POLICY BRIEFING

Strasbourg-Lisbon-Chicago: NATO quo vadis?

Abstract

The past three summits of NATO in Strasbourg / Kehl (2009), Lisbon (2010) and Chicago (2012) have addressed rather turbulent developments in the alliance's strategic environment, requiring it to adapt to new situations faster than ever before. NATO's structures have been revised several times, and from the 16 headquarters with 20,000 staff in the 1990s only 7 will survive, with less than 9,000 staff. Territorial defence, once key element of NATO's defence posture, will mainly consist of missile and cyber defence, and - perhaps - critical infrastructure protection. So far, NATO has become much more focused on sustainable high-end operations abroad, but the perspective of more such action is rather unlikely. With the financial crisis and the concentration of the US on its security interests on their pacific coast, the European allies are required to do more for European security. Previous such attempts in the 1990s 'drowned' during the war on terror; NATO and the EU now need to emerge in a true and mutually benefiting cooperation. With the arrival of the Lisbon treaty abolishing the pillar divides between the security and defence policy and the other Union policies, the EU can play its security role thoroughly. The Treaty on European Union requires the 'progressive framing of common Union defence policy'. This process, however, is all but well underway. It is unclear if the forthcoming European Council on defence matters in December 2013 will put this issue on its strategic agenda. The model of NATO, on which the EU treaties are based since Maastricht and Amsterdam, refers to a NATO that has significantly changed since. This is why reflecting on this matter becomes more important than ever before.
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1. Introduction

The article 42 (7) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) refers to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) as the organisation which ‘for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation’.

The paragraph 2 of that same article stipulates that the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the European Union (EU) ‘shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member states and shall respect the obligations of certain Member states, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework’.

It is noteworthy, that for collective defence the article 42 (7) TEU is strict: it refers to all Member States which are signatories of both treaties, assigns the lead in collective defence to NATO, and requires the EU’s security and defence policy to comply. For common defence, however, the article 42(2) TEU is less strict. It only refers to ‘the obligations of certain Members, which see their common defence realised’ in NATO.

In both paragraphs a third element is added: that certain EU Member States conduct a specific security and defence policy (e.g. neutrality, independent nuclear deterrence), which could differ from the common policies conducted in the EU and NATO frameworks.

This means, that some Member States see their common defence realised through the collective defence established in the NATO framework, and that they therefore might not necessarily need to commit to a common defence in the EU framework. However, for some members of both organisations, and those states, members of the EU but not of NATO, a common Union defence could be an option. Its establishment would, however, require the consent of all EU Member States.

The Treaty on European Union requires the ‘progressive framing of common Union defence policy’. This process, however, is all but well underway. It is unclear if the forthcoming European Council on defence matters in December 2013 will put this issue on its strategic agenda. The role model of NATO, on which the EU treaties are being built since Maastricht and Amsterdam, refers to a NATO that has significantly changed. Such reflections become more relevant than ever before.
2. 1991-1999: Enlargement, cooperation and peacemaking

The 1990s saw NATO’s large scale engagements on the Balkans. These ‘out of area’ engagements also uncovered weaknesses as NATO’s structures where not tuned to deployed operations.

The 1990s are characterised by the beginning of the enlargement of NATO with east Germany integrating to the NATO structures in 1995 after the withdrawal of Russian forces in late Summer 1994, and Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary then joining in 1999. In 1994 the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme was established, and the relations with Russia were put on a new basis in May 1997.

In June 1992 the Alliance declared its readiness to support ‘on a case-by-case basis […] peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), including by making available Alliance resources and expertise’¹. This declaration paved the way for the NATO operations outside its members’ territories (‘out-of-area’), namely its operations in the Balkans.

In article 6 of the Washington treaty, the NATO area is defined as

- the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America;
- the territory of or the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
- any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force;
- the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

Any operation outside these limitations is ‘out of area’. Figure 1 shows such NATO operations ‘out of area’ since the end of the Cold War.

