



2015/2344(INI)

9.6.2016

AMENDMENTS

1 - 86

Draft opinion
Paulo Rangel
(PE580.732v01-00)

Budgetary capacity for the Eurozone
(2015/2344(INI))

Amendment 1

Sylvie Goulard, Charles Goerens, Maite Pagazaurtundúa Ruiz

Draft opinion

Paragraph -1 (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

-1. *Recalls that, although still a young currency and despite having experienced a serious crisis over recent years, the euro is solidly established as a global reserve currency;*

Or. en

Amendment 2

Morten Messerschmidt

Draft opinion

Paragraph 1

Draft opinion

Amendment

1. Believes that the crisis enhanced the need for improvement in EU economic governance and that the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) **must be** progressively completed;

1. Believes that the crisis enhanced the need for improvement in EU economic governance – **with the proviso that this must not in any way undermine the EU's democracies** – and that **before** the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is progressively completed, **the first stage must be to revise the geography of the eurozone, which should not be allowed to extend beyond those countries that, taken together, would correspond to an optimal currency area (ZMO), this being a sine qua non for any currency to work, failing which the euro will continue to reduce flexibility, an intolerable situation in an economy open to what is in some cases unfair competition and one that would apply whatever the reforms and however many billions in financial transfers were channelled towards the southern countries, to quote the view that has long been held by many economists, including**

*the five Nobel Prize winners,
Maurice Allais, Milton Friedman,
Amartya Sen, Paul Krugman, and
Joseph Stiglitz;*

Or. fr

Amendment 3

Sylvie Goulard, Charles Goerens, Maite Pagazaurtundúa Ruiz

Draft opinion

Paragraph 1

Draft opinion

1. Believes that the crisis enhanced the need for improvement in EU economic governance and that the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) must be progressively completed;

Amendment

1. Believes, ***however***, that the crisis enhanced the need for improvement in EU economic governance and that the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) must be progressively completed; ***considers that public confidence will only be rebuilt through the development of a progressive and comprehensive roadmap; calls for this roadmap to be urgently established;***

Or. en

Amendment 4

Daciana Octavia Sârbu, Cătălin Sorin Ivan

Draft opinion

Paragraph 1

Draft opinion

1. Believes that the crisis enhanced the need for improvement in EU economic governance and that the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) must be progressively completed;

Amendment

1. Believes that the crisis enhanced the need for improvement in EU economic governance and that the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) must be progressively completed, ***while the European treaties have not provided the instruments necessary to tackle shocks in the eurozone;***

Amendment 5

Morten Messerschmidt, Kazimierz Michał Ujazdowski

Draft opinion

Paragraph 1

Draft opinion

1. Believes that the crisis enhanced the need for improvement in EU economic governance and that the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) ***must be progressively completed;***

Amendment

1. Believes that the crisis enhanced the need for improvement in EU economic governance and that ***national parliaments must play an important role to ensure legitimacy, and accountability in*** the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU);

Or. en

Amendment 6

Esteban González Pons

Draft opinion

Paragraph 1

Draft opinion

1. Believes that the crisis enhanced the need for improvement in EU economic governance and that the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) must be progressively completed;

Amendment

1. Believes that the crisis enhanced the need for improvement in EU economic governance and that the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) must be progressively completed, ***following a clear and predictable roadmap;***

Or. es

Amendment 7

Ivan Jakovčić

Draft opinion

Paragraph 1

Draft opinion

1. Believes that the crisis enhanced the need for improvement in EU economic governance and that the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) must be progressively completed;

Amendment

1. Believes that the crisis enhanced the need for improvement in *coordinated* EU economic governance and that the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) must be progressively, *but fully*, completed;

Or. hr

Amendment 8
Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

Draft opinion

1. Believes that the crisis *enhanced the need for improvement* in EU economic governance and that the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) must be *progressively completed*;

Amendment

1. Believes that the crisis *has demonstrated the failure of* EU economic governance *as projected* and that the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) must be *extensively reviewed and improved*;

Or. it

Amendment 9
Notis Marias

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

Draft opinion

1. Believes that the crisis enhanced the need for *improvement in EU* economic governance *and that the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) must be progressively completed*;

Amendment

1. Believes that the crisis enhanced the need for *a change in* EU economic governance *so to boost growth and employment within the EU Member States*;

Or. el

Amendment 10
Gerolf Annemans

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

Draft opinion

1. Believes that the *crisis enhanced the need for improvement in EU economic governance and that the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) must be progressively completed;*

Amendment

1. Believes that the *euro crisis has shown that the EMU is not functioning, and calls, to that end, for the current Monetary Union not to be continued or supposedly completed;*

Or. nl

Amendment 11
Sylvie Goulard, Charles Goerens, Maite Pagazaurtundúa Ruiz

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

1a. Recalls that 26 Member States are committed to joining the euro area and that in the Treaties the euro is recognised as the currency of the economic and monetary union (article 3(4) TEU); underlines that this single currency is the reason for the current single institutional framework which means that all MEPs, Commissioners and European judges participate fully in decisions concerning the euro area;

