

# EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

1999



2004

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*Session document*

FINAL  
**A5-0296/2002**

11 September 2002

## REPORT

on the progress achieved in the implementation of the common foreign and security policy  
(2002/2010(INI))

Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy

Rapporteur: Elmar Brok



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## PROCEDURAL PAGE

At the sitting of 17 January 2002 the President of Parliament announced that the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy had been authorised to draw up an own-initiative report, pursuant to Rule 163 of the Rules of Procedure, on the progress achieved in the implementation of the common foreign and security policy.

The Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy appointed Elmar Brok rapporteur at its meeting of 23 April 2002.

It considered the draft report at its meetings of 11 July and 9 and 10 September 2002.

At the last meeting it adopted the motion for a resolution by 28 votes to 10, with 2 abstentions.

The following were present for the vote: Elmar Brok, chairman and rapporteur; Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne, Geoffrey Van Orden and Christos Zacharakis vice-chairmen; Bastiaan Belder, Véronique De Keyser, Marielle de Sarnez (for Gunilla Carlsson), Andrew Nicholas Duff (for Ole Andreasen), Pere Esteve, Glyn Ford, Pernille Frahm (for André Brie), Michael Gahler, Jas Gawronski, Alfred Gomolka, Giorgos Katiforis (for Alexandros Baltas), Christoph Werner Konrad (for John Walls Cushnahan), Efstratios Korakas, Joost Lagendijk, Catherine Lalumière, Cecilia Malmström, Pedro Marset Campos, Emilio Menéndez del Valle, Pasqualina Napoletano, Arie M. Oostlander, Jacques F. Poos, Lennart Sacrédeus (for Gerardo Galeote Quecedo), Jannis Sakellariou, Jacques Santer, Amalia Sartori, Jürgen Schröder, Elisabeth Schroedter, Ioannis Souldakis, The Earl of Stockton (for Alain Lamassoure), Ilkka Suominen, Charles Tannock, Gary Titley (for Rosa M. Díez González), Bob van den Bos, Karl von Wogau, Paavo Väyrynen and Matti Wuori.

The report was tabled on 11 September 2002.

The deadline for tabling amendments will be indicated in the draft agenda for the relevant part-session.

## MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

### European Parliament resolution on the progress achieved in the implementation of the common foreign and security policy (2002/2010(INI))

*The European Parliament,*

- having regard to the 2001 annual report from the Council, submitted to Parliament on 30 April 2002, pursuant to point H, paragraph 40, of the Interinstitutional Agreement of 6 May 1999, on the main aspects and basic choices of the CSFP, including the financial implications for the general budget of the European Communities (7330/2002 - C5-0205/2002),
  - having regard to Article 21 of the EU Treaty and Rule 103(3) of its Rules of Procedure,
  - having regard to its resolution of 25 October 2001 on the progress achieved in the implementation of the common foreign and security policy<sup>1</sup>,
  - having regard to its resolutions of 10 April 2002 on the European defence industries and on the present state of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and EU-NATO relations<sup>2</sup>,
  - having regard to its resolution of 15 May 2002 on reinforcing the transatlantic relationship<sup>3</sup>,
  - having regard to the Commission communication entitled 'A project for the European Union' - COM(2002) 247 of 22 May 2002,
  - having regard to Rule 163 of its Rules of Procedure,
  - having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy (A5-0296/2002),
- A. recognising the EU's clear and unanimous response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and noting that, by joining in the coalition against terror and its commitment in Afghanistan, the EU has strengthened its partnership with the United States, and has demonstrated that it is also prepared to assume global responsibilities in a multilateral framework,
- B. whereas, with the increased and conscious deployment of its traditional instruments, such as aid, trade and diplomacy, the EU stands for a comprehensive notion of security and is increasingly making conflict prevention the guiding principle of its foreign policy actions and is thereby tackling not only the symptoms, but also the root causes of terrorism;

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<sup>1</sup> OJ C 112E/2002, 9 May 2002, p. 333.

