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2009 - 2014

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*Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs*

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**2013/2021(INI)**

18.4.2013

# **AMENDMENTS**

## **1 - 338**

**Draft report**  
**Arlene McCarthy**  
(PE506.244v01-00)

Reforming the structure of the EU's banking sector  
(2013/2021(INI))

AM\_Com\_NonLegReport

**Amendment 1**  
**Jean-Paul Gauzès**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Citation 1 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

**- having regard to the Directive 2010/76/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC as regards capital requirements for the trading book and for re-securitisations, and the supervisory review of remuneration policies.**

Or. en

**Amendment 2**  
**Jürgen Klute**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Citation 4 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

**- having regard to the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directives 77/91/EEC and 82/891/EC, Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC and 2011/35/EC and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010**

Or. en

**Amendment 3**  
**Wolf Klinz, Philippe De Backer**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Citation 6 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

**- having regard to the proposal of 6 June 2012 for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directives 77/91/EEC and 82/891/EC, Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC and 2011/35/EC and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010,**

Or. en

**Amendment 4**  
**Jürgen Klute**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Citation 9**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

– having regard to the 2012 report of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) entitled ‘Implicit Guarantees for Bank Debt: Where Do We Stand?’<sup>2</sup>,

– having regard to the 2012 report of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) entitled ‘Implicit Guarantees for Bank Debt: Where Do We Stand?’<sup>2</sup> **and to the 2009 report of the OECD 'The Elephant in the Room: The Need to Deal with What Banks Do'[1];**

**[1] <http://www.oecd.org/daf/fin/financial-markets/44357464.pdf>**

Or. en

**Amendment 5**  
**Philippe Lamberts**  
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Citation 10 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

**- Having regard to the Eurogroup  
Statement of 25 March 2013 regarding  
the crisis in Cyprus<sup>2</sup>**

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***[http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/136487.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/136487.pdf)***

Or. en

**Amendment 6**  
**Werner Langen**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital A**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

A. whereas ***the Commission estimates that the financial crisis cost EU governments around EUR 1.6 trillion (13 % of EU GDP) in state aid through bailouts of the financial sector<sup>4</sup>***;

A. whereas, ***since the beginning of the crisis, state aid of more than EUR 1.6 trillion (12.8% of EU GDP) was granted to the financial sector between 2008 and the end of 2011 (including the recapitalisation of Northern Rock in 2007), some EUR 1 080 billion of which went on guarantees, EUR 320 billion on recapitalisation measures, EUR 120 billion on impaired assets and EUR 90 billion on liquidity measures<sup>4</sup>***;

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<sup>4</sup> ***Some Member States, such as the UK, used up to two thirds of their GDP on account of the size of their financial sectors.***

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<sup>4</sup> ***COM(2012)778***

Or. de

**Amendment 7**  
**Corien Wortmann-Kool**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital A**

*Motion for a resolution*

A. whereas the Commission *estimates that the financial crisis cost EU governments* around EUR 1.6 trillion (13 % of EU GDP) in state aid *through bailouts of the financial sector*<sup>4</sup>;

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<sup>4</sup> *Some Member States, such as the UK, used up to two thirds of their GDP on account of the size of their financial sectors.*

*Amendment*

A. whereas the Commission *has supervised Member States' massive bank bailouts under the EU's state aid rules and has authorised* around EUR 1.6 trillion (13 % of EU GDP) *in used* state aid; *whereas the Commission required substantial restructuring of banks receiving aid, including cutting certain activities, to ensure their future viability without further public support and to offset distortions of competition caused by the subsidies received*;

Or. en

**Amendment 8**  
**Markus Ferber**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital A**

*Motion for a resolution*

A. whereas the Commission estimates that *the financial crisis cost EU governments* around EUR 1.6 trillion (13 % of EU GDP) in state aid *through* bailouts of the financial sector<sup>4</sup>;

*Amendment*

A. whereas the Commission estimates that around EUR 1.6 trillion (13 % of EU GDP) in state aid *was granted by EU governments in* bailouts of the financial sector *during the financial crisis*;

Or. de

### *Justification*

*The EUR 1.6 trillion was composed largely of state guarantees and therefore does not represent a direct burden on the budgets of the states concerned. In addition, the acquisition of shares in the receiver banks by the states concerned offsets the amounts which were actually transferred as part of the recapitalisation of banks and should therefore not be regarded as expenditure.*

#### **Amendment 9** **Jean-Paul Gauzès**

#### **Motion for a resolution** **Recital A**

##### *Motion for a resolution*

A. whereas the Commission estimates that the financial crisis cost EU governments around EUR **1.6 trillion (13 %** of EU GDP) in **state aid** through bailouts **of** the financial sector<sup>4</sup> ;

##### *Amendment*

A. Whereas the Commission estimates that the financial crisis cost EU governments around EUR **322.18 billion (2%** of EU GDP) in **recapitalization measures** through bailouts **to** the financial sector, **EUR 32 billion of which have been repaid**;

Or. en

#### **Amendment 10** **Jürgen Klute**

#### **Motion for a resolution** **Recital A a (new)**

##### *Motion for a resolution*

##### *Amendment*

**Aa. whereas these state financed bailouts lead to a massive increase of public indebtedness in the EU member states;**

Or. en

#### **Amendment 11** **Syed Kamall**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital B**

*Motion for a resolution*

B. whereas in the five years since the 2008 global economic and financial crisis, the EU economy has remained in a state of recession, with Member States providing subsidies and implicit guarantees to banks;

*Amendment*

B. whereas in the five years since the 2008 global economic and financial crisis, the EU economy has remained in a state of recession, with Member States providing subsidies and implicit guarantees to banks ***through such schemes as the deposit guarantee scheme as well as liquidity provision from central banks and outright nationalisation of banks which are at risk of insolvency;***

Or. en

**Amendment 12**  
**Peter Simon, Udo Bullmann**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital B**

*Motion for a resolution*

B. whereas in the five years since the 2008 global economic and financial crisis, the EU economy has remained in a state of recession, with Member States providing subsidies and implicit guarantees to banks;

*Amendment*

B. whereas in the five years since the 2008 global economic and financial crisis, the EU economy has remained in a state of recession, with Member States providing subsidies and implicit guarantees to banks; ***whereas the vicious circle involving the solvency of states and banks must be broken once and for all;***

Or. de

**Amendment 13**  
**Jean-Paul Gauzès**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital B**



*Motion for a resolution*

B. whereas in the five years since the 2008 global economic and financial crisis, the EU economy ***has remained in a*** state of recession, with Member States providing subsidies and implicit guarantees to banks;

*Amendment*

B. whereas in the five years since the 2008 global economic and financial crisis, the EU economy ***continues to be in*** state of recession with member states providing subsidies and implicit guarantees to banks ***due to also inadequate implementation of the economic and fiscal framework;***

Or. en

**Amendment 14**

**Wolf Klinz, Philippe De Backer**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Recital B**

*Motion for a resolution*

B. whereas in the five years since the 2008 global economic and financial crisis, the EU economy has remained in a state of recession, with Member States providing ***subsidies and implicit*** guarantees to banks;

*Amendment*

B. whereas in the five years since the 2008 global economic and financial crisis, the EU economy has remained in a state of recession, with Member States providing ***state aid in form of capital and*** guarantees to banks ***and markets that have remained fragmented;***

Or. en

**Amendment 15**

**Werner Langen**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Recital B**

*Motion for a resolution*

B. whereas in the ***five*** years since the 2008 global economic and financial crisis, the EU economy has remained in a state of recession, with Member States providing subsidies and implicit guarantees to banks;

*Amendment*

B. whereas in the ***four*** years since the 2008/***2009*** global economic and financial crisis, the EU economy has remained in a state of recession, with Member States providing subsidies and implicit guarantees

to banks;

Or. de

#### **Amendment 16**

**Philippe Lamberts**

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

#### **Motion for a resolution**

##### **Recital B a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***Ba. whereas the OECD in its 2012 report estimates the value of implicit state guarantees, in terms of cost savings to EU banks, at around 100 Billion USD for 2012 with wide variations between banks and Member States and the greatest benefit accruing to the banks of greatest size, particularly if they are perceived to be weak, and to banks based in the Member States with the highest sovereign credit rating. Furthermore the report finds that such guarantees extend beyond those banks classified as SIFIs under the FSB's methodology;***

Or. en

#### **Amendment 17**

**Werner Langen**

#### **Motion for a resolution**

##### **Recital C**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

C. whereas excessive risk-taking, excessive leverage, inadequate capital and liquidity requirements ***and*** the excessive complexity of the overall banking system ***were at the root of*** the financial crisis;

C. whereas excessive risk-taking, excessive leverage, inadequate ***equity*** capital and liquidity requirements, the excessive complexity of the overall banking system, ***excessively-large banking sectors in small economies, a lack of checks and***

*supervision, excessive expansion of trading in derivatives, incorrect rating assessments and excessive bonus systems contributed to causing the financial crisis;*

Or. de

**Amendment 18**  
**Markus Ferber**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital C**

*Motion for a resolution*

C. whereas excessive risk-taking, excessive leverage, inadequate capital and liquidity requirements and ***the excessive complexity of the overall banking system*** were at the root of the financial crisis;

*Amendment*

C. whereas excessive risk-taking, excessive leverage, inadequate capital and liquidity requirements, ***disincentives in the compensation systems of many financial institutions, an excessive share of the financial sectors of the economies of some Member States and incorrect ratings*** were at the root of the financial crisis;

Or. de

*Justification*

*Complexity is not a negative criterion per se. Sets out further causes of the financial crisis.*

**Amendment 19**  
**Jean-Paul Gauzès**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital C**

*Motion for a resolution*

C. whereas excessive risk-taking, excessive leverage, inadequate capital and liquidity requirements and ***the excessive complexity of the overall banking system*** were at the root of the financial crisis;

*Amendment*

C. whereas excessive risk-taking, excessive leverage, inadequate capital and liquidity requirements and ***inadequate risk management*** were at the root of the financial crisis, ***which had been largely fuelled by excessive real-estate exposures,***

*rather than capital market activities, and  
by insufficient supervision;*

Or. en

**Amendment 20**  
**Corien Wortmann-Kool**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital C**

*Motion for a resolution*

C. whereas excessive risk-taking, excessive leverage, inadequate capital and liquidity requirements **and** the excessive complexity of the overall banking system **were at the root of** the financial crisis;

*Amendment*

C. whereas excessive risk-taking, excessive leverage, inadequate capital and liquidity requirements, the excessive complexity of the overall banking system **and the strong interconnection between banks and sovereigns acted as a catalyst for** the financial **and economic** crisis **in the European Union**;

Or. en

**Amendment 21**  
**Marianne Thyssen**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital C**

*Motion for a resolution*

C. whereas excessive risk-taking, excessive leverage, inadequate capital **and** liquidity requirements and the excessive complexity of the overall banking system were at the root of the financial crisis;

*Amendment*

C. whereas excessive risk-taking, excessive leverage, inadequate capital **requirements for trading and investment activities, the absence of** liquidity requirements and the excessive complexity of the overall banking system were at the root of the financial crisis;

Or. nl

### *Justification*

*The problem of inadequate capital lay not in the credit risks but in trading and the trading portfolio. Just before the crisis, there was only between 0% and 2% capital coverage for trading activities.*

#### **Amendment 22**

**Syed Kamall**

#### **Motion for a resolution**

##### **Recital C**

##### *Motion for a resolution*

C. whereas excessive risk-taking, excessive leverage, inadequate capital and liquidity requirements **and** the excessive complexity of the overall banking system were **at the root** of the financial crisis;

##### *Amendment*

C. whereas excessive risk-taking, excessive leverage, inadequate capital and liquidity requirements, the excessive complexity **and consequent opacity** of the overall banking system were **causes** of the financial crisis, **resulting in markets not functioning properly**;

Or. en

#### **Amendment 23**

**Olle Schmidt, Anne E. Jensen, Nils Torvalds**

#### **Motion for a resolution**

##### **Recital C**

##### *Motion for a resolution*

C. whereas excessive risk-taking, excessive leverage, inadequate capital and liquidity requirements and the excessive complexity of the overall banking system were at the root of the financial crisis;

##### *Amendment*

C. whereas excessive risk-taking, excessive leverage, inadequate capital and liquidity requirements, **inadequate governance, risk management and compliance** and the excessive complexity of the overall banking system were at the root of the financial crisis;

Or. en

**Amendment 24**  
**Herbert Dorfmann**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital C**

*Motion for a resolution*

C. whereas excessive risk-taking, excessive leverage, inadequate capital and liquidity requirements and the excessive complexity of the overall banking system were at the root of the financial crisis;

*Amendment*

C. whereas ***a weak European regulatory framework with*** excessive risk-taking, excessive leverage, inadequate capital and liquidity requirements and the excessive complexity of the overall banking system were at the root of the financial crisis;

Or. en

**Amendment 25**  
**Burkhard Balz**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital C**

*Motion for a resolution*

C. whereas excessive risk-taking, excessive leverage, inadequate capital and liquidity requirements and ***the excessive complexity*** of the overall banking system were at the root of the financial crisis;

*Amendment*

C. whereas excessive risk-taking, excessive leverage, inadequate capital and liquidity requirements and ***a strong interconnectedness*** of the overall banking system were at the root of the financial crisis;

Or. en

**Amendment 26**  
**Wolf Klinz, Philippe De Backer**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital C**

*Motion for a resolution*

C. whereas excessive risk-taking, excessive leverage, inadequate capital and liquidity

*Amendment*

C. whereas excessive risk-taking, excessive leverage, inadequate capital and liquidity

requirements and the excessive complexity of the overall banking system were at the root of the financial crisis;

requirements, ***weak banking and markets supervision*** and the excessive complexity of the overall banking system were at the root of the financial crisis;

Or. en

#### **Amendment 27**

**Syed Kamall, Wolf Klinz, Sharon Bowles, Theodor Dumitru Stolojan, Sven Giegold**

#### **Motion for a resolution**

##### **Recital C a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***Ca. whereas the loss of prudence in accounting standards as a consequence of the adoption of international financial reporting standards played and continues to play a central role in allowing banks to give a view of their accounts that was and is not always true and fair with particular reference to IAS 39 on loan loss provisioning;***

Or. en

#### **Amendment 28**

**Jean-Paul Gauzès**

#### **Motion for a resolution**

##### **Recital C a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***Ca. whereas taking into account the weak situation of the European economy, the completion and implementation of existing new regulation (CRD IV, Banking Union...) should be prioritised and not disturbed by new reforms with high destabilizing capabilities;***

Or. en

**Amendment 29**  
**Werner Langen**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital C a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***Ca. whereas in Europe, risks were also accumulated by commercial banks, which issued loans in the real estate sector on the basis of short-sighted, defective risk management;***

Or. de

**Amendment 30**  
**Peter Simon, Udo Bullmann**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital C a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***Ca. whereas profits in the financial sector were often privatised but risks and losses were nationalised; whereas in a social market economy, risk and liability must go hand in hand;***

Or. de

**Amendment 31**  
**Olle Schmidt, Anne E. Jensen, Nils Torvalds**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital C a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***Ca. whereas, as highlighted in the HLEG's analysis, no particular business***



*model did particularly well or particularly poorly during the financial crisis;*

Or. en

**Amendment 32**  
**Burkhard Balz**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital D**

*Motion for a resolution*

D. whereas the *current post-crisis weakness in the structure of EU banks demonstrates the need for reform in order to serve the wider needs of the economy;*

*Amendment*

D. whereas the *overall set-up of the EU banking legislation should contribute to the stabilization and credit supply of the European economy, and in particular ensure the access to capital by small and medium-sized enterprises;*

Or. en

**Amendment 33**  
**Werner Langen**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital D**

*Motion for a resolution*

D. whereas the *current post-crisis weakness in the structure of EU banks demonstrates* the need for reform in order to serve the *wider* needs of the economy;

*Amendment*

D. whereas the *crisis made clear* the need for reform *of the structure of EU banks* in order to serve the *wide* needs of the *real* economy;

Or. de

**Amendment 34**  
**Jean-Paul Gauzès**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital D**

*Motion for a resolution*

D. whereas *the* current *post-crisis weakness in the structure* of EU banks *demonstrates* the need for reform *in order* to serve the wider needs of the economy;

*Amendment*

D. whereas current *weakness (capital, liquidity, risk management, supervision)* of EU banks *post-crisis demonstrate* the need for reform to serve the wider needs of the economy. *The current weakness also highlights the effects that macroeconomic imbalances have on the banking system, on wholesale markets and on consumer trust;*

Or. en

**Amendment 35**

**Wolf Klinz, Philippe De Backer**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Recital D**

*Motion for a resolution*

D. whereas the current post-crisis weakness in the *structure* of EU banks *demonstrates* the need for reform in order to serve the wider needs of the economy;

*Amendment*

D. whereas the current post-crisis weakness in the *capitalisation* of EU banks, *massive deleveraging and rising funding costs for banks in some Member States demonstrate* the need for *further* reform *of capital requirements* in order to serve the wider needs of the economy, *break the link between sovereigns and banks and restore the confidence in capital markets;*

Or. en

**Amendment 36**

**Syed Kamall**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Recital D**

*Motion for a resolution*

D. whereas the current *post-crisis weakness in the structure of EU* banks demonstrates the need for reform in order to *serve* the wider needs of the economy;

*Amendment*

D. whereas the current *state of European markets, in particular the weak financial state of many* banks, demonstrates the need for *further* reform in order to *ensure that the banks do not benefit from being 'too big to fail', ensuring that the markets once again can begin serving* the wider needs of the economy;

Or. en

**Amendment 37**

**Corien Wortmann-Kool**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Recital D**

*Motion for a resolution*

D. whereas the current post-crisis weakness *in the structure of EU banks* demonstrates the need for *reform* in order to serve the wider needs of the economy;

*Amendment*

D. whereas the current post-crisis weakness *of the European banking system* demonstrates the need for *reinforcing the architecture of European financial supervision and crisis management, including structural reforms for certain banks* in order to serve the wider needs of the economy;

Or. en

**Amendment 38**

**Marianne Thyssen**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Recital D**

*Motion for a resolution*

D. whereas the current post-crisis weakness in the structure of EU banks demonstrates *the* need for reform in order

*Amendment*

D. whereas the current post-crisis weakness in the structure of EU banks demonstrates *that there may be a* need for

to serve the wider needs of the economy;

*further* reform in order to serve the wider needs of the economy *and that moreover significant disparities between Member States are perceptible as regards the nature and degree of the reforms of their banking sectors which they have implemented and planned;*

Or. nl

## **Amendment 39**

**Jürgen Klute**

### **Motion for a resolution**

#### **Recital D**

##### *Motion for a resolution*

D. whereas the current post-crisis weakness in the structure of EU banks demonstrates the need for reform in order to serve *the wider needs of the economy*;

##### *Amendment*

D. whereas the current post-crisis weakness in the structure of EU banks demonstrates the need for reform in order to serve *especially the socially desirable needs and to strengthen growth and employment enhancing investments of small and medium enterprises*;

Or. en

## **Amendment 40**

**Olle Schmidt, Anne E. Jensen, Nils Torvalds**

### **Motion for a resolution**

#### **Recital D**

##### *Motion for a resolution*

D. whereas the current post-crisis weakness in the structure of EU banks demonstrates the need for reform in order to serve the wider needs of the economy;

##### *Amendment*

D. whereas the current post-crisis weakness in the structure of EU banks demonstrates the need for reform in order to serve the wider needs of the economy *and to safeguard European taxpayers' money against the risks that arise from the sheer size of the EU banking sector as a whole in relation to the overall*

*economy.*

Or. en

#### **Amendment 41**

**Sharon Bowles**

#### **Motion for a resolution**

##### **Recital D**

##### *Motion for a resolution*

D. whereas ***the current post-crisis weakness*** in the ***structure of EU banks demonstrates the*** need for reform in order to serve the wider needs of the economy;

##### *Amendment*

D. whereas ***weaknesses and excessive interconnectedness exposed*** in the ***financial crisis demonstrates there is a*** need for ***banking*** reform in order to serve the wider needs of the economy;

Or. en

#### **Amendment 42**

**Claudio Morganti, Mario Borghezio, Lorenzo Fontana**

#### **Motion for a resolution**

##### **Recital D a (new)**

##### *Motion for a resolution*

##### *Amendment*

***Da. whereas the 1933 US Glass-Steagall Act on banking separation helped to provide a way out of the worst global financial crisis to have occurred before the present crisis and whereas since the Act was repealed in 1999, there has been a considerable increase in speculative bank investment and financial failures;***

Or. it

#### **Amendment 43**

**Olle Schmidt, Anne E. Jensen, Nils Torvalds**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital D a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***D a. Whereas a number of important EU initiatives have been taken to prevent a new banking crisis, increase protection of tax payers and retail clients and create robust and sustainable payment systems.***

Or. en

**Amendment 44**  
**Hans-Peter Martin**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital D a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***D a. whereas banks should not be sovereign over public interest;***

Or. en

**Amendment 45**  
**Werner Langen**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital E**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

E. whereas the eighth (December 2012) edition of the Commission's Consumer Markets Scoreboard clearly indicates that consumer trust in ***the EU banking sector*** is at an all-time low ***and that the industry has high levels of noncompliance with consumer protection legislation***<sup>5</sup>;

