



2015/2041(INI)

26.11.2015

AMENDMENTS

1 - 54

Draft opinion

Bernd Lange

(PE569.667v02-00)

on transparency, accountability and integrity in the EU institutions
(2015/2041(INI))

Amendment 1

Franz Obermayr, Edouard Ferrand, Marine Le Pen, Matteo Salvini

Draft opinion

Paragraph 1

Draft opinion

1. **Recalls** that the Treaty on European Union (TEU) marked a new stage in the process of **creating an ever closer union** in which decisions are taken **as openly and as closely as possible to** the citizen (Article 1 TEU); notes that there is a considerable lack of trust among EU citizens in EU trade-policy making, and believes that a radical shift is needed in the way that information about trade negotiations is communicated to the public, in order to ensure their legitimacy;

Amendment

1. **Regrets** that the Treaty on European Union (TEU) marked a new stage in the process of **loss of sovereignty by Member States, often against the wishes of their citizens**, in which **European Union** decisions are **not taken in the interest of the** citizen (Article 1 TEU); notes that there is a considerable lack of trust among EU citizens in EU trade-policy making, and believes that a radical shift is needed in the way that information about trade negotiations is communicated to the public, in order to ensure their legitimacy; **stresses that such legitimacy can only be guaranteed by introducing elements of democracy to the decision-making process**;

Or. fr

Amendment 2

Klaus Buchner

Draft opinion

Paragraph 1

Draft opinion

1. Recalls that the Treaty on European Union (TEU) marked a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union in which decisions are taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen (Article 1 TEU); notes that there is a considerable lack of trust among EU citizens in EU trade-policy making, and believes that a radical shift is needed in the way that information about trade negotiations is

Amendment

1. Recalls that the Treaty on European Union (TEU) marked a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union in which decisions are taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen (Article 1 TEU); notes that there is a considerable lack of trust among EU citizens in EU trade-policy making, and believes that a radical shift is needed in the way that information about trade negotiations is

communicated *to the public*, in order to ensure their legitimacy;

communicated *and made publically available*, in order to ensure their legitimacy; *considers that a key point to regain public trust not only in trade-policy making but in the EU as such is to approach principles of transparency from the perspective of citizen to be empowered to understand policy-making and administration instead of an inner-administration logic of procedures and documentation;*

Or. en

Amendment 3 Christofer Fjellner

Draft opinion Paragraph 1

Draft opinion

1. Recalls that the Treaty on European Union (TEU) marked a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union in which decisions are taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen (Article 1 TEU); notes that *there is a considerable lack of trust among EU citizens in EU trade-policy making, and believes that a radical shift is needed in the way that information about trade negotiations is communicated to the public, in order to ensure their legitimacy;*

Amendment

1. Recalls that the Treaty on European Union (TEU) marked a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union in which decisions are taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen (Article 1 TEU); notes that *more can always be done to increase the level of information on trade negotiations that is communicated to the public, but reminds that a balance between transparency and effectiveness has to be struck, as in all other negotiations;*

Or. en

Amendment 4 Godelieve Quisthoudt-Rowohl

Draft opinion Paragraph 1

Draft opinion

1. Recalls that the Treaty on European Union (TEU) marked a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union in which decisions are taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen (Article 1 TEU); ***notes that there is a considerable lack of trust among EU citizens in EU trade-policy making, and believes that a radical shift is needed in the way that information about trade negotiations is communicated to the public, in order to ensure their legitimacy;***

Amendment

1. Recalls that the Treaty on European Union (TEU) marked a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union in which decisions are taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen (Article 1 TEU); ***takes into account the lively public debate across Europe on current trade negotiations and the concerns voiced by European citizens, welcomes both the Commission's transparency initiative for the TTIP negotiations and the release of the new trade strategy "Trade for all" which aims at creating a higher level of transparency in trade policy;***

Or. en

**Amendment 5
Daniel Caspary**

**Draft opinion
Paragraph 1**

Draft opinion

1. Recalls that the Treaty on European Union (TEU) marked a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union in which decisions are taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen (Article 1 TEU); notes that ***there is a considerable lack of trust among EU citizens in EU trade-policy making***, and believes that a radical shift is needed in ***the way*** that information about trade negotiations ***is*** communicated to the public, ***in order to ensure their legitimacy;***

Amendment

1. Recalls that the Treaty on European Union (TEU) marked a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union in which decisions are taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen (Article 1 TEU); notes that ***vested interests are endeavouring to destroy trust in the European institutions and EU trade policy***, and believes that a radical shift is needed in ***that regard and*** that information about trade negotiations ***must continue to be properly*** communicated to the public;

Or. de

**Amendment 6
Marietje Schaake**

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

Draft opinion

1. Recalls that the Treaty on European Union (TEU) marked a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union in which decisions are taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen (Article 1 TEU); notes that ***there is a considerable lack of trust among EU*** citizens in EU trade-policy making, and believes that a radical shift is needed in the way that information about trade negotiations is communicated to the public, in order to ensure their legitimacy;

Amendment

1. Recalls that the Treaty on European Union (TEU) marked a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union in which decisions are taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen (Article 1 TEU); notes that ***the expectations about involvement of different EU stakeholders and citizens is changing, and that trust in EU trade-policy making must be ensured and reinforced***, and believes that a radical shift is needed in the way that information about trade negotiations is communicated to the public ***and in the way information is gathered by Member States and the Commission***, in order to ensure their legitimacy;

Or. en

Amendment 7
Dita Charanzová

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

Draft opinion

1. Recalls that the Treaty on European Union (TEU) marked a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union in which decisions are taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen (Article 1 TEU); notes that ***there is a considerable*** lack of trust among EU citizens in EU trade-policy making, ***and believes that a radical shift is needed*** in the way that information about trade negotiations is communicated to the public, ***in order to ensure their legitimacy***;

Amendment

1. Recalls that the Treaty on European Union (TEU) marked a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union in which decisions are taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen (Article 1 TEU); notes that ***due to a*** lack of trust among EU citizens in EU trade-policy making, ***there has been a considerable*** shift in the way that information about trade negotiations is communicated to the public;

Amendment 8
David Borrelli

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

Draft opinion

1. Recalls that the Treaty on European Union (TEU) marked a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union in which decisions are taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen (Article 1 TEU); notes that there is a considerable lack of trust among EU citizens in EU trade-policy making, and believes that a radical shift is needed in the way that information about trade negotiations *is* communicated to the public, in order to ensure their legitimacy;

Amendment

1. Recalls that the Treaty on European Union (TEU) marked a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union in which decisions are taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen (Article 1 TEU); notes that there is a considerable lack of trust among EU citizens in EU trade-policy making, and believes that a radical shift is needed in the way that information about trade negotiations ***and the activities of the INTA Committee are*** communicated to the public, in order to ensure their legitimacy ***and to reach the widest possible audience;***

Or. en

Amendment 9
Marielle de Sarnez, Tokia Saïfi

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

Draft opinion

1. Recalls that the Treaty on European Union (TEU) marked a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union in which decisions are taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen (Article 1 TEU); notes that there is a considerable lack of trust among EU citizens in EU trade-policy making, and believes that a radical shift is needed in the way that information about trade negotiations is

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1. Recalls that the Treaty on European Union (TEU) marked a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union in which decisions are taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen (Article 1 TEU); notes that there is a considerable lack of trust among EU citizens in EU trade-policy making, and believes that a radical shift is needed in the way that information about trade negotiations is

communicated to the public, in order to ensure their legitimacy;

communicated to the public, in order to ensure their legitimacy; ***recalls that in accordance with Article 12 TEU on the role of national parliaments in the European Union, various instruments for cooperation between the European Parliament and national parliaments have been created to guarantee effective democratic scrutiny of EU legislation at all levels;***

Or. fr

Amendment 10
Georg Mayer, Harald Vilimsky

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

Draft opinion

1. Recalls that the Treaty on European Union (TEU) marked a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union in which decisions ***are*** taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen (Article 1 TEU); notes that there is a considerable lack of trust among EU citizens in EU ***trade-policy making***, and believes that a radical shift is needed in the way that information about trade negotiations is communicated to the public, in order to ensure their legitimacy;