¹ http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c920604a.htm
Figure 1: NATO operations 'out of area' since the end of the Cold War

The first UN mandated operation was PROVIDE PROMISE, the humanitarian relief airlift into Sarajevo, complemented by SHARP GUARD, the naval blockade in the Adriatic, and SKY MONITOR / DENY FLIGHT, the no-fly-zone enforcement over Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), all starting in 1992.

PROVIDE PROMISE transferred 160 000 tons of supplies into Sarajevo and evacuated 1 300 wounded people in close to 13 000 air sorties provided by 21 nations over three and a half years.

Under SHARP GUARD close to 75 000 ships were monitored in the Adriatic sea, of which almost 6 000 were boarded and then 1 500 inspected in port. A dozen blockade runners carrying arms and military supplies were stopped. The twelve participating navies delivered close to 20 000 sea days of patrols and 14 000 surveillance aircraft sorties over three and a half years.

The operations SKY MONITOR and DENY FLIGHT consisted of more than 100 000 sorties, including 27 000 combat sorties, flown by 12 nations’ aircrafts over three years.

They were followed by the operation DELIBERATE FORCE in August and September 1995, a response to the massacres in Srebrenica and the
mortar attacks on Markale in the weeks before. This air campaign with 3 500 sorties on 330 targets involved 400 aircrafts from 15 nations. It was key to the Dayton peace talks, which ended the Bosnian War in November of the same year.

One month later the NATO-led peace Implementation Force (IFOR) deployed the first of its 57 000 troops on the ground, making IFOR the first large scale Allied ground forces operation outside allied nations' territories. IFOR encompassed 16 NATO and 14 PfP nations, and included Russia and Ukraine.

The NATO Stabilisation Force (SFOR) succeeded IFOR as from December 1996, initially reducing the force strength to 30 000. This force was gradually reduced as the security situation improved in BiH to reach 7 000 troops by the end of 2004, when the operation was handed over to the European Union (EUFOR ALTHEA, still running). A total of 26 Allied nations – among those most new NATO members – participated together with 12 PfP and associated nations.

The last engagement of NATO on the Balkans started at the end of the decade in Kosovo when the guerrilla conflict between the security forces of the federal government of the Republic of Yugoslavia and the ethnic Albanian Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) gained momentum at the beginning of 1998.

After the breakdown of the Rambouillet peace talks, NATO started its air campaign ALLIED FORCE in late March 1999, which ended in June of the same year, when the Yugoslav armed forces started withdrawing from Kosovo. This air campaign delivered a total of 38 000 sorties over a period of 78 days, a quarter of them strike sorties, involving 13 NATO nations. This operation was not UN mandated and its justification by its supporters as a humanitarian war yielded many critics.

After the end of the air campaign, and under a UN mandate, the first elements of the NATO-led international peacekeeping force KFOR (Kosovo Force) deployed to Kosovo in mid June 1999. KFOR had an initial strength of 50 000 troops. Since its beginning more than 40 nations have contributed to KFOR. At present around 5 000 troops are deployed by 31 nations.

One of the key features of KFOR is that since its deployment to Kosovo it had only European Commanders, and – with the single exception of Norway – Generals from EU Member States. The same applies to the force structure: most of the forces are contributed by EU Member States, and commanded by their staff officers, with the US being the second or third biggest force provider only.