E. whereas the eighth (December 2012) edition of the Commission's Consumer Markets Scoreboard clearly indicates that consumer trust ***in the EU*** in banking ***services*** is at an all-time low;

Or. de

**Amendment 46**  
**Wolf Klinz, Philippe De Backer**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital E**

*Motion for a resolution*

E. whereas the eighth (December 2012) edition of the Commission's Consumer Markets Scoreboard clearly indicates that consumer trust in the EU banking sector is at an all-time low and that the industry has high levels of noncompliance with consumer protection legislation<sup>5</sup> ;

*Amendment*

E. whereas the eighth (December 2012) edition of the Commission's Consumer Markets Scoreboard clearly indicates that consumer trust in the EU banking sector is at an all-time low and that the industry has high levels of noncompliance with consumer protection legislation<sup>5</sup> ***and the consumers' confidence needs to be restored*** ;

Or. en

**Amendment 47**  
**Syed Kamall**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital E a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***Ea. whereas the recent bailout package in Cyprus originally included a tax on all bank deposits, thereby undermining confidence in the deposit guarantee scheme of that country;***

Or. en

**Amendment 48**  
**Danuta Maria Hübner**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital F**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***F. whereas research by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) suggests that once bank assets exceed a country's GDP, its financial sector has a negative impact on economic growth, as human and financial resources are drained from other areas of economic activity<sup>6</sup> ;***

***deleted***

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<sup>6</sup> 'Reassessing the impact of finance on growth', by Stephen G. Cecchetti and Enisse Kharroubi, Monetary and Economic Department of the Bank of International Settlements, July 2012: [www.bis.org/publ/work381.pdf](http://www.bis.org/publ/work381.pdf)

Or. en

*Justification*

*This is but one side of the argument from an extensive literature on the connection between growth and finance. The recital fails to capture existing complexities and there are many arguments suggesting that financial sector development can positively impact growth.*

**Amendment 49**  
**Marianne Thyssen**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital F**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***F. whereas research by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) suggests that once bank assets exceed a country's GDP, its financial sector has a negative impact on economic growth, as human and financial resources are drained from other areas of economic activity<sup>6</sup> ;***

***deleted***

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<sup>6</sup> 'Reassessing the impact of finance on growth', by Stephen G. Cecchetti and Enisse Kharroubi, Monetary and



Or. nl

*Justification*

*This is a dangerous assertion which is aimed at small countries and would in essence mean that small countries would not be permitted to develop a substantial financial sector. This reasoning is contrary to the very spirit of the internal market project. Moreover, the current concern about the size of the financial sector in relation to GDP ought to be largely overcome by the establishment of the European Resolution Fund, which would create a genuinely level playing field.*

**Amendment 50**  
**Werner Langen**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital F**

*Motion for a resolution*

F. whereas **research** by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) suggests that once **bank assets exceed** a country's GDP, its financial sector **has** a negative impact on **economic growth**, as human and financial resources are drained from other areas of economic activity<sup>6</sup>;

*Amendment*

F. whereas **a study** by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) suggests that once **the volume of private sector loans exceeds** a country's GDP **as a measure of the size of the financial sector and relative employment in that sector rises rapidly, an excessively large** financial sector **can have** a negative effect on **the increase in productivity**, as human and financial resources are drained from other areas of economic activity<sup>6</sup>;

Or. de

**Amendment 51**  
**Syed Kamall**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital F**

*Motion for a resolution*

F. whereas research by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) suggests that once bank assets exceed a country's GDP, its financial sector has a negative impact on economic growth, as human and financial resources are drained from other areas of economic activity<sup>6</sup> ;

*Amendment*

F. whereas research by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) suggests that once bank assets exceed a country's GDP, its financial sector has a negative impact on economic growth, as human and financial resources are drained from other areas of economic activity<sup>6</sup> ; ***also notes that the ability for any country to withstand the fallout from a collapse of such a systemically relevant bank will be called into question and that the fiscal health of the country in question will be severely undermined;***

Or. en

**Amendment 52**  
**Sharon Bowles**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital F**

*Motion for a resolution*

F. whereas research by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) suggests that once bank assets exceed a country's GDP, its financial sector has a negative impact on economic growth, as human and financial resources are drained from other areas of economic activity<sup>6</sup> ;

*Amendment*

F. whereas research by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) suggests that once bank assets exceed a country's GDP, its financial sector has a negative impact on economic growth, as human and financial resources are drained from other areas of economic activity<sup>6</sup> . ***Nevertheless, other reports (IMF) indicate economies can benefit from specialisation; further, with regard to banking it is the domestic exposure rather than the total sector size that should be considered for affordability;***

Or. en

**Amendment 53**  
**Jean-Paul Gauzès**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital F**

*Motion for a resolution*

F. whereas research by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) suggests that once bank assets exceed a country's GDP, its financial sector has a negative impact on economic growth, as human and financial resources are drained from other areas of economic activity<sup>6</sup> ;

*Amendment*

F. whereas research by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) suggests that once bank assets exceed a country's GDP, its financial sector has a negative impact on economic growth, as human and financial resources are drained from other areas of economic activity<sup>6</sup>; ***in addition, the right reference to compare banks size is at the level of Europe as a whole and not at individual national level;***

Or. en

**Amendment 54**  
**Hans-Peter Martin**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital F**

*Motion for a resolution*

F. whereas research by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) suggests that once bank assets exceed a country's GDP, its financial sector has a negative impact on economic growth, ***as*** human and financial resources are drained from other areas of economic activity<sup>6</sup>;

*Amendment*

F. whereas research by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) suggests that once bank assets ***markedly*** exceed a country's GDP – ***as is the case in over 80% of EU 27 states*** – its financial sector has a negative impact on economic growth, ***with the result that*** human and financial resources are drained from other areas of economic activity;

Or. de

**Amendment 55**  
**Wolf Klinz**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital F**

*Motion for a resolution*

F. whereas research by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) suggests that once bank assets exceed a country's GDP, its financial sector **has** a negative impact on economic growth, as human and financial resources are drained from other areas of economic activity<sup>6</sup> ;

*Amendment*

F. whereas research by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) suggests that once bank assets exceed a country's GDP, its financial sector **might have** a negative impact on economic growth, as human and financial resources are drained from other areas of economic activity<sup>6</sup> ;

Or. en

**Amendment 56**  
**Philippe Lamberts**  
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital F a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***Fa. whereas, in relation to the crisis in Cyprus, the Eurogroup has confirmed the principle that the size of the banking sector relative to [a Member State's] GDP should be limited in order to address banking sector imbalances and promote financial stability, from which it follows that, in the absence of substantial EU-level funds for resolution, limits on the size, complexity and interconnectedness of banks will be beneficial to systemic stability;***

Or. en

**Amendment 57**  
**Jürgen Klute**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital F a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***Fa. whereas the pure separation of financial institutions to investment- and retail branches does not address the problem concerning SIFIs and the relation between the volume of the Recovery and Resolution Fund on the one hand and the balance of institutions systemically relevant for credit, payment and deposit on the other;***

Or. en

**Amendment 58**  
**Philippe De Backer**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital F a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***Fa. Whereas the transformation process towards a more sustainable, less systemic and viable banking sector seems to differ between members states.***

Or. en

**Amendment 59**  
**Corien Wortmann-Kool**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital G**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

G. whereas the financial crisis demonstrated ***the problem of cross-contamination between banks' retail and investment activities;***

G. whereas the ***HLEG concludes that the*** financial crisis ***has*** demonstrated ***that no particular business model fared particularly well, or particularly poorly in the European banking sector; whereas the HLEG analysis revealed excessive risk-***

*taking, often in trading highly complex instruments or real estate related lending not matched with adequate capital protection, excessive reliance on short term funding and strong linkages between financial institutions causing a high level of systemic risk in the run up to the financial crisis;*

Or. en

**Amendment 60**  
**Sylvie Goulard**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital G**

*Motion for a resolution*

G. whereas the financial crisis demonstrated the problem of cross-contamination between banks' retail and investment activities;

*Amendment*

G. whereas the financial crisis demonstrated the problem of cross-contamination between banks' retail and investment activities; *whereas the report of the HLEG underlines that "there are important systemic benefits of having diversity of business models" and the Eurosystem states in its contribution of January 2013 that "diversity implies that different institutional forms, business and earnings models coexist which strengthens resilience and mitigates contagion vulnerabilities";*

Or. en

**Amendment 61**  
**Markus Ferber**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital G**

*Motion for a resolution*

G. whereas the financial crisis

*Amendment*

G. whereas the financial crisis

demonstrated the problem of cross-contamination between *banks' retail and investment activities*;

demonstrated the problem of cross-contamination between *the different business areas of banks, whilst the experience of recent years shows that the cross-contamination in the various Member States stemmed from different business sectors*;

Or. de

#### *Justification*

*For example, the cross-contamination in Ireland and the United Kingdom stemmed from the investment activities of banks and in Spain from classical loan operations (extending poorly-guaranteed real estate loans in an already over-heated market environment). It is therefore not possible to make a general statement to the effect that the problem is that the investment arms of banks have contaminated other, essentially healthy, sections.*

#### **Amendment 62** **Jean-Paul Gauzès**

#### **Motion for a resolution** **Recital G**

##### *Motion for a resolution*

G. whereas the financial crisis demonstrated *the problem of cross-contamination between banks' retail and investment activities*;

##### *Amendment*

G. Whereas the financial crisis demonstrated *that no particular banking structure had a clear advantage in terms of resilience*;

Or. en

#### **Amendment 63** **Sharon Bowles**

#### **Motion for a resolution** **Recital G**

##### *Motion for a resolution*

G. whereas the financial crisis demonstrated the problem of *cross-contamination between banks' retail and*

##### *Amendment*

G. whereas the financial crisis demonstrated the problem of *exposures and interconnectedness of banks and*

investment activities;

*raises concerns over internal conflicts  
between* retail and investment activities,

Or. en

**Amendment 64**  
**Marianne Thyssen**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital G**

*Motion for a resolution*

G. whereas the financial crisis demonstrated the problem of cross-contamination between banks' *retail* and investment activities;

*Amendment*

G. whereas the financial crisis demonstrated the problem of cross-contamination between banks' *depository/lending activities and their risky trading* and investment activities;

Or. nl

*Justification*

*In the event of a separation, it would be better to refer to 'deposit banks' and 'investment entities'. 'Deposit banks' refers to credit institutions which rely mainly on the acquisition of deposits for use in their operations and which use them mainly for the purpose of lending to businesses, families and authorities. They primarily operate in the field of relationship banking. Investment entities primarily operate through transactions to provide financing on financial markets, inter alia with regard to the provision of venture capital and trading in other securities.*

**Amendment 65**  
**Burkhard Balz**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital G**

*Motion for a resolution*

G. whereas *the financial crisis demonstrated* the problem of cross-contamination between banks' retail and investment activities;

*Amendment*

G. whereas *requirements for risk management and capital and the supervision thereof should be the priority in order to avoid* the problem of cross-contamination between banks' retail and



investment activities;

Or. en

## **Amendment 66**

**Syed Kamall**

### **Motion for a resolution**

#### **Recital G**

##### *Motion for a resolution*

G. whereas the financial crisis demonstrated the problem of cross-contamination between banks' retail and investment activities;

##### *Amendment*

G. whereas the financial crisis demonstrated the problem of cross-contamination between banks' retail and investment activities, ***whilst also noting that 'risky' activities took place in both retail and investment arms of banks;***

Or. en

## **Amendment 67**

**Wolf Klinz**

### **Motion for a resolution**

#### **Recital G**

##### *Motion for a resolution*

G. whereas the financial crisis demonstrated the problem of cross-contamination between banks' ***retail and investment*** activities;

##### *Amendment*

G. whereas the financial crisis demonstrated the problem of ***potential*** cross-contamination between banks' ***core business and non-banking holding*** activities;

Or. en

## **Amendment 68**

**Werner Langen**

### **Motion for a resolution**

#### **Recital G**

*Motion for a resolution*

G. whereas the financial crisis demonstrated the problem of **cross-contamination** between banks' retail and investment activities;

*Amendment*

G. whereas the financial crisis demonstrated the problem of **networking** between banks' retail and investment activities;

Or. de

**Amendment 69**  
**Corien Wortmann-Kool**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital G a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***Ga. whereas the HLEG underlines that simple labels, such as retail bank or investment bank, do not adequately describe the business model of a bank and its performance and riskiness; whereas business models are diverse along different key dimensions, such as size, activities, income model, capital and funding structure, ownership, corporate structure, and geographic scope, and have evolved substantially over time;***

Or. en

**Amendment 70**  
**Olle Schmidt, Anne E. Jensen, Nils Torvalds**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital G a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***Ga. whereas more banks have had significant losses from the types of activities that are supposed to remain in the deposit bank, in particular real estate***

***lending, than those caused by losses in trading related activities, let alone market making in fixed-income markets.***

Or. en

**Amendment 71**  
**Danuta Maria Hübner**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital G a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***Ga. Whereas it became clear that risks can originate in both the retail, as well as in the investment part of the bank.***

Or. en

*Justification*

*Retail banks were often at the heart of economic troubles, as was the case of Northern Rock in the UK.*

**Amendment 72**  
**Olle Schmidt, Anne E. Jensen, Nils Torvalds**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital G b (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***Gb. whereas there is no analysis in the HLEG report of whether mandatory separation within a holding company is sufficient to insulate the deposit bank from what happens to the trading bank. A mandatory separation does not necessarily hinder banks from transferring funds from the deposit taking entity at a subsidized price to the trading entity. Contagion effects cannot be excluded if the deposit bank and the***

*trading bank work under similar brands. Liquidity stress can be triggered by rumour rather than fact, which can adversely affect the deposit bank. Thus, the need for government intervention may still arise. In addition it is not obvious that a mandatory separation will reduce governments' incentives to bail out troubled banks. Governments may want to protect systemically important banks regardless from where the losses originate. Moreover it is unclear how a legal separation would be accomplished in a bank with a wide range of cross-border activities. The Group may thus be advocating a measure that is neither necessary, nor sufficient to achieve the stated objective. An impact assessment of the cost and benefits must therefore be made before rules on mandatory separation are adopted.*

Or. en

#### **Amendment 73**

**Olle Schmidt, Anne E. Jensen, Nils Torvalds**

#### **Motion for a resolution**

#### **Recital G c (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

*Gc. whereas there is little evidence to support that a mandatory separation into trading banks and deposit banks would have helped to prevent the financial crisis or even ease the consequences. Had the global banking system carried more capital, bigger liquidity buffers and longer term funding the crisis would have had less severe consequences.*

Or. en

**Amendment 74**  
**Corien Wortmann-Kool**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital H**

*Motion for a resolution*

H. whereas the Commission proposal should provide for a strong, stable and resilient banking sector for the internal market while respecting the diversity *of the Member States' banking sectors*;

*Amendment*

H. whereas the Commission proposal should provide for a strong, stable and resilient banking sector for the internal market while respecting the diversity *in the European banking sector; whereas maintaining and deepening the internal market for banking services is essential in order to foster economic growth in the Union and provide for adequate funding of the real economy*;

Or. en

**Amendment 75**  
**Burkhard Balz**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital H**

*Motion for a resolution*

H. whereas *the Commission proposal* should provide for a strong, stable and resilient banking sector for the internal market while respecting the diversity of the Member States' banking sectors;

*Amendment*

H. whereas *all upcoming legislative initiatives by the Commission* should provide for a strong, stable and resilient banking sector for the internal market while respecting the diversity of the Member States' banking sectors *and taking into account national specificities*;

Or. en

**Amendment 76**  
**Olle Schmidt, Anne E. Jensen, Nils Torvalds**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital H**

*Motion for a resolution*

H. whereas the Commission proposal should provide for a strong, stable and resilient banking sector for the internal market while respecting the diversity of the Member States' banking sectors;

*Amendment*

H. whereas the Commission proposal should provide for a strong, stable and resilient banking sector ***with access to a variety of funding sources*** for the internal market while respecting the diversity of the Member States' banking sectors ***and be based on a thorough impact assessment and cost benefit analysis.***

Or. en

**Amendment 77**  
**Jean-Paul Gauzès**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital H**

*Motion for a resolution*

H. whereas ***the Commission proposal*** should provide for a strong, stable and resilient banking sector for the internal market while respecting the diversity of ***the*** Member States' banking sectors;

*Amendment*

H. whereas ***EU legislation*** should provide for a strong, stable and resilient banking sector ***with access to wide variety of funding sources*** for the internal market while respecting the diversity of ***EU*** member states banking sectors;

Or. en

**Amendment 78**  
**Philippe Lamberts**  
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital H**

*Motion for a resolution*

H. whereas the Commission proposal should provide for a strong, stable and resilient banking sector for the internal market while respecting the diversity of the

*Amendment*

H. whereas the Commission proposal should provide for a strong, stable, ***competitive, transparent*** and resilient banking sector for the internal market

Member States' banking sectors;

while respecting the diversity of the  
Member States' banking sectors;

Or. en

#### **Amendment 79**

**Wolf Klinz**

#### **Motion for a resolution**

##### **Recital H**

##### *Motion for a resolution*

H. whereas ***the*** Commission proposal should provide for a strong, stable and resilient banking sector for the internal market while respecting the diversity of the Member States' banking sectors;

##### *Amendment*

H. whereas ***every adopted*** Commission proposal should provide for a strong, stable and resilient banking sector for the internal market while respecting the diversity of the Member States' banking sectors;

Or. en

#### **Amendment 80**

**Werner Langen**

#### **Motion for a resolution**

##### **Recital H**

##### *Motion for a resolution*

H. whereas the Commission ***proposal*** should provide for a strong, stable and resilient banking sector for the internal market while respecting the diversity of the Member States' banking sectors;

##### *Amendment*

H. whereas ***a legislative proposal by*** the Commission should provide for a strong, stable and resilient banking sector for the internal market while respecting the diversity of the Member States' banking sectors;

Or. de

#### **Amendment 81**

**Corien Wortmann-Kool**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital H a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

*Ha. whereas the Commission proposal should provide for a principles based approach to structural reforms of the European banking sector consistent with, and complementary to, already existing and forthcoming Union legislation for financial services; whereas EBA should play a key role by developing relevant technical standards to ensure consistent application and enforcement by the competent authorities, including the ECB, across the Union;*

Or. en

**Amendment 82**  
**Peter Simon, Udo Bullmann**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital H a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

*Ha. whereas decentralised local and regional institutions within the banking sector in the Member States have shown themselves to be stable and beneficial in terms of financing the real economy;*

Or. de

**Amendment 83**  
**Olle Schmidt, Anne E. Jensen, Nils Torvalds**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital H a (new)**



*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***Ha. whereas it is necessary that banks hold higher levels and better quality of capital; have greater liquidity buffers and longer-term funding.***

Or. en

**Amendment 84**  
**Werner Langen**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital I**

*Motion for a resolution*

I. whereas, since it is neither feasible nor desirable to effect a bank separation post-failure, an effective recovery and resolution regime is needed in order to ***provide authorities with a credible set of tools, including a bridge bank, so that they can intervene sufficiently early and quickly in an unsound or failing bank to enable its essential financial and economic functions to continue, while minimising the impact on financial stability and ensuring*** that appropriate losses are imposed on the shareholders and creditors who bore the risk of investing in the institution in question, and not by taxpayers or depositors;

*Amendment*

I. whereas an effective recovery and resolution regime is needed in order to ***ensure*** that appropriate losses are imposed on the shareholders and creditors who bore the risk of investing in the institution in question, and not by taxpayers or depositors;

Or. de

**Amendment 85**  
**Syed Kamall**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital I**

*Motion for a resolution*

I. whereas, since it is neither feasible nor desirable to effect a bank separation post-failure, an effective recovery and resolution regime is needed in order to provide authorities with a credible set of tools, including a bridge bank, so that they can intervene sufficiently early and quickly in an unsound or failing bank to enable its essential financial and economic functions to continue, while minimising the impact on financial stability and ensuring that appropriate losses are imposed on the shareholders and creditors who bore the risk of investing in the institution in question, and not by taxpayers or depositors;

*Amendment*

I. whereas, since it is neither feasible nor desirable to effect a bank separation post-failure, an effective recovery and resolution regime is needed in order to provide authorities with a credible set of tools, including a bridge bank, so that they can intervene sufficiently early and quickly in an unsound or failing bank to enable its essential financial and economic functions to continue, while minimising the impact on financial stability and ensuring that appropriate losses are imposed on the shareholders and creditors who bore the risk of investing in the institution in question, and not by taxpayers or depositors; ***whereas such recovery and resolution plans are not necessary for other types of private company, suggesting that there is a specific problem with the market in financial services; whereas if the market were functioning properly, financial institutions would be able to fail without any need for a recovery and resolution plan; whereas therefore the problem lies within the structures and interconnections between financial institutions;***

Or. en

**Amendment 86**  
**Śławomir Nitras**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital I**

*Motion for a resolution*

I. whereas, since it is neither feasible nor desirable to effect a bank separation post-failure, an effective recovery and resolution regime is needed in order to provide authorities with a credible set of

