



EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

2009 - 2014

Committee on Foreign Affairs

2012/2050(INI)

29.5.2012

DRAFT REPORT

on the Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the
Common Foreign and Security Policy
(12562/2011 – C7-0000/2012 – 2012/2050(INI))

Committee on Foreign Affairs

Rapporteur: Elmar Brok

CONTENTS

	Page
MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION	3
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT.....	19

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on the Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy

(12562/2011 – C7-0000/2012 – 2012/2050(INI))

The European Parliament,

- having regard to the Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (12562/2011 – C7-0000/2012),
- having regard to Article 36 of the Treaty on European Union,
- having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 17 May 2006 Part II, Section G, paragraph 43¹,
- having regard to the abovementioned Interinstitutional Agreement of 17 May 2006 between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on budgetary discipline and sound financial management,
- having regard to its resolutions of 11 May 2011² and 10 March 2010³ on the 2010 and 2009 CFSP annual reports respectively,
- having regard to its resolution of 8 July 2010⁴ on the European External Action Service,
- having regard to the declaration by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) on political accountability⁵,
- having regard to the statement made by the High Representative to the European Parliament meeting in plenary on 8 July 2010 on the basic organisation of the EEAS central administration⁶,
- having regard to Rule 119(1) of its Rules of Procedure,
- having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the opinion of the Committee on Budgets (A7-0000/2012),

A. whereas the EU should develop its foreign policy objectives further and advance its values and interests worldwide with the overall aim of contributing to peace, security, solidarity, conflict prevention, the promotion of democracy, the protection of human rights, gender equality, respect for international law, support for international institutions, effective

¹ OJ C 139, 14.6.2006, p. 1.

² Texts adopted, P7_TA(2011)0227.

³ OJ C 349 E, 22.12.2010, p. 51.

⁴ Texts adopted, P7_TA(2010)0280.

⁵ Texts adopted, P7_TA(2010)0399, Annex II.

⁶ Texts adopted, P7_TA(2010)0280, Annex.

multilateralism and mutual respect among nations, sustainable development, free and fair trade and the eradication of poverty;

- B. whereas the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty is bringing a new dimension to European external action and will be instrumental in enhancing the coherence, consistency and effectiveness of EU foreign policy and, more broadly, external actions;
- C. whereas the Lisbon Treaty is creating a new momentum in EU foreign policy, notably providing institutional and operational tools which could enable the Union to take on an international role compatible with its prominent economic status and its ambitions and to organise itself in such a way as to be an effective global player, able to share responsibility for global security and take the lead in defining common responses to common challenges;
- D. whereas the new momentum in European external action also requires the EU to act more strategically so as to bring its weight to bear internationally; whereas the EU's ability to influence the international order depends not only on coherence among its policies, actors and institutions, but also on a real strategic concept of EU foreign policy, which must unite all Member States behind the same set of priorities and goals so that they speak with a strong single voice in the international arena; whereas the EU's foreign policy must be provided with the necessary means and instruments in order to enable the Union to act effectively and consistently on the world stage;
- E. whereas parliamentary scrutiny of EU foreign policy is essential if European external action is to be understood and supported by EU citizens; whereas parliamentary scrutiny enhances the legitimacy of this action;

ASSESSMENT OF THE 2010 COUNCIL ANNUAL REPORT ON CFSP

1. Welcomes the steps taken by the Council, with the support of the HR/VP, in the 2010 Annual Report, towards mapping the Union's Foreign Policy in a forward-looking and strategic policy document;
2. Believes, however, that the Council's Annual Report falls short of the ambitions of the Lisbon Treaty in important ways, which include: not giving a sense of priorities or strategic guidelines for the CFSP; not clarifying the policy mechanisms for ensuring coherence and consistency among the different components of foreign policy, including those under the responsibility of the Commission; avoiding important questions on the role of the EEAS and the Delegations in ensuring that the Union's resources (personnel, financial and diplomatic) are aligned with its foreign affairs priorities; and avoiding a discussion, the holding of which is implied in the new strategies for the Horn of Africa and the Sahel, on how to embed ad hoc CSDP missions and operations (their rationale and end-state) in the political-strategic framework of EU foreign policy priorities for a country or region;
3. Recalls its Treaty prerogative to be consulted in the CFSP and CSDP spheres, to have its views duly taken into account and to make recommendations; recognises in this regard the availability of the HR/VP to the European Parliament; notes, however, that a solution needs to be found whereby the European Parliament is appropriately informed in the lead

up to, and on the final outcome of, the Foreign Affairs Council; looks forward to the review of the external assistance instruments and to an outcome that recognises the European Parliament's rights over strategy papers and multiannual action plans, as established in Article 290 of the TFEU; calls, furthermore, for improved provision of information at all stages of the procedure for CFSP Council Decisions on agreements with third countries, including frameworks for the participation of third countries in EU crisis management operations;