<sup>2</sup> Adopted text (P5\_TAPROV(2002)0171).

<sup>3</sup> Adopted text (P5\_TAPROV(2002)0243).

- C. whereas the perspective of accession to the European Union has led to a continued stability in the region and has proved to be effective for conflict prevention,
- D. whereas, while 13 EU Member States are militarily represented in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, neither NATO nor the EU through its ESDP plays a role as a multilateral institution in the planning and management of this force,
- E. whereas the events of September 11 have however, speeded up the further development of the CFSP and the ESDP, as shown by the statements of the Heads of State in Laeken and Seville on the operational readiness of the ESDP and its ability to carry out certain crisis management operations, the increased diplomatic profile of the Troika and the High Representative and the further consolidation of the Commission instruments for a policy of conflict prevention,
- F. convinced that the terrorist attacks of September 11 have altered the basic European foreign and security policy context, and that four major strategic tasks for the EU have appeared more clearly than ever since the end of the East-West conflict:
- the strategic importance of the transatlantic relationship, especially in view of diverging views on the importance of international cooperation and of different approaches to security,
  - the need to clarify relations between NATO and the ESDP as a precondition for the genuine operational readiness of an EU military crisis management,
  - strategic relations to Russia, particularly in the light of an EU undergoing enlargement and an expanding NATO, and within the triangular relationship USA-EU-Russia,
  - the importance of multilateral cooperation in the framework of the UN,
- G. taking the view that the new threats which consist of a mixture of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, religious fanaticism and states with crumbling systems of order, cannot be countered by the USA alone or by ad hoc international coalitions, and it is therefore important for the EU to establish itself permanently in the strategic quartet comprising the USA, EU, Russia and the UN, open to cooperation with all other partners,
- H. whereas only a foreign policy based on the consolidation of rights and freedoms and on the affirmation of the principles of democracy and the rule of law throughout the world, and in particular in all third countries with which the EU maintains special relations via cooperation and association agreements, will enable the Union to overcome threats to peace, stability and freedom,
- I. convinced that an important precondition for this is that European foreign and security policy should become Community-based,

- J. whereas since Nice, and with a view to the next Intergovernmental conference scheduled for 2004, the three institutions - the Council, the Commission and Parliament - have pursued their efforts pragmatically to further develop their respective foreign and security policy instruments, but that a substantial expansion of intergovernmental bodies in the EU's foreign and security policy management has taken place, particularly through the extension of new security and defence policy structures in the Council Secretariat,

### **Tendencies of the CFSP in the period 2001-2002**

1. Notes that the western Balkans remains the test case by which the EU's ability to contribute to successful crisis management will be judged and that, through its Stabilisation and Association process, economic aid from the CARDS programme and decisive political mediation, the EU has helped the robust NATO military presence (SFOR/KFOR/Amber Fox), in stabilising an unstable region on the brink of collapse, reintegrating it in the European development process, while recognising the many serious problems that remain, including widespread levels of organised crime;
2. Believes, however, that the presence of state-like entities could undermine the future stability of the region; urges the Council and the Commission, in this regard, to start an in-depth reflection with a view to defining a strategy for the future of Kosovo, revitalising regional cooperation and integrating it fully and effectively in EU policies;
3. Notes that the unstinting political and diplomatic mediation efforts of the High Representative and the EU Special Representative in the Middle East conflict and the EU's substantial economic and financial commitment in this region have been unable to halt the spiral of violence and terror and believes that the EU only has a chance of influencing the peace process within the quartet with the USA, Russia and the United Nations, as well as with other countries concerned;
4. Believes, therefore, that the international community should swiftly set up the relevant working parties and then convoke an international peace conference based on the principle of the peaceful coexistence of two states - Israel and Palestine - with recognised and secure borders, in which the EU, alongside the USA and Russia, must invest its full political, economic and possibly also security policy capabilities;
5. Notes that, with its commitment in Afghanistan as the largest source of international funds for reconstruction and as the organiser and moving force behind the Petersberg Conference in Bonn in December 2001 for the creation of a transitional government in Afghanistan, the EU has interpreted its role of international crisis management as a global one which is not limited to the area immediately beyond its borders; is worried, however, by the current lack of visibility of such action;