Amendment

1. Recalls that the Treaty on European Union (TEU) marked a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union in which decisions ***should be*** taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen (Article 1 TEU); notes that there is a considerable lack of trust among EU citizens in EU ***trade policy-making***, and believes that a radical shift is needed in the way that information about trade negotiations is communicated to the public, in order to ensure their legitimacy;

Or. de

Amendment 11
Jude Kirton-Darling

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

1a. Stresses that achieving progress in this

respect requires a meaningful engagement of the European Commission with social partners, commensurate to the EU's obligation to "recognise and promote the role of the social partners" as expressed in article 152 TFEU; notes in the context of the TTIP negotiations that neither the Civil Society Dialogue nor the TTIP Advisory Group are sufficient means to achieve this objective;

Or. en

Amendment 12
Klaus Buchner

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

1a. Recommends that the Commissions on-going efforts to increase transparency in all current and future trade negotiations should entail the strengthening of the European Ombudsman's mandate as an independent oversight body; calls on the Commission to grant the European Ombudsman the right of access to all trade related documents, in particular consolidated and confidential files;

Or. en

Amendment 13
Jude Kirton-Darling

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 b (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

1b. Stresses that greater democratic scrutiny by the European Parliament and

engagement by civil society and social partners is also necessary with respect to negotiating directives; regrets that Parliament, civil society and social partners are not systematically involved in the process of drafting negotiating directives by the European Commission, or even consulted prior to their adoption by the Council;

Or. en

Amendment 14
Klaus Buchner

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 b (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

1b. Suggests a set of new rules dealing in particular with the treatment of internal documents, especially wider access to Legal Service opinions drafted within the framework of the decision-making process as well as to information relating to the work of Member State representatives when acting as members of the Council, including transcripts of meetings;

Or. en

Amendment 15
Klaus Buchner

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

Draft opinion

Amendment

2. Recalls that, pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States must, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out

2. Recalls that, pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States must, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out

certain tasks (Articles 4 and 13 TEU), which is a precondition for Parliament to adequately exercise its legislative and budgetary functions, and those of political control and consultation (Article 14 TEU); calls on the Council and the Commission to commit fully and seriously to this principle of sincere cooperation with Parliament by immediately providing, through the relevant channels, full and accurate information pertaining to the Union's external action, including its Common Commercial Policy (CCP), in regard to decision-making and implementation of primary and secondary legislation; notes that, even though an interinstitutional cooperation agreement exists between Parliament and the Commission, the same does not exist between Parliament and the Council, which creates certain hurdles for scrutiny; calls on the Commission to take into full consideration Parliament's requests concerning the interinstitutional agreement, in particular as regards provisional application and implementation of trade agreements;

certain tasks (Articles 4 and 13 TEU), which is a precondition for Parliament to adequately exercise its legislative and budgetary functions, and those of political control and consultation (Article 14 TEU); calls on the Council and the Commission to commit fully and seriously to this principle of sincere cooperation with Parliament by immediately providing, through the relevant channels, full and accurate information pertaining to the Union's external action, including its Common Commercial Policy (CCP), in regard to decision-making and implementation of primary and secondary legislation; notes that, even though an interinstitutional cooperation agreement exists between Parliament and the Commission, the same does not exist between Parliament and the Council, which creates certain hurdles for scrutiny; calls on the Commission to take into full consideration Parliament's requests concerning the interinstitutional agreement, in particular as regards *a set of clear criteria for the* provisional application and implementation of trade agreements; *calls on the Council to accept these criteria and guarantee that the provisional application of trade agreements is contingent to the prior consent of Parliament;*

Or. en

Amendment 16 Godelieve Quisthoudt-Rowohl

Draft opinion Paragraph 2

Draft opinion

2. Recalls that, pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States must, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out certain tasks (Articles 4 and 13 TEU),

Amendment

2. Calls on the Council and the Commission to commit fully and seriously to *the* principle of sincere cooperation with Parliament by immediately providing, through the relevant channels, full and

which is a precondition for Parliament to adequately exercise its legislative and budgetary functions, and those of political control and consultation (Article 14 TEU); calls on the Council and the Commission to commit fully and seriously to *this* principle of sincere cooperation with Parliament by immediately providing, through the relevant channels, full and accurate information pertaining to the Union's external action, including its Common Commercial Policy (CCP), in regard to decision-making and implementation of primary and secondary legislation; *notes that, even though an interinstitutional cooperation agreement exists between Parliament and the Commission, the same does not exist between Parliament and the Council, which creates certain hurdles for scrutiny;* calls on the Commission to take into full consideration Parliament's requests concerning the interinstitutional agreement, in particular as regards provisional application and implementation of trade agreements;

accurate information pertaining to the Union's external action, including its Common Commercial Policy (CCP), in regard to decision-making and implementation of primary and secondary legislation; calls on the Commission to take into full consideration Parliament's requests concerning the interinstitutional agreement, in particular as regards provisional application and implementation of trade agreements;

Or. en

Amendment 17
Dita Charanzová

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

Draft opinion

2. Recalls that, pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States must, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out certain tasks (Articles 4 and 13 TEU), which is a precondition for Parliament to adequately exercise its legislative and budgetary functions, and those of political control and consultation (Article 14 TEU); calls on the Council and the Commission to

Amendment

2. Recalls that, pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States must, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out certain tasks (Articles 4 and 13 TEU), which is a precondition for Parliament to adequately exercise its legislative and budgetary functions, and those of political control and consultation (Article 14 TEU); calls on the Council and the Commission to

commit fully and seriously to this principle of sincere cooperation with Parliament by immediately providing, through the relevant channels, full and accurate information pertaining to the Union's external action, including its Common Commercial Policy (CCP), in regard to decision-making and implementation of primary and secondary legislation; notes that, even though an interinstitutional cooperation agreement exists between Parliament and the Commission, the same does not exist between Parliament and the Council, *which creates certain hurdles for scrutiny; calls on the Commission to take into full consideration* Parliament's requests concerning the interinstitutional agreement, in particular as regards provisional application and implementation of trade agreements;

commit fully and seriously to this principle of sincere cooperation with Parliament by immediately providing, through the relevant channels *and where appropriate*, full and accurate information pertaining to the Union's external action, including its Common Commercial Policy (CCP), in regard to decision-making and implementation of primary and secondary legislation; notes that, even though an interinstitutional cooperation agreement exists between Parliament and the Commission, the same does not exist between Parliament and the Council; *recalls* Parliament's requests concerning the interinstitutional agreement, in particular as regards provisional application and implementation of trade agreements;

Or. en

Amendment 18
Godelieve Quisthoudt-Rowohl

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 a (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

2a. Recalls that, pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States must, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out certain tasks (Articles 4 and 13 TEU), which is a precondition for Parliament to adequately exercise its legislative and budgetary functions, and those of political control and consultation (Article 14 TEU); notes that, even though an interinstitutional cooperation agreement exists between Parliament and the Commission, the same does not exist between Parliament and the Council, which creates certain hurdles for

Amendment 19
Godelieve Quisthoudt-Rowohl

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

Draft opinion

3. Welcomes the fact that the Committee on International Trade (INTA) and the Commission's Directorate-General for Trade have been collaborating pro-actively to enhance cooperation, establish best practices and improve communication channels, and that this collaboration has been especially useful for monitoring trade negotiations through INTA Standing Rapporteurs and targeted monitoring groups; welcomes recent efforts by the Commission to increase the transparency of trade negotiations; believes, nevertheless, that the Council and the Commission can still improve their working methods to better cooperate with Parliament as regards access to documents, information and decision-making for all issues and negotiations related to CCP *(such as information relating to negotiations – including scoping, mandates and evolution of negotiations – provisional application of trade agreements, activities and decisions taken by bodies created by trade and/or investment agreements, expert meetings, and delegated and implementing acts); notes with regret that after one year of negotiations* between the Commission and Parliament on access to documents related to the TTIP negotiations, *there is still no agreement about access to confidential documents;*