Or. en

Amendment 12
Gerolf Annemans

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

1a. Notes that already existing supranational components of the EMU, such as the Stability and Growth Pact, have not encouraged greater convergence between the eurozone Member States;

Or. nl

Amendment 13
Helmut Scholz

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

Draft opinion

2. ***Considers*** that the establishment of a budgetary capacity within the eurozone is necessary to ***complete*** the EMU and that it is recommendable to create a budgetary capacity, albeit limited, under the current Treaty framework;

Amendment

2. ***Notes*** that the establishment of a budgetary capacity within the eurozone is ***regarded as*** necessary ***so as to protect*** the ***existing*** EMU ***crisis regime against economic shocks in the longer term, by making it mandatory for all eurozone members, regardless of whether or not a country is in economic crisis***, and that it is recommendable to create a budgetary capacity, albeit limited, under the current Treaty framework;

Or. de

Amendment 14
Mercedes Bresso

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

Draft opinion

2. Considers that the establishment of a budgetary capacity within the ***eurozone***

Amendment

2. Considers that the establishment of a budgetary capacity within the ***euro area***

is necessary to complete the EMU and that it is recommendable to create a budgetary capacity, albeit limited, under the current Treaty framework;

is a necessary *milestone* to complete the EMU, *coherently with the McDougall and the Delors reports* and that it is *highly* recommendable *and feasible* to create a budgetary capacity, albeit limited, under the current Treaty framework, *notably through articles 136, 175, and 352 TFEU*

Or. en

Amendment 15 **Esteban González Pons**

Draft opinion **Paragraph 2**

Draft opinion

2. Considers that the establishment of a budgetary capacity within the eurozone is necessary to complete the EMU *and that it is recommendable to create a budgetary capacity, albeit limited, under the current Treaty framework*;

Amendment

2. Considers that the establishment of a budgetary capacity within the eurozone is necessary to complete the EMU, *within the framework of the Treaties and with the aim of promoting the eurozone's economic and social convergence and sustainable structural reforms, enhancing the eurozone's competitiveness and resilience and absorbing asymmetric shocks*;

Or. es

Amendment 16 **Fabio Massimo Castaldo**

Draft opinion **Paragraph 2**

Draft opinion

2. Considers that the establishment of a budgetary capacity within the eurozone *is necessary to complete the EMU and that it is recommendable to create a budgetary capacity, albeit limited, under the current Treaty framework*;

Amendment

2. Considers that the establishment of a budgetary capacity within the eurozone *would be detrimental to the harmonious development of the EU, given that it would confirm a significant gap between countries that have adopted the single*

currency and those that have kept their own currencies, leading to the emergence of a 'two-speed' Europe;

Or. it

Amendment 17
Jo Leinen

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

Draft opinion

2. Considers that the establishment of a budgetary capacity within the eurozone is necessary to complete the EMU and that it is recommendable to create a budgetary capacity, albeit limited, under the current Treaty framework;

Amendment

2. Considers that the establishment of a budgetary capacity within the eurozone is necessary to complete the EMU and that it is recommendable to create a budgetary capacity, albeit limited, under the current Treaty framework *as a stopgap measure until such time as an enhanced legal basis is established through reform of the Treaties;*

Or. de

Amendment 18
Pascal Durand
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

Draft opinion

2. Considers that the establishment of a budgetary capacity within the eurozone is *necessary to complete the EMU and that it is recommendable to create a budgetary capacity, albeit limited, under the current Treaty framework;*

Amendment

2. Considers that the establishment of a budgetary capacity within the eurozone, *under the current Treaty framework, is a sine qua non for remedying the serious shortcomings that have had mutually reinforcing effects and exacerbated the overall fragility of the eurozone and, in particular, for dealing with asymmetric shocks;*

Or. fr

Amendment 19
Morten Messerschmidt

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

Draft opinion

2. Considers that the establishment of a budgetary capacity within the eurozone is *necessary to complete the EMU and that it is recommendable to create a budgetary capacity, albeit limited, under the current Treaty framework;*

Amendment

2. Considers that the establishment of a budgetary capacity within the eurozone is *unacceptable for the EU and will provoke controversies and divisions between Member States; believes that EU has sufficient tools like ESM for financial emergency intervention to perform stabilization function;*

Or. en

Amendment 20
Morten Messerschmidt

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

Draft opinion

2. Considers that the establishment of a budgetary capacity within the eurozone is necessary to complete the EMU and that it is recommendable to create a budgetary capacity, albeit limited, under the current Treaty framework;

Amendment

2. Considers that the establishment of a budgetary capacity within the *new* eurozone, *comprising the optimal currency area (ZMO) only*, is necessary to complete the EMU and that it is recommendable to create a budgetary capacity, albeit limited, under the current Treaty framework;

Or. fr

Amendment 21
Notis Marias

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

Draft opinion

2. Considers that the *establishment* of a budgetary capacity within the eurozone *is necessary to complete the EMU and that it is recommendable to create a budgetary capacity*, albeit limited, under the current Treaty framework;

Amendment

2. Considers that the *existence* of a budgetary capacity within the eurozone albeit limited *is needed*, under the current Treaty framework;

Or. el

Amendment 22
Gerolf Annemans

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

Draft opinion

2. *Considers* that the *establishment* of a budgetary capacity *within the eurozone is necessary to complete the EMU and that it is recommendable to create a budgetary capacity, albeit limited, under the current Treaty framework*;

Amendment

2. *Notes* that the *idea* of a *single* budgetary capacity *is contrary to the Treaties and points out that, in 2012, the previous President of the European Commission, Mr Barroso, stated that a fiscal capacity for the EMU could not can be achieved without detailed treaty adjustments*;

Or. nl

Amendment 23
Mercedes Bresso

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 a (new)

Draft opinion

2a. *Recalls that the asymmetry of the EMU, with the Monetary Union not coupled with an Economic Union is one of the main structural reasons for the euro area's slow recovery after the 2008 crisis*;

Amendment

Amendment 24
Mercedes Bresso

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 b (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

2b. *Expresses its worry that postponing crucial necessary decisions to better times is creating the condition for extremism rise, thus making those decisions even more difficult in the future;*

Or. en

Amendment 25
Sylvie Goulard, Charles Goerens, Maite Pagazaurtundúa Ruiz

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

Draft opinion

Amendment

3. Takes note of different proposals for this purpose, with different designs and assigning different functions;

3. Takes note of different proposals for this purpose, with different designs and assigning different functions; ***points out that some options are possible under the current Treaties, whereas others would require Treaty change; stresses the importance of examining this issue from a holistic perspective - a budgetary capacity of the euro area is a tool which can complement others, notably a greater focus on convergence, or the completion of the Single Market, in order to reinforce both the euro area and the European Union - as an isolated measure it cannot be a panacea;***

Or. en

Amendment 26
Helmut Scholz

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

Draft opinion

3. Takes note of different proposals *for this purpose*, with different designs and assigning different functions;

Amendment

3. Takes note of *the* different proposals, with different designs and assigning different functions, *all of which involve, however, a central component for coordinating and monitoring 'fiscal discipline' and 'fiscal risk-sharing' in the eurozone*;

Or. de

Amendment 27
Gerolf Annemans

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

Draft opinion

3. *Takes note of different proposals for this purpose, with different designs and assigning different functions*;

Amendment

3. *Strongly opposes the idea of a single fiscal capacity for the EMU, since this would further erode the powers of the Member States and amount to debt mutualisation*;

Or. nl

Amendment 28
Gerolf Annemans

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

Draft opinion

3. *Takes note of different proposals*

Amendment

3. *Warns that the idea of a single*

for this purpose, with different designs and assigning different functions;

fiscal capacity is an infringement of no bail-out clause (Art. 125 TEU);

Or. nl

Amendment 29
Gerolf Annemans

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

Draft opinion

3. *Takes note of different proposals for this purpose, with different designs and assigning different functions;*

Amendment

3. *Opposes firmly any further extension of supranational budgetary policy;*

Or. nl

Amendment 30
Notis Marias

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

Draft opinion

3. Takes note of different proposals *for this purpose*, with different designs and assigning different functions;

Amendment

3. Takes note of different proposals with different designs and assigning different functions;

Or. el

Amendment 31
Helmut Scholz

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 a (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

3a. *Reiterates that the approaches taken to date to bring eurozone countries'*

economic cycles more into line with each other and reduce macroeconomic imbalances, inter alia through welfare cuts, more flexible labour markets, public-infrastructure cuts and other so-called structural reforms, have failed to a large degree to meet their targets, have been counter-productive to some extent and, as a result, have plunged the economies concerned into a deep recession;

Or. de

Amendment 32
Mercedes Bresso

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 a (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

3a. Recalls its permanent call for the insertion of the European Stability Mechanism within the EU legal framework and requests it to be done as soon as possible; recommends its transformation into a European Monetary Fund, acting as a specific shock-absorption instrument within the Eurozone budgetary capacity, which could thus reach about the dimension indicated by the MacDougall and Delors Reports as necessary to sustain the Economic and Monetary Union;

Or. en

Amendment 33
Jo Leinen

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 a (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

3a. *Points out in this connection that a European unemployment insurance scheme, which would complement rather than replace national unemployment insurance systems, could help cushion asymmetric economic shocks, increase labour market convergence, strengthen EMU's social pillars, and establish a direct link between the EU level and European citizens;*

Or. de

Amendment 34
Paulo Rangel

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 a (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

3a. *Points out that a budgetary capacity aiming to provide conditional incentives for structural reforms can be established on the basis of the current Treaties, if need be through enhanced cooperation;*

Or. en

Amendment 35
Helmut Scholz

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 b (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

3b. *Underlines the fact that real convergence between eurozone members, which is necessary, is possible, in particular through strengthened social*

cohesion brought about by bringing differing standards of living more into line with each other in the medium term and expanding social welfare systems; reaffirms that that requires public investment and stronger domestic demand across the board; in this connection, regards the proposed budgetary capacity as one of a variety of possible tools for funding such investment;

Or. de

Amendment 36
Paulo Rangel

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 b (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

3b. Points out that if a budgetary capacity would aim to provide support for adjustment to asymmetric or symmetric shocks, mechanisms to strengthen economic integration and convergence will need to develop from decentralized national fiscal policies towards further sovereignty sharing within common institutions, with increased democratic control at EU level, implying also a general use of the ordinary legislative procedure where this is not yet the case;

Or. en

Amendment 37
Paulo Rangel

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 c (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

3c. Considers furthermore that in

such case the integration of the ESM in the EU legal framework is recommendable and that consideration must be given to the establishment of a Treasury within the Commission to manage and supervise the common resources and policies related to them;

Or. en

Amendment 38

Sylvie Goulard, Charles Goerens, Maite Pagazaurtundúa Ruiz

Draft opinion

Paragraph 4

Draft opinion

Amendment

4. *Recalls that such capacity should be part of the EU budget as laid down in Article 310(1) TFEU and should comply with the provisions of Articles 310(4) and 312(1) TFEU;*

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 39

Pascal Durand

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Draft opinion

Paragraph 4

Draft opinion

Amendment

4. Recalls that such capacity should be part of the EU budget *as laid down in Article 310(1) TFEU and should comply with the provisions of Articles 310(4) and 312(1) TFEU;*

4. Recalls that such capacity should be part of the EU budget, *outside the ceilings of the multiannual financial framework (MFF);*

Or. fr

Amendment 40
Mercedes Bresso

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

Draft opinion

4. Recalls that such capacity should be part of the EU budget as laid down in Article 310(1) TFEU and should comply with the provisions of Articles 310(4) and 312(1) TFEU;

Amendment

4. Recalls that such capacity should be part of the EU budget as laid down in Article 310(1) TFEU and should comply with the provisions of Articles 310(4) and 312(1) TFEU, ***but outside the Multi-Annual Financial Framework***;

Or. en

Amendment 41
Esteban González Pons

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

Draft opinion

4. Recalls that such capacity should be part of the EU budget as laid down in Article 310(1) TFEU and should comply with the provisions of Articles 310(4) and 312(1) TFEU;

Amendment

4. Recalls that such capacity should be part of the EU budget ***and be financed through own resources*** as laid down in Article 310(1) TFEU and should comply with the provisions of Articles 310(4) and 312(1) TFEU;

Or. es

Amendment 42
Morten Messerschmidt, Kazimierz Michał Ujazdowski

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

Draft opinion

4. Recalls that ***such capacity*** should be part of the EU budget as laid down in Article 310(1) TFEU and should comply

Amendment

4. Recalls that ***any stabilization mechanism*** should be part of the EU budget as laid down in Article 310 (1)

with the provisions of Articles 310(4) and 312(1) TFEU;

TFEU and should comply with the provisions of Articles 310(4) and 312(1) TFEU;

Or. en

Amendment 43

Notis Marias

Draft opinion

Paragraph 4

Draft opinion

4. ***Recalls*** that such capacity should be part of the EU budget as laid down in Article 310(1) TFEU and should comply with the provisions of Articles 310(4) and 312(1) TFEU;

Amendment

4. ***Notes*** that such capacity should be part of the EU budget as laid down in Article 310(1) TFEU and should comply with the provisions of Articles 310(4) and 312(1) TFEU;

Or. el

Amendment 44

Morten Messerschmidt

Draft opinion

Paragraph 4 a (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

4a. Recognises the need to avoid imposing an even heavier tax burden on taxpayers and hence that 1) no European tax should be created and 2) European budget expenditure should be subject to a ceiling not exceeding 1% of GDP; 3) calls on the Commission and the Council to propose a reform aimed at rationalising the European budget, not least with a view to stamping out everything conducive to fraud, disorder, cronyism, and propaganda, cutting the Structural Funds, and complying more exactly with the recommendations in the annual reports of the Court of Auditors, which

have been very critical in the last 20 years;

Or. fr

Amendment 45
Jo Leinen

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 a (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

4a. *Takes the view that budgetary capacity should be funded as far as possible through own resources instead of from Member State contributions; calls in this connection for Article 33.1(a) of the Statute of the European Central Bank (ECB) to be amended with a view to using the ECB's annual profit as EU own resources for the EU budget;*

Or. de

Amendment 46
Morten Messerschmidt

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

Draft opinion

Amendment

5. Points out that, pursuant to Article 311 TFEU, it is possible to **raise** the own resources **ceilings**, to establish new categories of own resources (**even if** only from a limited number of Member States) and to assign certain revenue to finance specific items of expenditure, as provided for in Article 21 of the Financial Rules¹;

5. Points out that, pursuant to Article 311 TFEU, it is possible, **under a special legislative procedure requiring the Council to act unanimously and Member States to give their approval in accordance with their constitutional rules**, to **lay down ‘the provisions relating to the system of own resources’**, to establish new categories of own resources (**there is nothing in the above article to prevent these from coming** only from a limited number of Member States, **subject to an**

objective criterion), to abolish an existing category, and to assign certain revenue to finance specific items of expenditure, as provided for in Article 21 of the Financial Rules¹; considers that it would be desirable to do away with VAT-based resources, as this system is too complex, and rely instead on a single annual national contribution based on a percentage of GNI;

¹ Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002.

¹ Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002.

Or. fr

Amendment 47

Sylvie Goulard, Charles Goerens, Maite Pagazaurtundúa Ruiz

Draft opinion

Paragraph 5

Draft opinion

5. Points out that, pursuant to Article 311 TFEU, it is possible to raise the own resources ceilings, to establish new categories of own resources (even if only from a limited number of Member States) and to assign certain revenue to finance specific items of expenditure, as provided for in Article 21 of the Financial Rules¹ ;

¹ Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the

Amendment

5. Points out that, pursuant to Article 311 TFEU, it is possible to raise the own resources ceilings, to establish new categories of own resources (even if only from a limited number of Member States) and to assign certain revenue to finance specific items of expenditure, as provided for in Article 21 of the Financial Rules¹ ; ***believes that the best option would be to generate own resources specifically linked to the euro area, in order to avoiding mixing the budget of the EU 28 and the budget of the euro area, which each have different goals;***

¹ Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the

Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002.

Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002.

Or. en

Amendment 48

Morten Messerschmidt, Kazimierz Michał Ujazdowski

Draft opinion

Paragraph 5

Draft opinion

5. Points out that, pursuant to Article 311 TFEU, it is possible to raise the own resources ceilings, to establish new categories of own resources (*even if only from a limited number of Member States*) and to assign certain revenue to finance specific items of expenditure, as provided for in Article 21 of the Financial Rules¹ ;

¹ Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002.

Amendment

5. Points out that, pursuant to Article 311 TFEU, it is possible to raise the own resources ceilings, to establish new categories of own resources and to assign certain revenue to finance specific items of expenditure, as provided for in Article 21 of the Financial Rules¹ ; ***The decision shall not enter into force until it is approved by the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements;***

¹ Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002.

Or. en

Amendment 49

Jo Leinen

Draft opinion

Paragraph 5

Draft opinion

5. Points out that, pursuant to Article 311 TFEU, it is possible to raise the own resources ceilings, *to* establish new categories of own resources (*even if only from a limited number of Member States*) and to assign certain revenue to finance specific items of expenditure, *as provided for in Article 21 of the Financial Rules*¹;

¹ Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002.

Amendment

5. Points out that, pursuant to Article 311 TFEU, it is possible to raise the own resources ceilings *and* establish new categories of own resources; *notes that making use of the possibility, under Article 21 of the Financial Regulation, of assigning certain revenues from some Member States in order to fund* specific items of expenditure *does not breach the principle of budget universality*;

¹ Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002.

Or. de

Amendment 50
Notis Marias

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

Draft opinion

5. Points out that, pursuant to Article 311 TFEU, it is possible to raise the own resources ceilings, to establish new categories of own resources (*even if only from a limited number of Member States*) and to assign certain revenue to finance specific items of expenditure, as provided for in Article 21 of the Financial Rules¹;

¹ Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council

Amendment

5. Points out that, pursuant to Article 311 TFEU, it is possible to raise the own resources ceilings, to establish new categories of own resources and to assign certain revenue to finance specific items of expenditure, as provided for in Article 21 of the Financial Rules¹;

¹ Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council

Amendment 51
Helmut Scholz

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

Draft opinion

5. Points out that, pursuant to Article 311 TFEU, it is possible to raise the own resources ceilings, to establish new categories of own resources (even if only from a limited number of Member States) and to assign certain revenue to finance specific items of expenditure, as provided for in Article 21 of the Financial Rules¹;

¹ Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002.

Amendment

5. Points out that, pursuant to Article 311 TFEU, it is possible ***and necessary*** to raise the own resources ceilings, to establish new categories of own resources (even if only from a limited number of Member States) and to assign certain revenue to finance specific items of expenditure, as provided for in Article 21 of the Financial Rules¹;

¹ Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002.

Amendment 52
Danuta Maria Hübner

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 a (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

5a. Notes that articles 121(6) and 136 TFEU would provide the appropriate legal basis for a mechanism the scope of which would cover the euro area and which would aim to provide financial

incentives to structural reforms and to national policies fostering EU-wide economic convergence if the objectives of such a mechanism do not go beyond what is needed to achieve the proper implementation of the multilateral surveillance procedure set out in article 121 TFEU while, should the objectives of the fiscal capacity be broader and more ambitious, it would be necessary to make use of the so-called "flexibility provision" of article 352 TFEU;

Or. en

Amendment 53
Morten Messerschmidt, Kazimierz Michał Ujazdowski

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6

Draft opinion

6. Underlines that the EU budget also offers guarantees for specific lending operations and that several instruments, such as the EFSM and the EGF, allow for funds to be mobilised over and above the MFF expenditure ceilings;

Amendment

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 54
Morten Messerschmidt

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6

Draft opinion

6. Underlines that the EU budget also offers guarantees for specific lending operations and that several instruments, such as the EFSM and the EGF, allow for funds to be mobilised over and above the

Amendment

6. Underlines that the EU budget also offers guarantees for specific lending operations, *which in principle, however, should not be used to finance the EU budget*, and that several instruments, such

MFF expenditure ceilings;

as the EFSM and the EGF, allow for funds to be mobilised over and above the MFF expenditure ceilings;

Or. fr

Amendment 55

Notis Marias

Draft opinion

Paragraph 6

Draft opinion

6. Underlines that the EU budget *also* offers guarantees for specific lending operations *and that* several instruments, such as the EFSM and the EGF, allow for funds to be mobilised over and above the MFF expenditure ceilings;

Amendment

6. Underlines that, *while* the EU budget offers *sufficient* guarantees for specific lending operations, several instruments, such as the EFSM and the EGF, allow for funds to be mobilised over and above the MFF expenditure ceilings;

Or. el

Amendment 56

Mercedes Bresso

Draft opinion

Paragraph 6

Draft opinion

6. Underlines that the EU budget also offers guarantees for specific lending operations and that several instruments, such as the EFSM *and the EGF*, allow for funds to be mobilised over and above the MFF expenditure ceilings;

Amendment

6. Underlines that the EU budget also offers guarantees for specific lending operations and that several instruments, such as the EFSM, allow for funds to be mobilised over and above the MFF expenditure ceilings;

Or. en

Amendment 57

Esteban González Pons

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 a (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

6a. *Considers it necessary to integrate the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) into the EU's legal framework and to consider developing it into a Community mechanism as repeatedly called for by the European Parliament, and as the ESM treaty itself provides; considers that this would make it possible to endow the mechanism with democratic accountability and greater legitimacy, fostering the EMU's institutional consolidation;*

Or. es

Amendment 58
Helmut Scholz

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 a (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

6a. *Calls on the Commission to submit specific information to Parliament as to what extent it is intended to make available EU budget funds for a budgetary capacity, and in what form, and what consequences that will have for the current and prospective structure of the budget and for the development, as is necessary, of new EU own resources;*

Or. de

Amendment 59
Danuta Maria Hübner

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 a (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

6a. *Calls for a swift inclusion of the substance of the Treaty Establishing the ESM into the EU legal framework;*

Or. en

Amendment 60
Morten Messerschmidt

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7

Draft opinion

7. Reiterates the need for democratic legitimacy and accountability, implying the adoption of the community method, namely with the involvement of Parliament in the shaping, implementation and oversight of a budgetary capacity;

Amendment

7. Reiterates the need for democratic legitimacy and accountability, implying the adoption of the community method, namely with the involvement of Parliament in the shaping, implementation and oversight of a budgetary capacity, ***dovetailing with, and without encroaching on, the prerogatives of the national parliaments; also points out that the own resources system is a hybrid system: some revenue – traditional own resources – is of a fiscal nature, since it results from the fact that the EU has and exercises a genuine power to levy taxes directly on the taxpayers concerned, but the bulk is generated by automatic sharing of national budget resources, followed by automatic transfer of the proportion due to the EU, which is index-linked to macroeconomic statistical aggregates;***

Or. fr

Amendment 61
Pascal Durand
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7

Draft opinion

7. Reiterates the need for democratic legitimacy and accountability, implying the ***adoption*** of the ***community method***, ***namely with the involvement of Parliament in the shaping***, implementation and oversight of a budgetary capacity;

Amendment

7. Reiterates the need for democratic legitimacy and accountability, implying the ***use*** of the ***ordinary legislative procedure***, ***as set out in Article 289 TFEU***, for the implementation and oversight of a budgetary capacity; ***also suggests that the Commission Vice-President responsible for the euro should head the Eurogroup and be given wide-ranging powers over Economic and Monetary Union***;

Or. fr

Amendment 62
Jo Leinen

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7

Draft opinion

7. Reiterates the need for democratic legitimacy and accountability, ***implying the adoption of*** the community method, ***namely with the involvement of Parliament in the shaping***, implementation and oversight of a budgetary capacity;

Amendment

7. Reiterates the need for democratic legitimacy and accountability, ***which can be ensured by adopting*** the community method; ***points up the key position of the European Parliament, as one arm of the budgetary authority***, in the shaping, implementation and oversight of a budgetary capacity;