*Amendment*

I. whereas, since it is neither feasible nor desirable to effect a bank separation post-failure, an effective recovery and resolution regime is needed in order to provide authorities with a credible set of

tools, including *a bridge bank*, so that they can intervene sufficiently early and quickly in an unsound or failing bank *to enable its essential financial and economic functions to continue*, while minimising the impact on financial stability and ensuring that appropriate losses are imposed on the shareholders and creditors who bore the risk of investing in the institution in question, and not by taxpayers or depositors;

tools, including *legislation to split banks into separate investment and retail entities*, so that they can intervene sufficiently early and quickly in an unsound or failing bank, *so that it would be possible to separate and if necessary shut down the investment entity without this having any adverse effects on purely banking-related activities*, while minimising the impact on financial stability and ensuring that appropriate losses are imposed on the shareholders and creditors who bore the risk of investing in the institution in question, and not by taxpayers or depositors;

Or. pl

#### **Amendment 87** **Jean-Paul Gauzès**

#### **Motion for a resolution** **Recital I**

##### *Motion for a resolution*

I. whereas, *since it is neither feasible nor desirable to effect a bank separation post-failure*, an effective recovery and resolution regime is needed in order to provide authorities with a credible set of tools, including a bridge bank, so that they can intervene sufficiently early and quickly in *an unsound or* failing bank to enable its essential financial and economic functions to continue, while minimising the impact on financial stability and ensuring that appropriate losses are imposed on the shareholders and creditors who bore the risk of investing in the institution in question, and not by taxpayers or depositors;

##### *Amendment*

I. whereas an effective recovery and resolution regime is needed in order to provide authorities with a credible set of tools, including a bridge bank, so that they can intervene sufficiently early and quickly in *a* failing bank to enable its essential financial and economic functions to continue, while minimising the impact on financial stability and ensuring that appropriate losses are imposed on the shareholders and creditors who bore the risk of investing in the institution in question, and not by taxpayers or depositors;

Or. en

**Amendment 88**  
**Burkhard Balz**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital I**

*Motion for a resolution*

I. whereas, since it is neither feasible nor desirable to effect a bank separation post-failure, an effective recovery and resolution regime is needed in order to provide authorities with a credible set of tools, including a bridge bank, so that they can intervene sufficiently early and quickly in an unsound or failing bank to enable its essential financial and economic functions to continue, while minimising the impact on financial stability and ensuring that appropriate losses are imposed on the shareholders and creditors who bore the risk of investing in the institution in question, and not by taxpayers or depositors;

*Amendment*

I. whereas, since it is neither feasible nor desirable to effect a bank separation post-failure, an effective recovery and resolution regime ***as currently discussed in the legislative procedure on the Recovery and Resolution Directive*** is needed in order to provide authorities with a credible set of tools, including a bridge bank, so that they can intervene sufficiently early and quickly in an unsound or failing bank to enable its essential financial and economic functions to continue, while minimising the impact on financial stability and ensuring that appropriate losses are imposed on the shareholders and creditors who bore the risk of investing in the institution in question, and not by taxpayers or depositors;

Or. en

**Amendment 89**  
**Olle Schmidt, Anne E. Jensen, Nils Torvalds**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital I**

*Motion for a resolution*

I. whereas, since it is neither feasible nor desirable to effect a bank separation post-failure, an effective recovery and resolution regime is needed in order to provide authorities with a credible set of tools, including a bridge bank, so that they can intervene sufficiently early and quickly in an unsound or failing bank to enable its essential financial and economic functions

*Amendment*

I. whereas, since it is neither feasible nor desirable to effect a bank separation post-failure, an effective recovery and resolution regime is needed in order to provide authorities with a credible set of tools, including ***pre-defined bail-inable debt instruments*** and a bridge bank, so that they can intervene sufficiently early and quickly in an unsound or failing bank

to continue, while minimising the impact on financial stability and ensuring that appropriate losses are imposed on the shareholders and creditors who bore the risk of investing in the institution in question, and not by taxpayers or depositors;

to enable its essential financial and economic functions to continue, while minimising the impact on financial stability and ensuring that appropriate losses are imposed on the shareholders and creditors who bore the risk of investing in the institution in question, and not by taxpayers or depositors;

Or. en

## **Amendment 90**

**Wolf Klinz**

### **Motion for a resolution**

#### **Recital I**

##### *Motion for a resolution*

I. whereas, since it is neither feasible nor desirable to effect a bank separation post-failure, an effective recovery and resolution regime is needed in order to provide authorities with a credible set of tools, including a bridge bank, so that they can intervene sufficiently early and quickly in an unsound or failing bank to enable its essential financial and economic functions to continue, while minimising the impact on financial stability and ensuring that appropriate losses are imposed on the shareholders and creditors who bore the risk of investing in the institution in question, and not by taxpayers or depositors;

##### *Amendment*

I. whereas, since it is neither feasible nor desirable to effect a bank separation post-failure, an effective recovery and resolution regime is needed in order to provide authorities with a credible set of tools, including a bridge bank, so that they can intervene sufficiently early and quickly in an unsound or failing bank to enable its essential financial and economic functions to continue, while minimising the impact on financial stability and ensuring that appropriate losses are imposed on the shareholders and creditors who bore the risk of investing in the institution in question, and not by taxpayers or *insured* depositors;

Or. en

## **Amendment 91**

**Peter Simon, Udo Bullmann**

### **Motion for a resolution**

#### **Recital I a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***Ia. whereas supervisory and resolution authorities must be given the requisite authority to be able effectively to remove impediments to the resolvability of credit institutions and the banks must be forced to prove their resolvability; whereas the introduction of compulsory recovery and resolutions regimes provides an opportunity to influence the banking structure, reduce the complexity of institutions and restrict or terminate business sectors and products;***

Or. de

**Amendment 92**

**Philippe Lamberts**

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Motion for a resolution**

**Recital I a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***Ia. whereas, with regard to ending the implicit guarantee that many banks enjoy, one of the most important tools in the recovery and resolution regime proposed by the Commission is the power for authorities to intervene early, well before the point of non-viability, to require banks to change their business strategy, size or risk profile so that they can be resolvable without recourse to extraordinary public financial support;***

Or. en

**Amendment 93**

**Hans-Peter Martin**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital I a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***Ia. whereas banks should never be so big anymore that their failure causes systemic risks for the entire economy and therefore requiring the government and tax payers to rescue them, thus bringing the too-big-to-fail problem to an end;***

Or. en

**Amendment 94**  
**Hans-Peter Martin**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital I a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***Ia. whereas banks must no longer reach such a size – even in one single Member State – that they constitute a systemic risk in a nation state with taxpayers having to bear the cost of losses;***

Or. de

**Amendment 95**  
**Jean-Paul Gauzès**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital J**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***J. whereas the EU banking sector remains highly concentrated: 14 European banking groups are global systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), and 15 European banks own 43 % of the market (in terms of asset size) and*** ***deleted***

*represent 150 % of EU-27 GDP, with individual Member States citing even higher ratios; whereas the ratio of bank size to GDP has tripled since 2000;*

Or. en

**Amendment 96**  
**Werner Langen**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital J**

*Motion for a resolution*

J. whereas the EU banking sector remains highly concentrated: 14 European banking groups are global systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), and 15 European banks *own* 43 % of the market *(in terms of asset size)* and *represent* 150 % of EU-27 GDP, with individual Member States citing *even* higher ratios; whereas the ratio of bank size to GDP has *tripled since 2000*;

*Amendment*

J. whereas the EU banking sector remains highly concentrated: 14 European banking groups are global systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), and 15 European banks *share* 43 % of the market and *exceed* 150 % of EU-27 GDP, with individual Member States citing *considerably* higher ratios; whereas the ratio of bank size to GDP has *quadrupled in Luxembourg, Ireland, Cyprus, Malta and Great Britain*;

Or. de

**Amendment 97**  
**Hans-Peter Martin**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital J**

*Motion for a resolution*

J. whereas the EU banking sector remains highly concentrated: 14 European banking groups are global systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), and 15 European banks own 43 % of the market (in terms of asset size) *and* represent 150 % of EU-27 GDP, with individual

*Amendment*

J. whereas the EU banking sector remains highly concentrated: *the total assets of the banking sector in the EU amount to EUR 43 trillion, which represents 349% of EU-27 GDP.* 14 European banking groups are global systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), and 15



Member States citing even higher ratios; whereas the ratio of bank size to GDP has tripled since 2000;

European banks *alone* own **EUR 20 000 billion in assets, which corresponds to** 43% of the market (in terms of asset size). **They thus** represent 150% of EU-27 GDP, with individual Member States citing even higher ratios **of up to 800% of GDP**; whereas the ratio of bank size to GDP has tripled since 2000;

Or. de

## **Amendment 98**

**Syed Kamall**

### **Motion for a resolution**

#### **Recital J**

##### *Motion for a resolution*

J. whereas the EU banking sector remains highly concentrated: 14 European banking groups are global systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), and 15 European banks own 43 % of the market (in terms of asset size) and represent 150 % of EU-27 GDP, with individual Member States citing even higher ratios; whereas the ratio of bank size to GDP has tripled since 2000;

##### *Amendment*

J. whereas the EU banking sector remains highly concentrated: 14 European banking groups are global systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), and 15 European banks own 43 % of the market (in terms of asset size) and represent 150 % of EU-27 GDP, with individual Member States citing even higher ratios; whereas the ratio of bank size to GDP has tripled since 2000; **whereas there is a huge degree of diversity in the European banking sector both in terms of size and business model**;

Or. en

## **Amendment 99**

**Syed Kamall**

### **Motion for a resolution**

#### **Recital J a (new)**

##### *Motion for a resolution*

##### *Amendment*

**Ja. whereas currently the state guarantees**

*and implicitly subsidises the whole financial system via liquidity support, deposit guarantee schemes and nationalisation programmes; whereas it is only appropriate for the state to guarantee essential services that ensure the smooth running of the real economy, such as payment systems and overdraft facilities; whereas structural reform is simply about ensuring the state only guarantees essential services and that non essential services are priced by the market;*

Or. en

**Amendment 100**  
**Jean-Paul Gauzès**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital J a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

*Ja. whereas capital markets need to be able to meet European financial needs at a time of very constrained bank lending. There is a need in Europe to increase the availability of alternative financing sources, in particular through the development of capital market alternatives, to decrease the dependency on bank funding, as identified in the Commission's green paper on Long-Term Financing of the European Economy;*

Or. en

**Amendment 101**  
**Gunnar Hökmark, Krišjānis Kariņš**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital J a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***Ja. whereas enhanced competition in the European banking industry is highly desirable; whereas the aggregated amount of legislative and regulatory requirements on banks, although indeed warranted for many reasons, risk to create barriers to entry and, therefore, facilitate the cementation of the current banking groups' dominant positions;***

Or. en

**Amendment 102**

**Peter Simon, Udo Bullmann**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Recital J a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***Ja. whereas the EU banking sector faces far-reaching structural changes resulting from changes in the market situation and comprehensive regulatory reforms such as implementation of the Basel III rules;***

Or. de

**Amendment 103**

**Krišjānis Kariņš, Gunnar Hökmark**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Recital J a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***Ja. whereas the EU needs growth and jobs as businesses need capital and credit; EU banking sector plays an important role to initiate growth, therefore any reforms for the EU banking sector that***

*would impede growth should be avoided;*

Or. en

**Amendment 104**

**Burkhard Balz**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Recital J a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

*Ja. Whereas there is no evidence from the past that a separation model could positively contribute to avoid a future financial crisis or to diminish the risk of it;*

Or. en

**Amendment 105**

**Sylvie Goulard**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Recital J a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

*Ja. whereas the funding of the real economy by banks is significantly higher in most of the Member States than it is in the UK or the US;*

Or. en

**Amendment 106**

**Sylvie Goulard**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Recital J b (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***Jb. whereas the report of the Independent Commission on Banking and the Vickers reforms in the UK state several times that its recommendations are a policy approach for UK banks;***

Or. en

**Amendment 107**

**Gunnar Hökmark, Krišjānis Kariņš**

**Motion for a resolution  
Paragraph 1**

*Motion for a resolution*

1. Welcomes the HLEG's analysis and recommendations on banking reform ***and considers them a sound basis for initiating reforms;***

*Amendment*

1. Welcomes the HLEG's analysis and recommendations on banking reform. ***However, considers that legislative initiatives currently processed or recently adopted, such as the Single supervisory mechanism, the capital and prudential requirements regulation and directive, the Bank recovery and resolution directive, the Deposit guarantee scheme, MiFID and MiFIR, the Market abuse regulation and directive, the European markets infrastructure regulation, the Alternative investment fund managers' directive, the Financial transaction tax, the Insurance mediation directive, the Insurance guarantee schemes, the Investor compensation schemes, Omnibus II, Solvency II, UCITS II, the Credit rating agencies legislation and Short-selling legislation, should be implemented and allowed to come into operation and that the outcome thereof should be taken as a basis for the assessment of what might be needed in the future;***

Or. en

**Amendment 108**  
**Sylvie Goulard**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 1**

*Motion for a resolution*

1. Welcomes the HLEG's analysis and recommendations on banking reform and considers them a sound *basis for initiating reforms*;

*Amendment*

1. Welcomes the HLEG's analysis and recommendations on banking reform and considers them a sound *contribution; is of the opinion that any reform should take into account the EU funding opportunities available to the real economy, and in this respect, the role played by the banks*;

Or. en

**Amendment 109**  
**Olle Schmidt, Anne E. Jensen, Nils Torvalds**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 1**

*Motion for a resolution*

1. Welcomes the HLEG's analysis and recommendations on banking reform and considers them a sound basis for initiating reforms;

*Amendment*

1. Welcomes the HLEG's analysis and recommendations on banking reform and considers them a sound basis for initiating reforms, *subject to a comprehensive impact assessment proving that such reforms are necessary taking into account the impact of the full implementation of the existing package of reforms to capital, liquidity, resolution and capital markets*;

Or. en

**Amendment 110**  
**Jean-Paul Gauzès**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 1**

*Motion for a resolution*

1. Welcomes the HLEG's analysis and recommendations on banking reform and considers them a *sound basis for initiating* reforms;

*Amendment*

1. Welcomes the HLEG's analysis and recommendations on banking reform and considers them a *useful contribution to initiate* reforms *and fully assess their impact*;

Or. en

**Amendment 111**  
**Wolf Klinz**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 1**

*Motion for a resolution*

1. Welcomes the HLEG's analysis and recommendations on banking reform and considers them a sound basis for *initiating* reforms;

*Amendment*

1. Welcomes the HLEG's analysis and recommendations on banking reform and considers them a sound basis for *discussions about necessity of potential additional* reforms;

Or. en

**Amendment 112**  
**Werner Langen**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 1**

*Motion for a resolution*

1. Welcomes the *HLEG*'s analysis and recommendations on banking reform and considers them a sound basis for initiating reforms;

*Amendment*

1. Welcomes the *Liikanan Group*'s analysis and recommendations on banking reform and considers them a sound basis for initiating reforms;

Or. de

## **Amendment 113**

**Jürgen Klute**

### **Motion for a resolution**

#### **Paragraph 1**

##### *Motion for a resolution*

1. Welcomes the HLEG's analysis and recommendations on banking reform and considers them a sound basis for initiating reforms;

##### *Amendment*

1. Welcomes the HLEG's analysis and recommendations on banking reform and considers them a sound basis for ***the first steps*** initiating reforms;

Or. en

## **Amendment 114**

**Olle Schmidt, Anne E. Jensen, Nils Torvalds**

### **Motion for a resolution**

#### **Paragraph 1 a (new)**

##### *Motion for a resolution*

##### *Amendment*

***1a. Takes the view that mandatory separation could damage the market making function in fixed-income markets. This would have adverse effects on the real economy. In particular, it would increase the costs and risks borne by both sovereign borrowers, corporates and the functioning of the financial sector as a whole.***

Or. en

## **Amendment 115**

**Gunnar Hökmark**

### **Motion for a resolution**

#### **Paragraph 1 a (new)**



*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***1a. Stresses that many of the issues identified in the HLEG's report are addressed by currently processed and already adopted legislative initiatives, most importantly by the proposal for a Directive on bank recovery and resolution;***

Or. en

**Amendment 116**

**Olle Schmidt, Anne E. Jensen, Nils Torvalds**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Paragraph 1 b (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***1b. Believes that higher capital and liquidity buffers in combination with robust recovery and resolution regimes and reduced interconnectivity are essential in order to create financial stability. The proposal from the HLEG in relation to mandatory separation of banking activities has to be carefully assessed and be regarded as a possible complement to enhanced capital and liquidity requirements and other reforms already agreed upon. The impact assessment has to assess whether structural reform is needed. A proposal from the Commission to require separation along the lines proposed by the HLEG should not be taken until other legislative reforms have taken full effect.***

Or. en

**Amendment 117**

**Gunnar Hökmark**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 1 b (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***1b. Highlights that HLEG's analysis shows that no particular business model did better than others during the financial crisis of 2008-09; underlines that this insight must be a point of departure of the analysis for further initiatives;***

Or. en

**Amendment 118**  
**Sylvie Goulard**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 2**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

2. Takes the view that while current proposals for reforms of EU banking sector rules (including the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation, the Recovery and Resolution Directive, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive and shadow banking initiatives) are vital, ***a more fundamental reform of the banking structure is essential, and complementary to the other proposals;***

2. Takes the view that while current proposals for reforms of EU banking sector rules (including the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation, the Recovery and Resolution Directive, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive and shadow banking initiatives) are vital, ***they must be fully implemented and their cumulative effects assessed inter alia concerning complexity, risk-taking incentives and systemic risk; underlines that further reforms are necessary of banking structures as well as resolution, taking into account the global banking framework;***

Or. en

**Amendment 119**  
**Jean-Paul Gauzès**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 2**

*Motion for a resolution*

2. Takes the view that while current proposals for reforms of EU banking sector rules (including the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation, the Recovery and Resolution Directive, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive and shadow banking initiatives) are **vital, a more** fundamental reform of the banking structure **is essential, and complementary to the other proposals**;

*Amendment*

2. Takes the view that while current proposals for reforms of EU banking sector rules (including the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation, the Recovery and Resolution Directive, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive and shadow banking initiatives) are **already leading to** fundamental **structural changes, a** reform of the banking structure **should only be considered if it brings about proven incremental benefits in respect of the other proposal and after a thorough assessment of the impact on the European economy**;

Or. en

**Amendment 120**  
**Corien Wortmann-Kool**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 2**

*Motion for a resolution*

2. Takes the view that **while current** proposals for reforms of EU banking sector rules (including the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation, the Recovery and Resolution Directive, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive and shadow banking initiatives) are vital, **a more** fundamental reform of the banking **structure is essential**, and complementary to the other proposals;

*Amendment*

2. Takes the view that **existing and forthcoming** proposals for reforms of EU banking sector rules (including the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation, the Recovery and Resolution Directive, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive and shadow banking initiatives, **as well as the European Market Infrastructure Regulation and the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive and Regulation**) are vital **and contribute to a** fundamental reform of the **European** banking sector; **underlines that additional proposals for**

*structural reform of the banking sector must be consistent with, and complementary to, the other proposals;*

Or. en

**Amendment 121**  
**Syed Kamall**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 2**

*Motion for a resolution*

2. Takes the view that while current proposals for reforms of EU banking sector rules (including the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation, the Recovery and Resolution Directive, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive and shadow banking initiatives) are vital, a more fundamental reform of the banking structure is essential, and complementary to the other proposals;

*Amendment*

2. Takes the view that while current proposals for reforms of EU banking sector rules (including the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation, the Recovery and Resolution Directive, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive and shadow banking initiatives) are vital, a more fundamental reform of the banking structure is essential, and complementary to the other proposals; ***notes that the above initiatives do not tackle the issue of 'too big to fail' but are primarily about strengthening existing structures; suggests that further reform is required in order to allow markets to function, which would in turn allow banks to be resolved without state intervention.***

Or. en

**Amendment 122**  
**Philippe De Backer**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 2**

*Motion for a resolution*

2. Takes the view that while current

*Amendment*

2. Takes the view that while current

proposals for reforms of EU banking sector rules (including the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation, the Recovery and Resolution Directive, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive and shadow banking initiatives) are vital, *a* more fundamental **reform** of the banking structure **is essential**, and complementary to the other proposals;

proposals for reforms of EU banking sector rules (including the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation, the Recovery and Resolution Directive, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive and shadow banking initiatives) are vital, ***but should still come into effect; underlines that the cumulative impact of the new European financial regulation should be assessed and evaluated; stresses that such impact analysis should be taken into account when considering essential and*** more fundamental **reforms** of the banking structure, and complementary to the other proposals;

Or. en

#### **Amendment 123**

**Olle Schmidt, Anne E. Jensen, Nils Torvalds**

#### **Motion for a resolution**

##### **Paragraph 2**

###### *Motion for a resolution*

2. Takes the view that while current proposals for reforms of EU banking sector rules (including the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation, the Recovery and Resolution Directive, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive and shadow banking initiatives) are vital, ***a more fundamental*** reform of the banking structure ***is essential, and*** complementary to the other proposals;

###### *Amendment*

2. Takes the view that while current proposals for reforms of EU banking sector rules (including the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation, the Recovery and Resolution Directive, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive, ***European Markets Infrastructure Regulation, Markets in Financial Instruments Directive*** and shadow banking initiatives) ***in conjunction with the regulations on the European Supervisory Authorities and the European Systemic Risk Board*** are vital, ***further*** reform of the banking structure ***may only be required, where*** complementary to the other proposals.