4. Calls on the Council when drawing up future Annual CFSP Reports to engage at an early opportunity with the Committee on Foreign Affairs in order to discuss the broad policy framework for the coming year and establish a benchmark for providing European citizens with a clear statement on the evolution, priorities and progress of the European Union's foreign policy;

A NEW COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO THE EU'S FOREIGN POLICY

5. Points out that in the second decade of the twenty-first century there is a growing awareness amongst Europe's citizens, and further afield, that only comprehensive approaches that integrate diplomatic, economic and, in the last resort, military means are adequate for addressing global threats and challenges;
6. Believes that with the Lisbon Treaty the EU has all the means necessary to adopt a comprehensive approach such as this, whereby all the Union's diplomatic and financial resources are used to back common strategic policy guidelines in order to have the greatest possible leverage in promoting the security and economic prosperity of European citizens and their neighbours; calls for the further development of an appropriate mechanism in the EEAS, with the participation of the relevant Commission services, where geographic and thematic expertise are integrated and drive a comprehensive approach to policy planning, formulation and implementation;
7. Stresses that a comprehensive understanding of CFSP covers all areas of foreign policy, including the progressive framing of a Common Security and Defence Policy, with an emphasis on pursuing coherence and consistency whilst respecting the specificity of each component of external action; reiterates that such an approach to developing EU foreign policy must be based on the principles and objectives established in Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union;

THE FOREIGN POLICY ARCHITECTURE

8. Underlines the role of political leadership expected of the HR/VP in ensuring the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union; calls on the HR/VP to use to the full her powers to initiate, conduct and ensure compliance with the CFSP, involving Parliament's relevant bodies fully in that endeavour; welcomes the important lead role, on behalf of the international community, played under difficult circumstances by the HR/VP in the negotiations with Iran; calls for such leadership in enhancing the European Union's role in support of the Middle East Peace Process and in the Neighbourhood;
9. Recognises the essential role of the EEAS (including its Delegations and EU Special Representatives) in assisting the HR/VP in pursuing a more strategic, coherent and

consistent political approach to the Union's external action; affirms its intention to continue monitoring the geographic and gender balance of staff in the EEAS, including in senior positions, and to assess whether the appointment of Member State diplomats as Heads of Delegation is in the interests of the Union, not of Member States; stresses the importance of strengthening relations between the EEAS, the Commission and the Member States with a view to achieving synergies in the effective implementation of external action and in delivering a single EU message on key political issues;

10. Stresses that the role of EU Special Representatives should be complementary to the country-specific work of EU Heads of Delegations and should represent and coordinate EU policy towards regions with specific strategies or security interests, which require a continuous EU presence and visibility; welcomes the positive response by the HR/VP to having newly appointed EUSRs and Heads of Delegation appear before Parliament for an exchange of views before taking up their posts; calls for improved reporting and access to political reports from Delegations and EUSRs in order for Parliament **to receive full and timely information** on developments from the ground, particularly in areas considered to be strategically important or the focus of political concern;
11. Reiterates its position that important thematic policies previously covered by Personal Representatives should have the full support of the EEAS and appropriate external political representation, and therefore calls for proposals to be put forward such as that for Human Rights;
12. Believes that clearly defined strategic guidelines will help tailor the Union's important but finite financial resources to the ambitions and priorities of the Union's external action; stresses that a strategic approach such as this should be under democratic control, but that this should not inhibit or slow down flexibility to respond to changing political circumstances on the ground;
13. Welcomes the commitment by the Member States in the Lisbon Treaty to playing their full role in the development and implementation of the Union's foreign policy; stresses the importance of the Member States' solidarity, during a time of economic constraints, on improving the effectiveness of the Union as a cohesive global actor; notes in particular the importance of the Member States' making available civilian and military capabilities for the effective implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy;
14. Calls on the HR/VP to come forward with proposals to further encourage Member State cooperation under the CFSP, specifically by setting out a process that will lead to European Council conclusions on Permanent Structured Cooperation in the area of security and defence and guidelines for more systematic use of coalitions of the willing, such as in the 'core group' concept for CSDP missions and operations, as a means of overcoming the limits of the 'battlegroup' concept;

FOREIGN POLICY – BUDGETARY AND FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE

15. Recalls that the revision of the 2006 IIA on budgetary discipline and sound financial management should mark a further step forward in greater transparency and provision of information to the budgetary authority in the area of CFSP and the HR/VP's Declaration on Political Accountability; believes, in this regard, that full transparency and democratic

scrutiny require separate budget lines for each and every CSDP missions and operations, including EUSRs, accompanied by streamlined but transparent procedures for the transfer of funds from one item to another if circumstances so require;

