CONSOLIDATING THE EU'S CRISIS MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES: CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION AND THE FUTURE OF EU OHQ
Abstract

The performed move from ESDP to CSDP in the Lisbon Treaty is desirable for an increase of coherence in EU’s external action, including its crisis management efforts. Several key trends in this field are discerned and they all indicate that the EU has been moving in the direction towards more complex and hybrid operations for which comprehensive planning and conduct strategies need to be used. The need for more intensive intra-EU coordination as well as external cooperation of the EU with other actors involved in crisis management is recognised. Although the merger of DG VIII and DG IX and the foundation of the new body, the CMPD, have been welcome as an important step towards further integration of civilian and military approaches to crisis management, there have also been important lines of criticism, particularly related to the complexity of the chain of command and to the possibility that either the military or the civilian side will dominate the strategic planning and conduct in the field of crisis management. As far as the EU OHQ is concerned, the analysis suggests that none of the three existing options is particularly well-suited for current and future EU operations in the field of crisis management. It is for this reason that a case for the establishment of a permanent strategic planning and conduct structure is being made.
This study was requested by the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs.

**AUTHOR:**

Nik HYNEK, Research Fellow at the Institute of International Relations (IIR) in Prague and Lecturer at Charles University and Metropolitan University

**EDITOR RESPONSIBLE:**

Gerrard QUILLE
Policy Advisor - Security and Defence
Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union
Policy Department
WIB 06 M 081
rue Wiertz 60
B-1047 Brussels

**LINGUISTIC VERSIONS**

Original: EN

**ABOUT THE PUBLISHER**

Manuscript completed on 12 February 2010.
© European Parliament, 2010
Printed in Belgium
The study is available on the Internet at
If you are unable to download the information you require, please request a paper copy by e-mail: xp-poldep@europarl.europa.eu

**DISCLAIMER**

Any opinions expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament.

Reproduction and translation, except for commercial purposes, are authorised, provided the source is acknowledged and provided the publisher is given prior notice and supplied with a copy of the publication.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The performed move from ESDP to CSDP in the Lisbon Treaty is desirable for an increase of coherence in EU’s external action, including its crisis management efforts. The coherence is further reinforced by its institutional innovations, namely the double-hatted High Commissioner and the European External Action Service which is uniquely positioned to play the role of a principal agency in the field of crisis management. EU’s use of the concept of crisis management is underdeveloped and overused simultaneously. Several key trends in this field are discerned and they all indicate that the EU has been moving in the direction towards more complex and hybrid operations for which comprehensive planning and conduct strategies need to be used. The need for more intensive intra-EU coordination as well as external cooperation of the EU with other actors involved in crisis management is recognised. In respect of civil-military coordination in EU’s crisis management, the Lisbon Treaty brings along the promise of better institutional coordination and more strategic decision-making for this area. Specifically, the Lisbon Treaty has reinvigorated an ongoing process of overall structural change of the EU Council Secretariat by connecting it to the launch of EEAS. Although the merger of DG VIII and DG IX and the foundation of the new body, the CMPD, have been welcome as an important step towards further integration of civilian and military approaches to crisis management, there have also been important lines of criticism, particularly related to the complexity of the chain of command and to the possibility that either the military or the civilian side will dominate the strategic planning and conduct in the field of crisis management. As far as the EU OHQ is concerned, the analysis suggests that none of the three existing options is particularly well-suited for current and future EU operations in the field of crisis management. It is for this reason that a case for the establishment of a permanent strategic planning and conduct structure is being made.
Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY iii

1 INTRODUCTION 6

2 CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION IN EU’S CRISIS MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES 6
   2.1 MAIN POLITICAL, STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL TRENDS 6
   2.2 THE EVOLUTION AT THE EU LEVEL 7
   2.3 TOWARDS BETTER CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION 8
   2.4 STRUCTURAL CHANGE INITIATED BY THE LISBON TREATY 9
   2.5 AN ASSESSMENT AND THE MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENT 10