6. Welcomes that at the informal Council meeting of Helsingør EU Foreign Ministers spoke against military intervention in Iraq; urges the Council to take a formal common position in this regard and make every effort to convince Iraq to allow UN inspectors to return under respective working conditions, urges Member States to refrain from unilateral initiatives which could aggravate the present tense situation;
7. Welcomes therefore the efforts undertaken by the EU within the framework of the international community to defuse the conflict between Pakistan and India over Kashmir, and calls on the two countries to do everything to reduce tension and to make the first steps towards resuming a constructive dialogue;
8. Expresses its deepest concern at the growing arms build-up across the Taiwan Straits and urges the Council to take a strong initiative aimed at defusing tension, facilitating the resumption of dialogue and strengthening the political ties with the democratic governments in the region;

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9. Criticises, however, the fact that, despite the visible presence of the troika in the flashpoints referred to above and improved crisis management, the EU's foreign and security policy is still determined by the co-existence of two centres of gravity: the High Representative, as spokesman of the common will of the Member States, and the Commission whose role so far has been narrowly confined to mobilising common resources and instruments;
10. Regrets that the decision making authorities of the EU for CFSP remained silent with regard to the major international issues which took place in July and August 2002, therefore leaving it to individual member states to take their own position, and consequently the USA alone to express itself on the international scene;
11. Reiterates its view that in order to avoid the inefficiency caused by this situation, the tasks of the High Representative and the Commissioner for External Relations must be merged and that this new office to be set up in the Commission must be given a pivotal role in daily crisis management and must be answerable both to the Council and the European Parliament;
12. Reiterates that effective external action by the Union requires steps to be taken towards shaping a common, though not single, European diplomacy, boosting the political role of the network of European Commission delegations, strengthening the mechanisms for cooperation between the Commission's External Service and the Member States' diplomatic corps by, inter alia, bringing training programmes into line with each other and establishing common training modules on CFSC-related topics, in order to develop a European strategic culture and a common administrative mentality;
13. Takes the view that the creation of a Council of Foreign Ministers, as part of the ongoing reform of the Council, which would be responsible only for matters of foreign and security policy and which could also include ministers for defence, external trade and development cooperation, could shape the EU's conflict prevention policy and crisis management much more coherently and effectively; repeats,



however, its demand that a separate Council of Ministers for Defence should be created for ESDP matters;

14. Takes the EU's poor crisis management in the case of the presidential elections in Zimbabwe in March 2002 as a basis for its proposal to allow decision-making in the Council by qualified majority; in matters of security and defence policy, the rule of enhanced cooperation should be introduced so as to allow a coalition to be built between those Member States who are desirous to and capable of carrying out certain Petersberg operations;
15. Demands also that the obligation of the Presidency of the Council to notify and consult the European Parliament under Article 21 TEU be supplemented by making the future High Representative/Commissioner for external relations answerable in writing, and that this accountability must also cover matters of security and defence policy; considers that the Council's annual report so far on the financial implications of decisions taken within the framework of CFSP does not go far enough in this direction;

