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*Temporary Committee on the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transportation and illegal detention of prisoners*

PROVISIONAL  
**2006/2200(INI)**

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## **DRAFT REPORT**

on the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transportation and illegal detention of prisoners  
(2006/2200(INI))

Temporary Committee on the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transportation and illegal detention of prisoners

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## MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

### **on the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transportation and illegal detention of prisoners (2006/2200(INI))**

*The European Parliament,*

- having regard to its resolution of 15 December 2005 on the presumed use of European countries for the transportation and illegal detention of prisoners by the CIA<sup>1</sup>,
  - having regard to its decision of 18 January 2006 setting up a Temporary Committee on the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transportation and illegal detention of prisoners<sup>2</sup>,
  - having regard to its resolution of 6 July 2006 on the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transportation and illegal detention of prisoners, adopted midway through the work of the Temporary Committee<sup>3</sup>,
  - having regard to the delegations which its Temporary Committee sent to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, Romania, Poland and Portugal,
  - having regard to the hearings, numbering no fewer than 130, held by its Temporary Committee in the course of its meetings, delegation missions and confidential interviews,
  - having regard to all the written contributions received by its Temporary Committee or to which it has had access, particularly the confidential documents forwarded to it (in particular by the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (Eurocontrol) and the German Government) or which it has obtained from various sources,
  - having regard to Rule 175 of its Rules of Procedure,
  - having regard to the report of the Temporary Committee on the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transportation and illegal detention of prisoners (A6-0000/2006),
- A. whereas, in its resolution of 6 July 2006, the European Parliament decided that 'the Temporary Committee will continue its work for the remainder of its established twelve-month term, without prejudice to the provisions of Rule 175 of its Rules of Procedure on the possibility of extending the term',

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<sup>1</sup> Texts adopted on that date, P6\_TA(2005)0529.

<sup>2</sup> Texts adopted on that date, P6\_TA(2006)0012.

<sup>3</sup> Texts adopted on that date, P6\_TA-PROV(2006)0316.

- B. whereas, in adopting its resolution of 22 November 1990 on the Gladio affair<sup>1</sup>, it drew attention, more than 16 years ago, to the existence of **clandestine** operations involving intelligence services and military organisations without adequate democratic control,
- C. whereas the principle of the inviolability of human dignity appears in Article 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union<sup>2</sup> and underlies every other fundamental right, in particular the right to life (Article 2), the right to freedom from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Article 4), the right to liberty and security (Article 6), the right to protection in the event of removal, expulsion or extradition (Article 19) and the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial (Article 47); and whereas this principle should not be subject to restrictions, even for the purposes of security in times both of peace and of war,
- D. whereas extraordinary rendition and secret detention involve multiple violations of human rights, in particular the right to liberty and security, the freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, the right to an effective remedy, and, in extreme cases, the right to life; whereas, in some cases, where rendition leads to secret detention, it constitutes enforced disappearance,
- E. whereas the prohibition of torture is a peremptory norm of international law (*jus cogens*) and the obligation to protect against and sanction torture is an obligation owed by all states (*erga omnes*),
- F. whereas the fight against terrorism cannot be won by sacrificing the very principles that terrorism seeks to destroy, notably, the protection of fundamental rights must never be compromised; whereas terrorism must be fought by legal means and must be defeated while respecting international and national law and with a responsible attitude on the part of governments and public opinion alike,
- G. whereas on 6 September 2006, US President George W. Bush confirmed that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was operating a secret detention programme outside the United States,
- H. whereas President George W. Bush said that the vital information derived from the extraordinary rendition and secret detention programme had been shared with other countries and that the programme will continue,
- I. whereas the Temporary Committee has obtained, from a confidential source, records of the informal transatlantic meeting of EU and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) foreign ministers, including US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, of 7 December 2005, confirming that Member States had knowledge of the programme of extraordinary rendition and secret prisons,
- J. whereas the Temporary Committee has obtained, from a confidential source, records of meetings of the Council's Working Party on Public International Law (COJUR) and Transatlantic Relations Working Party (COTRA) with senior representatives of the US

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<sup>1</sup> OJ C 324, 24.12.1990, p. 201.

<sup>2</sup> OJ C 364, 18.12.2000, p. 1.

Department of State during the first half of 2006 (notably on 8 February and 3 May 2006),

- K. whereas, in the present resolution, 'European countries' should be understood as meaning Member States and candidate and associate countries, as outlined in the mandate of the Temporary Committee adopted on 18 January 2006,
1. Endorses the view that international terrorism represents one of the main threats to the security and stability of the European Union and that it has to be fought with lawful and coordinated efforts by all European governments, in tight collaboration with the United States; furthermore stresses that all the work carried out by the Temporary Committee is intended to make a contribution towards the development of clear and focused measures in the fight against terrorism, which are commonly accepted and respect national and international law;
  2. Considers it necessary to rethink the relationship between the need for security and the rights of individuals, ensuring that human rights are fully respected in that context;
  3. Emphasises that the positive obligation to protect human rights is binding, regardless of the legal status of the individual concerned, and that any discrimination between EU nationals and residents of Member States must be avoided;
  4. Recalls that the purpose of this report, based on the mandate of its Temporary Committee, is both to determine responsibilities for the facts which it has been able to study and to consider ways of preventing any repetition of the abuses and violations perpetrated in connection with measures against terrorism;
  5. Notes the statement made by US President George W. Bush on 6 September 2006, according to which the United States had indeed established a network of secret detention centres outside its borders and that a number of persons who had been detained there had subsequently been transferred to Guantánamo;
  6. Deplores, in this context, the inability of the Council - due to the opposition of certain Member States - to adopt conclusions in response that statement at the General Affairs and External Relations Council of 15 September 2006;
  7. Notes the statements by the legal adviser to the US State Department at a meeting on 3 May 2006 with representatives of the Member States meeting within the Council, according to which, in carrying out the extraordinary rendition programme, whose existence he confirmed, the sovereignty of the countries concerned had always been fully respected;
  8. Thanks the former CIA agents who agreed to cooperate with the Temporary Committee, particularly at certain confidential meetings at which they confirmed that the extraordinary rendition programme had already begun during the 1990s;
  9. Welcomes the announcement by the new majority established by the elections to the United States Senate that it will investigate the CIA's extraordinary rendition programme; notes that this is further confirmation of the relevance of its own work;