16. Welcomes the greater emphasis on consistency and coherence across the range of the Union's financial instruments, for example in the form of the cross-cutting provisions on the EEAS in the proposed regulations for new external relations financial instruments for the period 2014 to 2020; believes that such an approach will demonstrate the Union's added value in the pursuit of security and prosperity for the citizens of Europe;
17. Stresses the importance of ensuring that the new external relations financial instruments under consideration by the Parliament and Council should be tailored and fully funded to respond to the strategic interests of the Union as well as being adaptable to changing political circumstances; calls, therefore, for the Union's budget (the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020) to be properly resourced in line with the ambitions and priorities of the Union and to provide a secure and prosperous future for citizens as well as the necessary flexibility to cope with unforeseen developments;
18. Believes that a more joined-up and comprehensive approach to applying the EU's external relations instruments in support of common political and strategic objectives will deliver more efficient and cost-effective responses to foreign and security policy challenges and hence more security and prosperity for the citizens of Europe; stresses that in order for Parliament to reassure citizens about the coherence and cost-effectiveness of the external policies and financial instruments of the Union, the powers bestowed upon it by the Treaties (notably under Article 290 TFEU) must be properly reflected in the revision of the financial instruments and in particular in the use of delegated acts for strategic programming documents;
19. Stresses the importance of ensuring coherence between policy planning, formulation and implementation through an appropriate mix of external financial instruments in the area of foreign affairs; calls among other things for continued complementarity between the CFSP and the Instrument for Stability in the areas of mediation, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict peace-building, as well as for further work towards complementarity with the geographical instruments for long-term engagement with a country or region; welcomes the innovative introduction of a new Partnerships Instrument which brings important added value to the EU's CFSP by providing a financial framework for cooperation with the EU's Strategic Partners and in the follow-up to important international summits;
20. Believes that such an approach can be aided by the establishment of clear benchmarks, which should be monitored and evaluated by the European Parliament over the short, medium and long term; calls for benchmarking of the EU's foreign policy, drawing upon existing strategic programming documents or strategic policy frameworks (such as the Horn of Africa or the Sahel), including in a more systematic and quantifiable definition of policy priorities and objectives, as well as of the resources to be used over precise timelines in the short, mid- and long term;

STRATEGIC PRIORITIES: CONCENTRIC CIRCLES OF PEACE, SECURITY AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

21. Believes that the strategic interests, objectives and general guidelines to be pursued through the CFSP must be founded upon delivering peace, security and prosperity for the citizens of Europe, first of all in our neighbourhood, but also further afield, guided by the principles which inspired the creation of the EU itself, including, democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, equality and solidarity and respect for international law and the United Nations Charter;
22. Notes that the Union has developed relationships over time with countries and regional organisations that have differing contractual and legal bases, some having been termed ‘strategic’; observes that there is no clear formula for determining the Union’s choice of a strategic partner; notes that leveraging bilateral relationships can be an important force multiplier for EU foreign policy both regionally and within multilateral fora, and that therefore the choice of strategic partners deserves careful reflection in the light of the values and strategic objectives the Union wants to project;
23. Believes, therefore, that future decisions on strategic partners should be carefully framed in accordance with the foreign policy priorities of the Union vis-à-vis a country or region, or in international fora, and that due consideration should be given to ending partnerships that become obsolete or counter-productive; calls therefore for a follow-up debate with the European Parliament on the September 2010 European Council discussion on the strategic partnerships and for Parliament to be regularly informed ahead of decisions on future partnerships, particularly where such partnerships receive financial support from the Union budget or entail a closer contractual relationship with the EU;
24. Takes the view that, in order for the Union to be effective in delivering peace, security and socio-economic development to citizens in a highly competitive, changing and unpredictable international political order, it is important to focus the Union’s limited resources on strategic priorities, starting from the challenges closer to home, particularly in the neighbourhood, and extending outwards in concentric circles, including where relevant the role and relative influence of regional organisations;
25. Believes that demonstrating responsibility for our neighbourhood will strengthen the credibility of the Union’s global reach; considers that this will require working with other international partners in responding to international threats and challenges, including in response to crises;

- **the Western Balkans**

26. Supports the EU’s strategies towards the Western Balkans promoting stabilisation and socio-economic modernisation of both individual countries and the region as a whole; notes with concern that political instability, institutional weaknesses and unresolved bilateral issues are hampering further progress of some countries towards EU integration; calls on the EU to maintain its central role in the region and to consider it a top priority;
27. Reiterates its support for improving the accession process of the Western Balkans by making it more benchmark-driven, transparent and mutually accountable; calls on the EU to continue to prioritise in its enlargement policy conditions such as constructive political dialogue, consolidation of the rule of law, including ensuring the freedom of expression,

the effective fight against corruption and organised crime, enhancing the effectiveness and independence of the judiciary, improving administrative capacities and track records in enforcing acquis-related legislation, tackling inter-ethnic and inter-religious tensions, and addressing of the situation of refugees and displaced persons as well as resolution of open bilateral issues;