3 CURRENT EU OHQ OPTIONS AND FUTURE NEEDS 11
   3.1 CONTEXT AND THE EU CHAIN OF COMMAND 11
   3.2 THREE CURRENT OPTIONS: CHARACTERISTICS AND SHORTCOMINGS 11
   3.3 THE NEED FOR A PERMANENT STRATEGIC PLANNING AND CONDUCT STRUCTURE 13

4 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14
   4.1 CONCLUSIONS 14
   4.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 14

BIBLIOGRAPHY 16
1 INTRODUCTION

The Lisbon Treaty (also referred to as TEU throughout the text) which entered into force on December 13, 2009, amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, has brought with it important institutional innovations in EU’s external action. These changes were previously embarked upon in order to streamline the related decision-making processes and increase their internal coherence and efficiency. One of the main changes in the Lisbon Treaty has been the abandonment of the pillar structure and close interlinking of what was formerly the first pillar and the second pillar, despite the fact that some experts questioned the absoluteness of such a view in light of common foreign, security and defence policy remaining the only policy field with its own, separate legal status.¹

In line with the specifications, this briefing is intended to provide the European Parliament with an expert view on key issues and developments in EU’s comprehensive crisis management planning, civil-military coordination and cooperation as well as the future of the EU OHQ. The briefing begins with a short overview of key changes in EU’s external action after the Lisbon Treaty and focuses on the area of CFSP and ESDP/CSDP. Further on, the briefing continues by addressing the issue area of EU crisis management. After the evolution of the concept and practice at the EU level is examined and different phases are discussed, the brief analyses main political, strategic and operational trends in this field. Indeed, this part reflects on the implications of the Lisbon Treaty for crisis management. What follows is an assessment of the civil-military coordination in EU’s crisis management structures. In order to contextualise the most recent transformations which are investigated at length, basic concepts and terms are outlined and the evolution of civil-military coordination at the EU level is presented. The final substantive part tackles the current and future EU OHQ options. After the necessary contextualisation, characteristics and shortcomings of the three current options are analysed and based on these limits, the case for the establishment of a permanent strategic planning and conduct structure in Brussels is put forward. Finally, concluding remarks and recommendations are attached.

2 CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION IN EU’S CRISIS MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES

2.1 Main Political, Strategic and Operational Trends

Several trends can be discerned in the development of EU crisis management. They are important insofar as they contribute to the creation of feasible expectations for EU’s crisis management missions beyond 2009. The variety of types and geographical destinations as well as raising ambition of conducted missions suggests that the EU has become more self-confident in operational planning and implementation-process. This increase of ambition has been, nevertheless, offset by the inability of the EU to formulate a clear strategy for crisis management missions, the fact caused by the combination of two factors: first, no long-term vision has been underpinning operational planning; second, divergence between different member states’ interests has hampered any attempts to come up with a common approach.

The dissolution of traditional border between civilian and military crisis management, mainly by deliberate efforts to introduce hybrid, civilian/military crises management operations, has been one of

¹ Cf. Kurpas, S., 2007
the crucial trends in crisis management. Two developments can be mentioned in this context: first, further specialisation within more traditional tasks such as policing has taken place; second, a more complex and comprehensive design of operations has been introduced in some cases, as programming of Security Sector Reform (SSR) missions suggests. The EU has eagerly embraced the holistic and integrative concept of SSR since it has fit well with EU’s previous activities such as defence, police, intelligence and juridical reforms as well as EU’s normative commitment of democracy consolidation and promotion of human rights and good governance. Institutional implications of the continuous need to mesh civilian and military elements of crisis management are dealt with in the next section.