#### **Progress in European Security and Defence policy**

16. Welcomes the fact that the Laeken Declaration of December 2001 on the limited operational readiness of the ESDP and a first virtual military exercise in May 2002 (CME 02), the time is now coming when the ESDP will have the opportunity to become involved in real operations, as evidenced by the police operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina which has already been decided on and the intended takeover of the NATO operation 'Amber Fox' in Macedonia, as an EU-led operation;
17. Considers that a solution to the hitherto blocked agreement between the EU and NATO on access to the latter's planning facilities and military capabilities must be found as a matter of priority, and calls on the Council to issue a clear negotiating mandate for direct talks between the High Representative for the CFSP and the NATO Secretary-General; welcomes in this respect the declaration by the Seville European Council; reiterates its standpoint that such an agreement may under no circumstances hamper the EU's decision-making autonomy and would consider it unacceptable if extraneous demands would be linked to this issue, therefore invites Turkey to take a more constructive approach to the question;
18. Supports the enlargement of NATO and welcomes the increased involvement of Russia;
19. Advocates a greater division of labour between the Member States regarding procurement so as to fill existing gaps in the military capabilities of the 'Rapid Reaction Force' as swiftly as possible, and reiterates its demand for a European armaments agency and joint research efforts beyond the confines of the EU budget; notes with alarm the sell-out of European arms manufacturers and the resulting problems of technological backwardness and growing dependency on the USA; invites

the Member States to make even more efforts in their rationalisation process, in order to increase effectiveness and improve the cost/benefit ratio in the sector;

20. Notes that the US defence budget will soon be greater than the defence budgets of the next 15 largest states combined, and considers that if the EU wishes to be credible in its Common Foreign and Security Policy a further effort in the defence budget of certain member states will be needed;
21. Takes the view that the EU and its Member States should not limit themselves to peacekeeping missions alone but, in view of new threats, should also be in a position to carry out peace enforcement operations in accordance with the UN Charter;
22. Welcomes the agreement of 17 May 2002 on the funding of military operations which distinguishes between joint costs (costs for headquarters - transport, shelter and communications facilities – and costs for the backup for the armed forces - infrastructure and medical care) and individual costs to be borne by each Member State (troops, arms and equipment); recommends, however, that the transport of troops to the deployment area and accommodation there should be treated not on a case by case basis, but as joint costs as a matter of principle;
23. Advocates that, following an amendment to Article 28 TEU, the joint costs for military operations within the framework of ESDP should be funded from the Community budget (this already occurs in the civil sphere in the case of police operations) and not from a subsidiary budget of the Member States, as provided for at present; a special budget for military costs would not only leave aside the important aspect of civil and military cooperation and further broaden the gulf between the first and second pillars, it would also be contrary to the principle of parliamentary accountability and democratic controls, since a subsidiary budget of this kind could be controlled neither by the national parliaments of the Member States nor by the European Parliament;

### **Strategic partnerships**

24. Takes the view that the changed political landscape after September 11th has highlighted as never before the importance of a strategic partnership between Europe and the United States in maintaining and fostering common values and interests; deplores therefore the apparent alienation between the strategic partners; and appeals to them to solve the differences of opinion through constructive dialogue;
25. Welcomes the entry into force of the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court; repeats its call on the United States to review its position concerning the Court and to give up its policy of obstructing multilateral cooperation in the framework of the UN on the grounds of the American Servicemen Protection Act; takes note of the UN Security Council compromise asking the tribunal to allow a 12-month grace period before investigating or prosecuting UN peacekeepers from countries that do not support the Court 'if a case arises' and 'unless the Security Council decides otherwise'; hopes, however, that the compromise remains limited to

the one-year period; insists that the US has to come back to a multilateral decision-making process in accordance with its role as major global player;

