



**DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES**  
**POLICY DEPARTMENT**



**TOWARDS AN EU  
PEACEBUILDING  
STRATEGY?**

**AFET**

DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES OF THE UNION

**DIRECTORATE B**

POLICY DEPARTMENT

STANDARD BRIEFING

**TOWARDS AN EU PEACEBUILDING STRATEGY?  
EU CIVILIAN COORDINATION IN PEACEBUILDING  
AND THE EFFECTS OF THE LISBON TREATY**

**Abstract**

The Lisbon Treaty (LT) has been designed to improve the coherence of the Union's external action. Whilst peacebuilding, as HR Ashton has said in the European Parliament, is central to what the EU does externally, it is not spelled out in a clear policy statement what this means. The result is that the means that are principally available within the Union are not mainstreamed towards peacebuilding. If the EU is to play a role as an actor in international peacebuilding, a peacebuilding strategy should be set up. Such a strategy would seek to overcome both the conceptual diversity and the institutional fragmentation in view of coordinating the diverse instruments, providing for the appropriate resources and capabilities, and assuring their implementation.

This study was requested by the European Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs.

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Lisbon Treaty (LT) has been designed to improve the coherence of the Union's external action. Whilst peacebuilding, as HR Ashton has said in the European Parliament, is central to what the EU does externally, it is not spelled out in a clear policy statement what this means. The result is that the means that are principally available within the Union are not mainstreamed towards peacebuilding. If the EU is to play a role as an actor in international peacebuilding, a peacebuilding strategy should be set up. Such a strategy would seek to overcome both the conceptual diversity and the institutional fragmentation in view of coordinating the diverse instruments, providing for the appropriate resources and capabilities, and assuring their implementation.

Assuming that peacebuilding is a central aim of the EU, developing a common multidimensional strategy that welds together the wide range of potential EU responses into one overarching approach to peacebuilding is a moral responsibility. Lessons learned from EU and UN missions have revealed the negative impact that a lack of coordination at the strategic level has on achieving long-term peace on the ground, as well as for the individuals and their societies. In the worst case, the whole mission can be put at risk.

Better peacebuilding cannot be achieved by simply changing institutional settings and administrative procedures at the level of the HR or the European External Action Service (EEAS). Conversely, the institutional re-wiring has to be informed by a respective strategic vision and mandated by a decision at the highest possible level. Such a mandate would help bind together all the actors that strive to achieve this aim. Moreover, besides potentially enhancing efficiency, an overall strategy can also support the legitimacy of international bureaucracies – like the EEAS – to act as external actor in complex conflicts. It also offers an important yardstick to measure the progress of the EEAS in delivering on its peacebuilding mandate. Therefore, a strategy is a necessary element to allow for a positive audit of the EEAS and by those exerting oversight.

The EU should use this once-in-a-generation-chance to reset the system systematically and in a responsible manner. More broadly speaking, those who set up the institutional organisation of the EEAS should learn from similar problems and solutions at the national government level. As a result, *whole of bureaucracy approaches* to peacebuilding should be pursued as part of the *whole of EU system approach*. Eventually, given the diversity of challenges of peacebuilding, the organisation of the EEAS should be a question of flexible working methods rather than one of formal hierarchies.

One of the key recommendations in this study is for the European Parliament to support the development of a peacebuilding strategy for the EU. It should also ensure that the existing Commission services (Unit or Directorate level) dealing with peacebuilding (under the Instrument for Stability) are integrated into the EEAS in a way that respects the Commission's prerogatives as well as ensuring its experience (including working with international, national and NGO peacebuilding actors) can be a real-added value to the EEAS during its start up phase. It is only by having individuals in structures responsible for peacebuilding that the HR Ashton's declared view that the EU does peacebuilding through its many actions can be realised.

## 1 INTRODUCTION

Does the EU need a Peacebuilding Strategy to improve the coordination and implementation of its civilian instruments across the spectrum of its peacebuilding activities? Several actors have requested that such a strategy be elaborated.

Generally, strategies describe an aims-means relationship, that is, how to use the means to reach a certain aim. As the Lisbon Treaty (LT) introduces potentially significant changes to the EU means for civilian crisis management, it seems rational to call for a strategic (re-)vision to help shape these means and use them in line with the EU's overall strategic aim in peacebuilding. If not, the European External Action Service (EEAS), the potential centre of gravity in peacebuilding, risks suffering from similar problems as did the EU prior to the LT, with the only difference being that inter-pillar problems may turn into intra-agency problems.

This leads to four questions that are addressed in this study:

1. What is a Peacebuilding Strategy and how can it enhance civilian cooperation
2. How is civilian cooperation in the EU organised and in what way will it be affected by the reforms initiated by the LT?
3. In what way could the post-Lisbon setting of the EU be complemented by a Peacebuilding Strategy?
4. How could the European Parliament commence in due course to assure better coordination?