28. Considers it essential, furthermore, for EU foreign policy towards a region with a recent history of inter-ethnic armed conflict to promote a climate of tolerance, good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation, including through more integrated education systems (intra-regional exchanges of students) as prerequisites for European stability and as a means of facilitating reconciliation;

- **the Southern Neighbourhood and the Middle East**

29. Calls for the principles underlying the new European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) approach, as set out in the HR/VP and Commission Joint Communication of 25 May 2011, and for the 'more-for-more' principle and the 'partnership with society' in particular, to be fully operational and for Union assistance to be fully aligned to this new approach;
30. Recalls that the Southern Neighbourhood is of vital importance to the European Union and urges that a better balance be struck between pursuing market-oriented, on the one hand, and human and social approaches on the other in the EU's response to the Arab Spring; calls, therefore, for a greater focus on employment, education, training and regional development in order to help alleviate the current social and economic crisis in these countries, and to provide the assistance needed to support the ongoing political reforms and social and economic development; underlines the importance of supporting institutional capacity-building, including for the parliaments of these countries, an independent judicial system, the strengthening of civil-society organisations and the formation of pluralist political parties within a secular system;
31. Considers that the assessment of progress made by partner countries must be based on mutual transparency and should be based upon clearly defined, and jointly agreed, benchmarks that set out timetables for the implementation of reforms as provided for in the action plans; these benchmarks should be the basis for regular and, where possible, joint monitoring and evaluation that include a full role for civil society, in order to ensure effective and transparent implementation of policies;
32. Points out that Turkey is both a candidate country and an important strategic partner; calls, therefore, for the existing political dialogue with Turkey on foreign policy choices and objectives of mutual interest to be reinforced; stresses the importance of encouraging Turkey to pursue its foreign policy in a framework of dialogue and coordination with the European Union in order to create valuable synergies and reinforce the potential for a positive impact;
33. Recalls Turkey's ambition to inspire and assist democratic transitions and socio-economic reforms in the southern neighbourhood; notes that participation of Turkish institutions and non-governmental organisations in ENP instruments would generate unique synergy effects, especially in areas such as institution-building and socio-economic and civil

society development; believes that practical cooperation should be complemented with a structured dialogue between the EU and Turkey with a view to coordinating their respective neighbourhood policies; hopes that the conditions will improve for the opening of further chapters in the membership negotiations (e.g. ratification and implementation of the Ankara Protocol); recognises that the lack of cooperation in migration policy is having a negative impact, especially on Greece;

- **the Eastern Neighbourhood and Russia and Central Asia**

34. Calls for greater efforts towards achieving the objectives of the Eastern Partnership, as stated in the Prague Declaration and the Warsaw Summit Conclusions, particularly by pursuing the negotiations on, and conclusions of, Association Agreements with the Eastern Partners, by promoting mobility through mobility partnerships and visa dialogues, by ensuring continued progress in adoption and implementation of reforms, in close association with the EURONEST Parliamentary Assembly;
35. Underlines that, whilst the EU-Ukraine Agreement has been initialled, its signature and ratification can only happen if Ukraine fulfils the necessary requirements; this means respect for the rule of law in the form of strengthening the stability, independence and effectiveness of the institutions which guarantee the rule of law, and of showing respect for the rights of the opposition and putting an end to persecution of it, thus establishing a truly pluralistic democracy;
36. Calls for the development of relations with the Belarus authorities to be conditional on progress towards respect for the principles of democracy, the rule of law and human rights; at the same time, welcomes the efforts by the EU and its Delegation in Minsk to reach out and engage more with Belarusian society, including through ‘a European Dialogue for modernisation’, facilitated procedures for visa delivery and increased participation by Belarusian citizens in EU programmes;
37. Calls for continued and strong engagement on the part of the EU in resolving the region’s ‘frozen conflicts’, in cooperation with other important regional partners, in particular breaking the deadlock on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and playing a full role in support of any ensuing peace agreement; believes that the Transnistrian question can be a good test-case for the good will of the regional partners;

- **Russia**

38. Considers Russia as an important strategic partner, but continues to have concerns regarding Russia’s commitment to the rule of law, pluralist democracy and human rights;
39. Believes that it is the sovereign right of countries in the region to choose, free from external interference, the security organisation/arrangements/framework which, in their view, brings greatest security to their citizens;