26. Underscores its recommendations of 15 May 2002 on reinforcing the transatlantic relationship<sup>1</sup> and stresses that closer institutional relations between NATO and the European Union are necessary in order to be able to react more consistently to new global challenges, for example by combating international terrorism;
27. Sees in Russia an increasingly important strategic partner, not least because of its role within the international coalition against terror, and perceives possibilities, particularly in the field of international crisis management and cooperation in security matters, for increasingly close cooperation, as already occurs within NATO; is convinced that this partnership will only be really successful in the long run when promotion of democracy and human rights in the former Soviet Union is an integral part of it; this would include a solution to the conflict on Chechnya based on the respect of Human Rights, for which the EU should offer its services as mediator;
28. Takes the view that the EU should join the USA, Russia and the Black Sea and Caucasian states and should devote itself more to conflict prevention in this increasingly fragile region which is marked by conflicts of interest about gas and oil pipelines and is also increasingly developing into a dangerous transit area for drug smuggling, illegal immigration and trafficking in women; with the Transdnestr region of Moldova being the saddest example;
29. Reiterates its proposal from last year's report that those neighbours of the EU which will not receive the status of candidate country in the foreseeable future should develop a new form of cooperation based on partnership within a multilateral framework, without excluding forms of direct association;
30. Emphasises the definitive strategic importance of the Euro-Mediterranean area and the need to strengthen as much as possible all dimensions of the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue, political dialogue, including the security dimension, economic and trade cooperation and the social and cultural dimension, and reiterates the proposal it has made for 'Barcelona V', namely that crisis prevention and ESDP should be integrated in the Barcelona Process with a view to achieving mutual security; recalls the need to boost regional integration and South-South trade, and calls for the revitalisation of the Arab Maghreb Union; welcomes the creation of a Foundation for Dialogue between Cultures and the opening of a strengthened EIB credit line as fundamental steps towards increasing institutionalisation of the Euro-Mediterranean process;
31. Expresses its deepest concern at the lack of improvements as to human rights and democracy in some of the Euro-Mediterranean partner countries; believes that all signatories of the Barcelona declaration must be committed to undertaking concrete measures in order to develop and implement all the aspects of the partnership; urges, in this regard, all parties to define clear mechanisms concerning the implementation of Article 2 of the association agreements; calls on the Commission, the Council and

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<sup>1</sup> Adopted text (P5\_TAPROV(2002)0243)

partner countries to keep these issues high on the agenda during the Association Council meetings, with a view to bringing about a real step forward;

32. Welcomes the proposal contained in the Valencia Action Plan for the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly, a proposal which was taken up at the recent meeting of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Forum in Bari, and calls for an urgent start to the work of the group of senior officials for the setting up of this new assembly, which is to address, as a matter of priority, democratisation and human rights issues and immigration and to tackle the still unresolved question of the Western Sahara; considers it necessary to continue the recent contacts the European Parliament has maintained with the Libyan authorities;
33. Insists that, in furtherance of the NEPAD goals, African states should demonstrate their commitment to good governance and human rights by supporting the EU and the wider international community in bringing about change for the better in Zimbabwe;
34. Calls once again for specific substance to be given to the EU/Latin America Bi-Regional Strategic Association which it was decided to establish at the first and second summit meetings between the two regions, held in Rio de Janeiro in June 1999 and in Madrid in May 2002 respectively, by adopting a common EU strategy for the region as soon as possible; calls for the conclusion, likewise as soon as possible, of a comprehensive interregional association agreement which covers, in geographical and political terms, the association agreements already signed with Mexico and Chile and the other planned agreements with Mercosur, Central America and the Andean Community; calls, with regard to the ESDP, for the negotiation and signing of a Euro-Latin American Charter for Peace;
35. Considers it also to be essential, at bilateral level, to continue the support it was decided to give to the peace process and the process of social change in Colombia, and to the democracy movement in Cuba, and to favourable political, economic and social developments in countries such as Argentina, Peru, Venezuela, Guatemala and Cuba;
36. Takes the view that, within the framework of a strategic partnership between the EU and Asia, it is particularly important to hold a dialogue on new threats since September 11, focusing particularly on the issues of terrorism, illegal immigration and trafficking in drugs and human beings;
37. Calls on the Commission and the Council to be bolder when drawing up a strategic policy with regard to the countries of Asia, based on the introduction of a system providing for positive discrimination in favour of democratic countries or those that are clearly moving along the road to democracy;
38. Stresses that the EU must become involved, particularly in South-East Asian countries, such as Malaysia and Indonesia, exerting its influence to ensure that these countries become advocates of a moderate Islamic world, and not a breeding ground for Islamic radicalism;