Or. en

**Amendment 124**  
**Gunnar Hökmark**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 2**

*Motion for a resolution*

2. Takes the view that while current proposals for reforms of EU banking sector rules (including the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation, the Recovery and Resolution Directive, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive and shadow banking initiatives) ***are vital, a more fundamental reform of the banking structure is essential, and complementary to the other proposals;***

*Amendment*

2. Takes the view that while current proposals for reforms of EU banking sector rules (including the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation, the Recovery and Resolution Directive, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive and shadow banking initiatives) ***should be adopted, implemented and allowed to come into operation before the need for further legislative initiatives is assessed;***

Or. en

**Amendment 125**  
**Markus Ferber**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 2**

*Motion for a resolution*

2. Takes the view that ***while*** current proposals for reforms of EU banking sector rules (including the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation, the Recovery and Resolution Directive, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive and shadow banking initiatives) ***are vital, a more fundamental reform of the banking structure is essential, and complementary to the other proposals;***

*Amendment*

2. Takes the view that current proposals for reforms of EU banking sector rules (including the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation, the Recovery and Resolution Directive, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive and shadow banking initiatives) ***represent fundamental steps towards reform which will be complemented by other reform measures set out in this own-initiative report;***

Or. de

### *Justification*

*It should be stressed that the European legislator has already taken comprehensive steps towards reform in the banking sector which are complemented by the proposals in the own-initiative report.*

#### **Amendment 126**

**Werner Langen**

#### **Motion for a resolution**

##### **Paragraph 2**

###### *Motion for a resolution*

2. Takes the view that **while** current proposals for reforms of EU banking sector rules (including the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation, the Recovery and Resolution Directive, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive and shadow banking initiatives) are **vital, a more** fundamental reform of the banking structure **is essential, and complementary to the other proposals**;

###### *Amendment*

2. Takes the view that current proposals for reforms of EU banking sector rules (including the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation, the Recovery and Resolution Directive, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive and shadow banking initiatives) are **essential in achieving** a fundamental reform of the banking structure;

Or. de

#### **Amendment 127**

**Sharon Bowles**

#### **Motion for a resolution**

##### **Paragraph 2**

###### *Motion for a resolution*

2. Takes the view that while current proposals for reforms of EU banking sector rules (including the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation, the Recovery and Resolution Directive, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive and shadow banking initiatives) **are vital, a more**

###### *Amendment*

2. Takes the view that while current proposals for reforms of EU banking sector rules (including the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation, the Recovery and Resolution Directive, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive and shadow banking initiatives) **establish better**

*fundamental reform of the banking structure is essential, and* complementary to *the other* proposals;

*oversight and protection, structural reforms are* complementary to *those* proposals;

Or. en

**Amendment 128**  
**Wolf Klinz**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 2**

*Motion for a resolution*

2. Takes the view that *while* current proposals for reforms of EU banking sector rules (including the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation, the Recovery and Resolution Directive, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive and shadow banking initiatives) are vital, *a more fundamental reform of the banking structure is essential, and complementary to the other proposals;*

*Amendment*

2. Takes the view that current proposals for reforms of EU banking sector rules (including the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation, the Recovery and Resolution Directive, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive and shadow banking initiatives) are vital;

Or. en

**Amendment 129**  
**Arlene McCarthy**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 2**

*Motion for a resolution*

2. Takes the view that while current proposals for reforms of EU banking sector rules (including the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation, the Recovery and Resolution Directive, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive and shadow banking initiatives) are vital, a more

*Amendment*

2. Takes the view that while current proposals for reforms of EU banking sector rules (including the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation, the Recovery and Resolution Directive, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive and shadow banking initiatives) are vital, a more



fundamental reform of the banking structure is essential, and complementary to the other proposals;

fundamental reform of the banking structure is essential, and complementary to the other proposals, ***as it would further address issues such as risk-taking incentives, complexity, intra-group subsidies, resolvability and systemic risk;***

Or. en

**Amendment 130**  
**Herbert Dorfmann**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 2**

*Motion for a resolution*

2. Takes the view that while current proposals for reforms of EU banking sector rules (including the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation, the Recovery and Resolution Directive, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive and shadow banking initiatives) are vital, a more fundamental reform of the banking structure is essential, and complementary to the other proposals;

*Amendment*

2. Takes the view that while current proposals for reforms of EU banking sector rules (including the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation, the Recovery and Resolution Directive, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive and shadow banking initiatives) are vital ***and their structural impacts have to take effect***, a more fundamental reform of the banking structure is essential, and complementary to the other proposals;

Or. en

**Amendment 131**  
**Hans-Peter Martin**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 2**

*Motion for a resolution*

2. Takes the view that ***while*** current proposals for reforms of EU banking sector rules (including the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation, the Recovery

*Amendment*

2. Takes the view that current proposals for reforms of EU banking sector rules (including the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation, the Recovery

and Resolution Directive, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive and shadow banking initiatives) are vital, a more fundamental reform of the banking structure is essential, and complementary to the other proposals;

and Resolution Directive, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive and shadow banking initiatives) are vital **but that** a more fundamental reform of the banking structure is **also** essential, and complementary to the other proposals;

Or. de

**Amendment 132**  
**Marianne Thyssen**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 2**

*Motion for a resolution*

2. Takes the view that while current proposals for reforms of EU banking sector rules (including the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation, the Recovery and Resolution Directive, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive and shadow banking initiatives) are vital, a more fundamental reform of the banking structure is **essential**, and complementary to the other proposals;

*Amendment*

2. Takes the view that while current proposals for reforms of EU banking sector rules (including the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation, the Recovery and Resolution Directive, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive and shadow banking initiatives) are vital, a more fundamental reform of the banking structure is **called for**, and complementary to the other proposals;

Or. nl

**Amendment 133**  
**Syed Kamall**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 2 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***2a. notes that consumer confidence in the financial services sector can only be restored if banks act in the interests of their customers, and not solely in the***

*interests of their shareholders and employees; emphasises the need for customers to be alerted to the fact that their money is not kept in the bank itself but lent out to other enterprises, companies and governments; notes that on this basis, deposits are in fact investments in the bank and that retail investors must have this made clear to them when opening deposit accounts;*

Or. en

**Amendment 134**  
**Corien Wortmann-Kool**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 2 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

*2a. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for a principles based approach to structural reforms of the European banking sector that is consistent with, and complementary to, already existing and forthcoming Union legislation for financial services; takes the view that EBA should play a key role by developing relevant technical standards to ensure consistent application and enforcement by the competent authorities, including the ECB, across the Union;*

Or. en

**Amendment 135**  
**Philippe Lamberts**  
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 2 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***2a. Maintains that structural reform, particularly if it results in a simpler and more modular banking system, is a more effective approach to achieving financial stability, competitiveness and market discipline than a regulatory arms race in which ever more complex banking products, activities and structures are countered ex-post with increasingly unwieldy and equally complex sectoral legislation;***

Or. en

**Amendment 136**  
**Werner Langen**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 2 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***2a. Stresses that particularly the higher capital requirements and clearing obligations for OTC-traded derivatives will make a significant contribution to reducing risk in the financial sector;***

Or. de

**Amendment 137**  
**Sharon Bowles**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 2 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***2a. It is noted that capital rules are overly complex and that structural reforms should not add to complexity and should***

*be aimed at paving the way for simplification and thereby greater transparency. Simplicity should also be emphasised in the approval of recovery and resolution plans;*

Or. en

**Amendment 138**  
**Danuta Maria Hübner**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 2 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

*2a. Considers that financial stability at the national level should not come at the expense of the free movement of capital and single market integration.*

Or. en

**Amendment 139**  
**Olle Schmidt, Anne E. Jensen, Nils Torvalds**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 2 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

*2a. Underlines the importance the funds for DGS and RRD measures stipulated in the Recovery and Resolution Directive and the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive will have for the financial stability;*

Or. en

**Amendment 140**  
**Wolf Klinz, Philippe De Backer**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 2 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***2a. Deplores the national initiatives in France, Germany and UK that, although well intended, risk to undermine the Single Market and distort competition in the EU banking sector;***

Or. en

**Amendment 141**  
**Philippe Lamberts**  
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 2 b (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***2b. Underscores that while, for a bank with a given business model, prudential requirements aim at reducing the probability of failure and recovery and resolution requirements aim at limiting the cost of such a failure, the most effective way to prevent future systemic instability is to directly address the size, complexity, interconnectedness, degree of maturity mismatch and other factors that lead to market-distorting implicit subsidies for many banks in the first place, and are inherent in their business models;***

Or. en

**Amendment 142**  
**Danuta Maria Hübner**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 2 b (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***2b. Considers there is a strong need in Europe for harmonization and common rules. The creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), a Single Rulebook and a Single Resolution Mechanism reinforces the need for a European approach towards reform of bank structures, avoiding a patchwork of national initiatives.***

Or. en

**Amendment 143**  
**Werner Langen**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 2 b (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***2b. Urges the Commission to conduct, in any further legislative initiatives, a thorough analysis, in advance, of the effects of the laws on regulation in the banking sector which are currently under discussion or have already been adopted and to include the results in an impact study on the legislative proposal;***

Or. de

**Amendment 144**  
**Danuta Maria Hübner**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 2 c (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***2c. Emphasizes the importance of a well-balanced and diversified funding structure in terms of sources of financing, maturity and other risk exposures, nonetheless cautions that separation of banks will make the different structures less diversified and more expensive.***

Or. en

#### **Amendment 145**

**Wolf Klinz**

#### **Motion for a resolution**

##### **Paragraph 3**

*Motion for a resolution*

3. Insists that the Commission's impact assessment include a thorough assessment of the cost to both public finances and financial stability of the failure of an EU-based bank during the current crisis, ***together with information on the nature of the EU's current universal banking model, including the size and balance sheets of the retail and investment activities of all universal banks operating in the EU, broken down by individual bank and country;***

*Amendment*

3. Insists that the Commission's impact assessment include a thorough assessment of the cost to both public finances and financial stability of the failure of an EU-based bank during the current crisis, ***including all cumulative costs and benefits of adopted legislation for the EU banking sector together with information on additional costs and benefits of other proposals currently discussed and expected to be adopted;***

Or. en

#### **Amendment 146**

**Pervenche Berès**

#### **Motion for a resolution**

##### **Paragraph 3**



*Motion for a resolution*

3. Insists that the Commission's impact assessment include a thorough assessment of the cost to both public finances and financial stability of the failure of an EU-based bank during the current crisis, ***together with information on the nature of the EU's current universal banking model, including the size and balance sheets of the retail and investment activities of all universal banks operating in the EU, broken down by individual bank and country;***

*Amendment*

3. Insists that the Commission's impact assessment include a thorough assessment of the cost to both public finances and financial stability of the failure of an EU-based bank during the current crisis ***and adopt a comparative approach concerning the costs, losses and advantages associated to the various banking models existing in the different member States in terms of resilience in the crisis, contribution to the stability of financial markets, relationship with shadow banking system, financing of SMEs and long term investment;***

Or. en

**Amendment 147**  
**Marianne Thyssen**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 3**

*Motion for a resolution*

3. Insists that the Commission's impact assessment include a thorough assessment of the cost to both public finances and financial stability of the failure of an EU-based bank during the current crisis, ***together with*** information on the nature of the EU's current universal banking model, including the size and balance sheets of the ***retail*** and investment activities of all universal banks operating in the EU, broken down by individual bank and country;

*Amendment*

3. Insists that the Commission's impact assessment include a thorough assessment of the cost to both public finances and financial stability of the failure of an EU-based bank during the current crisis, ***as well as an assessment of the costs which would be entailed by a structural reform as regards the role of banks in financing the European economy, expressly taking account of the significant differences in the structure of the banking sectors of the various Member States, and also taking into account the impact of the measures which are currently being devised or have already been adopted both under the aegis of the Basel Committee and at EU level, and that the assessment provide*** information on the nature of the EU's

current universal banking model, including the size and balance sheets of the ***depository/lending activities and trading*** and investment activities of all universal banks operating in the EU, broken down by individual bank and country;

Or. nl

**Amendment 148**  
**Jean-Paul Gauzès**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 3**

*Motion for a resolution*

3. Insists that the Commission's impact assessment include a thorough assessment of the cost to both public finances and financial stability of the failure of an EU-based bank during the current crisis, together with information on the nature of the EU's current universal banking model, including the size and balance sheets of the retail and investment activities of all universal banks operating in the EU, broken down by individual bank and country;

*Amendment*

3. Insists that the Commission's impact assessment include a thorough assessment of the cost to both public finances and financial stability of the failure of an EU-based bank during the current crisis, together with information on the nature of the EU's current universal banking model, including the size and balance sheets of the retail and investment activities of all universal banks operating in the EU, broken down by individual bank and country; ***the impact assessment should also explore: the present financing needs of the European economy; the effects on the competitive landscape; incremental benefits, considering the regulatory changes already underway (as stressed in the ECB opinion); the impact on diversity of funding sources for the real economy and on European businesses' access to capital markets financing;***

Or. en

**Amendment 149**  
**Philippe Lamberts**  
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 3**

*Motion for a resolution*

3. Insists that the Commission's impact assessment include a thorough assessment of the cost to both public finances and financial stability of the failure of an EU-based bank during the current crisis, together with information on the nature of the EU's current universal banking model, including the size and balance sheets of the **retail and investment** activities of all universal banks operating in the EU, broken down by individual bank and country;

*Amendment*

3. Insists that the Commission's impact assessment include a thorough assessment of the **value of implicit guarantees provided by Member States to banks, including a methodology for regularly monitoring that value at Member State and Union level as an essential prerequisite for being able to assess the effectiveness of legislation at reducing the value of those guarantees, as well as the** cost to both public finances and financial stability of the failure of an EU-based bank during the current crisis, together with information on the nature of the EU's current universal banking model, including the size and balance sheets of the **retail banking and proprietary market risk taking** activities of all universal banks operating in the EU, broken down by individual bank and country;

Or. en

**Amendment 150**  
**Werner Langen**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 3**

*Motion for a resolution*

3. **Insists that** the Commission's impact assessment **include a thorough assessment** of the cost to both public finances and financial stability of the failure of an EU-based bank during the current crisis, **together with information on the nature of the EU's current universal banking model, including the size and balance sheets of the retail and investment**

*Amendment*

3. **Urges** the Commission **to include in its** impact assessment **an evaluation** of the cost to both public finances and financial stability of the failure of an EU-based bank during the current crisis, broken down by individual bank and country

***activities of all universal banks operating in the EU***, broken down by individual bank and country;

Or. de

**Amendment 151**  
**Corien Wortmann-Kool**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 3**

*Motion for a resolution*

3. Insists that the Commission's impact assessment ***include a thorough*** assessment of the ***cost to both public finances and financial stability of the failure of an EU-based bank during the current crisis***, together with information on the nature of the EU's current universal banking model, including the size and balance sheets of the retail and investment activities of all universal banks operating in the EU, broken down by individual bank and country;

*Amendment*

3. Insists that the Commission's impact assessment ***includes a comprehensive*** assessment of the ***impact of the potential structural reforms on funding costs, as well as possible unintended consequences namely on the provision of credit to the real economy***, together with information on the nature of the EU's current universal banking model, including the size and balance sheets of the retail, ***client-related services*** and investment activities of all universal banks operating in the EU, broken down by individual bank and country;

Or. en

**Amendment 152**  
**Gunnar Hökmark**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 3**

*Motion for a resolution*

3. Insists that the Commission's impact assessment include a thorough assessment of the cost to both public finances and financial stability of the failure of an EU-based bank during the current crisis,

*Amendment*

3. Insists that the Commission's impact assessment include a thorough assessment of the cost to both public finances and financial stability of the failure of an EU-based bank during the current crisis,

together with information on the nature of the EU's current universal banking model, including the size and balance sheets of the retail and investment activities of all universal banks operating in the EU, broken down by individual bank and country;

together with information on the nature of the EU's current universal banking model, including the size and balance sheets of the retail and investment activities of all universal banks operating in the EU, broken down by individual bank and country; ***reminds in this regard of the funding requirements stipulated for RRD and DGS and underlines the important contribution these will make in enhancing financial stability;***

Or. en

**Amendment 153**  
**Hans-Peter Martin**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 3**

*Motion for a resolution*

3. Insists that the Commission's impact assessment include a thorough assessment of the cost to both public finances and financial stability of the failure of an EU-based bank during the current crisis, together with information on the nature of the EU's current universal banking model, including the size and balance sheets of the retail and investment activities of all universal banks operating in the EU, broken down by individual bank and country;

*Amendment*

3. *(does not affect the English version)*

Or. de

**Amendment 154**  
**Philippe De Backer**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 3 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***3a. Stresses that also an impact assessment of the cost to the EU economy of splitting up certain banks needs to be taken into account when developing possible measures; underlines that such an impact assessment should also provide a clear picture on the desired timing of such possible reforms given the difficult economic situation within the European Union;***

Or. en

**Amendment 155**

**Olle Schmidt, Anne E. Jensen, Nils Torvalds**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Paragraph 3 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***3a. Requires that the Commission's impact assessment take account of all other regulatory proposals designed to mitigate the costs of future bank failure and promote financial stability, in particular CRD IV and the Recovery and Resolution directive;***

Or. en

**Amendment 156**

**Marianne Thyssen**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Paragraph 3 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***3a. Considers, moreover, that in view, inter alia, of the current difficult***

*economic situation in the European Union, this impact assessment should also investigate the desirable timetable for such structural reforms;*

Or. nl

**Amendment 157**  
**Gunnar Hökmark**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 4**

*Motion for a resolution*

4. Reminds the Commission of the warning issued by the European Banking Authority and the European Central Bank (ECB) that financial innovation can undermine the objectives of structural reforms, and ***insists that*** structural reforms ***be subject to periodic review***<sup>7</sup> ;

*Amendment*

4. Reminds the Commission of the warning issued by the European Banking Authority and the European Central Bank (ECB) that financial innovation can undermine the objectives of structural reforms, and ***considers that the eventual need for*** structural reforms ***might be considered once the current and recently concluded legislative procedures have come into operation***<sup>7</sup> ;

Or. en

**Amendment 158**  
**Jean-Paul Gauzès**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 4**

*Motion for a resolution*

4. Reminds the Commission of the warning issued by the European Banking Authority and the European Central Bank (ECB) that financial innovation can undermine the objectives of structural reforms, and ***insists that*** structural reforms be subject to periodic review<sup>7</sup> ;

*Amendment*

4. Reminds the Commission of the warning issued by the European Banking Authority and the European Central Bank (ECB) that financial innovation can undermine the objectives of structural reforms, and ***the necessity for*** structural reforms ***to be*** subject to periodic review<sup>7</sup> ***having regard that it is critical not to create a sense of***

*continuous uncertainty for financial institutions which would be detrimental to strategic planning ;*

Or. en

**Amendment 159**  
**Syed Kamall**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 4**

*Motion for a resolution*

4. Reminds the Commission of the warning issued by the European Banking Authority and the European Central Bank (ECB) that financial innovation can undermine the objectives of structural reforms, and insists that structural reforms be subject to periodic review<sup>7</sup> ;

*Amendment*

4. Reminds the Commission of the warning issued by the European Banking Authority and the European Central Bank (ECB) that financial innovation can undermine the objectives of structural reforms, and insists that structural reforms be subject to periodic review<sup>7</sup> *to ensure that financial institutions are not benefiting from regulatory arbitrage;*

Or. en

**Amendment 160**  
**Hans-Peter Martin**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 4**

*Motion for a resolution*

4. Reminds the Commission of the warning issued by the European Banking Authority and the European Central Bank (ECB) that financial innovation can undermine the objectives of structural reforms, and insists that structural reforms be subject to *periodic review*<sup>7</sup>;

*Amendment*

4. Reminds the Commission of the warning issued by the European Banking Authority and the European Central Bank (ECB) that financial innovation can undermine the objectives of structural reforms, and insists that structural reforms be subject to *reviews at least every two years;*

Or. de



**Amendment 161**  
**Werner Langen**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 4**

*Motion for a resolution*

4. Reminds the Commission of the warning issued by the European Banking Authority and the European Central Bank (ECB) that financial innovation can undermine the objectives of structural reforms, and insists that structural reforms be subject to periodic review<sup>7</sup>;

*Amendment*

4. *(does not affect the English version)*

Or. de

**Amendment 162**  
**Philippe Lamberts**  
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 4 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***4a. Invites the Commission to consider legislation applicable to the whole EU financial sector that explicitly prohibits activities and transactions whose primary purpose is deemed by the relevant authorities to be regulatory arbitrage or any other circumvention of sectoral legislation;***

Or. en

**Amendment 163**  
**Burkhard Balz**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 5**

*Motion for a resolution*

5. Urges the Commission to ***ensure that the core principles of reform detailed in paragraph 7 also apply to the shadow banking sector and*** unregulated areas of the financial services sector;

*Amendment*

5. Urges the Commission to ***bring forward a legislative proposal on the regulation of shadow banks in order to ensure that the same capital and liquidity standards as well as risk management and governance requirements apply to still*** unregulated areas ***as those already set up for the regulated areas*** of the financial services sector;