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2 DE seven times, IT four times, FR three times, ES and UK one time each.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Mandate</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PROVIDE PROMISE</td>
<td>humanitarian relief airlift</td>
<td>Sarajevo</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>1992-1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKY MONITOR / DENY FLIGHT</td>
<td>no fly zone enforcement</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>1992-1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DELIBERATE FORCE</td>
<td>air to ground campaign</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>August-September 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFOR / SFOR</td>
<td>peace implementation / stabilisation force</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>1995-2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALLIED FORCE</td>
<td>air to ground campaign</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td></td>
<td>March-June 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>peace keeping force</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>UN</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR</td>
<td>anti terror / WMD proliferation</td>
<td>Mediterranean Sea</td>
<td>Washington Treaty, Article 5</td>
<td>since 2001</td>
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<td>ISAF</td>
<td>security assistance force</td>
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<td>UN</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALLIED PROVIDER</td>
<td>protection of the vessels of the world food programme</td>
<td>off the cost at the Horn of Africa</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>October-December 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCEAN SHIELD</td>
<td>anti piracy operation</td>
<td>off the cost at the Horn of Africa</td>
<td>in line with relevant UN Security Council Resolutions</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO assistance to the African Union</td>
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<td>NTM-I</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIFIED PROTECTOR</td>
<td>arms embargo, no-fly-zone, actions to protect civilians from attack or the threat of attack</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>March-October 2011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The NATO engagement in the Balkans successfully ended the Bosnian and Kosovo wars. Together with the complementary and follow-on actions by the EU, peace, stability and membership were brought to some of the states that emerged from the collapse of former Yugoslavia. First Slovenia and then Croatia became NATO and EU members. However, for the remaining countries full stability, NATO and EU memberships are yet to be achieved.

NATO sees itself as a collective security and as a political alliance. In the Balkans it did successfully play both roles only during and around the violent phase of the conflicts. Post conflict, its role is mainly geared towards membership - a more comprehensive political role is not visible.

 Nonetheless, much of what was anticipated in the Alliance’s new strategic concept of 1991 actually happened in the 1990s. At the dawn of the new millennium:

- The Cold War force strengths and costs were massively reduced, the peace dividend started to materialise, and important arms control advances were made;
- NATO’s enlargement and partnership programmes were well underway and its relation to Russia was put on a new footing;
- NATO had successfully conducted several parallel large scale peace making and peacekeeping operations out of area, and
- European allies were taking more responsibilities and were sharing a larger operational burden, with many non-NATO countries contributing to the efforts.

However, the NATO-EU cooperation on the ground has not met the ambitions of the 1991 strategic concept, and it has certainly not fostered a sustainable Europeanisation of the Alliance, actually an objective that both organisations pursue.

### 3. The strategic concept 1999: Pre-empting transatlantic divide

The Alliance’s Strategic Concept of 24 April 1999 confirms the achieved. It states that the ‘developments in recent years have been generally positive, but uncertainties and risks remain which can develop into acute crises’ and identifies ‘the appearance of complex new risks to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability, including oppression, ethnic conflict, economic distress, the collapse of political order, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction’, and that ‘the Alliance does not consider itself to be any country’s adversary’.

In many aspects the 1999 concept is an evolution of the 1991 version. However, there are areas that need deeper reflection. To that end, the

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3 Prepared and endorsed under Javier Solana’s term as NATO Secretary General.
1999 strategic concept:

- adds crisis management and working with partners to the Alliances fundamental security tasks whilst removing the task of preserving a strategic balance within Europe;
- reiterates at several instances the need of a strong transatlantic link and that the 'security of Europe and that of North America are indivisible';
- emphasises on the importance to maintain military capabilities, in particular those for crisis management, and on the need of preserving NATO's structures and procedures as well as on the willingness 'to act collectively in the common defence';
- reiterates on and underlines the employability of NATO forces outside Allied territory, including the notions of rapid deployability and sustainability of forces; introduces the concept of civil-military cooperation;
- compared to the 1991 concept emphasises stronger on security risks like terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or trafficking of all kinds;
- states in particular that the 'principal non-proliferation goal of the Alliance and its members is to prevent proliferation from occurring or, should it occur, to reverse it through diplomatic means'; under the 'Alliance's Force Posture' headline the 1999 concept also refers to deployable capabilities for dealing with proliferation risks, and to missile defence as a remedy;
- links the notion of 'multinational forces' to rapid deployment only; in the 1991 concept it still linked to both 'collective defence arrangements' and 'reaction forces'; in the 1999 concept the multinational forces were still 'complementing national commitments to NATO' in general; this is now restricted to 'the Allies concerned' only;
- reiterates on the developing European Security and Defence Identity which evolved rapidly at the end of the 1990s, but totally removing the notion of a 'European Pillar' of NATO which was still present in the 1991 concept - the EU treaty of Amsterdam which featured the 'progressive framing of a common defence policy' entered into force on 01/05/1999, just one week after NATO's 1999 strategic concept was endorsed;
- emphasises on the Western European Union (WEU) as partner in defence matters instead, and on the European Union (EU) 'when appropriate' only - the EU and the WEU decided to dismantle the WEU and to integrate it into the EU framework at the EU's Cologne Summit in June 1999.
The 1999 strategic concept tries to preserve the Alliance's purpose and unity, against the backdrop of the loss of the potential enemy - the end of the Soviet Union and the decline of Russia where yet to come in 1991 - as well as a growing transatlantic divide as regards military capabilities, geopolitical vision and engagement. The unity of the Alliance was further challenged by a European defence identity developing outside NATO in the second half of the 1990s. Some of the future challenges identified in the 1999 concept materialised in the following years - even though they materialised in a different way than the strategic concept anticipates.