One of the trends in EU’s crisis management which will further grow as a result of the Lisbon Treaty entering into force has been the cooperation between the EU and the United Nations (UN). This cooperation has seen the introduction of three different concepts, at both strategic and operational levels. First, the EU has tried to develop the so-called modular approach which would consist in the provision of a particular component for a UN operation (e.g. an EU-UN planning cell, the provision of strategic airlift by the EU etc). Up to date, there has been, however, no empirical example of this type of cooperation. It is already clear that such cooperation will be ever more important for multistakeholder, complex crisis-management missions such as DDR(R) or SSR missions. The second EU concept for cooperation with the UN has rested on the bridging model (e.g. Operation Artemis) with the EU rapidly intervening for a short period with a clearly defined endpoint in order to allow the UN to introduce a new operation and/or reorganise an existing one. Finally, there is the over-the-horizon model in which the EU is expected to temporarily reinforce an existing UN operation. One of the recent examples has been the establishment of the EU Military Staff’s liaison officer at the UN Headquarters in December 2008 which has already been an interesting step in coordination of communication for the recent EUFOR Tchad/RCA and EU NAVFOR Somalia missions.

2.2 The Evolution at the EU Level

Two concepts are usually mentioned in efforts to interconnect civil and military approaches to crisis management: Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO). As far as CIMIC is concerned, it appertains to cooperation at operational and tactical levels ‘with the specific aim of connecting and making use of military capabilities in theatre for the coordination of and cooperation with national, international and non-governmental civilian actors’. Additionally, the EUMS is responsible within the EU for planning and implementing CIMIC at the political and strategic levels. The development of CIMIC at the EU level has been marked by two conferences. The EU CIMIC Conference held in June 2002 was oriented at political, strategic and conceptual levels and strived to delimit the functions between civilian and military actors in crisis situations, including the formulation of guiding principles. The second EU CIMIC conference from June 2003 was more oriented at the operational and tactical levels and a draft document concerned with generic guidelines was presented there as an initial step for further consultations between involved actors. Since 2003, there has been no significant development in the EU CIMIC concept which can be interpreted as an effective

---

3 Cf. Council of the European Union, 2008a
5 Council of the European Union, 2003a
abandonment of the concept at the EU level, though EU member states have used it at the national level.

The EU’s comprehensive approach to crisis management rests on the notion of Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO) which is said to ‘addresses the need for effective co-ordination of the actions of all relevant EU actors involved in the planning and subsequent implementation of EU response to the crisis’. CMCO thus represents an attempt to create an EU-wide culture of coordination for EU hybrid crisis-management missions. What is more, CMCO has been created to ‘encompass in the field of ESDP both civil-civil and civil-military co-ordination, as well as internal (EU) and external co-ordination (between EU and other actors). It is also understood to be required at all levels of EU crisis management’. At the heart of CMCO lies the Crisis Management Concept (CMC) which is understood as the ‘conceptual framework describing the overall approach of the EU to the management of a particular crisis’. Two teams have been instated to deal with coordination during the actual crisis management: an ad hoc Crisis Response Co-ordination Team (CRTC) responsible for a draft of CMC (political-strategic level) and an ad hoc Crisis Action Team within the EUMS (operational-tactical level) which contributes to the composure of MSOs.

The limits of CIMIC for a comprehensive coordination between civilian and military sides of ever more complex EU crisis management operations are given by the fact that the concept has been derived from a military perspective primarily concerned with force protection and the reason for cooperation with non-military actors is subordinated to that aim. While this is not to say that CIMIC is not important for EU crisis management as it represents an important operational component of CMCO, its use for comprehensive crisis management operations which incorporate the genuine coordination to all planning stages - including advanced planning, is rather limited. Shortcomings of CIMIC were fully exposed during the second CIMIC conference mentioned above in which participating representatives of non-governmental sphere argued that the gathering gave them the impression that the EUMS made no distinction between CIMIC and the ‘hearts and minds’ tactics. Too, CMCO has been criticised from several directions. In this respect, shortcomings have been seen in placing too much emphasis on the culture of coordination at the expenses of detailed structures and procedures. Additionally, planning and C2 issues create problems in CMCO as civilian and military chains of command for crisis-management operations are distinct.