## 2 SOME NOTES ON STRATEGY AND PEACEBUILDING

### 2.1 Strategy and strategic coherence

Strategies relate **aims with means**. Aims and means are both located in a strategic context. Once the context is analysed and strategic aims defined, there is a need to develop, organise and apply the means. This can be called strategy making – or in EU-Commission terms: programming and implementation. This process follows a cyclical pattern, as strategies are regularly revised in the light of changing aims or means.

Strategy making is influenced by three things: (political) **concepts** or visions; institutions, which translate these concepts into action through rules, laws etc; and resources, e.g. money, equipment or personnel that are needed to finally carry out the concepts in line with the rules and procedures of the institutions

The **challenge of strategy-making** is twofold: first, to develop a strategy that really tackles the aims of the empirical context and not those of the actors involved; and second to assure the implementation of this strategy. A priori, **collective strategies are particularly difficult to define and implement as they** usually combine diverse objectives. Hence they tend to generate conflicts over the priority of the various objectives and the allocation of limited resources. As a result, implementation suffers from inefficiencies. The more complex or multifaceted the aims and means relationship– which is very likely to be the case in Peacebuilding- the more difficult it is to focus political action.

**Successful strategies** are not based on wishful thinking but on **strategic coherence**. Strategic visions, blueprints or declarations have enormous political importance. They signal that a topic is worth the attention and show that compromises have been found. However, strategies also need to be

implemented. In fact, it is the pursuit of a strategy rather than the bright vision that offers the ultimate yardstick for evaluation.

## 2.2 Peacebuilding as a strategic context

There is no commonly agreed definition of “peacebuilding”. From a broad perspective, peacebuilding ranges from prevention via crisis management to post crisis activities. “Post conflict” management can also contribute to the prevention of the next conflict. Within this spectrum several concepts are discussed and instruments are applied. Table 1 provides a non-exhaustive list of the types of activities that are referred to in academic and policy literature on Peacebuilding.

2.2.1 Table 1: Non- comprehensive overview over practical instruments and concepts in peacebuilding

Peace/Prevention	Escalation	Conflict/Crisis management	Post-conflict	Post-conflict – Prevention
Political and diplomatic relations, and Development aid	Preventive military or police Deployment, Mediation	Humanitarian aid Military or police deployment Mediation	Humanitarian aid SSR, DDR, Rule of Law, reconstruction, Public administration reform, Political Stabilization, Human Rights/Gender issues Civilian protection Rehabilitation of infrastructure	Development aid Reconciliation democratisation

Diverging concepts regularly lead to conflict between the short-term and long-term priorities in a peacebuilding strategy such as between security and development needs, where short-term military intervention focuses on stabilising a hostile environment and where development strategies follow long-term structural socio-economic objectives that seek to reduce poverty and inequality.<sup>1</sup> Managing different donors or actors priorities (e.g. development, Security Sector Reform, reconstruction, and democratisation), also requires careful coordination in order to avoid undermining an overall Peacebuilding approach.

The clash of peacebuilding concepts, different institutional procedures, the fight over resources and the intensified interaction of actors and tasks have turned peacebuilding into a tremendously complex endeavour. Thus, **what is needed is a common, multidimensional strategy that coordinates the**

<sup>1</sup> Paris, R. and Sisk, D. (eds.) The Dilemmas of Statebuilding. Confronting the contradictions of postwar peace operations, Routledge 2009.

**wide range of responses to (potential and actual) crises and conflicts.**<sup>2</sup> Peacebuilding increasingly means complexity management. The internal and external coordination of all available instruments and actors, their timely and appropriate deployment in the various conflict phases, and the specification of common mission objectives have become of paramount importance for a successful international response.

However, limited resources and capabilities to effectively implement a Peacebuilding strategy draw attention to the crucial role of the member states in international organisations like the UN. The effectiveness of such organisations can only be as effective as the member states allow them to be. Their lack of commitment, whether financial or political, determines to a great extent the success of these peacebuilding operations. Whilst, the EU is *sui generis* international actor and has redress to its own instruments in external relations, the potential for it to develop successful peacebuilding policies also requires close coordination with its Member States in particular in providing crisis management instruments and additional political and financial resources.

### **2.3 What can be expected from peacebuilding strategies**

Those who call for a peacebuilding strategy want to improve the effectiveness of international responses. Given the challenges of today's conflicts however, such an improvement requires more than a reform of institutional procedures. Therefore, coordination must be supported by a political and strategic vision. Diverging visions and incoherent institutional procedures have been features of weak peacebuilding missions.

As a rule of thumb a successful peacebuilding strategy has three characteristics:

- it combines aims and means in the area of peacebuilding and outlines the conceptual foundation, the institutional arrangements and the required resources to be pursued,
- it outlines the cooperation necessary between actors on specific tasks,
- it provides a vision that can be implemented.

## **3 EU CIVILIAN COOPERATION IN PEACEBUILDING AND THE EFFECTS OF THE LISBON TREATY**

This section concentrates exclusively on planning and decision making. It assumes that effective implementation on the ground is based on appropriate planning at the strategic level.