4. **1999-2009: War on terror & fighting the proliferation weapons of mass destruction**

At the beginning of the new millennium NATO was still active on the Balkans with KFOR and SFOR, and was preparing to bring the new members from Eastern and South Eastern Europe and from the Balkans on board. From 1999 to early 2001 the recurring topics of the agenda of the Ministerial Meetings of the North Atlantic Council were typically the Balkans and South-Eastern Europe, NATO-EU relations, security challenges of the 21st century, defence capabilities, relations with Russia and Ukraine, enlargement, missile defence.

After the terrorist attack in New York in September 2001 the North Atlantic Council agreed for the first and sole time in NATO's history 'that, if it was determined that the attack was directed from abroad, it should be regarded as being covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty in other words that this attack on the United States was an attack upon all the Allies'.

As a first reaction NATO launched the naval operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR in the Mediterranean which focuses since October 2001 on detecting and deterring terrorist activity, and on preventing the movement of terrorists or weapons of mass destruction. A total of 15 Allied and 5 non-NATO navies have so far participated in the operation. It is building on NATO's two standing maritime groups. More than 100 000 ship movements have been monitored since, 480 ships escorted and 100 ships boarded. The operation is still running.

However, the bulk of the activities of the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan from October 2001 (Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF) and in Iraq from March 2003 (Operation Iraqi Freedom, OIF) are commanded by the United States Central Command in Tampa/Florida, but not by any element of the NATO command structure. OEF is still running. It also includes activities at the Horn of Africa and the Philippines since 2002, and

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4 [http://www.nato.int/docu/comm.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/comm.htm)
the Sahel region since 2012. OIF ended in December 2011. It involved about 40 countries providing 300,000 invasion and up to 176,000 stabilisation troops.

In December 2001 the UN Security Council mandated the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)\(^8\) to oversee the security in Afghanistan and to train its national army. Initially, ISAF only secured the Kabul area whereas in the rest of the country the combat action was conducted under OEF. ISAF is still running, with 49 nations participating providing more than 110,000 troops.

From 2001 to 2003 ISAF was commanded by a lead nation - which also provided the majority of the security assistance forces - on a rotating base, with a change in command every 6 months. In August 2003 NATO took over the leadership of ISAF and assumes it until today. Since June 2008 ISAF and since October 2008 also the US troops in Afghanistan (under OEF) are under a single command, always with a US General in this double hatted (NATO / US) function.

During the Iraq crisis the Alliance entered into a major crisis: in February 2003 the US endeavoured to obtain a UN mandate for an intervention in Iraq, supported by the UK. Two other NATO allies, France and Germany, objected to such a mandate in the UN Security Council. While preparing for the invasion of Iraq by the US led coalition of the willing, NATO intended to deploy inter alia Patriot surface to air missiles to Turkey. This was however, initially vetoed by France, Belgium and Germany, but finally a short deployment took place\(^9\).