Amendment

3. Welcomes the fact that the Committee on International Trade (INTA) and the Commission's Directorate-General for Trade have been collaborating pro-actively to enhance cooperation, establish best practices and improve communication channels, and that this collaboration has been especially useful for monitoring trade negotiations through INTA Standing Rapporteurs and targeted monitoring groups; welcomes recent efforts by the Commission to increase the transparency of trade negotiations; believes, nevertheless, that the Council and the Commission can still improve their working methods to better cooperate with Parliament as regards access to documents, information and decision-making for all issues and negotiations related to CCP; ***is confident that an agreement*** between the Commission and Parliament on access to ***confidential*** documents related to the TTIP negotiations ***will be reached in a very near future.***

Amendment 20
Bernd Lange

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

Draft opinion

3. Welcomes the fact that the Committee on International Trade (INTA) and the Commission's Directorate-General for Trade have been collaborating pro-actively to enhance cooperation, establish best practices and improve communication channels, and that this collaboration has been especially useful for monitoring trade negotiations through INTA Standing Rapporteurs and targeted monitoring groups; welcomes recent efforts by the Commission to increase the transparency of trade negotiations; believes, nevertheless, that the Council and the Commission can still improve their working methods to better cooperate with Parliament as regards access to documents, information and decision-making for all issues and negotiations related to CCP (such as information relating to negotiations – including scoping, mandates and evolution of negotiations – provisional application of trade agreements, activities and decisions taken by bodies created by trade and/or investment agreements, expert meetings, and delegated and implementing acts); ***notes with regret that after*** one year of negotiations between the Commission and Parliament on access to documents related to the TTIP negotiations, ***there is still no agreement about*** access to ***confidential*** documents;

Amendment

3. Welcomes the fact that the Committee on International Trade (INTA) and the Commission's Directorate-General for Trade have been collaborating pro-actively to enhance cooperation, establish best practices and improve communication channels, and that this collaboration has been especially useful for monitoring trade negotiations through INTA Standing Rapporteurs and targeted monitoring groups; welcomes recent efforts by the Commission to increase the transparency of trade negotiations; believes, nevertheless, that the Council and the Commission can still improve their working methods to better cooperate with Parliament as regards access to documents, information and decision-making for all issues and negotiations related to CCP (such as information relating to negotiations – including scoping, mandates and evolution of negotiations – provisional application of trade agreements, activities and decisions taken by bodies created by trade and/or investment agreements, expert meetings, and delegated and implementing acts); ***regrets that it took*** one year of negotiations between the Commission and Parliament ***to achieve an agreement*** on access to documents related to the TTIP negotiations; ***notes that regulation 1049/2011 on public*** access to ***documents grants very broad rights for ordinary citizens in term of access to*** documents ***which can go beyond the access that is currently given to Members of the European Parliament***

Or. en

Amendment 21
Klaus Buchner

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

Draft opinion

3. Welcomes the fact that the Committee on International Trade (INTA) and the Commission's Directorate-General for Trade have been collaborating pro-actively to enhance cooperation, establish best practices and improve communication channels, and that this collaboration has been especially useful for monitoring trade negotiations through INTA Standing Rapporteurs and targeted monitoring groups; welcomes recent efforts by the Commission to increase the transparency of trade negotiations; believes, nevertheless, that the Council and the Commission can still improve their working methods to better cooperate with Parliament as regards access to documents, information and decision-making for all issues and negotiations related to CCP (such as information relating to negotiations – including scoping, mandates and evolution of negotiations – provisional application of trade agreements, activities and decisions taken by bodies created by trade and/or investment agreements, expert meetings, and delegated and implementing acts); notes with regret that after one year of negotiations between the Commission and Parliament on access to documents related to the TTIP negotiations, there is still no agreement about access to confidential documents;

Amendment

3. Welcomes the fact that the Committee on International Trade (INTA) and the Commission's Directorate-General for Trade have been collaborating pro-actively to enhance cooperation, establish best practices and improve communication channels, and that this collaboration has been especially useful for monitoring trade negotiations through INTA Standing Rapporteurs and targeted monitoring groups; welcomes recent efforts by the Commission to increase the transparency of trade negotiations; believes, nevertheless, that the Council and the Commission can still improve their working methods to better cooperate with Parliament as regards access to documents, information and decision-making for all issues and negotiations related to CCP (such as information relating to negotiations – including scoping, mandates and evolution of negotiations – provisional application of trade agreements, activities and decisions taken by bodies created by trade and/or investment agreements, expert meetings, and delegated and implementing acts); notes ***that the European Commission was ineffective in properly assessing and reacting to all individual and standard responses to its public consultation on ISDS in TTIP in 2014 and calls on the Commission to improve the inclusiveness of all public consultation results in order to fulfil its commitments to the European citizens;*** notes with regret that after one year of negotiations between the Commission and Parliament on access to documents related to the TTIP negotiations, there is still no

agreement about access to confidential documents;

Or. en

Amendment 22
Daniel Caspary

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

Draft opinion

3. Welcomes the fact that the Committee on International Trade (INTA) and the Commission's Directorate-General for Trade have been collaborating *pro-actively* to enhance cooperation, establish best practices and improve communication channels, and that this collaboration has been especially useful for monitoring trade negotiations through INTA Standing Rapporteurs and targeted monitoring groups; welcomes recent efforts by the Commission to increase the transparency of trade negotiations; believes, nevertheless, that the Council and the Commission can still improve their working methods to better cooperate with Parliament as regards access to documents, information and decision-making for all issues and negotiations related to CCP (such as information relating to negotiations – including scoping, mandates and evolution of negotiations – provisional application of trade agreements, activities and decisions taken by bodies created by trade and/or investment agreements, expert meetings, and delegated and implementing acts); ***notes with regret that after one year of negotiations between the Commission and Parliament on access to documents related to the TTIP negotiations, there is still no agreement about access to confidential documents;***

Amendment

3. Welcomes the fact that the Committee on International Trade (INTA) and the Commission's Directorate-General for Trade have been collaborating *proactively* to enhance cooperation, establish best practices and improve communication channels, and that this collaboration has been especially useful for monitoring trade negotiations through INTA Standing Rapporteurs and targeted monitoring groups; welcomes recent efforts by the Commission to increase the transparency of trade negotiations; believes, nevertheless, that the Council and the Commission can still improve their working methods to better cooperate with Parliament as regards access to documents, information and decision-making for all issues and negotiations related to CCP (such as information relating to negotiations – including scoping, mandates and evolution of negotiations – provisional application of trade agreements, activities and decisions taken by bodies created by trade and/or investment agreements, expert meetings, and delegated and implementing acts); ***calls on Parliament to revise its own rules on the treatment of, and access to, confidential documents and, in order to protect confidentiality, greatly to increase the severity of the penalties incurred when persons entitled to consult such documents, Members included, infringe***

those rules;

Or. de

Amendment 23
Christofer Fjellner

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

Draft opinion

3. Welcomes the fact that the Committee on International Trade (INTA) and the Commission's Directorate-General for Trade have been collaborating pro-actively to enhance cooperation, establish best practices and improve communication channels, and that this collaboration has been especially useful for monitoring trade negotiations through INTA Standing Rapporteurs and targeted monitoring groups; welcomes recent efforts by the Commission to increase the transparency of trade negotiations; believes, nevertheless, that the Council and the Commission can still improve their working methods to better cooperate with Parliament as regards access to documents, information and decision-making for all issues and negotiations related to CCP (such as information relating to negotiations – including scoping, mandates and evolution of negotiations – provisional application of trade agreements, activities and decisions taken by bodies created by trade and/or investment agreements, expert meetings, and delegated and implementing acts); ***notes with regret that after one year of negotiations between the Commission and Parliament on access to documents related to the TTIP negotiations, there is still no agreement about access to confidential documents;***