2.3 Towards Better Civil-Military Coordination

Wide range of EU external actions, new trends under way, and the Lisbon Treaty entering into force means that existing institutional structures for the formulation and implementation of the relevant decisions in the area of CFSP and CSDP, both pre-Lisbon and the most recent ones, need to be strengthened. As the EU’s crisis management activities demonstrate, it is especially the doctrinal and operational need to consolidate civil-military coordination. Increasingly, EU crisis management missions

7 Council of the European Union, 2003b
8 Council of the European Union, 2003c
9 Council of the European Union, 2008
10 Ehrhart, H.G., 2007, pages 9-10
11 Khol, R., 2006, page 124
12 VOICE 2004, page 7
are operations that combine military and civilian aspects which need to be built into the plan in a holistic way and executed seamlessly. It is for this reason that a number of specialised bodies have been erected and transformed within the EU and the Lisbon Treaty furthers this process.

In respect of decision-making structures relevant for EU crisis management, the Helsinki European Council established three new permanent political and military bodies within the Council: Political and Security Committee (PSC), the Military Committee (EUMC), and the Military Staff (EUMS). The PSC’s role in crisis management is aimed at the political control and strategic direction of the operation. Also, the PSC is set to send guidelines to the EUMC, a body composed of the Chiefs of Defence. The EUMC’s responsibility towards the PSC has been the provision of military advice and recommendations. In regard to the EUMS, it takes military direction from the EUMC and its function has been the production of Military Strategic Options (MSOs) and conduct of EU-led military crisis management operations. ‘Once the MSOs have been produced, the EUMC prioritises them and the PSC decides on the preferred course of action’.14

The Lisbon Treaty reinvigorates an ongoing process of overall structural change of the EU Council Secretariat and connects it with the launch of EEAS. As a part of this transformation, the creation of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) which became operational in 2008 needs to be mentioned. CPCC has been responsible for the provision of the planning structure for the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM). The CPCC has been responsible for EU missions and saw its staff divided between Council officials and seconded national experts in the 1:1 ratio in order to fully integrate working methodology and procedures. The efficiency of the CPCC and its efforts to create a culture of coordination has been mixed: on one hand, the Council and the Commission have been involved in the fact-finding and planning stages of ESDP (and now CSDP) missions and the EU has used EUSRs to strengthen its political presence in the theatre; on the other hand, there has been a lack of common tools and templates for setting standards, reporting, training and the implementation of gathered experience.

### 2.4 Structural Change Initiated by the Lisbon Treaty

As the CPCC demonstrated its initial ability to conduct EU operations, it has played the role of a structural facilitator for enhanced civil-military coordination.15 The decisive move towards civil-military integration has been brought about by the Lisbon Treaty which has merged, in an unprecedented fashion, the DG VIII (military) and DG IX (civilian) into a single new directorate: the Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD). The idea of the directorate dates back to November 2008 and originally was proposed as a French-British initiative before being accepted by others. The CMPD will have responsibility for the Crisis Management Concept and its main value is seen in an increase in comprehensiveness and effectiveness of EU crisis-management structures.16

The current structure of CMPD was decided during the French presidency and its objective was defined as follows: ‘The CMPD will, within its area of responsibility, inter alia foster and coordinate work on synergies between civilian and military capability development, including in helping identify dual needs’.17

The implementation of the Lisbon Treaty indicates that the civilian and the military structures of crisis

---

15 Blair, S., 2009, page 3
16 Simón, L., 2010, page 26
17 The Council of the European Union, 2009 (b), page 18
management and certain elements (mainly the Civilian-Military Cell) of EUMS are being meshed and CMPD is to ensure cost-effectiveness of allocated resources and the avoidance of duplication with other partners such as NATO or the UN. There are reasonable doubts concerning the current placement (and even its utility) of the Civilian/Military Cell (Civ/Mil Cell) in the context of the recent structural transformation.