Or. de

Amendment 63
Morten Messerschmidt, Kazimierz Michał Ujazdowski

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7

Draft opinion

7. Reiterates the need for democratic

Amendment

7. Reiterates the need for democratic

legitimacy and accountability, implying the *adoption of the community method, namely* with the involvement of Parliament in the shaping, implementation and oversight of *a budgetary capacity*;

legitimacy and accountability, implying the *principles of subsidiarity and proportionality* with the involvement of *national parliaments and the European Parliament* in the shaping, implementation and oversight of *the EU budget*;

Or. en

Amendment 64
Mercedes Bresso

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7

Draft opinion

7. Reiterates the need for democratic legitimacy and accountability, implying the *adoption of the community method, namely with the involvement of Parliament in the shaping, implementation and oversight of a budgetary capacity*;

Amendment

7. Reiterates the need for democratic legitimacy, *clarity* and accountability, implying the *creation of a Euro area Treasury Minister, acting also as Vice President of the Commission and President of the Eurogroup, and the adoption of the community method*,

Or. en

Amendment 65
Notis Marias

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7

Draft opinion

7. Reiterates the need for democratic legitimacy and accountability, implying the adoption of the community method, namely with the involvement of Parliament in the shaping, implementation and oversight of a budgetary capacity;

Amendment

7. Reiterates the need for democratic legitimacy and accountability, implying the adoption of the community method, namely with the *mandatory* involvement of Parliament in the shaping, implementation and oversight of a budgetary capacity;

Or. el

Amendment 66
Mercedes Bresso

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 a (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

7a. Stresses that democratic legitimacy requires the full involvement of the Parliament in the shaping, implementation and oversight of a euro area budgetary capacity;

Or. en

Amendment 67
Mercedes Bresso, Roberto Gualtieri

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 b (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

7b. Recalls that the European Parliament is the Parliament of the Economic and Monetary Union. Considers that the establishment of a fully-fledged euro area fiscal capacity and its incorporation into the treaties shall require, without prejudice to Article 14(2) TEU and notwithstanding Article 231 TFEU, specific provisions in order to limit the corresponding budgetary prerogatives to Members elected in euro area and participating Member States constituencies.

Or. en

Amendment 68
Morten Messerschmidt

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8

Draft opinion

8. Recalls that the protocols on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and on the role of national parliaments offer ample opportunities for national parliaments' involvement in this respect;

Amendment

8. Recalls that the protocols on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and on the role of national parliaments offer ample opportunities for national parliaments' involvement in this respect; ***points out that it is profoundly anxious to preserve the eminent budgetary prerogative of the national parliaments of the countries from which so-called own resources originate and that it is committed to the fundamental democratic principle of 'no taxation without representation', which should not be gradually yoked together with, let alone replaced by, the principle of 'no representation without taxation'; warns against the real danger that the EU might move in the two unwelcome directions referred to above;***

Or. fr

Amendment 69

Sylvie Goulard, Charles Goerens, Maite Pagazaurtundúa Ruiz

**Draft opinion
Paragraph 8**

Draft opinion

8. Recalls that the protocols on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and on the role of national parliaments offer ample opportunities for national parliaments' involvement in this respect;

Amendment

8. Recalls that the protocols on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and on the role of national parliaments offer ample opportunities for national parliaments' involvement in this respect; ***states that responsibilities must be assigned at the level where decisions are taken or implemented, with national parliaments scrutinising national governments and the European Parliament scrutinising the European executives; believes that this is the only way to ensure the required increased accountability of decision-making;***

Amendment 70
Mercedes Bresso

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8

Draft opinion

8. Recalls that the protocols on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and on the role of national parliaments offer ample opportunities for national parliaments' involvement in this respect;

Amendment

8. Recalls that the protocols on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and on the role of national parliaments offer ample opportunities for national parliaments' involvement in this respect; ***also exploiting all the potentiality of the instruments provided by art. 13 of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union and by title II of protocol 1;***

Amendment 71
Morten Messerschmidt, Kazimierz Michał Ujazdowski

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8

Draft opinion

8. ***Recalls*** that the protocols on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and on the role of national parliaments ***offer ample opportunities for national parliaments' involvement in this respect;***

Amendment

8. ***Insists*** that the protocols on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and on the role of national parliaments ***empower national parliaments to be involved in coordination and scrutinising of the EU economic policy;***

Amendment 72
Gerolf Annemans

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8

Draft opinion

8. *Recalls that the protocols on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and on the role of national parliaments offer ample opportunities for national parliaments' involvement in this respect;*

Amendment

8. *Notes that the idea of a single budgetary capacity would necessitate an additional federalist or tax structure and regards this as contrary to every principle of subsidiarity;*

Or. nl

Amendment 73
Notis Marias

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8

Draft opinion

8. Recalls that the protocols on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and on the role of national parliaments offer **ample** opportunities for national parliaments' involvement in this respect;

Amendment

8. Recalls that the protocols on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and on the role of national parliaments offer opportunities for national parliaments' involvement in this respect;