- **Central Asia**

40. Supports the EU’s promotion of a regional approach in Central Asia, which is essential to tackling the regional dimension of issues including organised crime, trafficking in drugs,

radioactive materials and human beings, terrorism, natural and manmade environmental disasters and management of water resources; calls for such engagement to be differentiated and conditional upon progress in democratisation, human rights, good governance, sustainable socio-economic development, the rule of law and the fight against corruption; notes that the EU cooperation Strategy for Central Asia identifies seven priorities, but provides resources too limited to have an impact in all policy areas; calls therefore for the EU to define priorities better according to the resources available, whilst ensuring that development cooperation is not subordinated to economic, energy or security interests;

41. Notes that the overall situation in human rights, labour rights, lack of support for civil society and the status of the rule of law remain worrying; calls for the human rights dialogues to be strengthened and made more effective and result-oriented, with the close cooperation and involvement of civil society organisations in the preparation, monitoring and implementation of such dialogues; calls on the EU and HR/VP to raise publicly the cases of political prisoners and imprisoned human rights defenders and journalists and to call for their immediate release; calls for the Rule of Law Initiative to improve transparency towards civil-society organisations and to include clear objectives to make possible a transparent assessment of its implementation and results;
42. Notes that the energy- and resource-rich Central Asian countries provide a potentially significant source for the EU's diversification of sources and routes of supply; calls on the EEAS and the Commission to continue with support for energy projects and promotion of communication on important goals such as the Southern Corridor and the trans-Caspian pipeline;

- **Afghanistan**

43. Is concerned at the resurgence in violence following the breakdown in peace negotiations; highlights the importance of a sub-regional Central Asian approach to tackling cross-border trafficking in people and goods and to fighting organised crime and terrorism; calls for stepped-up support for building the capacity of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the National Security Forces as well as for helping the wider population with agricultural and socio-economic development in order for the country to assume full responsibility for security after completion of the transfer of internal security to the Afghan forces by the end of 2014;

- **Americas**

- **USA**

44. Takes the view that regular EU-US summits would provide an opportunity to identify common objectives and coordinate strategies on matters of global relevance, including economic governance and developing a common approach towards the emerging powers; considers that the Transatlantic Economic Council and the Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue should include a reflection on strategic engagement by the EU and the US with the BRICS and other relevant emerging countries and on how to foster regulatory convergence with such countries; recalls the need to set up a Transatlantic Political Council as an ad hoc body for systematic, high-level consultation and coordination on

foreign and security policy between the EU and the US;

45. Notes that, given the increasing global and regional relevance of China, India and other emerging countries in Asia, both the United States of America and the EU may progressively shift their primary attention, political investment and resources to the Pacific; further notes that Asia should have a more important place on the foreign agenda of the European Union and EU Member States; calls therefore for greater coordination of the US and EU policies towards China, India and other emerging countries in Asia in order to avoid a decoupling of approaches to key policies;
46. Believes that the USA as a NATO member is an important partner for the collective security of Europe;

- **Latin America**

47. Calls for EU-Latin America political dialogue to be widened at all levels, including the Summits of Heads of States and the EUROLAT Parliamentary Assembly, as an important tool for the development of political consensus; calls for political commitments following EU-Latin America Summits to be accompanied by the allocation of adequate financial resources;
48. Proposes to explore the possibility of closer cooperation, especially economic cooperation, between the Americas and the EU with the goal of a common Free Trade Agreement (FTA);
49. Calls for an enhancement of existing human rights dialogues, with a higher degree of European Parliament involvement, as well as dialogue to enhance cooperation on important security challenges, not least the devastating impact of organised and narco-crime on state institutions and human security; notes that the 7th EU-LAC Summit of Heads of State and Government, to be held in Chile in January 2013, could be a good opportunity to launch new visions for bi-regional cooperation across the range of political and socio-economic areas;
50. Stresses that social cohesion should remain a key principle of the development cooperation strategy towards Latin America, on account not only of its socio-economic implications, but also of its importance in terms of consolidating the democratic institutions in the region and the rule of law;
51. Welcomes the fact that the Association Agreement with Central America will be signed shortly and be subject in the European Parliament to the consent procedure; underlines the fact that as the first comprehensive region-to-region treaty for the EU, it upgrades the relationship and fosters a regional approach as well as Latin American regional integration; states its intention to closely monitor the implementation of the agreement, and in particular its impact on the human rights and rule of law situation in Central America;

- **Africa**

52. Notes that the joint Africa-EU Strategy has initially focused on the African Union and on

technical support for institutional capacity building and policies across the range of peace and security, human rights, democracy promotion, the rule of law and achieving the MDGs; recalls that whilst such a comprehensive approach remains valid, there is a pressing need to move beyond institutional capacity building at continental level towards developing a political partnership for peace, security and socio-economic development at regional and sub-regional level; calls for an extension of such political partnerships to include the Regional Economic Communities, not only as a strategy for strengthening the African Union, but also as a means of deepening the EU-Africa partnership at regional and sub-regional level, thus addressing the political, security and economic interests of African and European citizens;