### **3.1 EU peacebuilding pre-Lisbon: institutions and resources**

While peacebuilding is increasingly present in EU-policy language, its very notion remains ill-defined. It is mostly understood as part of an overall conflict-prevention-strategy. Prevention focuses on limiting the reoccurrence of conflict and aims to create the conditions for sustainable peace. The main EU actors are the Member States through the Council and the Commission.

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<sup>2</sup> Mölling C and Major C., International Organisations in Crisis Management – Comprehensive approaches towards coordination and coherence? Textbook contribution to the Workshop "Inter-ministerial Cooperation", 1-3 July 2008, Federal College for Security Studies, Berlin.

### 3.1.1 Institutions and Concepts: Commission and Council

**The Council:** the Member States through the Council focus on civilian and military aspects of crisis management within the framework of CFSP and ESDP (renamed CSDP with the LT). The main instruments are civilian missions and military operations. The Union has launched a total of 14 civilian missions since January 2003. It has given priority to four areas within the overall area of civilian crisis management: police, strengthening the rule of law, strengthening civilian administration, and civil protection. The European Security Strategy in 2003 set out an ambitious vision for improved EU coherence of civil and military instruments in the pursuit of external relations. The Council aims to ensure the coherence of its activities with the help of the concept of Civil-Military-Coordination (CMC) at the strategic level. In addition, Crisis Management Procedures (CMP), which are a kind of road map for an operation, should ensure that civilian and military issues are duly taken into account and coordinated. The Commission participates in both CMC and CMP. Moreover, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has the task to assure - at the political level - that the civilian and military aspects of crisis management are coordinated. The HR has hence a double bridging function: first to link civilian and military tools within the Council, and second to link the civilian tools of the Council with those of the Commission. The HR is also supported by EU-Special Representatives (EUSRs) who help coordinate operational activities with the HR, the EU-Presidency, the Commission and the missions of the member states.<sup>3</sup>

In 2007 the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) was created to meet the increasing demands from civilian missions. It plans and conducts civilian CSDP operations under the High Representative and the political control of the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which is composed of member state's representatives. In addition, the CPCC provides assistance and advice to the HR, the EU-Presidency and the relevant EU-Council bodies involved in civilian operations. The CPCC works in close cooperation with the European Commission. Moreover, the Council is currently integrating its different strategic planning capacities into one entity, the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD).<sup>4</sup> Other notable capabilities are the Situation Center (SitCen) and the Policy Unit (PU), which are both directly attached to the HR. They provide the EU with a capacity for intelligence and strategic analysis. The EU Military Staff supports the development of the military component of an EU civil-military approach to peacebuilding.<sup>5</sup>

**The Commission:** contributes to the EU's security and external policies by **drawing upon its powerful external relations family of Directorates-General and extensive diplomatic network of (approx 120) EU Delegations.** Its **conceptual focus** lies on structural prevention and peacebuilding. It increasingly stresses the need for integrated approaches to address the causes of conflict but also to manage post-conflict situations. This includes mainly long-term instruments ranging from economic development, strengthening civil society, the rule of law and good governance, as well as human and minority rights and addressing environmental factors.<sup>6</sup> The Commission also provides short-term support in the case of humanitarian disasters, crisis response, and in situations of instability.

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<sup>3</sup> Grevi, G. : Pioneering foreign policy: The EU Special Representatives. Chaillot Paper 106, Paris, October 2007

<sup>4</sup> these are: DGE VII DGE IX and the civ-mil cell.

<sup>5</sup> Major C. and Mölling C., More than wishful thinking? EU, UN and NATO and Comprehensive Approaches to Crisis Management. In: Koops, J., (Ed.), Military Crisis Management and Capacity-Building: The Challenge of Effective Interorganisationalism, Royal Institute for International Affairs: Egmont Paper Nr 30, Brussels, August 2009, pp. 28-37.

<sup>6</sup> European Consensus on Development 2006

Nevertheless, the Commission does not have a peacebuilding policy (although it organises regular programmes to develop the policy framework for peacebuilding issues under the Instrument for Stability). They are deemed to be part of more general policies and instruments.

The responsibility for peacebuilding is spread over **various institutional actors** in particular the DGs and the Commissioners for **External Relations and Development**. The main implementing agency for external aid programmes is **EuropeAid and its office AIDCO**. In addition, the **Commission delegations** collect information and conduct political tasks. Most of the preparatory and implementation work in external relations and aid is done through the delegations (via AidCo) in the recipient countries. The Commission's 'Crisis Platform' coordinates the Commission's contribution to CFSP and the Council Secretariat working groups. Internally, RELEX has been the umbrella for the Commission's policies for conflict prevention and crisis management. To this end, it worked closely with other entities, notably EuropeAid, DG Development, Trade and ECHO, without however having a general supervisory power over other DGs. It conducts regular monitoring of the world crisis spots and collects information with the help of its delegations.