In the second half of the decade NATO launched two more operations. The first was the air-lift and training support to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)\(^10\) from June 2005 to December 2007. NATO coordinated the transport of 31,500 AMIS troops and personnel, of which 5,000 were moved directly by Allies. The second was OCEAN SHIELD\(^11\) off the Horn of Africa in August 2009, complementing the EU Operation ATALANTA\(^12\).

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9. [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_20285.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_20285.htm);
11. [http://www.mc.nato.int/ops/Pages/OOS.aspx](http://www.mc.nato.int/ops/Pages/OOS.aspx)
17. [http://bmd.ncia.nato.int/Pages/default.aspx](http://bmd.ncia.nato.int/Pages/default.aspx)
21. [http://www.aco.nato.int/page142085426.aspx](http://www.aco.nato.int/page142085426.aspx)
whilst focusing on at-sea counter-piracy operations. OCEAN SHIELD is still running based mainly on US and UK units, so far complemented by a further 13 NATO and 14 non-NATO nations’ contributions. In addition, NATO conducted a training mission in Iraq (NTM-I)\textsuperscript{13} from 2004 until 2011, helping to develop Iraqi security forces training structures and institutions.

Furthermore, in September 2002, the establishment of a NATO Response Force (NRF) was proposed, which should be a ‘coherent, high-readiness, joint, multinational force package’ which would be ‘technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable’\textsuperscript{14}. The full operational capability of the Corps sized NRF (25 000 troops, commanded by a Lieutenant-General) was declared in November 2006. Forces are provided by NATO members on a rotating base.

Once activated it would be able to sustain an operation of up to 30 days. So far the NRF has not been used as such. However, force elements from the NRF have been involved in the Athens Olympic Games and the Afghan Elections in 2004, and in humanitarian relief in Pakistan in 2005\textsuperscript{15}. Main tasks of the NRF are:

- Contributing to the preservation of territorial integrity, to the protection of critical infrastructure and to security operations; Embargo, peace support and disaster relief operations;
- Demonstration of force, and serving as initial entry force (i.e. preceding a larger force).

The NRF is also instrumental to improve the interoperability between the NATO nations on the battlefield, and to support transformation into modern, versatile and deployable forces. Throughout the decade, NATO launched several more major defence initiatives:

- Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD)\textsuperscript{16} started with initial studies in 2001. In September 2005 the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) programme was launched, aimed at developing a missile defence capability for the protection of deployed forces\textsuperscript{17}. The NATO BMD capability will gradually become operational starting 2010.
- Already in the 1990s the Alliance planned to acquire ‘a minimum essential NATO-owned and operated AGS (Allied Ground Surveillance) core capability, supplemented by interoperable national assets’\textsuperscript{18}. However, serious work on AGS started in 2001 only, and the programme Memorandum of Understanding was only signed in 2009. AGS is planned to be operational by 2017.
- NATO significantly improved the airlift capabilities available to the Alliance through two initiatives:
  - the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS)\textsuperscript{19} as from 2003. SALIS builds on two permanently rented An-124-100 transport aircrafts, capable of carrying a payload of 150 tons, and
o the Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC)\textsuperscript{20} as from 2006. SAC builds on three C-17 airlifters, capable of carrying a payload of 77 tons.

Until the end of the first decade of the 21st century NATO has conducted two major long term land operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan, two smaller long term naval operations in the Mediterranean and at the Horn of Africa, and one smaller support operation in Darfur. It also conducts activities within its collective defence efforts, notably air policing since March 2004\textsuperscript{21} (over the Baltic States, Slovenia, and Albania), as well as the building up and running of the NRF since 2002 - with BMD, AGS, SALIS and SAC major capability shortfalls, identified in the previous decade, have been addressed. A total of nine new members joined NATO: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia in 2004, and then Albania and Croatia in 2009. In the same year France returned to full NATO membership.