53. Welcomes the EU's strategies for the Horn of Africa and the Sahel as important steps towards focusing political, diplomatic, financial and crisis management resources on a more politically strategic and cost-effective approach to difficult security complexes; calls for similar re-evaluation of Union policies towards other important regions where considerable financial and diplomatic resources are deployed; calls for closer association between the European Parliament, the Pan-African Parliament and regional parliamentary arrangements in order to ensure greater accountability for political and budgetary decisions vis-à-vis the citizens of both continents, and as a basis for measuring and evaluating progress in the implementation of political declarations;

- **Asia**

54. Calls for the EU to be more present in the Asia-Pacific region, in particular by contributing its experience and expertise to the multilateral initiatives in and around ASEAN and to the progressive emergence of increased Trans-Pacific initiatives; stresses that economic and cultural cross-fertilisation should be given higher priority, in particular by fostering direct investment opportunities and making access for students and researchers easier and more attractive; notes that this implies a strategic coordination of Member States and EU efforts, as opposed to parallel and competing national policies; notes that in the tense regional context, with territorial disputes around the South China Sea, the EU as a neutral partner should be an active proponent of a stable, peaceful solution based on multilateral institutions;

55. Calls for the EU to be more active in South Asia in support of democratic developments and improvement in the area of governance and the rule of law; welcomes, therefore, the commitment to a democratic and secular Pakistan; calls on the EU to seek closer cooperation with India, free from reciprocal post-colonial prejudices and aiming at the promotion of common values in the region and in multilateral fora;

• **China**

56. Notes that the change in leadership of China will be a major test of the country's evolution into either a more politically open and internationally constructive society or an increasingly repressive and nationalistic country; calls on the EU and its Member States to be more consistent and strategic in their respective messages and policies and so to contribute in a supportive way to a evolution in a positive direction; stresses that this implies eliminating the discrepancies between Member State and EU priorities on human rights in China, the human rights dialogue and support for civil-society organisations;

- **Taiwan**

57. Welcomes the successful conclusion of the presidential and parliamentary elections held in Taiwan on 14 January 2012; commends Taiwan's continuous efforts in maintaining peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region; recognises the progress in cross-Strait relations, with particular reference to enhanced economic links, and that closer economic ties with Taiwan could improve the EU's market access to China; notes that, as Taiwan is the EU's 15th largest trading partner and the world's 18th largest economy, with total trade amounting to USD 589.9 billion in 2011, an Economic Cooperation Agreement (ECA) between the EU and Taiwan would be mutually beneficial and in line with the EU's current FTA policy in East Asia; urges the Commission and the Council, in accordance with Parliament's CFSP resolution of May 2011, to take concrete steps to further enhance EU-Taiwan economic relations and facilitate the negotiation of an EU-Taiwan ECA; reiterates its firm support for Taiwan's meaningful participation in relevant international organisations and activities;

- **Multilateral partners**

- **G-7, G-8, G-20**

58. Believes that, in light of the increasing relevance of the BRICS and other emerging powers and the multipolar system of global governance that is taking shape, the G-20 could prove a useful and particularly appropriate forum for consensus building which is inclusive, based on partnership and able to foster convergence, including regulatory convergence; takes the view, however, that the G-20 has yet to prove its value in converting summit conclusions into sustainable policies that address critical challenges, not least the global financial and economic crisis; notes in this respect the potential for the G-8 to play a role in building consensus ahead of G-20 meetings; considers that the existence of the G-8 should also be harnessed in an effort to reconcile positions with Russia so that common challenges can be addressed in a coordinated and effective manner;

- **UN**

59. Considering that effective multilateralism is a cornerstone of EU foreign policy, calls for the EU to take a leading role in international cooperation and to advance global action by the international community; encourages the EU to further promote synergies within the UN system, to act as a bridge-builder at the UN and to engage globally with regional organisations and strategic partners; calls for the EU to contribute to sound financial management and budgetary discipline with regard to UN resources;

60. Considers it important that the UN General Assembly resolution on the EU's participation in the work of UNGA be fully implemented and that the EU act and deliver in a timely and coordinated fashion on substantive issues; calls on the EU to further improve the coordination of EU Member State positions and interests in the UN Security Council; welcomes the setting up of EU medium-term priorities at the UN and calls for the European Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs to be regularly consulted on the annual review and any implementation; stresses the need for stronger public diplomacy on UN affairs and for the EU's global role to be communicated in a more effective fashion to

the European public;