Amendment

3. Welcomes the fact that the Committee on International Trade (INTA) and the Commission's Directorate-General for Trade have been collaborating pro-actively to enhance cooperation, establish best practices and improve communication channels, and that this collaboration has been especially useful for monitoring trade negotiations through INTA Standing Rapporteurs and targeted monitoring groups; welcomes recent efforts by the Commission to increase the transparency of trade negotiations; believes, nevertheless, that the Council and the Commission can still improve their working methods to better cooperate with Parliament as regards access to documents, information and decision-making for all issues and negotiations related to CCP (such as information relating to negotiations – including scoping, mandates and evolution of negotiations – provisional application of trade agreements, activities and decisions taken by bodies created by trade and/or investment agreements, expert meetings, and delegated and implementing acts); ***welcomes the initiatives taken by the Commission to improve the access to documents related to the TTIP negotiations; acknowledges that the TTIP negotiations are the most transparent negotiations in history;***

Or. en

Amendment 24
Emmanuel Maurel

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

Draft opinion

3. Welcomes the fact that the Committee on International Trade (INTA) and the Commission's Directorate-General for Trade have been collaborating pro-actively to enhance cooperation, establish best practices and improve communication channels, and that this collaboration has been especially useful for monitoring trade negotiations through INTA Standing Rapporteurs and targeted monitoring groups; welcomes recent efforts by the Commission to increase the transparency of trade negotiations; believes, nevertheless, that the Council and the **Commission can** still improve their working methods to better cooperate with Parliament as regards access to documents, information and decision-making for all issues and negotiations related to CCP (such as information relating to negotiations – including scoping, mandates and evolution of negotiations – provisional application of trade agreements, activities and decisions taken by bodies created by trade and/or investment agreements, expert meetings, and delegated and implementing acts); notes with regret that after one year of negotiations between the Commission and Parliament on access to documents related to the TTIP negotiations, there is still no agreement about access to confidential documents;

Amendment

3. Welcomes the fact that the Committee on International Trade (INTA) and the Commission's Directorate-General for Trade have been collaborating pro-actively to enhance cooperation, establish best practices and improve communication channels, and that this collaboration has been especially useful for monitoring trade negotiations through INTA Standing Rapporteurs and targeted monitoring groups; welcomes recent efforts by the Commission to increase the transparency of trade negotiations; believes, nevertheless, that the Council and the **Commission's efforts remain insufficient and that both should** still improve their working methods to better cooperate with Parliament as regards access to documents, information and decision-making for all issues and negotiations related to CCP (such as information relating to negotiations – including scoping, mandates and evolution of negotiations – provisional application of trade agreements, activities and decisions taken by bodies created by trade and/or investment agreements, expert meetings, and delegated and implementing acts); **regrets, in this regard, that the Council has not made available to the Members of the European Parliament the negotiating mandates for all agreements currently in negotiation**; notes with regret that after one year of negotiations between the Commission and Parliament on access to documents related to the TTIP negotiations, there is still no agreement about access to confidential documents;

Or. en

Amendment 25
Marietje Schaake

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

Draft opinion

3. Welcomes the fact that the Committee on International Trade (INTA) and the Commission's Directorate-General for Trade have been collaborating pro-actively to enhance cooperation, establish best practices and improve communication channels, and that this collaboration has been especially useful for monitoring trade negotiations through INTA Standing Rapporteurs and targeted monitoring groups; welcomes recent efforts by the Commission to increase the transparency of trade negotiations; believes, nevertheless, that the Council and the Commission can still improve their working methods to better cooperate with Parliament as regards access to documents, information and decision-making for all issues and negotiations related to CCP (such as information relating to negotiations – including scoping, mandates and evolution of negotiations – provisional application of trade agreements, activities and decisions taken by bodies created by trade and/or investment agreements, expert meetings, and delegated and implementing acts); notes with regret that after one year of negotiations between the Commission and Parliament on access to documents related to the TTIP negotiations, there is still no agreement about access to confidential documents;

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3. Welcomes the fact that the Committee on International Trade (INTA) and the Commission's Directorate-General for Trade have been collaborating pro-actively to enhance cooperation, establish best practices and improve communication channels, and that this collaboration has been especially useful for monitoring trade negotiations through INTA Standing Rapporteurs and targeted monitoring groups; welcomes recent efforts by the Commission to increase the transparency of trade negotiations; **welcomes the Commission's ambition to use the current transparency initiative on TTIP as a model for all trade negotiations, as outlined in the new Trade Strategy 'Trade for All'**; believes, nevertheless, that the Council and the Commission can still improve their working methods to better cooperate with Parliament as regards access to documents, information and decision-making for all issues and negotiations related to CCP (such as information relating to negotiations – including scoping, mandates and evolution of negotiations – provisional application of trade agreements, activities and decisions taken by bodies created by trade and/or investment agreements, expert meetings, and delegated and implementing acts); notes with regret that after one year of negotiations between the Commission and Parliament on access to documents related to the TTIP negotiations, there is still no agreement about access to confidential documents;

Or. en

Amendment 26
Dita Charanzová

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

Draft opinion

3. Welcomes the fact that the Committee on International Trade (INTA) and the Commission's Directorate-General for Trade have been collaborating pro-actively to enhance cooperation, establish best practices and improve communication channels, and that this collaboration has been especially useful for monitoring trade negotiations through INTA Standing Rapporteurs and targeted monitoring groups; **welcomes** recent efforts by the Commission to increase the transparency of trade negotiations; believes, **nevertheless**, that the Council and the Commission **can still improve** their working methods to better cooperate with Parliament as regards access to documents, information and decision-making for all issues and negotiations related to CCP (such as information relating to negotiations – including scoping, mandates and evolution of negotiations – provisional application of trade agreements, activities and decisions taken by bodies created by trade and/or investment agreements, expert meetings, and delegated and implementing acts); notes **with regret** that after one year of negotiations between the Commission and Parliament on access to documents related to the TTIP negotiations, there is still no agreement about access to confidential documents;

Amendment

3. Welcomes the fact that the Committee on International Trade (INTA) and the Commission's Directorate-General for Trade have been collaborating pro-actively to enhance cooperation, establish best practices and improve communication channels, and that this collaboration has been especially useful for monitoring trade negotiations through INTA Standing Rapporteurs and targeted monitoring groups; **stresses** recent efforts by the Commission to increase the transparency of trade negotiations; believes that the Council and the Commission **have improved** their working methods to better cooperate with Parliament as regards access to documents, information and decision-making for all issues and negotiations related to CCP (such as information relating to negotiations – including scoping, mandates and evolution of negotiations – provisional application of trade agreements, activities and decisions taken by bodies created by trade and/or investment agreements, expert meetings, and delegated and implementing acts); notes that after one year of negotiations between the Commission and Parliament on access to documents related to the TTIP negotiations, there is still no agreement about access to confidential documents;

Or. en

Amendment 27
Marielle de Sarnez, Tokia Saïfi

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

Draft opinion

3. Welcomes the fact that the Committee on International Trade (INTA) and the Commission's Directorate-General for Trade have been collaborating pro-actively to enhance cooperation, establish best practices and improve communication channels, and that this collaboration has been especially useful for monitoring trade negotiations through INTA Standing Rapporteurs and targeted monitoring groups; welcomes recent efforts by the Commission to increase the transparency of trade negotiations; believes, nevertheless, that the Council and the Commission can still improve their working methods to better cooperate with Parliament as regards access to documents, information and decision-making for all issues and negotiations related to CCP (such as information relating to negotiations – including scoping, mandates and evolution of negotiations – provisional application of trade agreements, activities and decisions taken by bodies created by trade and/or investment agreements, expert meetings, and delegated and implementing acts); notes with regret that after one year of negotiations between the Commission and Parliament on access to documents related to the TTIP negotiations, there is still no agreement about access to confidential documents;

