MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

further to Question for Oral Answer B7-0232/2009

pursuant to Rule 115(5) of the Rules of Procedure

on the prospects for the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) following the
Seventh WTO Ministerial Conference

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on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
European Parliament resolution on the prospects for the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) following the Seventh WTO Ministerial Conference

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Doha Ministerial Declaration of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) of 14 November 2001,

– having regard to the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) of 18 December 2005,

– having regard to its resolutions of 5 September 2006\(^1\) on the suspension of the Doha negotiations, and of 9 October 2008\(^2\) on the future of the WTO Doha Development Agenda,

– having regard to the G20 Leaders’ Statement adopted in Pittsburgh on 25 September 2009,

– having regard to estimations by UNCTAD in its 2007 Trade and Development Report and in the Carnegie Endowment report ‘Winners and Losers of the Doha Round’ of March 2006 with regard to projected GDP growth of developing countries as result of the conclusion of the Doha Round, as well as various UNCTAD publications on the contribution of international trade in reaching the Millennium Development Goals,

– having regard to the chairman’s summary of the Seventh WTO ministerial Conference of 2 December 2009,

– having regard to Rules 115(5) and 110(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the Doha Development Round (DDA) was launched in 2001 with the objectives of creating new trading opportunities, strengthening multilateral trade rules, addressing current imbalances in the trading system and putting trade at the service of sustainable development, with an emphasis on the economic integration of developing countries, especially the least developed countries (LDCs),

B. whereas the DDA was launched in 2001 without the full consent of the developing countries on all its content; whereas the final decision on the content of the DDA was taken at the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference 2003 in Cancun after a dramatic walk-out by African WTO member states; whereas the DDA negotiations have been interrupted twice, in 2006 and 2008, and have been in a continuous stalemate for one year,

C. whereas over the last five years the development content of the DDA has been slowly but continuously sidelined to the disadvantage of the least developed countries in particular,

\(^1\) Texts adopted of that date, P6_TA(2006)0350.
among other things through the reduction of the Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) measures for developing countries to just a few ineffective measures,

D. whereas prognostic studies about the results of the DDA for developing countries by bodies including UNCTAD, the World Bank, the Overseas Development Institute and the Carnegie Endowment, concur in their estimations that the GDP growth-effect for developing countries will be marginal, resulting in almost all LDCs in less than one half of one percent, and accruing mainly to the three emerging economies of China, Brazil and India, while some least developed countries will even experience a negative growth effect,

E. whereas assumptions about the social and environmental effects of the DDA suffer from the lack of a serious Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA), updated for new proposals in the DDA working groups on Agricultural, Non-Agricultural Manufactured Goods, and Services,

F. whereas the global situation since the launch of the DDA in 2001 has shifted dramatically, posing new challenges and setting new global political goals, for example in confronting accelerating climate change, devastating food shortages in many poor countries, major value losses in the financial crisis, and new global waves of social hardships in the economic crisis,

G. whereas the last ten years have seen the proliferation of bilateral trade agreements which are aggressively pursuing the complete deregulation of markets, destroying the multilateral level playing field and cancelling out the significance of tariff reductions through the DDA and the importance of multilateral trade rules in general; whereas the EU has embarked on an aggressive bilateral trade policy since its 2006 ‘Global Europe’ strategy,

H. whereas the manifest global challenges with regard to climate change, social exclusion, extended famines and the depth of the financial and economic crises call for a reversal of WTO rules, which often have exacerbated these problems, and for a new system of global economic governance in which the WTO and the setting of multilateral trade rules are firmly anchored in the system of the United Nations, and made coherent with other global public policy goals,

1. Takes note of the conclusions of the Seventh WTO Ministerial Conference of 2 December 2009 in Geneva; deplores the irrelevance of this global meeting of ministers, given that it failed adequately to address the deepest financial and economic crisis of the era of the globalised economy which the WTO itself helped to create, or adequately to relate international trade to the Copenhagen Climate Conference;

2. Calls on WTO member states to draw the conclusions of eight years of unsuccessful negotiations on the DDA and to recognise that the DDA no longer bears any potential to foster sustainable development for the countries most in need; calls on the Commission and the Council to discuss a new agenda for the WTO, under the premise of the adaptation of global trade rules to financial crisis prevention, the promotion of food security and sovereignty, poverty reduction and Millennium Development Goal (MDG) fulfilment, and climate change goals;
3. Urges the WTO member states, in order to live up to the political expectations currently directed towards global institutions, to agree on common and differentiated global environmental and social standards for trade, including rules governing the differentiation of products according to their product and processing methods, e.g. energy intensity;

4. Urges the WTO member states to agree on principles advancing the goals of food security and food sovereignty, including respect for all Member States' measures geared towards facilitating access to basic foodstuffs at affordable prices and guaranteeing their right to control import and export volumes of basic foodstuffs, introducing a ban on all agricultural export subsidies, and upholding food-sovereignty-related criteria for foreign investment in the food and distribution sectors;

5. Urges the WTO member states to agree on principles avoiding prolonged trade imbalances, including through national and regional ceilings, measures to discourage aggressive export orientation, higher and binding social standards, and a redefinition of the anti-dumping rules to include the dimension of environmental dumping, and to elaborate criteria and limits for the liberalisation of financial services; regards regional integration models and the strengthening of regional trade relations as a valid economic alternative to the potential pitfalls of global trade;

6. Regards the WTO as a valid part and parcel of any novel global economic governance system, if re-integrated into the family of UN institutions; regards international trade as a valid part of global economic development, if integrated in the set of global rules and covenants governing environmental protection, social justice and the respect of all human rights;

7. As a first step towards such a new UN Trade Organisation (UNTO), commends WTO Member States to give a permanent presence and secretariat within the WTO to the administrative bodies of the most important Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs), to UNCTAD, the FAO, the ILO, and to the UNFCCC, so that international trade rules are governed by existing global law, and to open the WTO Dispute Settlement to third UN parties;

8. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the Director-General of the WTO.