Or. en

**Amendment 164**  
**Sharon Bowles**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 5**

*Motion for a resolution*

5. Urges the Commission to ensure that the core principles of reform detailed in paragraph 7 also apply to the shadow banking sector and unregulated areas of the financial services sector;

*Amendment*

5. Urges the Commission to ensure that the core principles of reform detailed in paragraph 7 also apply to the shadow banking sector and unregulated areas of the financial services sector ***in a way that is tailored to the specific nature of the services they provide;***

Or. en

**Amendment 165**  
**Sylvie Goulard**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 5**

*Motion for a resolution*

5. Urges the Commission to ensure that the

*Amendment*

5. Urges the Commission to ensure that the

core principles of *reform detailed in paragraph 7* also apply to the shadow banking sector and unregulated areas of the financial services sector;

core principles of *reforms* also apply to the shadow banking sector and unregulated areas of the financial services sector;

Or. en

**Amendment 166**  
**Gunnar Hökmark**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 5**

*Motion for a resolution*

5. Urges the Commission to ensure that the core principles of reform detailed in paragraph 7 also apply to the shadow banking sector and unregulated areas of the financial services sector;

*Amendment*

5. Urges the Commission to ensure that the core principles of reform detailed in paragraph 7 also apply to the shadow banking sector and unregulated areas of the financial services sector *if a structural review was to be initiated*;

Or. en

**Amendment 167**  
**Syed Kamall, Theodor Dumitru Stolojan, Sharon Bowles, Wolf Klinz, Sven Giegold**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 5 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

*5a. Notes that the HLEG did not look at the issue of accounting standards and their role in financial crisis in sufficient depth; notes that European company law requires that accounts must be true and fair in order for directors of a company to discharge their liabilities to creditors and shareholders of companies; suggests that as a consequence of international financial reporting standards being overly complex and being principally about providing information to the share trading*

*part of capital markets, these standards did and do not give a true and fair view of banks' accounts; notes that despite commitments from the IASB to update IAS 39 on loan loss provisioning from an incurred to expected loss model, its adoption has been delayed due to concerns expressed by FASB that the revised IASB model is still not a lifetime expected loss model; notes that although moving to an expected loss model recognises the problems caused by IAS 39 during the crisis, the added complexity may well create problems of their own; argues that, therefore, structural reform must include a thorough assessment of what role accounts should play in driving better governance of banks;*

Or. en

**Amendment 168**  
**Sylvie Goulard**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 5 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

*5a. recalls that any banking reform would not deliver if the supervision is not undertaken at the relevant level or is not provided with appropriate means; underlines that the transmission of information is key to ensure quality work by supervisors;*

Or. en

**Amendment 169**  
**Saïd El Khadraoui**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 5 a (new)**

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*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***5a. Invites the EC to transpose the recommendations of the different workstreams of the FSB on shadow banking, in particular the proposals on repo transaction and security lending.***

Or. en

**Amendment 170**  
**Burkhard Balz**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 6**

*Motion for a resolution*

6. Considers that ***the core principle of*** banking reform must ***be to*** deliver a safe, stable and efficient banking system that serves the needs of the real economy, customers and consumers; takes the view that ***structural reform must stimulate economic growth by supporting the provision of credit to the economy, in particular to SMEs and start-ups, provide greater resilience against potential financial crises, restore trust and confidence in banks and remove risks to public finances;***

*Amendment*

6. Considers that ***every*** banking reform must deliver a safe, stable and efficient banking system that serves the needs of the real economy, customers and consumers; takes the view that ***legislation must provide strong resilience against potential financial crises, enhance financial stability, restore trust and confidence in banks and remove risks to public finances and aim to foster economic growth by supporting the provision of credit to the economy, in particular to SMEs and start-ups;***

Or. en

**Amendment 171**  
**Gunnar Hökmark**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 6**

*Motion for a resolution*

6. Considers that the core principle of

*Amendment*

6. Considers that the core principle of

banking reform must be to deliver a safe, stable and efficient banking system that serves the needs of the *real* economy, customers and consumers; takes the view that structural reform *must stimulate* economic growth by *supporting the provision* of credit to the economy, in particular to SMEs and start-ups, *provide greater* resilience *against potential financial crises, restore trust and confidence in banks and remove* risks to public finances;

banking reform must be to deliver a safe, stable and efficient banking system that serves the needs of the economy, customers and consumers; takes the view that structural reform *might in fact hamper* economic growth by *reducing the overall supply* of credit to the economy, in particular to SMEs and start-ups *which often imply risks to those who lend to them, but also risking to reduce rather than increase the resilience of the banking system as funding sources will be less diversified, and increase* risks to public finances. *Therefore, is of the opinion that an eventual structural reform must be based on a clear analysis whether it would increase or decrease risk, whether it would be compatible with bail-in and in the perspective of current and recently concluded legislative initiatives;*

Or. en

#### **Amendment 172**

**Philippe Lamberts**

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

#### **Motion for a resolution**

##### **Paragraph 6**

###### *Motion for a resolution*

6. Considers that the core principle of banking reform must be to deliver a safe, stable and efficient banking system that serves the needs of the real economy, customers and consumers; takes the view that structural reform must stimulate economic growth by supporting the provision of credit to the economy, in particular to SMEs and start-ups, provide greater resilience against potential financial crises, restore trust and confidence in banks and remove risks to public finances;

###### *Amendment*

6. Considers that the core principle of banking reform must be to deliver a safe, stable, *competitive, transparent* and efficient banking system, *where ultimately no bank benefits from implicit public subsidies and all banks that reach the point of non-viability can be wound up or resolved without the need for extraordinary public support*, that serves the needs of the real economy *through the economic cycle*, customers and consumers; takes the view that structural reform must stimulate economic growth by supporting the provision of credit to the economy, in

particular to SMEs and start-ups, provide greater resilience against potential financial crises, restore trust and confidence in banks and remove risks to public finances;

Or. en

#### **Amendment 173**

**Olle Schmidt, Anne E. Jensen, Nils Torvalds**

#### **Motion for a resolution**

##### **Paragraph 6**

###### *Motion for a resolution*

6. Considers that the core principle of banking reform must be to deliver a safe, stable and efficient banking system that serves the needs of the real economy, customers and consumers; takes the view that structural reform must stimulate economic growth by supporting the provision of credit to the economy, in particular to SMEs and start-ups, provide greater resilience against potential financial crises, restore trust and confidence in banks and remove risks to public finances;

###### *Amendment*

6. Considers that the core principle of banking reform must be to deliver a safe, stable and efficient banking system that serves the needs of the real economy, customers and consumers; takes the view that structural reform must stimulate economic growth by supporting the provision of credit to the economy, in particular to SMEs and start-ups, provide greater resilience against potential financial crises, restore trust and confidence in banks and remove risks to public finances;

***Recognises also that market making is an essential part of the infrastructure of fixed-income markets in EU-countries and that the importance of market making for fixed-income markets has been recognised by the European Parliament in the current review of MiFID/MiFIR.***

Or. en

#### **Amendment 174**

**Jean-Paul Gauzès**

#### **Motion for a resolution**

##### **Paragraph 6**

*Motion for a resolution*

6. Considers that the core principle of banking reform must be to deliver a safe, stable and efficient banking system that serves the needs of the real economy, customers and consumers; takes the view that structural **reform** must stimulate economic growth by supporting the provision of credit to the economy, in particular to SMEs and start-ups, provide greater resilience against potential financial crises, restore trust and confidence in banks and **remove** risks to public finances;

*Amendment*

6. Considers that the core principle of banking reform must be to deliver a safe, stable and efficient banking system that serves the needs of the real economy, customers and consumers; takes the view that **that any reforms, including** structural **ones**, must stimulate economic growth by supporting the provision of credit **and banking services** to the economy, in particular to SMEs and start-ups, provide greater resilience against potential financial crises, restore trust and confidence in banks and **reduce** risks to public finances;

Or. en

**Amendment 175**

**Werner Langen**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Paragraph 6**

*Motion for a resolution*

6. Considers that the core principle of banking reform must be to deliver a safe, stable and efficient banking system that serves the needs of the real economy, customers and consumers; takes the view that structural reform must stimulate economic growth by supporting the provision of credit to the economy, in particular to SMEs and start-ups, provide greater resilience against potential financial crises, **restore trust and confidence in banks** and remove risks to public finances;

*Amendment*

6. Considers that the core principle of banking reform must be to deliver a safe, stable and efficient banking system that serves the needs of the real economy, customers and consumers; takes the view that structural reform must stimulate economic growth by supporting the provision of credit to the economy, in particular to SMEs and start-ups, provide greater resilience against potential financial crises and remove risks to public finances;

Or. de

**Amendment 176**

**Wolf Klinz**



**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 6**

*Motion for a resolution*

6. Considers that the core principle of banking reform must be to deliver a safe, stable and efficient banking system that serves the needs of the real economy, customers and consumers; takes the view that **structural** reform must stimulate economic growth by supporting the provision of credit to the economy, in particular to SMEs and start-ups, provide greater resilience against potential financial crises, restore trust and confidence in banks and remove risks to public finances;

*Amendment*

6. Considers that the core principle of **potential** banking reform must be to deliver a safe, stable and efficient banking system that serves the needs of the real economy, customers and consumers; takes the view that **every additional** reform must stimulate economic growth by supporting the provision of credit to the economy, in particular to SMEs and start-ups, provide greater resilience against potential financial crises, restore trust and confidence in banks and remove risks to public finances;

Or. en

**Amendment 177**  
**Peter Simon, Udo Bullmann**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 6**

*Motion for a resolution*

6. Considers that the core principle of banking reform must be to deliver a safe, stable and efficient banking system that serves the needs of the real economy, customers and consumers; takes the view that structural reform must stimulate economic growth by supporting the provision of credit to the economy, in particular to SMEs and start-ups, provide greater resilience against potential financial crises, restore trust and confidence in banks and remove risks to public finances;

*Amendment*

6. Considers that the core principle of banking reform must be to deliver a safe, stable and efficient banking system that serves the needs of the real economy, customers and consumers; takes the view that structural reform must stimulate economic growth by supporting the provision of credit to the economy, in particular to SMEs and start-ups, provide greater resilience against potential financial crises, restore trust and confidence in banks, **harmonise liability and risk** and remove risks to public finances;

Or. de

## Amendment 178

Olle Schmidt, Anne E. Jensen, Nils Torvalds

### Motion for a resolution

#### Paragraph 6

##### *Motion for a resolution*

6. Considers that the core principle of banking reform must be to deliver a safe, stable and efficient banking system that serves the needs of the real economy, customers and consumers; takes the view that structural reform must stimulate economic growth by supporting the provision of credit to the economy, in particular to SMEs and start-ups, provide greater resilience against potential financial crises, restore trust and confidence in banks and remove risks to public finances;

##### *Amendment*

6. Considers that the core principle of banking reform, **if conducted**, must be to deliver a safe, stable and efficient banking system that serves the needs of the real economy, customers and consumers; takes the view that structural reform must stimulate economic growth by supporting the provision of credit to the economy, in particular to SMEs and start-ups, provide greater resilience against potential financial crises, restore trust and confidence in banks and remove risks to public finances;

Or. en

## Amendment 179

Antolín Sánchez Presedo

### Motion for a resolution

#### Paragraph 6

##### *Motion for a resolution*

6. Considers that the core principle of banking reform must be to deliver a safe, stable and efficient banking system that serves the needs of the real economy, customers and consumers; takes the view that structural reform must stimulate economic growth by supporting the provision of credit to the economy, in particular to SMEs and start-ups, provide greater resilience against potential financial crises, restore trust and confidence in banks and remove risks to public finances;

##### *Amendment*

6. Considers that the core principle of banking reform must be to deliver a safe, stable and efficient banking system that serves the needs of the real economy, customers and consumers; takes the view that structural reform must stimulate economic growth by supporting the provision of **sustainable** credit to the economy, in particular to SMEs and start-ups, provide greater resilience against potential financial crises, restore trust and confidence in banks and remove risks to public finances;

Or. en

**Amendment 180**  
**Syed Kamall**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 6 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

*6a. notes that existing proposals, although welcome, seek to tackle specific activities, relationships and products that are perceived to be problematic; argues that the ongoing crisis is in part due to the fact that banks and sovereigns are inappropriately connected via implicit and explicit state guarantees as a consequence of certain banks being too big to fail; suggests that further reform is required in order to ensure that banks do not benefit from implicit or explicit state guarantees and they are subject to market forces as other private companies are;*

Or. en

**Amendment 181**  
**Sharon Bowles**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 6 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

*6a. Observes that while investment firms are often portrayed as 'casino banks', it should be noted that they do play an important role in our economy by connecting investors, including pension funds to companies. Further, creating and trading financial assets, is important for allocating capital to people, entrepreneurs and businesses that are likely to be profitable and beneficial to society; these activities should not be prejudiced by*

*structural reforms but unnecessary  
financial churning should be targeted;*

Or. en

**Amendment 182**  
**Gunnar Hökmark, Krišjānis Kariņš**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 6 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

*6a. Remembers that one of the main reasons why the situation in Cyprus has been so difficult to deal with is the fact that the banking system was more or less solely dependent on retail deposits for its funding. Highlights that had there been a larger share of unsecured debt-holders in the funding mix of Cypriot banks, the extraordinarily unfortunate debacle of bailing in insured depositors most probably would not have taken place;*

Or. en

**Amendment 183**  
**Olle Schmidt, Anne E. Jensen, Nils Torvalds**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 6 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

*6a. Recognises the importance of market making activities to the provision of credit and risk management services to the real economy, the value that universal banks can provide to their customers and the risks associated with structural measures;*

Or. en

**Amendment 184**  
**Wolf Klinz, Philippe De Backer**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 6 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***6a. Calls for more legal certainty and clarity in all ongoing and additional reforms, which have direct impact on funding costs for banks and - in consequence - also effect lending to the real economy;***

Or. en

**Amendment 185**  
**Olle Schmidt, Anne E. Jensen, Nils Torvalds**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 6 b (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***6b. Considers that banking activities that are essential for the functioning of the EU capital markets, such as market making, certain hedging activities, certain types of forex and interest related derivatives transactions, must not be hampered by new reform initiatives, these activities should be analysed and addressed on the basis of their importance for the functioning of the capital markets and creating long term economic growth;***

Or. en

**Amendment 186**  
**Syed Kamall**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 6 b (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***6b. Suggests that banking reform must identify which financial systems, services and processes must be protected in the event of a crisis to ensure civil order is maintained; argues that it is only appropriate for the state to guarantee these essential systems, services and processes; points out that non essential services should be priced at the market rate;***

Or. en

**Amendment 187**  
**Gunnar Hökmark**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 6 b (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***6b. Acknowledges the potential problems posed by large and overly complex banking groups. Is of the opinion that such concerns are most effectively mitigated through a credible recovery and resolution framework whereby it is ensured shareholders and bank creditors will be the ones to bear the losses from bank failures;***

Or. en

**Amendment 188**  
**Gunnar Hökmark**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 6 c (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***6c. Underlines that banks which are solely dependent on deposits and retail activities, thereby reducing the possible scope for bail-in, might pose a risk to public finances, as was clearly seen in Cyprus;***

Or. en

**Amendment 189**  
**Gunnar Hökmark**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 7**

*Motion for a resolution*

7. Considers that an effective banking system must deliver a change in banking culture in order to reduce complexity, enhance competition, limit interconnectedness between risky and commercial activities, improve corporate governance, create a responsible remuneration system, allow effective bank resolution and recovery, reinforce bank capital and deliver credit to the *real economy*;

*Amendment*

7. Considers that an effective banking system must deliver a change in banking culture in order to reduce complexity, enhance competition, limit interconnectedness between risky and commercial activities, improve corporate governance, create a responsible remuneration system, allow effective bank resolution and recovery, reinforce bank capital and deliver credit to the *economy*. ***Reiterates there are multiple ways of achieving these goals and that some 20 legislative initiatives have already been proposed to address these very issues;***

Or. en

**Amendment 190**  
**Syed Kamall**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 7**

*Motion for a resolution*

7. Considers that an effective banking system must deliver a change in banking culture in order to reduce complexity, enhance competition, limit interconnectedness between risky and commercial activities, improve corporate governance, create a responsible remuneration system, allow effective bank resolution and recovery, reinforce bank capital and deliver credit to the real economy;

*Amendment*

7. Considers that an effective banking system must deliver a change in banking culture in order to reduce complexity, enhance competition, limit interconnectedness between risky and commercial activities, improve corporate governance, create a responsible remuneration system, allow effective bank resolution and recovery, reinforce bank capital and deliver credit to the real economy; ***suggests that this will be achieved by introducing a greater degree of personal liability to ensure the managers of companies take responsibility for the actions and decisions of their employees;***

Or. en

**Amendment 191**

**Wolf Klinz, Philippe De Backer**

**Motion for a resolution  
Paragraph 7**

*Motion for a resolution*

7. Considers that an effective banking system must deliver a change in banking culture ***in order to*** reduce complexity, ***enhance competition***, limit interconnectedness between ***risky and commercial*** activities, improve corporate governance, create a responsible remuneration system, allow effective bank resolution and recovery, reinforce bank capital and deliver credit to the real economy;

*Amendment*

7. Considers that an effective banking system must deliver a change in banking culture ***and*** reduce complexity, ***simplify the structure***, limit interconnectedness between ***core banking and non-banking holding*** activities, improve corporate governance, create a responsible ***and sustainable*** remuneration system ***based on long-term incentives***, allow effective bank resolution and recovery, ***reinforce the customer oriented banking***, reinforce bank capital and deliver credit to the real economy;

Or. en



## Amendment 192

Philippe Lamberts

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

### Motion for a resolution

#### Paragraph 7

##### *Motion for a resolution*

7. Considers that an effective banking system must deliver a change in banking culture in order to reduce complexity, enhance competition, limit interconnectedness between risky and commercial activities, improve corporate governance, create a responsible remuneration system, allow effective bank resolution and recovery, reinforce bank capital and deliver credit to the real economy;

##### *Amendment*

7. Considers that an effective banking system must deliver a change in banking culture in order to reduce complexity, enhance competition, limit interconnectedness between risky and commercial activities, improve corporate governance, ***improved accountability for product design and marketing, quality of service to customers and enhance the personal liability for irresponsible risk taking for senior managers***, create a responsible remuneration system, allow effective bank resolution and recovery, reinforce bank capital and deliver credit to the real economy;

Or. en

## Amendment 193

Olle Schmidt, Anne E. Jensen, Nils Torvalds

### Motion for a resolution

#### Paragraph 7

##### *Motion for a resolution*

7. Considers that an effective banking system must deliver a change in banking culture in order to reduce complexity, enhance competition, limit interconnectedness between risky and ***commercial*** activities, improve corporate governance, create a responsible remuneration system, allow effective bank resolution and recovery, reinforce bank

##### *Amendment*

7. Considers that an effective banking system must deliver a change in banking culture in order to reduce complexity, enhance competition, limit interconnectedness between risky and ***essential*** activities, improve corporate governance, ***risk management and compliance, create incentives for banks to establish more transparent organisational***

capital and deliver credit to the real economy;

**structures**, create a responsible remuneration system, allow effective bank resolution and recovery, reinforce bank capital and deliver credit to the real economy;

Or. en

**Amendment 194**  
**Marianne Thyssen**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 7**

*Motion for a resolution*

7. Considers that an effective banking system must deliver a change in banking culture in order to reduce complexity, enhance competition, limit interconnectedness between risky **and commercial** activities, improve corporate governance, create a responsible remuneration system, allow effective bank resolution and recovery, reinforce bank capital and deliver credit to the real economy;

*Amendment*

7. Considers that an effective banking system must deliver a change in banking culture in order to reduce complexity, enhance competition, limit interconnectedness between risky **trading and investment activities and depository/lending** activities, improve corporate governance, create a responsible remuneration system, allow effective bank resolution and recovery, reinforce bank capital and deliver credit to the real economy;

Or. nl

*Justification*

*‘Ordinary’ depository/lending activities by banks always entail risk as well.*

**Amendment 195**  
**Marisa Matias**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 7**

*Motion for a resolution*

7. Considers that an effective banking

*Amendment*

7. Considers that an effective banking

system must deliver a change in banking culture in order to reduce complexity, enhance competition, *limit interconnectedness between* risky and *commercial* activities, improve corporate governance, create a responsible remuneration system, allow effective bank resolution and recovery, reinforce bank capital and deliver credit to the real economy;

system must deliver a change in banking culture in order to reduce complexity, enhance competition, *separate* risky activities *from retail activities*, improve corporate governance, create a responsible remuneration system, allow effective bank resolution and recovery, reinforce bank capital and deliver credit to the real economy;

Or. pt

**Amendment 196**  
**Peter Simon, Udo Bullmann**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 7**

*Motion for a resolution*

7. Considers that an effective banking system must deliver a change in banking culture in order to reduce complexity, enhance competition, limit interconnectedness between risky and commercial activities, improve corporate governance, create a responsible remuneration system, allow effective bank resolution and recovery, reinforce bank capital and deliver credit to the real economy;

*Amendment*

7. Considers that an effective banking system must deliver a change in banking culture in order to reduce complexity, enhance competition, limit interconnectedness between risky and commercial activities, improve corporate governance, create a responsible remuneration system, allow effective bank resolution and recovery, reinforce bank capital and deliver credit *and provide important service functions* to the real economy;