### 3.1.2 Resources

**CFSP/CSDP:** civilian crisis management is funded with a contribution from the CFSP budget (Heading 4- EU as a Global actor). The Council decides, but the Commission administers the budget.<sup>7</sup> In terms of personnel, the EU is constantly struggling to staff its missions. The assessment of the self imposed Civilian Headline Goal revealed several shortfalls.<sup>8</sup>

**Instrument for Stability** (IfS - Budget 2007-13: EUR 2 billion): is designed to provide both short and longer-term responses to conflict. It seeks to secure or create the necessary conditions to permit the implementation of longer-term Community development cooperation, to address threats and to be prepared for pre- and post-crisis situations. Peacebuilding projects under the IfS focus on a wide range of issues, such as mediation, confidence-building, interim administrations, etc. The IfS is activated especially when timely financial help in the face of a crisis or emerging crisis cannot be provided from other EU sources.

**The Development Cooperation Instrument and the European Development Fund:** The DG for Development coordinates and monitors i.a. funding provided through the European Development Funds (EDF) and the *Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI)*. The DCI's (Budget 2007-2013, 16,9 billion Euro) primary aim is to reduce poverty, strive for sustainable economic and social development and for a gradual integration of developing countries into the world economy. The *European Development Fund (EDF)*, (2008-2013 an amount of 22,7 billion) is an intergovernmental fund set up by the EU-member states. It finances the EC's geographic cooperation with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of countries and with the Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs).

**Humanitarian Aid:** The DG ECHO provides direct emergency relief to victims of disaster and war. Its grants cover emergency aid, worth a total of more than €700 million per year.

**The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI):** (Budget 2007-13: EUR 11.2 billion) (now also moved to the Enlargement portfolio).

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<sup>7</sup> Drent M. and Zandee D., *Breaking Pillars. Towards a Civil-Military Security Approach for the European Union*. Den Haag: Clingendael Institute, 2010 (Clingendael Security Paper; 13/2010), p. 45

<sup>8</sup> Korski, D/ Gowan, R.: *Can the EU rebuild Failing States? A Review of Europe's civilian Capabilities*. London, European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2009.

The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR): (Budget 2007-2013 EUR 1.1 billion)

### 3.1.3 Strategic coherence: problems and ambitions

From a perspective of effective peacebuilding the EU clearly lacks strategic coherence. Inefficient inter-pillar but also intra-pillar coordination are the core problems of the Union's approach to peacebuilding. Consequently, EU peacebuilding suffers from strained civilian capabilities, fragmented access to resources, fragmented approaches to the diverse crisis phases and tasks, but also missing personnel and the lack of a coherent institutional backbone and support structure.

The EU theoretically disposes of the necessary range of civilian and military instruments and resources for peacebuilding. However, institutional mechanisms and competences to activate them are split between the Commission and the Council. As they lack common concepts or a strategic vision to guide an inter-pillar approach to peacebuilding, an EU comprehensive approach tends to be cumbersome. Moreover, the competences within the Commission and the access to the resources are fragmented. The resulting EU policies in the area are largely incoherent. The institutional processes of generating EU-policies and missions have usually been characterised by attempts of the various actors to control them. These inter-institutional rivalries between the Council and the Commission also influence the allocation of resources. The member states fear an increase of the Community budget and its growing coherence as it would strengthen the Commission's role at their expense.

Thus, the incomprehensible distribution of roles and tasks within the EU and the institutional disconnect between the Commission and the Council often prevents the Union from effectively linking its tools in an integrated manner to carry out crisis prevention, crisis management and peacebuilding activities. Moreover, there is no standing structure that supports the planning and conduct of EU Peacebuilding as a whole.

The EU's main challenge is to bring together structural long-term and operational short-term instruments. The existing fragmentation is undesirable in terms of coherence, effectiveness, and clarity towards donor countries, but also with regard to democratic legitimacy, speed of implementation, and decision-making.<sup>9</sup>

## 3.2 The Lisbon Treaty: opportunities for better coordination of civilian instruments

The LT offers new opportunities to remedy the existing institutional incoherencies, but does it offer the opportunity to reach greater political-strategic coherence and coordination in the area of peacebuilding? This depends not only on the effective institutional cooperation but also on a convergence of concepts for peacebuilding and the future handling of resources. Practically, the task is to reassemble the existing concepts, institutions and resources from the Council and Commission in a way that strengthens the Union's approach to peacebuilding and makes it more coherent and capable. This was the intention in setting out a new institutional and political framework for the EU in external relations as set out in the new Lisbon Treaty.

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<sup>9</sup> Drent/ Zandee 2010

### 3.2.1 High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

A key element is the High Representative (HR) for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, a post held by Catherine Ashton since November 2009. The HR combines the competences that were previously split between the Council (the HR for CFSP) and the Commission (the Commissioner for external relations). This personal union is translated into a double-hat arrangement. The Council nominates Ashton to chair the Foreign Affairs Council, to assure the implementation of the CFSP, and confers to her the right of initiative. For her parallel function as a Vice President of the Commission responsible for external relations she needed to be nominated by the Commission President Barroso and appointed by the European Parliament.