Amendment

3. Welcomes the fact that the Committee on International Trade (INTA) and the Commission's Directorate-General for Trade have been collaborating pro-actively to enhance cooperation, establish best practices and improve communication channels, and that this collaboration has been especially useful for monitoring trade negotiations through INTA Standing Rapporteurs and targeted monitoring groups; welcomes recent efforts by the Commission to increase the transparency of trade negotiations; believes, nevertheless, that the Council and the Commission can still improve their working methods to better cooperate with Parliament as regards access to documents, information and decision-making for all issues and negotiations related to CCP (such as information relating to negotiations – including *their mixed or exclusive nature*, scoping, mandates and evolution of negotiations – provisional application of trade agreements, activities and decisions taken by bodies created by trade and/or investment agreements, expert meetings, and delegated and implementing acts); notes with regret that after one year of negotiations between the Commission and Parliament on access to documents related to the TTIP negotiations, there is still no agreement about access to confidential documents;

Or. fr

Amendment 28
Franz Obermayr, Edouard Ferrand, Marine Le Pen, Matteo Salvini

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

Draft opinion

3. Welcomes the fact that the Committee on International Trade (INTA) and the Commission's Directorate-General for Trade have been collaborating pro-actively to enhance cooperation, establish best practices and improve communication channels, and that this collaboration has been especially useful for monitoring trade negotiations through INTA Standing Rapporteurs and targeted monitoring groups; welcomes recent efforts by the Commission to increase the transparency of trade negotiations; believes, nevertheless, that the Council and the Commission can still improve their working methods to better cooperate with Parliament as regards access to documents, information and decision-making for all issues and negotiations related to CCP (such as information relating to negotiations – including scoping, mandates and evolution of negotiations – provisional application of trade agreements, activities and decisions taken by bodies created by trade and/or investment agreements, expert meetings, and delegated and implementing acts); notes with regret that after one year of negotiations between the Commission and Parliament on access to documents related to the TTIP negotiations, there is still no agreement about access to confidential documents;

Amendment

(Does not affect the English version.)

Or. fr

Amendment 29
Christofer Fjellner

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

Draft opinion

4. Stresses that, as pointed out by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), imperatives for transparency derive from the democratic nature of governance within the EU, and that, where confidential information is beyond the reach of public access, as in the case of trade negotiations, it must be available to parliamentarians who scrutinise trade policy on behalf of citizens; considers ***therefore that access to classified information is essential for scrutiny by Parliament, which in return*** should abide by its obligation to manage such information properly; considers that there should be clear criteria for labelling documents as ‘classified’; notes that the case law of the ECJ makes it clear that where a document originating in an EU institution is covered by an exception with regard to the right to access, the institution must clearly explain why access to this document could specifically and effectively undermine the interest protected by the exception, and that the risk must be reasonably foreseeable and not purely hypothetical; ***calls on the Commission to implement the recommendations of the European Ombudsman of July 2015 with particular regard to access to documents for all negotiations, and*** calls on the Commission to convince EU negotiating partners to increase transparency at their end;

Amendment

4. Stresses that, as pointed out by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), imperatives for transparency derive from the democratic nature of governance within the EU, and that, where confidential information is beyond the reach of public access, as in the case of trade negotiations, it must be available to parliamentarians who scrutinise trade policy on behalf of citizens; considers ***that*** Parliament should abide by its obligation to manage such information properly; considers that there should be clear criteria for labelling documents as ‘classified’; notes that the case law of the ECJ makes it clear that where a document originating in an EU institution is covered by an exception with regard to the right to access, the institution must clearly explain why access to this document could specifically and effectively undermine the interest protected by the exception, and that the risk must be reasonably foreseeable and not purely hypothetical; calls on the Commission to convince EU negotiating partners to increase transparency at their end;

Or. en

Amendment 30
David Borrelli

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

4. Stresses that, as pointed out by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), imperatives for transparency derive from the democratic nature of governance within the EU, and that, where confidential information is beyond the reach of public access, as in the case of trade negotiations, it must be available to parliamentarians who scrutinise trade policy on behalf of citizens; considers therefore that access to classified information is essential for scrutiny by Parliament, which in return should abide by its obligation to manage such information properly; considers that there should be clear criteria for labelling documents as ‘classified’; notes that the case law of the ECJ makes it clear that where a document originating in an EU institution is covered by an exception with regard to the right to access, the institution must clearly explain why access to this document could specifically and effectively undermine the interest protected by the exception, and that the risk must be reasonably foreseeable and not purely hypothetical; calls on the Commission to implement the recommendations of the European Ombudsman of July 2015 with particular regard to access to documents for all negotiations, and calls on the Commission to convince EU negotiating partners to increase transparency at their end;

4. Stresses that, as pointed out by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), imperatives for transparency derive from the democratic nature of governance within the EU, and that, where confidential information is beyond the reach of public access, as in the case of trade negotiations, it must be available to parliamentarians who scrutinise trade policy on behalf of citizens; considers therefore that access to classified information is essential for scrutiny by Parliament, which in return should abide by its obligation to manage such information properly; considers that there should be clear criteria for labelling documents as ‘classified’, ***and also that the document should be declassified as soon as its classification is no longer necessary***; notes that the case law of the ECJ makes it clear that where a document originating in an EU institution is covered by an exception with regard to the right to access, the institution must clearly explain why access to this document could specifically and effectively undermine the interest protected by the exception, and that the risk must be reasonably foreseeable and not purely hypothetical; calls on the Commission to implement the recommendations of the European Ombudsman of July 2015 with particular regard to access to documents for all negotiations, and calls on the Commission to convince EU negotiating partners to increase transparency at their end; ***calls to mind the importance of harnessing as far as possible information technology, online archives, the new technologies and the new media in order to guarantee that access to documents for citizens, wherever they may be, is as direct, simple and immediate as it can be***; ***considers that, in general, publicity concerning documents should be regarded as the norm and classification as an exception, especially in the case of documents concerning***

major trade agreements that will have a significant impact on citizens' lives;

Or. it

Amendment 31

Klaus Buchner

Draft opinion

Paragraph 4

Draft opinion

4. Stresses that, as pointed out by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), imperatives for transparency derive from the democratic nature of governance within the EU, and that, where confidential information is beyond the reach of public access, as in the case of trade negotiations, it must be available to parliamentarians who scrutinise trade policy on behalf of citizens; considers therefore that access to classified information is essential for scrutiny by Parliament, which in return should abide by its obligation to manage such information properly; considers that there should be clear criteria for labelling documents as 'classified'; notes that the case law of the ECJ makes it clear that where a document originating in an EU institution is covered by an exception with regard to the right to access, the institution must clearly explain why access to this document could specifically and effectively undermine the interest protected by the exception, and that the risk must be reasonably foreseeable and not purely hypothetical; calls on the Commission to implement the recommendations of the European Ombudsman of July 2015 with particular regard to access to documents for all negotiations, and calls on the Commission to convince EU negotiating partners to increase transparency at their end;

Amendment

4. Stresses that, as pointed out by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), imperatives for transparency derive from the democratic nature of governance within the EU, and that, where confidential information is beyond the reach of public access, as in the case of trade negotiations, it must be available to parliamentarians who scrutinise trade policy on behalf of citizens; considers therefore that access to classified information is essential for scrutiny by Parliament, which in return should abide by its obligation to manage such information properly; ***demands that Members of the European Parliament and key political group staff with a "need to know" will be granted access to trade negotiation documents on the level of the best current practice of any national Parliament within the EU***; considers that there should be clear criteria for labelling documents as 'classified' ***and for the de-classification of classified documents at the earliest moment***; notes that the case law of the ECJ makes it clear that where a document originating in an EU institution is covered by an exception with regard to the right to access, the institution must clearly explain why access to this document could specifically and effectively undermine the interest protected by the exception, and that the risk must be reasonably foreseeable and not purely hypothetical; calls on the Commission to implement the recommendations of the

European Ombudsman of July 2015 with particular regard to access to documents for all negotiations, and calls on the Commission to convince EU negotiating partners to increase transparency at their end; ***believes that the scoping exercise prior to the start of trade negotiations with a third country should include the scoping of aspired transparency of the negotiations and that continuous failure of partners in trade negotiations to increase transparency to a similar level as in the EU should constitute a reason to halt negotiations;***