Or. de

**Amendment 197**  
**Hans-Peter Martin**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 7**

*Motion for a resolution*

7. Considers that an effective banking system must deliver a change in banking culture in order to reduce complexity, enhance competition, limit interconnectedness between risky and commercial activities, improve corporate governance, create a responsible remuneration system, allow effective bank resolution and recovery, reinforce bank capital and deliver credit to the real economy;

*Amendment*

7. Considers that an effective banking system must deliver a change in banking culture in order to reduce complexity, enhance competition, limit interconnectedness between risky and commercial activities, improve corporate governance, create a responsible **and moderate** remuneration system, allow effective bank resolution and recovery, reinforce bank capital and deliver credit to the real economy;

Or. de

**Amendment 198**  
**Slawomir Nitras**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 7**

*Motion for a resolution*

7. Considers that an effective banking system must deliver a change in banking culture in order to reduce complexity, enhance competition, limit interconnectedness between **risky and commercial** activities, improve corporate governance, create a responsible remuneration system, allow effective bank resolution and recovery, reinforce bank capital and deliver credit to the real economy;

*Amendment*

7. Considers that an effective banking system must deliver a change in banking culture in order to reduce complexity, enhance competition, limit interconnectedness between **investment and purely banking-related** activities, improve corporate governance, create a responsible remuneration system, allow effective bank resolution and recovery, reinforce bank capital and deliver credit to the real economy;

Or. pl

**Amendment 199**  
**Jürgen Klute**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 7**

*Motion for a resolution*

7. Considers that an effective banking system must deliver a change in banking culture in order to reduce complexity, enhance competition, limit interconnectedness between **risky** and commercial activities, improve corporate governance, create a responsible remuneration system, allow effective bank resolution and recovery, reinforce bank capital and deliver credit to the real economy;

*Amendment*

7. Considers that an effective banking system must deliver a change in banking culture in order to reduce complexity, enhance ***fair and sustainable*** competition, limit interconnectedness between ***investment*** and commercial activities ***to a minimum***, improve corporate governance, create a responsible remuneration system, allow effective bank resolution and recovery, reinforce bank capital and deliver credit to the real economy;

Or. en

*Justification*

*To prevent a barely possible distinction between different investment activities as trading on own account, market making and others, all investment activities should be separated from the commercial branch. To relieve smaller entities from a disproportionate burden a threshold should be defined.*

**Amendment 200**  
**Arlene McCarthy**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 7**

*Motion for a resolution*

7. Considers that an effective banking system must deliver a change in banking culture in order to reduce complexity, enhance competition, limit interconnectedness between risky and commercial activities, improve corporate governance, create a responsible remuneration system, allow effective bank resolution and recovery, reinforce bank capital and deliver credit to the real economy;

*Amendment*

7. Considers that an effective banking system must deliver a change in banking culture ***and practice*** in order to reduce complexity, enhance competition, limit interconnectedness between risky ***market-related activities*** and commercial activities, improve corporate governance, create a responsible remuneration system, allow effective bank resolution and recovery, reinforce bank capital and deliver credit to the real economy;

Or. en

**Amendment 201**  
**Antolín Sánchez Presedo**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 7**

*Motion for a resolution*

7. Considers that an effective banking system must deliver a change in banking culture in order to reduce complexity, enhance competition, limit interconnectedness between risky and commercial activities, improve corporate governance, create a responsible remuneration system, allow effective bank resolution and recovery, reinforce bank capital and deliver credit to the real economy;

*Amendment*

7. Considers that an effective banking system must deliver a change in banking culture in order to reduce complexity, enhance competition, limit interconnectedness between risky and commercial activities, improve corporate governance, create a responsible remuneration system, allow effective bank resolution and recovery, reinforce bank capital and deliver **sustainable** credit to the real economy;

Or. en

**Amendment 202**  
**Sharon Bowles**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 7 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

***7a. Notes that, some risks such as concentration risk, interest rate risk and operational risk are unlikely to be made 'safer' by structural reform and that many banking problems have in fact been concentrated on the retail side or result from sovereign bond capital holdings. In this respect urges the Commission to work closely with the Basel committee and swiftly implement any further recommendations from them in these areas;***

Or. en

**Amendment 203**  
**Philippe Lamberts**  
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 7 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

*7a. Considers that structural reform must be complemented by legislation setting out simple, clear and enforceable rules that ensure that activities not permitted for certain banks do not end up being carried out by under regulated shadow banking entities, especially those to which regulated banks are directly or indirectly exposed;*

Or. en

**Amendment 204**  
**Olle Schmidt, Anne E. Jensen, Nils Torvalds**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 7 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

*7a. Considers that the transmission funds efficiently from savers to investors is a key component of a well functioning economy and necessary for long term economic growth within the EU and that market making activities which service clients and provide liquidity are key contributors to this process.*

Or. en

**Amendment 205**  
**Jean-Paul Gauzès**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 7 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***7a. Considers that, as stressed by the ECB, published on January, 24, the diversity of business models in the EU should be preserved; no one-size-fits-all solution should be imposed;***

Or. en

**Amendment 206**  
**Jean-Paul Gauzès**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 7 b (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***7b. Considers that free movement of capital and the great potential of the Single Market should not be compromised for the sake of uncoordinated and disproportionate measures taken with a view to preserving financial stability exclusively at national level. The current practices of 'ring-fencing' assets, which could, in practice, restrict cross-border transfers of banks' capital and potentially constrain the free flow of capital throughout the European Union should be forbidden;***

Or. en

**Amendment 207**  
**Philippe Lamberts**  
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 7 b (new)**



*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***7b. Considers that it is essential to establish regulatory regimes for activities, such as securitisation and repo funding, which can provide a benefit to the real economy but entail potentially large systemic risks. Such regimes could consist of specific limited purpose banking licences for such entities and rules governing their permitted activities and related prudential requirements as well as their interactions with other components of the financial system;***

Or. en

**Amendment 208**

**Olle Schmidt, Anne E. Jensen, Nils Torvalds**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Paragraph 7 b (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***7b. Urges the Commission to finalise its impact assessment and on the basis of it come forward with an appropriate follow up taking into account the aims, results and effects of the ongoing regulatory reform agenda.***

Or. en

**Amendment 209**

**Jean-Paul Gauzès**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Paragraph 7 c (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***7c. Considers there is a strong need in***

*Europe for harmonization and common rules. The creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), a Single Rulebook and a Single Resolution Authority reinforces the need for a European approach towards reform of bank structures avoiding a patchwork of national initiatives;*

Or. en

**Amendment 210**

**Olle Schmidt, Anne E. Jensen, Nils Torvalds**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Paragraph 7 c (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

*7c. Urges the Commission to not prejudge the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision's ongoing review of the Trading Book;*

Or. en

**Amendment 211**

**Jean-Paul Gauzès**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Paragraph 7 d (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

*7d. Considers that the Liikanen report explained that poor funding structures are one of the main sources of the banking crisis. Emphasizes in this respect the importance of a well-balanced and diversified funding structure in terms of sources of financing, maturity and other risk exposures;*

Or. en

**Amendment 212**  
**Jean-Paul Gauzès**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 7 e (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***7e. Considers that with the introduction of the bail-in concept of the RRD, owners and all creditors of banks will be the ones bailing out banks in the next crisis and that the power to separate activities vested in the resolution authority will be an important tool under the Bank Recovery and Resolution directive and it will represent a proportionate, tailored and risk-sensitive approach;***

Or. en

**Amendment 213**  
**Jean-Paul Gauzès**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 7 f (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***7f. Underlines the important role of banks in providing capital market services to governments, companies and investors to issue bonds and securities in the markets and stresses in this respect the vital role of market making;***

Or. en

**Amendment 214**  
**Gunnar Hökmark**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Subheading 2**

*Motion for a resolution*

B. Key elements of structural reform

*Amendment*

B. Key elements of ***eventual*** structural reform

Or. en

**Amendment 215**  
**Werner Langen**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 8**

*Motion for a resolution*

***8. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for mandatory separation of banks' retail and investment activities;***

***deleted***

*Amendment*

Or. de

**Amendment 216**  
**Gunnar Hökmark, Krišjānis Kariņš**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 8**

*Motion for a resolution*

***8. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for mandatory separation of banks' retail and investment activities;***

***deleted***

*Amendment*

Or. en

**Amendment 217**  
**Wolf Klinz**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 8**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

**8. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for mandatory separation of banks' retail and investment activities;**

**deleted**

Or. en

**Amendment 218**  
**Sylvie Goulard**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 8**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

**8. Urges the Commission to *come forward with a proposal for mandatory* separation of banks' retail and investment activities;**

**8. Urges the Commission to *carefully assess the complementarity of structural reform with the new EU banking framework, including in particular CRD4, the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, Banking Union before any decision is taken on structural reform and in particular on legal separation between deposits and proprietary trading and other significant trading activities, if the activities to be separated amount to a significant share of a bank's business;***

Or. en

**Amendment 219**  
**Sharon Bowles**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 8**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

**8. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal *for mandatory* separation**

**8. *Given the proposals for structural separation already underway in several***

of banks' retail and investment activities;

*Member States, urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal **to set down principles and options for structural reform of banks which safeguard the single market and free flow of capital and recognise the need for banks to perform and provide services to clients efficiently and remain globally competitive. Such proposals may include options for total separation of banks' retail and investment activities as well as methods of internal isolation or 'ring fencing'**;*

Or. en

#### **Amendment 220**

**Olle Schmidt, Anne E. Jensen, Nils Torvalds**

#### **Motion for a resolution**

##### **Paragraph 8**

##### *Motion for a resolution*

8. Urges the Commission **to come** forward with a proposal for **mandatory** separation of banks' retail and investment activities;

##### *Amendment*

8. Urges **if** the Commission **comes** forward with a proposal for **appropriate** separation of banks' retail and investment activities, **should such an approach be justified by a balanced and comprehensive impact assessment which proves that the real economy, the fixed-income markets or EU competitiveness will not be disadvantaged. The form of appropriate separation, legal or otherwise, for various activities should depend on the determination of supervisory authorities based on the risks and costs involved;**

Or. en

#### **Amendment 221**

**Marianne Thyssen**

#### **Motion for a resolution**

##### **Paragraph 8**

*Motion for a resolution*

8. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for mandatory separation of banks' **retail** and investment activities;

*Amendment*

8. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for mandatory separation of banks' **depository/lending activities and significant trading** and investment activities, **adhering to the two-stage procedure and the separation criteria set out in the HLEG report, although for the purpose of calculating the thresholds the less risky assets available for sale (the 'AFS' category), as to be more precisely defined by the EBA, should not be taken into account;**

Or. nl

*Justification*

*Proprietary trading, PE, SIV and HF activities must at least be ring-fenced in a separate entity. Although it requires further examination, the threshold of 15-25% for permitted trading activities within a bank (as proposed by HLEG) seems appropriate to enable banks to retain 'useful client-related trading' provided that it is accepted that the less risky assets available for sale (AFS) do not constitute trading. If a bank has more trading activities, there will be a suspicion that these are for its own account and no longer perform a traditional banking function.*

**Amendment 222**

**Corien Wortmann-Kool**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Paragraph 8**

*Motion for a resolution*

8. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for mandatory separation of **banks' retail and investment** activities;

*Amendment*

8. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for **a principles based approach to structural reforms of the European banking sector, including mandatory separation of certain significant activities in the trading book of financial institutions that are not associated to the provision of client-related services, as well as separation of certain activities conditional on the**

*assessment of the recovery and resolution plans;*

Or. en

#### **Amendment 223**

**Burkhard Balz**

#### **Motion for a resolution**

##### **Paragraph 8**

###### *Motion for a resolution*

8. Urges the Commission to ***come forward with a proposal for mandatory*** separation of banks' retail and investment activities;

###### *Amendment*

8. Urges the Commission to ***conduct a thorough impact assessment of a possible separation of banks' retail and investment activities on the basis of the Report of the High-level Expert Group on reforming the structure of the EU banking sector and to take into account legislation already adopted and initiated at the European level;***

Or. en

#### **Amendment 224**

**Claudio Morganti, Mario Borghezio, Lorenzo Fontana**

#### **Motion for a resolution**

##### **Paragraph 8**

###### *Motion for a resolution*

8. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for mandatory separation of ***banks' retail and investment*** activities;

###### *Amendment*

8. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for mandatory separation of ***commercial banks and merchant banks, safeguarding the financial deposit-taking and credit activities forming part and parcel of the real economy, as distinct from activities linked to investment and speculation on national and international financial markets;***

Or. it



**Amendment 225**  
**Markus Ferber**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 8**

*Motion for a resolution*

8. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for mandatory separation of banks' retail and investment activities;

*Amendment*

8. Urges the Commission, ***taking account of the legal structures which have evolved in the various banking models in Europe***, to come forward with a proposal for mandatory separation of banks' retail and investment activities ***which will only be implemented if the investment activity represents a significant share of the turnover of the bank in question***;

Or. de

*Justification*

*A threshold must be stipulated for the mandatory separation of banks' retail and investment activities, as set out in the Liikanen Report. This would enable in particular smaller banks, for which investment banking is a subsidiary activity, to continue providing their customers with investment banking services at a single point, so that SMEs in particular would find the services they need available in rural areas.*

**Amendment 226**  
**Herbert Dorfmann**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 8**

*Motion for a resolution*

8. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for ***mandatory*** separation of banks' retail and investment activities;

*Amendment*

8. ***Considering the legal structure and the different European banking models*** urges the Commission to ***ensure to*** come forward with a proposal for ***a conditional*** separation of banks' retail and investment activities, ***if the activities to be separated represent a significant share of the overall bank activity***;

**Amendment 227**  
**Jean-Paul Gauzès**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 8**

*Motion for a resolution*

8. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for mandatory separation of banks' ***retail and investment*** activities;

*Amendment*

8. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for mandatory separation of banks' activities ***serving the real economy from speculation***;

Or. fr

**Amendment 228**  
**Syed Kamall**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 8**

*Motion for a resolution*

8. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for mandatory separation of banks' retail and investment activities;

*Amendment*

8. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for mandatory separation of banks' retail and investment activities ***in order to ensure that the state only guarantees essential banking services***;

Or. en

**Amendment 229**  
**Peter Simon, Udo Bullmann**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 8**

*Motion for a resolution*

8. Urges the Commission to come forward

*Amendment*

8. Urges the Commission to come forward

with a proposal for mandatory separation of **banks'** retail and investment activities;

with a proposal for mandatory separation of **the** retail and investment activities **of those banks which engage in significant commercial activity**;

Or. de

#### **Amendment 230**

**Philippe Lamberts**

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

#### **Motion for a resolution**

##### **Paragraph 8**

###### *Motion for a resolution*

8. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for mandatory separation of banks' retail and **investment** activities;

###### *Amendment*

8. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for mandatory separation of banks' retail and **proprietary market risk taking** activities;

Or. en

#### **Amendment 231**

**Astrid Lulling**

#### **Motion for a resolution**

##### **Paragraph 8**

###### *Motion for a resolution*

8. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for mandatory separation of banks' **retail and investment** activities;

###### *Amendment*

8. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for mandatory separation of banks' **trading** activities;

Or. en

#### **Amendment 232**

**Philippe De Backer**

#### **Motion for a resolution**

##### **Paragraph 8**

*Motion for a resolution*

8. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for mandatory separation of banks' retail and investment activities;

*Amendment*

8. Urges the Commission to ***analyse the need to*** come forward with a proposal for mandatory separation of banks' retail and investment activities;

Or. en

**Amendment 233**

**Philippe Lamberts**

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Motion for a resolution**

**Paragraph 8 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***8a. Urges the Commission, rather than attempting to exhaustively define what retail banks are not permitted to do, to base the key definition of what should be inside a "ring-fence" on a positive definition of the core financial services provided by banks to the real economy that cannot be allowed to be interrupted, and therefore will continue to receive an implicit government guarantee; Believes that only such an approach can serve as a basis for a clear and enforceable way of preventing disruption to these services by problems other banking activities. Such a definition should take account of which activities constitute services of general economic interest as referred to in Article 14 TFEU;***

Or. en

**Amendment 234**

**Jean-Paul Gauzès, Alfredo Pallone**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 8 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***8a. Urges the Commission to carry out a thorough impact analysis of such a legislative proposal including whether the main aim of a banking structural reform, increasing the solvability and the resolvability of European banks, has already been achieved by ongoing European legislation;***

Or. en

**Amendment 235**  
**Saïd El Khadraoui**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 8 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***8a. underlines that keeping both entities in one single bank holding will not entirely eliminate the risk of spillover effects, as in stress situations, reputational risk may spread within the banking group thus reducing the potential benefits of separation.***

Or. en

**Amendment 236**  
**Hans-Peter Martin**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 8 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***8a. urges the Commission to include into their proposal a cap on bank leverage, a***

*cap on size as well as an implementation of a rigorous bail-in regime that will see all creditors bear the risk of absorbing banks' losses;*

Or. en

**Amendment 237**  
**Krišjānis Kariņš, Gunnar Hökmark**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 8 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

*8a. Underlines that such proposal might hinder the functioning of the whole banking sector of the EU, distort competition and pose far-reaching negative effects on the economic growth;*

Or. en

**Amendment 238**  
**Philippe Lamberts**  
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 8 b (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

*8b. Recommends that any definition of proprietary market risk taking cover at least any activity resulting in a marginal increase in net exposure of the bank to market risk where either a) the activities are not undertaken as a service requested by a client in relation to the prudent management of the client's financial needs in the clients best interest or b) it is possible to transfer the resulting market risk to a legally separate entity, but this is not, in fact, done;*

**Amendment 239**  
**Philippe Lamberts**  
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 8 c (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***8c. Stresses that, where core banking services provided by retail banks to the real economy unavoidably result in proprietary market risk taking, that this risk be required to be fully hedged where possible or subject to strict limits on the level and duration of such exposure for particular activities;***

**Amendment 240**  
**Werner Langen**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 9**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ around bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the retail entity continues business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or***

***deleted***

*insolvency of the investment entity;*

Or. de

**Amendment 241**  
**Gunnar Hökmark**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 9**

*Motion for a resolution*

9. Urges the Commission to *come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ around bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the retail entity continues business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entity;*

*Amendment*

9. Urges the Commission to *contribute to the conclusion of already existing legislative initiatives before the need for further legislative acts is assessed. Reminds the Commission that a number of legislative proposals have been in deadlock for a long time and that the physical capacity of the Parliament and Council to professionally deal with all outstanding dossiers is already significantly over-stretched;*

Or. en

**Amendment 242**  
**Claudio Morganti, Mario Borghezio, Lorenzo Fontana**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 9**

*Motion for a resolution*

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation *through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ around bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those*

*Amendment*

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation *whereby:*



*relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the retail entity continues business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entity;*

*(a) commercial banks, that is to say, banks which accept deposits from the public, would be prohibited from carrying out activities related to securities trading and brokerage, and commercial bank functions would be separated from merchant bank functions;*

*(b) commercial banks would be prohibited from holding interests in, or entering into business cooperation agreements of any kind with, the following: merchant banks, investment banks, securities brokerage firms, and, in general, finance companies which accept deposits from the public;*

Or. it

**Amendment 243**  
**Wolf Klinz**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 9**

*Motion for a resolution*

9. Urges the Commission to *come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ around bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the retail entity continues business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses,*

*Amendment*

9. Urges the Commission to *support the legislators in a fast and credible implementation of the banking crisis management and resolution directive proposal, foreseeing a mandatory simplification of banking structure in case of a stated non-resolvability in the resolution plan of an institution;*

***funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entity;***

Or. en

**Amendment 244**  
**Marianne Thyssen**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 9**

*Motion for a resolution*

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ around bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the **retail** entity continues business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entity;

*Amendment*

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’, ***or even complete hiving-off into an entity outside the banking group, around those risky trading and investment activities of significant volume, on the basis of an evaluation process which closely adheres to the two-stage procedure and the separation criteria set out in the HLEG report, although for the purpose of calculating the thresholds the less risky assets available for sale (the ‘AFS’ category), as to be more precisely defined by the EBA, should not be taken into account, in order not to contaminate*** bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the **deposit/lending bank** entity continues business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entity;

Or. nl

## Justification

*Het is beter om de investeringsentiteit te ringfencen i.p.v. de deposito-kredietverlening poot (cfr. HLEG). Zo behoudt de depositobank de flexibiliteit om haar nuttige cliëntgerelateerde handels- en beleggingsactiviteiten uit te oefenen. Deze entiteit opereert o.i. zelfs best buiten de bankengroep. Immers, als deze risicovolle activiteiten binnen de bankengroep gebeuren, zijn er belangrijke reputatierisico's. Bovendien brengt de doorvoering van een dergelijke strenge afscherming van entiteiten binnen eenzelfde groep grote toezichtproblemen mee. Ook valt te verwachten dat de deposito-kredietverlening-entiteit toch impliciet garant zal staan voor de investeringsentiteit die deel uitmaakt van dezelfde bankengroep gezien de grote reputatieschade bij falen.*

### Amendment 245 Burkhard Balz

#### Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9

##### *Motion for a resolution*

9. Urges the Commission to ***come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible 'ring fence' around*** bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits; ***takes*** the view that in the event of a bank failure, ***the ring fence*** must ensure that the ***retail entity continues*** business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of ***the investment entity***;

##### *Amendment*

9. Urges the Commission to ***assess the necessity and models of a possible*** separation ***of*** bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits ***and investment banking activities, for all credit institutions in the Single Market, and to also assess potentially adverse consequences of such a separation.***