#### **Conflict prevention and crisis management**

39. Considers that it is the priority task of the Common Foreign and Security Policy to help prevent the outbreak, spread or resurgence of violent conflicts;
40. Points out that further progress should be made to implement the Göteborg Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict of June 2001, in the sense that conflict prevention should be mainstreamed in all EU external policies and criteria for action should be developed, including in such action cooperation with other actors, in particular the OSCE, and also with the NGOs working on the ground;
41. Acknowledges in this sense the successful preventive diplomacy conducted in the case of relations between Serbia and Montenegro, the economic and political engagement in Afghanistan and continuing attempts to ensure that the Middle East conflict does not descend into anarchy caused by terror;
42. Underscores the importance of human rights, democracy, good governance, the rule of law and an increase in free trade in the prevention and settlement of conflicts and also the various Community programmes to support police training and infrastructures in countries such as Guatemala, El Salvador, South Africa, Algeria and Macedonia;
43. Views the political agreement of 17 June 2002 on issuing a negotiating mandate for a trade and cooperation agreement with Iran as an important signal for the forces of reform in that country; reiterates that a future trade and cooperation agreement with Iran will need to contain a substantive human rights clause as an essential element and attaches great importance to the separate negotiations on a political dialogue on inter alia human rights issues, foreign and security policy, weapons of mass destruction and the proliferation of nuclear weapons and cooperation in combating terrorism and to the inclusion of such agreements in the overall agreement to be concluded; calls on the Council and the Commission to carefully monitor compliance with these agreements and to report to Parliament regularly on its findings;
44. Reiterates that every effort should be made to counter the proliferation of arms in the world and that, to be efficient, the EU Member States should rigorously control their arms exports, adhering fully to the adopted EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports;

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45. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and Commission and the national parliaments.

## **EXPLANATORY STATEMENT**

### **I. Introduction: September 11 and its implications for the CFSP/ESDP**

This annual report on the role of the European Union in the world is based on the Council report on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP for 2001 (PESC 100-7330/02).

It is dominated by the events of September 11 2001 and the challenges arising in their wake for a common foreign and security policy.

The assessment that can be made of subsequent developments cuts both ways:

Europe's political and diplomatic response to the terrorist attacks of September 11 was unequivocal and unanimous and came about because the EU institutions joined forces to hitherto unprecedented effect.

The Foreign Ministers thus held a special meeting on the day after; the chairmen of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Policy Committees of the parliaments of the EU Member States and the European Parliament held a joint special meeting at the European Parliament on 18 September 2001 with the representatives of the troika, Foreign Minister Michel, representing the Belgian Presidency, the High Representative, Javier Solana, and Chris Patten, the Member of the Commission responsible for external relations.

Immediately afterwards, on 19 September 2001, the troika went to Washington, and preparations were made for the extraordinary European Council in Brussels on 21 September 2001. The three institutions, the Council, the Commission, and Parliament, then issued a joint declaration.

By joining the anti-terrorism coalition the EU has made it plainly and emphatically clear that it is willing to shoulder global responsibility as well. It has successfully proved the point by organising the conference on Afghanistan in Bonn in December 2001, appointing an EU special envoy, Klaus Klaiber, to coordinate humanitarian and reconstruction aid, sending a high-ranking troika delegation to Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in September 2001 and to Central Asia in October 2001, and contributing at the economic level as the biggest donor, providing 25% of the total international aid to Afghanistan.

Through the unceasing political and diplomatic efforts of its High Representative, Javier Solana, and the troika to resolve the conflict in the Middle East, the EU has cemented its role within the informal group of four, comprising the US, the EU, the UN, and Russia, and consequently greatly enhanced its international conflict management profile.

The crises in Bosnia and Kosovo were dealt with by the 'contact group', consisting of the guarantee powers, the US and Russia, and four European States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy. The 'Global Responsibility Four', however, point to a promising new avenue for resolving international conflicts on a multilateral basis enabling the EU to carry political and diplomatic weight more commensurate with its economic importance.