5. **The strategic concept 2010: A leaner NATO in a globalised world**

The strategic concept adopted at the Lisbon summit in November 2010\textsuperscript{22} and the decisions to restructure NATO at the Strasbourg / Kehl summit in April 2009 mark a significant turn towards a leaner NATO. Already, the preface of the strategic concept underlines the changes and features:

- collective defence against new threats to the safety of the citizens,
- crisis management, post-conflict stabilisation and working with the UN and the EU as key partners,
- political engagement and burden sharing with partners around the world.

It also confirms nuclear disarmament, enlargement as well as its own transformation and reform as strategic objectives of the Alliance.

The 2010 concept puts cyber and energy security as well as the access to global commons more in the focus of NATO’s strategy as well as technological developments that could impede the use of surveillance and communications capabilities, or the access to space.

The concept confirms NATO’s defence and deterrence posture including nuclear deterrence and ballistic missile defence. It adds under ‘emerging security challenges’ the development of its capabilities in cyber defence, critical infrastructure protection, energy security and the fight against international terrorism to NATO’s collective defence portfolio.

The 2010 strategic concept emphasises security through crisis management, which includes crisis prevention, post-conflict stabilisation and support for reconstruction. It reflects a more advanced understanding of NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive political, civilian and military

\textsuperscript{22} Prepared and endorsed under Fogh Anders Rasmussen’s term as NATO Secretary General.
approach in crisis management in international collaboration. This includes improving the gathering and sharing of intelligence, the development of a civilian NATO crisis management capability, and the capacity of integrated civil-military planning.

The concept features arms control and disarmament, the open door policy (NATO enlargement), worldwide partnerships, and the relationships with the UN, the EU, and Russia.

Reform and transformation of NATO remain a key strategic objective of the Alliance. The strategic concept emphasises on the deployability and operational sustainability of forces, on joint and common capabilities, and on capability modernisation.

Under the new strategic concept, the command and control structure moves from 16 headquarters (HQ) and 20 000 staff in the 1990s to 7 HQ and 8 800 staff after 2010 (refer to Table 2 below). About 2 000 staff serve in the AWACS and future AGS units, and further staff provides essential deployable communications capabilities, leaving only some margin for further downsizing without loss of capability.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Headquarters</th>
<th>Staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Until 1999</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2003</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2010</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Since 2010</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8 800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NATO

6. The new decade: Transformation and the end of the free ride

In March 2011 NATO started its operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR, the UN mandated intervention in Libya. France and the UK took the lead and acted outside NATO for a short initial period, and with significant US support. However, with the coalition growing and the US not taking the lead, only NATO had the necessary command and control capability to conduct such a major operation. UNIFIED PROTECTOR ended in October 2011. The NATO led coalition comprised 14 NATO members and 4 other

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23 Airborne Warning and Control System.
25 [http://www.defenceviewpoints.co.uk/military-operations/reflections-on-op-unified-protector](http://www.defenceviewpoints.co.uk/military-operations/reflections-on-op-unified-protector)
countries.

Since January 2013, NATO has deployed air borne early warning, theatre ballistic missile and air defence capabilities to the Syrian-Turkish border to prevent a spill over of the Syrian civil war into Turkey\textsuperscript{26}.

In his well known speech in June 2011 the then US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates identified four major issues that the Alliance has to address in the future\textsuperscript{27}:

- the post ISAF transition in Afghanistan;
- dealing with NATO's serious capability gaps;
- addressing NATO's institutional shortcomings, both identified through operation Unified Protector;
- the need to revisit the balance between the US and the European engagement in NATO, often referred to as a 'the end of the free ride'.

He underlines the political and the military necessity of 'fixing these shortcomings if the transatlantic security alliance is going to be viable going forward'.

A good year later, at the Chicago Summit May 2012, the Allies confirmed to continue their engagement in Afghanistan in a post ISAF mission\textsuperscript{28} and launched inter alia the SMART DEFENCE and CONNECTED FORCES initiatives to improve capabilities\textsuperscript{29}.