***The Commission shall take*** the view that in the event of a bank failure, ***a potential separation model*** must ensure that the ***credit institution can continue*** business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of ***an entity that is part of the credit institution***;

Or. en

**Amendment 246**  
**Corien Wortmann-Kool**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 9**

*Motion for a resolution*

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation ***through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ around bank activities*** that are ***vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits***; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ***ring fence*** must ensure that the retail ***entity continues business*** unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the ***investment*** entity;

*Amendment*

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation ***of certain significant activities in the trading book of financial institutions*** that are ***not associated to the provision of client-related services***; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ***separation*** must ensure that the ***entity providing retail and other client-related activities that are vital for the real economy remains*** unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the ***separated*** entity;

Or. en

**Amendment 247**  
**Peter Simon, Udo Bullmann**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 9**

*Motion for a resolution*

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ around bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the retail entity continues business

*Amendment*

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ around bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the retail entity continues business

unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entity;

unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entity; ***considers a holding structure to be one way of ensuring that the requisite ring fence is put in place under one roof; urges the Commission to investigate how the joint and several liability of individual business units can be effectively brought to an end and economies of scope and scale put into practice with a holding structure in place;***

Or. de

#### **Amendment 248** **Syed Kamall**

#### **Motion for a resolution** **Paragraph 9**

##### *Motion for a resolution*

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ around bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the retail entity continues business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entity;

##### *Amendment*

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ around bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the retail entity continues business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entity; ***notes that simply banning certain activities does not tackle the problem of the state guarantees and subsidies being used by the arms of the bank involved in non essential banking services;***

Or. en

**Amendment 249**  
**Hans-Peter Martin**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 9**

*Motion for a resolution*

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ around bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the retail entity continues business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entity;

*Amendment*

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ around bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the retail entity continues business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entity, ***the ‘ring fence’ must be part of a technicality that protects EU tax payers from bailing out both retail and investment entities;***

Or. en

**Amendment 250**  
**Jean-Paul Gauzès, Alfredo Pallone**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 9**

*Motion for a resolution*

9. Urges the Commission to ***come forward with a proposal for such*** mandatory separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ around bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and

*Amendment*

9. Urges the Commission to ***consider the impact of*** mandatory separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ ***on the current European economic landscape and on the role of the European banks in financing the European economy,*** around

deposits; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the retail entity continues business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entity;

bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, **market making**, payment systems and deposits; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the retail entity continues business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entity;

Or. en

**Amendment 251**  
**Antolín Sánchez Presedo**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 9**

*Motion for a resolution*

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible **‘ring fence’ around** bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the **ring fence** must ensure that the retail entity continues business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entity;

*Amendment*

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent, **complete** and credible **measures insulating and protecting** bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the **measures** must ensure that the retail entity continues **independent** business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entity;

Or. en

**Amendment 252**  
**Sharon Bowles**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 9**

*Motion for a resolution*

9. Urges the Commission to ***come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation through the establishment of*** a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ ***around*** bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the retail entity continues business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entity;

*Amendment*

9. Urges the Commission to ***propose mechanisms for establishing*** a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ ***separating*** bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits ***from some or all investment activities***; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the retail entity continues business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entity;

Or. en

**Amendment 253**  
**Herbert Dorfmann**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 9**

*Motion for a resolution*

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for ***such mandatory*** separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ around bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems ***and deposits***; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the retail entity continues business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entity;

*Amendment*

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for ***a conditional*** separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ around bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems, ***deposits and other services for the real economy through a universal banking concept***; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the retail entity continues business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the



resolution or insolvency of the investment entity;

Or. en

## Amendment 254

Sylvie Goulard

### Motion for a resolution

#### Paragraph 9

##### *Motion for a resolution*

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for ***such mandatory separation through*** the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ ***around*** bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems ***and deposits***; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the retail entity continues business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entity;

##### *Amendment*

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ ***between*** bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems, ***deposits, business support services and high-risk activities relating to trading***; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the retail entity continues business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entity;

Or. en

## Amendment 255

Astrid Lulling

### Motion for a resolution

#### Paragraph 9

##### *Motion for a resolution*

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ around bank activities that are ***vital***

##### *Amendment*

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ around bank activities that are

*for* the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the **retail** entity continues business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the **investment** entity;

**customer-related and connected to** the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the **ring-fenced** entity continues business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the **trading** entity;

Or. en

#### **Amendment 256**

**Olle Schmidt, Anne E. Jensen, Nils Torvalds**

#### **Motion for a resolution**

##### **Paragraph 9**

##### *Motion for a resolution*

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ around bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the retail entity continues business **unaffected by** operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages **or reputational damage** resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entity;

##### *Amendment*

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ around bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits, **market making and risk management**; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the retail entity **is able to** continues **its** business **without significant** operational problems, financial losses, **or** funding shortages resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entity;

Or. en

#### **Amendment 257**

**Arlene McCarthy**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 9**

*Motion for a resolution*

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible **'ring fence' around** bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the **ring fence must ensure that the** retail entity **continues** business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entity;

*Amendment*

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible **criteria for the protection of** bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the retail entity **must continue** business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entity;

Or. en

**Amendment 258**  
**Philippe Lamberts**  
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 9**

*Motion for a resolution*

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible 'ring fence' around bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the retail entity continues business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of **the investment**

*Amendment*

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible 'ring fence' around bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the retail entity continues business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of **an entity**

*entity;*

*engaged in proprietary market risk taking;*

Or. en

**Amendment 259**  
**Philippe De Backer**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 9**

*Motion for a resolution*

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for ***such mandatory separation through*** the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ around bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that ***the retail entity continues*** business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entity;

*Amendment*

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ around bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that ***these bank activities continue*** business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entity;

Or. en

**Amendment 260**  
**Syed Kamall**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 9**

*Motion for a resolution*

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ around bank activities that are ***vital for*** the real economy, such as those relating

*Amendment*

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ around bank activities that are ***essential for the functioning of*** the real

to credit functions, payment systems and deposits; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the retail entity continues business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entity;

economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the retail entity continues business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entity;

Or. en

**Amendment 261**  
**Hans-Peter Martin**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 9**

*Motion for a resolution*

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ around bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the retail entity continues business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entity;

*Amendment*

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ around bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the retail entity continues business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, ***financial losses to customers and consumers***, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entity;

Or. de

**Amendment 262**  
**Arlene McCarthy**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 9 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

**9a. Encourages the Commission to explore bank models that increase transparency, improve competition, facilitate supervision and regulatory intervention and reduce contagion risk in case of a crisis.**

Or. en

**Amendment 263**

**Burkhard Balz**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Paragraph 9 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

**9a. Urges the Commission to include in its thorough impact assessment alternatives to separation including higher risk management standards for trading activities and proprietary trading;**

Or. en

**Amendment 264**

**Wolf Klinz, Philippe De Backer**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Paragraph 10**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

10. Urges the **Commission to ensure that trading activities do not benefit from implicit guarantees, the use of insured deposits or taxpayer bailouts and that these activities do not pose a risk to the delivery of ring-fenced retail services;**

10. Urges the **responsible management of banks and competent supervisors to ensure that trading activities in the banking system do not pose a systemic risk and are subject to robust risk management controls;**

Or. en

**Amendment 265**  
**Gunnar Hökmark**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 10**

*Motion for a resolution*

10. Urges the Commission to ensure *that trading activities do not benefit from implicit guarantees, the use of insured deposits or taxpayer bailouts and that these activities do not pose a risk to the delivery of ring-fenced retail services;*

*Amendment*

10. Urges the Commission to ensure *the implicit guarantee of the banking system in its entirety is reduced;*

Or. en

**Amendment 266**  
**Burkhard Balz**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 10**

*Motion for a resolution*

10. Urges the Commission to ensure that *trading activities do not benefit from implicit guarantees, the use of insured deposits or taxpayer bailouts and that these activities do not pose a risk to the delivery of ring-fenced retail services;*

*Amendment*

10. Urges the Commission to ensure that *proprietary trading and certain high risk financial* activities do not pose a risk to the delivery of retail services;

Or. en

**Amendment 267**  
**Markus Ferber**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 10**

*Motion for a resolution*

10. Urges the Commission to ensure that **trading** activities do not benefit from implicit guarantees, the use of insured deposits or taxpayer bailouts and that these activities do not pose a risk to the **delivery of ring-fenced retail services**;

*Amendment*

10. Urges the Commission to ensure that **investment** activities **which are separated as a result of their significant share of a bank's turnover** do not benefit from implicit guarantees, the use of insured deposits or taxpayer bailouts and that these activities do not pose a risk to the **retail arm**;

Or. de

**Amendment 268**

**Olle Schmidt, Anne E. Jensen, Nils Torvalds**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Paragraph 10**

*Motion for a resolution*

10. Urges the Commission to ensure that trading activities do not benefit from implicit guarantees, the use of insured deposits or taxpayer bailouts and that these activities do not pose a risk to the delivery of **ring-fenced** retail services;

*Amendment*

10. Urges the Commission to ensure that **proprietary** trading activities **on own account that are not related to the facilitation of client orders or hedging of risks** do not benefit from implicit **public** guarantees, the use of insured deposits or taxpayer bailouts and that these activities do not pose a risk to the delivery of retail services;

Or. en

**Amendment 269**

**Marianne Thyssen**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Paragraph 10**

*Motion for a resolution*

10. Urges the Commission to ensure that trading activities do not benefit from

*Amendment*

10. Urges the Commission to ensure that trading **and investment** activities do not



implicit guarantees, the use of insured deposits or taxpayer bailouts and that these activities do not pose a risk to the **delivery** of **ring-fenced retail** services;

benefit from implicit guarantees, the use of insured deposits or taxpayer bailouts and that these activities do not pose a risk to the **provision** of **depository/lending** services;

Or. nl

### *Justification*

*In the way proposed in the HLEG report, it seems better to ring-fence investment and trading activities rather than the depository/lending arm. This will allow this depository/lending entity the necessary flexibility to carry out its useful client-related trading and investment activities.*

### **Amendment 270** **Pervenche Berès**

#### **Motion for a resolution** **Paragraph 10**

##### *Motion for a resolution*

10. Urges the Commission to ensure that trading activities do not benefit from implicit guarantees, the use of insured deposits or taxpayer bailouts and that these activities **do not pose a risk** to the **delivery of ring-fenced retail services**;

##### *Amendment*

10. Urges the Commission to ensure that trading activities do not benefit from implicit guarantees, the use of insured deposits or taxpayer bailouts and that these activities **effectively contribute** to the **real economy**;

Or. en

### **Amendment 271** **Corien Wortmann-Kool**

#### **Motion for a resolution** **Paragraph 10**

##### *Motion for a resolution*

10. Urges the Commission to ensure that trading activities do not benefit from implicit guarantees, the use of insured deposits or taxpayer bailouts and that these activities do not pose a risk to the delivery

##### *Amendment*

10. Urges the Commission to ensure that trading activities **that are not related to the provision of client-related services** do not benefit from implicit guarantees, the use of insured deposits or taxpayer bailouts and

of *ring-fenced retail* services;

that these activities do not pose a risk to the delivery of *retail and other client-related* services;

Or. en

**Amendment 272**  
**Antolín Sánchez Presedo**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 10**

*Motion for a resolution*

10. Urges the Commission to ensure that trading activities do not benefit from implicit guarantees, the use of *insured* deposits or taxpayer bailouts and that these activities do not pose a risk to the delivery of *ring-fenced* retail services;

*Amendment*

10. Urges the Commission to ensure that trading activities do not benefit from implicit guarantees, the use of *retail* deposits or taxpayer bailouts and that these activities do not pose a risk to the delivery of *insulated and protected* retail services;

Or. en

**Amendment 273**  
**Sharon Bowles**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 10**

*Motion for a resolution*

10. Urges the Commission to ensure that trading activities do not benefit from implicit guarantees, the use of insured deposits or taxpayer bailouts and that these activities do not pose a risk to the delivery of ring-fenced retail services;

*Amendment*

10. Urges the Commission to ensure that trading activities do not benefit from implicit guarantees, the use of insured deposits or taxpayer bailouts and that these activities do not pose a risk to the delivery of ring-fenced retail services, *noting that bail-in arrangements must be clear for investors.*

Or. en

**Amendment 274**  
**Philippe Lamberts**  
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 10**

*Motion for a resolution*

10. Urges the Commission to ensure that **trading** activities do not benefit from implicit guarantees, the use of insured deposits or taxpayer bailouts and that these activities do not pose a risk to the delivery of ring-fenced retail services;

*Amendment*

10. Urges the Commission to ensure that **proprietary market risk taking** activities do not benefit from implicit guarantees, the use of insured deposits or taxpayer bailouts and that these activities do not pose a risk to the delivery of ring-fenced retail services;

Or. en

**Amendment 275**  
**Syed Kamall**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 10**

*Motion for a resolution*

10. Urges the Commission to ensure that trading activities do not benefit from implicit guarantees, the use of insured deposits or taxpayer bailouts and that these activities do not pose a risk to the delivery of ring-fenced retail services;

*Amendment*

10. Urges the Commission to ensure that trading activities **are priced by the market** **and** do not benefit from implicit guarantees, the use of insured deposits or taxpayer bailouts and that these activities do not pose a risk to the delivery of ring-fenced retail services,

Or. en

**Amendment 276**  
**Jean-Paul Gauzès**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 10**

*Motion for a resolution*

10. Urges the Commission to ensure that trading activities do not benefit from implicit guarantees, the use of insured deposits or taxpayer bailouts and that these activities do not pose a risk to the delivery of ring-fenced retail services;

*Amendment*

10. Urges the Commission to ensure that ***speculative*** trading activities do not benefit from implicit guarantees, the use of insured deposits or taxpayer bailouts and that these activities do not pose a risk to the delivery of ring-fenced retail services;

Or. fr

**Amendment 277**

**Astrid Lulling**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Paragraph 10**

*Motion for a resolution*

10. Urges the Commission to ensure that trading activities do not benefit from implicit guarantees, the use of insured deposits or taxpayer bailouts and that these activities do not pose a risk to the delivery of ring-fenced ***retail*** services;

*Amendment*

10. Urges the Commission to ensure that trading activities do not benefit from implicit guarantees, the use of insured deposits or taxpayer bailouts and that these activities do not pose a risk to the delivery of ring-fenced services;

Or. en

**Amendment 278**

**Arlene McCarthy**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Paragraph 10 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***10a. In the case where there is no separate investment banking entity, it might be possible for a deposit-taking bank to conduct limited trading activities to the benefit of its non-financial clients proving that:***

*i) These trading activities are limited to simple financial instruments undertaken with / on behalf of non-financial clients,*

*ii) The amount of trading activities within the deposit-taking bank is capped as a % of total balance sheet. The amount of the threshold should be precisely assessed in the impact assessment.*

Or. en

**Amendment 279**

**Sharon Bowles**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Paragraph 10 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

*10a. Urges the commission to take into account efficiency as well as safety when proposing separation of bank activities given that costs will be passed on to consumers and customers and have an immediate cost to society whereas the effectiveness of structural separation is not proven, not least as failures in the crisis have predominantly been in retail operations, mainly mortgage related, or due to over-expansion in mergers; notes that total guarantees for the retail side of banking may in fact continue to encourage overly risky mortgage lending.*

Or. en

**Amendment 280**

**Peter Simon, Udo Bullmann**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Paragraph 10 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***10a. Urges the Commission to investigate which commercial activities should be permitted for banks, and on what scale, to enable them effectively to support the real economy and to ensure the stability of individual institutions and of the financial sector overall;***

Or. de

**Amendment 281**

**Olle Schmidt, Anne E. Jensen, Nils Torvalds**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Paragraph 11**

*Motion for a resolution*

11. Urges the Commission to ensure that where banks undertake trading activities, the risks and costs associated with those activities ***are borne by their trading arm and not by their ring-fenced retail arm;***

*Amendment*

11. Urges the Commission to ensure that ***supervisors conduct an analysis of*** where banks undertake ***risky proprietary*** trading activities ***compared with market making which is a core activity of banks important to the financing of the economy, managing government debt and in particular the financing of corporations which need access to primary markets,*** the risks and costs associated with those ***risky proprietary trading*** activities ***properly capitalized and costs of losses are absorbed first by shareholders and creditors.***

Or. en

**Amendment 282**

**Wolf Klinz**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Paragraph 11**

*Motion for a resolution*

11. Urges the **Commission** to ensure that where banks undertake trading activities, the risks and costs associated with those activities are borne by ***their trading arm and not by their ring-fenced retail arm***;

*Amendment*

11. Urges the **management of banks and supervisors** to ensure that where banks undertake trading activities, the risks and costs associated with those activities are borne by ***the trading unit; calls for internal control mechanisms to ensure that losses are not borne by other units and asks for mandatory reporting of profits and losses borne by all relevant units***;

Or. en

**Amendment 283**  
**Arlene McCarthy**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 11**

*Motion for a resolution*

11. Urges the Commission to ensure that where banks undertake trading activities, the risks and costs associated with those activities are borne by their trading arm and not by ***their ring-fenced retail arm***;

*Amendment*

11. Urges the Commission to ensure that where banks undertake trading activities, ***to be understood as but not limited to market making, underwriting, proprietary trading and credit to leveraged investment funds***, the risks and costs associated with those activities are borne by their trading arm and not by ***deposit-taking activities***;

Or. en

**Amendment 284**  
**Markus Ferber**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 11**

*Motion for a resolution*

11. Urges the Commission to ensure that

*Amendment*

11. Urges the Commission to ensure that

where ***banks undertake trading*** activities, the risks and costs associated with those activities are borne by ***their trading*** arm and not by ***their ring-fenced*** retail arm;

where ***a bank undertakes investment*** activities ***and this area was earmarked for separation as a result of its significant share of the bank's turnover***, the risks and costs associated with those activities are borne by ***its investment*** arm and not by ***its*** retail arm;

Or. de

**Amendment 285**  
**Marianne Thyssen**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 11**

*Motion for a resolution*

11. Urges the Commission to ensure that where banks undertake trading activities, the risks and costs associated with those activities are borne by their ***trading*** arm and not by their ***ring-fenced retail*** arm;

*Amendment*

11. Urges the Commission to ensure that where banks undertake ***particularly risky investment and*** trading activities, the risks and costs associated with those activities are borne by their ***ring-fenced investment*** arm and not by their ***depository/lending*** arm;

Or. nl

**Amendment 286**  
**Sharon Bowles**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 11**

*Motion for a resolution*

11. Urges the Commission to ensure that where banks undertake trading activities, the risks and costs associated with those activities ***are borne by their trading arm and not by their ring-fenced*** retail arm;

*Amendment*

11. Urges the Commission to ensure that where banks undertake ***purely financial*** trading activities ***in derivatives***, the risks and costs associated with those activities ***do not impact on the*** retail arm;

Or. en



**Amendment 287**

**Philippe Lamberts**

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Motion for a resolution**

**Paragraph 11**

*Motion for a resolution*

11. Urges the Commission to ensure that where banks undertake **trading** activities, the risks and costs associated with those activities are borne by their **trading** arm and not by their ring-fenced retail arm;

*Amendment*

11. Urges the Commission to ensure that where banks undertake **proprietary market risk taking** activities, the risks and costs associated with those activities are borne by their **proprietary market risk taking** arm and not by their ring-fenced retail arm;

Or. en

**Amendment 288**

**Philippe De Backer**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Paragraph 11**

*Motion for a resolution*

11. Urges the Commission to ensure that where banks undertake trading activities, the risks and costs associated with those activities are borne by their trading arm and not by their ring-fenced retail arm;

*Amendment*

11. Urges the Commission to ensure that where banks undertake **particular trading risk type of** activities, the risks and costs associated with those activities are borne by their trading arm and not by their ring-fenced retail arm;

Or. en

**Amendment 289**

**Jean-Paul Gauzès**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Paragraph 11**

*Motion for a resolution*

11. Urges the Commission to ensure that where banks undertake trading activities, the risks and costs associated with those activities are borne by their trading arm and not by their ring-fenced retail arm;

*Amendment*

11. Urges the Commission to ensure that where banks undertake *speculative* trading activities, the risks and costs associated with those activities are borne by their trading arm and not by their ring-fenced retail arm;

Or. fr

**Amendment 290**  
**Astrid Lulling**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 11**

*Motion for a resolution*

11. Urges the Commission to ensure that where banks undertake trading activities, the risks and costs associated with those activities are borne by their trading arm and not by their ring-fenced *retail* arm;

*Amendment*

11. Urges the Commission to ensure that where banks undertake trading activities, the risks and costs associated with those activities are borne by their trading arm and not by their ring-fenced arm;

Or. en

**Amendment 291**  
**Markus Ferber**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 11 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***11a. Urges the Commission to take account, in its proposal, of the fact that a bank's retail arm must be allowed to conduct certain investment activities if they form part of its services provided for the real economy or serve to safeguard their own risk positions; urges the Commission to provide for suitable***

*derogations and to stipulate thresholds;*

Or. de

*Justification*

*In its report the High Level Group emphasised that not all investment activities need to be included in a separation of the investment arm from the retail arm, where this takes place. Therefore, activities which directly serve customers in the real economy should be allowed to be offered by the retail arm so that SMEs will still be able to benefit, even in rural areas, from what are for them essential services.*