By stressing that it is not just the symptoms of terrorism that have to be fought, but also and above all its root causes, and that dialogue must be conducted first and foremost with the

weak, vacillating States, the EU is making conflict prevention the guiding principle of its foreign policy action and thus to some extent counterbalancing the US 'axis of evil' doctrine.

By making greater deliberate use of its traditional means of action such as aid, trade, and diplomacy, the EU is embodying a comprehensive security concept – not least to meet the challenge posed by terrorist threats.

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On the other hand, one criticism to be made is that the EU has played no form of military role in tackling the Afghanistan crisis.

The US deployed an entirely new combination of computer-controlled air attacks and special ground forces to smash the Taliban regime and partially destroy the al Qaeda network. To a large extent it achieved this result on its own.

Although the Article V assistance clause was invoked for the first time, NATO was not called upon to organise and lead the International Security Assistance Force for Afghanistan (ISAF). The US and the United Kingdom were opposed to this. And when the Belgian Presidency proposed at the Laeken Summit that the matter be treated as European action, the Heads of State or Government concluded that the EU could not establish a common presence for crisis management purposes. The EU as such was not yet ready for that task, either politically or in terms of its military command structures, to say nothing of its military capability. Owing to the lack of suitable transport facilities it took two months to get German troops to Kabul.

Nevertheless, 13 EU Member States are today represented in the 5 000-strong ISAF force, which encompasses 18 nations in all. Only Luxembourg and Ireland are missing. Out of the NATO countries, two thirds are present in Afghanistan, and there are more European than American ground troops.

However, neither multilateral institution, be it NATO or the EU through its ESDP, is playing a military role. That point gives food for thought.

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The events of September 11 have served to confirm the existing 'road-map' for further development of the CFSP and ESDP and generated a powerful impetus to speed up their implementation. This can be seen in, for example, the declaration by the Heads of State or Government in Laeken on the operational capability of the ESDP and the Union's ability to carry out given crisis management operations, the more prominent diplomatic role of the troika and the High Representative, the continuing consolidation of the Commission's conflict prevention policy tools, the improved early warning system, and the fact that the 'rapid reaction mechanism', to provide first injections of financing in conflict situations, is fully ready to use.

Conversely, the terrorist attacks of September 11 have shifted the frame of reference for a European foreign and security policy and make traditional standpoints appear in a completely new light.

Above all, the main strategic challenges have come to the fore more visibly than at any time since the end of the East–West antagonism, and the EU must accordingly address itself to:

- the strategic importance of transatlantic relations, as described in the European Parliament's Elles report<sup>1</sup>,
- the imperative need to clarify relations between NATO and the ESDP in order to make EU military crisis management actually operational<sup>2</sup>,
- strategic relations with Russia, especially in the light of an enlarged EU and the expansion in the membership of NATO and within the US-EU-Russia triangular relationship<sup>3</sup>.

The end of the East–West antagonism has brought the new totalitarian threat more sharply into focus than ever before: Western societies are today confronted by a deadly combination of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, radical Islam, and States in which the established order is crumbling.

The threat stems from a region extending eastwards from Israel as far as Central Asia. The problems of the Middle East, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir must be seen in the context and as part of an overall strategic equation.

Neither the US alone nor *ad hoc* international coalitions can deal with threats of this kind. What the EU will need to do in the future is to establish itself permanently as a strong partner within the strategic Four (the US, the EU, Russia, and the UN). That is why the Convention chairman, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, is right to call for EU foreign and security policy to be strengthened. Your rapporteur's view is that it needs to assume a more markedly Community character. The European Commission has provided a good basis for discussion with its proposals of 22 May 2002 and its assertion that 'it is time for the Union to shoulder its responsibilities as a world power'<sup>4</sup>.

## **II. Foreign and Security Policy priorities in EU crisis management**

### **1. The Balkans**

The western Balkans remain the test case for the EU's ability to engage in successful crisis management.

