR would be well placed to manage the acquisition component;
57. Welcomes the agreement signed on 27 July 2012 between the European Defence Agency and OCCAR, which will allow the institutionalisation of the relationship between the two agencies, the establishment of more integrated cooperation in respect of military capability development programmes and exchanges of classified information;
58. Recalls that the war in Libya has also highlighted the lack of reconnaissance drones in European armed forces and notes that in Europe there are currently two rival MALE (Medium Altitude Long Endurance) drone projects; notes also Franco-British cooperation over UCAVs (Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles), which would benefit from not being exclusive, but open to other European partners;
59. Considers that the establishment of the European Air Transport Command is a concrete example of successful 'pooling and sharing' and stresses that the creation of an A400M fleet within this structure would greatly enhance the projection capabilities of the European Union and its Member States;
60. Calls on the Commission, the Council, Member States and the EDA to consider the adoption of innovative solutions to increase the European Union's projection capabilities, particularly as part of a twin-track approach: a public-private partnership in the field of air transport, built around a small fleet of A400Ms, would allow both the delivery of humanitarian aid for disaster relief and the transport of equipment and personnel as part of CSDP missions and operations;

61. Insists that the building-up of European capabilities should also result in the consolidation of the industrial and technological base of Europe's defence industry; recalls in this connection the importance of the principle of European preference and the relevance of a European Buying Act;
62. Notes that the financial and budgetary crisis facing the European Union and its Member States will lead to loss of expertise unless a major programme is launched at European level on a bilateral or multilateral basis, and may also lead to the disappearance of a highly specialized industrial fabric;
63. Notes with concern the reduction in the appropriations allocated to research and technology, which in the long term will affect the ability of Europeans to maintain a credible defence capability;
64. Welcomes the efforts of the European Defence Agency to maintain a European industrial and technological defence base and the Barnier / Tajani initiative to create within the European Commission a Task Force charged with preserving and developing this strategic tool whose function is to ensure the autonomy of the EU and its Member States in the field of defence;
65. Call on Member States fully to implement the Defence Procurement Directive in order to combat market fragmentation which often benefits third countries;
66. Stresses the relevance of the capability development plan drawn up by the EDA; calls on Member States to better integrate it in their national planning;
67. Takes the view that the Council and Member States should further support those of the Union's capabilities that could lead to cost savings through pooling, in particular the European Defence Agency, the EU Satellite Centre and the European Security and Defence College;
68. Urges the Council and Member States to provide the European Defence Agency with adequate funds and qualified staff so that it is able to perform all the tasks assigned to it by the Treaty of Lisbon; believes that this must be taken into account in the context of the next multiannual financial framework;

A space policy to underpin the CSDP

69. Emphasizes that, if the European Union is to enjoy decision-making and operational autonomy, it must have adequate satellite resources in the fields of space imagery, intelligence gathering, communications and space surveillance; considers that these areas could be further shared and pooled compared to existing agreements either on a bilateral basis or with the European Union Satellite Centre in respect of the Helios, Cosmo-SkyMed SAR-Lupe programmes; hopes that the MUSIS programme, which is due to replace the present generation of observation satellites, will prove a model of cooperation between European countries but also with the EEAS and the political-military bodies of the Union;
70. Calls on the Council and the Commission, in this context, to explore the possibility of a

financial contribution by the European Union to fund future space imaging satellite programmes so as to allow the political-military bodies of the European Union and the EEAS to 'task' satellites and obtain, upon request according to their own needs, satellite images of regions in crisis or regions in which a CSDP mission is to be deployed;

71. Reiterates the need for Community funding of the GMES project which should become a key infrastructure of the European Union, like the Galileo programme;

Strengthen the rapid response capability

72. Notes that, despite the changes made to the ATHENA mechanism and the European Union battlegroup deployment doctrine, as demanded, for example. in the Weimar letter, none of the battlegroups have so far been deployed, even though they could act as a 'force of first entry' until relieved by other forces better equipped for the long haul;
73. Believes that this undermines the credibility of the battlegroups as an instrument and of the CSDP in general, since they could already have been deployed; encourages Member States to remain mobilised and to meet their commitments in respect of this instrument;
74. Supports the process of reviewing crisis management procedures which should be concluded before the end of the year and facilitate the more rapid deployment of civilian and military CSDP operations; believes that the crisis management procedures should be reserved for CSDP operations and not include other instruments which would risk making these procedures more cumbersome; supports also a review of funding procedures so as to move towards greater flexibility and speed in the mobilisation of funds;

Structures and planning

75. Believes that the role of coordinating missions in the Horn of Africa entrusted to the Operations Centre is a first step towards the creation of a European planning and operations conduct capability which is properly staffed and endowed with sufficient means of communications and control;
76. Reiterates its call for the creation of an EU Operational Headquarters (OHQ) for operational planning and the conduct of military operations in the European External Action Service, if necessary through enhanced cooperation;
77. Notes the willingness expressed by the Council in its conclusions of December 2011 to strengthen forward planning capabilities; supports the extension of the powers of the EU General Staff in this regard; believes that the Operations Centre could also support the EUMS in this task;
78. Notes with interest the division of the Situation Centre into two new entities, the 'Situation Room', on one hand, and the 'Intelligence Centre' or INTCEN, on the other, and that the latter will have to expand if Member States wish to develop the CFSP and CSDP;
79. Advocates the creation of posts of temporary or permanent security expert in the most significant European Union delegations for the CSDP in order to better relay security issues;

PARTNERSHIPS

European Union/NATO

80. Notes that the European Union and NATO, which are united by a strategic partnership which was reaffirmed at the Chicago summit, are both active in a number of theatres such as Kosovo, Afghanistan and the fight against piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean; recalls in this context the importance of good cooperation between the EU and NATO;
81. Notes that the impasse linked to the dispute between Turkey and Cyprus has not prevented the two organisations from conducting, by appropriate channels, a political dialogue, from working together through 'staff-to-staff' contacts or from coordinating their activities; calls, nevertheless, for a resolution of this dispute in order to improve cooperation between the two organisations;
82. Welcomes cooperation between the European Union and NATO in the area of military capabilities, particularly in order to avoid any duplication between the initiative of pooling and sharing EU capabilities and NATO's *Smart Defense*;
83. Regrets the development of civilian crisis management structures in NATO, given that this represents an unnecessary duplication of capabilities already present and well developed in the European Union;

European Union / African Union

84. Welcomes the cooperation between the European Union and the African Union to maintain peace and stability on the Continent of Africa; notes that the European Union is contributing to the establishment of a blueprint for peace and security in Africa, and, to this end, supports the peace efforts of the African Union and African regional organizations such as ECOWAS, to combat instability, insecurity and the threat of terrorism from the Horn of Africa to the Sahel;
85. Recalls that the EU remains the largest contributor to AMISOM's budget and stresses the need for a strategic vision of the future of that operation;

European Union / United Nations

86. Welcomes the good cooperation that has developed between the EEAS and the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations; notes that the European Union, with its battlegroups, could provide a force of first entry for urgent peacekeeping operations, until relieved by a UN force;

EU / third countries

87. Welcomes also the cooperation between the European Union and the United States in

respect of crisis management operations, including EUTM Somalia, EUNAVFOR Atalanta, EULEX Kosovo and EUPOL Afghanistan;

88. Welcomes the framework agreements signed so far by the European Union with a dozen third countries to enable their participation in civilian and military operations conducted within the framework of the CSDP;

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89. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the High Representative / Vice-President of the Commission, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of Member States, the Secretary-General of NATO, the President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE and the President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly.