TOWARDS
A SINGLE PARLIAMENT

THE INFLUENCE OF THE ECSC COMMON ASSEMBLY
ON THE TREATIES OF ROME

1957-2007

FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE TREATIES OF ROME
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The cover photograph shows the first meeting of the Assembly set up by the Rome Treaties and is from the archives of the Dernières Nouvelles d’Alsace newspaper in Strasbourg. Unless otherwise specified, all photographs are from the European Parliament archives.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD BY THE PRESIDENT ................................................................. 5
PREFACE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL .................................................. 7
NOTE TO READERS .................................................................................... 9

PART ONE - TOWARDS A SINGLE PARLIAMENT - THE INFLUENCE
OF THE ECSC COMMON ASSEMBLY ON THE TREATIES OF ROME

  1. Europe in the 1950s - the road to a common market ........................................... 13
     (a) The situation in Europe in the 1950s and the first European organisations .......... 13
     (b) The European Defence Community (EDC) - the first setback ......................... 14
     (c) The Common Assembly and the failure of the EDC .......................................... 14
  2. The Teitgen resolution ....................................................................................... 16
  3. Setting up the Working Party ............................................................................. 18
  4. The Working Party ........................................................................................... 18

II THE COMMON ASSEMBLY AND THE PREPARATIONS FOR THE ROME TREATIES ... 21
  1. The Assembly and the Messina Conference ......................................................... 21
  2. The Committee of Experts and the Common Assembly ......................................... 23
  3. The Assembly's position on the common market in March 1956 .......................... 23
  4. The Assembly's position on Euratom in March 1956 ........................................... 25
  5. Lead-up to the Venice Conference ....................................................................... 26
  6. Institutional aspects ........................................................................................... 28
  7. Social aspects .................................................................................................... 29

III THE COMMON ASSEMBLY AND THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE ........... 31
  1. The final stage of negotiations ............................................................................ 31
  2. The Working Party memorandum ..................................................................... 32
  3. Plenary debate on the progress of negotiations .................................................. 33
  4. Steps taken by the ‘European Assemblies’ ....................................................... 35
  5. The Convention on Certain Common Institutions .............................................. 37
  6. Following the signing of the Treaties of Rome: the Treaties in the words of the President of the Common Assembly ................................................................. 38

CONCLUSIONS - THE ROLE OF THE COMMON ASSEMBLY IN PREPARING THE TREATIES OF ROME ................................................................. 41

COMMON ASSEMBLY MEMBERS MENTIONED .............................................. 43

LIST OF DOCUMENTS MENTIONED .................................................................. 53
  A. List of attached documents ................................................................................ 55
  B. List of reports of the Common Assembly mentioned ......................................... 56
  C. List of reports of meetings of the Working Party mentioned ............................. 57
  D. List of other documents mentioned .................................................................. 58
PART TWO
DOCUMENTS(LIST A)
FRENCH ORIGINALS

A1  ASSEMBLEE COMMUNE – Résolution adoptée le 2 décembre 1954 et relative aux Pouvoirs de l’Assemblée Commune et à leur exercice ................................................................. 63
A2  ASSEMBLEE COMMUNE – Proposition de résolution à l’adresse des Gouvernements des états membres de la CECA ......................................................................................... 67
A3  ASSEMBLEE COMMUNE – Groupe de Travail – Compte rendu de la réunion du samedi 8 décembre 1956 .............................................................................................................. 73
A6  ASSEMBLEE COMMUNE – Groupe de Travail – Memorandum sur la Relance européenne .......... 113
A7  ASSEMBLEE COMMUNE – BUREAU – Procès-Verbal de la réunion du samedi 2 février 1957 .......... 121
A9  Procès-verbal de l’audience accordée à la délégation des Bureaux des trois Assemblées européennes par le six Ministres réunis en Conférence le 4 février 1957 au Val Duchesse à Bruxelles .................................................. 141
A10 Procès-verbal de la réunion de la Délégation des Bureaux des trois Assemblées européennes (Bruxelles, le 4 février 1957) .............................................................................................................. 151

DOCUMENTS(LIST A)
UNOFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF FRENCH ORIGINALS

A 1 COMMON ASSEMBLY – Resolution adopted on 2 December 1954 concerning the Powers of scrutiny of the Common Assembly and their use ........................................................................ 161
A 2 COMMON ASSEMBLY – Motion for a resolution addressed to the Governments of the Member States of the ECSC ....................................................................................... 165
A 3 COMMON ASSEMBLY - Working Party – Minutes of the meeting of Saturday, 8 December 1956(extract: Exchange of views on the current progress of the proceedings of the Intergovernmental Conference on the Common Market and Euratom) ............................................................. 169
A 5 COMMON ASSEMBLY – Working Party – Letter by Mr Motz to Mr Spaak of 10 December 1956 ..... 191
A 7 COMMON ASSEMBLY – BUREAU – Minutes of the meeting of Saturday, 2 February 1957 .......... 201
A 8 Minutes of the joint meeting of the Bureaux of the ECSC Common Assembly, the Council of Europe Consultative Assembly and the Western European Union Assembly of 2 February 1957 ......................................................... 209
A 9 Minutes of the hearing accorded to the delegation from the Bureaux of the three European Assemblies by the six Ministers meeting in Conference at Val Duchesse on 4 February 1957 ...................................................... 217
A10 Minutes of the meeting of the Delegation from the Bureaux of the three European Assemblies (Brussels, 4 February 1957) ........................................................................................................ 225
The adoption of the Treaties of Rome was a turning point, imparting a new impetus to the process of economic and social reconstruction and moral and institutional integration under way in a Europe striving to heal the wounds left behind by the Second World War.

This collection of ECSC Common Assembly documents (many of them published for the first time) and the accompanying account of events illustrate the contribution that the Assembly made to the work leading up to the Rome Treaties. The publication covers the three-year period from August 1954 (which saw the collapse of the European Defence Community project) to March 1957.

An analysis of the Common Assembly’s activities over this period shows an assembly which, though still elected by national parliaments, quickly became the mouthpiece for the pro-European sentiments held by the public at the time; an assembly which, with the Teitgen resolution of 2 December 1954, was one step ahead of the Messina Conference in calling for ‘constituent power’ and raising the issue of the extension of the ECSC’s competences at an historic moment, when the failure of the European Defence Community appeared to have brought the European integration process to an end.

The minutes of the Common Assembly’s proceedings show that many conflicting emotions were at play: disappointment at the failure of a project (the European Defence Community) to which the Assembly had made a major contribution; the belief that European integration remained of essential importance if Europe was to face up to the challenges of a world that – as was gradually becoming apparent – was undergoing radical change; and a shared desire to map out new paths to integration that went beyond national and ideological boundaries.

The role which the Common Assembly played as a driving force for European integration was later taken over and made its own by the European Parliament, which, over and above the impact of the positions it has adopted, has come to embody the soul of the European integration process.

Between 1954 and 1957, the Assembly drove the process forward by making clear, pragmatic proposals, as can be seen from the acts adopted and the majority of the statements made in plenary and in working party meetings. The members were keenly aware of the challenges and difficulties facing Europe, particularly in the energy field (an issue still high on the agenda today), which it could not tackle unless it was united. During this period, the Assembly was able to experiment and determine what role it should play in the institutional set-up and in relations between the States.

This ability to strike the right balance between the desirable and the possible enabled the Common Assembly to make its voice heard by the foreign ministers of the six founding Member States. It is an ability that is still the main asset of today’s European Parliament, enabling it to continue to play a central role in the institutional changes required in order to take the European integration process forward.

Hans-Gert Pöttering
This publication, which adds to our understanding of the origins of the Treaties of Rome and their innovative significance for the process of European integration, is one that is close to my heart, and I have followed and encouraged the making of it with great enthusiasm.

Among the numerous initiatives taken by the European Parliament to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the Rome Treaties, the publication (in most cases for the first time) of the texts adopted by the ECSC Common Assembly as it helped to plan and draft the treaties is particularly important for an understanding of the role of Parliament. The ideas and proposals of the ECSC Common Assembly, the forerunner of the Parliamentary Assembly set up by the 1957 treaties, played an important part in this decisive phase in the economic and institutional development of Europe.

As Secretary-General of the European Parliament, I am happy to launch the process of making these previously unpublished and already historically valuable documents available to researchers and the public at large. This will also enable the European Parliament to continue the upgrading of its own historical archive, which covers the period from 1953 – the year when the Common Assembly was set up – to the present. This is a major collection of archival material, which Parliament is classifying, digitising and making available to users, who can also access a specialised database in the same area.

In so doing, Parliament is meeting its legal obligations of conservation and transparency vis-à-vis the public. Article 255 of the Treaty establishing the European Community states that ‘any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State, shall have a right of access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents’.

However, this publication is also a response to the political curiosity of members of the public (ordinary citizens, students and researchers) and their wish to understand better the actions and views of the European Parliament in a historical context over which it has had a significant influence.

A broader understanding of Parliament and its acts will enable the history of the European institutions to be more comprehensively analysed and recorded, and in the long term will lead to a clearer perception of the democratic foundations of the European Union.

It is for these reasons that I, in my capacity as Secretary-General of the European Parliament, also plan to publish a series of documents relating to the history of the institution. In addition to its commemorative role, the present publication serves to inaugurate that series with this, the first contribution to the process of making the history of the European Union more widely known.

Harald RØMER
This document brings together documents of the ECSC Common Assembly concerning the establishment of the European Economic Community and Euratom in Rome on 25 March 1957. Some of these documents are previously unpublished and are attached, together with two further documents which it was felt useful to include, even though they have already been published.

In order to assist readers, documents which are attached or simply cited in the text have been grouped into four lists, which are referred to in the footnotes:

A. List of documents (annexes)
B. List of minutes of sittings of the Common Assembly (not attached)
C. List of minutes of meetings of the Working Party (ad hoc body of the Common Assembly) (not attached)
D. List of documents not included in the above lists.

Accordingly, footnote references to Docs. A, B, C or D, followed by a number, refer to the corresponding document in the relevant list. The page numbers given refer to the French version of the document. Information concerning Members of the Joint Assembly who are mentioned can be found in a separate list at the end of the document.
PART ONE

TOWARDS A SINGLE PARLIAMENT -
THE INFLUENCE OF THE ECSC COMMON ASSEMBLY ON THE TREATIES OF ROME
1. Europe in the 1950s - the road to a common market

(a) The situation in Europe in the 1950s and the first European organisations

The political climate in the years following the Second World War, when the European Communities were established, was profoundly different from that of the pre-war period. The United States had become the leading economic power and this influenced the balance of power in Europe, which was now divided into two opposing blocs. A further important factor during the post-war years, and one which was to influence the European integration process, was the German question. From the end of the Second World War until 1949 Germany did not exist as a state, but was governed by an Inter-Allied Commission. Nevertheless, the countries of Western Europe felt the need to incorporate the western part of Germany into the European system to avert conflict between France and Germany, ensure that democracy in Federal Germany had a firm foundation, secure the territory for the western alliance in the event of conflict with the Eastern bloc and, lastly, to support the country’s economic reconstruction and incorporate its economy into that of Western Europe. In international relations, the division of Europe into two blocs meant that there was a clear distinction between friendly and hostile States, reducing the margin of diplomatic freedom enjoyed by individual States.

Against this background, the countries of Western Europe realised the need for close international cooperation to tackle common problems. Support also came from some sectors of public opinion and movements for European Union were set up in various countries. By the late 1940s a series of European international organisations had been established, although Germany remained excluded from them.

It was Schuman, then Foreign Minister, who found a way of bringing Germany back into the European fold, while at the same time paving the way for further developments on the road to European integration. In his historic speech of 9 May 1950 he proposed that French and German coal and steel production should be brought together under a single high authority as part of an organisation open to other European countries.

The six founder countries of the ECSC agreed to the proposal on 3 June 1950 and the relevant treaty was signed in Paris on 18 April 1951, entering into force after ratification on 23 July 1952.

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2 These organisations were, at economic level, the Benelux Customs Convention between Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands (signed in 1944) and the OECD (1948), which was set up to coordinate the Marshall Plan. At political and military level, the Treaty of Brussels was signed in 1947, a treaty of alliance that would lead to the setting up of the Western European Union and the Brussels Treaty Organisation, which would become NATO in 1949. The same year saw the establishment of the Council of Europe, whose role was to develop and guarantee a common political ethos.

3 Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and Netherlands.
(b) The European Defence Community (EDC) - the first setback

Following the opening of negotiations on establishing the ECSC, a further integration plan took shape in the highly sensitive area of defence policy, prompted by a rapid sequence of international events⁴.

As for military alliances in Western Europe, NATO did not include among its members the Federal Republic of Germany, created one month after the signing of the Atlantic Alliance, even though it was felt, by the Americans in particular, that the country needed to be rearmed in order to bring it within the Western European defensive system. All the NATO member states shared this ambition, although they remained divided as to how it should be done.

Following pressure from America, where it was felt that a greater military commitment by the United States should take second place to German rearmament, on 24 October 1950 René Pleven, the French Prime Minister, put forward an alternative proposal based on the model previously advocated by his Foreign Minister for the ECSC, namely the setting up of a European defence community which would allow future German military units to be integrated at battalion level only, under the auspices of a European defence ministry. The negotiations opened on 15 February 1951 and the outcome went further than Pleven had called for. The Treaty signed in Paris on 27 May 1952 by the member states of the ECSC provided for a European army of 40 divisions, with a common uniform and an executive in the form of a nine-member commissariat modelled on the ECSC’s High Authority, though with more limited powers, and an institutional structure identical to the ECSC but a balance of powers between the institutions weighted more in favour of the Council. Furthermore, the Court and the Assembly would be the same.

In France, however, there was strong opposition both from the public and the National Assembly, which on 30 August 1954 rejected the law ratifying the Treaty.

Far from ending the push towards European integration, the French Parliament’s vote gave strength and vigour to those who took a more functional view and advocated European integration via the gradual extension of cooperation in the economic sphere. By the beginning of 1955 the setting up of an Atomic Energy Community was firmly on the political agenda, prompted by the belief that this source of energy was destined to play a prominent role in the continent’s economy. It was Monnet who proposed the plan for a specific community, soon know as Euratom. This was backed up by a proposal for a customs union put forward by Ludwig Erhard⁵. These two proposals were brought together with others in the Benelux Memorandum, which was to provide the basis for discussions at the Conference of Messina⁶.

(c) The Common Assembly and the failure of the EDC

The failure to secure ratification of the EDC had repercussions in the Common Assembly. The vote by the French National Assembly took place on 30 August. At the next session of the Common Assembly⁷, the subject was not only raised, but discussed in a way that was not recriminatory but rather displayed a positive commitment to European integration.

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⁴ On 25 June 1950 the Korean war broke out, bringing East-West relations in Europe to a head one year after the Berlin crisis had been overcome and at a time when a substantial part of the French army was occupied in Indo-China.

⁵ German Minister for Economic Affairs.

⁶ 1-3 June 1955, held under the Presidency of Josef Bech of Luxembourg and with the participation of Paul-Henry Spaak (Belgian), Walter Hallstein (Germany), Antoine Pinay (France), Gaetano Martino (Italy) and Jan Willem Beyen (Netherlands).

⁷ 29 November - 2 December 1954.
The new President of the Assembly, Luigi Pella, devoted his inaugural address to the events of that August, rejecting any nascent pessimism as unable to check the impetus of efforts to achieve objectives which were necessary. It was Jean Monnet, however, who opened the debate on the substance of the problem, explaining to the Assembly his decision not to request an extension of his mandate as President of the High Authority, which was to expire on 10 February of the following year:

"...in order to work to bring about European unity, which must be tangible and real, with total freedom of speech and action. I want to join with the efforts of all those who are striving to continue what has been started. The United States of Europe are not only the great hope, but also the urgent need of our age, because upon them depends both the welfare of our peoples and the strengthening of peace."

During the ensuing debate on ECSC economic policy, countless references not strictly relevant to the topic under discussion were made to the failure to ratify the EDF, or grant the Common Assembly powers of parliamentary scrutiny over the newly established Western European Union and, more generally, in support of greater European integration.

The subsequent debate on ECSC general policy provided an opportunity to examine the situation in greater depth. The basis for discussion was a report by the Political Affairs Committee, which dealt only in part with the events of the summer, although these dominated the debate, which saw broad agreement on the need for an integrationist approach, although differences remained on various matters.

In her speech, Margeretha Klompé, the rapporteur, focused on the internal functioning of the Community and in particular on the role of the Assembly and the extension of the ECSC’s responsibilities. In discussing the first argument, there are two factors to consider: the situation under existing law, the potential of which the rapporteur felt had not been fully exploited, and the amendments needed to the Treaty. Here Mrs Klompé called in particular for the Assembly to be given greater budgetary powers of censure over the executive. She supported an increase in the ECSC’s responsibilities, arguing that there were links with the areas of competence already assigned to it and pointing to the difficulty of formulating a coal policy separate from overall energy policy, which remained the preserve of the nation states at the time.

This question, which was dealt with in Mrs Klompé’s report was of particular concern to many members of the Assembly, who felt that the proposed solution for extending European competence was an abandonment of the supranational idea.

Successive speakers, with the sole exception of Michel Debré, were inspired by a common pro-European sentiment both as regards improving internal procedures and extending the ECSC’s competence (basically to include energy, but also transport), mostly on the basis of arguments similar to those used by Mrs Klompé.

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9 Doc. B 2, pp. 21-22. The words quoted in the text are taken directly from the resolution on Monnet’s resignation which was adopted the same day (ibid. p. 113). For the text of the proposal (Sassen, Mollet and Delbos), which was adopted without amendment, see ibid. pp. 87-88.
10 ibid, pp. 22-61.
11 Doc. D 1. The report did not include a motion for a resolution, which was held over to a later date.
12 Doc. B 3, pp. 77-84
13 Doc. D 1, p. 7.
14 The speakers who followed the rapporteur, in the order in which they spoke, were as follows: Gérard Jaquet, Pierre Wigny, Michel Debré, Jonkheer Marinus van der Goes van Naters, Willy Birkelbach, Giuseppe Togni, Gerrit Vixseboxse, Nicolas Margue, Hermann Kopf and Fernand Dehouss.
15 Debré was opposed to extending the ECSC’s functions and regretted that the policy was being considered at such length in an assembly whose functions were to monitor the economic activities of the High Authority.
2. The Teitgen resolution

On 2 December 1954 the ECSC Common Assembly discussed the report on *The powers of scrutiny of the Common Assembly and their use* by Mr Pierre-Henri Teitgen, which was the basis for a resolution divided into three parts, the first devoted to interinstitutional problems that could be resolved under the existing Treaty, the second calling for ‘constituent power’ to be vested in the Assembly under the existing Treaty, and the third calling for a working party to be set up on election of the Assembly by universal suffrage, the powers of the ECSC and the extension of its competences.

The report took the existing institutional situation as its starting point. The Assembly lacked some of the powers typical of a parliament, such as legislative and budgetary powers, but did enjoy the other basic power of monitoring the executive, although without being able to express a lack of confidence in it; this scrutiny was not merely technical but was of undoubted political value. The Assembly also had the power to participate in amending the Treaty. Lastly, and in more general terms, the ECSC had been designed as an emerging community whose future prospects far exceeded its current competences, something widely recognised in both professional circles and by national governments. In this connection

> Our governments have given a firm undertaking to implement the letter and spirit of the Treaty faithfully. Fortified by this commitment, the Assembly is entitled, after debating and adopting appropriate resolutions, to draw the attention of the Member States to any policy which by its immediate or future effects jeopardises the existence and efficiency of the European Coal and Steel Community and disappoints the hopes which it embodies.

This role of providing parliamentary impetus, to which the Assembly was laying claim, was the trigger for a proposal for its election by universal suffrage, which would give it greater moral and political authority. With this in view, it was proposed that a working party be set up, which would also be responsible for ‘examining to what extent experience showed that a better definition of certain powers was needed, as well as a possible extension of the Community’s powers’.

In introducing his report, Mr Teitgen outlined the arguments in favour of election by universal suffrage and extension of the ECSC’s powers, citing significant examples and in particular highlighting the links between the two objectives. Aligning himself with the opinions prevalent among pro-Europeans at the time the rapporteur identified energy as a choice sector for giving the ECSC new responsibilities, arguing that, in addition to the complementary nature of these powers, there were other considerations which could be illustrated by a specific example. Mr Teitgen noted that national governments had done little to exploit the possibility of using ECSC aid for undertakings in order to resolve problems relating to lay-offs and believed that this was caused by governments’ fear of generating social distortions between different sectors in the respective states, e.g. between the coal and steel industry, which could benefit from ECSC aid, and other industries which could not. On this basis, the rapporteur argued that the Community powers should be extended to a broad range of economic and social measures.

The extension of Community powers justified the proposal for electing the Assembly by universal suffrage, since public opinion in the different countries would not see the need to accord such legitimacy to an Assembly merely required to discuss coal and steel issues. Furthermore, this extension of powers was justified because:

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16 Doc. D 2.
17 Doc. A 1. During the debate Mr Michel Debré wondered whether this second part, although brief, should be the basis of the entire resolution. Doc. B 4, p. 142.
18 Doc. D 2, p. 17.
19 Ibid, p. 18.
20 Speech can be found in Doc. B 4, pp. 124-132. The points referred to here can be found on pp. 131-132.
We can see quite simply that there are problems whose solution can only be found at European level. The solution is a European one because the problem is a European one and the decision-making power to resolve such problems must be at European level. This is the basis of our argument when we speak of the need for European institutions.

Many Members spoke in the ensuing debate. The discussions, which were also of a high level in cultural terms, focused essentially on fundamental principles, in particular supranationality, for which there were various arguments for and against. It was this principle which generally dictated what approach was taken to the extension of the ECSC’s powers, while the question of elections seemed to elicit less interest on the part of speakers, who devoted less time to it.

‘Politicising the ECSC’ was the keynote to the speech by Mr Carcaterra, who fully supported the motion for a resolution. In practice, ‘politicising’ the ECSC meant involving the ministers of the Member States so as to enable the Assembly to exert a direct influence over national policies. With this in view it was also important that the Assembly’s resolutions should have an impact beyond the institution and result in specific achievements. These objectives could be achieved without amending the Treaty, an option which the speaker did not rule out, although believing it to be an instrument that should be used when other methods were insufficient to realise the construction of a European Union.

There were some, such as Mr Maroger who supported a cautious step-by-step approach, citing by way of example the history of German unification, which had followed on from a long period of customs union, and considering what concept of ‘community’ should be adopted. It was necessary to have a clear idea of what was meant by ‘community’ in order to address the objective danger that a rapid expansion could in the short and medium term cause harm to consumers and lead citizens to become disaffected with Community.

Mr Debré, a Gaullist opposed to supranationality but in favour of ‘a political organisation of European nations’, stressed that the current situation of the construction of Europe was irreversible because of the existence of supranational bodies.

Mr Motz supported the motion for a resolution and, drawing on the experience of the Benelux countries, tackled the issues of customs union and free trade areas, concluding that the ECSC should be the point of departure for a wider economic community.

Mr Bruins Slot took a pessimistic view and, after a number of specific remarks on the Teitgen report, said that the movement towards integration had stalled and it was no use under the present circumstances advocating direct elections, since the barriers to integration came from national governments and parliaments and it was therefore at national level, not supranational level, that the relaunch of European integration needed to begin.

21 Ibid, p. 132.
24 The speaker backed up his ideas by referring to the concept of community (Gemeinschaft) scientifically defined by Tonnies and more generally by late 19th century German sociology. This refers to a Community of interests where participants are united and each member has an equal right to benefit from withdrawals and redistribution of resources in accordance with his needs. The ECSC falls within this definition, as the speaker shows through appropriate references to Treaty provisions and in particular to parts of the preamble, which take up the concept defined by Tonnies.
25 Doc. B 4, pp. 136-140.
26 Ibid, pp. 141-145.
28 Ibid, pp. 147-151.
Eventually, the motion for a resolution was adopted without substantial amendments. For present purposes, there are two main points of interest in the text adopted: the paragraph in which the Assembly recognises itself as competent to discuss resolutions on amendments to the Treaty and the paragraph proposing that a working party be established on

the procedure to be followed for examining the most appropriate and effective ways of: ...

2. extending the competence of the Community and in general enlarging the common market,

3. the problems relating to the election of members of the Assembly by universal suffrage.

3. Setting up the Working Party

The Bureau of the Assembly examined the question and drew up a motion for a resolution implementing paragraph V of the resolution of 2 December 1954 on the setting up of a working party. The task of rapporteur was assigned to the President of the Assembly, Luigi Pella.

The report dealt with the nature of the working party, which would be similar to a committee of the Assembly, into which it could in future be converted, and consequently with its relations with other bodies of the Assembly. On the question of its composition, the Bureau proposed that it should have 26 members representing the groups and Member States and chosen mainly from among members having responsibilities on the Assembly’s various general committees. There would be six members each for the three larger countries (Germany, France and Italy), three for Belgium and Holland and two for Luxembourg. They would be appointed by the Assembly on a proposal from the Bureau, acting in cooperation with the committees and groups. The motion for a resolution contained fewer details than had been anticipated in the resolution.

The debate took place on 6 and 9 May 1955 and, despite the highly technical nature of the proposal, was a lively discussion, but with little that need detain us here. The resolution was adopted on 9 May.

4. The Working Party

On 13 May 1955 the Assembly appointed the Working Party, which consisted of 28 members. The following day the Working Party held its first meeting and elected Mr Roger Motz Chairman and Mr Wolfgang Pohle and Mr Gerard Jacquet Vice-Chairmen.

30 Ibid. Point IV of the resolution.
31 Ibid. Point V of the resolution.
34 Doc. D 4.
36 Doc. C 1.
From the time when it was established until February 1957 the Working Party consisted of the following members: Martin Blank, Heinz Braun, Henri-Guy Caillavet, Enrico Carboni, Antonio Carcaterra, Giuseppe Caron, Alfred Chupin, Napoléon Cochart, Fernand Dehousse, Jean Fohrmann, Jonkheer Marinus van der Goes van Naters, Gilles Gozard, Cornelis P. Hazenbosch, Gerhard Jaquet, Margaretha Klompé, Hermann Kopf, Gerhard Kreyssig, Ugo La Malfa, Nicolas Margue, François de Menthon, Roger Motz, Erwin Müller, Joseph Oesterle, Attilio Piccioni, Alain Poher, Wolfgang Pohle, Roger de Saivre, Vincenzo Selvaggi, Alberto Simonini, Erwin Müller, Joseph Oesterle, Attilio Piccioni, Alain Poher, Wolfgang Pohle, Roger de Saivre, Vincenzo Selvaggi, Alberto Simonini, Pierre Wigny.

The European Parliament’s archives hold the records of the 18 meetings from the constituent meeting up to the meeting of 26 February 1958, which does not seem to have been the last. After the signing of the Treaties of Rome, the Working Party addressed the question of the amendments needed to the ECSC Treaty.

In line with the objectives set in the resolution which established it, the Working Party focused on two areas: on the one hand, improving the implementation and extension of the powers of the ECSC and, on the other, the establishment of a single market extending beyond the coal and steel sector.

37 Until November 1955.
38 From February 1956.
39 Until November 1955.
40 Until July 1955.
41 From February 1956.
42 Until February 1956.
43 Until October 1956.
44 Until May 1956.
45 From May 1956.
46 Until February 1956.
47 Until May 1956.
48 Until May 1956.
49 No records could be found of the meeting of 7 January 1957.
1. The Assembly and the Messina Conference

The Assembly kept a close track of debates and initiatives relating to European integration, particularly those instigated by national governments. These included the Messina Conference, which was to discuss the German proposal for a customs union and Jean's Monnet's Euratom proposal.

The conference was held in early June 1955; in mid-May the Assembly adopted a resolution setting out its own position prior to the conference. In the resolution, the Assembly called on the Foreign Ministers to ask the Community institutions to draw up proposals for the extension of the ECSC and to organise one or more Intergovernmental Conferences at which to draw up the draft treaties required for the next stages in the European integration process.

The debate held prior to the adoption of the resolution provides clear indications as to the meaning of the resolution and the Members’ expectations. In particular, the call for one or more intergovernmental conferences was intended to involve governments in the drawing up of a draft treaty, and thus to secure the support of the individual states. However, as an authoritative Member implicitly admits, it is difficult to draw any hard and fast conclusions as to the Members’ intentions from the debate of 14 May.

In Messina the Foreign Ministers set up a Committee of Experts to draft a report setting out proposals on the single market and Euratom, for submission to a forthcoming Conference of Foreign Ministers (in Venice on 29 May 1956). The Conference was to decide the action to be taken on the report and to convene an Intergovernmental Conference. Paul-Henri Spaak was appointed chairman of the Committee of Experts.

The debate held after the Messina Conference on the basis of a motion for a resolution tabled by the Committee on Political Affairs went into greater detail. The Assembly noted that, despite not providing explicit answers, the Messina resolution had taken its concerns into account. It welcomed the fact that a political figure had been appointed Chairman of the Committee of Experts and instructed its Working Party to assess the outcome of the Conference. The Assembly was not wholly

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50 Doc B 8, pp. 485-501. The previous day, the Assembly had set up a Working Party to look into the issue of European integration.
51 Speech by Mrs Klompe, ibidem, p.488.
52 Speech by Mr Dehousse, ibidem, p.489. The Socialist Member admitted that the Working Party had not had time to meet before the Messina Conference.
53 Doc. D 5.
54 Doc. D 6.
satisfied with what it saw as the limited role which the Conference felt it should play in the work on European integration and with the Conference’s failure properly to grasp the special position which the ECSC held within the European organisations.

Mrs Klompé, rapporteur for the Committee on Political Affairs, spoke of the two possible paths forward towards European integration that had been put forward at Messina, namely a sector-based approach and an across-the-board approach consisting in a common market. She favoured the latter approach, both because of the interconnectedness of the various sectors of the modern economy and because:

> What we are looking for is a community of interests in which all citizens of the Community, irrespective of the country in which they live, have the feeling that measures taken at European level are of direct concern - of direct benefit - to them.

> Were we to adopt a sector-based approach, we might find that some countries draw the benefits of integration while others suffer the drawbacks.

While taking a generally positive view, Mr Kopf regretted the foreign ministers’ failure to say anything about Assembly involvement in the Conference’s work and deplored the fact that the Messina Conference had failed to deliver on the German and Benelux proposals regarding, in particular, parliamentary scrutiny - a far from secondary consideration in the building of a sound institutional framework:

> Parliamentary scrutiny does, of course, require the existence of an executive. A parliament is the natural counterpart to an executive, a government. Institutional measures should be taken to ensure that there is a parliament as a counterpart to the executive.

Mr Vendroux took a critical, rather discordant, stance, questioning whether the Assembly should be considering the issues of extending its own sphere of competence and how Europe should be organised, given that no article in the Treaty gave it the powers so to do. He drew attention to the disparity in the views expressed by the Assembly and the High Authority, which tended to view the progress made by the ECSC in its own sphere of competence as a contribution to European integration, and saw it as being the national governments’ and parliaments’ responsibility to take European integration forward.

In one of the most critical speeches made, Mr Wehner said that Messina had failed sufficiently to emphasise the importance of an ECSC economic policy for further economic cooperation in Europe, and made a detailed review of the instruments for such cooperation.

Mr Wigny took a resolutely optimistic view, stating that he was proud to be part of an Assembly that was in a better position than anyone to understand the mechanisms of a common market. He also failed to understand the proposals for the Assembly to be elected by universal suffrage, in that such a means of giving the Assembly legitimacy would not create a shared sense of belonging among voters and would cut the valuable ties between the Assembly and national parliaments.

55 These negative aspects were raised with varying degrees of emphasis by a number of speakers, including Mr Wehner, details of whose speech are given below. The resolution adopted following the debate made no mention of these negative aspects.
56 Doc. B 9, p. 600.
57 Ibidem, p.605.
58 Ibidem, pp.606-609.
59 Ibidem, pp.609-612
60 Ibidem, pp.612-615
Mr Maroger was even more optimistic, setting out his own view of what a common market should be. His speech is extremely interesting to read 50 years after the event, in the light of what has happened since. Mr Maroger said that a single market did not mean everyone having the same wages, taxes or currency, but having the same tax mechanisms distributed in the same way among the various sources of income, with the same social charges and convertible currencies.

Mr von Merkatz stressed the importance of institutional issues in the European integration process and said that the Messina Conference had been successful above all in not overlooking the need for the institutions to be organised in an effective manner and in clearly identifying the problems in each area of the economic integration process.

2. The Committee of Experts and the Common Assembly

The relationship between the Committee of Experts and the Assembly represents the first instance of an intergovernmental body working alongside the representative body in connection with the revision or consolidation of the texts underpinning the European integration process.

Mr Spaak, the political driving force in the two intergovernmental bodies that followed on from each other between 1955 and 1957 and who had already been President of the Common Assembly, personally kept the Assembly and its Working Party informed. He attended two Working Party meetings, on 19 December 1955 and 8 December 1956, and reported directly to the Assembly on 13 March 1956. These three meetings took place at different stages in the negotiating process. In December 1955 the Committee of Experts had started work only a few months earlier; by 13 March 1956 it had completed its work and the heads of delegation had started drafting their report to the Venice Conference; by December 1956 the Committee of Experts had given way to the Intergovernmental Conference which, at the time, was made up of the foreign ministers and chaired by Mr Spaak, who thus ensured the continuity of the negotiations.

3. The Assembly’s position on the common market in March 1956

Mr Spaak’s March statement was not followed by a debate, but the same sitting saw a debate on the development of the common market, which may be considered as the Common Assembly’s first response to the Committee of Experts. The debate focused on a Working Party document, much of which was given over to refuting objections to the market concept but which also contained a detailed proposal as to how to bring a common market into being.

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61 Ibidem, pp.617-619
63 Doc. C 3.
64 Doc. A 3.
66 For space reasons, the statements made by Mr Spaak in December 1955 and March 1956 are not looked at here. However, those he made in December 1956 are dealt with in the following chapter.
67 Doc. D 9, p.43. This report, which was drafted by the Subcommittee on Competences and Powers, was discussed at the Working Party meeting of 2 March 1956 (Doc. C 4, p.28). The first working document on the report, which is held in Parliament’s archives, dates back to July 1955 and is marked ‘version 2’; there would appear to be no trace of version 1, and there is no mention of it in Working Party minutes prior to 3 November 1955, the date of the meeting during which the chairman of the subcommittee stated that the above report had been discussed on 16 and 17 September (and thus on the basis of version 2 - Doc. C 2, p. 3). The report produced by the Working Party’s Subcommittee on Competences and Powers was not formally adopted by the Working Party, which decided to forward it to the Assembly on 2 March 1956.
The core idea in the proposal was that of a multilateral treaty laying down in great detail the various stages in a transitional process predicted to last between ten and fifteen years, with twelve years felt to be the most likely. During this period, customs tariffs would be gradually brought down on the basis of a precise schedule, so as to prevent signatory states from delaying implementation. There was, however, no intention of making the system automatic, since two factors were required for the gradual reduction to be a success, namely: a governing structure to ensure the necessary flexibility in the schedule and introduce safeguard measures in the event of economic disruptions; two funds - a readjustment fund and an investment fund - to smooth the way to a common market, the first of which would help to modernise the industrial and agricultural systems, and the second to raise productivity.

As to market distortions caused by disparities in national social and tax legislation, the United States had shown that a common market could exist in the presence of major differences. Turnover tax did, however, need to be harmonised.

The report tackled the delicate issue of farming and its modernisation, that had up until then been hampered by the small size of holdings all around Europe.

Legal barriers to the movement of goods - particularly foodstuffs - and state aid were other central problems that needed to be overcome, but in a sensitive manner, so as to ensure that

the (wholly justified) replacement of the principle of independence with that of interdependence did not come as a slap in the face to those who have lived and worked under the old system in good faith. A way needs to be found to prevent any deterioration in the living standards of hard-working people whose only fault is to have considered a system that in actual fact represents a waste of resources to be perfectly normal, as everyone else has 68.

During the debate held in plenary on 14 March, the rapporteur introduced his report and made a number of interesting geo-political observations which he intended as a reply to the question which Mr Debré had, at national level, put to the French Government on the action that needed to be taken to prevent France from being completely subjected to policies formulated abroad. Mr van der Goes looked at the issue of further European integration from the standpoint of the competition between the two political blocs existing in Europe at the time.

Although some of the following speakers raised a few controversial points, no opposition was expressed. There was, however, a special focus on various topics that were included in the joint motion for a resolution that wound up the debate 69. The resolution, which was adopted unopposed, with one abstention, asked the Member States for a Treaty which, among other things:

• set up a single market free of any trace of isolationism;
• provided for freedom of movement for not just goods, services and capital, but also workers;
• set up an investment fund;
• made the necessary economic adjustments while taking due account of the specific situation in the farming sector;
• harmonised social charges as part of an active and progressive policy of steadily raising living standards;
• set up institutions with sufficient powers to implement the above principles under proper democratic control.

68 Ibidem, pp 33-34.
69 Doc. D 8.
4. The Assembly’s position on Euratom in March 1956

Alongside the issue of European integration, the energy question was being looked into in the knowledge that, as far as international competition was concerned, Europe was hampered by its high energy costs and the fact that it was lagging far behind the United States in the nuclear energy field. In response to this situation, a preliminary report on Europe’s energy problem was discussed by the Common Assembly at an extraordinary session held in March 1956. The report set out the current options, but did not reflect the rapporteur’s deeply held beliefs, as Mr Wigny himself told the Working Party. The report analysed the energy situation in great detail, focusing on the nuclear energy production process and reviewing the European projects seeking to integrate nuclear energy research and production that had been conducted since the war. The rapporteur summed up his report as follows to the Working Party:

There can be no doubt about the need for Euratom. [...] The question is whether Euratom should involve 18 or six countries, and whether it should take the form proposed by the OEEC or that put forward by the Brussels Committee of Experts, the Monnet Committee or the report currently under discussion. The OEEC plan simply lists the measures required, which depend on the goodwill of the Member States and would be implemented by means of a series of multilateral agreements. The proposed institutions would have no coordinating powers. There is no clash between the OEEC plan and the Six’s plan, and the two could coexist without problem.

The report advocates a common market that, in the nuclear industry, would combine the advantages of a division of labour and free competition and, at the same time, would regulate minerals and fuels, plant and equipment, scientific research and human and financial resources. The common market in nuclear energy should be subject to oversight by the international authorities with a view to ensuring equal access to users, a balance between demand and supply and military security and health protection. Some research and operational activities should be carried out by common undertakings, the most important of which would be the Joint Research Centre, which would be formed from the national research centres. The Euratom institutions would be based on the tried and tested model of an international Commission, a Council of Ministers, an Assembly, the Court of Justice and an advisory social council, representing the industry. This was much the same set-up as that recommended by the Committee of Experts chaired by Mr Spaak, which was to appear in the Treaty the following year. The report nonetheless took a stance on the issue of the ownership of nuclear materials, which was the subject of a debate in plenary. Within the English-speaking world in particular, it was held that ownership of such materials was necessary in order to ensure that the necessary controls were in place for the purposes of military security, health protection and security of supply. Mr Wigny took the opposing view, maintaining that what mattered was not ownership but the possession, transport and use of nuclear materials and that any supply problems - which were anyway unlikely to occur - could be solved by appropriate powers of intervention, rather than ownership. Furthermore, Euratom ownership of nuclear materials would create a monopoly at odds with the free market principle and might discourage some states from joining Euratom.

During the debate in plenary, the report received broad support, both for its basic thrust and for the institutional mechanisms which it advocated, but there were heated discussions on the issue of ownership.

70 Doc. D 7, p.76.
71 Doc. C 4, p.16.
72 Ibidem, pp.16-17.
74 Ibidem, p.20.
Mr Furled was the first to address the issue, dismissing the need for public ownership in a detailed speech analysing the various positions on the matter and expressing the view that peaceful use meant banning only the building of nuclear weapons, not nuclear-powered military vehicles, vessels and aircraft.

An opposing view was put in a statement by the Socialist Group read out in plenary by Mr Delouse, which dealt with two issues, namely the peaceful use of nuclear energy and public ownership of nuclear fuels. In connection with the former, the Socialist Group maintained that the Euratom Treaty should establish an effective system of controls involving both checks on documents and on-the-spot inspections and ensure that a proper inventory was kept of fissile materials. On the latter issue, the group reiterated its long-held view that Euratom should have exclusive ownership of nuclear fuels, subject to parliamentary scrutiny.

The Christian Democrats made a statement in support of the peaceful use of nuclear energy but not touching upon the issue of the ownership of nuclear materials. The statement, which was read out in plenary by Mr Sassen, maintained that the common market in nuclear energy should enable private enterprise to make a constructive contribution and that the manufacture of nuclear weapons - which would be ruled out initially - could take place only within a Community framework, following a unanimous decision by the Member States. The Liberal Group endorsed this position. The debate focused mainly on the above issues, with each speaker explaining the views of his or her group. No resolution was adopted.

5. Lead-up to the Venice Conference

Since the publication of the heads of delegation report the Working Party had been seeking to ensure that the Assembly could adopt a position prior to the Venice Conference. The meetings of 30 April and 7, 8 and 9 May 1956 were devoted to this issue. A motion for a resolution drawn up on the basis of these discussions was discussed and adopted without amendment on 11 May 1956.

The motion endorsed the heads of delegation report and reiterated the wishes and recommendations expressed in the Working Party documents of March 1956 and during the discussions thereon.

The motion put forward the view that the institutions should have real powers, that the Assembly should exercise effective democratic control, that there should be a fair balance between Commission and Council, that use should be made of the existing ECSC institutions and that trade associations should be involved in decision-making. The Working Party’s text, which was less detailed than the draft motion for a resolution drawn up by Mr van der Goes, was finally adopted.

The Working Party carried out a detailed analysis of the Intergovernmental Conference’s report on the basis of an exchange of questions and answers with Mr Uri. The main issues dealt with were the gradual reduction of customs duties, the single currency, the unanimity principle and

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75 Doc. B 11, pp. 302-305.
76 Doc. B 12, pp. 322-323.
77 Ibidem, p.325
78 Speech by Mr Blank, Ibidem.
80 Doc. C 5, C 6, C 7, C 8.
82 Doc. B 13, pp. 451-528.
84 Director of the High Authority’s Economic Division, who had most probably been working with the Committee of Experts.

social legislation, although on the last two points the Working Party went no further than to request clarifications, without expressing any views departing from those set out in the heads of delegation report.

The heads of delegation report provided for a 12-year transitional period, with tariffs being brought down by 30% in each of the first two four-year periods, with the reduction being calculated on the basis of the level reached during the previous period. The Working Party report of March 1956 had advocated a 10-year transitional period, with a 60% reduction in the first five years. This issue was dealt with in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the motion for a resolution. Paragraph 10 called on the ministers to state their position on the Working Party proposal for a 10-year transitional period, while paragraph 11 was critical of the fact that the arrangement proposed by the heads of delegation would result in tariffs being halved over the first eight years, leaving only four years for the remainder. Following some clarifying remarks by Mr Uri and a short discussion on the inappropriateness of a detailed resolution and the issue of the reduction of customs duties, the two paragraphs were removed from the motion for a resolution, and the issue of a single currency was broached.

Although this was an incidental issue at the time, it is of interest to anyone looking through the 1956 papers today, following the introduction of the euro. Mr Caillavet pointed out that the abolition of customs duties would have an impact on prices in countries which, for the most part, did not have free economies, and raised the question of whether ‘in order to achieve European integration and build a common market, we should not start by formulating a common monetary policy’.

Mr Uri, who at the meetings held in May 1956 appeared to be acting more as a representative of the Committee of Experts than as an expert working for the High Authority, said that a single currency was unattainable in the present situation and that a gradual merging of national economies was the chosen path; discussions between Member States on monetary issues that might interfere with the common market were not, however, ruled out. Mr Gozard maintained that Mr Uri’s replies were off the mark, given that the failure to provide for a single currency did not preclude the setting up of a body responsible for formulating a monetary policy. The issue was dropped.

During the plenary debate, the issue of the supranational nature of the new Community continued to crop up in connection with other more central issues. Some Members maintained that it had not been covered in the heads of delegation report and felt that it should be, while others felt that it had been, although only surreptitiously.

The speakers on the matter included Mr Gozard, Mr Kopf and Mr Kreyssig, who identified the main issues at hand. Mr Gozard gave a foretaste of the report on institutional matters which he was to table in June 1956.

Mr Kopf complained that the system put forward in the heads of delegation report failed clearly to mark out the boundaries between general economic policy, which remained the responsibility of individual states, and common market-related measures, responsibility for which lay with the Community bodies; for example, customs tariffs would be set at Community level but would affect national budgets. How the farm sector, with its highly specific features, was to be incorporated into

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85 During which customs tariffs were to be progressively phased out.
86 Doc. C 7, pp. 4-6.
87 Ibidem, p. 6.
89 The former included Mr Kopf and the latter, Mr Debré.
91 Ibidem, pp. 478-482.
the common market was an extremely difficult question. In particular, there was a contradiction between the general ban on state aid and the public subsidies which farmers received in many states and which were necessary in order for farming to remain profitable.

Mr Kopf saw two possible ways forward in the social field, namely the setting up of an advisory committee, such as that already existing within the ECSC, and the harmonisation of social legislation which the heads of delegation report advocated for various areas such as equal pay for women and men, the working week and holidays. Mr Kopf hoped that the future assembly would be involved in harmonisation efforts, but noted that the lack of supranationality of the proposed institutions would be a problem.

Taking up the subject of social policy, Mr Kreyssig observed that while the lack of competence in this area could be accepted within the ECSC, it could not be in a Community covering all markets. Similarly, a full-employment policy needed to be introduced and the failure to harmonise financial, economic and social policy would hamper the success of the new Community.

Mr Kreyssig also forcefully put across the Socialist position on Euratom monopoly ownership of fissile materials.

6. Institutional aspects

These were dealt with in a specific report93 discussed in plenary on 21 June 1956. The report, drafted by the Subcommittee on Institutional Affairs, gave rise to some concern among members of the Working Party which, following a lively discussion, decided not to approve it, but to authorise its tabling in plenary as an interim report94.

The report contained an institution-by-institution analysis of the heads of delegation proposals, together with comments and additional proposals. The main proposals made in the report were:

- to endow the current institutions with the powers provided for in the new Treaties and to amend the ECSC Treaty, even if the sole common institutions were to be the Assembly and the Court of Justice, as proposed by the heads of delegation;
- to give the Commission powers of initiative in general policy matters;
- gradually to make the ministers accountable to the Assembly;
- gradually to replace unanimous voting with qualified majority voting on general policy matters within the Council of Ministers;
- to weight national votes within the Council of Ministers on the basis of production volumes;
- to give the Assembly the power to discuss the budget chapter by chapter and to amend it95;
- to give the Assembly the power to confirm appointments of Commission Members by national governments and to require an absolute majority rather than a simple majority for the adoption of motions of censure on the Commission;
- to extend the Assembly’s power to discuss Commission proposals to matters of general economic policy;
- to increase the number of Members of the Assembly, not only in its common market and Euratom ‘formations’ but also as a whole, including the ECSC ‘formation’;

93 Doc. D 12.
94 C 9, pp.3-14.
95 In the heads of delegation report, the Assembly only had the power to approve or reject the draft budget in its entirety.
- to set up three chambers within the Court of Justice – covering the ECSC, the common market and Euratom – thus avoiding the appointment of associate judges specialising in economic matters from outside the Court (as provided for in the heads of delegation report), to which Member States, companies and trade unions should also be able to apply; a public prosecutor’s office should be able to act on its own initiative;
- to set up an advisory body representing trade unions;
- to set up a council of central bank governors to prepare for monetary union.

At the sitting of 21 June 1956, Mr Gozard outlined his report and on some matters went beyond what was contained in the report itself, for example calling for the Assembly to be given competence to draft tax legislation for all Member States. In the ensuing debate, Mr Kopf drew attention to the real purpose of the debate, which was to determine the Assembly’s position on the matter prior to a further series of meetings in which the Committee of Experts headed by Mr Spaak was to draw up Treaty drafts. Mr Kopf explained the heads of delegation proposal to set up two Commissions, separate from the ECSC High Authority, for the two new Communities. The two new executive bodies would play a less central role than the ECSC executive, while the Council of Ministers would have a leading role and would vote unanimously only in a limited number of cases. This was the only point on which Mr Kopf expressly gave his opinion, stating that he endorsed the idea of unanimous voting being confined to a small number of extremely important issues.

Following this explanation, Mr Kopf went on to discuss the role of the Parliament, saying that there should be a single Assembly for the three Communities. Having cleared the ground of issues that were of minor importance or were premature, such as the number of Members and their election by universal suffrage, Mr Kopf addressed the core issue of the Parliament’s role which, under the heads of delegation proposals would be a minor one, given in particular that it would not have the power to discuss general policy. Mr Kopf took the view that the Council’s prospective role in coordinating the economic policy of Member States should be matched by the Parliament having a say on economic policy issues and having similar budgetary powers to those of national parliaments. This was essential in order to unite the Member States.

7. Social aspects

The social aspects of European integration, which had been raised several times during parliamentary debates, were dealt with formally in a report discussed in plenary in November 1956. With reference to the heads of delegation proposals, the report was critical of the fact that the Commission would be able to refer matters to the Council of Ministers alone and that there was no provision for Assembly involvement in action to improve living and working conditions and in the harmonisation of social charges. The report called for a central labour market coordination office to be set up. Worker consultation was also called for.

96 Doc. B 14, pp. 750-760.
98 Mr Kopf was the first Member to use the term ‘Parliament’ in a consistent manner when referring to the consultative body that was to come into being following what were to be the Treaties of Rome, using the term ‘Assembly’ solely to designate the equivalent ECSC body.
99 A similar view was expressed by Mr Kreyssig (Doc. B 14, pp. 757-758).
100 Doc. D 13, p.23.
101 Ibidem, p.25.
Mr Birkelbach’s report went on to call for a common employment policy, the goals of which would inform the use of the investment fund. In particular, there was an urgent need for a programme of measures to reduce structural unemployment. Furthermore, the Member States should seek to reduce working hours, provide unemployment support and ensure equal pay for men and women. A mechanism that would ensure that migrant workers were granted the necessary entitlements under the various welfare systems also needed to be introduced\textsuperscript{103}.

Following a brief debate in which the speakers expressed support, the Assembly adopted a resolution endorsing the report\textsuperscript{104}.

\textsuperscript{103} Ibidem, pp. 25-26.

\textsuperscript{104} Doc. B 15, pp. 104-117; Doc. B 16, pp. 143-144 (text of resolution and vote thereon).
1. The final stage of negotiations

The reports on the single market, Euratom and institutional aspects submitted by the Working Party in 1956 and the report on social aspects submitted by the relevant Assembly committee in November of that year rounded off the Common Assembly’s deliberations on the substance of the treaties under negotiation. The final stage now opened, during which the Assembly would bring pressure to bear on the negotiators in the months immediately preceding the signing of the Treaties.

The first development consisted in Mr Spaak’s statements to the Working Party on the progress of negotiations at the meeting of 8 December 1956\textsuperscript{105}. A less than ideal picture emerged as the optimism of the Venice Conference, which had welcomed the heads of delegation report, gave way to the realisation that there were other problems: in addition to discussions being slowed down by the substitution of many experts, delegations had submitted reservations and new proposals. France, in particular, had stated that it could not join the common market unless it was granted a number of safeguard clauses to take account of its economic situation. However, the French requests were not confined to safeguards but also concerned more general issues, such as the inclusion of its overseas territories in the common market, various procedures for the transition from the first to the second stage of the common market, harmonisation of social charges, the maintenance of export subsidies and certain import duties, safeguard clauses in the event of a balance of payments disequilibrium and a number of objections regarding the application of the new Treaties.

Germany, for its part, submitted alternative proposals to those contained in the heads of delegation report on the supply of fissile materials in the Euratom framework. It opposed Euratom’s right of preemption over uranium and advocated a free market.

The other delegations were not prepared to support the German proposals. They were, however, prepared to support the French proposals, in particular those on harmonisation of social charges. Efforts to find a solution to the difficulties identified were facilitated by a bilateral meeting between Konrad Adenauer and Guy Mollet on 6 November. This meeting was more important than might seem from the statements made by Mr Spaak, who mentioned them several times in relation to the various issues. In political terms, it marked the beginning of a special relationship between France and Germany and, in terms of the negotiations, it resolved a number of significant problems: it solved the Euratom issue by endorsing the Venice proposals (principally through Germany dropping its own proposals) and produced a compromise on safeguards relating to balance of payments disequilibria.

While progress was made in a number of areas, the issue of the overseas territories, on which a Franco-Belgian memorandum had given rise to concern among the other delegations, remained unresolved.

\textsuperscript{105} Doc. A 3, pp. 12-36
One of the issues which Mr Spaak tackled was the accession of the United Kingdom. The UK was prepared to join a free-trade area but not a common market, which would require it to abandon its customs agreements with the Commonwealth countries. While favouring such an arrangement, Mr Spaak was aware of the difficulties involved in setting up a free-trade area.

As regards the substance of the Treaties, the drafting of the Euratom Treaty proved particularly difficult, despite the Franco-German agreement, owing to the specialised and unfamiliar nature of the subject matter. The Treaty was thus confined to laying down the basic principles for subsequent legislation.

In institutional terms, Mr Spaak confirmed the Intergovernmental Committee’s view that a single assembly should be established for the three Communities, but drew attention to the fact that a recent French Parliament resolution had called for an assembly separate from that of the ECSC. Although he did not share this view, he did not feel that it was worth jeopardising the Treaties over this matter. As for the balance to be established between the institutions, Mr Spaak did not come out in favour of either of the two options, namely whether to give more power to the Council or to shift the balance towards the Commission.

Voting within the Council was an extremely delicate issue. The prevailing view was that unanimity should be required at the first stage, a qualified majority at the second and possibly a simple majority thereafter. However, treating all Member States equally was somewhat idealistic, and a weighting system was required if the strictures of the unanimity rule were to be overcome. A judicious weighting system was accepted, at least in principle, by all the delegations and, as things stood, discussions centred on a system allocating four votes to each of the three larger countries, two to Belgium and the Netherlands and one to Luxembourg.

In relation to worker representation, Mr Spaak announced that an Economic and Social Committee was to be set up. The Chairman of the Intergovernmental Committee took an extremely cautious approach on social policy:

> The common market is essentially an economic and technical matter and [ ..]. it would be wrong to give the impression that we are seeking, through its provisions, to reintroduce proposals for supranational and political institutions which failed when the plans drawn up by the ad hoc Assembly were rejected.

It was nevertheless felt that the harmonisation of social charges and working conditions should be an objective of the common market and that the Commission should be in a position to put forward proposals on the matter.

Mr Spaak was, however, against the establishment of bodies with monetary powers, in view of the sensitive nature of the issue, to which some of the safeguards requested by France related. Introducing such bodies might jeopardise the conclusion of the Treaties.

## 2. The Working Party memorandum

The Working Party felt it necessary to inform the Intergovernmental Conference of its views and, to this end, convened a meeting on 7 January 1957 to hear oral reports from Mr Van der Goes, Mr Gozard and Mr Wigny on developing the Working Party’s proposals to the Intergovernmental Conference. The minutes of the meeting of 7 January are not held in the European Parliament's...
archives\textsuperscript{108}, but the memorandum drawn up on this occasion is available\textsuperscript{109}. As early as 10 December 1956, the Chairman of the Working Party, Mr Motz, in a letter thanking Mr Spaak for his contribution of 8 December\textsuperscript{110}, took the opportunity to remind him of a number of points which were felt to be fundamental:

- that the powers and competences conferred by the Treaties on the Commission should be as broad and real as possible;
- that the Assembly should have, in addition to powers of scrutiny, some right of initiative and real parliamentary powers;
- that the Assembly should be the existing ECSC Common Assembly;
- that the new Treaties should contain effective formulae to allow for the close involvement of the overseas territories in the new European Communities\textsuperscript{111}.

The memorandum, which subsequently became a resolution of the Common Assembly\textsuperscript{112}, fleshed out the points contained in Mr Motz’s letter. It expressed the concern that the institutions provided for in the Treaties under preparation, especially the executive, would have fewer powers than those of the ECSC: ‘Promoting Community interests depends primarily on having an independent Executive which, moreover, is answerable for its policy to a European assembly’\textsuperscript{113}.

A further concern was the lack of parliamentary scrutiny. According to the information obtained by the Working Party, such powers did not cover the decisions of important bodies, such as the Joint Research Centre, the Euratom Supply Agency, and the Monetary Office and Investment Fund for the Common Market. The first prerogative of parliaments was to vote on the budget\textsuperscript{114}.

In addition to emphasising that the three Communities resulting from the new Treaties should have a single Assembly and a single Court of Justice, the memorandum proposed establishing coordination mechanisms, such as a Conference of Presidents\textsuperscript{115}.

3. **Plenary debate on the progress of negotiations**

The Common Assembly heard oral reports by the three Working Party rapporteurs, without debate, at its sitting of 12 February 1957. The purpose of these reports, which followed informal contacts with the Intergovernmental Conference, was to inform the plenary of the progress of negotiations with regard to both the substance of the treaties under preparation and the remaining political difficulties. On the whole, the three rapporteurs regretted the fact that the texts had not yet been finalised, which meant that they could not be very specific.

Mr van der Goes\textsuperscript{116} said that the conclusion of the negotiations, scheduled initially for 25 January and subsequently for 10 February, had been further postponed and that problematic issues were still under discussion in a climate which, following a number of misunderstandings, had steadily

\textsuperscript{108} The fact that approval of these minutes does not appear on the agenda for subsequent meetings suggests that no minutes were taken. Subsequent developments also suggest that the meeting of 7 January was in fact an informal meeting between a few leading members of the group to draw up the memorandum.

\textsuperscript{109} Doc. A 6.

\textsuperscript{110} Doc. A 5.

\textsuperscript{111} This was, in substance, what was contained in a note from Mr Gozard, of the same date. Doc. A 4.

\textsuperscript{112} Doc. D 14.

\textsuperscript{113} Doc. A 16, point II.

\textsuperscript{114} Doc. A 16, point III.

\textsuperscript{115} Doc. A 16, point IV.

\textsuperscript{116} Doc. B 17, pp. 187-190.
improved but was liable to be undermined if the Assembly took a controversial stance. The rapporteur
nevertheless regretted the fact that the High Authority, despite having taken part in the Committee
of Experts, was now being excluded from the proceedings of the Intergovernmental Conference
and complained that the problems which initially seemed to be raised solely by France, were now
coming from all sides. He referred, in particular, to the different positions of the Six on the issue of
overseas territories.

The positive news was that they were close to reaching a compromise on agriculture, but transport
issues (on which the basic rules had not yet been established) and the problem of external tariffs
(i.e. the classification of goods) had not yet been resolved. Mr van der Goes’ main concern, however,
related to decision-making procedures. The balance of power between the Commission and the
Council (or rather the number of decision-making procedures assigned to each) was shifting towards
the Council, thereby undermining the powers of scrutiny of the Assembly, to which ministers were
not answerable. The question was not merely quantitative but also procedural, i.e. whether the
Assembly’s vote should occur before or after that of the Council. The rapporteur favoured the latter
option. The same problem arose on the delicate issue of budget votes.

Mr Wigny\textsuperscript{117} stressed once again that nuclear energy was essential for Europe’s future development
and only referred to his report on the progress of negotiations on Euratom in the second half of his
speech. Decisions on joint undertakings would be taken by the Council of Ministers, on a proposal
from the Commission, and would concern trade and industrial affairs. They could be open to the
participation of private operators and third countries, the latter acting as a link between the Small
and Large Europe. Alongside the joint undertakings, there would be private undertakings subject to
specific forms of coordination and monitoring.

The most delicate issue was that of military and health controls. Military controls, involving
supervision to avoid radioactive materials and waste being used for nuclear weapons, should be
carried out through monitoring and tracing of materials at all stages of their processing and transport
on the basis of reports and inspections carried out by an international body. Health controls, on the
other hand, would essentially be the responsibility of the Member States, on the basis of European
directives.

Mr Wigny considered that the Euratom provisions resulting from the negotiations were acceptable,
despite not living up to expectations.

Mr Gozard addressed the institutional aspects\textsuperscript{118}. The Commission had fewer powers than the ECSC
High Authority. However, those powers were, at the current stage of the negotiations, greater than
those advocated in the heads of delegation report. Moreover, the Commission’s role was strengthened
by the voting system in the Council, which could approve or reject proposals from the executive en
bloc by a majority, but would require unanimity to amend them. Furthermore, the Council would
be able, following a transitional period, to vote by a qualified majority under a mechanism and
weighting system which Mr Gozard explained in detail.

He also gave a detailed account of the progress of negotiations on the Court of Justice, which would
form a single institution for the three Communities. The only significant stance taken by the rapporteur
on this institution was his opposition to experts being incorporated into the Court. Although the
hearing of experts was something to be encouraged, their incorporation would turn the Court into
a hybrid body made up of magistrates and non-magistrates, with dangerous consequences, which
were not specified in his speech.

\textsuperscript{117} \textit{Ibidem}, pp. 191-195.
\textsuperscript{118} \textit{Ibidem}, pp. 195-199.
On the subject of the Assembly, he welcomed the choice of a single Assembly for the three Communities, which would however not be the current institution but a new Assembly which would absorb that of the ECSC. On the other hand, he regretted the fact that the Assembly’s powers had not been extended as proposed in the parliamentary documents submitted for the negotiations. He highlighted the powers of scrutiny over the Common Market and Euratom Commissions, welcoming the decision to authorise motions of censure not solely on the occasion of the debate on the annual report, as initially planned, but also whenever the Assembly deemed it necessary.

Mr Gozard expressed his concerns regarding the financing of the Community. He was not happy with the proposal for national contributions and would have preferred a kind of Community tax, which would more effectively guarantee the Community’s independence from the national governments.

The only other statement was made by Mr Motz, Chairman of the Working Party, who gave a summary of the contacts which had taken place, in particular over the last three months, with the Intergovernmental Conference. Some of the information provided by Mr Motz is already contained in the previous paragraph and other details are given in the following paragraph. At the end of the debate on relaunching Europe, the Assembly adopted a resolution on the subject, which was based on the Working Party memorandum and has already been mentioned in that connection.

4. Steps taken by the ‘European Assemblies’

In February 1957, while the Working Party was stating its views on the substance of the Treaties under preparation, the Bureaux of the Common Assembly, the Council of Europe Consultative Assembly and the Western European Union Assembly were taking steps to prevent the establishment of a fourth Assembly for the two new Communities, which at one point had been decided by the Intergovernmental Conference. The minutes of the Common Assembly Bureau meeting of 2 February 1957, and in particular the introduction by President Furler, provide a summary of the events leading up to the representations made to the Conference within the next few days. The Council of Europe Assembly and the Western European Union Assembly had already taken a stance against a fourth Assembly and the President of the Council of Europe Assembly, Mr Dehousse, proposed holding a joint meeting of the three Bureaux to draw up a joint proposal on the subject.

In Mr Furler’s view, the best arrangement would be to extend the Common Assembly’s functions to the new Communities. However, following the French Parliament’s vote in favour of a new European Assembly, this seemed unrealistic while a virtually identical result could be achieved by setting up a new Assembly covering the same functions as the Common Assembly, which would cease to exist. The new Assembly would exercise the powers conferred on it by the new Treaties and those which the ECSC Treaty conferred on the Common Assembly. This arrangement entailed a number of problems, namely the need to amend the ECSC Treaty and to renegotiate the Assembly’s composition, altering the existing size of the various national component groups. Mr Furler put...
forward a proposal which slightly increased the size of delegations from medium-sized countries and Luxembourg, thereby ensuring that no two large countries could together form an absolute majority of the Assembly.\(^{124}\)

However, this approach was different from Mr Dehousse’s call for a single European Assembly, also incorporating those of the Council of Europe and the WEU, although this came up against the additional problem of the different composition of the respective organisations, the Council of Europe having 15 Member States and the Communities six.

There was no support for Mr Dehousse’s proposal in the debate and concerns were expressed about a single Assembly for the Communities in view of the different powers exercised by the current Common Assembly and those provided for in the Treaties under preparation for the Assembly of the new Communities.

The three Bureaux held a joint meeting on that same day.\(^{125}\) In the course of the discussions, Mr Furler put forward a basic proposal, which he had outlined at the previous meeting of the Common Assembly Bureau. Mr Pleven, President of the WEU Assembly, strongly supported the single Assembly option, based on the plan which had been attributed at the previous meeting to Mr Dehousse, who nevertheless did not express his position on the substance of the matter, being more concerned to obtain the agreement of the three Bureaux to form a joint delegation to a meeting with the Foreign Ministers of the Six. It was in fact on a proposal from Mr Dehousse that they decided that ‘the suggestions made would not be too detailed and in particular the question of weighting would not be considered in depth’.\(^{126}\) At the end of the meeting, a recommendation largely based on Mr Furler’s idea of an Assembly common to the three Communities was adopted, with a reminder that the general aim to be pursued was the creation of a single European Assembly.\(^{127}\)

The delegation from the three Bureaux was received on 4 February by the six Foreign Ministers under the chairmanship of Mr Spaak, in his capacity as President of the Conference of Ministers.\(^{128}\) Mr Furler presented his proposal, which was now the proposal of the three Bureaux, in great detail: supported in its position by the leaders of the parliamentary parties, considered that the new Assembly should maintain its proceedings within the strict limits of the precise competences laid down by the new treaties.\(^{129}\)

Mr Spaak replied that the Ministers had already marked their agreement on the principle raised by the Bureaux and that the matter would be discussed in the course of that day. Most of the Ministers who spoke endorsed this view. The French Minister, Mr Faure, went into greater detail, responding to gentle prompting from Mr Dehousse in favour of a single Assembly at least as a future prospect by pointing out that there were two proposals on the table, namely a proposal for a single Assembly, which he described in greater detail than during the previous discussion, and the Furler proposal. He said he had no particular preference for either of these options and that he would support whichever of the two notions the majority of the Conference approved, but that it was difficult for him to say what his parliament’s position would be on the subject.

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124 According to the seat allocation established by the Conference, the three largest states had 60 members each, the two medium-sized states 20 and Luxembourg 5, for a total of 225 Members. Mr Furler proposed 27 members for each of the two medium-sized countries and 6 for Luxembourg, maintaining the 60 for the largest countries and bringing the total to 240 members.

125 Doc. A 8.

126 Ibidem, p. 4.


129 The proposal is already set out above, in the section on the Common Assembly Bureau meeting of 2 February.

130 Doc. A 9, p. 4.
The Bureaux’ delegation met that same day to draw up a memorandum on the Assembly proposals\(^{131}\), as it had promised to do during the hearing.

The final paragraph of the definitive text of the memorandum\(^{132}\) stated that 

**provision should be made at a later stage for the new Assembly to be incorporated into a single European Assembly**\(^{133}\). The memorandum 

opted for an Assembly common to the ECSC, the common market and Euratom and exercising, in respect of each Community, the powers conferred by the relevant Treaty; states would be represented in the new Assembly on a proportional basis similar to that currently applicable within the Common Assembly, with an attempt being made to reduce rather than increase the total number of Members proposed by the Conference (225); current members of the Common Assembly would automatically be members of the new Assembly for the first year and states undertook to appoint to the new Assembly a number of members of the Council of Europe Consultative Assembly. The Common Assembly would cease to exist as soon as the new Assembly was constituted.

The memorandum was the final stance taken by the Common Assembly before the conclusion of the Treaties establishing the EEC and Euratom, which took place on 25 March 1957.

### 5. The Convention on Certain Common Institutions

Once the principle that there would be one Assembly and one Court of Justice for the three Communities had been established, it needed to be laid down in law and, for this purpose, and in order to establish a single set of rules on the newly set up Economic and Social Committee\(^{134}\), a Convention on Certain Institutions Common to the European Communities was drawn up and was signed together with the Treaties of Rome on 25 March 1957.

The issue was addressed by the Common Assembly Bureau at its meeting of 26 February 1957, when an exchange of views took place, of which there is no record in the minutes and following which the Chairman of the Assembly’s Legal Affairs Committee, Mr Fayat, was asked to draw up a note on the provisions required for the merger of the ECSC Assembly with the Assembly provided for in the draft new Treaties. This note was examined by the chairmen of the parliamentary groups and by Mr Fohrmann, Mr Battista and Mr Blank before being submitted to Mr Spaak by a delegation made up of Mr Fayat and Mr Battista\(^{135}\).

The note in question was extremely brief and made up of two points. The first, which would subsequently be formalised as Article 1 of the Convention, stipulated that the new Assembly would exercise the powers of the ECSC Assembly under the conditions laid down in the relevant Treaty. The second point set out the implications, i.e. the need to amend Article 21 of the ECSC Treaty, establishing the composition of the Assembly, and the financing of the new Assembly, a third of which would be charged to the ECSC budget on the basis of a mechanism whereby Member States would reimburse two-thirds of Assembly expenditure to the ECSC High Authority\(^{136}\).

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131 Doc. A 10.
132 *Ibidem*, p. 6 (attached).
133 Paragraph 7 of the memorandum, *Ibidem*.
134 This body was common to the EEC and Euratom.
136 D 16.
The minutes of the Bureau meeting of 20 March 1957\textsuperscript{137} indicate that, on 28 February 1957\textsuperscript{138}, a delegation comprising Mr Fayat, chairman, and Mr Battista, Mr Blank, Mr Motz and Mr Sassen presented the note to Mr Spaak. The Intergovernmental Conference followed the Assembly’s position in the text of the Convention, though only partially as regards the financing of the Assembly; although the principle of an equal breakdown between the budgets of the three Communities was in fact accepted, the details of how amounts would be charged to the individual budgets was not established. The Convention did not lay down rules in the matter, but merely endorsed the principle of an equal breakdown between the Communities concerned\textsuperscript{139}.

6. Following the signing of the Treaties of Rome: the Treaties in the words of the President of the Common Assembly

The Common Assembly did not hold any debate on the Treaties of Rome so as not to interfere with the ratification procedures in the Member States\textsuperscript{140}. However, at the first sitting of the Common Assembly following the signing of the Treaties\textsuperscript{141}, President Furler made a statement focusing on the role which the new Assembly would be required to play in a three-Community Europe.

The first achievement which Mr Furler attributed to the Assembly was that it had given a new impetus to the European ideal, which the West seemed to have abandoned at the time. Its second achievement was that it had sacrificed itself after realising the impracticability of becoming the focus of the new Communities’ parliamentary powers, and had accepted its own dissolution to form the new Assembly of the three Communities\textsuperscript{142}. This had been the price to pay in order to provide the ‘European system’ with a simple parliamentary structure and an effective system of parliamentary scrutiny, without altering the powers and competences of the existing Assembly, as provided for in the ECSC Treaty.

It was important to ensure, in this connection, that the new Assembly benefited from the ‘acquis’ of the Common Assembly, in terms of rights and powers which it had won in its five years of existence and with a view to safeguarding the parliamentary tradition which had been built up in the process\textsuperscript{143}.

One of the essential points which the President emphasised was the close relationship between the European parliamentary institutions\textsuperscript{144}, which should also be seen in the wider context of the plan to bring within a single parliamentary framework not only the organisations comprising parliamentary assemblies\textsuperscript{145}, but also the OECD and the Atlantic Council. Mr Furler did not seem to support this project because of the difficulties which the different functions of the institutions concerned would entail, as well as the risks which the integration of such institutions would create in terms of the effectiveness of parliamentary action and the gradual, step-by-step progress of European union.

\textsuperscript{137} D 17, pp. 5-6.
\textsuperscript{138} Date deduced from the object of the note.
\textsuperscript{139} Article 6 of the Convention.
\textsuperscript{140} This was the justification given by Mr Motz to the Working Party for the decision of the Common Assembly Committee of Presidents. C 10, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{141} B 18.
\textsuperscript{142} On this subject, Mr Furler reminded members of representations made by the Bureaux of the European Parliamentary Assemblies to the Intergovernmental Conference and the problems, including administrative problems, which incorporation into the new Assembly had involved (see earlier paragraphs in this section).
\textsuperscript{143} This was possibly the first instance of a speech by the President of the Assembly using the term ‘Parliament’, which would become official in 1962.
\textsuperscript{144} The Assembly of the three European Communities, that of the Council of Europe and that of the Western European Union.
\textsuperscript{145} See previous note.
However, he did not wish to reject the project out of hand, but rather to consider it as a long-term prospect\textsuperscript{146}. He dwelt on existing forms of cooperation between the three European parliamentary assemblies and the consolidation of such relations\textsuperscript{147}.

His main concern was the consolidation of the new Communities following ratification of the Treaties and ensuring that they were not closed but open to non-member European states:

> We unanimously support the key idea of a free-trade area, which, linked to the common market, would comprise the largest possible number of European states\textsuperscript{148}.

This idea of an open Community was a key theme in Mr Furler’s address:

> It goes without saying that, even in the developed form it is about to take, the Community of six countries must remain open. We unanimously reject the idea of forming a bloc within Europe\textsuperscript{149}.

\textsuperscript{146} The debate to which Furler referred is no longer relevant and is mentioned here as a record of ideas which have now been dropped but were important issues for the European movement in the 1950s.

\textsuperscript{147} The President emphasised, in particular, the importance of the joint annual meeting of the three assemblies. B 18, p. 421.

\textsuperscript{148} Ibidem, p. 420.

\textsuperscript{149} Ibidem, p. 422.
CONCLUSIONS

THE ROLE OF THE COMMON ASSEMBLY IN PREPARING THE TREATIES OF ROME

Anyone reading the documents summarised above, fifty years on, should take due account of the historical conditions in which the Assembly grew up and of relations between the ECSC institutions and governments while the Treaties of Rome were being prepared.

The Common Assembly’s democratic legitimacy was merely indirect, its sphere of competence – the coal and steel sector – was extremely specialised and it existed for only a few years. Moreover, the drafting of the Treaties was seen, according to the view of international law generally accepted at that time, exclusively as the responsibility of states and their governments.

In such circumstances, the Common Assembly would have been virtually unable to act if it had not, from its establishment, presented itself as speaking on behalf of that section of European public opinion that supported European integration as an essential requirement transcending the individual interests of the various economic sectors. The resolutions by Mrs Klompé\(^{150}\) and Mr Teitgen\(^{151}\) are illustrations of the Assembly’s role in anticipating and supporting the process of relaunching the Communities after the failure of the EDC.

On the basis of the above and of the results achieved, one can confidently say that, in the run-up to the Treaties of Rome, the Assembly was able to represent these views and combine them with the practical interests of economic circles and of the states themselves.

A significant example of this is to be found in the Euratom documents and discussions. The Common Assembly succeeded in combining Europe’s need for a source of energy considered at the time to be essential for economic competitiveness and growth with that of safety and the ban on military use of such energy. The Assembly’s approach, in line with the approach which led to the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1957, is to a large extent, though not entirely, contained in the Euratom Treaty: it does not, for example, provide for an explicit ban on the manufacture of atomic weapons but for inspections to determine whether fissile materials are used for the stated purposes.

A slightly different view can be taken of the Assembly’s contribution to the EEC Treaty. The more general dimension of this development, which affected the economy as a whole, with the exception of the coal and steel industries, already covered by the ECSC Treaty, and the nuclear energy sector, increased and fragmented the problems involved. The basic approach – the market economy and the easing of trade between Member States – was the subject of a broad consensus, which the Assembly defended against threats from individual interests, mainly national interests and those related to specific sectors or specific aspects thereof conflicting in the negotiations. The Assembly did not play a significant role in these conflicts of interest, through its own choice or because it was excluded from them, and confined itself to campaigning for its involvement in the decision-making process and drawing attention to the albeit brief experience of the ECSC, in the transport sector for instance.

\(^{150}\) See Section I, paragraph 1c.
\(^{151}\) See Section I, paragraph 2.
The Assembly’s most decisive action was at institutional level. Undoubtedly, it deserves credit for the establishment of the Economic and Social Committee to represent the interests of business and workers at European level. The Common Assembly also played a part in ensuring that the executives of the new Communities were given greater powers than in the original draft of the Messina Conference.

An important achievement due to the lobbying work of the ECSC Assembly is without doubt the establishment of a single Assembly for the three Communities, into which the ECSC Common Assembly was dissolved, as requested in the memorandum of the delegation from the Bureaux. The Convention on Certain Institutions Common to the European Communities provided for the immediate substitution of the Common Assembly with a single Assembly, which was to exercise the powers and competences conferred by the ECSC Treaty.\textsuperscript{152}

Finally, the Treaties of Rome conferred powers on the Assembly which, though fewer than hoped for, were nevertheless greater than those proposed at the beginning of the negotiations: the power to censure the Commissions was a significant novelty in relation to the Messina Conference, not so much in terms of its effective use as because it conferred on the Common Assembly a status in line with that of national parliaments.

\textsuperscript{152} The total number (142) of delegates was less than that initially proposed by the Ministers (225), while the number allocated to the larger countries (Germany, France and Italy) was reduced more than proportionately (from 60 to 36 delegates) to the benefit of the smaller countries (the number for Belgium and the Netherlands falling from 20 to 14 and that for Luxembourg increasing from 5 to 6).
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Some leading members of the Common Assembly during a debate. From left to right: Gozard, Wigny, von Merkatz (shown here following his resignation to take up the post of Minister for Justice in the Federal Republic of Germany), Fohrmann, Cavalli and Pleven (former Prime Minister of France).
BLANK, Martin
German
Liberal Democrat

CARCATERA, Antonio
Italian
Christian

VAN DER GOES VAN NETERS, Marinus Jonkheer
Dutch
Socialist
1957-2007

PHOTOS

GOZARD, Gilles
French
Socialist

KLOMPÉ, Margaretha
Dutch
Christian Democrat

LA MALFA, Ugo
Italian
Socialist
MARGUE, Nicolas
Luxembourgish
Christian Democrat

MAROGER, Reynaud
French
Liberal Democrat

MOTZ, Roger
Belgian
Liberal Democrat
TEITGEN, Pierre Henri
French
Christian Democrat

WEHNER, Herbert
German
Socialist

WIGNY, Pierre
Belgian
Socialist
En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires soussignés ont apposé leurs signatures au bas de la présente Convention.

Zu Urkund dessen haben die unterzeichneten Bevollmächtigten ihre Unterschriften unter dieses Abkommen gesetzt.

In fede di che i plenipotentiarii sottoscritti hanno apposto le loro firme in calce alla presente Convensione.

Ten blijke waarvan de ondertekende gevolmachtigden hun handtekening onder deze Overeenkomst hebben gesteld.

Fait à Rome, le vingt-cinq mars mil neuf cent cinquante-sept.

Geschehen zu Rom, am fünfundzwanzigsten Mars neunzehnhundertsechsundfünfzig.

Fatto a Roma, il venticinque marzo millenovecentocinquanta.

Gedaan te Rome, de vijfentwintigste maart negentienhonderd zeven en vijftig.

Signatures of the Six at the foot of the Treaty.
25 March 1957: Treaty signing ceremony held in the Sala degli Orazi e Curiazi in the Palazzo dei Conservatori (Campidoglio) in Rome.
A. List of attached documents
B. List of reports of the Common Assembly mentioned
C. List of reports of meetings of the Working Party mentioned
D. List of other documents mentioned
# A. LIST OF ATTACHED DOCUMENTS

The documents in the list are attached in the original French version, with an English translation produced for this publication. The other available language versions may be obtained from CARDOC (tel.: 00 352-4300 24104 - Arch-info@europarl.europa.eu)

<table>
<thead>
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<tr>
<td>A 2</td>
<td>COMMON ASSEMBLY Motion for a Resolution addressed to the governments of the ECSC Member States</td>
<td>D,F,I,N</td>
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<td>A 3</td>
<td>COMMON ASSEMBLY - Working Party Minutes of the meeting of Saturday, 8 December 1956</td>
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<td>A 5</td>
<td>Letter of 10 December 1956 from Mr Motz to Mr Spaak</td>
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<td>A 6</td>
<td>COMMON ASSEMBLY - Working Party Memorandum on the European Relaunch</td>
<td>D,F,I</td>
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<td>A 7</td>
<td>COMMON ASSEMBLY - BUREAU Minutes of the meeting of Saturday, 2 February 1957</td>
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<tr>
<td>A 8</td>
<td>Minutes of the joint meeting of the Bureaux of the ECSC Common Assembly, the Council of Europe Consultative Assembly and the Western European Union Assembly of 2 February 1957</td>
<td>F</td>
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<tr>
<td>A 9</td>
<td>Minutes of the hearing accorded to the delegation from the Bureaux of the three European Assemblies by the six Ministers meeting in Conference at Val Duchesse, Brussels, on 4 February 1957</td>
<td>F</td>
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<tr>
<td>A 10</td>
<td>Minutes of the meeting of the delegation from the Bureaux of the three European Assemblies (Brussels, 4 February 1957)</td>
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</table>
### B. LIST OF COMMON ASSEMBLY MINUTES MENTIONED

The minutes of the Common Assembly are available in the indicated languages from CARDOC (tel.: 00 352-4300 24104 - Arch-info@europarl.europa.eu)

<table>
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<td>Thursday 2 December 1954</td>
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<td>B 18</td>
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</table>
C. LIST OF MINUTES OF WORKING PARTY MEETINGS MENTIONED

The minutes of Working Party meetings are available in French from CARDOC (tel.: 00 352-4300 24104 - Arch-info@europarl.europa.eu)

<table>
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<td>19 December 1955</td>
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<td>C 4</td>
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<td>19 June 1956</td>
<td>GT/CRA 56-6</td>
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<td>C 10</td>
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<td>GT/CRA 57-3</td>
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<td>A 3</td>
<td>8 December 1956 (part of doc. attached)</td>
<td>GT/CRA 56-8</td>
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## D. LIST OF OTHER DOCUMENTS MENTIONED

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<th>Number</th>
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<tr>
<td>D 1</td>
<td>COMMON ASSEMBLY Report on behalf of the Political Affairs Committee on the Community’s external relations and development thereof envisaged in the light of current political developments</td>
<td>D, F, I, N</td>
<td>CARDOC Doc. 04 54/55</td>
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<tr>
<td>D 2</td>
<td>COMMON ASSEMBLY Report on behalf of the Political Affairs Committee on the Powers of scrutiny of the Common Assembly and the exercise thereof</td>
<td>D, I, N</td>
<td>CARDOC Doc. 5 54/55</td>
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<td>D 3</td>
<td>COMMON ASSEMBLY Report on behalf of the Bureau on the implementation of the provisions of the resolution of 2 December 1954 instructing the Bureau [...] to refer a proposal to set up a working party to the Assembly, March 1955</td>
<td>D, F, I, N</td>
<td>CARDOC Doc. 12 54/55</td>
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<td>D 5</td>
<td>COMMON ASSEMBLY Report on behalf of the Political Affairs Committee on the resolution adopted by the Foreign Ministers [...] meeting in Messina</td>
<td>D, F, I, N</td>
<td>Cardoc Doc 43 (AC AP RELA 1953 AC-0043/55-mai 0010</td>
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<tr>
<td>D 9</td>
<td>COMMON ASSEMBLY Preliminary report on the development of European economic integration - obstacles and their elimination, rapporteur van der Goes van Naters</td>
<td>D, F, I, N</td>
<td>CARDOC Doc. 7 55/56</td>
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<td>D 13</td>
<td>COMMON ASSEMBLY Social Affairs Committee - Draft report on the <em>social aspects of the report by the Heads of Delegation of the intergovernmental Committee set up by the Messina Conference, to the Foreign Ministers</em></td>
<td>D,I,N</td>
<td>CARDOC Doc. 2 56/57</td>
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<td>D 15</td>
<td>COMMON ASSEMBLY - Bureau <em>Minutes of the meeting of 26 February 1957</em></td>
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<td>D16</td>
<td>COMMON ASSEMBLY Bureau note on the establishment of a single Assembly for the three European Communities, presented to Mr Paul-Henri Spaak on 28 February 1957</td>
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<td>CARDOC AC 3036</td>
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<td>D 17</td>
<td>COMMON ASSEMBLY - Bureau <em>Minutes of the meeting of 20 March 1957</em></td>
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<td>CARDOC AC 3091</td>
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*N.B. documents in list ‘D’ are available in the languages indicated from CARDOC (tel.:00 352-4300 24104 - Arch-info@europarl.europa.eu)*
PART TWO

DOCUMENTS
(list A)

FRENCH ORIGINALS
ASSEMBLEE COMMUNE

Résolution adoptée le 2 décembre 1954 et relative aux Pouvoirs de l'Assemblée Commune et à leur exercice

Partie V

Sur la partie V, M. Wigny défend son amendement (no 3).

Interviennent: M. Fayat, Mlle Klompe, MM. Wigny, Teitgen, rapporteur, Fayat, Dehousse.

L’amendement de M. Wigny (no 3) est adopté.

Partie II (suite)

Sur le § B de la partie II, précédemment réservé, interviennent MM. Dehousse, Poher et Teitgen, rapporteur.

Le § B de la partie II est adopté.

Sur l’ensemble du texte de la résolution intervient M. Vendroux.

L’Assemblée adopte la résolution suivante relative aux pouvoirs de l’Assemblée Commune et à leur exercice:

« L’Assemblée Commune

I. rappelle à ses commissions qu’elles sont en droit:

A. — de charger, avec l’accord du Bureau de l’Assemblée, un ou plusieurs de leurs membres d’une mission spéciale d’information,

— soit auprès des organisations économiques, professionnelles et syndicales qualifiées,

— soit auprès des organisations internationales qui poursuivent des buts analogues à ceux de la Communauté,

— soit auprès des Gouvernements nationaux,

— soit auprès du Conseil spécial de Ministres;

B. — d’inviter à l’une de leurs réunions pour y prendre la parole toute personne dont l’audition paraîtrait utile et spécialement:

— les membres du Conseil spécial de Ministres,

— les représentants des organisations économiques, syndicales et professionnelles, dont l’opinion pourrait éclairer la commission.

II. demande à la Haute Autorité:

A. — de reconnaître, en accord avec le Comité Consultatif, que les commissions de l’Assemblée peuvent demander à leurs rapporteurs d’assister, en qualité d’observateurs, aux réunions du Comité Consultatif présentant un intérêt particulier pour l’information de l’Assemblée ou de ses commissions;


III. demande aux membres du Conseil spécial de Ministres de bien vouloir informer régulièrement l’Assemblée de la politique du Conseil, en usant de la faculté ouverte par le paragraphe 4 de l’article 22 du Traité.

IV. se reconnaît compétente pour débattre, à l’initiative de l’une de ses commissions ou de l’un de ses membres, des propositions de résolution relatives :

a) à l’application des articles 95 et 96 du Traité,

b) à tous actes, décisions ou projets qui par leur contenu ou leurs conséquences pourraient compromettre l’existence de la Communauté, son efficacité ou l’évolution que postule le Traité.

V. demande à son Bureau de la saisir du projet de constitution d’un groupe de travail chargé de faire rapport à l’Assemblée sur les questions suivantes:
a) les formules envisagées en collaboration avec la Haute Autorité pour donner suite au n° II de la présente résolution;

b) la procédure qui pourrait être proposée pour étudier les formules les plus opportunes et les plus efficaces pouvant assurer :

1. — une formulation plus nette du pouvoir de contrôle de l'Assemblée vis-à-vis de l'exécutif;

2. — une extension de la compétence matérielle de la Communauté, et d'une manière plus générale une extension du marché commun;

3. — les problèmes de l'élection au suffrage universel des membres de l'Assemblée.

Convocation de l'Assemblée en session extraordinaire

L'Assemblée prend acte de l'accord de la Haute Autorité pour convoquer l'Assemblée Commune pour une session extraordinaire le 23 février prochain. L'ordre du jour suivant est envisagé :


— Rapport de M. von Merkatz, au nom de la commission du Règlement.

— Un rapport de la commission des Investissements.

— Un rapport de la commission des Affaires sociales et

— Un rapport de la commission des Transports.

— Eventuellement, un rapport sur le statut des fonctionnaires de la Communauté.

— Exposé de la Haute Autorité.

M. le président adresse ses remerciements et ses voeux à l'Assemblée

Adoption du procès-verbal de la présente séance

Le procès-verbal de la présente séance est adopté.

Clôture de la session extraordinaire de novembre-décembre 1954

La session extraordinaire de novembre-décembre 1954 est déclarée close.

La séance est levée à 19 heures 45
ASSEMBLEE COMMUNE

Proposition de résolution à l’adresse des Gouvernements des États membres de la CECA

Source: CECA Journal Officiel – Assemblée Commune Officiel du 29.3.1956, p115-116
PROCÈS-VERBAL DE LA SÉANCE DU VENDREDI 16 MARS 1956

PRÉSIDENCE DE M. FOHRMANN
Vice-président

La séance est ouverte à 11 heures 10.

Adoption du procès-verbal

Le procès-verbal de la précédente séance est adopté.

Suite de la discussion sur le rapport préliminaire de M. van der Goes van Naters sur l'intégration économique de l'Europe (Document N° 7)

Interviennent: MM. Battista, Vanrullen, Kreyssig, van der Goes van Naters, rapporteur.

La séance est suspendue à 12 heures 20.

PRÉSIDENCE DE M. MOTZ
Vice-président

La séance est reprise à 15 heures 05.

Dépôt d'un document


L'Assemblée décide de procéder à la discussion et au vote de cette proposition de résolution, dès cet après-midi, sans renvoi devant la Commission compétente.

Suite de la discussion sur le rapport préliminaire de M. Wigny sur les problèmes de l'énergie en Europe (Document N° 8)


PRÉSIDENCE DE M. PELLA
Président

Interviennent dans la suite de la discussion MM. Lapic, Maroger, Mayor, Président de la Haute Autorité, M. Wigny, rapporteur et M. Dehouste.

L'Assemblée décide de tirer ultérieurement la conclusion du présent débat.

Discussion de la proposition de résolution à l'adresse des Gouvernements des États membres de la Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l'Acier, présentée au nom des trois groupes politiques (Document N° 9).

Intervient: M. de Menthon.

L'Assemblée adopte la résolution suivante:

«L'Assemblée Commune,

Considérant le retard économique croissant de l'Europe,

Considérant qu'une politique européenne commune peut seule permettre un relèvement du niveau de vie fondé sur l'expansion économique et le développement de l'emploi,

Considérant que cette politique exige la constitution progressive d'un marché commun,

Considérant que ce marché commun ne doit pas seulement permettre la concurrence économique et la division du travail, mais doit aussi tenir compte de la solidarité humaine entre les populations des États membres,
TOWARDS A SINGLE PARLIAMENT

Commissaire 1956

Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l'Acier

29.3.56

Commissaire 1956

Considérant que ce marché commun ne peut se limiter à des mesures de libération des échanges mais que sa création implique la coordination de la politique économique, sociale, monétaire et fiscale des pays membres en vue d'assurer l'adaptation de certains secteurs, la stabilité de l'emploi et l'expansion de l'ensemble de la production,

Considérant qu'un marché commun exige en tout cas une Autorité pour assurer son ouverture et son développement, éliminer les distorsions et aider les États membres en difficulté,

Vu ses résolutions du 2 décembre 1954 et du 12 mai 1955,

Vu le rapport préliminaire présenté par le Groupe de travail à sa session de Bruxelles en mars 1956 et entendu la discussion à son sujet,

Considérant la nécessité d'un Traité,

qui établit définitivement les bases d'un marché commun général sous la forme d'une Union douanière et économique, excluant toute autarcie,

qui prévoit la libre circulation non seulement des biens, des services et des capitaux mais aussi de la main-d'œuvre,

qui institue en outre un fonds d'investissements destiné à promouvoir l'expansion économique,

qui facilite l'adaptation des économies nationales tout en tenant compte de la situation spéciale de l'agriculture et en imposant une réalisation progressive et irrévocable de cette Union économique,

qui, dans le même but, prévoit une aide communautaire aux États membres par le moyen d'un fonds de réadaptation et qui stipule des clauses de sauvegarde pour les cas où des intérêts vitaux nationaux seraient menacés,

qui prévoit parallèlement au développement du marché commun l'harmonisation des charges sociales dans le cadre d'une politique active et progressive en vue de réaliser une amélioration constante du niveau de vie,

qui crée des institutions ayant les pouvoirs suffisants pour mettre en œuvre sous un contrôle démocratique, les principes énoncés ci-dessus,

qui soit largement ouvert à tous les autres membres de l'O. E. C. E.,

Invite les Gouvernements des États membres de la Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l'Acier à conclure d'urgence entre eux un Traité sur la base de ces principes.
Fixation du calendrier de la prochaine session

Sur proposition du Comité des Présidents, l’Assemblée décide que la session ordinaire qui commencera le 8 mai prochain à Strasbourg sera interrompue le 11 et reprise, également à Strasbourg, à partir du 18 juin.

Au cours de la première partie de la session, M. le Président de la Haute Autorité présentera à l’Assemblée le rapport général, prévu à l’article 17 du Traité sur l’activité de la Communauté et son exposé sera suivi d’une discussion générale. Ensuite, l’Assemblée pourra poursuivre le débat sur les problèmes du marché commun et de l’énergie à la lumière du rapport des experts qui aura été vraisemblablement rendu public à ce moment.

Suivra ensuite la discussion des rapports présentés au nom du Groupe de travail par M. Fohrmann sur le rôle et le fonctionnement des groupes politiques à l’Assemblée Commune et de M. Carboni sur les relations permanentes entre l’Assemblée Commune et quelques organisations internationales.

Au cours de la deuxième partie de la session ordinaire, qui s’ouvrira le 18 juin, aura lieu la discussion des différents rapports présentés par les commissions intéressées sur le rapport général de la Haute Autorité et sur quelques autres problèmes de la compétence des dites commissions.

Sur demande de M. Bertrand, le Président précise qu’il n’y aura pas de séance publique le 10 mai.

Adoption du procès-verbal

En application du paragraphe 2 de l’article 19 du Règlement, l’Assemblée adopte le procès-verbal de la présente séance.

Clôture de la session

La deuxième session extraordinaire de l’Assemblée Commune pour l’exercice 1955-1956 est déclarée close.

La séance est levée à 18 heures 15.

ANNEXE AU JOURNAL OFFICIEL

BULLETIN DES QUESTIONS ET RÉPONSES

QUESTION N° 29

de M. Alain Pohé,
Membre de l’Assemblée Commune
(25 février 1956)

M. Alain Pohé demande à la Haute Autorité:

1. le nombre, par pays et par industrie, des demandes d’aide financière qui lui ont été adressées depuis l’établissement du marché commun en vue de contribuer:

(i) à la réadaptation de la main-d’œuvre des entreprises dont elle a la charge;

(ii) à la transformation de ces entreprises ou à la création d’activités nouvelles en vue d’assurer, sur place, le réemploi productif de la main-d’œuvre appelée à changer d’emploi.

2. le nombre de réponses positives données à ces demandes et le montant de l’aide financière allouée en chaque cas.

3. pour chacune des industries visées ci-dessus, en ce qui concerne les travailleurs licenciés:
A3

ASSEMBLEE COMMUNE – Groupe de Travail

Compte rendu de la réunion du samedi 8 décembre 1956

(extrait: “Echange de vues sur l’évolution actuelle des travaux de la Conférence Intergouvernementale pour le Marché commun et l’Euratom)

page 3 point 3

Source: GT/CRA 56-8
COMMUNAUTÉ EUROPÉENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L’ACIER
ASSEMBLÉE COMMUNE

GROUPE DE TRAVAIL

COMPTES RENDUS

GT/CRA/56-8

de la
réunion du samedi 8 décembre 1956 à 9 h. 30
Sénat de Belgique
Palais de la Nation
Salle des Groupes
BRUXELLES

Étaient présents : M. MOTZ, Président,
M. POHLE, Vice-Président,
MM. BLANK, CARBONI, van der GOES van
NATERS, GOZARD, HAZENBOSCH, KOFF,
KREYSIG, MARGUE, de MENTHON, MUTTER
et POHER.

Conformément à l’article 38, § 3 du Règlement, M. AMADEO
était suppléée par M. SCHONE, M. FOHRMANN par M. VANRULLEN
et M. WEHNER par M. BIRKELBACH,
as ainsi que M. FURLER, Président de
l’Assemblée Commune.

Étaient excusés : MM. DEHOUSSE, Vice-Président, BLAISSE,
CAILLAVET, CARON, COULON, OESTERLE,
PELLA, SCHIAVI et WIGNY.

Assistaient également à la réunion :

M. P.-H. SPAAK, Président de la Conférence
Intergouvernementale pour le Marché
commun et l’Euroatom, ainsi que
M. CALMEES, Secrétaire général du Conseil
spécial de Ministres de la C.E.C.A.,
M. HUPPERTS, Ministre plénipotentiaire,
MM. ALBRECHTS et VERNAEVE de la Conférence
Intergouvernementale.

La Haute Autorité était représentée par M. ERNST, Directeur-adjoint de la Division des Relations extérieures. AC 2739
Pour le Secrétariat de l'Assemblée Commune assistaient :

M. VAN DEN BERDE, Chef de la Division des Commissions,
M. d'ARVISSENT, Chef de la Division des Études et de la Documentation,
MM. KONIG, PASETTE et von MOHREN Schildt de la Division des Commissions,
M. LAGACHE de la Division des Études et de la Documentation.

Secrétariat des Groupes politiques :

Mlle VALENTIN du Groupe démocrate-chrétien,
M. DREZE du Groupe libéral,
M. GEORGES du Groupe socialiste.
## SOMMAIRE

1. Adoption du compte rendu du 19 juin 1956 (doc. AC/GT/CH/56-6) ........................................ 4

2. Echange de vues sur le programme des travaux
   1e partie ............... 4 - 11
   2e partie ............... 36 - 40

3. Echange de vues sur l'évolution actuelle des travaux de la Conférence Intergouvernementale pour le Marché commun et l'Euratom
   1e partie (Exposé de M. SPAAK) ............... 12 - 22
   2e partie (Questions des membres et réponses de M. SPAAK) ............... 23 - 36

4. Fixation de la date de la prochaine réunion .................. 40 - 41

**Annexe I :** Tableau des décisions prises par le Groupe de Travail .................. 42 - 43

**Annexe II :** Projet d'ordre du jour de la réunion .................. 44
EXTRAIT:

3. "Échange de vues sur l'évolution actuelle des travaux de la Conférence Intergouvernementale pour le Marché commun et l'Euratom"

page 3, point 3

M. Paul-Henri SPAAK, accompagné de ses collaborateurs, fait son entrée en séance.

M. le Président WOTZ salue M. P.-H. SPAAK, le remercie d'être venu et propose de reprendre la discussion sur le programme des travaux après avoir entendu M. SPAAK.

M. P.-H. SPAAK commence son exposé en indiquant que la réunion d'aujourd'hui se situe à un moment difficile. En effet, les travaux se trouvent entre deux phases qu'on doit considérer comme décisives et, si bien des points sont déjà arrêtés, un certain nombre de questions restent encore en suspens. Il est donc difficile de donner des indications quelque peu définitives sur les traités en cours d'élaboration.

L'orateur estime toutefois que pour situer exactement le problème, il y a lieu de faire brièvement l'histoire de l'idée de l'intégration européenne depuis la Conférence de Messine.

Le Comité Intergouvernemental institué après Messine avait établi en avril 1956 un premier rapport des chefs de délégations aux Ministres des Affaires étrangères qui a été généralement considéré comme un travail remarquable.

À la Conférence de Venise qui a suivi, le Rapport a été présenté dans une atmosphère optimiste et, même sans entrer dans tous les détails, il prouvait que des solutions techniques générales pouvaient être trouvées pour l'ensemble des problèmes. La difficulté n'avait d'ailleurs pas été de trouver ces solutions, mais de choisir entre les différentes solutions possibles.
L'orateur rappelle que la Conférence de Venise avait laissé l'impression d'un succès total. Dans une atmosphère favorable, les Ministres étaient arrivés assez rapidement à des conclusions positives et avaient accepté le Rapport comme base de travail. L'impression était que la suite pouvait se réaliser très vite.

Il est apparu toutefois assez rapidement que le fait d'accepter le rapport comme base de travail ne signifiait pas qu'il y eût un accord sur toute la ligne. Sans doute quelques réserves avaient été faites par certaines délégations mais qui ne semblaient pas avoir une incidence particulière.

Par contre, la délégation française avait introduit dans le débat une idée nouvelle importante : celle d'adjoindre au marché commun les territoires d'outre-mer. C'est là un problème qui allait revenir ultérieurement et qui, au stade actuel des travaux préoccupe plus particulièrement les experts.

Après la Conférence de Venise, les travaux furent repris le 26 juin pendant une brève période mais ce n'est qu'au début du mois de septembre 1956 que les experts se remirent à la tâche.

Il existait certes un accord sur les idées de base mais, par contre, aucun engagement tout à fait formel de la part des États participants. En outre, les équipes d'experts qui avaient fait le premier rapport étaient sensiblement modifiées. Ceci signifiait qu'à peu près toutes les questions furent remises en cause et toutes les discussions reprises.

Pendant plusieurs semaines, les progrès allaient être très lents et en rediscutant des problèmes qu'on avait considérés comme acquis, un malaise planait sur les travaux.
Cette atmosphère ne fut modifiée qu'à la suite d'une prise de position de M. Maurice FAURE qui, très franchement, essaya de définir clairement les difficultés et les oppositions et invita les délégations à formuler d'une façon précise les objections qu'elles désiraient présenter. Il s'agissait essentiellement d'objections de la part de la France en ce qui concerne le marché commun général et de l'Allemagne en ce qui concerne l'EURATOM.

Ce fut le début d'une nouvelle phase des travaux. Les difficultés subsistaient sans doute mais en essayant de les formuler clairement, il devenait plus facile de rechercher des solutions.

Il subsistait essentiellement deux grandes difficultés :

a) d'une part la France déclarait ne pouvoir accepter d'entrer dans le marché commun sans qu'il lui soit fait une situation particulière sur quelques points. Sa situation économique, en effet, est telle que sans un certain nombre de clauses de sauvegarde, son intégration dans l'Europe des six lui paraissait impossible ;

b) en ce qui concerne l'EURATOM, l'Allemagne proposait, dans le domaine de l'approvisionnement en matières premières, des solutions totalement différentes de celles qui figuraient dans le rapport initialement adopté par les chefs de délégations.

M. SPAAK souligne que la réaction des autres délégations à l'égard de ces difficultés a été à la fois compréhensive et constructive. La réalité qui se situe derrière les objections a été reconnue comme valable et on s'est trouvé d'accord pour examiner la situation particulière de la France.
À ce sujet, l'orateur rappelle que le désir de rapprochement des délégations était particulièrement encourageant et il souligne que notamment la délégation italienne s'était déclarée prête à suivre en principe le point de vue français.

Le point étant acquis, l'étude du problème pouvait commencer au cours de laquelle il fallait fixer les limites acceptables dans lesquelles on pouvait admettre cette situation particulière de la France.

Dans le mémorandum présenté par la France, celle-ci proposait des modifications par rapport au document établi par les chefs de délégations à Bruxelles. Ces propositions de la France :

- introduisaient des modalités nouvelles pour le passage de la première à la deuxième étape ;
- soulevaient le problème difficile de l'harmonisation des charges sociales ;
- demandaient des possibilités de maintenir un régime d'aide à l'exportation et de taxes à l'importation ;
- préconisaient des clauses de sauvegarde en cas de difficultés de la balance de paiements ;
- et enfin faisaient des objections aux modalités de mise en vigueur du Traité.

Toutes ces questions furent traitées au cours de plusieurs réunions de chefs de délégations. Sur un assez grand nombre de points, on arriva assez facilement à proposer des solutions de compromis. Par contre, certains problèmes assez importants restèrent ouverts.

Le moment était venu de passer à un niveau supérieur à celui des chefs de délégations et de soumettre les questions aux Ministres.

AC 2739
En ce qui concernait la proposition allemande, les cinq autres délégations avaient fait connaître leur intention ferme de maintenir les solutions préconisées dans le rapport d'avril 1956 au sujet de l'approvisionnement en matière nucléaire.

Deux documents furent établis pour la rencontre des Ministres qui eut lieu les 20 et 21 octobre à Paris. Le premier jour, il semblait que l'accord allait se réaliser facilement ; le deuxième jour toutefois, il fallut constater l'impossibilité d'arriver à des solutions satisfaisantes et claires, surtout dans le domaine de l'harmonisation des charges sociales.

Il s'agissait :
- du régime des congés payés,
- de l'uniformisation des salaires féminins et masculins, où les Français demandaient l'adoption de leur système, et
- de la durée du travail et du paiement des heures supplémentaires.

On constate assez rapidement que le problème des congés payés n'offrait pas de véritable difficulté puisque, après examen, il apparut que les systèmes étaient comparables entre les différents pays. Si dans un pays, le nombre de jours de congés payés était plus élevé que dans d'autres, par contre, la différence était compensée par le nombre de jours fériés, le total étant approximativement le même.

En ce qui concernait les identités des salaires féminins et masculins, là aussi le compromis semblait facile.

Une difficulté absolue subsistait : c'était celle de l'harmonisation de la durée du travail et du paiement des heures supplémentaires. Cette difficulté était encore accrue.
par le fait que certaines intransigeances sur ce point avaient amené les délégations à retirer des concessions qu'elles avaient déjà faites sur d'autres points.

Le résultat final était que la rencontre de Paris se soldait par un échec. Il fallait désormais placer le problème sur le niveau politique le plus élevé afin de trouver le rapprochement nécessaire entre la France et l'Allemagne. Pour cette raison, MM. ADENAUER et Guy MOLLÉT se sont rencontrés le 6 novembre au cours d'une réunion qui a été, dans l'ensemble, fructueuse.

Le Chancelier et le Président du Conseil reprirent le mémorandum de Paris et parvinrent à réaliser un accord de principe presque général. Cet accord entraînait quelques nouvelles formules qui furent aussitôt communiquées aux autres délégations et acceptées par celles-ci.

Ce cap difficile étant dépassé, les experts se remirent au travail et au début du mois de décembre, le traité instituant le marché commun général est déjà partiellement rédigé, non seulement sous forme de projet mais déjà sous forme de chapitres et d'articles. Plusieurs de ces articles ont même fait l'objet d'une discussion très approfondie et déterminante.

L'orateur adresse un hommage plus particulier à M. von der GROEBEN, le chef de la délégation allemande qui préside la Commission du marché commun.

M. SPAAK indique que le 6 décembre les chefs de délégations ont pu se mettre d'accord sur quatre chapitres :
- l'élimination des droits de douane entre les États membres,
- l'élimination des restrictions quantitatives,
- le fonds européen de réadaptation qui sera désormais dénommé "fonds de réemploi",
- les règles de concurrence.
De plus, quatre autres chapitres sont dès à présent rédigés et seront examinés par les chefs de délégations dans les prochains jours. Il s'agit des chapitres intitulés :
- le fonds d'investissement,
- l'aide accordée par les États,
- la balance des paiements,
- les questions monétaires.

Pour les 19 et 20 décembre, on compte terminer les chapitres consacrés à :
- l'agriculture,
- les tarifs extérieurs communs,
- la politique commerciale.

Enfin, pour la première semaine de janvier, on espère disposer des textes concernant :
- les transports,
- les services,
- la libre circulation des travailleurs.
On compte également disposer des textes relatifs aux distortions et aux rapprochements des législations et aux mouvements de capitaux.

L’orateur reconnaît qu’il s’agit là d’un timing audacieux mais, d’après lui, rien ne s’oppose à sa réalisation, ce qui permettrait de terminer les travaux pour le 15 janvier.

Il reste cependant un problème difficile : c'est celui des territoires d'outre-mer. À ce sujet il existe un mémorandum établi de commun accord par les Français et les Belges, qui contient leurs suggestions en ce qui concerne l'intégration des territoires d'outre-mer. Cependant, ce document a été reçu avec quelques réticences par les autres délégations.

AC 2739
En résumé, ce mémorandum suggère d'intégrer aussi loin que possible les territoires d'outre-mer dans le marché commun à condition toutefois qu'en compensation, tous les Etats membres de la nouvelle communauté interviennent dans les investissements publics nécessaires pour l'équipement de ces territoires.

Le mémorandum a avancé des chiffres évidemment considérables qui semblent avoir effrayé certaines délégations qui considèrent peut-être que la balance n'est pas tout à fait favorable. Ceci a déclenché des doutes et des hésitations.

L'orateur se déclare lui-même très partisan de l'idée développée dans le mémorandum et la délégation française y attache également une très grande importance. En effet, il y a dans ce mémorandum l'embryon d'une formule euroafricaine qui permettra également de préciser les éléments d'une politique d'aide aux pays sous-développés.

À ce sujet, l'orateur se déclare sceptique à des formules qui tendent à fournir une aide à des pays même hostiles à notre orientation politique générale. Il est d'avis qu'il est sans doute préférable d'aider des pays dont on peut normalement supposer que leur évolution politique les rapprochera de la conception politique occidentale.

Il semble bien qu'en ce moment le problème des territoires d'outre-mer soit le plus important. On peut toutefois s'attendre dans quelques jours à un rapport sur cette question qui permettra d'arriver à des conclusions.


Au sujet de la Grande-Bretagne, il est certain qu'il y existe un mouvement favorable au rapprochement avec l'Europe continentale, idée qui a été développée à plusieurs reprises par M. Mac MILLAN.
Toutefois, la Grande-Bretagne a estimé qu'il lui était impossible d'adhérer purement et simplement au marché commun mais qu'elle pourrait participer à une "zone de libre échange" intimement associée au marché commun.

La différence essentielle entre les deux formules est que le marché commun règle des questions communes aux États membres telles que les tarifs extérieurs alors que dans la zone de libre échange, les tarifs extérieurs restent libres, ce qui permet aux Anglais de maintenir leur système de tarifs préférentiels avec le Commonwealth.

L'orateur s'est déclaré favorable à cette idée de rapprochement et il annonce son intention de la soutenir devant l'O.E.C.E. Toutefois, il souligne que malgré les apparences, il n'est pas plus facile de réaliser la zone de libre échange que le marché commun lui-même. En effet, puisque la zone de libre échange comportera également des clauses de sauvegarde, la géance de celle-ci exigera des solutions institutionnelles communes auxquelles la Grande-Bretagne ne pourra échapper.

Il est un fait que le Groupe de Travail de l'O.E.C.E. a dû reprendre de son côté tous les problèmes devant lesquels se sont trouvés les experts de la Conférence Intergouvernementale. Une difficulté supplémentaire provient du fait que la Grande-Bretagne veut exclure l'agriculture de la zone de libre échange alors que la Hollande, la Belgique et l'Italie n'accepteront jamais cette exclusion.

Au niveau de l'O.E.C.E., où 17 pays sont confrontés, un problème semblable s'est posé en raison de la situation particulière agricole du Danemark.

Cependant, M. SPAAK estime qu'il est impossible de revoir encore l'ensemble des problèmes avec les experts de l'O.E.C.E. ou du G.A.T.T. puisque chaque fois des solutions nouvelles sont proposées qui risquent de remettre en cause ce qui a déjà été fait.
- 21 -

Actuellement, la proposition est formelle : il faut réaliser le marché commun tout en cherchant à yassocier une zone de libre échange.

Incidemment, l'orateur indique encore que l'Angleterre semble d'une part assez réticente à l'égard de l'intégration des territoires d'outre-mer et d'autre part plus hostile que les cinq autres délégations continentales aux clauses de sauvegarde demandées par la France. Il en résulte la situation paradoxale suivante : ceux qui en France n'ont pas voulu du marché commun parce que l'Angleterre ne pouvait s'y associer, verraient maintenant échouer la zone de libre échange à cause des réticences de l'Angleterre devant les exigences de la situation particulière française.

Bien qu'il subsiste donc des difficultés considérables, l'orateur est d'avis que la voie est désormais plus claire. D'autre part, il y a un intérêt immense à réaliser vite, avant que des événements nouveaux toujours possibles ne viennent détourner l'attention des Gouvernements intéressés.

Pour cette raison, M. SPAAK pense qu'il faut envisager la signature des traités par les Gouvernements dans les derniers jours du mois de janvier.

L'orateur s'excuse de ne pas avoir jusqu'à présent beaucoup parlé de la structure même des traités. Dans ce stade déterminant, il lui est difficile de faire autrement.

En ce qui concerne l'Euratom, il communique que MM. ADENAUER et MOLLET se sont mis d'accord pour maintenir d'une façon générale les solutions qui figurent déjà dans le rapport des chefs de délégations d'avril 1956.

Il semble toutefois que la rédaction des chapitres et articles du traité Euratom s'avère être plus difficile que pour le traité sur le marché commun et il faudra probablement se contenter de ce qu'on pourrait appeler un traité-cadre créant les engagements nécessaires et fixant les principes généraux. AC 2739
En effet, les problèmes soulevés par une communauté de l'énergie nucléaire sont encore relativement inconnus et aussi bien l'évolution de la science que de la politique pratiquée en ce domaine par les grandes puissances sont trop sujet à des modifications pour pouvoir fixer, d'une manière rigide et pour une période de 50 ans, des dispositions et des règles détaillées.

Dans les prochains jours, il faudra se décider sur les modalités générales du traité qui, d'après les réactions des différents Gouvernements représentés, pourrait se présenter un peu différemment de celui instituant le marché commun général.

Les travaux prendront sans doute une tournure définitive au cours de la deuxième quinzaine de décembre et il n'est pas exclu d'envisager que la rédaction du traité se termine vers la fin du mois de janvier.

L'orateur termine l'exposé historique sur l'évolution des travaux et déclare se tenir à la disposition des membres du Groupe de Travail pour répondre aux questions qu'il désirent poser. Il rappelle toutefois qu'il lui est difficile de donner des précisions techniques et de détails, puisqu'actuellement les textes sont en pleine élaboration et que ce ne sera que dans 15 jours ou 3 semaines que l'ensemble prendra plus définitivement forme. À ce moment, les chefs de délégations auront pu prendre leurs responsabilités et se seront prononcés sur les différents points qui restent encore à éclaircir.

M. le Président MOTZ remercie l'orateur au nom de ses collègues du Groupe de Travail. Il constate que l'exposé est empreint d'optimisme puisqu'il révèle que, malgré les difficultés qui restent encore à surmonter, les allées sont décrites tracées et que l'avenir se découvre devant nous. Il donne la parole aux membres qui désirent poser des questions.
M. MARGUE exprime l'espoir que les projets exposés par M. Spaak aboutiront comme il l'a laissé entrevoir et déclare partager l'optimisme modéré exprimé par M. Spaak.

En ce qui concerne le problème de l'agriculture, il est d'avis que celle-ci ne peut être exclue des traités. Cependant, il est absolument nécessaire de tenir compte des intérêts réels qui sont en jeu, intérêts qui ne sont pas simplement techniques mais qui peuvent toucher, le cas échéant, la structure même de certains États; dans tous les projets formulés, il y a lieu de tenir compte très particulièrement des intérêts des petits pays.

M. SPAAK se rallie entièrement à l'opinion exprimée par M. Margue. On ne peut en effet exclure l'agriculture mais il est certain qu'elle demande des conditions particulières et qu'elle doit être considérée comme un problème spécial. Il signale d'ailleurs que pour l'examen de cette question, les ministres de l'agriculture des différents pays intéressés sont intimement associés aux travaux.

M. GOZARD désire recevoir quelques indications supplémentaires sur les problèmes institutionnels. Les solutions envisagées actuellement s'écartent-elles de beaucoup des solutions contenus dans le rapport des chefs de délégation d'avril 1956 ?

- Quels sont les principes et les solutions adoptés en ce qui concerne les problèmes monétaires ?

- Dans quelle mesure est-il envisagé une représentation du monde du travail ?

M. SPAAK répond que sur le plan institutionnel, le principe initial était celui de l'identité de la ou des nouvelles assemblées à créer avec l'Assemblée Commune de la C.E.C.A. Il rap-
pelle toutefois qu'il y a eu un vote à l'Assemblée Nationale française qui exigeait la dissociation de l'assemblée nouvelle et de l'Assemblée de la C.E.C.A. Les négociations ultérieures ont prouvé que la délégation française semblait fortement impressionnée par ce vote. L'orateur déclare rester fidèle au principe initial développé dans le rapport, mais il est d'avis toutefois qu'on ne peut envisager de faire échecuer l'ensemble du traité Marché commun sur une telle controverse.

Sur le plan plus général, il reconnaît qu'il existe deux tendances : l'une qui tend à mettre l'accent plutôt sur le Conseil de Ministres, l'autre tendant à augmenter les pouvoirs de la Commission européenne.

Quant à la procédure de vote, l'idée initiale est restée. Elle prévoit que, au cours de la première étape, les décisions soient prises à l'unanimité, ensuite à une majorité qualifiée et, au cours de la troisième étape, éventuellement à la majorité simple. D'une façon générale, les délégués semblent admettre que, dans l'ensemble des institutions, la tendance à l'unanimité ne soit pas de règle.

Dans cet ordre d'idées, l'orateur signale qu'une question particulièrement délicate est celle de la pondération, la pondération consistant à accorder à chaque État un nombre différent de voix. Il estime qu'il s'agit d'une pure vue de l'esprit que de considérer que tous les pays sont égaux et l'expérience a prouvé que les organisations basées sur ce principe fonctionnent souvent fort mal. Ce n'est qu'en appliquant judicieusement le principe de la pondération qu'on peut progressivement abandonner le principe de l'unanimité. Toutefois, la notion de pondération peut amener des situations assez particulières. En effet, dans certains cas, la majorité qualifiée peut ne pas correspondre à la majorité des États membres. L'orateur estime que c'est une conséquence parfaitement logique et justifiée.

AC 2739
Au stade actuel des négociations, certains États restent réticents devant l'idée de la pondération, mais ils se sont ralliés au principe. La pondération ne peut toutefois être absolue et il faut se concilier à l'idée qu'elle doit toujours jouer quelque peu en faveur des petits États. Actuellement dans les projets de traités, la pondération est basée sur les rapports suivants : 4 voix pour les grands pays, 2 pour la Belgique et les Pays-Bas, 1 pour le Luxembourg.

En ce qui concerne les problèmes monétaires, l'orateur est d'avis qu'il faut les approcher avec infiniment de prudence. Certaines difficultés qui se présentent du côté français et qui ont incité la France à demander des clauses de sauvegarde correspondent à des soucis de caractère monétaire. Il est certain que si la question monétaire est posée comme un préalable, les traités échoueront.

En ce qui concerne la représentation du monde du travail, l'orateur considère que l'évolution est favorable. La création d'un Conseil économique et social est envisagée. La participation patronale et syndicale au fonds de réemploi est décidée et il est possible qu'une telle participation soit également prévue à la gestion du fonds d'investissement.

M. van der GOES van NATERS désire savoir s'il est effectivement prévu dans les projets de traités que ce sera le Conseil de Ministres qui interviendra dans le cas où il y aurait des difficultés urgentes en matière de balance des paiements.

Il se souvient que la délégation néerlandaise était d'avis que ce droit devait revenir à la Commission européenne; il se demande s'il n'y aura pas impossibilité réelle pour le Conseil de Ministres, qui ne se réunit qu'à des intervalles assez éloignés, de décider de la politique générale communautaire. Confiera-t-on alors ce travail à des suppléants ou à
des fonctionnaires ? Si oui, l'orateur est d'avis qu'un contrôle parlementaire devient alors inopérant.

La Commission européenne pourra-t-elle donner des recommandations de caractère obligatoire en matière de politique générale touchant le marché commun, et le cas échéant en matière de politique sociale exigée par le développement du marché commun ?

L'orateur rappelle ensuite que M. Luns, Ministre néerlandais, a déclaré récemment que certaines délégations auraient introduit des amendements qui s'écartent dans une mesure considérable des solutions envisagées dans le rapport des chefs de délégation. Il demande quelques renseignements à ce sujet.

Enfin, en ce qui concerne les territoires d'outre-mer, il se rallie aux idées exposées par M. Spaak, relatives à une politique eurofrançaise. Toutefois, il aimerait savoir s'il est question également d'associer au marché commun les Indes occidentales néerlandaises, Suriname et Curaçao.

M. SPAAK, en réponse à la première question de M. van der GOES van NATERS, rappelle qu'il s'agit là du cas de crise urgente, pour lequel une disposition, résultant d'un compromis franco-allemand, est prévue dans le projet de traité et qui se lit comme suit :

"En cas de crise soudaine de la balance des paiements, "si les circonstances rendent impossible l'application "de la procédure normale d'accord préalable, les Etats "membres sont autorisés à prendre, de leur propre auto- "rité, des mesures de sauvegarde à titre conservatoire "sous réserve de les notifier au moment même où elles "se présentent aux institutions de la Communauté pour "décisions subséquentes. La Commission doit être infor-
"mée de ces mesures de sauvegarde au plus tard au mo-
ment où elles entrent en vigueur. Elle peut proposer
"au Conseil le concours mutuel aux termes du paragra-
phe 1 ci-dessus".

Cette disposition n'est toutefois pas encore définiti-
vement arrêtée.

En ce qui concerne la politique sociale, M. Spaak est
d'avis qu'il faut aborder ce problème avec une certaine cir-
conspection. Il estime que le problème du marché commun est un
problème essentiellement économique et technique et qu'il ne
faut pas donner l'impression que par le biais de ses disposi-
tions on désire réintroduire certains projets d'institutions
supranationales politiques qui ont échoué lorsque les projets
élaborés par l'Assemblée ad hoc ont été rejetés.

Enfin, en ce qui concerne les différences auxquelles a
peut-être voulu faire allusion M. Luns, M. Spaak rappelle que
certains problèmes, tels que par exemple celui des territoires
d'outre-mer, ne figuraient pas dans le rapport des chefs de
délégation; toutes questions qui s'y rapportent s'écartent donc
du texte initial. On peut donc considérer comme un amendement
important les propositions franco-belges dont l'orateur a
déjà parlé précédemment. Il y a sans doute d'autres modifica-
tions à l'égard du texte du rapport initial. Ainsi, actuelle-
ment, certains changements sont intervenus notament en ce
qui concerne les modalités d'abaissement des droits de douane
où on semble être parti d'autres chiffres de référence et de
taux moyens. Ces différences re sont toutefois pas fondamen-
tales puisqu'elles doivent aboutir aux mêmes résultats. Dans
l'ensemble, on comprendra aisément que pour des raisons pure-
ment politiques, il faut parfois adopter des compromis qui,
sur le plan scientifique, peuvent être considérés comme étant
moins valables.

AC 2739
En ce qui concerne la dernière question de M. van der Goes van Naters, l'orateur signale que les propositions franco-belges sont ouvertes également aux territoires néerlandais d'outre-mer.

**M. MUTTER** se réfère à ce qu'a dit M. Spaak au sujet des institutions et plus particulièrement de l'Assemblée parlementaire.

A son avis, le vote de l'Assemblée Nationale française n'aurait pas une influence telle que l'on doive considérer comme impossible une identité de l'Assemblée et de la Cour de la C.E.C.A. à celles du Marché commun et de l'Euratom. En effet, l'idée de cette dissociation avait été introduite pour s'assurer le vote favorable d'un petit groupe de 15 ou 20 voix au sein de la majorité gouvernementale. Il n'est pas certain qu'une même répartition des votes va se retrouver lors des débats de ratification.

L'orateur demande à M. Spaak si un des six pays a insisté pour que la participation de l'Angleterre au Marché commun, sous la forme d'une zone de libre échange, soit considérée comme condition préalable au dépôt de ratification des traités devant son Parlement.

**M. SPAAK** répond à cette dernière question qu'aucune condition de ce genre n'a été formulée et qu'il ne semble pas en être question jusqu'à présent.

**M. MUTTER** reprend en se déclarant en faveur d'une forme d'association intime des territoires d'outre-mer au Marché commun; il désire savoir si l'on a prévu dans le projet franco-belge un comité commun de gestion, car il serait inconcevable qu'on demande aux autres pays d'investir des capitaux sans qu'ils puissent participer à la gestion commune des projets réalisés.
La possibilité de prolonger de deux années consécutives la première étape est, à son avis, importante et indispensable; il s'agit là d'une concession nécessaire pour avoir l'accord de tous les Parlements à la clause d'irréversibilité prévue dans les projets de traité.

En ce qui concerne le projet d'Euratom, M. Mutter estime que ce projet doit être très rapidement réalisé; au cours des derniers mois, les interventions privées et les créations d'autres organismes se sont multipliées, ce qui peut faire naître de nouveaux obstacles à la conclusion du traité Euratom.

L'orateur demande enfin à M. Spaak si les récents événements politiques ne mettent pas en cause le principe de la seule utilisation pacifique de l'énergie nucléaire.

M. SPAAK répond en ce qui concerne les territoires d'outre-mer, que le mémorandum franco-belge a fait mention de chiffres très impressionnants. Sans doute y aura-t-il une gestion commune, mais la question n'est pas encore réglée.

M. Spaak confirme qu'une prolongation possible limitée est prévue à la fin de la première étape de quatre ans. La procédure envisagée prévoit un vote unanime qui doit constater au bout de la première étape que les objectifs fixés ont été réalisés. S'il n'y a pas unanimité, l'étape sera prolongée d'un an. Au bout de cette année supplémentaire, c'est un vote à la majorité qualifiée qui pourra consacrer que les objectifs sont réalisés. En cas de vote négatif, une deuxième et dernière prolongation d'un an sera possible.

En matière d'Euratom, M. Spaak est d'accord avec M. Mutter qui veut aller le plus vite possible, mais il semble qu'actuellement la rédaction du traité Marché commun avance plus facilement que celle du traité Euratom.
Il faudra peut-être se contenter d'un "traité-cadre". Effectivement, la technique se modifie très vite dans ce domaine ainsi que l'attitude politique des grandes puissances intéressées plus particulièrement à la question.

En ce qui concerne l'utilisation exclusivement pacifique de l'énergie nucléaire, les délégations française et allemande sont arrivées à une solution de compromis qui semble être généralement acceptée. M. Spaak rappelle qu'il a toujours été lui-même plus ou moins opposé au rejet absolu de toute possibilité d'utilisation militaire de l'énergie nucléaire. Les événements des derniers jours incitent encore à plus de souplesse dans cette question.

M. de Menthon demande si, sur le plan politique ou juridique, il existe un lien entre les deux traités en ce qui concerne leur signature et leur ratification.

M. Spaak répond que rien n'a été convenu au préalable à cet égard. Les deux traités seront probablement prêts en même temps, mais juridiquement les textes existent indépendamment l'un de l'autre.

M. Pohle constate que, entre la création d'une zone de libre échange ou l'association avec la Grande-Bretagne d'une part et la création du Marché commun général d'autre part, il n'y aurait pas de lien juridique. Une ratification des traités par les Parlements des six pays serait donc possible sans que la participation de la Grande-Bretagne soit déjà décidée. Il demande à M. Spaak s'il peut confirmer cette interprétation?

L'orateur pose une deuxième question concernant la zone de libre échange : dans le système économique anglais, il existe des subventions à l'exportation, des réglementations en matière de devises, des tarifs différentiels et d'autres me-
sures gouvernementales. Comment ces mesures peuvent-elles être conciliées avec la zone de libre échange ?

Une question qui lui paraît essentielle pour la réalisation de la zone de libre échange est l'attitude des gouvernements du Commonwealth britannique. Alors qu'il est certain que la position du Gouvernement anglais a changé à l'égard des projets européens, il semble que les Gouvernements du Commonwealth restent en partie opposés à l'égard de ceux-ci. Il cite à ce propos un article du Financial Times du 4 décembre 1956 d'où il ressort que c'est la crainte d'une diminution des exportations en provenance du Commonwealth sur le marché britannique qui est à l'origine de cette attitude réservée de certains membres du Commonwealth. Cette réserve ne peut manquer d'influencer la position finale du Gouvernement britannique.

M. SPAAK, en réponse à M. Pohle, confirme qu'aucun gouvernement n'a mis comme condition préalable à l'acceptation du Marché commun que soit créée la zone de libre échange qui associerait la Grande-Bretagne.

A la seconde question de M. Pohle, il répond que tous les problèmes soulevés par M. Pohle se posent pour la zone de libre échange aussi bien que pour le marché commun. La Grande-Bretagne n'a peut-être pas réalisé tout à fait cet aspect de la question. Il n'y a donc en réalité qu'une solution, c'est que la zone de libre échange accepte les mêmes règles et le même système qui auraient été considérés comme valables pour le marché commun.

En ce qui concerne les réactions des pays du Commonwealth, il est un fait que les avis sont assez différents et partagés parce que les réactions n'ont pas encore pu être recueillies systématiquement. Ceci n'a pu être fait par la Grande-Bretagne...
pour la simple raison qu'il est encore en ce moment difficile de préciser exactement ce qu'on entend par zone de libre échange, voire d'en mesurer exactement les incidences.

M. SCHÖNE rappelle que le rapport des chefs de délégation aux Ministres des affaires étrangères prévoyait un **fonds d'investissement commun** qui, dans l'esprit des auteurs du rapport, devait avoir, d'une part, pour objet de donner un élan supplémentaire au marché commun en créant des facilités dans le domaine monétaire, et, d'autre part, avoir un effet compensatoire permettant d'éviter les difficultés résultant du maintien des systèmes monétaires différents des Etats membres. Ce fonds d'investissement a-t-il été abandonné au cours des dernières négociations et pense-t-on à le maintenir uniquement au cas où les territoires d'outre-mer de certains pays membres feraient partie du marché commun ?

Il signale, en outre, que le fonds de réadaptation semble avoir reçu une autre appellation, celle de "fonds de réemploi". Il demande si avec cette nouvelle dénomination, la nature même du fonds a été modifiée ?

Il désire savoir également si la Commission européenne aura un pouvoir de contrôle sur les deux fonds ou si les fonds seront des organismes autonomes ?

Touchant les problèmes institutionnels, il semble y avoir une controverse sur les compétences à accorder soit à la Commission européenne, soit au Conseil de Ministres. Ceux qui militent en faveur de la Commission européenne auraient une tendance à mettre l'accent sur les interventions dirigistes dans le fonctionnement du marché commun, alors que d'autres préfèrent le Conseil de Ministres parce qu'il représente mieux les intérêts nationaux, voire nationalistes. A son avis, il existe un moyen sûr pour éviter une telle controverse : en
effet, la création d'un véritable Parlement européen aurait pour conséquence un assouplissement des aspirations dirigistes de la Commission européenne et des tendances par trop nationales du Conseil de Ministres.

L'orateur a l'impression que d'après le rapport des chefs de délégation et l'exposé que vient de faire M. Spaak, les pouvoirs seraient plus ou moins étendus suivant le domaine dont il s'agit ; en ce qui concerne, par exemple, l'énergie, les transports ou l'agriculture, les pouvoirs de la Commission sont d'importance différente. Il demande au Président de la Conférence si tous les pouvoirs seront centralisés auprès d'un seul organisme ou s'il est envisagé de conférer quelques-uns de ceux-ci à des institutions déjà existantes ou à d'autres institutions encore à créer.

M. SPAAK répond à M. Schoene que le fonds d'investissement prévu initialement dans le rapport d'avril 1956, reste évidemment intact et est indépendant d'un éventuel fonds d'investissement utilisé le cas échéant pour régler les problèmes des territoires d'outre-mer.

En ce qui concerne le fonds de réemploi, là aussi le principe reste acquis, mais sa structure et son objet ont été modifiés par rapport aux propositions contenues dans le rapport du mois d'avril 1956. En effet, deux délégations avaient proposé des solutions assez divergentes de celles initialement prévues, mais un compromis valable a été réalisé. Dans l'ancien système, le fonds de réemploi était basé sur la conception d'une indemnisation des industries et des hommes touchés par les conséquences du marché commun. Il était prévu de payer des indemnités d'attente ou de réemploi. Dans la nouvelle formule proposée, il s'agit plutôt de chercher les moyens permettant, dans le cadre d'une économie expansive, l'implantation de nouvelles industries et, par là, la création d'emplois pour la main-d'œuvre actuellement en chômage.
M. SPAAK reconnaît que dans les pourparlers et les négociations, il apparaît toujours une certaine rivalité entre une tendance supranationale et une autre qui met plutôt l'accent sur les intérêts et les pouvoirs nationaux. Le résultat final sera probablement un compromis entre les deux.

À la dernière question de M. SCHONE, M. SPAAK répond qu'il n'est pas question de répartir les tâches entre les institutions dérivées de la Commission européenne. L'ensemble des pouvoirs prévus sera exerçé par la Commission européenne elle-même. Il souligne cependant que les pouvoirs en matière d'énergie nucléaire pourraient être de nature différente de ceux se rapportant au marché commun.

M. BIRKELBACH pose quelques questions sur la politique sociale envisagée. Si l'on pouvait admettre qu'en cas d'intégration partielle, les aspects sociaux n'avaient pas été mis à l'avenir plan parce qu'on pouvait croire que les conséquences dans le domaine social restaient toujours contrôlables, le problème change d'ampleur et d'importance quand il s'agit d'un marché commun général. Une libre circulation des marchandises entraînera nécessairement une libre circulation des travailleurs et à ce sujet il sera nécessaire de prévoir des dispositions bien déterminées en matière sociale.

D'autre part, la différence des structures et du système de recrutement des syndicats ouvriers dans les différents États membres rendra une action syndicale uniforme plus difficile sur le plan européen. Pour cette raison il est nécessaire de donner aux travailleurs certaines garanties en matière de sécurité sociale. L'objet doit être une pleine utilisation de la main-d'œuvre disponible, ce qui demande une politique coordonnée de plein emploi.

AC 2739
À cet égard, il est important d'éviter que la différenciation d'équipement économique existant entre diverses régions ou entre différents pays ne donne naissance à une politique dangereuse en matière d'investissements qui aurait pour résultat d'aggraver encore les différences déjà existantes dans la structure économique des pays de la Communauté.

Enfin, il est important de se rappeler que les difficultés qu'ont subies les projets de traités élaborés par l'Assemblée ad hoc provenaient, au moins en partie, de ce que la structure économique et sociale qu'ils préconisaient ne répondait pas entièrement aux préoccupations de l'ensemble de la population des États membres. Il sera donc nécessaire, si l'on veut faire aboutir les nouveaux projets de traités, de songer à les faire répondre aux aspirations légitimes de toutes les couches intéressées de la population.

M. SPAAK, répondant à M. BIRKELBACH, signale que les solutions trouvées ou recherchées en matière notamment de la durée du travail à la suite des revendications françaises, vont dans le sens indiqué par M. BIRKELBACH. Il ajoute que l'harmonisation des charges sociales et des conditions de travail doit être un des objectifs principaux du marché commun. La Commission européenne pourra sans doute faire des propositions en matière d'harmonisation sociale. Mais il n'y a pas un chapitre spécial sur la politique sociale.

M. POHER souligne que la ratification doit se faire dans les plus brefs délais possibles. Il attire l'attention de M. SPAAK et du Groupe de Travail sur les difficultés qui pourraient se présenter en France si on laissait le temps aux adversaires de l'Europe d'organiser une campagne contre les deux projets.
C'est pour cette raison qu'une ratification dans le premier trimestre 1957 est très souhaitable. Il lui semble qu'une ratification ultérieure, par exemple au cours de l'été, se heurterait à une résistance bien plus forte.

**M. KOFF** rappelle que **M. SPAAK** a signalé dans son exposé que le travail de la Conférence a été rendu plus difficile du fait que la délégation allemande a présenté de nouvelles propositions concernant l'approvisionnement en combustible nucléaire. Il désire savoir quelle était la différence entre la nouvelle proposition allemande et la solution prévue par le rapport des chefs de délégations, et si cette difficulté a pu être surmontée.

**M. SPAAK** répond à **M. KOFF** que dans le rapport d'avril 1956 était prévu le principe de la priorité d'achat accordée à EURATOM de tout l'uranium de la Communauté. La nouvelle proposition allemande s'oppose à ce monopole prioritaire et préconise un système de marché libre. Le compromis qu'il faudra rechercher à ce sujet interviendra dans les prochains jours.

**M. MOTZ** remercie **M. SPAAK** d'avoir répondu avec autant de soin aux multiples questions que les membres du Groupe de Travail lui ont posées.

Reprise du point 2 : *Echange de vues sur le programme des travaux.*

**LE PRESIDENT** estime que le Groupe devrait maintenant décider dans quelle mesure les travaux entamés aujourd'hui pourront trouver une expression devant l'Assemblée plénière qui se réunit au début du mois de février, et arrêter un programme de travaux en conséquence.

AC 2739
A4

ASSEMBLEE COMMUNE – Groupe de Travail

Sous-Commission des questions institutionnelles
Notes sur l’élaboration des clauses institutionnelles des traités de l’Euratom et du Marché

10.12.1956 (Gozard)

Source: CARDOC AC 2734
Note sur l’élaboration des clauses institutionnelles des traités de l’ Euratom et du Marché commun


2. Cependant, les articles des traités relatifs aux institutions des nouvelles communautés européennes ne sont pas encore rédigés. La raison en est double. D’une part les experts comme les chefs de délégations ont considéré qu’il était de meilleure méthode de préciser d’abord la substance même des nouvelles communautés et de déterminer ensuite, en fonction des objectifs et des buts, les institutions plutôt que d’opérer selon un processus inverse. D’autre part, les options qui se posent quant aux institutions n’ont pas encore été levées.
3. Aussi semble-t-il utile pour la sous-Commission des Questions institutionnelles du Groupe de Travail de l'Assemblée Commune de la C.E.C.A. de préciser quelques points qui lui paraissent de nature à devoir être retenus dans la rédaction des traités, tout à la fois dans le but de rendre ceux-ci suffisamment souples pour leur permettre de recueillir, lors des procédures de ratification par les Parlements nationaux la plus large majorité possible, comme dans celui d'être aussi complets que possible pour satisfaire aux nécessités d'une organisation européenne réelle.

4. Il paraît nécessaire de réaffirmer l'intérêt de ne pas créer par les nouveaux traités des institutions totalement indépendantes et dissociées de celles existant actuellement pour la Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l'Acier. Les diverses communautés auront à connaître des problèmes identiques. Même si elles examinent chacun d'eux sous un aspect particulier, il peut être extrêmement dangereux que deux institutions aient à statuer indépendamment l'une de l'autre et isolément. Si la multiplicité des institutions se conçoit parfaitement et apparaît même nécessaire en ce qui concerne l'exécutif, Haute Autorité ou Commission Européenne, elle semble extrêmement dangereuse pour les autres institutions.

5. C'est pourquoi nous réaffirmons la nécessité d'une Cour de Justice unique et d'une Assemblée unique, le Conseil de Ministres pouvant voir siéger des Ministres différents selon les problèmes à traiter.

6. En ce qui concerne la Cour de Justice, la solution la meilleure, et qui permettrait au surplus d'éviter les jurisprudences contradictoires, serait celle d'une Cour unique
divisée en autant de sections qu'il y aurait de communautés européennes distinctes (Charbon-Acier, Euratom, Marché commun), avec possibilité de siéger toutes sections réunies pour assurer l'unité de la jurisprudence.

7. Pour l'Assemblée Commune, une seule Assemblée s'impose également. Pour éviter que cette Assemblée ne paraîse être l'émanation de l'actuelle Assemblée Commune de la C.E.C.A., il pourrait être décidé par les traités la création d'une nouvelle Assemblée unique qui absorberait l'Assemblée Commune de la C.E.C.A. existant actuellement. Pratiquement, le résultat serait identique, mais psychologiquement, l'indépendance complète de la nouvelle Assemblée à l'égard de l'Assemblée Commune actuelle serait respectée.

8. Il nous faut également insister sur la nécessité de la pondération des votes, spécialement au Conseil de Ministres. Il apparaît nécessaire tout à la fois de prévoir celle-ci et de s'orienter résolument vers des décisions prises à la majorité.

9. L'institution d'organismes associant le monde du Travail est également un des points essentiels pour les nouveaux traités, qu'il s'agisse d'un Conseil Économique et Social ou de toute autre institution.

10. Nous considérons par ailleurs qu'il y a lieu de réaffirmer la nécessité de doter les Commissions européennes de pouvoirs suffisamment étoffés pour qu'elles n'en soient pas réduites au simple rôle d'exécutant des décisions et de la politique du Conseil de Ministres.
11. Sans avoir l'ambition d'épuiser les divers aspects actuellement soulevés par l'élaboration des clauses des traités relatives aux nouvelles institutions des nouvelles communautés européennes, les remarques qui précèdent paraissent de nature à pouvoir utilement orienter les travaux de la Conférence Intergouvernementale et des chefs de délégations en vue de la rédaction définitive des traités auxquels à elles seront communiquées.

Gilles GOZARD
Paris, le 10 décembre 1956.
Lettre de M. Motz à Spaak du 10.12.1956
COMMUNAUTÉ EUROPÉENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L’ACIER

ASSEMBLÉE COMMUNE

GROUPE DE TRAVAIL


Bruxelles, le 10 décembre
Sénat de Belgique

L’Annuaire de Travaux, au nom de mes collègues et en mon nom propre, pour le remarquable exposé que vous avez bien voulu faire samedi devant le Groupe de Travail.

L’échange de vues qui a suivi votre départ a fait apparaître que les membres du Groupe de Travail étaient fortement impressionnés par le fait que vous ayez reçu entrevoir la clôture probable des travaux de rédaction des nouveaux traités vers la mi-janvier et la signature possible de ceux-ci par les gouvernements intéressés pour la fin du même mois.

Devant ce très bref délai, le Groupe de Travail a décidé de se réunir encore le 7 janvier pour formuler, sur la base de rapports oraux présentés par M. Wigny, van der Goes van Naters et Gozard, quelques ultimes suggestions que les membres de l’Assemblée souhaitent encore vous soumettre avant que les experts n’arrêtent définitivement les textes.

Dès à, à la fin de la réunion de samedi dernier, le Groupe de Travail m’a chargé de porter à votre attention quelques considérations de caractère général qu’il juge d’une im-

AC 2735
portance primordiale.

Ainsi les membres tiennent à renouveler le vœu déjà exprimé précédemment que les pouvoirs et compétences à réserver à la future Commission européenne soient aussi larges et réels que possible, qu'ils lui confèrent une autorité véritable et des moyens d'action efficaces et directs.

D'autre part, le Groupe de Travail est d'avis qu'une assemblée qui disposerait, en plus de son pouvoir de contrôle, d'un certain droit d'initiative et de véritables pouvoirs parlementaires, pourrait sans aucun doute contribuer fortement à faciliter sur le plan politique la fusion progressive des préoccupations des États membres et le rapprochement des intérêts nationaux.

Le Groupe de Travail espère qu'aucun effort ne sera ménagé pour que les tâches de cette Assemblée puissent être confiées à l'Assemblée Commune de la C.E.C.A. puisqu'il semble difficile de défendre devant l'opinion publique européenne qu'une nouvelle assemblée parlementaire vienne encore s'ajouter à celles qui existent déjà.

Enfin, le Groupe de Travail espère qu'il sera possible de trouver dans le cadre des nouveaux traités des formules efficaces permettant une association intime des territoires d'outre-mer aux nouvelles communautés européennes.

Le Groupe de Travail a constaté avec une satisfaction particulière qu'il a été possible, malgré la situation spéciale que la France a fait valoir, de maintenir dans le projet de traité le principe de l'irréversibilité, tout en admettant la possibilité d'une prolongation limitée de la première étape.

J'espère que vous voudrez bien prêter à ces quelques réflexions toute l'attention qu'elles méritent et je vous prie de croire, Monsieur le Président, à l'expression de mes sentiments de haute considération.

(signé : Roger NOTZ)
Président du Groupe de Travail

AC 2735
ASSEMBLÉE COMMUNE – Groupe de Travail

Memorandum sur la Relance européenne
COMMUNAUTÉ EUROPÉENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L’ACIER
ASSEMBLÉE COMMUNE

GROUPE DE TRAVAIL

Communication aux Membres

A l’issue de la réunion du lundi 7 janvier 1957, le Groupe de Travail a chargé un Comité de Rédaction d’établir un Mémorandum dans lequel le Groupe a défini succinctement sa position à l’égard de l’orientation générale des nouveaux projets de traités, dans la mesure où le Groupe de Travail a pu obtenir des informations à ce sujet.

Le Mémorandum a été adressé aux Ministres des Affaires étrangères des six États membres, en annexe à une lettre qui leur a été adressée par M. MOTZ, au nom du Groupe de Travail.

Le texte de cette lettre ainsi que du Mémorandum sont repris ci-après.

Division des Commissions.

Luxembourg, le 14 janvier 1957.

AC 2814
Strasbourg, le 8 janvier 1957
Maison de l'Europe.

Monsieur le Ministre,

Le lundi 7 janvier 1957, le Groupe de Travail de l'Assemblée Commune s'est réuni à Strasbourg afin d'examiner un certain nombre de problèmes touchant la relance européenne et l'élaboration des nouveaux traités instituant l' Euratom et le marché commun général.

Le Groupe de Travail a particulièrement apprécié l'attention que la Conférence intergouvernementale a bien voulu consacrer au rapport que l'Assemblée Commune lui a transmis sur les aspects sociaux de l'intégration européenne, en permettant notamment à une délégation de la Commission des Affaires sociales de se faire entendre par les délégués des six Gouvernements, réunis à Bruxelles sous la présidence de M. von der Groeben.

Dans le présent mémorandum, qui est joint à cette lettre, le Groupe de Travail définit succinctement sa position à l'égard de l'orientation générale des nouveaux projets de traité. Il espère que la Conférence intergouvernementale ou la Conférence des Ministres voudra bien examiner favorablement ce texte et envisager des solutions qui répondent dans la mesure du possible aux voeux qui s'y trouvent exprimés.

La présente lettre ainsi que le mémorandum a été également envoyée aux Ministres des Affaires étrangères des autres États participant à la Conférence.

Je vous prie de croire, Monsieur le Ministre, à l'expression de ma très haute considération.

(sé) Roger MOTZ,
Président du Groupe de Travail.

A leurs Excellences, MM.
les Ministres des Affaires étrangères des six États-membres
de la Communauté.
MEMORANDUM

du Groupe de Travail de l'Assemblée Commune

sur

la relance européenne

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Strasbourg, le 7 janvier 1957.

I.

Le Groupe de Travail, créé pour suivre les progrès de la Relance européenne et lui apporter la collaboration et l'appui politique de l'Assemblée Commune, vient d'être mis au courant, par ses rapporteurs, de certains problèmes que soulèvent les projets d'Euratom et de Marché commun.

N'étant pas en possession des textes eux-mêmes, le Groupe de Travail ne peut se livrer à une critique constructive de ces projets. Ses observations risqueraient d'être imprécises en raison des lacunes de son information et des courts délais dont il dispose.

Le Groupe de Travail croit préférable de formuler quelques remarques générales qui se fondent sur l'état actuel des projets mais qui sont surtout inspirées par l'expérience de la C.E.C.A. Dans cette Communauté, se poursuit depuis quelques années une action inédite et unique de collaboration européenne. Les faits sont aussi forts que les textes, la pratique aussi instructive que les propositions théoriques et c'est ce qui peut donner sa valeur au présent témoignage.
Les remarques qui vont suivre précisent notamment celles qui ont été énoncées dans la lettre du 10 décembre adressée par M. MOTZ, Président du Groupe de Travail, à M. SPAAK, Président de la Conférence intergouvernementale; c'est sur elles que le Groupe de Travail veut attirer tout spécialement l'attention des Ministres avant que les décisions définitives ne soient prises au niveau gouvernemental.

II.

En premier lieu, le Groupe de Travail est convaincu que la dualité des pouvoirs organisés dans la C.E.C.A. entre la Haute Autorité et le Conseil des Ministres a permis à la Communauté d'affirmer la réalité européenne sans être oppressive ou dommageable pour les États membres. Déforcer la Haute Autorité future ou son équivalent risque d'enlever aux institutions futures un dynamisme nécessaire, sans cependant augmenter d'une façon utile la protection des États membres. Il est difficile de concevoir une organisation politique efficace sans la doter d'un organe spécifiquement chargé de prendre les initiatives. Car pour réaliser une intégration européenne il ne suffit pas de la décréter par les dispositions d'un traité ni même de créer un Conseil des Ministres. Sans doute celui-ci est chargé de coordonner et d'harmoniser les politiques mais il est aussi préoccupé par la sauvegarde des intérêts nationaux vitaux que le Traité confie à sa vigilance. La promotion des intérêts communautaires dépend, en ordre principal, d'un Exécutif indépendant qui, au surplus, est responsable de sa politique devant une assemblée européenne.
III.

L'Europe, en effet, ne peut s'organiser en reniant ses traditions politiques et en instaurant une technocratie totalement ou partiellement irresponsible. Déjà dans la C.E.C.A., ce contrôle est insuffisamment assuré car des décisions importantes sont prises sans être en fait surveillées ni par l'Assemblée Commune ni par les Parlements nationaux. Il semble que dans les projets d'Euratom et de Marché commun, des organismes spécialisés soient prévus qui bénéficient d'un statut largement décentralisé. Tels sont par exemple le Centre Commun de Recherche, l'Agence d'approvisionnement pour l'Euratom, le Fonds d'investissements et l'Office Monétaire pour le Marché commun. Sans doute, cette décentralisation est techniquement et politiquement souhaitable mais elle ne peut aboutir à la technocratie. Sans s'immiscer dans les décisions particulières - qui doivent être dépolitisées - l'Exécutif européen doit pouvoir fixer la politique générale de ces organismes et en prendre la responsabilité devant l'Assemblée.

Le Groupe de Travail rappelle aussi dans ce domaine que la première prérogative des assemblées démocratiques est de voter le budget.

IV.

En troisième lieu, la multiplicité des Communautés européennes risque de créer les conflits de compétence, les contrariétés de politique, voire les rivalités entre organismes souverains, que l'intégration avait précisément pour but de supprimer entre les États. Le Groupe de Travail a déjà proposé une économic des organes, par exemple une seule Assemblée et une seule Cour de Justice assurant le contrôle politique et juridique des différents Exécutifs. Au surplus, il lui paraît AC 2814
indispensable de prévoir dans les Traités une coordination organique, par exemple un Comité des Présidents, des Bureaux mixtes ou toutes autres institutions imposant des confrontations périodiques et des solutions concertées. Sinon comment parviendrait-on à harmoniser par exemple le marché commun général, celui du charbon et de l'acier, celui des matières premières et équipements nucléaires, ou encore la politique énergétique charbonnière et nucléaire ?

V.

Le Groupe de Travail répète l'opinion qu'il a déjà exprimée au sujet des territoires qui ont, avec les États membres, des liens constitutionnels ou spéciaux. Il espère que des formules seront trouvées qui assurent à ceux-ci le bénéfice des nouvelles communautés en les y associant intimement.

VI.

Fort de l'expérience de la C.E.C.A., le Groupe de Travail rappelle qu'un marché commun n'implique pas seulement une libération des échanges, mais aussi une solidarité positive qui oblige la Communauté à aider chaque État membre, notamment par la gestion d'un fonds d'investissements, à moderniser son économie et à l'adapter aux conditions nouvelles de la concurrence.

Il ajoute que progrès économique et progrès social doivent aller de pair et se conditionnent mutuellement. Les organes communautaires doivent donc avoir des pouvoirs suffisants aussi bien dans le domaine social qu'en matière économique.
ASSEMBLEE COMMUNE – BUREAU

Procès-Verbal de la réunion du samedi 2 février 1957

Source: CARDOC AC 2902
La séance est ouverte à 9.00 heures sous la présidence de M. FURLER, Président de l'Assemblée Commune.

Étaient présents : M. FURLER, Président
MM. FOHRMANN, MOTZ, VIXSEBOXSE, VANRULLEN, Vice-Présidents.

MM. de NEREE tot BABBERICH, Secrétaire Général,
HUMMELSHEIM, Secrétaire Général adjoint,
VAN DEN EEDE, Chef de la Division des Commissions

Étaient présents également :

M. SASSEN, Président du Groupe démocrate-chrétien
M. PAYAT, Président du Groupe Socialiste
M. PLEVEN, Président du Groupe des libéraux et apparentés.

Le Secrétariat de la réunion était assuré par M. RUEST.
1. Modification de l'ordre du jour de la session du mois de février.

M. FURLER informe les membres du Bureau que le Président SPAAK se trouve dans l'impossibilité de se rendre à Strasbourg lors de la session de l'Assemblée Commune du mois de février, et propose en conséquence de modifier l'ordre des travaux comme suit :

- **lundi 11 février** : réservé aux réunions des groupes politiques;
- **mardi 12 février** : 9 h 30 heures : Comité des Présidents; 10 h 30 heures: Ouverture de la séance publique. La journée de mardi sera consacrée à l'exposé de M. WIGNY sur son rapport et aux exposés introductifs de MM. WIGNY, VAN DER GOES VAN Naters et GOZARD sur les aspects politiques et institutionnels des nouveaux Traités.
- **mercredi 13 février** : Discussion générale;
- **jeudi 14 février** : Rapport de M. de MENTHON et rapport de M. CARBONI;
- **vendredi 15 février** : Rapport de M. MUTTER.

Le Bureau décide :

de communiquer aux Membres le projet de l'ordre du jour ainsi modifié en les informant qu'èses modifications sont motivées par l'empêchement de M. SPAAK de se rendre à Strasbourg.

2. Création d'une quatrième Assemblée européenne dans le cadre du Traité instituant le Marché commun général et l'Euratom.

M. FURLER rappelle que la décision prise à la Conférence intergouvernementale des Affaires étrangères de créer une quatrième Assemblée européenne dans le cadre du Traité instituant le Marché commun général et l'Euratom a provoqué une opposition unanime dans les milieux parlementaires et dans l'opinion publique.

Suite à la recommandation 117 relative à la rationalisation des activités parlementaires européennes, votée par


M. FURLER estime que la meilleure solution consisterait à étendre la compétence de l'Assemblée Commun au contrôle parlementaire du Marché commun et de l'Euratom. Toutefois il est à craindre que la formule préconisée se heurte à des objections insurmontables de la part des Ministres, motivées par l'attitude prise par une fraction de l'Assemblée Nationale en France, et il est sage de proposer une solution plus souple.

En vue d'assurer l'unité des institutions européennes, il conviendrait dès lors de créer une nouvelle Assemblée parlementaire pour les six pays, qui exercerait à la fois ses compétences et pouvoirs à l'égard du Marché commun général, de l'Euratom et de la Communauté Charbon-Acier. La création de cette nouvelle Assemblée parlementaire devrait aller de pair avec une modification du Traité instituant la C.E.C.A., l'Assemblée Commun s'effaçant au bénéfice de la nouvelle Assemblée qui serait alors investie de toutes les compétences prévues dans le Traité C.E.C.A. Certes des difficultés subsistent, notamment en ce qui concerne la composition de la nouvelle Assemblée qui selon les propositions des Ministres, devrait comprendre 225 Représentants répartis comme suit :

- Allemagne : 60
- France : 60
- Italie : 60
- Pays-Bas : 20
- Belgique : 20
- Luxembourg : 5

Or cette composition ne correspond pas, en ce qui concerne la représentation nationale à la répartition qui se trouve à la base de l'Assemblée Commun.

Une modification dans la répartition des sièges se heurtera très certainement à l'opposition des petits pays membres de la C.E.C.A., leur représentation dans le cadre de
L'Assemblée Commune, étant beaucoup plus favorable puisque les trois pays du Benelux disposent de :

- Pays-Bas : 10 sièges
- Belgique : 10 sièges
- Luxembourg : 4 sièges

Dans la nouvelle Assemblée, la représentation des grands pays est sensiblement plus forte par rapport aux petits pays. En effet, la somme des Représentants des deux grands pays dans la nouvelle Assemblée dégage une majorité de 120 sur 225, alors qu'au sein de l'Assemblée Commune ce même calcul donne les chiffres de 36 sur 78.

M. FURLER préconise une solution de compromis plus favorable aux petits pays en prévoyant pour la nouvelle Assemblée 243 sièges répartis comme suit entre les pays du Benelux :

- aux Pays-Bas 27 sièges
- à la Belgique 27 sièges
- aux Luxembourg 9 sièges

Mais en préconisant une composition de 243 sièges, l'équilibre recherché par les Ministres se trouve modifié. Cet équilibre pourrait être rétabli en réduisant le nombre de sièges à 240 à répartir comme suit :

- Allemagne : 60
- France : 60
- Italie : 60
- Belgique : 27
- Pays-Bas : 27

M. FURLER, après l'examen de ces solutions constructives, souligne l'existence de difficultés provenant du fait que le Président de l'Assemblée Consultative du Conseil de l'Europe fera des propositions tendant à créer une "Assemblée européenne unique" au sein de laquelle les autres Assemblées actuellement existantes formeraient des "commissions". Cette proposition a toutefois peu de chance d'être retenue, étant donné qu'elle implique une modification du Statut du Conseil de l'Europe, modification qui nécessite l'accord des Gouvernements des 15 pays membres du Conseil de l'Europe, et en plus la ratification des 15 Parlements.

M. PLEVEN demande au Président FURLER des précisions quant aux pouvoirs de cette nouvelle Assemblée et quant aux possibilités qui existent pour d'autres pays d'adhérer à la C.E.C.A. sans toutefois adhérer au Marché commun et à l'Eu-

AC 2902
M. FURLER répond que la nouvelle Assemblée aura les pouvoirs qui lui seront attribués par les Traités dans chacun des domaines de son activité.

M. S. Sassen réplique que la question de M. PLEVEN soulève déjà de grandes difficultés dans le cadre du Traité de la C.E.C.A. et considère que la thèse de M. FURLER n'est pas de nature à créer des difficultés insurmontables, la solution définie étant à trouver dans la formule du contrat d'association suggérée par M. PLEVEN.

M. FAYAT estime que si la solution préconisée par M. FURLER devait prévaloir, c'est-à-dire créer une Assemblée nouvelle avec des compétences résultant des Traités instituant le C.E.C.A., le Marché commun général et l'Euratom, il n'y aurait pas de difficultés partielles et inhérentes à cette Assemblée, mais des difficultés resteraient toujours internes à ces autorités spéciales.

M. VIXSEBOXSE n'est pas très optimiste quant à la réalisation de ce projet car les pouvoirs actuels de l'Assemblée Commune sont plus étendus que ceux qui sont attribués à la nouvelle Assemblée. Il se demande s'il ne serait pas possible de créer une administration unique pour les trois Assemblées (Assemblée Commune, Assemblée du Marché commun général et de l'Euratom), étant entendu que le secrétariat de l'Assemblée Commune devrait être agrandi en prévision de ces nouvelles tâches.

M. FURLER estime qu'il est indispensable de créer un seul secrétariat, et que les fonctionnaires de l'Assemblée Commune soient fusionnés dans le secrétariat de la nouvelle Assemblée.

M. S. Sassen approuve partiellement la thèse soutenue par M. VIXSEBOXSE, il estime que pour deux raisons il convient d'éviter la création d'une quatrième Assemblée parlementaire : d'une part une telle création serait absolument inutile, et d'autre part la création d'un nouveau Secrétariat serait fâcheuse car elle entraînerait le départ des meilleurs éléments qui sont actuellement en fonction à Luxembourg pour rejoindre la capitale de la nouvelle organisation. Si sur ce point il est entièrement d'accord avec M. VIXSEBOXSE, il ne partage cependant pas ses inquiétudes quant à la possibilité de créer une Assemblée parlementaire unique, étant donné que ce projet ne se heurte pas à des difficultés fondamentales. En plus, les
objections formulées par une fraction de l'Assemblée Nationale française tombent, étant donné que les pouvoirs définis par le Traité instituant le Marché commun et l'Euratom ne seraient plus exercés par l'Assemblée Commune, mais par une nouvelle Assemblée qui absorberait l'Assemblée Commune.

M. SASSEN donne certes la préférence à l'extension de l'Assemblée Commune, extension tant en ce qui concerne le nombre des Représentants que de ses attributions, mais en présence de la difficulté que rencontre ce projet, il est préférable de créer une nouvelle Assemblée chargée du contrôle parlementaire, tant en ce qui concerne le Marché commun général, le C.E.C.A., et l'Euratom. A ce sujet il est partisan de la formule préconisée par le Président FURLER, qui consiste à répartir les sièges au sein de cette nouvelle Assemblée selon la formule : 60 - 60 - 60 - 27 - 27 - 6 , soit en tout 240. Toutefois il est sage de tenir compte des propositions formulées par le Président de l'Assemblée Consultative, M. DEHOUSSÉ, et de souligner lors de la réunion des trois Bureaux qu'une plus grande uniformité est souhaitable et reste le but fixé pour l'avenir. Cependant, dans la situation actuelle des choses il convient d'être réaliste et de réaliser un programme concret tout en ne perdant pas de vue que la modification du Statut du Conseil de l'Europe suppose l'accord de 15 Gouvernements et de 15 Parlements.

M. MOTZ, en sa qualité de membre des deux Assemblées, souligne l'aspect psychologique du problème. Il constate que du côté de l'Assemblée Consultative du Conseil de l'Europe, les débats ont eu un caractère académique, à la fois plus confus et plus élevé qu'à l'Assemblée Commune où le débat est concis et clair du fait des pouvoirs réels qui sont conférés à l'Assemblée Commune. Ce la nouvelle Assemblée aurait sur certains chapitres des pouvoirs différents et il convient de veiller à définir de manière très précise les pouvoirs de cette nouvelle Assemblée.

M. VANRULLEN fait remarquer que l'instrument qui modifie le Traité de la C.E.C.A. devra être établi et ratifié en même temps que le Traité instituant le Marché commun général et l'Euratom et qui fixera le Statut de la nouvelle Assemblée.

M. FURLER soulève la question de la présidence de la Réunion jointe qui doit avoir lieu à 10.00 heures et propose que M. DEHOUSSÉ préside cette réunion, étant donné qu'elle a lieu sur l'initiative du Président de l'Assemblée Consultative, et qu'il lui sera plus facile d'intervenir dans les débats s'il...
n'est pas chargé de la présidence.


M. FURLER informe les Membres du Bureau que le Sénat de la République d'Italie a désigné les neuf sénateurs et que la Chambre des Députés a fait entrevoir l'élection des neuf Députés vers le 22 février. D'autre part les difficultés techniques en ce qui concerne la tenue d'une session à Rome ayant pu être surmontées, le Président FURLER avec l'accord des Membres du Bureau proposera lors de la réunion du Comité des Présidents de tenir la session à Rome entre le 5 et le 9 novembre 1957.

La séance est levée à 10 heures.

Luxembourg, le 6 février 1957
Procès-verbal de la réunion commune des Bureaux de l'Assemblée commune CECA, de l'Assemblée consultative du Conseil de l'Europe et de l'Assemblée de l'Union de l'Europe Occidentale du 2 février 1957
Strasbourg, le 6 février 1957

PROCES-VERBAL

de la réunion commune des Bureaux
1° de l'Assemblée Commune de la Communauté européenne
pour le Charbon et l'Acier,
2° de l'Assemblée Consultative du Conseil de l'Europe,
3° de l'Assemblée de l'Union de l'Europe Occidentale,
à Bruxelles, le 2 février 1957

Présents :

Pour l'Assemblée Consultative du Conseil de l'Europe :

M. Dehusse, Président de l'Assemblée Consultative
Lord Layton, Vice-Président
M. Crosby, Vice-Président
M. Mommer, Rapporteur de la commission des Affaires Générales.

Pour l'Assemblée Commune :

M. Furler, Président
M. Fohrmann, Vice-Président
M. Motz, Vice-Président
M. Vanvrullen, Vice-Président
M. Vixseboxse, Vice-Président

Pour l'Assemblée de l'Union de l'Europe Occidentale :

M. Pezet, Président
M. Bohy, Vice-Président
M. Fens, Vice-Président
M. Schaus, Vice-Président
M. Struye, Rapporteur de la commission des Affaires Générales.
Pour les groupes politiques :

M. Sassen, Président du Groupe démocrate-chrétien (Assemblée Commune)
M. Heyman, Président du Groupe démocrate-chrétien (Assemblée Consultative et U.E.O.)
M. Fayat, Président du Groupe socialiste
M. Pleven, Président du Groupe des libéraux et apparentés.

La réunion est ouverte à 10 heures sous la présidence de M. Dehoussé, Président de l'Assemblée Consultative.

M. Dehoussé remercie ses collègues MM. Purler et Pezet qui lui ont demandé d'assumer la présidence de la réunion. Il se félicite de cette prise de contact entre les trois Bureaux qui inaugure, il le souhaite, une tradition. Il propose que la présidence en soit assurée par rotation lors des prochaines réunions.

Il en est ainsi décidé.

M. Dehoussé, après avoir lu les télégrammes d'excuse de MM. Benvenuti, Kiesinger et Teitgen, propose que chaque Président expose tout d'abord le point de vue de son Assemblée. Au nom de son Assemblée il indique qu'il a convoqué la Commission Permanente de l'Assemblée Consultative pour examiner la question de la création d'une quatrième Assemblée. Il donne ensuite lecture d'un télégramme à M. Bech, Président du Comité des Ministres, à ce même sujet. Il interroge ses collègues sur l'opportunité d'une démarche auprès des six ministres négociant à Val Duchesse les traités de marché commun et d'Euratom, pour proposer la création d'un Comité mixte composé des représentants des Ministres et des trois Bureaux.

M. Purler expose le point de vue de l'Assemblée Commune. Il constate tout d'abord que les parlementaires membres des Assemblées européennes ont été unanimes à s'opposer à la création d'une quatrième Assemblée.

Il propose en premier lieu que les trois Bureaux indiquent qu'à leur avis le contrôle parlementaire d'Euratom et du marché commun soit confié à l'Assemblée de la C.E.C.A. élargie à cette fin. Toutefois, afin de ne pas mettre les traités en danger par cette exigence les Bureaux envisagent une proposition transactionnelle. Ils désirent qu'il n'y ait qu'une seule institution parlementaire pour les trois communautés, ce qui pourrait être réalisé par la fusion des Assemblées compétentes - avec des modalités différentes - pour le marché commun général, Euratom et la C.E.C.A.
En ce qui concerne la composition, le Président Furler constate qu’en l’état actuel de la pondération envisagée de l’Assemblée nouvelle de 225 membres, deux “grands États” auraient à eux seuls la majorité absolu. Il propose une pondération différente pour la France, l’Allemagne, l’Italie de 60 chacune, 27 pour la Belgique et pour les Pays-Bas et 6 pour le Luxembourg, aboutissant à un total de 240 membres.

Enfin il estime que le moment est venu de réaliser une rationalisation des institutions parlementaires européennes.

M. Puzet expose alors le point de vue de l’Assemblée de l’Union de l’Europe Occidentale. Il note que si l’Assemblée n’a pas encore eu à se prononcer sur la question de la création d’une quatrième Assemblée, sa commission des Affaires Générales a suivi les conclusions de son Rapporteur, M. Struye, à qui il laissera le soin d’exposer plus particulièrement son point de vue.

Il estime que la fusion des institutions parlementaires sera imposée par le bon sens et la nécessité et tout doit être fait, à son avis, pour laisser la porte ouverte à la création d’une Assemblée unique.

Passant ensuite à la participation britannique à Euratom et au marché commun, il lui semble que l’Assemblée de l’U.E.O. est qualifiée pour réaliser cette association.

M. Struye, Rapporteur de la commission des Affaires Générales de l’Assemblée de l’U.E.O., sur la question de la création d’une quatrième Assemblée, estime qu’il n’est plus nécessaire d’insister sur les grands inconvénients de la prolifération des Assemblées dont tout le monde est conscient. La proposition de création d’une quatrième Assemblée répond à une difficulté politique. En fait, M. Struye ne pense pas que cette difficulté politique corresponde à une réalité très consistante, mais plutôt à une attitude sentimentale.

Afin de ne pas être mis en face d’un fait accompli et d’une quatrième Assemblée, M. Struye recommande qu’il y ait concomitance entre la naissance de la nouvelle Assemblée et l’extinction de l’Assemblée de la C.E.C.A.

En second lieu, il faut s’efforcer de procéder à un regroupement général des Assemblées. Le but ultime doit être l’unité et il ne faut pas que les Bureaux se placent dans l’optique des négociateurs mais dans celle des parlementaires.

M. Debussche souligne qu’à aucun moment de la négociation les Assemblées européennes n’ont été consultées.

Il se demande si la désignation de suppléants à l'Assemblée de la C.E.C.A. ne permettrait pas d'élargir la composition de cette Assemblée. Il note que si l'Assemblée Commune doit être incorporée dans la nouvelle assemblée, il sera nécessaire de modifier le traité instituant la C.E.C.A. et de faire ratifier cette modification. Aussi faut-il exiger des garanties avant d'admettre la création d'une nouvelle Assemblée.

Il indique enfin qu'il serait possible d'aboutir à l'équilibre réclamé par M. Furler dans la pondération de l'Assemblée par une diminution de la représentation des trois Grands.

M. Dehoussé interrompt à ce point la discussion générale pour demander aux trois Bureaux leur accord sur le principe et la composition d'une délégation qui rendrait visite aux six ministres.

Il est décidé que les Bureaux seront représentés par leurs trois Présidents assistés des deux Rapporteurs, MM. Struye et Mommer, ainsi que de M. Motz, Président du Groupe de travail de la C.E.C.A.

Il est décidé sur proposition de M. Dehoussé qu'il ne sera pas fait de suggestions trop précises et qu'en particulier la question de la pondération ne sera pas approfondie.

Il est décidé que la création d'un Comité mixte réunissant des Ministres et des représentants des Bureaux des 3 Assemblées européennes sera recommandée.

M. Dehoussé insiste sur la nécessité d'un front commun des trois Assemblées.

M. Pleven insiste sur la nécessité d'une Assemblée unique à composition large qui sera le miroir et le point de départ de l'Europe politique. C'est pourquoi il s'oppose à ce que l'Assemblée Européenne unique soit dénommée Assemblée Economique Européenne. Il désire que l'adjectif économique soit donc supprimé. Il se déclare en complet accord avec M. Mommer et suggère qu'un avenant au traité de la C.E.C.A. supprimant l'Assemblée Commune soit signé et ratifié en même temps que les traités de marché commun et d'Euratom.
M. Pezet marque son complet accord avec M. Pleven.

M. Fayat est lui aussi partisan de l'Assemblée unique. Il recommande cependant la sagesse et souhaite que cette Assemblée n'outrepasse pas le mandat qui lui est confié par les traités.

M. Furler indique qu'il faut qu'il soit spécifié que partout où l'Assemblée Communne est compétente ce sera désormais la nouvelle Assemblée.

M. Saassen rappelle que le marché commun et l'Euratom ne sont que des étapes sur la voie de l'Europe. Il faut que les trois Bureaux expriment leur volonté d'aboutir à une unité plus large.

Lord Layton est tout à fait opposé à la création d'une quatrième Assemblée. C'est le moment, estime-t-il, de réclamer une Assemblée européenne unique.

M. Mommer propose qu'il soit prévu qu'un nombre de représentants et de suppléants de l'Assemblée Consultative égal à la représentation à cette Assemblée soit membre de la nouvelle Assemblée.

M. Furler estime qu'il ne faut pas se lier à la notion non parlementaire de suppléants et qu'il ne faut pas compliquer les négociations en insistant sur les détails. Il doit être possible d'éviter une quatrième Assemblée, soit en élargissant l'Assemblée Communne, soit en procédant à la fusion des deux Assemblées.

M. Dehousse reconnaît que la notion de suppléants n'est pas parlementaire, mais ils existent et jouent un rôle dans les Assemblées européennes. L'institution des suppléants pour des motifs pragmatiques devrait être admise à titre provisoire dans la nouvelle Assemblée.

M. Fens fait remarquer qu'il y aura un risque de chevauchement dans le domaine du contrôle des matières fissiles entre l'Assemblée de l'U.E.O. et l'Assemblée chargée du contrôle de l'Euratom.

M. Vixsebossé demande que la délégation des Présidents et Rapporteurs tienne les Bureaux informés par écrit des résultats de leurs démarches.

M. Crosbie fait part de son complet accord avec les propositions de Lord Layton.

M. Dehousse déclare la discussion close.
Il est procédé alors sur la base des projets présentés par MM. Struye et Mommer à la rédaction du texte d'une proposition de recommandation à soumettre aux Ministres des six États membres.

Les Bureaux délibèrent.

Le texte de la proposition de recommandation qui sera soumis le lundi, 4 février, aux Ministres réunis à Val Duchesse est adopté (voir annexe).

M. Dehoussé fait savoir que la délégation des 3 Bureaux sera reçue par les Ministres à Val Duchesse le lundi 4 février à 15 heures.

La séance est levée à 12 h 50.
Les Bureaux des trois Assemblées européennes, réunis à Bruxelles le 2 février 1957 en présence des Présidents et Vice-Présidents des Groupes politiques des Assemblées;

Se ralliant aux considérations essentielles qui s'opposent à la création d'une quatrième Assemblée européenne, considérations exprimées dans les résolutions émanant des Assemblées européennes et de certaines Assemblées nationales;

Reprenant plus particulièrement à leur compte les conclusions suivantes contenues dans la Recommandation 117 de l'Assemblée Consultative et dans la Recommandation de la Commission des Affaires Générales de l'Assemblée de l'U.E.O., demandant de :

- rejeter toute proposition de création d'une quatrième Assemblée européenne;
- confier le contrôle parlementaire de l'Euratom et du Marché Commun à l'Assemblée Commune de la C.E.C.A. et élargir la composition de cette Assemblée ....

Emettent l'avis que, si des objections insurmontables s'opposaient à l'adoption de cette formule, la création d'une Assemblée assurant le contrôle parlementaire de l'Euratom et du Marché Commun devrait s'accompagner de dispositions établissant dès à présent les modalités selon lesquelles l'Assemblée Commune de la C.E.C.A. serait appelée à fusionner immédiatement avec la nouvelle Assemblée, sans qu'il soit porté atteinte aux rapports actuellement existant entre les institutions de la C.E.C.A., ni aux pouvoirs qui leur sont respectivement attribués;

Rappellent que l'objectif général à poursuivre est la création d'une Assemblée européenne unique,

Décident à cette fin l'étude des modifications et du regroupement à apporter aux Assemblées existantes

Et invitent les Hautes Parties Contractantes à prendre l'engagement d'inclure, au sein de la nouvelle Assemblée, un certain nombre de membres de l'Assemblée Consultative du Conseil de l'Europe.
Procès-verbal de l’audience accordée à la délégation des Bureaux des trois Assemblées européennes par le six Ministres réunis en Conférence le 4 février 1957 au Val Duchesse à Bruxelles

Source: CARDOC AC OD PV/BURE BUBE-19570204 0010
Strasbourg, le 11 février 1957

PROCES-VERBAL

de l’audience accordée à la délégation des Bureaux des trois Assemblées européennes

par

les six Ministres réunis en Conférence le 4 février 1957, au Val Duchesse à Bruxelles

La séance est ouverte à 15 heures sous la présidence de M. P.-H. SPAAK, Président de la Conférence des Ministres.

Étaient présents :

La délégation des trois Bureaux composée de :

MM. DEHousse
FURLER
BOHY (remplaçant M. PEzet)
STRUYE
MOMMER
HOTZ
accompagnés des greffiers des trois Assemblées ;

et,

pour la République Fédérale d'Allemagne :

M. von BRENTANO,
accompagné de MM. CARSTENS et OPHULS ;

pour l'Italie :

M. MARTINO
accompagné de MM. VENTURINI, BADINI CONFALONIERI ;

À 32.223

//.

Confidentiel
AS/3 B (57) 3
pour le Luxembourg :

M. BECH,
accompagné de M. SCHLAUS;

pour les Pays-Bas :

M. LUNS,
accompagné de MM. VAN DER BEUGEL et LINTHORST HOMAN;

pour la France :

M. Mauricio FAURE,
accompagné de M. MARJOLIN;

pour la Belgique :

le Baron SNOY et d'OPPERS,
accompagné de M. de SCHEYVEN.

M. Dehoussé présente la délégation que les Bureaux des trois Assemblées ont constituée au cours de leur réunion commune du 2 février 1957. Cette délégation réunit les Présidents des trois Assemblées ainsi que les personnalités politiques qui ont, dans des rapports présentés à l'Assemblée Consultative, à l'Assemblée de l'U.E.O. et à l'Assemblée Commune, traité les problèmes actuellement en discussion.

L'orateur souligne que la position qui sera défendue par la délégation au cours de la présente audience a fait l'objet d'un mandat explicite donné par les trois Bureaux, en présence des chefs des groupes politiques de ces Assemblées.

Le but de l'audience n'est pas d'ajouter, aux préoccupations nombreuses des Ministres, des difficultés nouvelles. La démarche est faite dans un esprit de collaboration et de bonne volonté et devrait permettre d'apporter des solutions positives en ce qui concerne la constitution de la nouvelle Assemblée chargée de contrôler le Marché commun et l'Euratom. L'orateur confirme que les membres des trois Bureaux et, par conséquent, les membres de la délégation sont d'ailleurs tous, en principe, favorables à l'objectif poursuivi par les nouveaux traités.
M. Dehousse justifie ensuite la demande d’audience de la délégation par le fait qu’il était naturel que les Assemblées européennes soient consultées sur la constitution de la nouvelle Assemblée. D’une part, le caractère même des Assemblées justifie cette consultation et, d’autre part, la nature du problème traité fait que celui-ci aura nécessairement une incidence sur la structure et même sur l’existence des Assemblées actuellement en place. L’objectif à atteindre doit être une construction aussi rationnelle que possible et qui permette de progresser vers une unification de l’action parlementaire au moment où la "relance" devient une réalité. A plus longue échéance, il faut s’attacher à jeter les bases de ce qui pourrait être un jour une Assemblée européenne unique.

L’orateur fait ressortir que la démarche n’est nullement inspirée par le désir d’acaparer les compétences nouvelles ou de défendre des situations acquises.

M. Dehousse propose que M. Furler présente le passage de la recommandation relatif à l’Assemblée de la C.E.C.A.

Il termine en déclarant que la délégation reste à la disposition des Ministres pour donner les éclaircissements qu’ils pourraient désirer et suggère la création d’un comité mixte réunissant les délégués des gouvernements et les membres de la délégation parlementaire.

M. Furler rappelle que la réaction des Assemblées européennes a toujours été qu’il serait normal que la nouvelle Assemblée soit constituée sur la base de l’Assemblée Commune qui, par son activité de quatre années, a eu l’occasion d’acquérir une expérience en matière d’énergie et en matière économique. Etant donné, toutefois, que cette solution a soulevé dans les milieux parlementaires de certains pays des objections de caractère irréductible, le Bureau de l’Assemblée Commune a fait la suggestion que la solution pourrait alors être recherchée dans une formule qui supprimerait l’Assemblée Commune au moment même de la constitution de la nouvelle Assemblée, celle-ci reprenant intégralement les compétences actuellement exercées par l’Assemblée Commune. A ces compétences viendraient s’ajouter celles qui lui seront conférées par les nouveaux traités.
Dès à présent, le Bureau de l'Assemblée Commune, appuyé dans sa position par les chefs des groupes politiques, estime que cette nouvelle Assemblée devra maintenir ses travaux dans les limites strictes des compétences précises prévues dans les nouveaux traités.

En considérant les incidences de cette fusion, l'attention a été attirée sur un problème que l'orateur désire soumettre aux Ministres.

En effet, le rapport entre les représentations nationales, tel qu'il apparaît dans les propositions faites pour la nouvelle Assemblée, et celles prévues par le Traité C.E.C.A. pour l'Assemblée Commune est sensiblement différent, puisque à l'Assemblée Commune la représentation des petites nations est plus élevée que dans les chiffres proposés pour la nouvelle Assemblée. Si l'on envisage une fusion des deux Assemblées, il sera sans doute nécessaire de réviser les chiffres proposés pour les délégations, de façon à augmenter légèrement la représentation de la Belgique, des Pays-Bas et du Luxembourg. Au lieu de faire la répartition sur la base des chiffres 60, 20 et 5, on pourrait prévoir 60 pour les grands pays, 27 pour la Belgique et les Pays-Bas et 6 pour le Luxembourg. Ces chiffres ne sont pas le rétablissement des rapports existant au sein de l'Assemblée Commune mais un compromis entre la répartition à l'Assemblée Commune et celle proposée pour la nouvelle Assemblée.

Le but de cette modification serait d'éviter la possibilité - d'ailleurs plutôt fictive - qu'un bloc formé de deux grands pays ne dispose au sein de l'Assemblée de la majorité absolue, tout en évitant cependant qu'il puisse être mis en minorité (principe de la parité des voix).

L'orateur estime que la modification est possible. Il lui semble qu'il suffirait d'inscrire, dans un protocole joint au nouveau traité, que là où dans le Traité C.E.C.A. figurent les mots "Assemblée Commune", le nom de la nouvelle Assemblée leur soit substitué. Resterait encore à prévoir un texte nouveau pour l'article qui fixe la composition de l'Assemblée Commune.

En ce qui concerne les compétences sur le plan parlementaire correspondant à la liaison entre le Marché commun général et des pays tiers dans une zone de libre échange, l'orateur est d'avis qu'elles relèveraient davantage de l'Assemblée Consultative du Conseil de l'Europe et de l'Assemblée de l'U.E.O. En effet, les problèmes de la zone de libre échange se rattachent plus directement à l'activité de l'O.E.C.E. qui soumet déjà régulièrement ses rapports aux organismes du Conseil de l'Europe.

Dans cette solution, l'action parlementaire concernant les matières économiques et sociales régies à la fois dans le Traité Marché commun général-Euratom et Charbon-Acier serait...
concentrée dans un ensemble unique, alors que les liaisons vers les pays tiers relèveraient plutôt de l'Assemblée du Conseil de l'Europe.


Il estime que les solutions préconisées par la délégation sont tout à fait acceptables, permettant d'unifier l'action parlementaire européenne et d'éviter la multiplicité des administrations. Le Bureau de l'U.E.O. donne à ces solutions l'appui le plus complet.

M. Spaak répond que les Ministres réunis à la présente conférence ont déjà marqué leur accord sur le principe énoncé par les orateurs de la délégation. Le désir général d'éviter de créer une assemblée entièrement nouvelle qui existerait à côté des Assemblées déjà en place. M. Spaak indique que le problème sera encore discuté le jour même.

M. Struye précise que si l'intention existe d'arriver à une Assemblée unique, il craint par contre que la fusion de la nouvelle Assemblée et de l'Assemblée Commune ne soit réalisée qu'ultérieurement et que, dans ce domaine, les Ministres pourraient se limiter à une décision de principe. Or, il est d'avis que la fusion doit se faire au moment même de la constitution de la nouvelle Assemblée. En effet, s'il n'y a pas simultanéité, l'Assemblée Commune poursuivra son existence et la nouvelle Assemblée sera en fait tentée de créer son administration et ses services propres. Ceci doit être évité à tout prix.

En ce qui concerne la proportion des délégations nationales au sein de la nouvelle Assemblée, il est important de trouver à ce sujet un accord précis. En effet, la différence entre les nouvelles proportions et les proportions existant au sein de l'Assemblée Commune pourrait créer des difficultés de principe, au sujet desquelles des controverses pourraient naître. L'orateur confirme que ce sont là les raisons pour lesquelles les Bureaux des Assemblées ont estimé opportun d'offrir leur collaboration aux Ministres, afin de les aider à trouver les solutions les plus utiles.

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M. von Brentano indique que, pour sa part, il peut se rallier aux considérations qui ont été exposées. La grande question semble être en effet quelle Assemblée absorbera l'autre. Il exprime le vœu que les nouveaux traités puissent réaliser l'idée de l'absorption de l'Assemblée Commune dans la nouvelle Assemblée. Il remercie la délégation d'avoir appuyé aussi clairement cette solution.

M. Luns fait remarquer que les solutions proposées correspondent entièrement aux vues du Gouvernement néerlandais qui est également prêt à en appuyer la réalisation.

M. Bech rappelle que le Parlement luxembourgeois a adopté, il y a quelques jours, une motion dans le même sens et que le gouvernement s'y est rallié.

Il constate que sur les principes essentiels tout le monde semble être d'accord. Il s'agira d'examiner si la solution préconisée peut être réalisée dans l'immédiat et s'il n'y a pas de difficultés majeures qui pourraient être soulevées à cette occasion.

M. Dehouxse invite les Ministres à ne pas perdre de vue les perspectives institutionnelles d'une unification de l'ensemble des institutions parlementaires européennes.

M. Spaak demande si M. Dehouxse fait allusion à une unification qui comprendrait également l'Assemblée Consultative du Conseil de l'Europe et l'Assemblée de l'U.E.O.

M. Dehouxse confirme que c'est bien son idée mais il admet que l'unification qui comprendrait à la fois l'Europe des 15 et l'Europe des 7 ne peut se faire qu'à un stade ultérieur.

Enfin, l'orateur renouvelle son offre faite précédemment d'une collaboration avec les Ministres.

M. Spaak conclut en constatant que sur l'ensemble des solutions proposées par la délégation, il ne semble pas y avoir de divergence de vues entre les Ministres.

Les considérations qui ont été faites au cours de cette audience seront examinées attentivement.

En ce qui concerne la proposition de collaboration de la délégation, l'orateur interrogera ultérieurement les Ministres. Cependant, il serait peut-être utile que, dans l'immédiat et en prévision de la discussion qui aura lieu le même jour, la délégation puisse présenter des propositions plus précises en vue de réaliser la fusion préconisée.
M. Dehoussé fait remarquer que la délégation n'a pas connaissance des textes déjà arrêtés mais qu'elle fera cependant diligence pour rédiger un memorandum relavant quelques principes généraux.

M. Maurice Faure estime que l'entretien en cours a permis de dégager l'essentiel des propositions. Il lui semble que pour réaliser l'unification, deux thèses sont en présence. La première préconise une Assemblée européenne unique à l'intérieur de laquelle les différents pouvoirs seraient exercés par des "commissions" à caractère spécialisé, jouissant d'une certaine autonomie (Solution : "Assemblée à tirer"). La deuxième thèse suggère la création d'une nouvelle Assemblée qui exercerait aussi tous les pouvoirs de l'Assemblée de la C.E.C.A., cette dernière étant supprimée.

L'orateur indique qu'il n'a pour sa part aucune préférence particulière et qu'au cours des délibérations qui vont suivre il se ralliera à celle des deux thèses que la majorité de ses collègues approuvera. Il conclut en disant qu'il peut difficilement indiquer quelle sera la réaction de son Parlement à ce sujet.

M. Dehoussé remercie M. Spaak et les personnalités gouvernementales présentes de l'accueil qui a été réservé à la délégation des trois Bureaux. Il confirme que cette délégation se mettra aussitôt au travail pour rédiger un bref memorandum précisant les termes des solutions proposées.

M. Spaak lève la séance à 15 h 40.
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Procès-verbal de la réunion de la Délégation des Bureaux des trois Assemblées européennes (Bruxelles, le 4 février 1957)

Source: CARDOC AC OD PV/BURE BUBE-19570204-AM 0010
PROCES-VERBAL

de la réunion de la Délégation des Bureaux des Trois Assemblées européennes (pour le MARCHE COMMUN et l'EURATOM) tenue à Bruxelles le 4 février 1957 à 17 heures.

Étaient présents :

MM. DEHOUSSE, Président
FURLER
BOHY, suppléant de M. Pezet
MOMMER
MOTZ
STRUYE

M. Dehousse ouvre la séance.

Il considère que le "Memorandum" doit être rédigé et communiqué aux ministres dans les plus brefs délais possibles.

Il regrette que la Délégation n'ait pas eu communication des conclusions auxquelles les ministres semblent déjà avoir abouti.

Son impression est que la formule d'une assemblée unique "à tiroirs" serait susceptible de recueillir l'adhésion générale et en particulier celle du Parlement français.

Il suggère de retenir ce principe au même titre que la création d'une Assemblée "unique", commune à l'Euratom, au Marché Commun et à la C.E.C.A. et que la simultanéité de cette création avec la dissolution de l'Assemblée de la C.E.C.A.
M. Furler estime lui aussi que l'idée d'une Assemblée économique commune, à Six, et à un stade ultérieur, d'une Assemblée unique sont susceptibles de rencontrer l'agrément des ministres. Il convient de formuler ces thèses en quelques paragraphes courts et précis qui puissent être repris dans le Traité.

M. Bohy fait part des craintes de M. Spaak selon lesquelles une consultation des assemblées pourrait retarder l'élaboration et la signature des Traités. Il rapporte que M. Faure s'est montré satisfait de la démarche des Bureaux qui renforcerait la position du Gouvernement français devant son Parlement.

M. Motz insiste pour que l'Assemblée Commune conserve l'intégrité des pouvoirs qui lui ont été conférés par le Traité de la C.E.C.A.

M. Struyve énonce un certain nombre de principes qu'il estime devoir figurer dans le mémorandum :

- La nouvelle Assemblée exercera, dans le domaine du charbon et de l'acier, toutes les compétences attribuées jusqu'à présent à l'Assemblée Commune.

- La répartition par nationalité des membres de l'Assemblée nouvelle sera établie en se rapprochant davantage de la répartition fixée pour l'Assemblée Commune, si possible en réduisant plutôt qu'en augmentant le nombre total actuellement envisagé.

- Les membres actuels de l'Assemblée Commune feront de droit partie de la nouvelle Assemblée, mais seulement durant la première année de son existence.

- Les États ou les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engageront à faire désigner comme membres de l'Assemblée nouvelle un certain nombre de membres de l'Assemblée Consultative et par conséquent de l'Assemblée de l'U.E.O.

- L'Assemblée Commune de la C.E.C.A. cesserait d'exister le jour où la nouvelle Assemblée sera constituée.

- La possibilité serait réservée par accord ultérieur des gouvernements d'insérer la nouvelle Assemblée "économique" dans le cadre de l'Assemblée du Conseil de l'Europe.

M. Furler estime que l'on se trouve en présence de l'alternative suivante : ou bien les compétences de l'Assemblée Commune sont étendues au contrôle de l'Euratom et du Marché Commun, ou bien il est créé une Assemblée entièrement nouvelle dont les compétences seront fixées par les Traités instituant la C.E.C.A., le Marché Commun et l'Euratom.
Le nombre des membres de cette nouvelle Assemblée Commune devrait de préférence être fixé à 240, ainsi réparti : 60 pour chacun des trois grands pays, 27 pour la Belgique et les Pays-Bas, et 6 pour le Luxembourg.

Les amendements nécessaires seraient apportés dans ce cas au Traité de la C.E.C.A.

M. Dehoussé estime que l'on peut parfaitement associer les suggestions de M. Struye et de M. Furler, celles de M. Struye fournissant le canevas général.

Il est procédé à la rédaction du memorandum.

Les paragraphes suivants sont adoptés.


La Délégation souligne qu'il ne lui est pas possible, dans le bref délai qui lui est imparti, d'énoncer autre chose que des principes généraux à soumettre à l'attention de la Conférence.

Dans cet esprit, la Délégation unanime recommande à la Conférence les principes suivants, étant bien entendu que ces principes ne sont applicables que dans l'hypothèse où des objections insurmontables s'opposerait à attribuer compétence à l'Assemblée Commune de la C.E.C.A.

1. La nouvelle Assemblée, appelée à contrôler le Marché commun et l'Euratom, exercera, dans le domaine du charbon et de l'acier, toutes les compétences et attributions accordées actuellement à l'Assemblée de la C.E.C.A.

Il ne sera pas porté atteinte aux rapports actuellement existants entre les institutions de la C.E.C.A., ni aux pouvoirs qui leur sont respectivement attribués."

Un débat s'engage sur la question du nombre des membres de la nouvelle Assemblée.
M. Furler estime qu'il convient de fixer à un chiffre assez élevé le nombre des membres de l'Assemblée nouvelle. Cette précaution est nécessaire si l'on considère que dans quelques années, les membres de l'Assemblée pourront être élus au suffrage universel direct. Il est bon d'autre part d'associer le maximum possible de parlementaires aux activités des institutions européennes.

M. Bohy craint pour sa part que la délégation par les Parlements d'un trop grand nombre de leurs membres aux Assemblées européennes ne porte préjudice au bon fonctionnement de ces Parlements.

M. Furler fait observer que les membres des Assemblées européennes sont désignés généralement dans chaque Parlement national par deux chambres, ce qui atténue sensiblement l'inconvenant signalé par M. Bohy. Il convient de ne pas oublier que cette assemblée nouvelle sera appelée à représenter une population de 160 millions d'habitants et que sa compétence s'étendra à l'ensemble de l'économie des six pays membres.

M. Dehoussé fait observer que l'élection des membres de l'Assemblée n'est pas prévue pour un avenir immédiat et que, d'autre part, il sera toujours possible de réviser la composition de l'Assemblée dans un protocole additionnel.

La majorité de la Délégation se rallie à l'avis de M. Motz qui estime qu'il ne convient pas de préciser à ce stade le nombre des membres de la future assemblée.

La Délégation adopte sur ce point les trois paragraphes suivants :

"2. La proportion des membres de l'Assemblée nouvelle sera établie en se rapprochant davantage de la proportion actuellement fixée à l'Assemblée de la C.E.C.A.

De préférence, il s'agira de réduire plutôt que d'augmenter le nombre total des membres envisagé par les ministres.

Au cas où, dans la suite, il viendrait à être décidé de procéder à des élections directes, le nombre des membres pourrait être reconsidéré dans un protocole additionnel."

Les cinq derniers points sont adoptés, après discussion, dans la rédaction suivante : 

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4. Les États s'engagent à faire désigner, parmi les membres de l'Assemblée nouvelle, un certain nombre de membres de l'Assemblée Consultative.

Cette proposition devra faire l'objet d'une stipulation expresse des Traités.

5. L'Assemblée Commune cesserà d'exister le jour où la nouvelle Assemblée sera constituée.

6. Les Traités devront réserver des possibilités de coopération avec les États qui ne font pas partie des Communautés des Six.

7. À un stade ultérieur, il y aura lieu de prévoir l'intégration de la nouvelle Assemblée dans une Assemblée européenne unique.

Sur la proposition du Président, il est décidé qu'une simple lettre de transmission, signée de M. Dehousse, accompagnera le Mémorandum. Celui-ci sera remis à M. Spaak par le Chef de Cabinet de M. Dehousse.

La séance est levée à 18 heures.
ANNEXE

MEMORANDUM

remis par la délégation des Bureaux des 3 Assemblées Européennes
à la Conférence intergouvernementale de Bruxelles
le 4 février 1957

La Délégation constituée le 2 février 1957 par les Bureaux des trois
Assemblées européennes (Conseil de l'Europe, C.E.C.A., U.E.O.) s'est réunie dans
les locaux du Sénat de Belgique, immédiatement après l'audience qui lui a
été accordée le lundi 4 février par la Conférence des Ministres.

La Délégation souligne qu'il ne lui est pas possible, dans le bref
délai qui lui est imparti, d'énoncer autre chose que des principes généraux à
oummettre à l'attention de la Conférence.

Dans cet esprit, la Délégation unanime recommande à la Conférence
les principes suivants, étant bien entendu que ces principes ne sont applica-
bles que dans l'hypothèse où des objections insurmontables s'opposeraient à
attribuer compétence à l'Assemblée Commune de la C.E.C.A.

1. La nouvelle Assemblée, appelée à contrôler le Marché Commun
et l'Euratom, exercera, dans le domaine du charbon et de l'acier, toutes les
compétences et attributions accordées actuellement à l'Assemblée de la C.E.C.A.

Il ne sera pas porté atteinte aux rapports actuellement
existants entre les institutions de la C.E.C.A., ni aux pouvoirs qui leur
sont respectivement attribués.

2. La proportion des membres de l'Assemblée nouvelle sera établie
en se rapprochant davantage de la proportion actuellement fixée à l'Assemblée
de la C.E.C.A.

De préférence, il s'agira de réduire plutôt que d'augmenter
le nombre total des membres envisagé par les Ministres.

Au cas où, dans la suite, il viendrait à être décidé de procéder
des élections directes, le nombre des membres pourrait être reconsideré
dans un protocolle additionnel.

3. Les membres actuels de l'Assemblée Commune de la C.E.C.A., feront
de droit partie de la nouvelle Assemblée durant la première année de son
existence. Cette mesure est nécessaire, au départ des nouvelles institutions,
pour assurer la continuité dans les travaux.

4. Les Etats s'engagent à faire désigner, parmi les membres de
l'Assemblée nouvelle, un certain nombre de membres de l'Assemblée Consultative.
Cette proposition devra faire l'objet d'une stipulation expresse
des Traités.

5. L'Assemblée Commune cessera d'exister le jour où la nouvelle
Assemblée sera constituée.

6. Les Traités devront réservé des possibilités de coopération
avec les Etats qui ne font pas partie des Communautés des Six.

7. à un stade ultérieur, il y aura lieu de prévoir l'intégration de
la nouvelle Assemblée dans une Assemblée européenne unique.
*N.B. The documents in the list are attached in the original French version, with an English translation produced for this publication. The other available language versions (see table headed ‘A. List of attached documents’, at the end of Part 1 of this document) may be obtained from CARDOC (tel. 00 352-4300 24104 - Arch-info@europarl.europa.eu )
Resolution adopted on 2 December 1954 concerning the

Powers of scrutiny of the Common Assembly and their use

‘The Common Assembly

I. Reminds its committees that they are entitled:

A. to instruct, with the agreement of the Assembly Bureau, one or more of their members to carry out a special fact-finding mission
   – either to the appropriate economic, professional and trade union organisations,
   – or to international organisations pursuing objectives similar to those of the Community,
   – or to the national Governments,
   – or to the Special Council of Ministers;

B. to invite to one of their meetings, for the purpose of addressing it, anyone whom it might be useful to hear, including in particular:
   – members of the Special Council of Ministers,
   – representatives of any economic, trade union or professional organisations whose opinions the committee might find instructive,

II. Calls on the High Authority:

A. to recognise, in agreement with the Consultative Committee, that the committees of the Assembly may ask their rapporteurs to attend, as observers, any meetings of the Consultative Committee which are of particular interest for the information of the Assembly or its committees;

B. to negotiate, in collaboration with the Bureau of the Assembly, agreements which would enable the Assembly to maintain permanent relations, for information purposes, with the ILO, GATT, OECD, the EEC and, eventually, the Western European Union.

III. Calls on the members of the Special Council of Ministers to keep the Assembly regularly informed of Council policy, using the opportunity offered by the fourth paragraph of Article 23 of the Treaty.

IV. Recognises that it has the power to debate, on the initiative of one of its committees or members, motions for resolutions concerning:

   (a) the application of Articles 95 and 96 of the Treaty,

   (b) any acts, decisions or proposals which, on account of their content or consequences, could jeopardise the existence of the Community, its effectiveness or its development as envisaged in the Treaty.

V. Calls on its Bureau to refer to it the proposal to set up a working party with the task of reporting to the Assembly on the following questions:
(a) the arrangements devised in collaboration with the High Authority to give effect to point II of this resolution;

(b) the procedure which could be proposed to study the most appropriate and effective means of enabling:

1. the Assembly’s power of scrutiny vis-à-vis the Executive to be formulated more clearly;

2. the Community’s material jurisdiction - and, more generally, the common market - to be extended;

3. the difficulties relating to the election of members of the Assembly by universal suffrage to be resolved.’
COMMON ASSEMBLY

Motion for a resolution addressed to the Governments of the Member States of the ECSC

The Common Assembly,

- whereas Europe’s economy is lagging ever-further behind,

- whereas only a common European policy can enable living standards to be raised on the basis of economic expansion and increased employment,

- whereas that policy requires a common market to be progressively established,

- whereas this common market must not only allow economic competition and the division of labour, but must also fulfil the requirements of solidarity between the peoples of the Member States,

- whereas this common market must not be confined to trade liberalisation measures, as its establishment implies that the economic, social, monetary and fiscal policies of the Member States should be coordinated to allow certain sectors to be adjusted and to ensure stable employment and the expansion of industry as a whole,

- whereas, in any event, a common market needs an Authority to see that it is opened up and developed, eliminate distortions and help Member States which are in difficulty,

- having regard to its resolutions of 2 December 1954 and 13 May 1955,

- having regard to the preliminary report presented by the Working Party to its session in Brussels in March 1956 and the debate thereon,

- having regard to the need for a Treaty:

  which definitively establishes the basis for a general common market in the form of a customs and economic union which precludes any form of autarky,

  which envisages the free movement not only of goods, services and capital but also of workers,

  which establishes, furthermore, an investment fund aimed at promoting economic expansion,

  which helps national economies to adapt while taking account of the special situation of agriculture and ensuring the progressive and irreversible establishment of this economic union,

  which, to the same end, provides for Community aid to be channelled to Member States through a readaptation fund and stipulates safeguard clauses to cover cases where vital national interests might be at risk,

  which makes provision for the development of the common market to proceed hand-in-hand with the harmonisation of social security contributions in the context of an active and progressive policy aimed at ensuring a steady improvement in standards of living,
which establishes institutions having sufficient powers to carry the abovementioned principles into effect, subject to democratic oversight,

which is broadly open to all the other members of the OECD,

Calls on the Governments of the Member States of the European Coal and Steel Community, as a matter of urgency, to conclude a Treaty between themselves on the basis of these principles.'
COMMON ASSEMBLY - Working Party

Minutes of the meeting of Saturday, 8 December 1956
(extract: Exchange of views on the current progress of the proceedings of the Intergovernmental Conference on the Common Market and Euratom)

page 3, point 3

Source: CARDOC GT/CRA/56-8
EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY

COMMON ASSEMBLY

WORKING PARTY

MINUTES

of the

meeting of Saturday 8 December 1956, at 9.30 a.m.
Belgian Senate
Palais de la Nation
Political Groups Room

BRUSSELS

Present:
Mr MOTZ, Chairman,
Mr POHLE, Vice-chairman,
Messrs. BLANK, CARBONI, van der GOES van NATERS, GOZARD, HAZENBOSCH, KOPF, KREYSSIG, MARGUE, DE MENTHOS, MUTTER and POHER.

Pursuant to Rule 38(3) of the Rules of Procedure, Mr AMADEO was replaced by Mr SCHONE, Mr FOHRMANN by Mr VANRULLEN and Mr WEHNER by Mr BIRKELBACH.

Mr FURLER, President of the Common Assembly

Apologies received from: Mr DEHOUSSE, Vice-Chairman, Messrs BLAISSE, CAILLAVET, CARON COULON, OESTERLE, PELLA, SCHIAVI and WIGNY.

Also present at the meeting:
Mr P.-H. SPAAK, Chairman of the Intergovernmental Conference for the Common Market and Euratom, and
Mr CALMES, Secretary-General of the ECSC Special Council of Ministers,
Mr HUPPERTS, Minister Plenipotentiary,
Mr ALBRECHTS and Mr VERNAEVE of the Intergovernmental Conference.

The High Authority was represented by Mr ERNST, Deputy Director of the External Relations Division.

Secretariat of the Common Assembly represented by:
Mr VAN DEN EEDE, Head of the Committees Division,
Mr d’ARVISSENT, Head of the Research and Documentation Division,
Mr KONIG, Mr PASETTI and Mr von MOHRENSCHILDT of the Committees Division,
Mr LAGACHE of the Research and Documentation Division.

Political Groups’ secretariat:

Miss VALENTIN, Christian-Democrat Group,
Mr DREZE, Liberal Group,
Mr GEORGES, Socialist Group.
SUMMARY

1. Adoption of minutes of 19 June 1956 (Doc. AC/GT/cra/56-6) ......................... 4

2. Exchange of views on the programme of work ..............................................
   Part 1 ................................................................................................................... 4 - 11
   Part 2 ................................................................................................................... 36 - 40

3. Exchange of views on the current progress of the proceedings of the
   Intergovernmental Conference for the Common Market and Euratom
   Part 1 (Address by Mr SPAAK) ........................................................................... 12 - 22
   Part 2 (Members’ questions and Mr SPAAK’s replies).......................................... 23 - 36

4. Date of the next meeting .................................................................................... 40 - 41

Annex I: Table of decisions taken by the Working Party........................................ 42 - 43

Annex II: Draft agenda of the meeting ................................................................. 44
Mr Paul-Henri SPAAK, accompanied by his staff, enabled the room.

Mr MOTZ, chairman, welcomed Mr SPAAK, thanked him for coming and suggested that the meeting resume discussion of the programme of work after hearing Mr SPAAK.

Mr P.-H. SPAAK began by noting that that day’s meeting was taking place at a difficult time. The conference was currently poised between two crucial stages and, although many points had already been settled, some questions were still unresolved. It was difficult, therefore, to give any definitive information about the treaties which were being drawn up.

Mr SPAAK considered that, however, to put the question into perspective, he should briefly summarise the history of the concept of European integration since the Messina Conference.

In April 1956, the Intergovernmental Committee set up after Messina, had produced an initial report by the delegation heads to the Foreign Ministers which was generally regarded as a remarkable achievement.

The report had been submitted to the subsequent Venice Conference in a climate of optimism and, without going into detail, it demonstrated that general technical solutions could be found for all the various problems. The difficulty had not been to find such solutions, but to choose between the various possible options.

Mr Spaak reminded the meeting that the Venice Conference had created an impression of total success. The Ministers, meeting in a favourable atmosphere, had reached positive conclusions fairly rapidly and accepted the report as a working basis. The impression created was that the remaining stages could be concluded very swiftly.

It had soon become apparent, however, that the fact that the report had been accepted as a working basis did not mean that agreement had been reached on every issue. Although certain delegations had entered reservations, they had not seemed to be of any particular importance.

On the other hand, the French delegation had introduced into the debate an important new idea, that of including the overseas territories in the common market. That had raised a problem which was to return later and to which the experts were devoting considerable attention at the time of speaking.

After the Venice Conference, work had resumed again on 26 June for a brief period, but it was not until the beginning of September 1956 that the experts had returned to the task in hand.

Although agreement existed on the basic ideas, no formal commitment had been made by the participating states. Moreover, there had been a considerable change in the composition of the teams of experts who had drawn up the initial report. The consequence was that almost every question was reopened and all the discussions were resumed.
For several weeks, progress was very slow, and the fact that problems which had been regarded as settled were being discussed once again put a damper on proceedings.

This atmosphere was relieved only after the intervention of Mr Maurice FAURE who, speaking very frankly, tried to define the difficulties and conflicting opinions involved, and called on the delegations to formulate very precisely any objections they wish to present. In essence, this meant France’s objections with regard to the general common market and Germany’s objections with regard to Euratom.

This marked a new phase of the proceedings. Difficulties certainly remained, but attempting to formulate them clearly had made the task of finding solutions somewhat easier.

Two major difficulties remained:

(a) France declared that it could not agree to enter the common market unless France was regarded as a special case in relation to certain issues. France’s economic situation was such that it did not believe that it could be integrated into Europe unless certain safeguard clauses were introduced;

(b) with regard to Euratom, Germany proposed, on the question of the supply of fissile materials, solutions which were totally different from those contained in the initial report adopted by the delegation heads.

Mr SPAAK stressed that attitude of the other delegations to these difficulties had been both understanding and constructive. They had recognised the validity of the objections raised and agreed to consider the special situation in which France found itself.

Mr SPAAK pointed out that the fact that the various delegations wished to reach an agreement was very encouraging, and stressed that the Italian delegation, in particular, had declared that it was prepared in principle to endorse the French position.

Once this issue had been agreed, it was possible to begin considering the problem, which involved laying down acceptable limits for the special treatment which France should be accorded.

In the memorandum tabled by France, it had proposed certain modifications to the document drawn up by the delegation heads in Brussels. The French proposals:

- introduced new arrangements for the transition from the first to the second stage;
- raised the difficult problem of harmonising social security contributions;
- asked for the possibility of retaining a system of export refunds and taxes on imports;
- called for safeguard clauses in the event of balance of payment difficulties;
- and, finally, raised objections to the arrangements for the implementation of the Treaty.

All these questions had been dealt with at a series of meetings of delegation heads. Compromise solutions had been reached without difficulty on a fairly large number of points. However, certain fairly important problems were still unresolved.
The moment had come to move to a higher level than delegation head and put the questions before the Ministers.

With regard to the German proposal, the five other delegations had let it be known that they firmly intended to retain the solutions proposed in the April 1956 report on supplies of fissile material.

Two documents had been drawn up for the ministers’ meeting on 20 and 21 October in Paris. On the first day, it had seemed that it would be easy to reach agreement; on the second day, however, it had proved impossible to reach clear and satisfactory solutions, particularly in the area of harmonising social security contributions.

The points at issue were:

- arrangements for paid holidays;
- bringing women’s and men’s salaries into line, a point on which the French insisted that their system be adopted, and
- working hours and payment for overtime.

It had soon become apparent that the problem of paid holidays did not raise any real problems since, on examination, it had emerged that the different countries respective systems were comparable. The greater number of days’ paid annual leave in some countries was offset by the greater number of public holidays in others, with the result that the total number of days’ paid holiday ended up roughly the same.

It seemed that compromise would also be easy to reach as regards identical salaries for women and men.

One insurmountable difficulty remained: harmonising working hours and payments for overtime. This problem was exacerbated by the fact that the intransigent attitude adopted by some delegations had led others to withdraw the concessions they had made on other issues.

The upshot was that the Paris meeting had ended in failure. Consequently the problem had to be addressed at the highest political level in order to achieve the necessary rapprochement between France and Germany. Mr ADENAUER and Mr MOLLET had therefore held a meeting on 6 November which had been, on the whole, constructive.

The German Chancellor and the French Prime Minister revisited the Paris memorandum and succeeded in reaching almost complete agreement in principle. The agreement involved certain new proposals which were communicated immediately to the other delegations and accepted by them.

Once this difficulty had been successfully negotiated, the experts resumed their task and, by the beginning of December, the treaty establishing the general common market had already been partially drafted, not merely in outline but already in the form of chapters and articles. In fact several of these articles had already been discussed very thoroughly and conclusively.

Mr SPAAK paid particular tribute to Mr von der GROEBEN, the head of the German delegation, who chaired the common market committee.
Mr SPAAK confirmed that, on 6 December, the delegation heads had been able to reach agreement on the following four chapters:

- abolishing customs duties between Member States,
- abolishing quantitative restrictions,
- a European readaptation fund, to be referred to in future as the ‘redeployment fund’,
- competition rules.

In addition, four more chapters had already been drafted and would be examined by the delegation heads over the next few days. These chapters were headed as follows:
- the investment fund,
- state aid,
- the balance of payments,
- monetary questions.

The following chapters were expected to be completed by 19 to 20 December:

- agriculture,
- common external tariffs,
- trade policy.

Finally, it is hoped that, by the first week in January, provisions would have been drafted with regard to:

- transport,
- services,
- the free movement of workers.

It was also expected that texts would have been drafted on the subject of distortions of competition, the harmonisation of legislation and capital movements.

Mr SPAAK acknowledged that this was an ambitious timetable but stated that, in his view, there was nothing to stop it being met, which would enable the work to be concluded by 15 January.

The difficult problem of overseas territories still had to be addressed however. A memorandum had been drawn up jointly by the French and the Belgians, setting out their proposals concerning the inclusion of overseas territories. However, the document had been received with some reservations by the other delegations.

Briefly, the memorandum proposed integrating the overseas territories into the common market as far as possible but with the proviso that, in return, all the Member States of the new Community should contribute to the public investment required to provide these territories with the necessary amenities.

The sums referred to in the memorandum were, of course, rather large; these seemed to have alarmed certain delegations, which possibly, took the view that the advantages were outweighed by the disadvantages. That had given rise to doubts and reservations.
The speaker declared that he was very much in favour of the idea developed in the memorandum and that the French delegation also regarded it as very important. The memorandum contained an initial blueprint for regulating relations between Europe and Africa which could also be used to formulate a policy for the provision of aid to under-developed countries.

Mr SPAAK declared that he was dubious about arrangements which would have the effect of providing aid even to countries which were hostile to our general political outlook. He believed that it was undoubtedly preferable to help those countries whose political development was likely to bring them closer to the Western political model.

It seemed at present that the problem of the overseas territories was the most important one. However, it was expected that a report on the question would be available in a few days which would make it possible to wind the matter up.

One further question remained: that of relations with the OECD and the United Kingdom.

On the subject of the United Kingdom, it was certain that there was a current of opinion in that country which favoured closer links with continental Europe, an idea which had been developed on several occasions by Mr MACMILLAN.

However, the United Kingdom had taken the view that, while it was unable to simply accede to the common market, it could participate in a ‘free trade area’ closely associated with the common market.

The main difference between the two entities was that the common market regulated issues which were common to the Member States, such as external tariffs, whereas in the free trade area, external tariffs continue to be freely determined by members, which would enable the British to maintain their system of preferential tariffs for Commonwealth countries.

Mr SPAAK said he was in favour of such rapprochement and intended to support it in the OECD. However, he stressed that, despite appearances, it would be no easier to create the free trade area than the common market itself. For, as the free trade area would also incorporate safeguard clauses, it would have to be administered by means of common institutions to which the United Kingdom will have no alternative but to subscribe.

The OECD working party had had to address all the problems with which the Intergovernmental Conference experts had been faced. There was one additional difficulty in that the United Kingdom wished to exclude agriculture from the free trade area whereas the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy would never agree to it being excluded.

At OECD level, where 17 countries were involved, a similar problem had arisen because of the particular situation of Danish agriculture.

However, Mr SPAAK believed that it was impossible to revisit these problems with the OECD or GATT experts, as on each occasion new solutions were proposed which could jeopardise all the progress achieved so far.

The current position was clear: the aim was to establish a common market while seeking to ensure that it was closely associated with a free trade area.
Mr SPAAK noted in passing that the United Kingdom seemed to have certain reservations about including overseas territories, while being more hostile that the five continental delegations to the safeguard clauses requested by France. This had led to a paradoxical situation: those French citizens who had wanted nothing to do with the common market because the United Kingdom was unable to join might now see the prospective free trade area collapse because of the United Kingdom’s concerning the need to take France’s specific situation into account.

Although considerable difficulties remained to be solved, Mr SPAAK believed that the way forward was now more apparent. It was immensely important to finalise the project swiftly, before some new turn of events - which was always possible - distracted the attention of the Governments concerned.

That being so, Mr SPAAK believed that plans should be made for the Governments to sign the treaties by the end of January.

Mr SPAAK apologised for not having discussed in detail the structure of the treaties themselves. He had little alternative, however, at this crucial stage of proceedings.

On the subject of Euratom, he announced that Mr ADENAUER and Mr MOLLET had agreed in general terms to retain the solutions proposed in the delegation heads’ report of April 1956.

It seemed, however, that the task of drafting the chapters and articles of the Euratom treaty would prove more difficult than in the case of the treaty on the common market, and we would probably have to be satisfied with what one might call a framework treaty setting out the required commitments and establishing general principles.

The problems raised by a nuclear energy community were still relatively unknown, and scientific development and the policy pursued in this area by the great powers were so liable to change that it was impossible to lay down rigid and detailed rules to cover the next 50 years.

In the coming days, decisions would have to be taken about the general provisions of the treaty which, judging by the reaction of the various governments involved, might take a rather different form from that establishing the general common market.

Provisions would doubtless begin to be finalised in the course of the second half of December, and it was not impossible that the drafting of the treaty would be completed towards the end of January.

Mr SPAAK concluded his account of the progress of work so far and declared that he was ready to answer any questions which members of the working party wished to raise. He noted, however, that it would be difficult for him to provide precise technical and other details, as the texts in question were still being drawn up and it would be two or three weeks before they assumed more definitive form. By the present stage, the delegation heads would have played their part by stating their views on the various points which still had to be clarified.

Mr MOTZ, the Chairman, thanked Mr SPAAK on behalf of the working party. Mr SPAAK’s account had been an optimistic one, since it made clear that, despite the problems which still had to be overcome, a blueprint had been drawn up and the future was opening up before us. He gave the floor to members who wished to raise questions.
Mr MARGUE hoped that the projects to which Mr SPAAK had alluded would be carried to completion in the way that he had suggested, and shared Mr SPAAK’s relative optimism.

Mr MARGUE considered that the problematic issue of agriculture should not be excluded from the treaties. However, it was essential to take account of all the genuine interests at stake, which were not just a technical matter but could affect the underlying structure of certain states; all the proposals formulated had to take careful account of the interests of the smallest countries.

Mr SPAAK completely agreed with Mr MARGUE. Agriculture could not be excluded, but it required certain specific conditions and had to be regarded as a special case. He pointed out that the ministers of agriculture of the various countries concerned were closely involved in considering this issue.

Mr GOZARD asked for some additional information about the problem of the institutions. Were the solutions currently being considered very far removed from the solutions proposed in the delegation heads’ report of April 1956?

- What principles and solutions had been adopted with regard to monetary problems?

- What provisions had been made for labour representation?

Mr SPAAK replied that, with regard to institutional arrangements, the initial principle was to determine which new assembly or assemblies should be established together with the ECSC Common Assembly. He noted, however, that the French National Assembly had voted in favour of requiring any new assembly to be completely separate from the ECSC Assembly. Subsequent negotiations had shown that the French delegation appeared to have been strongly influenced by that vote. Mr SPAAK said that, while he continued to support the initial principle set out in the report, he believed it was inconceivable to allow the whole common market treaty to collapse because of a disagreement of this kind.

In more general terms, Mr SPAAK recognised that two trends had emerged: one involved placing the emphasis on the Council of Ministers, while the other involved increasing the powers of the Commission.

With regards to voting procedure, the initial idea had been retained. This meant that, during the first stage, decisions would be taken unanimously, in the second stage by a qualified majority, and, in the third stage, by a simple majority if necessary. In general, it seemed that delegates accepted that, in all the institutions, unanimity should not be mandatory.

On the same theme, Mr SPAAK the speaker noted that one particularly delicate issue was the question of weighting, which meant giving each State a different number of votes. It was completely unrealistic to take the view that all countries were equal, and experience had shown that organisations based on that principle often worked very badly. It was only by judicious application of the principle of weighted votes that it would be possible to progressively abandon the principle of unanimity. However, the concept of weighting could lead to some peculiar situations. In some cases, a qualified majority would not require a majority of Member States. Mr SPAAK believed that outcome was perfectly logical and justifiable.

At the current stage of negotiations, some States still had reservations about the idea of weighting, but had accepted it in principle. The weighting factor could be an absolute value, however, and it had to
be accepted that it would always work in favour of small countries to some extent. As the draft treaties currently stood, the weighting was as follows: four votes for big countries, two votes for Belgium and the Netherlands, one for Luxembourg.

Mr SPAAK warned that monetary problems had to be approached with extreme caution. Some difficulties raised by the French, which had led France to request safeguard clauses, arose from concerns relating to monetary matters. Undoubtedly, if resolving the monetary question was to be regarded as a necessary precondition, the treaties would fail.

With regard to the representation of labour, Mr SPAAK considered that the outlook was favourable. It was envisaged that an Economic and Social Council would be set up. It had been decided that both sides of industry should participate in the redeployment fund, and it was possible that provision would be made for them to participate in the management of the investment fund also.

Mr van der GOES van NATERS wishes to know whether the draft treaties made provision for the Council of Ministers to intervene in the event of urgent balance of payments difficulties.

He recalled that the Dutch delegation believed that the Commission that should have the right to intervene; he wondered whether it might not be impossible in practice for the Council of Ministers, which met only relatively infrequently, to make general Community policy decisions. In that case, would the task be entrusted to junior ministers or to officials? If so, Mr van der GOES van NATERS believed that parliamentary oversight could no longer be assured.

Would the Commission be able to make mandatory recommendations regarding general policy affecting the common market, and indeed with regard to the social policies required by the development of the common market?

Mr van der GOES van NATERS noted that Mr Luns, the Dutch Foreign Minister, had recently stated that some delegations had introduced amendments which departed very considerably from the solutions proposed in the delegation heads’ report. He requested clarification on this point.

Finally, with regard to the overseas territories, Mr van der GOES van NATERS agreed with Mr SPAAK’s suggestions concerning Europe’s policy on relations with Africa. However, he wished to know whether there was a possibility that Surinam and Curaçao, the Dutch West Indies, would also be associated with the common market.

Mr SPAAK said that the subject of Mr van der GOES van NATERS’ first question came under the provisions on urgent crises which had been included in the draft treaty as a result of a Franco-German compromise, and read as follows:

‘Where a sudden crisis in the balance of payments occurs, if circumstances preclude the application of the normal prior agreement procedure, the Member States may, on their own authority and as a precaution, take the necessary protective measures provided they are notified to the Community institutions for subsequent decisions at the time when such circumstances arise. The Commission shall be informed of such protective measures not later than when they enter into force. The Commission may recommend to the Council the granting of mutual assistance under paragraph 1, above’.

This provision has not yet been finalised, however.
Mr Spaak considered that the problem of social policy should be approached with caution. The problem addressed by the common market was basically economic and technical, and the treaty provisions should not give the impression that the aim was to reintroduce certain proposals for supranational political institutions which had been dropped when the proposals drawn up by the ad hoc Assembly had been rejected.

Finally, with regard to the differences to which Mr LUNS had perhaps been referring, Mr SPAAK noted that some problems, for example that of the overseas territories, had not been raised in the delegation heads’ report; any points relating to that subject, therefore, departed from the initial text. In that sense, the Franco-Belgian proposals to which Mr Spaak had referred earlier could be regarded as an important change to that initial text in comparison. Undoubtedly, there were others. At present, for example, certain changes had been proposed with regard to the reduction of customs duties which seemed to be based on different reference figures and average rates. These differences were not fundamental, however, as they were intended to achieve the same results. On balance, it was easy to see that, for political reasons, compromises sometimes had to be adopted which, in purely technical terms, might be regarded as unsatisfactory.

With regard to Mr VAN DER GOES VAN NATERS’ last question, Mr SPAAK replied that the Franco-Belgian proposals would also apply to the Dutch overseas territories.

Mr MUTTER referred to Mr SPAAK’s comments concerning the institutions and, in particular, the parliamentary Assembly.

He believed that the vote in the French National Assembly was not so momentous that one should regard it as impossible for the ECSC to have the same Assembly and Court as the Common Market and Euratom. The provision to ensure they were separate had been introduced purely to secure the votes of a small nucleus of 15 or 20 people within the government majority. It was by no means certain that members would vote the same way when it came to treaty ratification.

Mr MUTTER asked Mr SPAAK whether any of the six countries had insisted that the participation of the UK in the common market, in the form of a free-trade area, should be regarded as a prerequisite for treaty ratification by its parliament.

Mr SPAAK replied that no condition of that kind had been laid down and that, to date, there had been no question of any such condition being formulated.

Mr MUTTER said that he was in favour of close association between the overseas territories and the common market; he wished to know whether the Franco-Belgian proposal made any provision for a joint management committee, as it would be inconceivable to ask other countries to invest capital without their being able to participate in the joint management of the projects concerned.

He regarded the possibility of prolonging the first stage by two consecutive years as important and essential; it was a necessary concession if we were to secure the agreement of all parliaments to the irreversibility clause included in the draft treaties.

Mr Mutter considered that the Euratom project ought to be completed very swiftly; in the last few months, there had been an increasing number of private initiatives and a number of other organisations had been set up, which could create new obstacles to the conclusion of the Euratom treaty.
Finally, Mr MUTTER asked Mr SPAAK whether recent political developments did not call into question the principle that nuclear energy should be used solely for peaceful purposes.

Mr SPAAK replied, on the subject of the overseas territories, that the Franco-Belgian memorandum envisaged the deployment of very large sums of money. There would doubtless be some form of joint management, but the question had not yet been resolved.

Mr SPAAK confirmed that it was envisaged that the initial four-year stage could be extended for a limited period. The procedure would involve a unanimous vote at the end of the first stage to establish that the objectives set had been attained. In the absence of unanimity, the stage would be extended by one year. At the end of that additional year, a qualified majority would be sufficient to establish that the objectives had been attained.

If the vote was not carried, a second and final extension of one year would be possible.

With regard to Euratom, Mr SPAAK agreed with Mr MUTTER that progress should be as fast as possible, but it seemed at present that it was proving easier to draft the treaty establishing the common market than the Euratom Treaty.

It was possible that we would have to make do with a ‘framework treaty’. Obviously, the technology was changing very rapidly in this area, as was the political stance of the major powers with a particular interest in the question.

On the matter of the use of nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful purposes, the French and German delegations had formulated a compromise solution which seemed to have won general acceptance. Mr SPAAK himself had always been more or less opposed to outright rejection of the possibility of using nuclear energy for military purposes. The events of the last few days also argued in favour of a more flexible approach to this question.

Mr de MENTHON wondered whether, from the political or the legal point of view, there was any link between the two treaties as regards their signature and ratification.

Mr SPAAK replied that there had been no prior agreement on this subject. The two treaties would probably be ready at the same time, but the legal position was that the texts existed independently of each other.

Mr POHLE noted that there would be no legal link between (on the one hand), the establishment of a free trade area or association with the UK and the setting up of the general common market on the other. It would be possible, therefore, for the parliaments of the six countries to ratify the treaties without any decision having been taken as to the United Kingdom’s involvement. He asked Mr SPAAK whether he could confirm that interpretation.

Mr POHLE raised a second question concerning the free trade area: under the British economic system, there existed export subsidies, exchange control regulations, differential tariffs and other government measures. How could such measures be reconciled with the free trade area?

One question he regarded as essential when it came to establishing a free trade area was the attitude of Commonwealth governments. Although the British Government’s position with regard to the European project had definitely changed, it appeared that the Governments of some Commonwealth
countries were opposed to any such proposals. He cited an article in the Financial Times of 4 December 1956 which indicated that the reason for the reservations of some Commonwealth members was their fear that there would be a reduction of Commonwealth exports to the British market. These reservations could not fail to influence the position eventually adopted by the British Government.

Mr SPAAK, replying to Mr POHLE, confirmed that no government had set as a precondition for accepting the common market the establishment of a free trade area involving the United Kingdom.

In reply to Mr POHLE’s second question, Mr SPAAK replied that all the problems raised by Mr POHLE applied to the free trade area as well as to the common market. It was possible that the United Kingdom had not fully grasped this aspect of the question. In point of fact there was only one solution, which was for the free trade area to accept the same rules and the same system which would apply to the common market.

With regard to the Commonwealth countries’ reactions, opinions differed because there had been no systematic effort, as yet, to record their views. The United Kingdom had been unable to do so for the simple reason that at present it was still difficult to state exactly what was meant by the free trade area, or to provide an exact indication of the effects it would have.

Mr SCHOENE noted that the delegation heads’ report for the Foreign Ministers envisaged a common investment fund which the authors of that report intended should give the common market an additional boost by creating monetary facilities while, at the same time, helping to even out imbalances and thus avoid the difficulties arising from maintaining the Member States’ separate monetary systems. Had this notion of an investment fund been abandoned in the course of the most recent negotiations, and was the intention now that it should be maintained solely if certain Member States’ overseas territories were included in the common market?

He noted, furthermore, that the readaptation fund seemed to have been renamed the ‘redeployment fund’. He wondered whether the very nature of the fund had been changed in line with its new name?

He also wished to know whether the Commission would have oversight powers over the two funds, or whether they would be autonomous organisations?

On the matter of institutional problems, it seemed that there was disagreement concerning the powers to be granted either to the Commission, or to the Council of Ministers. Those who argued most strongly in favour of the Commission seemed to place their faith in ‘dirigiste’ intervention in the workings of the common market, whereas others preferred the Council of Ministers because it more effectively represented national - or, indeed, nationalist - interests. Mr SCHOENE considered that there was a sure means of avoiding any such disagreement: establishing a genuine European Parliament would have the effect of mitigating the Commission’s ‘dirigiste’ ambitions and the Council of Ministers’ tendency to think too much in national terms.

Mr SCHOENE had the impression that, judging by the delegation heads’ report and the presentation Mr SPAAK had just made, the extent of powers would vary with the domain in which they were exercised; for example, the Commission’s powers varied in importance in the fields of energy, transport and agriculture respectively. He asked the President of the Conference whether all the such powers would be centralised in a single body or whether it was envisaged that some should be conferred on existing institutions or on other institutions which had not yet been created.
Mr SPAAK replied to Mr SCHOENE that the investment fund initially envisaged in the April 1956 report was of course still in play, and would be independent of any investment fund that might be used to resolve the problems of the overseas territories.

With regard to the redeployment fund, the principle had not been changed, but its structure and purpose had been altered compared to the proposals contained in the April 1956 report. Two delegations had proposed solutions which differed quite considerably from those initially proposed, but an acceptable compromise had been reached. Under the former system, the readaptation fund had been based on the notion of compensating the industries and workers affected by the consequences of the common market. It had been envisaged that transitional or redeployment allowances would be paid. Under the new formula now being proposed, the aim was to seek ways of establishing new industries in a context of economic expansion and, hence, creating employment for those currently unemployed.

Mr SPAAK recognised that, in all the discussions and negotiations, there was always a certain rivalry between those who favoured a supranational approach and those who placed greater emphasis on national interests and national powers. The final outcome would probably be a compromise between the two positions.

In answer to Mr SCHOENE’s last question, Mr SPAAK replied that there would be no question of devolving tasks to institutions which were offshoots of the Commission. All the powers in question would be exercised by the Commission itself. He stressed, however, that powers in respect of nuclear energy might be different in nature from those relating to the common market.

Mr BIRKELBACH raised certain questions concerning the social policy envisaged.

Although it was understandable that, in the event of only partial integration, priority would not be given to the social aspects, since it might be thought that the social consequences could be controlled, in the case of a general Common Market the problem would be very difficult in scale and importance. The free movement of goods would automatically involve free movement of workers, and consequently it would be necessary to lay down very definite provisions in the social field.

Meanwhile, differences in the structure and methods of affiliation to trade unions in the various Member States would make it more difficult to ensure that trade union action was uniformly effective at European level. It was necessary, therefore, to provide workers with certain guarantees in the area of social security. The aim must be to ensure that full use was made of the available labour force, which required a coordinated policy geared towards full employment.

It was important to prevent differences in the economic development of different regions or countries from producing a dangerous policy with regard to investment which would have the effect of further exacerbating existing differences in Community countries’ respective economic structures.

Finally, it was important to remember that the problems encountered by the various draft treaties drawn up by the ad hoc Assembly were due, at least in part, to the fact that the economic and social structures they envisaged did not actually address the concerns of the general public in the Member States. So, if we wished the new draft treaties to succeed, we had to try to ensure they corresponded to the legitimate aspirations of all sections of the population.
Mr SPAAK, in reply to Mr BIRKELBACH, noted that the solutions found or being sought in response to the French proposals, particularly as regards working hours, chimed in with Mr BIRKELBACH’s concerns. He added that harmonising social security contributions and working conditions had to be one of the prime objectives of the common market. The Commission would doubtless be able to submit proposals for the harmonisation of the social aspects. But there was no specific chapter on social policy.

Mr POHER stressed that ratification should be completed as soon as possible. He drew the attention of Mr SPAAK and the working party to the difficulties which might arise in France if those opposed to Europe were given sufficient time to organise a campaign against the two draft treaties. That was why it would be desirable to secure ratification in the first quarter of 1957. He believed that if ratification was left to a later date, such as the summer, it would encounter much stronger opposition.

Mr KOPF noted that Mr SPAAK had said, in his speech, that the work of the conference had been made much more difficult by the fact that the German delegation had submitted new proposals concerning the supply of fissile material. He wished to know what the difference was between the new German proposal and the solution envisaged in the delegation heads’ report, and if it had been possible to overcome this difficulty.

Mr SPAAK replied to Mr KOPF that the April 1956 report laid down the principle that Euratom would be accorded the right of preemption in respect of all uranium in the Community. The new German proposal rejected this monopoly system and advocated a free market approach. A compromise was being sought and should be achieved within the next few days.

Mr MOTZ thanked Mr SPAAK for replying so carefully to all the many questions that the members of the working party had raised.

Summary of item 2: Exchange of view on the programme of work.

THE CHAIRMAN believed that the Working Party should decide at this juncture whether and how the work begun that day could be reported to the plenary assembly at the beginning of February, and lay down a programme of work in accordance with that decision.
JOINT ASSEMBLY - Working Party

Sub-Committee on institutional questions

Notes on the drafting of the institutional clauses of the Euratom and Common Market Treaties

10.12.1956 (Gozard)

Source: CARDOC AC 2734
Note on the drafting of the institutional clauses of the Euratom and Common Market Treaties

1. The drafting of the text of the Euratom and Common Market Treaties by the Intergovernmental Conference on the Common Market and Euratom, presided by Mr Paul Henri Spaak, seems to have entered a critical phase. Mr SPAAK announced at the Working Party’s meeting of 8 December in Brussels that he fully hoped that the drafting of the treaties would be completed in January and that they could be signed later that month.

2. However, the Treaty articles concerning the institutions of the new European Communities have not yet been drafted. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, the experts and the delegation heads took the view that it was more methodical to begin by agreeing on the substance of the new Communities and only then to decide on the institutions, in the light of the objectives and purposes established, rather than the other way round. Secondly, the options which are available as regards institutions have not yet been addressed.

3. It seems appropriate, therefore, for the Subcommittee on Institutional Questions of the Working Party of the ECSC Common Assembly to specify the points which it believes should be born in mind when drafting the treaties, with a view both to ensuring the treaties are sufficiently flexible to be adopted by the largest possible majority when they are ratified by the national parliaments, and to being as complete as possible to meet the requirements of a fully-functioning European organisation.

4. Emphasis should be placed on the need to prevent the new Treaties from creating institutions which are completely independent and separate from those already established for the European Coal and Steel Community. The different Communities will have to face identical problems. Even if they approach each problem from a particular viewpoint, it would be very dangerous if two institutions were to take decisions independently of each other and in isolation. Although separate institutions might be perfectly reasonable, and probably even necessary, in the case of the executive authority, whether it be the High Authority or the Commission, it would be extremely dangerous for the other institutions.

5. That is why we stress the need for a single Court of Justice and a single Assembly, while the Council of Ministers can assemble different ministers depending on the problems addressed.
6. With regard to the Court of Justice, the best solution, and one which would present the additional advantage of avoiding the emergence of contradictory case law, would be a single court divided into as many sections as there are separate European Communities (Coal and Steel, Euratom, Common Market), which could hold joint sessions of all the sections to ensure uniform case law.

7. The Common Assembly should also be a single Assembly. To avoid creating the impression that this Assembly is an offshoot of the existing ESCS Joint Assembly, the treaties could establish a new, single Assembly which would absorb the existing ESCS Common Assembly. In practice, the result would be identical, but psychologically, the complete independence of the new Assembly from the Common Assembly would command respect.

8. We must also stress the need for votes to be weighted, particularly in the Council of Ministers. We need both to make provision for the weighting of votes and to move in a determined fashion towards majority decision making.

9. Another essential feature of the new treaties must be the setting up of organisations to ensure the involvement of labour, whether via an Economic and Social Council or some other institution.

10. We also believe that we should reaffirm the need for the European Commission (or Commissions) to be equipped with sufficient powers to ensure that they are not reduced to the role of merely enforcing the Council of Ministers’ decisions and policies.

11. The foregoing comments, which do not pretend to exhaust all the various points currently raised by the drafting of the Treaty provisions relating to the new institutions of the new European Communities, should provide useful guidance for the work of the Intergovernmental Conference and the delegation heads in connection with the final drafting of the Treaties, and will be forwarded to them.

Gilles GOZARD
Paris, 10 December 1956.
A 5

COMMON ASSEMBLY – Working Party

Letter by Mr Motz to Mr Spaak of 10 December 1956

Source: CARDOC AC 2735
Letter from Mr Roger Motz, on behalf of the Working Party, to Mr Paul-Henri Spaak, Chairman of the Intergovernmental Conference for the Common Market and Euratom, following the Working Party meeting of 8 December 1956

Brussels, 10 December 1956
Belgian Senate

Dear Mr Spaak,

I should like to thank you, on behalf of my colleagues and myself, for the remarkable statement that you made to the Working Party on Saturday.

The exchange of views that followed your departure made it clear that the members were strongly impressed by the fact that you had intimated that the work of drafting the new treaties would probably be completed by mid-January and that they could be signed by the governments concerned by the end of that month.

Given this very short notice the Working Party decided to meet again on 7 January to set down some further suggestions, on the basis of oral reports by Messrs Wigny, Van der Goes, Van Naters and Gozard, that the members of the Assembly would still like to put to you before the experts adopt the definitive texts.

By the end of last Saturday’s meeting the Working Party had already instructed me to draw your attention to some general considerations that it regards of primordial importance.

The members would like to renew their wish, that they have expressed before, that the powers and competences for the future European Commission should be as wide and real as possible, and should invest it with real authority and effective and direct resources for taking action.

The Working Party also believes that an assembly that had, in addition to its power of scrutiny, some right of initiative and real parliamentary powers would undoubtedly be able to make a strong contribution to assisting politically with the gradual merger of the Member States’ concerns and the coordination of national interests.

The Working Party hopes that no effort will be spared to ensure that the tasks of that Assembly may be entrusted to the ECSC Common Assembly, as it seems difficult to persuade public opinion that a new parliamentary assembly should be added to those already in existence.

Finally, the Working Party hopes it will be possible to find effective formulae in the new treaties to allow for the close involvement of the overseas territories in the new European communities.
The Working Party noted with particular satisfaction that it had been possible, despite the special situation that France highlighted, to maintain the principle of irreversibility in the draft treaty, while allowing for the possibility of limited extension of the first stage.

I trust that you will be good enough to give these ideas all the attention they deserve.

(Closing formula and signature)
A 6

COMMON ASSEMBLY – Working Party

Memorandum on the European Relaunch

Source: CARDOC AC 2814
EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY
COMMON ASSEMBLY

WORKING PARTY

Notice to members

Following the meeting of Monday 7 January 1957, the Working Party instructed a Drafting Committee to draw up a Memorandum in which the Working Party succinctly defined its position with regard to the general orientation of the new draft treaties, in so far as the Working Party had been able to obtain information on this subject.

The Memorandum was addressed to the Foreign Ministers of the six Member States, as an enclosure to a letter sent them by Mr Motz on behalf of the Working Party.

The text of the letter and the Memorandum are enclosed.

Committee Division

Luxembourg, 14 January 1957

AC 2814
Letter from Mr Roger Motz, Chairman of the Working Party, to the Foreign Ministers of the six Member States of the Community

Strasbourg, 8 January 1957
Maison de l’Europe

Dear Sir,

On Monday 7 January 1957, the Working Party of the Common Assembly met in Strasbourg to consider a number of problems touching upon the European Relaunch and the drafting of the new treaties establishing Euratom and the general common market.

The Working Party particularly appreciated the attention that the Intergovernmental Conference devoted to the report that the Common Assembly had sent it on the social aspects of European integration, in particular by enabling a delegation from the Committee on Social Affairs to put its case to the delegates of the six governments, meeting in Brussels with Mr von der Groeben in the chair.

In the memorandum enclosed with this letter the Working Party succinctly defines its position with regard to the general orientation of the new draft treaties. It hopes that the Intergovernmental Conference or the Conference of Ministers will give this text favourable consideration and come up with solutions that as far as possible fulfil the wishes that it sets out.

This letter and the memorandum have also been sent to the Foreign Ministers of the other States taking part in the Conference.

(Closing formula and signature)
MEMORANDUM
by the Common Assembly Working Party
on
the European Relaunch

Strasbourg, 7 January 1957

I

The Working Party set up to monitor the progress of the European Relaunch and provide the cooperation and political support of the Common Assembly has recently been advised, through its rapporteurs, of certain problems raised by the plans for Euratom and the Common Market.

Not being in possession of the texts themselves the Working Party cannot embark on constructive criticism of these plans. Its comments would risk being inaccurate as a result of the gaps in its information and the short deadlines that it faces.

The Working Party believes it preferable to make some general points based on the current state of the plans, but mainly informed by the experience of the ECSC. In this Community an unprecedented and unique effort of European collaboration has been pursued for some few years. The facts are just as strong as the texts, practice as instructive as theoretical proposals, and that is what invests this testimony with its true value.

The remarks that follow clarify those raised in the letter of 10 December by Mr Motz, Chairman of the Working Party, to Mr Spaak, Chairman of the Intergovernmental Conference; it is to these especially that the Working Party wants to draw the Ministers’ attention before the final decisions are taken at government level.

II

First, the Working Party is convinced that the duality of powers, in the organisation of the ECSC between the High Authority and the Council of Ministers, has enabled the Community to affirm the reality of Europe without being oppressive or damaging to the Member States. Disheartening the future High Authority or its equivalent is likely to deprive the future institutions of the necessary dynamism without usefully increasing the protection of the Member States. It is difficult to design an effective political organisation unless you endow it with a body expressly responsible for taking initiatives. For to carry out any European integration it will not be enough to issue a decree laid down by treaty, nor even to set up a Council of Ministers. The latter is no doubt responsible for coordinating and standardising policy, but it is also concerned to safeguard the vital national interests that the Treaty entrusts to its vigilance. Promoting Community interests depends primarily on having an independent Executive – which, moreover, is answerable for its policy to a European assembly.
III

Indeed, Europe cannot be organised by denying its political traditions and setting up a technocracy that is wholly or partly irresponsible. Even in the ECSC such scrutiny is insufficiently provided as important decisions are taken without in fact being supervised either by the Common Assembly or the national Parliaments. It seems that in the plans for Euratom and the Common Market specialised organisations are being provided that will enjoy a largely decentralised status. Such for instance is the case of the Joint Research Centre, the Euratom Supply Agency, the Investment Fund and the Monetary Office for the Common Market. Such decentralisation is no doubt technically and politically desirable but it must not result in a technocracy. Without interfering in individual decisions – which should be depoliticised – the European Executive must be able to lay down the general policy for such bodies and answer for them to the Assembly.

The Working Party also points out in this connection that the first prerogative of democratic assemblies is to vote on the budget.

IV

Third, a plethora of European Communities is likely to set up conflicts of competence, opposing policies and even rivalries between sovereign organisations, when it was precisely the aim of integration to remove such rivalries between the States. The Working Party has already proposed some organisational economy, for instance a single Assembly and a single Court of Justice to provide political and juridical control over the different Executives. Moreover, it appears to the Working Party to be indispensable to make provision in the Treaties for organisational coordination, for instance a Committee of Presidents, Combined Bureaux or other forms of institution to require periodic confrontations and concerted solutions. How otherwise would we manage to harmonise, for instance, the general common market, the market for coal and steel, the market for nuclear raw materials and equipment, or indeed the coal and nuclear energy policy?

V

The Working Party repeats the view that it has already expressed on the issue of the territories which have constitutional or special links with the Member States. It hopes that formulae will be found to provide them with the benefit of the new communities by involving them in them closely.

VI

Based on its experience with the ECSC, the Working Party points out that a common market means not only freeing up trade, but also a positive solidarity that obliges the Community to help each Member State, in particular through the management of an investment fund, to modernise its economy and adjust to the new conditions of competition.

It adds that economic progress and social progress must go hand in hand and affect each other. The Community bodies must therefore have sufficient powers in the social as well as the economic domain.

AC 2814
COMMON ASSEMBLY – BUREAU

Minutes of the meeting of Saturday, 2 February 1957

Source: CARDOC AC 2902
The meeting opened at 09.00 with Mr Furler, President of the Common Assembly, presiding.

**Present:**
- President Furler
- Vice-Presidents Fohrmann, Motz, Vixseboxse and Vanrullen
  - o -
- Messrs de Neree tot Babberich, Secretary-General, Hummelsheim, Deputy Secretary-General, and Van den Eede, Head of the Committee Division

**Also present:**
- Mr Sassen, Chairman of the Christian-Democratic Group
- Mr Fayat, Chairman of the Socialist Group
- Mr Pleven, Chairman of the Liberals and Allies Group

Mr Ruest acted as secretary to the meeting.

1. **Amendment of the agenda for the February session**

Mr Furler told Bureau members that as President Spaak was unable to attend the Common Assembly’s February session in Strasbourg, he proposed to change the order of business as follows:

- **Monday 11 February** Reserved for political group meetings
- **Tuesday 12 February**
  - 09.30: Committee of Presidents
  - 10.30: Opening of public sitting. Tuesday would be devoted to the statement by Mr Wigny on his report and the introductory statements
by Messrs Wigny, Van der Goes Van Naters and Gozard on the political and institutional aspects of the new Treaties.

- Wednesday 13 February  General debate
- Thursday 14 February  Report by Mr de Menthon and report by Mr Carboni
- Friday 15 February  Report by Mr Mutter

The Bureau decided to notify Members of the draft agenda as amended, pointing out that the reason for the changes was Mr Spaak’s inability to attend the Strasbourg session.

2. Creation of a fourth European Assembly under the Treaty establishing the General Common Market and Euratom

Mr Furler said the decision taken at the Intergovernmental Conference of Foreign Ministers to set up a fourth European Assembly under the Treaty establishing the General Common Market and Euratom had given rise to unanimous opposition in parliamentary circles and public opinion.

Further to Recommendation 117 on the rationalisation of European parliamentary activities, adopted by the Council of Europe Consultative Assembly at its eighth ordinary session, and the draft recommendation for the WEU Assembly adopted by the General Affairs Committee further to the Report by Mr Struye, a recommendation rejecting any proposal to set up a fourth European Assembly, President Dehousse expressed the wish to convene the Bureaux of the three European Assemblies to draw up more detailed proposals bearing the authority of the three European Assemblies to put to the Ministers.

The Bureau Members and Political Group Chairmen of the Common Assembly were invited to this preliminary meeting to adopt the Common Assembly Bureau’s position before the joint meeting of the Bureaux of the three existing European Assemblies.

Mr Furler thought that the best solution would be to extend the competence of the Common Assembly to cover parliamentary scrutiny of the Common Market and Euratom. However, he feared that the recommended formula would run into insurmountable objections by the Ministers, prompted by the attitude taken by one parliamentary party in the French national Assembly, and it would be wise to propose a more flexible solution.

To safeguard the unity of the European institutions, it was therefore desirable to set up a new Parliamentary Assembly for the six countries, which would at one and the same time exercise its competences and powers with regard to the General Common Market, Euratom and the Coal and Steel Community. The creation of this new Assembly should go hand in hand with an amendment of the Treaty establishing the ECSC, the Common Assembly retiring in favour of the new Assembly, which would then be invested with all the competences laid down in the ECSC Treaty. There were certainly still some difficulties, particularly on the membership of the new Assembly which under the Ministers’ proposals would need to comprise 225 Representatives, allocated as follows:

- Germany  60
- France    60
- Italy     60
- Netherlands  20

Towards a Single Parliament
This membership scheme did not match the allocation of national representatives for the Common Assembly.

A change in the allocation of seats was bound to run into the opposition of the ECSC’s small member countries as their representation in the Common Assembly was much more favourable, since the three Benelux countries had:

- Netherlands 10 seats
- Belgium 10 seats
- Luxembourg 4 seats.

In the new Assembly, representation of the large countries was appreciably stronger in relation to the small countries. Thus the sum of the Representatives of the two large countries in the new Assembly would obtain a majority of 120 out of 225, whereas in the Common Assembly the same calculation would produce figures of 36 out of 78.

Mr Furler recommended a compromise solution that was more favourable to the small countries, by providing 243 seats for the new Assembly, allocated between the Benelux countries as follows:

- Netherlands 27 seats
- Belgium 27 seats
- Luxembourg 9 seats.

But recommending a membership of 243 seats would mean modifying the balance sought by the Ministers. That balance could be restored by reducing the number of seats to 240, allocated as follows:

- Germany 60
- France 60
- Italy 60
- Belgium 27
- Netherlands 27
- Luxembourg 6.

Having considered these constructive solutions, Mr Furler underlined the difficulties arising from the fact that the President of the Council of Europe Consultative Assembly would be making proposals to create a ‘single European Assembly’ in which the other Assemblies currently in existence would form ‘commissions’. However, this proposal stood little chance of being adopted since it would involve amending the Council of Europe’s Statute, and that amendment would require the agreement of the governments of the 15 member countries of the Council of Europe, plus ratification by the 15 Parliaments.

Mr Pleven asked President Furler for further details of the powers of the new Assembly and the opportunities available for other countries to join the ECSC without joining the Common Market and Euratom.

Mr Furler replied that the new Assembly would have powers conferred on it by the Treaties in each of the fields of its activity.
Mr Sassen rejoined that Mr Pleven’s question already pointed up major difficulties within the ECSC Treaty and thought that Mr Furler’s argument was unlikely to create insurmountable difficulties, as the solution as defined could be found in the formula of the association agreement suggested by Mr Pleven.

Mr Fayat thought that if the solution recommended by Mr Furler were to prevail, namely to create a new Assembly with competences deriving from the Treaties establishing the ECSC, the General Common Market and Euratom, there would be no partial and intrinsic difficulties with that Assembly, but difficulties would still remain within those special authorities.

Mr Vixseboxse was not very optimistic about fulfilment of the plan as the current powers of the Common Assembly were more extensive than those conferred on the new Assembly. He wondered if it might not be possible to set up a single administration for the three assemblies (the Common Assembly, General Common Market Assembly and Euratom Assembly), on the basis that the Common Assembly’s secretariat would have to be enlarged to allow for the new tasks.

Mr Furler thought it essential to create a single secretariat, and that the officials of the Common Assembly should be merged with the new Assembly’s secretariat.

Mr Sassen partly supported the argument advanced by Mr Vixseboxse. He thought there were two reasons for avoiding setting up a fourth parliamentary assembly: first, it would be absolutely pointless, and second, setting up a new Secretariat would be disagreeable as it would involve the departure of the best staff currently working in Luxembourg to join the headquarters of the new organisation. While on this point he entirely agreed with Mr Vixseboxse, he did not share the latter’s concerns as to the possibility of setting up a single Parliamentary Assembly, as such a plan did not raise fundamental difficulties. Besides, the objections raised by one parliamentary party in the French Assembly would be nullified, as the powers laid down by the Treaty establishing the Common Market and Euratom would not be exercised by the Common Assembly but by a new Assembly that would absorb the Common Assembly.

Mr Sassen certainly preferred extending the Common Assembly, both as regarded the number of representatives and its powers, but in view of the difficulty that this scheme was facing it was preferable to set up a new Assembly responsible for parliamentary scrutiny, with regard both to the General Common Market, the ECSC and Euratom. On this point he favoured the formula proposed by President Furler, in which the seats in this new Assembly would be allocated in the ratio of 60 – 60 – 27 – 27 – 6, totalling 240. But it would be wise to take account of the proposals put forward by the President of the Consultative Assembly, Mr Dehousse, and point out at the meeting of the three Bureaux that greater uniformity was desirable and remained the aim set for the future. However, in the present circumstances there was a need to be realistic and come up with a practical programme, while not losing sight of the fact that amendment of the Council of Europe’s Statute would need the agreement of 15 governments and 15 Parliaments.

Speaking as a member of both Assemblies, Mr Motz drew attention to the psychological aspect of the problem. At the Council of Europe Consultative Assembly, debates had an academic character that was both more confused and more elevated than in the Common Assembly, where debate was concise and clear in view of the real powers conferred on the Common Assembly. The new Assembly would have different powers over certain aspects and there was a need to be sure to define the powers of the new Assembly very clearly.
Mr Vanrullen pointed out that the instrument amending the ECSC Treaty would have to be drawn up and ratified at the same time as the Treaty establishing the General Common Market and Euratom and laying down the Statute for the new Assembly.

Mr Furler raised the question of the chairmanship of the joint meeting to be held at 10.00, and proposed that Mr Dehousse should preside as it was taking place on the initiative of the President of the Consultative Assembly, and that it would be easier to speak in the debates if he was not in the chair.

3. **Outcome of President Furler’s journey to Rome**

Mr Furler informed Bureau members that the Senate of the Italian Republic had appointed nine senators and that the Chamber of Deputies had intimated that the nine Deputies would be elected by 22 February. Furthermore, as the technical difficulties with holding a session in Rome had been overcome, President Furler would at the meeting of the Committee of Presidents and with the agreement of the Bureau members propose holding the session in Rome from 5 to 9 November 1957.

The meeting closed at 10.00.

Luxembourg, 6 February 1957
Minutes
of the joint meeting of the Bureaux of the ECSC Common Assembly, the Council of Europe Consultative Assembly and the Western European Union Assembly

of 2 February 1957

Source: CARDOC AC OD PV/BURE BUBE-19570202-AM 0010
Strasbourg, 6 February 1957

MINUTES

of the joint meeting of the Bureaux of
1. the ECSC Common Assembly,
2. the Council of Europe Consultative Assembly
3. the Western European Union Assembly

BRUSSELS
2 February 1957

Present

For the Council of Europe Consultative Assembly

Mr Dehousse, President
Lord Layton, Vice-President
Mr Crosbie, Vice-President
Mr Mommer, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee

For the Common Assembly

Mr Furler, President
Mr Fohrmann, Vice-President
Mr Motz, Vice-President
Mr Vanrullen, Vice-President
Mr Vixseboxse, Vice-President

For the Western European Union Assembly

Mr Pezet, President
Mr Bohy, Vice-President
Mr Fens, Vice-President
Mr Schaus, Vice-President
Mr Struye, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee

A 32.203
For the political groups:

Mr Sassen, Chairman of the Christian-Democratic Group (Common Assembly)
Mr Heyman, Chairman of the Christian-Democratic Group (Consultative Assembly and WEU)
Mr Fayat, Chairman of the Socialist Group
Mr Pleven, Chairman of the Liberals and Allies Group

The meeting opened at 10.00 with Mr Dehousse, President of the Consultative Assembly, in the chair.

Mr Dehousse thanked his colleagues Messrs Furler and Pezet for asking him to chair the meeting. He welcomed the establishment of contact between the three Bureaux which he hoped would inaugurate a new tradition. He proposed that the chairmanship should be held in rotation at future meetings.

This was agreed.

Mr Dehousse proposed, after reading out telegrams of apology from Messrs Benvenuti, Kiesinger and Teitgen, that each President should first set out his Assembly’s point of view. On behalf of his own, he said he had convened the Consultative Assembly’s Standing Committee to consider the question of setting up a fourth Assembly. He then read out a telegram to Mr Bech, President of the Committee of Ministers, on the subject. He asked his colleagues to consider the expediency of making representations to the six ministers negotiating the treaties for the common market and Euratom at Val Duchesse, for proposing the creation of a Joint Committee comprising representatives of the Ministers and the three Bureaux.

Mr Furler set out the viewpoint of the Common Assembly. He began by noting that the parliamentary members of the European Assemblies were unanimous in their opposition to setting up a fourth Assembly.

He proposed first of all that the three Bureaux should indicate that in their opinion parliamentary scrutiny of Euratom and the common market should be entrusted to the ECSC Common Assembly enlarged for the purpose. However, to avoid endangering the treaties by this requirement the Bureaux envisaged a transactional proposal. They wished there to be only one parliamentary institution for the three communities, which could be brought about by merging the competent Assemblies – with different arrangements – for the general common market, Euratom and the ECSC.

As to membership, President Furler noted that in the current scheme of weighting proposed for the new Assembly of 225 members, two ‘major States’ would have an absolute majority on their own. He proposed a different weighting, with France, Germany and Italy having 60 each, 27 for Belgium and the Netherlands and 6 for Luxembourg, giving a total of 240 members.

Finally, he thought it was time for a rationalisation of the European parliamentary institutions.

Mr Pezet then set out the viewpoint of the Western European Union Assembly. While the Assembly had not yet stated its position on the question of creating a fourth Assembly, its General Affairs Committee had followed the conclusions of its Rapporteur, Mr Struye, whom he would leave to explain its point of view in greater detail.
He thought the merger of the parliamentary institutions would be required by common sense and necessity, and in his view everything possible should be done to leave the door open for the creation of a single Assembly.

Moving on to British participation in Euratom and the common market, it seemed to him that the WEU Assembly was qualified to bring about an association of that kind.

Mr Struye, Rapporteur for the WEU Assembly’s General Affairs Committee on the question of creating a fourth Assembly, thought that there was no longer any need to stress the major disadvantages of proliferating Assemblies, of which everyone was aware. The proposal to set up a fourth Assembly was a response to a political difficulty. Mr Struye did not in fact think that the difficulty reflected a consistent reality, but rather a sentimental attitude.

To avoid being faced with a fait accompli and a fourth Assembly, Mr Struye recommended that there should be concomitance between the birth of the new Assembly and the extinction of the Assembly of the ECSC.

Secondly, there must be efforts to proceed with a general regrouping of the Assemblies. The ultimate aim must be unity and the Bureaux must see things not from the negotiators’ standpoint but from that of the parliamentarians.

Mr Dehousse said that the European Assemblies had not been consulted in the negotiations at any stage.

Mr Mommer, Rapporteur for the Consultative Assembly’s General Affairs Committee on the question of creating a fourth Assembly, mentioned the interesting precedent of relations between the Consultative Assembly and the OEEC, which reported to the Strasbourg Assembly. He thought that the Consultative Assembly could become an OEEC Assembly.

He wondered if the appointment of substitutes to the ECSC Assembly might not make it possible to enlarge the membership of that Assembly. He noted that if the Common Assembly were to be incorporated in the new assembly it would be necessary to amend the Treaty establishing the ECSC and get the amendment ratified. Guarantees must also be required before agreeing to the creation of a new Assembly.

Finally, it would be possible to reach the balance sought by Mr Furler in the weighting of the Assembly by reducing the representation of the Big Three.

Mr Dehousse interrupted the general debate at this point to ask the three Bureaux for their agreement on the principle and membership of a delegation that would visit the six ministers.

It was decided

- that the Bureaux would be represented by their three Chairmen, assisted by the two Rapporteurs, Messrs Struye and Mommer, and by Mr Motz, Chairman of the ECSC Working Party;
- on a proposal by Mr Dehousse, that the suggestions made would not be too detailed and in particular the question of weighting would not be considered in depth;
that creation of a Joint Committee of the Ministers and the representatives of the Bureaux of the three European Assemblies would be recommended.

Mr Dehousse stressed the need for a common front for the three Assemblies.

Mr Pleven stressed the need for a single Assembly with a broad membership that would be a mirror and starting point for political Europe. For this reason he was opposed to the idea of calling the single European Assembly the European Economic Assembly. He therefore wished the adjective ‘economic’ to be deleted. He fully agreed with Mr Mommer and suggested that a codicil to the ECSC Treaty abolishing the Common Assembly should be signed and ratified at the same time as the treaties for the common market and Euratom.

Mr Pezet fully agreed with Mr Pleven.

Mr Fayat also supported the single Assembly. But he recommended prudence and did not wish this Assembly to exceed the mandate conferred on it by the treaties.

Mr Furler said it must be specified that wherever the Common Assembly was competent this would in future be the new Assembly.

Mr Sassen pointed out that the common market and Euratom were no more than stages on the road to Europe. The three Bureaux must express their determination to reach a broader form of unity.

Lord Layton was totally opposed to the creation of a fourth Assembly. This was in his view the moment to call for a single European Assembly.

Mr Mommer proposed that it should be specified that a number of representatives and substitutes from the Common Assembly equal to the representation at that Assembly should be members of the new Assembly.

Mr Furler thought that there should not be a commitment to the unparliamentary concept of substitutes and that the negotiations should not be complicated by insisting on the details. It must be possible to avoid a fourth Assembly either by enlarging the Common Assembly or by merging the two Assemblies.

Mr Dehousse recognised that the concept of substitutes was not a parliamentary one, but they did exist and had a role to play in the European Assemblies. The institution of substitutes on pragmatic grounds should be accepted in the new Assembly on a provisional basis.

Mr Fens pointed out that there was a risk of duplication in the area of monitoring of fissile materials between the WEU Assembly and the Assembly responsible for the scrutiny of Euratom.

Mr Vixseboxse called for the delegation of Presidents and Rapporteurs to keep the Bureaux informed in writing of the outcome of their representations.

Mr Crosbie said that he fully agreed with the proposals made by Lord Layton.

Mr Dehousse declared the debate closed.
Further procedure: on the basis of the drafts put forward by Messrs Struye and Mommer a proposal for a recommendation was drawn up to put to the Ministers of the six Member States.

The Bureaux deliberated.

The text of the proposal for a recommendation that would be submitted on Monday, 4 February to the Ministers meeting at Val Duchesse was adopted (see appendix).

Mr Dehousse said that the delegation of the three Bureaux would be received by the Ministers at Val Duchesse on Monday, 4 February at 15.00.

The meeting closed at 12.50.
The Bureaux of the three European Assemblies, meeting in Brussels on 2 February 1957 in the presence of the Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Assemblies’ Political groups;

Supporting the essential considerations opposing the creation of a fourth European Assembly, which are expressed in the resolutions by the European Assemblies and some National Assemblies;

Endorsing in particular for their part the following conclusions set out in Recommendation 117 of the Consultative Assembly and the Recommendation of the WEU Assembly’s General Affairs Committee, calling for:

- any proposal to set up a fourth European Assembly to be rejected;
- parliamentary scrutiny of Euratom and the Common Market to be entrusted to the ECSC Common Assembly and membership of that Assembly to be enlarged…;

Deliver the opinion that, if insurmountable objections were to oppose the adoption of this formula, the creation of an Assembly providing for the parliamentary scrutiny of Euratom and the Common Market should be accompanied by provisions establishing as of now the arrangements by which the ECSC Common Assembly would be called upon immediately to merge with the new Assembly, without affecting the relations existing at present between the institutions of the ECSC or the powers respectively conferred upon them;

Point out that the general aim to be pursued is the creation of a single European Assembly,

Decide to that end to look into the modifications and regrouping to be carried out on the existing Assemblies

And invite the High Contracting Parties to give an undertaking to include in the new Assembly a number of Members of the Council of Europe Consultative Assembly.
A 9

Minutes of the hearing accorded to the delegation from the Bureaux of the three European Assemblies by the six Ministers meeting in Conference

at Val Duchesse on 4 February 1957

Source: CARDOC AC OD PV/BURE BUBE-19570204 0010
Strasbourg, 11 February 1957

MINUTES

of the hearing accorded to the delegation from the Bureaux
of the three European Assemblies

by

the six Ministers meeting in Conference
at Val Duchesse, Brussels on 4 February 1957

The meeting opened at 15.00 with Mr Paul-Henri Spaak, President of the Conference of Ministers, in the chair.

Present

The delegation from the three Bureaux, consisting of:

Messrs Dehousse
Furler
Bohy (deputising for Mr Pezet)
Struye
Mommer
Motz
accompanied by the registrars of the three Assemblies;

and,

for the Federal Republic of Germany:

Mr von Brentano
accompanied by Messrs Carstens and Ophuls;

for Italy:

Mr Martino
accompanied by Messrs Venturi and Badini Confalonieri;

*A 32.223
Mr Bech accompanied by Mr Schaus;

for the Netherlands:
Mr Luns, accompanied by Messrs Van der Beugel and Linthorst Homan;

for France:
Mr Maurice Faure accompanied by Mr Marjolin;

for Belgium:
Baron Snoy et d’Oppuers accompanied by Mr de Scheyven.

Mr Dehousse introduced the delegation that the Bureaux of the three Assemblies had set up at their joint meeting of 2 February 1957. The delegation comprised the Presidents of the three Assemblies and leading politicians who had presented reports to the Consultative Assembly, the WEU Assembly and the Common Assembly dealing with the problems currently under discussion.

The position that the delegation would defend in the hearing had been the subject of an explicit mandate given by the three Bureaux in the presence of the heads of the political groups of those Assemblies.

The purpose of the hearing was not to add further difficulties to the Ministers’ numerous concerns. These representations were being undertaken in a spirit of cooperation and goodwill, and should make it possible to reach positive solutions with regard to the constitution of the new Assembly responsible for monitoring the Common Market and Euratom. Indeed, the members of the three Bureaux and, in consequence, the delegation members were all in principle favourable to the aim pursued by the new treaties.

Mr Dehousse then justified the request for a hearing of the delegation by the fact that it was natural that the European Assemblies should be consulted on the constitution of the new Assembly. Firstly, the very nature of the Assemblies justified that consultation and secondly, the nature of the problem under discussion meant that it was bound to have an impact on the structure and even the existence of the Assemblies currently in place. The aim to be achieved must be a design that was as rational as possible and would enable progress towards unification of parliamentary action at a time when the ‘relaunch’ was becoming a reality. In the longer term there was a need for a commitment to laying the foundations of what could one day be a single European Assembly.
The speaker emphasised that the representations were in no way prompted by a wish to acquire new competences or defend established positions.

Mr Dehousse proposed that Mr Furler should present the passage of the recommendation concerning the ECSC Assembly.

He concluded by stating that the delegation remained at the Ministers’ disposal for any further clarifications they might wish to have and suggested the creation of a joint committee combining the delegates of the governments and the members of the parliamentary delegation.

Mr Furler pointed out that the response of the European Assemblies had always been that it would be normal for the new Assembly to be constituted on the basis of the Common Assembly which, throughout its four years of activity, had had the opportunity to acquire experience in the fields of energy and the economy. However, given that this solution had raised objections of an irreducible nature in the parliamentary circles of certain countries, the Common Assembly’s Bureau had put forward the suggestion that the solution might then be sought in a formula that abolished the Common Assembly at the very moment when the new Assembly was constituted, with the latter fully incorporating the competences at present exercised by the Common Assembly. To those competences would be added the competences that would be conferred upon it by the new treaties.

For the present, the Common Assembly Bureau, supported in its position by the leaders of the political groups, considered that the new Assembly should maintain its proceedings within the strict limits of the precise competences laid down by the new treaties.

In considering the implications of the merger, attention had been drawn to a problem that the speaker wished to lay before the Ministers.

The relationship between the national representations, as shown by the proposals for the new Assembly, and those laid down by the ECSC Treaty for the Common Assembly was appreciably different, since at the Common Assembly representation of the small nations was higher than in the figures proposed for the new Assembly. If it was envisaged to merge the two Assemblies, it would no doubt be necessary to revise the proposed figures for the delegations so as to slightly increase the representation of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. Instead of making the allocation on the basis of 60, 20 and 5, provision could be made for 60 for the large countries, 27 for Belgium and the Netherlands and 6 for Luxembourg. These figures were not a restoration of the ratios currently existing within the Common Assembly but a compromise between the allocation for the Common Assembly and that proposed for the new Assembly. The purpose of this modification would be to set aside the – albeit rather notional – possibility that a bloc formed by two large countries might have recourse to an absolute majority in the Assembly, while at the same time preventing it from being placed in a minority (the principle of voting parity).

He thought that such a modification was possible. It would seem to be sufficient to inscribe, in a protocol attached to the new treaty, that where in the ECSC Treaty the words ‘Common Assembly’ appeared the name of the new Assembly should replace them. There remained the need to provide a new text for the article determining the membership of the Common Assembly.

With regard to the competences in parliamentary terms relating to the linkage between the General Common Market and third countries in a free trade area, he took the view that these were rather a matter for the Council of Europe Consultative Assembly and the WEU Assembly. Indeed, the problems
of the free trade area were more closely associated with the activity of the OEEC which was already regularly submitting its reports to the Council of Europe’s bodies. In this solution, parliamentary action on economic and social matters regulated both in the General Common Market-Euratom Treaty and the Coal and Steel Treaty would be concentrated in a single body, while the links with third countries would be rather a matter for the Council of Europe Assembly.

Mr Bohy, speaking on behalf of the President of the WEU Assembly, said that the WEU Bureau’s intervention in these representations was dictated by concern for the European interest. He affirmed that there was no direct ambition on the WEU’s part to intervene directly and to provide itself with new competences.

He thought that the solutions recommended by the delegation were entirely acceptable, making it possible to unify European parliamentary activity and avoid a plethora of administrations. The WEU Bureau was giving these solutions its fullest support.

Mr Spaak replied that the Ministers meeting at the conference had already marked their agreement on the principle raised by the delegation’s speakers. There seemed to be a general desire to avoid setting up an entirely new assembly that would exist alongside the Assemblies already in place. Mr Spaak said that the problem would discussed further that very day.

Mr Struye said, by way of clarification, that while there was an intention to end up with a single Assembly, he feared that the merger of the new Assembly with the Common Assembly would not be completed until a later date and that, in this domain, the Ministers might confine themselves to a decision in principle. It was his opinion that the merger should take place at the very moment when the new Assembly was constitution. Unless there was simultaneity the Common Assembly would continue its existence and the new Assembly would in practice be tempted to create its own administration and services. This should at all costs be avoided.

With regard to the proportions of the national delegations in the new Assembly, it was important to seek a clear agreement on this matter. The difference between the new proportions and those existing in the Common Assembly could create difficulties of principle, which might give rise to controversy. He confirmed that those were the reasons why the Bureaux of the Assemblies had thought it advisable to offer the Ministers their cooperation, so as to help them find the most practicable solutions.

Mr von Brentano said that he personally could support the points that had been made. The major issue did indeed seem to be which Assembly would absorb the other. He hoped that the new treaties could give effect to the idea of absorbing the Common Assembly in the new Assembly. He thanked the delegation for having given this solution such clear support.

Mr Luns said that the solutions as proposed entirely reflected the views of the Netherlands Government, which was also ready to support their implementation.

Mr Bech said that the Luxembourg Parliament had adopted a motion a few days before to the same end and that the government had supported it.

He noted that on the essential principles everyone seemed to be in agreement. There would be a need to consider whether the recommended solution could be carried out immediately and whether there were not major difficulties that might be raised on that occasion.
Mr Dehousse invited the Ministers not to lose sight of the institutional prospects of unifying all of the European parliamentary institutions.

Mr Spaak asked whether Mr Dehousse was alluding to a unification that would also include the Council of Europe Consultative Assembly and the WEU Assembly.

Mr Dehousse confirmed that this was indeed his idea but he admitted that the unification that included both the Europe of 15 and the Europe of 7 could only take place at a later stage.

Finally, he renewed his offer he had made earlier of cooperating with the Ministers.

Winding up the discussion, Mr Spaak noted that on the full range of solutions proposed by the delegation there did not seem to be a divergence of views between the Ministers.

The points that had been made in the course of the hearing would be given close attention.

With regard to the proposal for the delegation’s cooperation, he would ask the Ministers their views in due course. Meanwhile it would perhaps be useful if, for the moment and in view of the discussion to be held that day, the delegation could put forward more detailed proposals for giving effect to the merger as recommended.

Mr Dehousse pointed out that the delegation was not familiar with the texts that had already been adopted but it would make haste to draft a memorandum setting out some general principles.

Mr Maurice Faure thought that the current discussion had enabled the essential nature of the proposals to be brought out. To bring about unification, it seemed to him that two notions were being put forward. The first recommended a single European Assembly within which the different powers would be exercised by ‘commissions’ of a specialised nature, enjoying a measure of autonomy (the ‘chest of drawers’ Assembly solution). The second suggested creating a new Assembly that would also exercise all the powers of the ECSC Assembly, the latter being abolished.

For his own part the speaker had no particular preference and in the course of the deliberations that would follow he would support whichever of the two notions the majority of his colleagues approved. He concluded that it might be difficult to tell what would be the response of his Parliament on this subject.

Mr Dehousse thanked Mr Spaak and the government representatives for the reception they had given to the delegation from the three Bureaux. He confirmed that the delegation would get to work straight away to draft a short memorandum setting out the terms of the proposed solutions.

Mr Spaak closed the meeting at 15.40.
Minutes of the meeting of the Delegation from the Bureaux of the three European Assemblies (Brussels, 4 February 1957)
MINUTES

of the meeting of the delegation from the Bureaux of the three European Assemblies (for the COMMON MARKET and EURATOM) held in Brussels on 4 February 1957 at 17.00

Present

Messrs Dehousse, Chairman
Furler
Bohy, deputising for Mr Pezet
Mommer
Motz
Struye

Mr Dehousse opened the meeting.

He thought that the Memorandum should be drawn up and sent to the ministers as soon as was possible.

He regretted that the Delegation had not been informed of the conclusions which the ministers seemed to have reached already.

It was his impression that the formula of a single ‘chest of drawers’ Assembly would be likely to obtain general support and particularly the support of the French Parliament.

He suggested that this principle be retained on the same basis as the creation of a Single Assembly, common to Euratom, the Common Market and the ECSC and as the simultaneity of its creation and the dissolution of the ECSC Assembly.

Mr Furler also thought that the idea of a Common Economic Assembly, for the Six, and at a later stage, a Single Assembly were likely to meet the agreement of the ministers. These notions should be set out in a few short and precise paragraphs that could be included in the Treaty.

Mr Bohy reported on Mr Spaak’s fears that consultation of the assemblies could hold up the drafting and signing of the Treaties. He also reported that Mr Faure had been satisfied with the representations by the Bureaux, which would strengthen the French Government’s position with the French Parliament.
Mr Motz insisted that the Common Assembly should preserve in full the powers conferred upon it by the ECSC Treaty.

Mr Struye listed a number of principles that he thought should appear in the memorandum:

- The new Assembly would exercise in the field of coal and steel all the powers at present conferred upon the Common Assembly.
- The allocation by nationality of members of the new Assembly would be established by moving closer to the allocation laid down for the Common Assembly, if possible by reducing rather than increasing the total number at present envisaged.
- The present members of the Common Assembly would de jure form part of the new Assembly, but only for the first year of its existence.
- The States or the High Contracting Parties would undertake to arrange for the appointment as members of the new Assembly of a number of members of the Common Assembly and in consequence of the WEU Assembly.
- The ECSC Common Assembly would cease to exist on the day when the new Assembly was constituted.
- The option would be reserved by later agreement of the governments to incorporate the new Economic Assembly within the framework of the Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Mr Furler thought that they were facing the following alternatives: either the competences of the Common Assembly were extended to scrutiny of Euratom and the Common Market, or an entirely new Assembly was created whose competences would be laid down by the Treaties establishing the ECSC, the Common Market and Euratom.

The number of members of the new Common Assembly would preferably be set at 240, allocated as follows:
- 60 for the three large countries,
- 27 for Belgium and the Netherlands, and
- 6 for Luxembourg.

The necessary amendments would be made in that event to the ECSC Treaty.

Mr Dehousse thought that they could perfectly well combine the suggestions by Mr Struye and Mr Furler, those by Mr Struye providing the general background.

The memorandum was then drawn up.

The following paragraphs were adopted.

‘The Delegation set up on 2 February 1957 by the Bureaux of the three European Assemblies (Council of Europe, ECSC and WEU) met at the Senate, immediately after the hearing it had been granted on Monday 4 February by the Conference of Ministers.

The Delegation points out that, in view of the short notice it received, it is not able to do more than set out some general principles to submit for the attention of the Conference.'
In this spirit the Delegation unanimously commends to the Conference the following principles, on the understanding that these principles are applicable only in the event that insurmountable objections should oppose conferring competence upon the ECSC Common Assembly.

1. The new Assembly required for scrutiny of the Common Market and Euratom will, in the field of coal and steel, exercise all the competences and powers at present granted to the Common Assembly.

This will not affect the relations existing at present between the institutions of the ECSC, nor the powers respectively conferred upon them.  

A debate ensued on the question of the number of members of the new Assembly.

Mr Furler thought that there was a need to set a fairly high figure for the number of members of the new Assembly. This precaution was necessary bearing in mind that in a few years’ time the members of the Assembly could be elected by direct universal suffrage. It was also a good idea to involve the maximum possible number of parliamentarians in the activities of the European institutions.

Mr Bohy feared that delegation by the Parliaments of too great a number of their members to the European Assemblies would affect the efficiency of those Parliaments.

Mr Furler said that the members of the European Assemblies were generally appointed in each national parliament by two chambers, which appreciably reduced the inconvenience to which Mr Bohy had drawn attention. They should not forget that this new assembly would be expected to represent a population of 160 million inhabitants and that its competence would cover the entire economy of the six member countries.

Mr Dehousse said that there were no plans for the election of members of the Assembly in the immediate future and that, moreover, it would always be possible to revise the Assembly’s composition in a supplementary protocol.

On this point the Delegation adopted the following three paragraphs:

‘2. The proportion of members of the new Assembly will be established by moving closer to the proportion at present laid down for the ECSC Assembly.

The aim will in preference be to reduce rather than increase the total number of members envisaged by the ministers.

In the event that, in due course, it should be decided to proceed with direct elections, the number of members could be reconsidered in a supplementary protocol.’

The last five points were adopted after discussion with the following wording:

‘3. The present members of the ECSC Common Assembly will de jure form part of the new Assembly for the first year of its existence. This measure is necessary at the beginning of the new institutions to ensure the continuity of their work.'
4. The States undertake to arrange for the appointment as members of the new Assembly of a number of members of the Consultative Assembly.

This proposition must be the subject of an explicit stipulation in the Treaties.

5. The Common Assembly will cease to exist on the day on which the new Assembly is constituted.

6. The Treaties must reserve opportunities for cooperation with States that do not form part of the Communities of the Six.

7. At a later stage, there will be a need to make provision for incorporating the new Assembly in a Single European Assembly’.

On a proposal by the Chairman, it was decided that a simple forwarding letter signed by Mr Dehousse would accompany the Memorandum. This would be handed to Mr Spaak by the Head of the Private Office of Mr Dehousse.

The meeting closed at 18.00.
ANNEX

MEMORANDUM

tendered by the delegation from the Bureaux of the 3 European Assemblies
to the Brussels Intergovernmental Conference
on 4 February 1957

The Delegation set up on 2 February 1957 by the Bureaux of the three European Assemblies (Council of Europe, ECSC and WEU) met at the Belgian Senate, immediately after the hearing it had been granted on Monday 4 February by the Conference of Ministers.

The Delegation points out that, in view of the short notice it received, it is not able to do more than set out some general principles to submit for the attention of the Conference.

In this spirit the Delegation unanimously commends to the Conference the following principles, on the understanding that these principles are applicable only in the event that insurmountable objections should oppose conferring competence upon the ECSC Common Assembly.

1. The new Assembly required for scrutiny of the Common Market and Euratom will, in the field of coal and steel, exercise all the competences and powers at present granted to the Common Assembly. This will not affect the relations existing at present between the institutions of the ECSC, nor the powers respectively conferred upon them.

2. The proportion of members of the new Assembly will be established by moving closer to the proportion at present laid down for the ECSC Assembly. The aim will in preference be to reduce rather than increase the total number of members envisaged by the ministers. In the event that, in due course, it should be decided to proceed with direct elections, the number of members could be reconsidered in a supplementary protocol.

3. The present members of the ECSC Common Assembly will de jure form part of the new Assembly for the first year of its existence. This measure is necessary at the beginning of the new institutions to ensure the continuity of their work.

4. The States undertake to arrange for the appointment as members of the new Assembly of a number of members of the Consultative Assembly. This proposition must be the subject of an explicit stipulation in the Treaties.

5. The Common Assembly will cease to exist on the day on which the new Assembly is constituted.

6. The Treaties must reserve opportunities for cooperation with States that do not form part of the Communities of the Six.

7. At a later stage, there will be a need to make provision for incorporating the new Assembly in a Single European Assembly.