As it currently looks, Ashton will be in charge of the strategic and operational aspects of EU foreign and security policy while Council President van Rompuy seeks to assure consensus over the broad strategic orientation in the Council. Since January 2010 Ashton is chairing the Foreign Affairs Council, which takes decisions in the areas of CFSP and CSDP. She disposes of all the instruments to set the agenda and to negotiate compromises that previously fell to the rotating presidency. Following a transition phase of 6 to 12 months, a representative of the HR will also chair the PSC, the geographical working groups and CFSP/CSDP working groups.

Ashton hence disposes of various instruments to steer the decision-shaping in her policy area: from the initiative via the debate in the working groups up to the decision-making in the Council. She has the tools at hand to assure greater coherence, consistency and coordination in policy formulation and implementation. The HR is hence a key figure when it comes to developing new approaches, including strategies, reaching their adoption at the EU level and assuring their implementation. A restricting factor for the HR is however the fact that the LT doesn't change the intergovernmental decision-making structure in CFSP. In the end, the member states have the last word.

Conceptually, the LT does not include articles on peacebuilding but it does refer to the Union's ambition to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.<sup>10</sup> The CSDP shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union can use them in missions such as peacekeeping and conflict prevention.<sup>11</sup> The HR shall ensure the coordination of the civilian and military aspects of such missions.<sup>12</sup> The LT foresees the creation of a "start up fund" for preparatory military crisis management operations.

### 3.2.2 The European External Action Service (EEAS)

The HR will be supported by the EEAS. The EEAS is meant to effectively overcome the gap between the Commission and the Council activities by merging their competences into one single service. It will play a role in supporting the development of strategies and it will be instrumental in translating those strategies into daily policies of the EU and vis-à-vis third actors. The EEAS is conceived as a service: it should closely cooperate with the member states, assist the President of the Council and the members of the Commission (including the President) in their activities in the area of external relations. The structure and functioning of the EEAS are currently being worked out by HR Ashton in cooperation with

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<sup>10</sup> LT Art 21 2 (c)

<sup>11</sup> LT Art 42 1

<sup>12</sup> LT Art 43 2

the member states, the Commission and the European Parliament. The first blueprints have been presented and a decision should soon be taken.

Being a service that spans the previous pillars and works closely with EU Member States, the EEAS offers great potential to assure **better coordination in peacebuilding**. However, the current debates paint an ambiguous picture. The Draft Council Decision presented by the HR on 25th March 2010 highlights the need for consistency between the different areas of the Union's external relations and between these and other policies. It is certainly an enabling factor that the Council structures that allow for short-term and comprehensive civilian-military approaches to peacebuilding will be part of the EEAS. HR Ashton will have the competence to increase their integration. This can be supported by regional and thematic expertise, given that the EEAS will most probably consist of regional and thematic units.

However, the key element is still missing, namely a strategic vision that defines the aims of the HR and the EEAS. It would enable the Union to deduce precise policy areas, competences and tasks to be covered by the EEAS. In the absence of such a conceptual basis, the EEAS is taken as a hostage in the current **institutional** turf wars over the competences and policy areas that remain with the Commission and those that will become part of the EEAS. This can be seen in the debates on the programming and implementation of the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) and the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). It is crucial for the HR and EEAS who will have important roles in the definition of EU regional and thematic strategies, to have the means to ensure such political strategies (adopted either by the Council or Commission) are tuned into operational reality i.e. by leading on the strategic levels of programming of the financial instruments and specifically the DCI and ENPI. Likewise, the chain of command for the delegations must be resolved to ensure coordination and coherence of implementation of EU strategies and the programmes on the ground.

All this has serious implications for the access to **resources**. If Development and Enlargement are not part of the EEAS, major parts of the budget will not be available to implement a more integrated policy. In the worst case, these funds risk accidentally creating adverse effects.

### 3.2.3 [Lisbon's limited approach to strategic coherence in peacebuilding](#)

Whilst, the **institutional innovation** of the HR and EEAS should allow the EU to organise its external relations more coherently. Ashton disposes of various instruments to steer the whole decision-shaping process in her policy area. However, she risks missing the authority over some of the most important policy areas and related instruments that are essential for effective peacebuilding: i.e. development policy. This might not only prevent her from shaping a comprehensive peacebuilding policy and from using the instruments in a more coherent manner. Eventually, this also risks undermining a typical aim of peacebuilding: long-term post conflict recovery and prevention of the next conflict.

The EEAS and the HR are likely to assure a smoother interaction and coordination of the classical external relations areas, namely diplomacy, military and civilian missions. However, the risk is high that the involvement of necessary structural and long-term policies like Trade or Development to support short-term achievements will provoke the same cumbersome negotiations as it was the case prior to Lisbon. The unaccomplished integration of EU external relations has a price.

In addition, the institutional change is not supported by the integration of **concepts**. The EU does not have one peacebuilding strategy but several related strategies. It lacks a conceptual point of reference. What exact tasks would the HR and EEAS have to fulfil? The LT does not provide much support to the HR in the row with other EU actors about who gets what EU-instruments. An institutional reform without a focal point undermines a coherent approach to peacebuilding. A renewed fragmentation of authority

over the long-term and short-term instruments does not only affect the coherence of policy formulation but also the swift provision of resources to implement them.