10. Denounces the very great reluctance of virtually all the Member States, and of the Council of the European Union, to cooperate fully with its Temporary Committee;
11. Stresses the serious and rigorous work undertaken by the judicial authorities of Italy, Germany and Spain concerning the allegations which fall within the remit of its Temporary Committee;
12. Encourages the national parliaments of European countries to continue or launch thorough investigations, in the ways they consider most appropriate, into these allegations;
13. Pays tribute to the world press, in particular the US journalists who were the first to disclose the abuses and breaches of human rights related to extraordinary rendition, thus demonstrating the great democratic tradition of the US press; also recognises the efforts and good work undertaken by several non-governmental organisations (NGOs) on these matters, especially Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch;
14. Expresses its profound gratitude to all victims who had the courage to share their very traumatic experiences with the Temporary Committee;
15. Calls on all European countries to refrain from taking any action against officials, former officials, journalists or others who, by providing testimony or other information, either to the Temporary Committee or to other investigating bodies, have helped shed light on the system of extraordinary rendition, illegal detention and the transportation of terrorism suspects;
16. Reiterates its call on the Council, as expressed in its resolution of 6 July 2006, to adopt a common position against the use by Member States of diplomatic assurances from third countries, where there are substantial grounds for believing that individuals would be in danger of being subjected to torture or ill-treatment;

***Cooperation with EU institutions and international organisations***

17. Deplores the failure by the Council and its Presidency to comply with their obligations to keep the European Parliament fully informed of the main aspects and basic choices of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and of work carried out in the field of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters pursuant to Articles 21 and 39 of the Treaty on European Union;
18. Stresses, in this context, that it is totally unacceptable that the Council should first have concealed and then, at the request of the European Parliament, only supplied piecemeal information on the regular discussions held with senior officials of the US Administration, invoking the express wish of a third State as grounds for not divulging the full summary record of these exchanges of views as reflected in documents which are nonetheless purely internal to this EU institution;
19. Expresses its deep concern about the omissions and denials in the statements made to its Temporary Committee by the Secretary-General (and High Representative for the CFSP) of the Council of the European Union, Javier Solana, regarding the Council's

- discussions and knowledge of the methods used by the United States in its campaign against terrorism, which has led to all the abuses and violations which have been confirmed by the proceedings of its Temporary Committee;
20. Questions the real substance of the post of European Union Counter-terrorism Coordinator occupied by Gijs de Vries, and draws attention to the lack of credibility of his statements to its Temporary Committee; deplores his hesitation to appear before it;
  21. Deplores the refusal by the Director of the European Police Office (Europol), Max-Peter Ratzel, to appear before its Temporary Committee, particularly because it has emerged that liaison officers, especially for the US intelligence services, were seconded to the Office;
  22. Thanks the Vice-President of the European Commission, Franco Frattini, for his cooperation with the work of its Temporary Committee and encourages the Commission to step up its work in the context of the continuing efforts to ascertain the truth and find ways of preventing any repetition of the facts analysed by its Temporary Committee;
  23. Thanks Eurocontrol for its excellent cooperation and for the very useful information which it shared with its Temporary Committee;
  24. Appreciates the close cooperation which it has maintained with the Council of Europe, particularly its Parliamentary Assembly and its Secretary-General, and encourages the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights - and its Chairman, Senator Dick Marty - to continue its work; endorses the recommendations made to the Committee of Ministers by the Secretary-General, Terry Davis; stresses the agreement between the findings of the two committees to date;
  25. Cannot be satisfied with the refusals by the previous and current Secretaries-General of NATO, Lord Robertson and Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, to appear before its Temporary Committee or with that organisation's rejection of its request for access to the decision taken by the North Atlantic Council on 4 October 2001 concerning the implementation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty following the attacks on the United States on 11 September;
  26. Thanks the special rapporteurs of the United Nations, Manfred Nowak (on torture) and Martin Scheinin (on the promotion and protection of human rights in connection with counter-terrorism measures) for their contributions to the work of its Temporary Committee, while regretting that it was not possible for the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, to meet it;

### ***Information analysed by the Temporary Committee***

#### *Extraordinary rendition and the misuse of airspace and airports*

27. Recalls that the programme of extraordinary rendition is an extra-judicial practice whereby an individual suspected of involvement in terrorism is illegally abducted, arrested and/or transferred into the custody of US officials and/or transported to another country for interrogation which, in the majority of cases, involves *incommunicado*

- detention and torture;
28. Deplores the fact that the families of the victims are kept in complete ignorance of the fate of their loved ones;
  29. Condemns extraordinary rendition as an illegal and systematic instrument used by the United States in the fight against terrorism; condemns, further, the acceptance and concealing of the practice, on several occasions, by the secret services and governmental authorities of certain European countries;
  30. Recalls that participating in the interrogation of individuals who are victims of extraordinary rendition represents a deplorable legitimisation of that type of illegal procedure, even where those participating in their interrogation do not bear direct responsibility for the kidnapping and detention of the victims;
  31. Considers that the practice of extraordinary rendition has been shown to be counterproductive in the fight against terrorism and that, in some cases, extraordinary rendition in fact damages and undermines regular police and judicial procedures against terrorism suspects;
  32. Stresses that at least 1245 flights operated by the CIA have flown into European airspace or stopped over at European airports;
  33. Regrets that European countries have been relinquishing their control over their airspace and airports by admitting flights operated by the CIA which, on some occasions, were being used for extraordinary rendition or the illegal transportation of detainees;
  34. Is concerned, in particular, that the blanket overflight and stopover clearances granted to CIA-operated aircraft may have been based, inter alia, on the NATO Agreement on the implementation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, adopted on 4 October 2001;
  35. Recalls that Article 1 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (the Chicago Convention) sets out the principle that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory;
  36. Emphasises that the CIA has been using civil aviation rules to bypass the legal obligations for state aircraft, including those operated by the military and the police, as provided in the Chicago Convention; recalls that Article 4 of the Chicago Convention provides that: "Each contracting State agrees not to use civil aviation for any purpose inconsistent with the aims of this Convention";
  37. Confirms, in view of the additional information received during the second part of the proceedings of its Temporary Committee, that it is unlikely that certain European governments were unaware of the extraordinary rendition activities taking place in their territory;
  38. Stresses that the Temporary Committee's working documents No 7 and No 8<sup>1</sup> provide