Or. en

Amendment 32
Dita Charanzová

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

Draft opinion

4. Stresses that, as pointed out by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), imperatives for transparency derive from the democratic nature of governance within the EU, and that, where confidential information is beyond the reach of public access, as in the case of trade negotiations, it must be available to parliamentarians who scrutinise trade policy on behalf of citizens; considers therefore that access to classified information is essential for scrutiny by Parliament, which in return should abide by its obligation to manage such information properly; considers that there should be clear criteria for labelling documents as ‘classified’; notes that the case law of the ECJ makes it clear that where a document originating in an EU institution is covered by an exception with regard to the right to access, the institution must clearly explain why access to this document could specifically and

Amendment

4. Stresses that, as pointed out by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), imperatives for transparency derive from the democratic nature of governance within the EU, and that, where confidential information is beyond the reach of public access, as in the case of trade negotiations, it must be available to parliamentarians who scrutinise trade policy on behalf of citizens; considers therefore that access to classified information is essential for scrutiny by Parliament, which in return should abide by its obligation to manage such information properly; considers that there should be clear criteria for labelling documents as ‘classified’; notes that the case law of the ECJ makes it clear that where a document originating in an EU institution is covered by an exception with regard to the right to access, the institution must clearly explain why access to this document could specifically and

effectively undermine the interest protected by the exception, ***and that the risk must be reasonably foreseeable and not purely hypothetical***; calls on the Commission to implement the recommendations of the European Ombudsman of July 2015 with particular regard to access to documents for all negotiations, and calls on the Commission to ***convince*** EU negotiating partners ***to increase*** transparency ***at their end***;

effectively undermine the interest protected by the exception; calls on the Commission to implement the recommendations of the European Ombudsman of July 2015 with particular regard to access to documents for all negotiations, and calls on the Commission to ***discuss with*** EU negotiating partners transparency ***measures***;

Or. en

Amendment 33 **Marietje Schaake**

Draft opinion **Paragraph 4**

Draft opinion

4. Stresses that, as pointed out by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), imperatives for transparency derive from the democratic nature of governance within the EU, and that, where confidential information is beyond the reach of public access, as in the case of trade negotiations, it must be available to parliamentarians who scrutinise trade policy on behalf of citizens; considers therefore that access to classified information is essential for scrutiny by Parliament, which in return should abide by its obligation to manage such information properly; considers that there should be clear criteria for labelling documents as 'classified'; notes that the case law of the ECJ makes it clear that where a document originating in an EU institution is covered by an exception with regard to the right to access, the institution must clearly explain why access to this document could specifically and effectively undermine the interest protected by the exception, and that the risk must be reasonably foreseeable and not purely

Amendment

4. Stresses that, as pointed out by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), imperatives for transparency derive from the democratic nature of governance within the EU, and that, where confidential information is beyond the reach of public access, as in the case of trade negotiations, it must be available to parliamentarians who scrutinise trade policy on behalf of citizens; considers therefore that access to classified information is essential for scrutiny by Parliament, which in return should abide by its obligation to manage such information properly; considers that there should be clear criteria for labelling documents as 'classified'; notes that the case law of the ECJ makes it clear that where a document originating in an EU institution is covered by an exception with regard to the right to access, the institution must clearly explain why access to this document could specifically and effectively undermine the interest protected by the exception, and that the risk must be reasonably foreseeable and not purely

hypothetical; calls on the Commission to implement the recommendations of the European Ombudsman of July 2015 with particular regard to access to documents for all negotiations, *and calls on the Commission to convince EU negotiating partners to increase transparency at their end*;

hypothetical; calls on the Commission to implement the recommendations of the European Ombudsman of July 2015 with particular regard to access to documents for all negotiations;

Or. en

Amendment 34
Emmanuel Maurel

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

Draft opinion

4. Stresses that, as pointed out by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), imperatives for transparency derive from the democratic nature of governance within the EU, and that, where confidential information is beyond the reach of public access, as in the case of trade negotiations, it must be available to parliamentarians who scrutinise trade policy on behalf of citizens; considers therefore that access to classified information is essential for scrutiny by Parliament, which in return should abide by its obligation to manage such information properly; considers that there should be clear criteria for labelling documents as ‘classified’; notes that the case law of the ECJ makes it clear that where a document originating in an EU institution is covered by an exception with regard to the right to access, the institution must clearly explain why access to this document could specifically and effectively undermine the interest protected by the exception, and that the risk must be reasonably foreseeable and not purely hypothetical; calls on the Commission to implement the recommendations of the

Amendment

4. Stresses that, as pointed out by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), imperatives for transparency derive from the democratic nature of governance within the EU, and that, where confidential information is beyond the reach of public access, as in the case of trade negotiations, it must be available to parliamentarians who scrutinise trade policy on behalf of citizens; considers therefore that access to classified information is essential for scrutiny by Parliament, which in return should abide by its obligation to manage such information properly; considers that there should be clear criteria for labelling documents as ‘classified’; notes that the case law of the ECJ makes it clear that where a document originating in an EU institution is covered by an exception with regard to the right to access, the institution must clearly explain why access to this document could specifically and effectively undermine the interest protected by the exception, and that the risk must be reasonably foreseeable and not purely hypothetical; calls on the Commission to implement the recommendations of the

European Ombudsman of July 2015 with particular regard to access to documents for all negotiations, and calls on the Commission to convince EU negotiating partners to increase transparency at their end;

European Ombudsman of July 2015 with particular regard to access to documents for all negotiations, and calls on the Commission to convince EU negotiating partners to increase transparency at their end, *so as the bilateral and plurilateral negotiations the EU is involved in could be led with a greater level of transparency and, if possible, with no less transparency than the negotiations organised in the WTO framework;*

Or. en

Amendment 35
Jude Kirton-Darling

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

Draft opinion

4. Stresses that, as pointed out by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), imperatives for transparency derive from the democratic nature of governance within the EU, and that, where confidential information is beyond the reach of public access, as in the case of trade negotiations, it must be available to parliamentarians who scrutinise trade policy on behalf of citizens; considers therefore that access to classified information is essential for scrutiny by Parliament, which in return should abide by its obligation to manage such information properly; considers that there should be clear criteria for labelling documents as ‘classified’; notes that the case law of the ECJ makes it clear that where a document originating in an EU institution is covered by an exception with regard to the right to access, the institution must clearly explain why access to this document could specifically and effectively undermine the interest protected by the exception, and that the risk must be reasonably foreseeable and not purely

Amendment

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hypothetical; calls on the Commission to implement the recommendations of the European Ombudsman of July 2015 with particular regard to access to documents for all negotiations, and calls on the Commission to convince EU negotiating partners to increase transparency at their end;

effectively undermine the interest protected by the exception, and that the risk must be reasonably foreseeable and not purely hypothetical; calls on the Commission to implement the recommendations of the European Ombudsman of July 2015 with particular regard to access to documents for all negotiations, and calls on the Commission to convince EU negotiating partners to increase transparency at their end;

Or. en

Amendment 36 **Godelieve Quisthoudt-Rowohl**

Draft opinion **Paragraph 4**

Draft opinion

4. Stresses that, as pointed out by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), imperatives for transparency derive from the democratic nature of governance within the EU, and that, where confidential information is beyond the reach of public access, as in the case of trade negotiations, it must be available to parliamentarians who scrutinise trade policy on behalf of citizens; considers therefore that access to classified information is essential for scrutiny by Parliament, which in return should abide by its obligation to manage such information properly; considers that there should be clear criteria for labelling documents as ‘classified’; notes that the case law of the ECJ makes it clear that where a document originating in an EU institution is covered by an exception with regard to the right to access, the institution must clearly explain why access to this document could specifically and effectively undermine the interest protected by the exception, and that *the* risk must be reasonably foreseeable and not purely