This may become apparent when the EU seeks to set up its first complex peacebuilding or civil-military mission. Development, aid or diplomacy realms will most likely offer different solutions. If buttressed by institutional independence and the missing need to consent, their different positions will not lead to a comprehensive approach but rather to endless theological battles. A conflict of interest or values certainly has to be carried out at some point. This however should not happen in the eve of a peacebuilding mission, as it risks delaying the mission and undermining the Union's security objectives, capacity to act, and eventually its legitimacy.

In terms of **resources**, two aspects become visible: first, a more coherent approach to the financial funds i.e. the pooling of some of the remaining instruments such as EDF and IfS, and second, a coherent financial chain of command is not visible. Financial instruments distributed as a patchwork across the Commission, the Council and the EEAS. Parts of them are likely to be pooled into an operations budget. This will however likely take place in a complicated and ad hoc manner.

Given the current state of play, one cannot realistically expect that the strategic coherence in peacebuilding will increase tremendously thanks to the active management by the HR and EEAS. It is not yet clear to what extent this new structure reflects a more integrated conceptual approach to peacebuilding. Quite the opposite, the current debates sadly concentrate on funds instead of focussing on politics and policies

#### **4 RESPONSIBILITY TO COOPERATE: TOWARDS AN EU-PEACEBUILDING STRATEGY?**

The LT sets out to improve the coherence of the Union's external relations. While peacebuilding, as HR Ashton has said in the European Parliament, is certainly central to what the EU does externally, it is not spelled out in a clear policy statement what this means. The result is that the means that are principally available within the Union are not mainstreamed towards peacebuilding. If the EU is to play a role as an actor in international peacebuilding, a peacebuilding strategy should be set up. Such a strategy would seek to overcome both the conceptual diversity and the institutional fragmentation in view of coordinating the divers instruments, providing for the appropriate resources and capabilities and assuring the implementation.

Assuming that peacebuilding is a central aim of the EU, developing a common, multidimensional strategy that welds together the wide range of potential EU responses into one overarching approach to peacebuilding is a moral responsibility. Lessons learned from EU and UN missions have revealed the negative impact that a lack of coordination at the strategic level has on the security and long-term peace on the ground, for the individuals as well as for the societies. In the worst case, the whole mission is put at risk.

Better peacebuilding cannot be achieved by simply changing institutional settings and administrative procedures at the level of the HR or the EEAS. Conversely, the institutional rewiring has to be informed by a respective strategic vision and mandated by a decision at the highest possible level. Such a mandate would bind all other actors that strive to achieve this aim. Moreover, besides potentially enhancing efficiency, an overall strategy can also support the legitimacy of international bureaucracies – like the EEAS - to act as external actor in conflicts. It also offers an important yardstick that clarifies for what activities and aims the EEAS receives resources and how it would use them. Therefore, a strategy is

a necessary element to allow for a positive audit of the EEAS and other Institutions by those who exert oversight over them.

The EU should use this once-in-a-generation-chance to reset the system systematically and in a responsible manner.

#### **4.1 Concepts: Peacebuilding - from vision to concept**

The EU's overall objectives in the area of peace and security are partly refined. Yet it remains blurry if and how exactly this translates into the extensive institutional reform of the EU crisis management machinery. Developing a more coherent EU-wide conceptual approach should however start with defining at least the framework of a peacebuilding vision. It does not need to be a fully-fledged and implementable strategy. It's rather about developing a starting point that presents several ideas from which, in a later step, priorities can be deduced. The elaboration of such a vision should involve as many stake holders as possible i.e. besides the EU institutions also NGOs, the civil society etc.

From there, a policy should be developed with a peacebuilding strategy which includes an organisational strategy. While the former focuses on the link between the EU and the actual peacebuilding, the latter should explain how the peacebuilding is translated within the EU internal machinery. It would describe in detail the institutional actors, their interaction and resources.

Such an exercise should at least engage EU actors in a constructive debate over interests and values. As painful as it might be, such a process has to take place in order to reach a solid consensus. It should however take place on a principal level and not involve operative details. Such a debate on principles at the beginning of a strategic debate should also allow preventing that debates on the same issues reoccur constantly and risk affecting decisions on a concrete peacebuilding mission.

While the issues and policy areas to be included and prioritized are principally subject of the process of strategy definition, the link of long-term and short-term instruments is a condition sine qua none. Peace enforcement and humanitarian aid cannot substitute development and vice versa. While this has obviously a moral dimension, it is also worth underlining the cost effectiveness of prevention.