61. Strongly believes in the need to build partnerships in the area of conflict prevention, civilian and military crisis management, and peace-building, and, with this in mind, to make the EU-UN Steering Committee more operational in the context of crisis management; calls on the EU and its Member States to generate further progress on the operationalisation of the Responsibility to Protect principle and to work with UN partners towards ensuring that this concept becomes part of prevention and post-conflict reconstruction;

62. Underlines the need to develop more effective mediation guidelines and capacities as well as to provide adequate resources for mediation in a timely and coordinated manner; considers it essential for the implementation of the EU's human rights policy to develop the UN Human Rights Council's capacity to address serious and urgent human rights situations, to reinforce the follow-up process on the implementation of recommendations of the Special Procedures and to strengthen the process of the Universal Periodic Review;

- **EU-NATO**

63. Notes that the current global and European economic crisis has spurred efforts to seek more cost-effective and urgently required operational capabilities in both the EU and NATO; calls, therefore, for the HR/VP to be more proactive in promoting further concrete proposals for organisation-to-organisation improvement (with smart defence, pooling and sharing and a comprehensive approach as guiding principles); calls on Turkey for an urgent solution to the blockage on cooperation under the 'Berlin Plus' arrangements, which are damaging the prospects for the two organisations to cooperate effectively, including on the ground, where the lives of European citizens may be endangered;

- **Council of Europe**

64. Underlines the importance of the monitoring procedures of the Council of Europe as a major contribution to assessing progress by neighbouring countries in achieving democratic reforms;

- **OSCE**

65. Supports the dialogue on reform of the OSCE, provided that this does not come at the price of weakening existing institutions and mechanisms or affecting their independence; emphasises the need to maintain a balance between the three dimensions of the OSCE, developing them coherently and comprehensively and building on what has already been achieved; stresses, moreover, that security threats and challenges should be tackled through all three dimensions if action is to be truly effective; calls on the OSCE to further strengthen its capacity to ensure respect for, and the implementation of, principles and commitments undertaken by its participating states in all three dimensions, inter alia by enhancing follow-up mechanisms;

- **GCC**

66. Expects the EU to develop a real strategic partnership with the Gulf Cooperation Council,

including an open, regular and constructive dialogue and structured cooperation on the transition process and crisis management in the Southern Neighbourhood; to support this objective, reiterates that the EEAS should devote more human resources to the region and open delegations in the main GCC countries;

- **Arab League:**

67. Acknowledges the increasingly important role of the Arab League in regional matters, and calls on the EU to strengthen cooperation, especially on questions related to transition processes and crisis management in the Southern Neighbourhood; welcomes EU efforts to assist the Arab League in its integration process;

- **Thematic CFSP priorities**

- **Common Security and Defence Policy**

68. Emphasises that Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) actions should be embedded in a comprehensive policy targeting countries and regions in crisis, where the EU's values and strategic interests are at stake and where CSDP operations would provide real added value in terms of promoting peace, stability and the rule of law; stresses, further, the need for a lessons-learned process that assesses more accurately the successful implementation of each operation and its lasting impact on the ground;

69. Reiterates its call for the HR/VP, the Council and the Member States to overcome the imbalance between civilian and military planning capabilities in the EEAS and the general difficulty in achieving staffing requirements for CSDP missions and operations, in particular for staff in the fields of justice, civilian administration, customs and mediation, so as to ensure that adequate and sufficient expertise can be provided for CSDP missions; calls for the HR/VP to come forward with specific proposals for making up these staffing shortages, in particular in the area of civilian crisis management and the sectors described above;

- **Conflict prevention and peace-building**

70. Calls for the HR/VP to put forward proposals for boosting the capacities of the EEAS on conflict prevention and peace-building, with particular reference to the Gothenburg Programme, and to further expand the EU's capacity to prevent conflict and provide mediation capacities alongside its better-resourced crisis management capacities; calls as a matter of priority for stock to be taken of EU policies in the area of conflict prevention and peace-building with a view to the HR/VP reporting back to Parliament on proposals for strengthening the Union's external capacity and responsiveness in this area;

- **European Defence Agency**

71. Reiterates its call on the Member States to increase European cooperation in defence, which is the only feasible way to make sure that European military forces continue to be credible and operational in the face of diminishing defence budgets; notes the progress made under the EU's pooling and sharing and NATO's smart defence and considers it essential that further synergies are achieved between the two organisations; stresses the

need to make further progress in pooling and sharing of assets, and the potential for synergies in research, development and industrial cooperation in defence at Union level;