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<sup>1</sup> Reference numbers: PE 380.593v04-00 and PE 380.984v02-00.



strong evidence of the extraordinary renditions analysed by the committee, as well as of the companies linked to the CIA, the aircraft used by the CIA and the European countries in which CIA aircraft made stopovers;

#### ITALY

39. Deplores the fact that the representatives of the current and former Italian Governments who are or were responsible for the Italian secret services declined the invitation to appear before the Temporary Committee;
40. Condemns the extraordinary rendition by the CIA of the Egyptian cleric Abu Omar, who had been granted asylum in Italy and who was abducted in Milan on 17 February 2003, transferred from Milan to Aviano by car, and then flown, via Ramstein in Germany, to Egypt, where he has been held *incommunicado* and tortured ever since;
41. Condemns the active role played by certain officials of the Italian military security services (SISMI) in the abduction of Abu Omar, as shown by the judicial investigation and the evidence collated by Milan's Public Prosecutor Armando Spataro;
42. Concludes, and deplores the fact, that General Nicolò Pollari, former Director of the SISMI, concealed the truth while appearing before the Temporary Committee on 6 March 2006, when he stated that Italian agents had played no part in any CIA kidnapping;
43. Considers it very likely, in view of the involvement of its secret services, that the Italian Government of the day was aware of the extraordinary rendition of Abu Omar from within its territory;
44. Thanks Public Prosecutor Spataro for his testimony to the Temporary Committee, applauds the efficient and independent investigations he carried out in order to shed light on the extraordinary rendition referred to and fully endorses his conclusions and his decision to issue warrants for the arrest of 26 US nationals and two senior officials of the SISMI;
45. Regrets that the abduction of Abu Omar jeopardised Public Prosecutor Spataro's investigation into the terrorist network to which Abu Omar was connected; recalls that had Abu Omar not been illegally seized and transported to another country, he would have faced a regular and fair trial in Italy;
46. Takes note that the testimony provided by General Pollari is inconsistent with a number of documents found on SISMI premises and confiscated by Milan prosecutors; considers that such documents show that the SISMI was regularly informed by the CIA about the detention of Abu Omar in Egypt;
47. Deeply regrets the systematic misleading of, among others, Milan prosecutors by the board of the SISMI with the aim of jeopardising the investigation into the extraordinary rendition of Abu Omar;
48. Condemns the illegal pursuing of Italian journalists investigating the extraordinary

- rendition of Abu Omar and the tapping of their telephone conversations; stresses that testimonies from those journalists have been of the utmost benefit to the work of the Temporary Committee;
49. Criticises the length of time it took for the Italian Government to decide to remove from office and replace General Pollari;
  50. Regrets that a document on US-Italian cooperation in the fight against terrorism, which would have assisted the investigation into the extraordinary rendition of Abu Omar, was classified by the former Italian Government and that the current government has confirmed the classified status of this document;
  51. Urges the Italian Minister of Justice to process, as soon as possible, the requests for extradition of the 26 US nationals referred to, for the purpose of standing trial in Italy;
  52. Condemns the extraordinary rendition of Italian citizen Abou Elkassim Britel, who was arrested in Pakistan in March 2002 by the Pakistani police and interrogated by US and Pakistani officials, and subsequently rendered to the Moroccan authorities and imprisoned in the detention facility 'Temara', where he remains detained; emphasises that the criminal investigations in Italy against Abou Elkassim Britel were closed without charge;
  53. Regrets that, according to the documentation provided to the Temporary Committee by Abou Elkassim Britel's lawyer, the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs was at the time in 'constant cooperation' with foreign secret services concerning the case of Abou Elkassim Britel following his arrest in Pakistan;
  54. Urges the Italian Government to take concrete steps in order to obtain the immediate release of Abou Elkassim Britel and Abu Omar so that proceedings against the latter can be prosecuted in the Court of Milan;
  55. Deeply regrets that Italian territory was used by the CIA to make a stopover during the flight that was used to carry out the extraordinary rendition of Maher Arar, who gave testimony to the Temporary Committee, from the United States to Syria, via Rome;
  56. Expresses serious concern about the 46 stopovers made by CIA-operated aircraft at Italian airports, which on some occasions came from or were bound for countries linked with extraordinary rendition circuits and the transfer of detainees; deplores the stopovers at Italian airports of aircraft which have been shown to have been used by the CIA on other occasions for the extraordinary renditions of Ahmed Agiza, Mohammed El-Zari, Bisher Al-Rawi, Jamil El-Banna, Abou Elkassim Britel, Khaled El-Masri, Binyam Mohammed, Abu Omar and Maher Arar;

#### THE UNITED KINGDOM

57. Deplores the way in which the British Government, as represented by its Minister for Europe, cooperated with the Temporary Committee;
58. Thanks the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Renditions (APPG),

comprising members of the House of Commons and House of Lords, for its work and for providing the Temporary Committee delegation to London with a number of highly valuable documents;