When it was physically created in 2005, the original plan was to enhance EU’s capacity for crisis management planning, to reinforce the national HQ designated to conduct an EU autonomous operation, to assist in co-ordinating civilian and military instruments at its disposal, and to contribute to strategic planning (including contingency planning) and running an autonomous EU military operation. In light of the establishment of CMPD, the Civ/Mil Cell placed within the EUMS does not make much sense from a strategic perspective as CMPD itself will include the needed capabilities and certain reorganisation of EUMS is probable.

The EEAS includes CPCC, CMPD and EUMS and they are all attached to the High Representative. The member-states intelligence-sharing hub - the Situation Centre (SitCen) and, possibly, experts from the Commission who deal with crisis response and peacebuilding activities should be placed here as well. These structures will form an entity placed under the direct authority and responsibility of the High Representative in his/her capacity of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. This arrangement will fully respect Declaration no 14 annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon. One of the recent activities of the EU in connection to this new structure is a drafting of doctrine which would further integrate human rights and gender into policies that will be formulated within this entity.

2.5 An Assessment and the Most Recent Development

Although the merger of DG VIII and DG IX and the foundation of the new body, the CMPD, have been welcome as an important step towards further integration of civilian and military approaches to crisis management, there have also been important lines of criticism. These can be divided into two different strands. First, the ongoing complexity of the chain of command has been identified as an obstacle to otherwise streamlined and effective structure. Specifically, the fact that the CMPD, CPCC and EUMS are all located within the same entity and yet are not unified in the same chain of command has been seen as a particularly problematic situation.

The second line of criticism with regard to the establishment of CMPD has noted that it has created the space in which the strong military planning capabilities could dominate in the CMPD, with detrimental effect on a civilian aspect of EU operations. ‘In the absence of civilian strategic planners, the new CMPD will need to ‘grow’ them and this will take time, although certainly not the 20 years as some with a military background would suggest.’ However, it is still too early to empirically evaluate this claim. Interestingly, the military chiefs have been twitchy about the implications of the Lisbon Treaty and have seen the opposite danger, namely that their advice will not carry the same weight as it used to (the DG VIII vs. the CMPD integrated planning within EEAS). One of the important changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty has been a partial change in the reporting line of the military chiefs. While they reported

---

18 The Council of the European Union, 2005, page 29
19 The Council of the European Union, 2009 (a), page 3
20 Blair, S., 2009, page 3
21 Pop, V., 2009
Consolidating the EU’s crisis management structures: civil-military coordination and the future of the EU OHQ

to the Member States in the PSC which was previously chaired by the rotating EU Presidency, they are newly required to report directly to the High Representative in his double-hatted capacity.

There have been other recent restructuring of the EU staff working on external relations (EEAS). The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has decided to stay within the premises of the Commission. This move reinforces her formal position to make proposals for CSDP and CFSP, both within the Commission and the Council. Simultaneously, the Lisbon Treaty foresees the High Representative to appoint a separate PSC Chair under her authority. This setting represents a shift from a situation under which the post was previously reserved for the six-month EU Presidency. Also, previous attempts of some governments to keep the EU Military Staff (EUMS) outside of the EEAS structures failed and this result augur well for enhanced civil-military cooperation. As far as broad civilian-military cooperation in EU crisis management is concerned, the role of the Commission under the Lisbon Treaty has institutionally been strengthened. For instance, the Commission will also be in charge of the Instrument for Stability (IfS)’s budget. However, its closer link to CSDP in general and crisis management in particular has been offset by its ongoing disconnection from activities on the military side of crisis management, especially at the politico-strategic level. It is clear that institutional consolidation is not enough here due to the political nature of this problem.