Usually cited as examples for SMART DEFENCE are strategic airlift (SALIS and SAC), reconnaissance and surveillance (AWCS and AGS), or logistics (MCCE\textsuperscript{30} and MLCC\textsuperscript{31}), but also defence specific arrangements like the Franco-British defence agreement or the Dutch-Belgian naval cooperation. There is, however, 'no shortage of valid reasons, why Smart Defence can ultimately be expected not to deliver its promises\textsuperscript{32}. This fear is nourished by the fact, that many Smart Defence examples concern initiatives, that are not new or which have not a significant cost improvement effect - the latter being essential for freeing resources for the further transformation of the armed forces and their adaption to the challenges ahead.

The Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) aims at coping with the expected reduction in experience from operational engagements once majority of

\textsuperscript{26} http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_92140.htm
\textsuperscript{27} http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1581
\textsuperscript{28} http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87595.htm
\textsuperscript{29} http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87594.htm
\textsuperscript{30} Movement Coordination Centre Europe, https://www.mcce-mil.com/Pages/default.aspx
\textsuperscript{31} Multinational Logistics Coordination Centre, http://www.mlcc-home.cz/index.html
\textsuperscript{33} http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_98527.htm
\textsuperscript{34} http://www.nshq.nato.int/nshq/
forces will have withdrawn from Afghanistan after 2014. Key objective is to maintain a high level of operational preparedness, of capability and interoperability through ‘expanded education and training, increased exercises and the better use of technology’33. One key element of the CFI will be the participation to the NATO Response Force (NRF), the other the newly created NATO Special Operations Headquarters34 located at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons (Belgium).

New in this clarity in the ‘Deterrence and Defence Posture Review’35 for NATO’s conventional forces the Chicago Summit:

- declares that ‘the bulk of the conventional capabilities that […] will be available in the future for Alliance operations are provided by the Allies individually’. That this requires the Allies to ‘provide adequate resources for their military forces’, and continues that such forces need to have ‘the required characteristics, notwithstanding […] financial difficulties’;

- calls for ‘a new conceptual approach, one that places a premium on the identification and pursuit of priorities, multinational cooperation, and specialisation as appropriate, and on increased efforts to ensure that the Allies […] are interoperable’;

- states that it will be important for ‘NATO and the European Union to cooperate more fully in capability development as agreed, to avoid unnecessary duplication and maximise cost-effectiveness’.

7. NATO, quo vadis?

Today, many voice concerns about the future of NATO and of European defence in general. Most European NATO allies do not manage to invest 2 % of their GDP in defence. And even where this happens, the capabilities yielded might not necessarily meet future requirements - aircraft carriers and air defence frigates to fight pirates, terrorists and cyber threats - or lead to ‘opera’ armed forces where most of the defence expenditure is for personnel, and for maintenance of obsolete material.

Table 3 shows the defence expenditure of all European NATO members from 1970 to 2010 in constant 2005 USD36. Since the adoption of the ‘flexible response’ strategic concept in 1967 which foresaw a gradual mixture of conventional and nuclear answers to an aggression - the annual expenditure doubled from the early 1970s until the fall of the Berlin wall.

Since then, defence expenditure by the European NATO members has been stable between 258 and 275 billion 2005 USD. The 'peace dividend' between 1990 and 2010 is thus about 15 % of the defence expenditure

35 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87597.htm
36 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49198.htm
and the European NATO members invest the most in conventional forces.

Table 3:
European NATO allies defence expenditure 1970-2010

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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Five-year averages in 2005 constant USD, period starting with the year indicated.

Source: NATO

In the early 1970s the expenditure of France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom amounted for almost 90% of the total European NATO defence expenditure. This share was reduced to close to 75% until 2010, which is inter alia due to the enlargements of NATO, but also owing to the retirement of Cold War capabilities, including those for nuclear deterrence.

Thus, the overall defence expenditure has seen a 15% decrease since the end of the Cold War, and the major European investors in the collective defence in the past continue to shoulder a large part of the burden. Many new NATO members entered the scene and added their capabilities and investments, some of which - e.g. Spain and Poland - now reach and exceed those made by longer term members.

And nonetheless: none of the European NATO allies is able to sustain higher demand campaigns alone or even in smaller groups, without recourse to NATO and US capabilities.