72. Recalls, in this context, the essential role of the European Defence Agency (EDA) in developing and implementing a European capabilities and armaments policy; calls on the Council, therefore, to strengthen the institutional character of the EDA and to unleash its full potential, as provided for in Articles 42 (3) and 45 TEU;
73. Urges the Council and the Member States to provide the EDA with adequate funding for the full range of its mission and tasks; takes the view that this would best be done by financing the Agency's staffing and running costs from the Union budget, starting with the forthcoming multiannual financial framework; to that end calls on the HR/VP to put forward the necessary proposals;

- **Energy security**

74. Notes that Article 194 of the Lisbon Treaty specifies that the EU is entitled to take measures at European level to ensure security of energy supply; believes that diversification of supply sources and transit routes is urgent and essential for the EU, which is highly dependent on external sources of energy; notes that the main directions for diversification are North Africa and the Southern Corridor from Turkey to Central Asia; believes that it should be ensured that the current main source of imports – Russia – complies with internal market rules, regulations under the Third Energy package and the Energy Charter Treaty.
75. Notes that in 2011 the Commission proposed setting up an information exchange mechanism on intergovernmental agreements in energy between Member States and third countries; believes that exchange of best practices and political support from the Commission would also strengthen Member States' negotiating power; calls on the HR/VP and the Commission to report regularly to Parliament on the setting up and implementation of the mechanism; calls on the Commission to include an 'energy security clause' in trade, association and partnership and cooperation agreements with producer and transit countries, i.e. a code of conduct in the event of disruption of, or unilateral changes to, the terms of supply;

- **Cultural and religious dialogue**

76. Believes that fostering dialogue and understanding between different religions and cultures should therefore be an integral part of our external engagement with third countries and societies and, in particular, of our support for resolving conflicts and promoting tolerant and democratic societies;

◦
◦ ◦

77. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the EU Member States, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Secretary-General of NATO, the

President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE, the President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the Chairman of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, and the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

This year's report marks a new departure for our Annual Report on CFSP - it is not written as a review of the Council's 2010 CFSP report but intended as our contribution to framing a **new strategic and forward looking approach** to the European Union's Foreign Policy.

What does this new approach mean? We take the **ambitions of the Lisbon Treaty as our point of departure** where *'The Union's competence in matters of CFSP shall cover **all areas of foreign policy** and all questions relating to the Union's security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence policy'* (article 24.1 TEU). This represents an important strategic level of ambition and an essential framework for developing a comprehensive, coherent and consistent Union approach to foreign policy.

However, it is also important that we recognise the specificity in the development and implementation of the different components of the Union's external action, including the CFSP (and its CSDP), but also the Neighbourhood Policy, Development Policy, and International Trade. This **comprehensive approach** is essential to constructing a strategic and coherent approach for pursuing the Union's foreign policy. In the area of civilian and military crisis management this requires better coordination and cooperation with important partners such as NATO where for the latter this requires resolving differences with Turkey to improve cooperation under Berlin Plus.

The **2010 Report of the Council** includes important steps in the direction of mapping out the Union's foreign policy priorities in a forward-looking and strategic framework. However, it falls short of the ambitions of the Lisbon Treaty in important ways, including *inter alia* by **not giving a sense of priorities or strategic guidelines for the CFSP**; by not clarifying the **policy mechanisms for ensuring coherence** and consistency between the different components of foreign policy including under the responsibility of the Commission; by avoiding important questions on the role of the EEAS and the Delegations in **ensuring that the Union's resources** (personnel, financial and diplomatic) **are aligned with our priorities in foreign affairs**; or by avoiding a discussion on how to embed *ad hoc* CSDP missions and operations (their rationale and end-state) in the political-strategic framework of EU foreign policy priorities for a country or region.

Whilst this report is intended to be ambitious and politically strategic, it should also be **realistic and pragmatic in setting benchmarks** to be monitored, evaluated and developed in subsequent Annual Reports. Therefore we should avoid becoming obsessed with calling for more strategies and sub-strategies without a **careful reflection on priorities and the resources available for the Union to achieve clear objectives** and provide real added value in a period of economic austerity. Indeed, rather than simply call for a new Foreign Policy Review or a new European Security Strategy this report should be a contribution to framing EU foreign policy and to setting benchmarks for monitoring and evaluating progress made over the coming years. On this basis future AFET reports can develop this framework and assess progress in pursuing a Union foreign policy.

This report should call for the EU to achieve greater synergies based upon the triple-hatted mandate of Catherine Ashton as High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Vice-President of the Commission, Chair of the Foreign Affairs Council and supported by the

EEAS. Whilst there have been understandable difficulties in the transition to a new approach to CFSP following the Lisbon Treaty, this report now calls upon the HR/VP and EEAS for leadership through quality, courage and decisive and timely action. The absence of such leadership and strategic approach necessitates the prioritisation of the European Neighbourhood Policy as a strategic principle including in development of CFSP.