3 CURRENT EU OHQ OPTIONS AND FUTURE NEEDS

3.1 Context and the EU Chain of Command

An assessment of the EU Operation Headquarters (OHQ) which includes the discussion of the implications of the Lisbon Treaty for its future development requires contextualisation by the role of the chain of command and relevant institutional bodies. In order to plan and carry out a crisis-management mission, the EU’s chain of command features three levels of joint headquarters which correspond to three levels of planning and implementation for a mission: EUMS for the strategic/pre-decision level; the actual OHQ for the planning and conduct level; and the Force Headquarters (FHQ) for the local level.

As far as the first, the EUMS is a staff at the disposal of the Military Committee (EUMC) and is tasked with early warning, pre-decision situation assessment and planning and proposes strategic options. The designated agency within the EUMS for these tasks has been the Civil/Military Cell (Civ/Mil Cell) which was established in 2004 and was made fully operational in 2006. As argued above, the Civ/Mil Cell has practically not lived to its declared promises. In respect of the second, there are three options where OHQ can be established (see below). Importantly, it is tasked with operational planning, command and termination of the operation at the strategic level. As for the third, FHQ provides detailed planning, recommends the structure of forces, sets up a multinational logistics centre and commands the operation on the ground.

3.2 Three Current Options: Characteristics and Shortcomings

As already mentioned, there are three options for planning and running EU crisis management operations: using the structures of NATO (Berlin Plus); HQs of EU framework nations, or a newly created Operations Centre within the EUMS. The first option has been built up in order to plan and command NATO military operations, including those focused on crisis management and use common NATO assets and capabilities under the Berlin-Plus arrangements. An instrumental role in this option has been played by the Great Britain which has preferred ‘no duplication’ between NATO and EU capabilities. Thus, ‘the Berlin Plus agreements rest on the principle of the presumption of availability of NATO assets
and capabilities for ESDP operations’. For this option, Operation ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been an example.

There have been, however, a number of deficiencies in this option with direct relevance for civil-military crisis management. Some of them have already been solved, for example the problems with lack of mutual exchange of information between NATO and the EU. It was for this reason that a permanent EU liaison cell at NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and the SHAPE Cell in EUMS have been created. However, other deficiencies have been inextricably built into the structure of this option and no solutions to address them seem to exist. Most importantly, since the concept does not rely on civil instruments in house, any civil-military cooperation (the so-called CIMIC) needs to rely on the doctrine of Force Multiplier which means ‘organising military cooperation with available civil actors in the theatre.’ Indeed, such an arrangement cannot achieve a true coordination of civilian and military instruments and approaches. Among other important deficiencies, long negotiations between EU and NATO (in case of ALTHEA more than eight months) or political blockage by a non-EU NATO member are inherently present as potential flaws.

The second option regards the use of HQ of EU framework nations. The key move in this option has been a carried-out multinationalisation of several existing HQ and their use for an EU-led operation. So far, there have been five EU states which have volunteered and made their HQ ready for an EU operation: France (Mont Valérien), Germany (Postdam), the United Kingdom (Northwood), Greece (Larissa) and Italy (Cento Celle). The first three have already been used: Mont Valérien HQ for Operation Artemis in DRC in 2003 and EUFOR Tchad/RCA, Postdam HQ for Operation EUFOR DRC in 2006 and Northwood HQ for EUNAVFOR Atalanta (from December 2008 onwards). In this option, standards for equipment, procedures and manning have been defined by the EU and framework nations implement them. The framework nation is expected to supply the Operation Commander (with the exception of EUFOR Tchad/RCA), key elements of military C2, communication and information systems and significant assets and capabilities for a given operation. The great proportion of EU staff is double hatted and immediately transferable to the activated OHQ.

The problem with this option is that ‘[n]ational HQ do not have civil-military competencies either. National parent headquarters continue to have other national, alliance and coalition roles to fulfil … [Additionally, the idea that one country bears the burden for providing an OHQ is not compatible with the concept of fair burden-sharing].’ This option is also not particularly suitable for civil-military crisis management as military planning dominates the overall organisation of a given mission and the multinationalisation can take up to 20 days. One of the reasons is a difficult delineation of planning between the EU level and the framework nation. Finally, the fact that the EU does not have a permanent military-strategic level of command means that there is little information about and coherence in applying relevant EU concepts and procedures.

The use of the EU Operations Centre within the EUMS represents the third existing option for EU civil-military crisis management missions. It is important to note that ‘the Operations Centre is not a standing HQ. Instead, it is a permanently available capacity to rapidly set up a HQ for a particular operation.’ What is ready

---

23 Hochleitner, E., 2008, page 28
24 Ibid, page 28
25 Simón, 2010, page 14
26 Brauss, H. and Zinzius, R., 2007, page 2
then is rather the necessary infrastructure, developed procedures and permanent staff within Civ/Mil Cell which is responsible for maintaining the capability to activate the Operations Centre at any time. Initial Operating Capability (i.e. capability to plan an operation) is within 5 days and Full Operational Capability (i.e. capability to run an operation) is within 20 days for operation of up to 2,000 soldiers. Importantly, the ‘Civ/Mil Cell including its inherent Operations Centre capacity is the first standing EU body that fully integrates military and civilian expertise, including from the European Commission’.27

While the EU Operations Centre represents a welcome option for the EU to establish an operational chain of command for a particular operation, especially if a joint civil-military response is needed, this possibility essentially suffers from two handicaps. The first is the need for extra time between the request of the Council and the actual activation of the Operations Centre which suggests that even this option will not be ideal for very urgent cases of hybrid crisis management. Second handicap can be seen in the limited size of operations which can be executed under this option. The size of the EU Operations Centre (89 envisaged staff, including 13 civilians) means in practice that rather small autonomous operations of no more than 2,000 forces could be carried out. Indeed, the relatively small size of prospective operations does not match entirely with both an increase in EU’s global ambition in crisis management as well as the transformations in strategic environment.

3.3 The Need for a Permanent Strategic Planning and Conduct Structure

Although the third option is the most suitable from the existing ones for EU’s hybrid (civilian and military) crisis management, it is far from being satisfactory and a new option needs to be considered. This brief sees the establishment of a permanent EU strategic planning and conduct structure in Brussels as the right answer to much needed EU capabilities in this field. A mere enlargement of the Civ/Mil Cell and/or its deeper integration under EEAS is not seen as a sufficient answer to the needed EU crisis management capabilities. There are many factors which can support this establishment and only the most important ones for the focus of this brief are presented.

First, there is the need for a rapid reaction to crisis escalation and it is clear that none of the above options can meet the 2010 Headline Goal’s related responsiveness target (10 days). The only way of achieving this is create a permanently activated strategic planning and conduct structure rather than capacity. Second, staff shortages is a very important issue too as the potential use of any of the three existing options would significantly weaken the designated structures during the EU’s crisis response.28

Third, the proposed option is seen as the only one capable of developing lasting strategic culture of comprehensive response to crisis management, mainly through the mechanism of institutional-memory maintenance within the EEAS. It is clear that institutional memory can be formed as a result of a fully-fledged, existing structure, rather than mere capacity. Finally, this option would allow planning and conducting more complex and larger EU crisis management missions.

Indeed, the key question is how should such a permanent structure look like? Informal proposals have included discussions of approximately 100 personnel reserved for the permanent EU OHQ. This number has been seen as sufficient ‘to deliver the planning and C2 leg of up to two Battlegroup-sized operations. These numbers remain strikingly modest if compared with SHAPE’s capacity of over 3,000’.29

The proposed development has mainly been hindered by (negative) political preferences of key

27 Ibid, page 1
28 Hochleitner, E., 2008, pages 30-33
29 Simón, L., 2010, page 42
member states, such as Great Britain with its ‘no duplication’ argument. ‘In fact, a planning skeleton of some 50 personnel would suffice to address the most urgent problems … It would, on the one hand, offer the CMPD operational insight in the context of politico-strategic planning deliberations, as well as contribute to the CMPD’s advance comprehensive planning packages … CPCC should place a permanent cell within the skeleton, while the latter should reciprocate by sending its own permanent liaison team to the CPCC’.30 The above operational skeleton would represent a crucial step with a potential to overcome no permanent OHQ thinking and develop a robust EU’s strategic culture.31

4 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 Conclusions

Effective decision-making and steady leadership are two crucial characteristics for EU’s crisis management after the Lisbon Treaty. Qualified majority voting can be newly used for creating, funding and administering a start-up fund to ensure rapid access to appropriation in the EU budget for urgent need to finance CFSP/CSDP initiatives such as crisis management missions. Although member states are still the key locus of political power, the Lisbon Treaty gives significant political clout to the High Representative and the Commission as they are responsible for joint proposals in CFSP and CSDP. It remains to be seen to what extent the possibility for a joint proposal will be used in practice. This practice can have a transformative effect in achieving and reinforcing consistent leadership as suggested by the Lisbon Treaty, thus moving beyond the need for separate CFSP/CSDP procedures.

As far as EU planning and conduct structures in the issue are of crisis management are concerned, the EU has made a significant progress in creating a variety of options ranging from the Berlin Plus arrangement through the framework nation to the Operations Centre. While laudable both in principle and practice, none of these options have possessed the key characteristics needed for a rapid, consistent and robust response to all sorts of crisis situations on ground calling for joint response. It was for this reason that the case for the establishment of permanent EU strategic planning and conduct structure in Brussels was put forward.

4.2 Recommendations

− The establishment of a permanent EU strategic planning and conduct structure in Brussels is recommended as the right answer to empirically needed EU capabilities in the field of crisis management. Such a move would increase EU’s institutional memory and comprehensiveness in the this field as well as it would lead to greater coherence and consistency in applying civilian and military planning and conduct concepts and procedures.

− The initial permanent planning and conduct structure could be staffed by approximately 50 personnel; the later stage should double this number. An incremental approach is seen as advantageous due to existing principled political objections to this establishment. This would allow the EU to get involved in larger operations which would require both rapid and joint (in the sense of civil-military) response.

30 Ibid, page 43

EU needs to invest more resources and time to developing civilian crisis management capabilities. This is not only the issue of absolute sums but also of (lack of) coordination between CMPD and OHQ with the Commission’s expertise and bodies. This would beyond any doubts enhance not only civil-military coordination but also the broader civilian-civilian cooperation and coordination. For a proper functioning in the future, the placement of the Commission Crisis Response and Peacebuilding unit directly under the High Representative is seen crucial. Too, the currently convoluted chain of command needs to be streamlined so CMPD, CPCC, EUMS, SitCen and the Commission Crisis Response unit are better interlinked in this respect.

There are reasonable doubts concerning the current placement (and make-up) of the Civilian/Military Cell (Civ/Mil Cell) in the context of the structural transformation under way. In light of the establishment of CMPD, the Civ/Mil Cell placed within the EUMS does not make much sense from a strategic perspective as CMPD itself will include the needed capabilities and certain reorganisation of EUMS is desirable.

The European Parliament (EP) needs to use its supervisory and consultative role in foreign policy under the Lisbon Treaty strategically. In particular, the close working relationship with the High Representative who has the responsibility to consult the EP regularly and ensure that its views are being taken into account will be crucial for EP’s enhancement of its profile in this area. Too, it should use the regular debates on implementation of CFSP and CSDP which take place twice a year as platforms for more in-depth knowledge and opinion exchange with the High Representative and other key actors in the field of crisis management.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Consolidating the EU's crisis management structures: civil-military coordination and the future of the EU OHQ


DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES

POLICY DEPARTMENT

Role
Policy departments are research units that provide specialised advice to committees, inter-parliamentary delegations and other parliamentary bodies.

Policy Areas
Foreign Affairs
Human Rights
Security and Defence
Development
International Trade

Documents