59. Condemns the extraordinary rendition of Bisher Al-Rawi, an Iraqi citizen and resident of the UK, and Jamil El-Banna, a Jordanian citizen and resident of the UK, who were arrested by Gambian authorities in Gambia in November 2002, turned over to US agents, and flown to Afghanistan and then to Guantánamo, where they remain detained without trial or any form of judicial assistance;
60. Condemns the multiple extraordinary rendition of Binyam Mohammed, Ethiopian citizen and resident of the UK; points out that Binyam Mohammed has been held in at least two secret detention facilities, in addition to military prisons;
61. Is deeply disturbed by the testimony of Binyam Mohammed's lawyer, who gave an account of the most horrific torture endured by his client to the official delegation of the Temporary Committee to the UK;
62. Points out that the telegrams from the UK security service MI5 to an unspecified foreign government which were released to the Chairman of the APPG, Andrew Tyrie, suggest that the abduction of Bisher Al-Rawi and Jamil El-Banna was facilitated by partly erroneous information supplied by the UK security service;
63. Emphasises that the former UK Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Jack Straw, conceded in December 2005 that UK intelligence officials met Binyam Mohammed when he was arrested in Pakistan; points out in this respect that some of the questions put by the Moroccan officials to Binyam Mohammed appear to have been inspired by information supplied by the UK;
64. Condemns the extraordinary rendition of UK citizen Martin Mubanga, who met the official delegation of the Temporary Committee to the UK, and who was arrested in Zambia in March 2002 and subsequently flown to Guantánamo; regrets the fact that Martin Mubanga was interrogated by British officials at Guantánamo, where he was detained and tortured for four years without trial or any form of judicial assistance and then released without charge;
65. Criticises the unwillingness of the UK Government to provide consular assistance to Bisher Al-Rawi and Jamil El-Banna on the grounds that they are not UK citizens;
66. Thanks Craig Murray, former UK Ambassador to Uzbekistan, for his very valuable testimony to the Temporary Committee on the exchange of intelligence obtained under torture and for providing a copy of the legal opinion of Michael Wood, former legal advisor to the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office;
67. Is outraged by Michael Wood's legal opinion, according to which 'receiving or possessing' information extracted under torture, in so far as there is no direct participation in the torture, is not *per se* prohibited by the UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; points out that Michael Wood declined to give testimony to the Temporary Committee;

68. Expresses serious concern about the 170 stopovers made by CIA-operated aircraft at UK airports, which on many occasions came from or were bound for countries linked with extraordinary rendition circuits and the transfer of detainees; deplores the stopovers at UK airports of aircraft which have been shown to have been used by the CIA, on other occasions, for the extraordinary renditions of Ahmed Agiza, Mohammed El-Zari, Bisher Al-Rawi, Jamil El-Banna, Abou Elkassim Britel, Khaled El-Masri, Binyam Mohammed, Abu Omar and Maher Arar;

#### GERMANY

69. Acknowledges the good cooperation on the part of the German Government by providing valuable information to the Chairman and the rapporteur of the Temporary Committee;
70. Welcomes the excellent work of the German Parliament inquiry committee and expresses its full support for the continuation of the committee's work;
71. Thanks Munich Public Prosecutor Martin Hofmann for his testimony to the Temporary Committee and applauds all ongoing judicial inquiries in Germany;
72. Deplores the fact that German authorities at least had knowledge of the illegal abduction of German citizen Khaled El-Masri, who gave testimony to the Temporary Committee, and requests the German Parliament inquiry committee to examine further and clarify the role of German agents in this case;
73. Condemns the extraordinary rendition of Turkish citizen and resident of Germany Murat Kurnaz, who gave testimony to the Temporary Committee and who was arrested in Pakistan in November 2001, transferred to the US units across the border in Afghanistan by the Pakistani police on no legal basis and with no judicial assistance, and finally flown to Guantánamo at the end of January 2002, from where he was released on 24 August 2006 without charge, having been tortured in all the locations where he had been held;
74. Points out that, according to confidential institutional information, the German Government did not accept the US offer, made in 2002, to release Murat Kurnaz from Guantánamo; notes that on many occasions since 2002, Murat Kurnaz's lawyer was told by the German Government that it was impossible to open negotiations with the US Government on his release because Murat Kurnaz was a Turkish citizen; notes that US and German intelligence concluded, as early as 2002, that Murat Kurnaz had no connection to Al-Qaeda or the Taliban and that he posed no terrorist threat;
75. Regrets the fact that Murat Kurnaz was interrogated twice, in 2002 and in 2004, by German officials at Guantánamo, where he was detained without formal charge or trial and without judicial assistance; regrets the fact that German officials denied him any assistance because they were only interested in questioning him;
76. Fully supports the investigation launched by the public prosecutor in Potsdam into unknown perpetrators in order to establish whether Murat Kurnaz was ill-treated in Afghanistan by German soldiers belonging to the Kommando Spezialkräfte (KSK), the

- German army's special operational forces, before being sent to Guantánamo;
77. Appreciates the German Government's initiative in January 2006 which led to the release of Murat Kurnaz;
  78. Condemns the extraordinary rendition of the German citizen Mohammed Zammar, arrested without formal charge on 8 December 2001 at Casablanca airport in Morocco and detained and tortured in Morocco and Syria;
  79. Notes that, according to a confidential institutional source, on 26 November 2001 the German Federal Criminal Police Office provided details of Mohammed Zammar's whereabouts to the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and that this facilitated Mohammed Zammar's arrest;
  80. Points out that, subsequent to a meeting between the officials of the German Federal Chancellery and Syrian intelligence officials in July 2002, German prosecutors dropped charges against several Syrian citizens in Germany while the Syrian authorities allowed German officials to meet Mohammed Zammar in the Syrian prison Far' Falastin, as also confirmed by a confidential institutional source; regrets that Mohammed Zammar was interrogated by German agents in that prison;
  81. Expresses serious concern about the 336 stopovers made by CIA-operated aircraft at German airports that on many occasions came from or were bound for countries linked with extraordinary rendition circuits and the transfer of detainees; deplores the stopovers in Germany of aircraft which have been shown to have been used by the CIA, on other occasions, for the extraordinary renditions of Ahmed Agiza, Mohammed El-Zari, Bisher Al-Rawi, Jamil El-Banna, Abou Elkassim Britel, Khaled El-Masri, Binyam Mohammed, Abu Omar and Maher Arar; is particularly concerned that one of the flights referred to was destined for Guantánamo; strongly encourages the German authorities to investigate this flight further;

#### SWEDEN

82. Condemns the fact that Sweden's expulsion in December 2001 of Mohammed El-Zari and Ahmed Agiza, Egyptian nationals who were seeking asylum in Sweden, was based solely on diplomatic assurances from the Egyptian Government, which did not provide effective safeguards against torture;
83. Deplores the lack of appropriate reaction by Swedish authorities to the evidence proving the involvement of Swedish police in this illegal abduction;
84. Fully endorses the UN Human Rights Committee's decision of 6 November 2006 in which it found that Sweden had breached the absolute ban on torture; endorses in the same way a separate ruling by the UN Committee against Torture of 20 May 2005, which concluded that Sweden had violated the UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and stated that "procurement of diplomatic assurances [from Egypt], which, moreover, provided no mechanism for their enforcement, did not suffice to protect against this manifest risk";