**Amendment 292**

**Burkhard Balz**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Paragraph 11 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***11a. Urges the Commission to consider the need for retail and commercial banks to maintain certain investment banking activities in order to service the real economy or to mitigate own risk positions and to include in its considerations adequate thresholds or product-related exceptions;***

Or. en

**Amendment 293**

**Gunnar Hökmark, Krišjānis Kariņš**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Paragraph 12**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***12. Urges the Commission to ensure that separation results in:***

***deleted***

***(a) separate legal entities, with separate sources of funding for the bank's retail***

*and investment entities;*

*(b) limits on the extent to which the two entities are reliant on each other for funding and/or resources; in particular, there should be no legal basis for shifting capital and liquidity from ring-fenced entities to other entities in the group;*

*(c) the application of adequate, thorough and separate capital, leverage and liquidity rules to each entity, including separate balance sheets;*

*(d) net and gross large exposure limits for intra-group transactions between ring-fenced and non-ring-fenced activities, which are at least as strict as those for third-party exposure, including strict limits on the exposure of ring-fenced activities to the investment entity's riskier activities;*

Or. en

#### **Amendment 294**

**Wolf Klinz**

#### **Motion for a resolution**

#### **Paragraph 12**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

**12. Urges the Commission to ensure that separation results in:**

**deleted**

*(a) separate legal entities, with separate sources of funding for the bank's retail and investment entities;*

*(b) limits on the extent to which the two entities are reliant on each other for funding and/or resources; in particular, there should be no legal basis for shifting capital and liquidity from ring-fenced entities to other entities in the group;*

*(c) the application of adequate, thorough and separate capital, leverage and*

*liquidity rules to each entity, including separate balance sheets;*

*(d) net and gross large exposure limits for intra-group transactions between ring-fenced and non-ring-fenced activities, which are at least as strict as those for third-party exposure, including strict limits on the exposure of ring-fenced activities to the investment entity's riskier activities;*

Or. en

**Amendment 295**  
**Saïd El Khadraoui**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 12 – introductory part**

*Motion for a resolution*

12. Urges the Commission to ensure that separation results in:

*Amendment*

12. Urges the Commission to ensure that separation results in:

*(a) separate legal entities, with separate sources of funding for the bank's retail and investment entities;*

*(b) limits on the extent to which the two entities are reliant on each other for funding and/or resources; in particular, there should be no legal basis for shifting capital and liquidity between from ring-deposit-taking and investment banking entities to other entities in the group. Strict firewalls are required between individual business entities. The group can still take advantage of synergies and scale economies, including a common technology platform, but without unwanted financial contamination of the banking affiliates' balance sheet.*

*(c) the application of adequate, thorough and separate capital, leverage and liquidity rules to each entity, including separate balance sheets;*

*(d) net and gross large exposure limits for intra-group transactions between ring-fenced and non-ring-fenced activities the commercial banking entity and the trading / investment banking entity, which are at least as strict as those for third-party exposure, including strict limits on the exposure of ring-fenced activities to the investment entity's riskier activities*

Or. en

**Amendment 296**

**Olle Schmidt, Anne E. Jensen, Nils Torvalds**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Paragraph 12 – introductory part**

*Motion for a resolution*

12. Urges the Commission to ensure that separation results in:

*Amendment*

12. Urges the Commission to ensure that *in the event that the removal of impediments to resolution in accordance with Article 14 and 15 of the Recovery and Resolution Directive have been insufficient to achieve the objectives set out above, and where supervisors determine there are risky proprietary activities which are not a core activity for banks, separation of such activities* results in:

Or. en

**Amendment 297**

**Markus Ferber**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Paragraph 12 – introductory part**

*Motion for a resolution*

12. Urges the Commission to ensure that separation results in:

*Amendment*

12. Urges the Commission to ensure, *taking into account the legal structures which have evolved in the different*

*European banking models, that the separation of the investment arm – where this is necessary owing to its accounting for a significant share of the bank's turnover – results in:*

Or. de

**Amendment 298**  
**Herbert Dorfmann**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 12 – introductory part**

*Motion for a resolution*

12. Urges the Commission to ensure that separation results in:

*Amendment*

12. ***Considering the legal structure and the different European banking models*** urges the Commission to ensure, ***if the activities to be separated represent a significant share of the overall bank activity***, that separation results in:

Or. en

**Amendment 299**  
**Sylvie Goulard**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 12 – introductory part**

*Motion for a resolution*

12. Urges the Commission to ensure that separation ***results in***:

*Amendment*

12. Urges the Commission to ensure that ***any separation of certain high-risk activities that are not associated with the provision of client-related services***:

Or. en

**Amendment 300**  
**Burkhard Balz**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 12 – introductory part**

*Motion for a resolution*

12. Urges the Commission to ensure that separation **results in**:

*Amendment*

12. Urges the Commission to **respect the diversity of the European banking sector and to** ensure that **a potential** separation **model shall**:

Or. en

**Amendment 301**  
**Philippe De Backer**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 12 – introductory part**

*Motion for a resolution*

12. Urges the Commission to ensure that separation results in:

*Amendment*

12. Urges the Commission to ensure that **in the case of an obligatory** separation **this would** result in:

Or. en

**Amendment 302**  
**Jürgen Klute**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 12 – introductory part**

*Motion for a resolution*

12. Urges the Commission to ensure that separation results in:

*Amendment*

12. Urges the Commission to ensure that separation **at least** results in:

Or. en

**Amendment 303**  
**Sylvie Goulard**



**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 12 – subparagraph 1 (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

**(i) results in:**

Or. en

**Amendment 304**  
**Olle Schmidt, Anne E. Jensen, Nils Torvalds**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 12 – point a**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

(a) *separate legal* entities, with *separate* sources of funding for the bank's retail and investment entities;

(a) *functionally separate* entities, with *diverse* sources of funding for the bank's retail and investment entities, *physical and IT segregation and separate organisational and reporting lines with appropriate internal controls to prevent breaches*;

Or. en

**Amendment 305**  
**Syed Kamall**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 12 – point a**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

(a) separate legal entities, with separate sources of funding for the bank's retail and investment entities;

(a) separate legal entities, with separate sources of funding for the bank's retail and investment entities, *in order to ensure that the state guarantee and subsidy for the retail arm does not cross subsidise the investment entity*;

Or. en

**Amendment 306**  
**Jean-Paul Gauzès**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 12 – point a**

*Motion for a resolution*

(a) separate legal entities, with separate sources of funding for the bank's ***retail and investment*** entities;

*Amendment*

(a) separate legal entities, with separate sources of funding for the bank's entities ***engaged in economically important activities and its speculative trading entities***;

Or. fr

**Amendment 307**  
**Hans-Peter Martin**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 12 – point a**

*Motion for a resolution*

(a) separate legal entities, with separate sources of funding for the bank's retail and investment entities;

*Amendment*

(a) separate legal entities, with separate sources of funding for the bank's retail and investment entities, ***as well as separate management and accounting departments***;

Or. en

**Amendment 308**  
**Marianne Thyssen**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 12 – point a**

*Motion for a resolution*

(a) separate legal entities, with separate sources of funding for the bank's ***retail*** and

*Amendment*

(a) separate legal entities, with separate sources of funding for the bank's

investment entities;

*depository banking* and investment entities;

Or. nl

**Amendment 309**

**Philippe Lamberts**

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Motion for a resolution**

**Paragraph 12 – point a**

*Motion for a resolution*

(a) separate legal entities, with separate sources of funding for the bank's retail and *investment* entities;

*Amendment*

(a) separate legal entities, with separate sources of funding for the bank's retail and *proprietary market risk taking* entities;

Or. en

**Amendment 310**

**Burkhard Balz**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Paragraph 12 – point a**

*Motion for a resolution*

(a) separate legal entities, with separate sources of funding for the bank's retail and investment entities;

*Amendment*

(a) *ensure the viability of possible* separate legal entities, with separate sources of funding for the bank's retail and investment entities;

Or. en

**Amendment 311**

**Astrid Lulling**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Paragraph 12 – point a**

*Motion for a resolution*

(a) separate legal entities, with separate sources of funding for the bank's ***retail and investment*** entities;

*Amendment*

(a) separate legal entities, with separate sources of funding for the bank's ***ring-fenced and trading*** entities;

Or. en

**Amendment 312**  
**Sharon Bowles**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 12 – point a**

*Motion for a resolution*

(a) separate legal entities, with separate sources of funding for the bank's retail and investment entities;

*Amendment*

(a) separate legal entities, with separate sources of funding for the bank's retail and ***purely financial*** investment entities;

Or. en

**Amendment 313**  
**Jürgen Klute**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 12 – point a a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***(aa) rules to ensure that the executive and controlling bodies of these separate entities and their respective members act independently from each other and that members of the legal bodies of one entity cannot be members of the legal bodies of the other entity in the same group***

Or. en

*Justification*

*To prevent conflicts of interest, board members should only be responsible for one branch in*

*a group.*

**Amendment 314**  
**Marisa Matias**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 12 – point b**

*Motion for a resolution*

(b) ***limits on the extent to which the two entities are reliant on each other for funding and/or resources; in particular, there should be no legal basis for shifting capital and liquidity from ring-fenced entities to other entities in the group;***

*Amendment*

(b) the ***total separation of*** funding, in particular, ***a ban on the transfer of*** capital and liquidity from ring-fenced entities to other entities in the group;

Or. pt

**Amendment 315**  
**Burkhard Balz**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 12 – point b**

*Motion for a resolution*

(b) ***limits on*** the extent to which the two entities are reliant on each other for funding and/or resources; in particular, there should ***be no*** legal ***basis*** for shifting capital and liquidity ***from ring-fenced entities to other*** entities in the group;

*Amendment*

(b) ***not unnecessarily limit*** the extent to which the two entities are reliant on each other for funding and/or resources; in particular, there should ***not be any unnecessary*** legal ***obstacles*** for shifting capital and liquidity ***between separated*** entities in the group;

Or. en

**Amendment 316**  
**Arlene McCarthy**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 12 – point b**

*Motion for a resolution*

(b) limits on the extent to which the two entities are reliant on each other for funding and/or resources; in particular, there should be no legal basis for shifting capital and liquidity **from ring-fenced entities to other** entities **in** the group;

*Amendment*

(b) limits on the extent to which the two entities are reliant on each other for funding and/or resources; in particular, there should be no legal basis for shifting capital and liquidity **between deposit-taking and investment banking** entities **of** the group;

Or. en

**Amendment 317**

**Antolín Sánchez Presedo**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Paragraph 12 – point b**

*Motion for a resolution*

(b) limits on the extent to which the two entities are reliant on each other for funding and/or resources; in particular, there should be no legal basis for shifting capital and liquidity from **ring-fenced** entities to other entities in the group;

*Amendment*

(b) limits on the extent to which the two entities are reliant on each other for funding and/or resources; in particular, there should be no legal basis for shifting capital and liquidity from **retail** entities to other **non retail** entities in the group;

Or. en

**Amendment 318**

**Sylvie Goulard**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Paragraph 12 – point b**

*Motion for a resolution*

(b) limits on the extent to which the two entities are reliant on each other for funding and/or resources; in particular, there should be no legal basis for shifting capital and liquidity from ring-fenced entities to other entities in the group;

*Amendment*

(b) limits on the extent to which the two entities are reliant on each other for funding and/or resources; in particular, there should be no legal basis for **unduly and unnecessarily** shifting capital and liquidity from ring-fenced entities to other

entities in the group;

Or. en

#### **Amendment 319**

**Slawomir Nitras**

#### **Motion for a resolution**

#### **Paragraph 12 – point b**

##### *Motion for a resolution*

(b) limits on the extent to which the two entities are reliant on each other for funding and/or resources; in particular, there should be no legal basis for shifting capital and liquidity from ring-fenced entities to other entities in the group;

##### *Amendment*

(b) limits on the extent to which the two entities are reliant on each other for funding and/or resources; in particular, there should be no legal basis for shifting capital and liquidity from ring-fenced entities to other entities in the group, ***and vice versa***;

Or. pl

#### **Amendment 320**

**Philippe Lamberts**

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

#### **Motion for a resolution**

#### **Paragraph 12 – point b a (new)**

##### *Motion for a resolution*

##### *Amendment*

***(ba) Limits on the extent to which securitisation results in the expansion of unsustainable lending or investment in higher risk areas whether within or outside the group containing the originator;***

Or. en

#### **Amendment 321**

**Burkhard Balz**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 12 – point c**

*Motion for a resolution*

***(c) the application of adequate, thorough and separate capital, leverage and liquidity rules to each entity, including separate balance sheets;***

*Amendment*

***deleted***

Or. en

**Amendment 322**  
**Philippe Lamberts**  
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 12 – point c**

*Motion for a resolution*

(c) the application of adequate, thorough and separate capital, leverage and liquidity rules to each entity, including separate balance sheets;

*Amendment*

(c) the application of adequate, thorough and separate capital, leverage and liquidity rules to each entity ***appropriately calibrated to the business models of those entities***, including separate balance sheets;

Or. en

**Amendment 323**  
**Olle Schmidt, Anne E. Jensen, Nils Torvalds**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 12 – point c**

*Motion for a resolution*

(c) the application of adequate, thorough and separate capital, leverage and liquidity rules to each entity, including separate balance sheets;

*Amendment*

(c) the application of adequate, thorough and separate capital, leverage and liquidity rules to each entity ***not subject to consolidated supervision***, including separate balance sheets; ***or***



**Amendment 324**  
**Werner Langen**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 12 – point d**

*Motion for a resolution*

*(d) net and gross large exposure limits for intra-group transactions between ring-fenced and non-ring-fenced activities, which are at least as strict as those for third-party exposure, including strict limits on the exposure of ring-fenced activities to the investment entity's riskier activities;*

*Amendment*

*deleted*

**Amendment 325**  
**Markus Ferber**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 12 – point d**

*Motion for a resolution*

(d) net and gross large exposure limits for intra-group transactions between **ring-fenced and non-ring-fenced** activities, which are at least as strict as those for third-party exposure, including strict limits on the exposure of **ring-fenced activities** to the investment entity's riskier activities;

*Amendment*

(d) net and gross large exposure limits for intra-group transactions between **separated** activities, which are at least as strict as those for third-party exposure, including strict limits on the exposure of **the retail entity** to the investment entity's riskier activities **where the latter entity was earmarked for separation as a result of its significant share of the bank's turnover; the competent authorities of the Member States must be able, as set out in Article 389(2)(c) and (d) of the CRR, to exclude certain risks from the restriction within a group;**

*Justification*

*Art. 389 (2) (c) and (d) of the CRR enables Member States to exclude certain loans and exposures extended within groups such as savings banks and cooperative banks from the scope of application of the large exposure limit in Article 384(1). There are likely to be similar exceptions as a result of the particular structure of savings banks and cooperative banks in order to guarantee liquidity supply within the group.*

**Amendment 326****Philippe Lamberts**

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Motion for a resolution****Paragraph 12 – point d***Motion for a resolution*

(d) net and gross large exposure limits for intra-group transactions between ring-fenced and non-ring-fenced activities, which are at least as strict as those for third-party exposure, ***including*** strict limits on the exposure of ring-fenced activities to ***the investment entity's riskier activities***;

*Amendment*

(d) net and gross large exposure limits for intra-group transactions between ring-fenced and non-ring-fenced activities, which are at least as strict as those for third-party exposure, ***as well as*** strict limits on the exposure of ring-fenced activities to ***banks and shadow banks inside or outside the same group that are permitted to engage in proprietary market risk taking***;

**Amendment 327****Antolín Sánchez Presedo****Motion for a resolution****Paragraph 12 – point d***Motion for a resolution*

(d) net and gross large exposure limits for intra-group transactions between ***ring-fenced and non-ring-fenced*** activities, which are at least as strict as those for third-party exposure, including strict limits on the exposure of ***ring-fenced*** activities to the investment entity's riskier activities;

*Amendment*

(d) net and gross large exposure limits for intra-group transactions between ***insulated and protected activities and the rest of*** activities, which are at least as strict as those for third-party exposure, including strict limits on the exposure of ***the former*** activities to the investment entity's riskier

activities;

Or. en

#### **Amendment 328**

**Burkhard Balz**

#### **Motion for a resolution**

#### **Paragraph 12 – point d**

##### *Motion for a resolution*

(d) net and gross large exposure limits for intra-group transactions between ***ring-fenced and non-ring-fenced*** activities, which ***are at least*** as strict as those for third-party exposure, including ***strict*** limits on the exposure of ***ring-fenced*** activities to the investment entity's riskier activities;

##### *Amendment*

(d) ***not discriminate*** net and gross large exposure limits for intra-group transactions between ***possibly separated*** activities, which ***may be*** as strict as those for third-party exposure, including limits on the exposure of ***retail*** activities to the investment entity's riskier activities;

Or. en

#### **Amendment 329**

**Arlene McCarthy**

#### **Motion for a resolution**

#### **Paragraph 12 – point d**

##### *Motion for a resolution*

(d) net and gross large exposure limits for intra-group transactions between ***ring-fenced and non-ring-fenced*** activities, which are at least as strict as those for third-party exposure, including strict limits on the exposure of ***ring-fenced*** activities to the investment entity's riskier activities;

##### *Amendment*

(d) net and gross large exposure limits for intra-group transactions between ***deposit taking activities and investment/trading*** activities, which are at least as strict as those for third-party exposure, including strict limits on the exposure of ***deposit taking*** activities to the investment entity's riskier activities;

Or. en

**Amendment 330**  
**Slawomir Nitras**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 12 – point d**

*Motion for a resolution*

(d) net and gross large exposure limits for intra-group transactions between ring-fenced and non-ring-fenced activities, which are at least as strict as those for third-party exposure, including strict limits on the exposure of ring-fenced activities to the investment entity's riskier activities;

*Amendment*

(d) net and gross large exposure limits ***taking into account the operation of concentration limits*** for intra-group transactions between ring-fenced and non-ring-fenced activities, which are at least as strict as those for third-party exposure, including strict limits on the exposure of ring-fenced activities to the investment entity's riskier activities, ***so as to guarantee the market-oriented nature of such transactions***;

Or. pl

**Amendment 331**  
**Marianne Thyssen**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 12 – point d**

*Motion for a resolution*

(d) net and gross large exposure limits for intra-group transactions between ring-fenced and non-ring-fenced activities, which are at least as strict as those for third-party exposure, including strict limits on the exposure of ***ring-fenced*** activities to the investment entity's riskier activities;

*Amendment*

(d) net and gross large exposure limits for intra-group transactions between ring-fenced and non-ring-fenced activities, which are at least as strict as those for third-party exposure, including strict limits on the exposure of ***depository/lending*** activities to the ***ring-fenced*** investment entity's riskier activities;

Or. nl

**Amendment 332**  
**Jean-Paul Gauzès**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 12 – point d a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

*(da) clear-cut rules serving to determine which activities are to be considered economically important. In particular, as regards market-making, criteria and indicators need to be laid down, depending on whether or not there is a market-maker standing ready on the market at all times or on the size of the orders concerned in relation to the market and proceeding from the necessary exact quantitative reference points (time threshold for continuous operation on the market, bid-ask spread, etc.), which should be adjusted according to the particular financial instruments involved. Revenue from market-making should come from fees, commission, and bid-ask spreads, rather than being generated by position price trends. The methods for calculating traders' pay must not encourage risk-taking;*

Or. fr

**Amendment 333**

**Sylvie Goulard**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Paragraph 12 – point d a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

*(da) (ii) does not result in:*

*(a) increasing dependency on non-EU banks or unregulated sources of funding;*

*(b) increasing regulatory arbitrage (inside and outside the EU) and a global unlevel playing field;*

*(c) a discrepancy between overly regulated retail banks and lite-regulated investment banks;*

*(d) fragmentation of the internal market;*

**Amendment 334**  
**Marisa Matias**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 12 – point d a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

*(da) limits being placed on the possibility of risk transfer from entities engaged in retail activities to other entities, for example through debt securitisation;*

Or. pt

**Amendment 335**  
**Jean-Paul Gauzès, Alfredo Pallone**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 12 – point d b (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

*(db) increasing the uneven level playing field for market makers in Europe at the benefit of other jurisdictions;*

Or. en

**Amendment 336**  
**Sharon Bowles**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 12 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

*12a. Urges the commission to ensure that separation does not result in:*

*(a) a fragmentation of the single market, in particular it should not entail disproportionate adverse effects on the*

*whole or parts of the financial system in other Member States or of the EU as a whole forming or creating an obstacle to the functioning of the internal market or the free flow of capital;*

*(b) excessive operational or infrastructure costs that would be passed onto the customer or consumer or pose an entry barrier to having a basic bank account;*

*(c) becoming overly prescriptive;*

Or. en

**Amendment 337**  
**Gunnar Hökmark**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 12 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

*12a. Stresses the crucially important role of banks as market makers in order to uphold liquidity and, thereby, reduce the funding costs for firms, public authorities and sovereigns; reminds of the significant technical difficulties in defining what is a "pure" market making activity; is concerned that with an inferior definition of market making activities, structural separation would have considerably detrimental effect to the smooth functioning of capital markets;*

Or. en

**Amendment 338**  
**Jean-Paul Gauzès**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 12 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***12a. Urges the Commission to consider the alternative approach resulting from the application of the future Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, whereby structural separation can result from the resolvability assessment of the firm;***

Or. en