Amendment

4. Stresses that, as pointed out by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), imperatives for transparency derive from the democratic nature of governance within the EU, and that, where confidential information is beyond the reach of public access, as in the case of trade negotiations, it must be available to parliamentarians who scrutinise trade policy on behalf of citizens; considers therefore that access to classified information is essential for scrutiny by Parliament, which in return should abide by its obligation to manage such information properly; considers that there should be clear criteria for labelling documents as ‘classified’; notes that the case law of the ECJ makes it clear that where a document originating in an EU institution is covered by an exception with regard to the right to *public* access, the institution must clearly explain why access to this document could specifically and effectively undermine the interest protected by the exception, and that *this* risk must be reasonably foreseeable and not purely

hypothetical; calls on the Commission to implement the recommendations of the European Ombudsman of July 2015 with particular regard to access to documents for all negotiations, and calls on the Commission to convince EU negotiating partners to increase transparency at their end;

hypothetical; calls on the Commission to implement the recommendations of the European Ombudsman of July 2015 with particular regard to access to documents for all negotiations, and calls on the Commission to convince EU negotiating partners to increase transparency at their end;

Or. en

Amendment 37
Daniel Caspary

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

Draft opinion

4. Stresses that, as pointed out by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), imperatives for transparency derive from the democratic nature of governance within the EU, and that, where confidential information is beyond the reach of public access, as in the case of trade negotiations, it must be available to parliamentarians who scrutinise trade policy on behalf of citizens; considers therefore that access to classified information is essential for scrutiny by Parliament, which in return should abide by its obligation to manage such information properly; considers that there should be clear criteria for labelling documents as ‘classified’; notes that the case law of the ECJ makes it clear that where a document originating in an EU institution is covered by an exception with regard to the right to access, the institution must clearly explain why access to this document could specifically and effectively undermine the interest protected by the exception, and that the risk must be reasonably foreseeable and not purely hypothetical; calls on the Commission to **implement** the recommendations of the European Ombudsman of July 2015 with

Amendment

4. Stresses that, as pointed out by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), imperatives for transparency derive from the democratic nature of governance within the EU, and that, where confidential information is beyond the reach of public access, as in the case of trade negotiations, it must be available to parliamentarians who scrutinise trade policy on behalf of citizens; considers therefore that access to classified information is essential for scrutiny by Parliament, which in return should abide by its obligation to manage such information properly; considers that there should be clear criteria for labelling documents as ‘classified’; notes that the case law of the ECJ makes it clear that where a document originating in an EU institution is covered by an exception with regard to the right to access, the institution must clearly explain why access to this document could specifically and effectively undermine the interest protected by the exception, and that the risk must be reasonably foreseeable and not purely hypothetical; calls on the Commission to **examine** the recommendations of the European Ombudsman of July 2015 with

particular regard to access to documents for all negotiations, and calls on the Commission to convince EU negotiating partners to increase transparency at their end;

particular regard to access to documents for all negotiations, and calls on the Commission to convince EU negotiating partners to increase transparency at their end;

Or. de

Amendment 38
Bernd Lange

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 a (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

4a. Stresses that more engagement with civil society and social partners is crucial in order to achieve greater transparency; stresses in this respect the important need for improvement of the functioning of the domestic advisory groups engaged in the implementation of existing trade agreements in terms of working methods, membership and overall resources dedicated by the Commission;

Or. en

Amendment 39
Marietje Schaake

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 a (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

4a. Believes that the EU must take the lead when it comes to furthering transparency of trade negotiations, not only regarding bilateral, but also plurilateral and multilateral processes; Stresses however, that the Commission must also convince negotiating partners to increase transparency at their end to

make sure that this is a reciprocal process in which the EU's negotiating position is not compromised; Stresses that increased transparency is in the interest of all our negotiating partners and stakeholders worldwide, and that it can strengthen the global support for rules-based trade;

Or. en

Amendment 40
Marietje Schaake

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 b (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

4b. Believes that, while transparency is crucial, more is needed to maintain the legitimacy of EU trade policy, namely actual engagement with all stakeholders through organising meetings, briefings and other events;

Or. en

Amendment 41
Daniel Caspary

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

Draft opinion

Amendment

5. Recalls the importance for the CCP legislative process to count on Union statistics consistent with Article 338(2) TFEU and on impact assessments conforming to the highest standards of impartiality and reliability; *calls for further reflection on further promoting a mandatory legislative (and lobbying)*

5. Recalls the importance for the CCP legislative process to count on Union statistics consistent with Article 338(2) TFEU and on impact assessments conforming to the highest standards of impartiality and reliability;

footprint throughout the legislative process, which would further legitimise it by making it more fact based and transparent for citizens and stakeholders;

Or. de

Amendment 42
Godelieve Quisthoudt-Rowohl

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

Draft opinion

5. Recalls the importance for the CCP legislative process to count on Union statistics consistent with Article 338(2) TFEU and on impact assessments conforming to the highest standards of impartiality and reliability; calls for further reflection on *further promoting a mandatory legislative (and lobbying) footprint throughout the legislative process, which would further legitimise it by making it more fact based and transparent for citizens and stakeholders;*

Amendment

5. Recalls the importance for the CCP legislative process to count on Union statistics consistent with Article 338(2) TFEU and on impact assessments conforming to the highest standards of impartiality and reliability; calls for further reflection on *how to improve the existing EU register for EU lobbyists to further enhance transparency in the legislative process;*

Or. en

Amendment 43
Emmanuel Maurel

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

Draft opinion

5. Recalls the importance for the CCP legislative process to count on Union statistics consistent with Article 338(2) TFEU and on impact assessments conforming to the highest standards of impartiality and reliability; calls for further reflection on further promoting a

Amendment

5. Recalls the importance for the CCP legislative process to count on Union statistics consistent with Article 338(2) TFEU and on impact assessments conforming to the highest standards of impartiality and reliability; *considers that sector-by-sector impact assessments would*

mandatory legislative (and lobbying) footprint throughout the legislative process, which would further legitimise it by making it more fact based and transparent for citizens and stakeholders;

provide EU trade agreements with a higher level of reliability and legitimacy; calls for further reflection on further promoting a mandatory legislative (and lobbying) footprint throughout the legislative process, which would further legitimise it by making it more fact based and transparent for citizens and stakeholders;

Or. en

Amendment 44
Klaus Buchner

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

Draft opinion

5. Recalls the importance for the CCP legislative process to count on Union statistics consistent with Article 338(2) TFEU and on impact assessments conforming to the highest standards of impartiality and reliability; calls for further reflection on further promoting a mandatory legislative (and lobbying) footprint throughout the legislative process, which would further legitimise it by making it more fact based and transparent for citizens and stakeholders;

Amendment

5. Recalls the importance for the CCP legislative process to count on Union statistics consistent with Article 338(2) TFEU and on impact assessments *and sustainability impact assessments* conforming to the highest standards of impartiality and reliability, *a principle which should lead all respective revisions in the frame of the "Better Regulation" policy of the Commission*; calls for further reflection on further promoting a mandatory legislative (and lobbying) footprint throughout the legislative process, which would further legitimise it by making it more fact based and transparent for citizens and stakeholders;

Or. en

Amendment 45
Georg Mayer, Harald Vilimsky

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

Draft opinion

5. Recalls the importance for the CCP legislative process to count on Union statistics consistent with Article 338(2) TFEU and on impact assessments conforming to the highest standards of impartiality and reliability; calls for further reflection on further promoting a mandatory legislative (and lobbying) footprint throughout the legislative process, which would further legitimise it by making it more fact based and transparent for citizens and stakeholders;

Amendment

5. Recalls the importance for the CCP legislative process to **be able to** count on Union statistics consistent with Article 338(2) TFEU and on impact assessments conforming to the highest standards of impartiality and reliability, **and calls for more to be done to provide the guarantees needed to make this possible**; calls for further reflection on further promoting a mandatory legislative (and lobbying) footprint throughout the legislative process, which would further legitimise it by making it more fact based and transparent for citizens and stakeholders;

Or. de

Amendment 46
Dita Charanzová

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

Draft opinion

5. Recalls the importance for the CCP legislative process to count on Union statistics consistent with Article 338(2) TFEU and on impact assessments conforming to the highest standards of impartiality and reliability; **calls for** further reflection on **further** promoting a mandatory legislative (**and lobbying**) footprint throughout the legislative process, **which would further legitimise it by making** it more fact based and transparent for citizens and stakeholders;