Or. el

Amendment 74
Sylvie Goulard, Charles Goerens, Maite Pagazaurtundúa Ruiz

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8 a (new)

Draft opinion

8a. Stresses that using own resources specifically linked to the euro area would ensure the necessary clarity, transparency and democratic legitimacy concerning

Amendment

control and accountability, as these resources would be generated and controlled at the European level;

Or. en

Amendment 75
Esteban González Pons

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8 a (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

8a. *Calls for the European Parliament and national parliaments to be given a stronger role in the new economic governance framework in order to strengthen democratic accountability;*

Or. es

Amendment 76
Morten Messerschmidt

Draft opinion
Paragraph 9

Draft opinion

Amendment

9. *Believes that non-eurozone Member States should be involved, if they so desire, although in a differentiated way and depending on the design of the budgetary capacity.*

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 77
Daciana Octavia Sârbu, Cătălin Sorin Ivan

Draft opinion
Paragraph 9

Draft opinion

9. Believes that non-eurozone Member States should be involved, if they so desire, although in a differentiated way and depending on the design of the budgetary capacity.

Amendment

9. Believes that non-eurozone Member States, ***both those with an opt-out and those wishing to join***, should be involved, if they so desire, although in a differentiated way and depending on the design of the budgetary capacity.

Or. ro

Amendment 78

Notis Marias

Draft opinion

Paragraph 9

Draft opinion

9. Believes that non-eurozone Member States should be involved, if they so desire, although in a differentiated way and depending on the design of the budgetary capacity.

Amendment

9. Believes that non-eurozone Member States should be involved, if they so desire, although in a differentiated way and depending on the design of the budgetary capacity, ***subject to retention of their national sovereignty***.

Or. el

Amendment 79

Sylvie Goulard, Charles Goerens, Maite Pagazaurtundúa Ruiz

Draft opinion

Paragraph 9

Draft opinion

9. Believes that non-eurozone Member States should be involved, if they so desire, although in a differentiated way and depending on the design of the budgetary capacity.

Amendment

9. Believes that non-eurozone Member States should be involved, if they so desire, although in a differentiated way, ***and with no decision-making capacity***, and depending on the design of the budgetary capacity;

Or. en

Amendment 80
Mercedes Bresso

Draft opinion
Paragraph 9

Draft opinion

9. Believes that *non-eurozone* Member States should be involved, if they so desire, although in a differentiated way and depending on the design of the budgetary capacity.

Amendment

9. Believes that *non-euro area* Member States should be involved, if they so desire, although in a differentiated way and depending on the design of the budgetary capacity.

Or. en

Amendment 81
Morten Messerschmidt, Kazimierz Michał Ujazdowski

Draft opinion
Paragraph 9 – subparagraph 1 (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

Emphasises that EU Member States' economies are linked and believes that all Member States should be involved, to ensure the long-term economic sustainability of the eurozone.

Or. en

Amendment 82
Sylvie Goulard, Charles Goerens, Maite Pagazaurtundúa Ruiz

Draft opinion
Paragraph 9 a (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

9a. Considers it essential to differentiate between discussion concerning policies for the euro area and related decision making; modalities must be found to allow all Member State who

are committed to joining the euro area to participate in discussions concerning the euro area, if they so wish, however only Member States who are members of the euro area and contribute to rescue funds and the budgetary capacity should be able to vote on these decisions;

Or. en

Amendment 83
Esteban González Pons

Draft opinion
Paragraph 9 a (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

9a. Takes the view that, as the process of building a genuine EMU advances, it is becoming increasingly necessary to create a eurozone treasury for collective decision-making, supervision and management of the budgetary capacity of the eurozone;

Or. es

Amendment 84
Sylvie Goulard, Charles Goerens, Maite Pagazaurtundúa Ruiz

Draft opinion
Paragraph 9 b (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

9b. Considers that, in parallel to the euro area decision-making body within the European Parliament, it will also be essential to foresee an equivalent decision-making structure within the Council of Ministers; suggests that the Euro Group could be the appropriate formation, with its accountability improved;

Amendment 85

Sylvie Goulard, Charles Goerens, Maite Pagazaurtundúa Ruiz

Draft opinion

Paragraph 9 c (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

9c. Believes that a clearly defined role for the European Court of Justice will be crucial in order to guarantee fairness and efficiency in the implementation of the new framework;

Or. en

Amendment 86

Sylvie Goulard, Charles Goerens

Draft opinion

Paragraph 9 d (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

9d. Underlines that improvements of the euro area can already be implemented under the current Treaties; considers, however, that Treaty revision or an ad-hoc euro area Treaty should not be excluded; recalls that recourse to an intergovernmental agreement was the option chosen for the UK settlement; considers that the current single institutional framework is no longer justified; considers that any evolution would need to respect the "Community" framework and its spirit, for example maintaining the existing institutions but modifying their structure to reflect the new reality rather than creating new ones, as much as possible;

Or. en