#### **4.2 Institutions: whole of bureaucracy approach**

The institutional setup of the new EU external action framework should allow linking long-term with short-term objectives. Especially the strategic levels of development programming must be part of the EEAS. If not, the LT implementation will create new frictions as the short-term instruments of the former Commission and Council will be under one umbrella but the Commission's financial instruments continue existing in parallel. Development policy needs to give input to short-term crisis management and needs to coordinate with the regional experts/desks. As stated in the European Report on Development 2009, the EU development policy has to prevent the backfire of other EU policies and those of member states in order to be successful. In addition, it should bridge the gap between short-term needs and long-term policies to enhance resilience and strengthen the handling of the security development nexus.<sup>13</sup>

As no other institutions besides the HR and the EEAS are tasked to ensure the coherence of external action, the EEAS and thus the HR should have a strong role in strategic programming (country

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<sup>13</sup> European Communities: European Report on Development 2009, Overcoming Fragility in Africa, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole [http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/ERD\\_report\\_advanced\\_copy\\_20091020.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/ERD_report_advanced_copy_20091020.pdf)

allocations, country and regional strategy papers and regional and national indicative programmes). The other DGs, particularly AidCo and the Delegations, have a critical role in the implementation (i.e. annual action programmes and implementation). Therefore, delegations themselves should be equipped with a single chain of command through the EEAS to the HR. However, an EU approach to peacebuilding cannot do without the Commission's expertise in areas such as Trade that clearly have an external relations dimension, but are not part of the EEAS. Those areas have to be adequately plugged in. The same applies to the Council expertise and existing structures for the planning and conduct of peacebuilding missions that are still outside the EEAS, namely national Headquarters and those of international organisations. Upstream involvement is usually key to deliver best results when decisions have to be taken.

More broadly speaking, those who set up the institutional organisation of the EEAS should learn from similar problems and solutions at the national government level. As a result, *whole of bureaucracy approaches* to peacebuilding should be pursued as part of the *whole of EU system approach*. The establishment of a Peacebuilding directorate is only one institutional solution among several. Eventually, given the diversity of challenges of peacebuilding, the organisation of the EEAS should be a question of flexible working methods rather than one of formal hierarchies. The British model of task forces in this area can offer helpful insights. Cooperation between departments can be enforced by the pooling of resources.<sup>14</sup>

What peacebuilding needs in the field differs significantly from case to case. There is hence a danger that a department that is not fully comprehensively organised might apply the wrong organisational capabilities. A strong line of command that links all available means in the EU would enable to pull all the strings very swiftly in the case such action is needed. However, experiences at the national level show that such a strong line of command must be first balanced with a strategic planning unit that is not attached to a specific policy. Second, it must be supported by the long-term development of capabilities and their availability. If not the capabilities will be made available on a ad hoc basis, and will be very limited.

There is evidence to suggest that the EEAS will take a classical bureaucratic structure. In order to complement it with more supple elements, the EUSR should be kept as a unique and flexible tool to handle complex peacebuilding missions. Heads of Delegation of regional directors cannot be expected to lead a complex mission in parallel to their daily business. Moreover, a head of delegation might simply not be deployed to the most difficult areas. Eventually it may be politically wise to be able to conduct policies through different channels, one of which are the EUSRs. These are some of the most important lessons identified from both EU and UN missions. There is no reason why these lessons should no longer apply.

### **4.3 Resources: Pooling of funds**

The financial arrangements for missions and policies have to be evaluated from the perspective of comprehensiveness and effectiveness. This concerns the civilian side but also the civil-military link. The upcoming mid-term review of the financial instruments should consider this.

The EEAS will be a-pillar-integrating body. As a result, the financial structures and resources for its policies and strategies should also follow this inter-pillar logic, abolishing primacy of Council or Commission over it. Access to pooled funds can be linked to inter- or intradepartmental coordination

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<sup>14</sup> Patrick, S. and Brown K., *Greater than the Sum of its Parts? Assessing «Whole of Government» Approaches to Fragile States*. New York: International Peace Academy, 2007.

and consensus, enforcing cooperation among all the actors and creating creativity and the need to communicate.

One option could be the pooling of respective budget lines into two different ones: a long-term and a short-term budget. The short-term budget can be activated on short notice and also for combined civil operations. The long-term funds for structural policies would remain linked to the existing procedure but would be pooled into one budget line. This could also increase the leverage in international environments like vis-à-vis the UN Peacebuilding Commission. Here, the poor coordination of donors from EU budgets constrains the Union's political room for manoeuvre.<sup>15</sup>

#### **4.4 Beyond civilian coordination - Towards a Comprehensive Approach of the EU**

While a Peacebuilding Strategy certainly may have a positive effect on the EEAS set up central elements like the member states and the peer international actors but also the local actors cannot be left out of such a strategy.

The coordination of civilian instruments and actors is essential for a successful EU approach to peacebuilding. However, by definition, achieving coherence means an institutional structure and concepts allowing for a wide scope. This implies integrating all relevant actors into a "comprehensive approach" or a "Whole of system approach".

**Military** tools for planning and conduct have to be integrated with the civilian one from the earliest stage possible. This implies not only joint planning of concrete missions but the strategic planning for peacebuilding contingencies. Civilian and military planners have to develop "comprehensive scenarios" to deduce needed instruments and capabilities from it. Moreover, preventive policies and the knowledge of the regional and political context need to be integrated into mission planning at its earliest stage. This shall allow to not only define the objectives of a short-term intervention but also of long-term engagement as well as for the appropriate hand over between actors, including exit and transition strategies among military, police and other instruments. Thus a permanent and integrated planning and conduct structure at the EU level is a condition sine qua non.