Amendment

5. Recalls the importance for the CCP legislative process to count on Union statistics consistent with Article 338(2) TFEU and on impact assessments conforming to the highest standards of impartiality and reliability; **welcomes** further reflection on promoting a mandatory legislative footprint throughout the legislative process **to make** it more fact based and transparent for citizens and stakeholders;

Or. en

Amendment 47

Franz Obermayr, Edouard Ferrand, Marine Le Pen, Matteo Salvini

Draft opinion

Paragraph 6

Draft opinion

6. Stresses that the Commission must promote the general interests of the Union, be led by members chosen on the grounds of their competence and independence, and refrain from any action incompatible with its duties (Article 17 TFEU); welcomes initiatives aimed at greater transparency, accountability and integrity, including the decisions adopted by the Commission on 25 November 2014 and the new impetus given to the Transparency Register, which should be mandatory and binding for all EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies; calls for Parliament, in this respect, to coordinate action to enhance transparency within the institutions as regards the activity of lobbies and special interest groups;

Amendment

6. Stresses that the Commission must promote the general interests of the Union, be led by members chosen on the grounds of their competence and independence, and refrain from any action incompatible with its duties (Article 17 TFEU); welcomes initiatives aimed at greater transparency, accountability and integrity, including the decisions adopted by the Commission on 25 November 2014 and the new impetus given to the Transparency Register, which should be mandatory and binding for all EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies; calls for Parliament, in this respect, to coordinate action to enhance transparency within the institutions as regards the activity of lobbies and special interest groups; ***notes that lobbies are widely consulted and listened to in all trade negotiations while no account is taken of the opinion of Member States' citizens;***

Or. fr

Amendment 48

Godelieve Quisthoudt-Rowohl

Draft opinion

Paragraph 6

Draft opinion

6. Stresses that the Commission must promote the general interests of the Union, be led by members chosen on the grounds of their competence and independence, and refrain from any action incompatible with its duties (Article 17 TFEU); welcomes

Amendment

6. Stresses that the Commission must promote the general interests of the Union, be led by members chosen on the grounds of their competence and independence, and refrain from any action incompatible with its duties (Article 17 TFEU); welcomes

initiatives aimed at greater transparency, accountability and integrity, including the decisions adopted by the Commission on 25 November 2014 and the new impetus given to the Transparency Register, ***which should be mandatory and binding for all EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies; calls for Parliament, in this respect, to coordinate action to enhance transparency within the institutions as regards the activity of lobbies and special interest groups;***

initiatives aimed at greater transparency, accountability and integrity, including the decisions adopted by the Commission on 25 November 2014 and the new impetus given to the Transparency Register, ***in order to reflect the possibility to improve the register to further enhance transparency within the institutions;***

Or. en

Amendment 49
Georg Mayer, Harald Vilimsky

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6

Draft opinion

6. Stresses that the Commission must promote the general interests of the Union, be led by members chosen on the grounds of their competence and independence, and refrain from any action incompatible with its duties (Article 17 TFEU); welcomes initiatives aimed at greater transparency, accountability and integrity, including the decisions adopted by the Commission on 25 November 2014 and the new impetus given to the Transparency Register, which should be mandatory and binding for all EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies; calls for Parliament, in this respect, to coordinate action to enhance transparency within the institutions as regards the activity of lobbies and special interest groups;

Amendment

6. Stresses that the Commission must promote the general interests of the Union, be led by members chosen on the grounds of their competence and independence, and refrain from any action incompatible with its duties (Article 17 TFEU); welcomes initiatives aimed at greater transparency, accountability and integrity, including the decisions adopted by the Commission on 25 November 2014 and the new impetus given to the Transparency Register, which should be mandatory and binding for all EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies; calls for Parliament, in this respect, to coordinate action to enhance transparency within the institutions, ***especially*** as regards the activity of lobbies and special interest groups; ***calls for all lobbies to be included and shown in the EU Transparency Register;***

Or. de

Amendment 50
Daniel Caspary

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6

Draft opinion

6. Stresses that the Commission must promote the general interests of the Union, be led by members chosen on the grounds of their competence and independence, and refrain from any action incompatible with its duties (Article 17 TFEU); welcomes initiatives aimed at greater transparency, accountability and integrity, including the decisions adopted by the Commission on 25 November 2014 and the new impetus given to the Transparency Register, which should be mandatory and binding for all EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies; calls for Parliament, in this respect, to coordinate action to enhance transparency within the institutions as regards the activity of lobbies and special interest groups;

Amendment

6. Stresses that the Commission must promote the general interests of the Union, be led by members chosen on the grounds of their competence and independence, and refrain from any action incompatible with its duties (Article 17 TFEU); welcomes initiatives aimed at greater transparency, accountability and integrity, including the decisions adopted by the Commission on 25 November 2014 and the new impetus given to the Transparency Register, which should be mandatory and binding for all EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies; calls for Parliament, in this respect, to coordinate action to enhance transparency within the institutions as regards the activity of lobbies, ***non-governmental organisations, trade unions,*** and ***other*** special interest groups;

Or. de

Amendment 51
David Borrelli

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6

Draft opinion

6. Stresses that the Commission must promote the general interests of the Union, be led by members chosen on the grounds of their competence and independence, and refrain from any action incompatible with its duties (Article 17 TFEU); welcomes initiatives aimed at greater transparency, accountability and integrity, including the decisions adopted by the Commission on 25 November 2014 and the new impetus

Amendment

6. Stresses that the Commission must promote the general interests of the Union, be led by members chosen on the grounds of their competence and independence, and refrain from any action incompatible with its duties (Article 17 TFEU); welcomes initiatives aimed at greater transparency, accountability and integrity, including the decisions adopted by the Commission on 25 November 2014 and the new impetus

given to the Transparency Register, which should be mandatory and binding for all EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies; calls for Parliament, in this respect, to coordinate action to enhance transparency within the institutions as regards the activity of *lobbies* and special interest groups;

given to the Transparency Register, which should be mandatory and binding for all EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies; calls for Parliament, in this respect, to coordinate action to enhance transparency within the institutions as regards the *direct and indirect* activity of *any kind of lobby and group of pressure* and special interest groups;

Or. en

Amendment 52
Marielle de Sarnez, Tokia Saïfi

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7

Draft opinion

7. Believes firmly that transparency, integrity and ethical behaviour, accountability and good governance should inspire and be mainstreamed into all EU administrative and political initiatives, and considers that further commitment and interinstitutional coordinated work towards higher standards of integrity should be sought;

Amendment

7. Believes firmly that transparency, integrity and ethical behaviour, accountability and good governance should inspire and be mainstreamed into all EU administrative and political initiatives, and considers that further commitment and interinstitutional coordinated work towards higher standards of integrity should be sought, *and that, for example, the Commission should not adopt guidelines which run counter to the position of Parliament and the Council;*

Or. fr

Amendment 53
Klaus Buchner

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 a (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

7a. Believes that the credibility of the EU's ethical behaviour will be ultimately judged by citizens in relation to the

consistency of the EUs political initiatives with its internal administrative standards; commends in this regard the EU internal standards on the fight against corruption and the protection of whistle-blowers and demands to protect these standards in international trade agreement negotiations on the protection of trade secrets within chapters on Intellectual Property.

Or. en

Amendment 54
Miroslav Poche

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8

Draft opinion

8. Believes that Parliament should *also* cooperate with the ECJ, the Court of Auditors, the European Ombudsman and the Commission's Anti-Fraud Office *in order to closely monitor* the evolution of CCP within the framework of their respective powers and responsibilities.

Amendment

8. Believes that Parliament should cooperate *in a more targeted manner* with the ECJ, the Court of Auditors, the European Ombudsman and the Commission's Anti-Fraud Office *so that they can report to one another in detail on* the evolution of CCP within the framework of their respective powers and responsibilities.

Or. cs