Table 4 might hint at an element of answer. It shows the changes in the balance of the share of the defence expenditure categories equipment, infrastructure, personnel and other - i.e. operations and maintenance expenditure, other R&D expenditure (i.e. not linked to equipment, infrastructure or personnel), and other types of expenditures not allocated elsewhere.

Table 4:
Change in the balance of the shares of defence expenditure categories.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Infrastructure</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Other*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>-1 (16)</td>
<td>-2 (9)</td>
<td>+5 (55)</td>
<td>-2 (25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES (from 1990)</td>
<td>+9 (21)</td>
<td>+2 (9)</td>
<td>-10 (55)</td>
<td>+1 (22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR (from 2000)</td>
<td>+2 (9)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>-2 (56)</td>
<td>0 (17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>-4 (11)</td>
<td>+1 (1)</td>
<td>+13 (75)</td>
<td>-8 (13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>0 (18)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>-12 (49)</td>
<td>+12 (30)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

37 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49608.htm
UK | 0 (22) | 0 (2) | -6 (39) | +6 (37)


Example: Germany (DE) - the equipment expenditure share was 17% in average during 1975-1979 and is 16% in average during 2005-2009. It thus changed by -1%.

Source: NATO38

Even though the individual analysis might also be interesting as such, the overall picture shows - few similarities.

The investment decisions made by six key NATO allies as a reaction to the end of the Cold War and the changes in the world's security situation neither hints at a common vision nor does it reveal a common approach - even though the strategic analysis is shared - since 4. April 1949.

It should therefore be expected that - without changing the conditions for their implementation - any of the future strategic concepts of NATO will have only a marginal influence on member states' defence investment behaviours. Those will be driven in their vast majority by purely national considerations, even though some of those might have recourse to NATO's strategic guidance for justification or as a reference.

NATO's strategic concept will continue to evolve and to drive the changes of NATO as an international organisation and as a service provider for capabilities. They will form a smarter NATO, but might not help too much working towards a smarter and more collective defence. With the envisaged changes in NATO's structures and the significant reductions in staff programmed by the latest strategic review, NATO will have to work hard to find its new balance, soon.

In the domain of operations, the post-ISAF mission, KFOR and OCEAN SHIELD will remain active in the near future, and the support to AMIS could increase. Collective defence will mainly focus on cyber and missile defence in the nearer future.

With the end of the ISAF as a deployed high demand real life operation, the participation in the NATO response force will become a major driver for preserving readiness, as well as improving interoperability and connectivity of the Allied forces. The command and control structures will become much leaner, requiring NATO to concentrate on essential tasks and capabilities.

NATO enlargement will continue, even though the necessary (political)

38 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49608.htm
conditions are not met in all cases. Partnerships with Russia and Ukraine, as well as with countries participating in the Mediterranean Dialogue\textsuperscript{39} and in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative\textsuperscript{40} will continue.

The US pivot to the Asia/Pacific region could be understood as leaving European regional security issues to the Europeans, supporting them mainly through arrangements in the NATO framework. The US will continue to lead with words, but not necessarily follow with means. Managing European security under these circumstances would require the other European NATO allies to converge to a more streamlined position - which is a true challenge for them.

The cooperation with the EU will also be a key aspect of NATO's future. NATO has handed over one operation to the EU (in BiH), and cooperates with EU missions and operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan and at the Horn of Africa. However, a common comprehensive approach to European, Euro-Atlantic and international security is still missing. For the NATO, this might be a key element to prevent a growing Atlantic divide in the alliance. For the EU, building this relationship is a treaty requirement, endorsed by all EU Member States, and enshrined in the article 42 of the Treaty on European Union.

In a globalised world in times of financial austerity, for both organisations true and mutual cooperation is also a question of credibility. There is no 'either - or' anymore: both organisations need to make sure together that the public opinion does not turn one day to a 'neither - nor'.

\textsuperscript{39} http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52927.htm
\textsuperscript{40} http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52956.htm