85. Thanks the Swedish Chief Parliamentary Ombudsman, Mats Melin, for his testimony to the Temporary Committee and applauds his investigation which concluded that the Swedish security service and airport police “were remarkably submissive to the American officials” and “lost control of the enforcement”, resulting in the ill-treatment of Ahmed Agiza and Mohammed El-Zari, including physical abuse and other humiliation, at the airport immediately before they were transported to Cairo;

#### AUSTRIA

86. Condemns the rendition of Sudanese citizen and resident of Austria since 1989, Masaad Omer Behari, who gave testimony to the Temporary Committee, and who was abducted at Amman airport on 12 January 2003 on his way back to Vienna from Sudan;
87. Deplores the fact that Masaad Omer Behari was later illegally secretly detained in a prison close to Amman run by the Jordan General Intelligence Department, without trial or legal rights, and tortured and ill-treated there until 8 April 2003, when he was released without charge; recalls that a judicial procedure was started by the Austrian authorities against Masaad Omer Behari in September 2001, which was subsequently closed in August 2002, without charge;
88. Deplores the fact that, according to Masaad Omer Behari's statement to the Temporary Committee, there may have been cooperation between the US, Austrian and Jordanian authorities in respect of his rendition;
89. Condemns the abduction of Egyptian citizen and resident of Austria, Gamal Menshawi, who was arrested on his way to Mecca at Amman airport in February 2003, and later brought to Egypt where he was secretly detained until 2005 without trial or legal rights; recalls that no allegations have ever been made against Gamal Menshawi in Austria;
90. Regrets that, having considered the above paragraphs, neither a special nor a parliamentary inquiry was carried out in Austria into the possible involvement of the Austrian authorities in the two renditions referred to; urges the Austrian Parliament to start appropriate inquiries as soon as possible;

#### SPAIN

91. Welcomes the good cooperation with the Temporary Committee of the Spanish Government, in particular, the testimony given to the Temporary Committee by its Minister for Foreign Affairs;
92. Congratulates the Spanish Government on the timely measures it took directly after the first allegations were made that European airports had been used for the transit of CIA aircraft within the context of the programme of extraordinary renditions;
93. Thanks the Chief Prosecutor Javier Zaragoza and Prosecutor Vicente González Mota of the *Audiencia Nacional* for their testimony to the Temporary Committee and applauds their investigations into the use of Spanish airports for the transit of CIA aircraft within the context of the programme of extraordinary rendition; encourages the prosecutors to investigate further the stopovers of the aircraft involved in the extraordinary rendition of

Khaled El-Masri;

94. Applauds the Spanish Government for facilitating the work of the Spanish prosecutors; recalls the words of Chief Prosecutor Zaragoza that 'there was no obstacle, objection or trouble from the Spanish Government side in the investigations by the *Audiencia Nacional*';
95. Calls on the Spanish authorities to take all necessary steps to allow Spanish citizen Mustafa Setmariam Nasar who, abducted in Syria in October 2005 and rendered to US agents, to face a fair trial before competent judicial authorities;
96. Expresses serious concern about the 68 stopovers made by CIA-operated aircraft at Spanish airports that on many occasions came from or were bound for countries linked with extraordinary rendition circuits and the transfer of detainees; deplores the stopovers in Spain of aircraft which have been shown to have been used by the CIA, on other occasions, for the extraordinary renditions of Ahmed Agiza, Mohammed El-Zari, Bisher Al-Rawi, Jamil El-Banna, Abou Elkassim Britel, Khaled El-Masri, Binyam Mohammed, Abu Omar and Maher Arar; is particularly concerned that, of the above flights, three originated from or were destined for Guantánamo; strongly encourages the Spanish Prosecutors to investigate these flights further;

#### PORTUGAL

97. Takes note of the inter-ministerial working group set up on 26 September 2006 by the Portuguese Foreign Ministry to examine the procedures followed and possible weaknesses in the system as regards CIA-operated aircraft at Portuguese airports;
98. Expresses serious concern about the 91 stopovers made by CIA-operated aircraft at Portuguese airports that on many occasions came from or were bound for countries linked with extraordinary rendition circuits and the transfer of detainees; deplores the stopovers in Portugal of aircraft which have been shown to have been used by the CIA, on other occasions, for the extraordinary renditions of Ahmed Agiza, Mohammed El-Zari, Bisher Al-Rawi, Jamil El-Banna, Abou Elkassim Britel, Khaled El-Masri, Binyam Mohammed, Abu Omar and Maher Arar; is particularly concerned that of the above flights, three originated from or were destined for Guantánamo; strongly encourages the Portuguese authorities to further investigate these flights;

#### IRELAND

99. Expresses serious concern about the 147 stopovers made by CIA-operated aircraft at Irish airports that on many occasions came from or were bound for countries linked with extraordinary rendition circuits and the transfer of detainees; deplores the stopovers in Ireland of aircraft which have been shown to have been used by the CIA, on other occasions, for the extraordinary renditions of Ahmed Agiza, Mohammed El-Zari, Bisher Al-Rawi, Jamil El-Banna, Abou Elkassim Britel, Khaled El-Masri, Binyam Mohammed, Abu Omar and Maher Arar;

#### GREECE

100. Expresses serious concern about the 64 stopovers made by CIA-operated aircraft at Greek airports that on many occasions came from or were bound for countries linked with extraordinary rendition circuits and the transfer of detainees; deplores the stopovers in Greece of aircraft which have been shown to have been used by the CIA, on other occasions, for the extraordinary renditions of Ahmed Agiza, Mohammed El-Zari, Bisher Al-Rawi, Jamil El-Banna, Abou Elkassim Britel, Khaled El-Masri, Binyam Mohammed and Maher Arar;

#### CYPRUS

101. Expresses serious concern about the 57 stopovers made by CIA-operated aircraft at Cypriot airports that on many occasions came from or were bound for countries linked with extraordinary rendition circuits and the transfer of detainees; deplores the stopovers in Cyprus of aircraft which have been shown to have been used by the CIA, on other occasions, for the extraordinary renditions of Ahmed Agiza, Mohammed El-Zari, Bisher Al-Rawi, Jamil El-Banna, Abou Elkassim Britel, Khaled El-Masri, Binyam Mohammed and Abu Omar;

#### DENMARK

102. Welcomes the cooperation received from the Danish authorities, while regretting that no representative of the government considered it worthwhile to appear before its Temporary Committee;

#### TURKEY

103. Expresses its serious concern about the failure of the Turkish authorities to extend diplomatic protection to their national Murat Kurnaz and about the absence of any step to secure his release from the prison at Guantánamo;
104. Regrets that the same authorities, on the contrary, used the illegal detention of their national to interrogate him at Guantánamo;
105. Deplores the silence of the Turkish authorities concerning the use of their territory for the stopover of an aircraft which had taken to Guantánamo the six nationals and/or residents of Bosnia of Algerian origin who were illegally arrested in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

#### FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

106. Emphasises that a delegation of its Temporary Committee was received in Skopje in April 2006 by the President of the Republic, members of the government and several officials; notes, however, a lack of thorough investigation into the Khaled El-Masri case by the authorities of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia;
107. Condemns the extraordinary rendition of the German citizen Khaled El-Masri, abducted at the border-crossing Tabanovce in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on 31



December 2003, illegally held in Skopje from 31 December 2003 to 23 January 2004 and then transported to Afghanistan on 23-24 January 2004, where he was held until May 2004 and subjected to degrading and inhuman treatment;

108. Urges the Council to shed full light on the claims that the EU police mission (PROXIMA) had high-level contacts in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia counter-espionage unit at the time when Khaled El-Masri was handed over to the CIA;
109. Fully endorses the preliminary findings of Munich Public Prosecutor Martin Hofmann that there is no evidence to refute Khaled El-Masri's version of events;
110. Deeply regrets the fact that the authorities of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia failed to follow up the recommendations made by the Temporary Committee in its interim report of 6 July 2006;
111. Points out again that the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia authorities are expected to carry out investigations; urges the newly elected national parliament of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to set up a committee of inquiry as soon as possible to deal with the Khaled El-Masri case and establish full cooperation with the ongoing inquiry of the German Parliament;

#### BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

112. Welcomes the fact that the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the only European government that does not deny its participation in the extraordinary rendition of four citizens and two residents of Bosnia and Herzegovina, all of Algerian origin; regrets, however, that the steps undertaken by the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina have not yet resulted in the release of the six men from Guantánamo;
113. Condemns the extraordinary rendition of the six men referred to who were abducted in Sarajevo on 17 January 2002, turned over to US soldiers and then flown to Guantánamo, where they remain detained without trial or legal guarantees;
114. Takes note of the testimony given to its Temporary Committee by Wolfgang Petritsch, former High Representative of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and by Michèle Picard, former President of the Human Rights Chamber of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which suggested that representatives of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina had some knowledge about the imminent handing-over of the six men referred to the US forces before events unfolded;
115. Regrets the fact that the international community as represented in Bosnia and Herzegovina turned a blind eye when the decisions of the Supreme Court and the Human Rights Chamber of Bosnia and Herzegovina ordering the release of the men from custody were not implemented;
116. Points out that, according to the information that its Temporary Committee received from Wolfgang Petritsch and the lawyers of the six men, the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina were subject to unprecedented pressure from the US Government, which threatened to close its embassy, withdraw all staff and cease diplomatic relations with

Bosnia and Herzegovina unless the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina immediately arrested the six men on terrorism charges;

#### OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

117. Is concerned about the stopovers made by CIA-operated aircraft in other European countries and encourages their authorities to launch adequate investigations into this matter;

#### *Secret detention facilities*

118. Welcomes the investigations carried out into the existence of secret detention facilities in Europe by Human Rights Watch, the Washington Post and ABC News;
119. Recalls that some journalists at the Washington Post and ABC News, as they confirmed to the Temporary Committee, were put under pressure not to name the eastern European countries, namely Poland and Romania, where there were said to have been secret detention facilities;
120. Emphasises that the concept of “secret detention facility” is not exclusively comprised of prisons, but includes all places where somebody is held *incommunicado*, such as private apartments, police stations or hotel rooms, as in the case of Khaled El-Masri in Skopje;
121. Is deeply concerned that, in some cases, temporary secret detention facilities in European countries may have been located at US military bases;
122. Regrets that there may have been a lack of control over US military bases by host European countries; recalls, however, that, according to the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), all State parties are bound to exercise jurisdiction over their whole territory, including foreign military bases;
123. Recalls that, according to the ECHR, every case of detention must be lawful and must be the result of proceedings prescribed by law, whether national or international;
124. Recalls that active and passive cooperation by a European country in imposing and executing secret detentions renders it responsible under the ECHR;

#### ROMANIA

125. Welcomes the excellent hospitality and good cooperation extended by the Romanian authorities to the Temporary Committee, including meetings with members of the Romanian Government, as well as the establishment of an ad hoc inquiry committee of the Romanian Senate;
126. Notes, however, the reluctance on the part of the Romanian authorities to investigate thoroughly the existence of secret detention facilities on its territory;
127. Regrets that the report issued by the Romanian inquiry committee was almost entirely

secret and that its conclusions, included in Chapter 7, appear premature and superficial; takes note, however, of the intention expressed by the Chairwoman of the inquiry committee to the Temporary Committee delegation to consider the conclusions provisional;

128. Regrets the lack of control of the Gulfstream aircraft with Registration Number N478GS that suffered an accident on 6 December 2004 when landing in Bucharest; recalls that the aircraft took off from Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan, and that its seven passengers disappeared following the accident; appreciates, however, the good cooperation of the Romanian authorities in handing over the report on the accident to the Temporary Committee;
129. Expresses serious concern about the 21 stopovers made by CIA-operated aircraft at Romanian airports that on many occasions came from or were bound for countries linked with extraordinary rendition circuits and the transfer of detainees; deplores the stopovers in Romania of aircraft which have been shown to have been used by the CIA, on other occasions, for the extraordinary renditions of Ahmed Agiza, Mohammed El-Zari, Bisher Al-Rawi, Jamil El-Banna, Abou Elkassim Britel, Khaled El-Masri, Binyam Mohammed and Abu Omar; is particularly concerned that, of the flights referred to, two originated from or were destined for Guantánamo; strongly encourages the Romanian authorities to investigate these flights further;
130. Is extremely concerned that the Romanian authorities may have lacked control over US activities in the military base at Kogalniceanu airport;
131. Cannot exclude, according to the statements made by Romanian authorities to the Temporary Committee delegation to Romania, the possibility that US secret services have operated in Romania on a clandestine basis;

#### POLAND

132. Deplores the lack of cooperation by the Polish Government with the Temporary Committee, in particular when receiving its delegation at an inappropriate level; deeply regrets that all those representatives of the Polish Government and Parliament who were invited to do so, declined to meet the Temporary Committee;
133. Believes that this attitude reflected an overall scepticism on the part of the Polish Government towards the Temporary Committee's work;
134. Regrets that no special inquiry committee has been established and that the Polish Parliament has not conducted an independent investigation;
135. Recalls that, on 21 December 2005, the Special Services Committee held a sitting *in camera* with the Minister Coordinator of Special Services and the heads of both intelligence services; emphasises that the sitting was conducted speedily and in secret, in the absence of any hearing or testimony and subject to no scrutiny; stresses that such an investigation cannot be defined as independent and regrets that the committee released no documentation, save for a single final statement in this regard;

136. Expresses serious concern about the 11 stopovers made by CIA-operated aircraft at Polish airports that on many occasions came from or were bound for countries linked with extraordinary rendition circuits and the transfer of detainees; deplores the stopovers in Poland of aircraft which have been shown to have been used by the CIA, on other occasions, for the extraordinary renditions of Ahmed Agiza, Mohammed El-Zari, Bisher Al-Rawi, Jamil El-Banna, Abou Elkassim Britel, Khaled El-Masri and Binyam Mohammed;
137. Regrets that, following the hearings carried out by the Temporary Committee delegation in Poland, there were contradictory statements and confusion about flight logs for the above-mentioned CIA flights, which were first said not to have been retained, then said to have been faxed and destroyed and finally said to have been saved in an unspecified place;
138. Takes note that, according to different sources, several high-value detainees who had been held secretly in Afghanistan in 2003 were transferred out of the country in September and October 2003; underlines with concern that a Boeing 737 with Registration Number N313P, used by the CIA for ascertained renditions, flew from Kabul to Szymany airport on 22 September 2003 and was then directed to Guantánamo;
139. Recalls that, concerning the landing of the aircraft referred to at Szymany airport, seven staff on board were joined by five passengers and that no customs control was carried out on those passengers;
140. Takes note of the declarations made by Szymany airport employees according to which:
  - in 2002, two Gulfstream jets, and in 2003, four Gulfstream jets with civilian registration numbers were parked at the edge of the airport, and did not enter customs clearance;
  - orders were given directly by the regional border guards about the arrivals of the aircraft referred to, emphasising that the airport authorities should not approach the aircraft and that military staff and services alone were to handle those aircraft and only to complete the technical arrangements after the landing;
  - according to a former senior official of the airport, no Polish civilian or military staff were permitted to approach the aircraft;
  - landing fees were paid in cash and overpriced - usually between EUR 2000 and EUR 4000;
  - one or two vehicles would wait for the arrival of those aircraft;
  - the vehicles had military registration numbers starting with “H”, which are associated with the intelligence training base in nearby Stare Kiejkuty;
  - in one case a medical emergency vehicle, belonging to either the police academy or the military base, was involved;

- one airport staff member reported once following the vehicles and seeing them heading towards the intelligence training centre at Stare Kiejkuty;
141. Acknowledges that shortly after, and in accordance with, President George W. Bush's statements on 6 September 2006, a list of the 14 detainees who had been transferred from a secret detention facility to Guantánamo was published; notes that seven of the fourteen detainees had been referred to in a report by ABC News, published nine months previously on 5 December 2005 but withdrawn shortly thereafter from ABC's webpage, listing the names of twelve top Al Qaeda suspects held in Poland;
  142. Encourages the Polish Parliament to establish a proper inquiry committee, independent of the Government and capable of carrying out serious and thorough investigations;
  143. Regrets that Polish human rights NGOs and investigative journalists have faced a lack of cooperation from the government and refusals to divulge information;
  144. Considers that, in the light of the above serious circumstantial evidence, a temporary secret detention facility may have been located at the intelligence training centre at Stare Kiejkuty;

#### KOSOVO (UNDER UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1244)

145. Expresses deep concern over the fact that the Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) obtained access to NATO-run detention facilities in Kosovo only in July 2006;
146. Regrets the refusal of NATO to provide evidence on the allegations of illegal detention of terrorist suspects in the prison run by the NATO-led peacekeeping force (KFOR) at Camp Bondsteel, the only detention facility in Europe where CPT inspectors have not had unlimited access until very recently;
147. Points out in this respect that the testimony given to the Temporary Committee by the former Kosovo Ombudsman, Marek Antoni Nowicki, confirmed that until 2002, inmates were arbitrarily detained at Camp Bondsteel, subject only to a decision by the Commander of KFOR;

#### ***Recommendations***

##### *Political recommendations*

148. Considers it necessary that those European countries that have started inquiries and investigations at governmental and/or parliamentary level on matters within the remit of the Temporary Committee should conclude their work as soon as possible and make public the results of the investigations;
149. Urges European countries in relation to which serious allegations have been made and that have not undertaken governmental and/or parliamentary investigations to commence such proceedings as soon as possible; recalls that, according to the case law of the European Court on Human Rights, there is a positive obligation on Member States to investigate allegations of human rights violations in possible breach of the

ECHR;

150. Calls for the closure of Guantánamo and for European countries to accept the return of their citizens and residents who are being held illegally by US authorities;
151. Considers that all European countries that have not done so should initiate independent investigations into all stopovers made by civilian aircraft carried out by the CIA, at least since 2001, including those cases already analysed by the Temporary Committee;
152. Asks the Commission to undertake an evaluation of all anti-terrorist legislation in the Member States from a human rights perspective and to present proposals for actions in order to avoid any repetition of the matters under the remit of the Temporary Committee;
153. Deems it necessary better to define the exceptions that flow from the notion of 'Secret of State' in the framework of the upcoming review of Regulation 1049/01<sup>1</sup>;
154. Points out the current lack of a structured political framework for EU-US dialogue on security matters, including differences in the approach to terrorism as well as the concerns raised by the Temporary Committee; calls for a common language and joint conclusions from EU-US summits to be adopted in national policies on terrorism and followed up with concrete implementation in national legislation;
155. Encourages European countries when they conduct military operations in third countries to:
  - ensure that any detention centre established by their military forces is subject to civilian and judicial supervision and that *incommunicado* detention is not permitted;
  - take active steps to prevent any other authority from operating detention centres which are not subject to political and judicial oversight or where *incommunicado* detention is permitted;

#### *Legal recommendations*

156. Considers that the powers of Parliament temporary inquiry committees should be reinforced and the interinstitutional decision governing the exercise of the European Parliament's right of inquiry amended accordingly;
157. Calls for all information related to the fight against international terrorism that is in the possession of national parliaments or governments or received from international organisations to be readily shared with Parliament;

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<sup>1</sup> Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, p. 43).

#### SECRET SERVICES

158. Calls on Member States to ensure that adequate and effective monitoring and supervision of their secret and intelligence activities is carried out by their respective parliaments and governments;
159. Considers that all European countries should have specific national laws to regulate the activities of third countries' secret services on their national territories;
160. Considers highly desirable the reinforcement of cooperation between the secret and security services of Member States, either on a multilateral, preferably within the EU framework, or a bilateral basis, provided that human rights are respected and protected at all times;

#### AIR TRAFFIC

161. Urges Member States to ensure that Article 3 of the Chicago Convention, which excludes state aircraft from the scope of the Convention, is properly implemented in order that all military and/or police aircraft fly over or land on another State's territory only if they have prior authorisation;
162. Calls on Member States to take adequate measures to ensure that overflight clearances for military and/or police aircraft should be granted only if accompanied by guarantees that human rights will be respected and monitored;
163. Considers it necessary to enforce effectively, both at EU and national level, the Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft so that the exercise of jurisdiction is used to ensure the observance of any obligation under a multilateral international agreement, in particular concerning the protection of human rights, and that, when appropriate, inspections on board should be undertaken;

#### INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND AGREEMENTS

164. Urges the Member States that have not yet done so to complete as soon as possible ratification of the 2003 EU-US Extradition Agreement, while taking adequate steps to avoid wrongly interpreting Article 12 of the Agreement, thereby ensuring that its scope does not go beyond formal extradition and does not legitimise extraordinary renditions;
165. Calls on European countries to support the rapid adoption by the UN General Assembly of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons Against Enforced Disappearance, adopted on 29 June 2006 by the UN Human Rights Council;
166. Believes that, in providing for the adequate interpretation and enforcement of the UN Convention Against Torture, all European countries should ensure that their definition of torture is in accordance with Article 1 of the Convention, thus including any violent, inhuman, degrading or ill-treatment, and that the prohibition of *refoulement* in Article 3 is properly enforced, in particular in relation to the activities of their secret services;
167. States that, given that the protection against *refoulement* is stronger under the ECHR

than under the Convention against Torture, European countries should ensure in any event the protection afforded by the ECHR;

168. Calls on all European countries to sign and ratify the Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and establish independent national mechanisms to monitor places of detention;
169. Takes the view that the CPT should be granted access without any delay or obstruction to any place of detention within the European countries, including foreign military bases, and provided with all relevant information concerning such detention, and that, to this end, any bilateral agreements which restrict the access of the CPT should be revised;
170. Urges all European countries to comply with the provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court;
171. Believes that the EU should encourage all third countries to become party to the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and to the Convention on Enforced Disappearances;
172. Asks European countries to establish clear rules that provide for the possibility of State immunity being waived where illegal actions violate human rights;

*Administrative recommendations (at EU level)*

173. Takes the view that all internal services within the Council (inter alia, the Policy Unit and the Joint Situation Centre) and the Commission (the Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention Unit in DG External Relations and relevant services in DG Justice, Freedom and Security), should be strengthened in the framework of the implementation of the EU Security Strategy and the counter-terrorism strategy in close cooperation with all Member States; considers that Parliament should be fully informed in this regard;

*EU relations with third countries*

174. Urges the European Union to stress in its contacts with third countries that the appropriate legal framework for governing the international fight against terrorism is criminal law and international human rights law;
175. Calls on the European Union to recall that the full application of the 'democratic clause' is fundamental in its relations with third countries, especially those with which it has concluded agreements;
176. Strongly believes that it is necessary to promote within the UN framework codes of conduct for all security and military services based on respect for human rights, humanitarian law and democratic political control, similar to the 1994 Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe;



***Final conclusions***

177. Stresses, in view of the time which it had at its disposal, that its Temporary Committee was not able to fully investigate all the cases of abuses and violations falling within its remit and that its conclusions are therefore not exhaustive;
178. Recalls the principles and values on which the European Union is based, as stated in Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union, and calls on the Council and Commission to shoulder their responsibilities and take all appropriate action in the light of the conclusions of the work of its Temporary Committee, the facts it has revealed and all relevant provisions of the Treaties;
179. Calls on its Secretary-General to publish the records of the proceedings of its Temporary Committee in the most appropriate manner and calls on him to ensure that the developments which ensue in fields falling within the remit of the Temporary Committee after its disbandment are monitored;
180. Instructs its Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, where necessary in cooperation with the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to follow up politically the proceedings of the Temporary Committee and to recommend to it any resolution which may prove necessary in this context;
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  - o
181. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, of the candidate Member States and the associated countries, and to the Council of Europe, NATO, the United Nations and the Government and two Houses of Congress of the United States.