One of the main stumbling blocks exists at the level of **member states**. They not only hold the bulk of instruments and resources. However, the various EU member state's concepts and institutions for peacebuilding are not well fitted among each other. Therefore, it is rather unlikely that the sum of these various member states strategies will form a coherent strategy at the EU level or can easily be integrated into one.<sup>16</sup>

A comprehensive approach would also have to remain flexible and open to respond to the situation on the ground as well as for other actors linked to the EU framework but that are not formally part of it: **UN, civil society, international donors**. Last but not least various other actors in the field, especially **NGOs, and local groups** are to be allowed to plug into in procedures and structures of EU bureaucratic politics.

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<sup>15</sup> Miall, G., The EU and the Peacebuilding Commission, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, vol 20, No 1 2007: 42

<sup>16</sup> Mölling, C., Umfassende Ansätze im internationalen Krisenmanagement Von der schrittweisen Weiterentwicklung zur konzeptionellen Reorganisation, A. Wenger et al. (eds.), Bulletin zur schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik 2009, Zürich 2009, pp.83-113.

While the EU has given much talk to the comprehensive approach, its institutional resistance to adapt in practice is outstanding. The current fight over the EEAS signifies that. This persistence of traditional patterns and structures further reduces the space for successfully applying a Comprehensive Approach.

However, those challenges that made a Comprehensive Approach necessary, still linger on. Therefore, and as long as the international community perceives peacebuilding as an appropriate instrument, there is no alternative than to continue pursuing a comprehensive approach. Conversely, to keep on failing to manage complexity of peacebuilding will further undermine the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the engagement of the international community in crisis management.

Key challenge for EU is to move beyond rhetoric of an integrated approach to security and development and towards effective implementation. The European parliament should use all its power to enable the EU to implement the full potential of the LT with a strong EEAS as a centre for a coherent and successful EU in peacebuilding.

## **5 RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT**

### **5.1 The Parliament in the decision-making framework**

If the HR/VP considers her post, the LT and the EEAS as the once-in-a-lifetime chance to change things, the European Parliament should see it as its once-in-a-lifetime chance to assure that this change is done in a way that the EU people can believe in it and consider it as being in their interest. Peacebuilding is presumably of fundamental interest to the majority of Europeans. Therefore, the European Parliament should not rest to call for a coherent and consistent but also responsible approach to global challenges in the area of peace and security.

### **5.2 Support to a Peacebuilding Strategy**

The European Parliament should support the development of a peacebuilding strategy for the EU by ensuring that the existing Commission services (Unit or Directorate level) dealing with peacebuilding (under the Instrument for Stability) are integrated into the EEAS in a way that respects the Commission's prerogatives as well as ensuring its experience (including working with international, national and NGO peacebuilding actors) can be a real-added value to the EEAS during its start up phase. It is only by having individuals in structures responsible for peacebuilding that the HR Ashton's declared view that the EU does peacebuilding through its many actions can be realised.

### **5.3 Introduce the Peacebuilding Strategy into the political process**

The European Parliament should immediately introduce stepping-stones for the introduction of a Peacebuilding strategy into EU external relations in view of introducing the strategy in 2012 and in view of implementing it into the organisational structure in due course to the EEAS reform post 2014.

As the implementation of the LT is a moving target, the European Parliament needs to carefully think about both the room for manoeuvre but also where engagement is rather futile. Important decisions will be taken until September 2010. However, a meaningful strategy would need more time to mature. Therefore the European Parliament should aim to introduce a clause that guarantees that the new EU framework for external action will be guided by a peacebuilding strategy. Its cornerstones could be introduced through the clause. This would allow for orientation of the organisational set-up. Moreover, the Parliament would have a point of reference that is of fundamental nature to CFSP.

#### **5.4 Budgetary authority**

The European Parliament should use its budgetary authority to insist on the pooling of budgets, their full transparency and increased access to the funds through interdepartmental decisions.

The European Parliament should support the flexible and swift use of funds for short-term interventions, i.e. civilian missions.

Given that the EEAS is financed by the EU budget, the European Parliament should use its additional gain ex ante and ex post auditing rights for the spending. This audit includes by nature the scrutiny of economic effectiveness of decision-making procedure and programmes. It may allow to insist on the search for synergies and to reveal programmes where resources are used in a way that they indirectly neutralize each other. This would include impact estimates as well as impact and outcome evaluations.

#### **5.5 Parliamentary oversight**

The Parliament has the right to hear the HR/VP concerning especially fundamental issues of CFSP and CSDP. Hence the EP should regularly hear Ms Ashton on her progress to mainstream peacebuilding in EU external relations and the state of implementation of the peacebuilding strategy. Moreover, it should proactively inject its ideas into the political process through its exchanges with the HR/VP and other EU institutions.

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