The EU has succeeded in bringing a crumbling and unstable region back into the mainstream of European development through the process of stabilisation and association, economic aid under the Cards Programme and decisive political mediation and on the basis of a robust NATO military presence (SFOR/KFOR/AMBER FOX). The ESDP is now to face the first test in the real world with the despatch of a police task force to Bosnia Herzegovina and the take-over of the NATO operation 'Task Force Fox' in Macedonia. This will be the first time that all elements of crisis management - civil and military alike - are united under the European flag, on the basis of the EU's economic power and financial aid.

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<sup>1</sup> EP resolution of 15 May 2002 on Reinforcing the Transatlantic Relationship.

<sup>2</sup> EP resolution of 10 April 2002 on the present state of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and EU-NATO relations.

<sup>3</sup> EP resolution of 15 May 2002 on the EU-Russia summit.

<sup>4</sup> 'A project for the European Union', communication from the Commission (COM(2002) 247).



The Foreign Ministers decided on 18 February 2002 that the EU would take over the tasks of the International Police Task Force.

On 10 April 2002 the European Parliament supported the idea that part of the annual running costs of EUR 38 million would be funded out of the CFSP budget. The remaining costs are to be covered by contributions from the Member States, according to the principle that costs should be borne where they occur.

Sven Frederiksen, a Danish citizen, has been appointed Head of the Police Task Force. He is answerable to the EU Special Envoy for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lord Ashdown, who reports back to the High Representative, Mr Solana, and to the PSC. This transparent management structure is intended to ensure the greatest possible coordination between the police task force and the stabilisation and association process.

The mandate of the mission is confined to training and support for the Bosnian police force, and does not include actual policing.

The success of the mission depends ultimately on the extent to which it will succeed in contributing towards a state of law in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Commission will also make available additional funds from the Cards Programme for this purpose.

The question of the take-over by an EU-led elite force of the NATO operation 'Task Force Fox' in Macedonia to protect EU and OSCE observers and to monitor the peace agreement of Ochrid is still unresolved. This would be a first operation at the lower end of the Petersberg tasks; admittedly, the 700-men-strong NATO force already consists exclusively of European soldiers and the commanding officer is a European (Holland took over the command from Germany in June 2002).

However, the precondition for a European take-over of the TFF mission is secure access to NATO planning and command structures (Shape and D-Saceur), since an EU mission in Macedonia would have to work closely with KFOR units in Kosovo and their support units in Macedonia. However, an EU-NATO agreement is still blocked. First it was Turkey, on the NATO side, that found the negotiated text unacceptable, and now it is Greece on the EU's side. Whatever solution is found to this problem, the European Parliament considers that the decision-making autonomy of the European Union must not be compromised by such an agreement. It has therefore proposed direct negotiations between the EU High Representative, Mr Solana, and NATO Secretary-General, Lord Robertson.<sup>1</sup>

## **2. Middle East**

The other item at the top of the EU's political and diplomatic agenda, apart from the western Balkans, particularly after the events of September 11 and the escalation of the spiral of violence and terror, which has absorbed substantial funds, particularly funds

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<sup>1</sup> European Parliament resolution of 13 June 2002 on the preparations of the European Council in Seville.

allocated for shoring up the Palestinian Authority (on average some EUR 250 million a year, which accounts for over 50% of total international aid). At the same time, the EU is Israel's most important trading partner.

The EU has endeavoured repeatedly, particularly through the numerous mediation efforts by the High Representative, Mr Solana, in Israel and the Palestinian territories, to influence the peace process, which, however, can ultimately only succeed in cooperation with the USA, Russia and the United Nations.

The Madrid Conference of April 2002 has already provided a propitious framework for such a multilateral approach. It is important that the EU plays a constructive role in the international peace conference mooted for 2002 and invests its economic, political and, possibly, security policy capability in this conference.

On 10 April 2002 the European Parliament had called on the EU Member States to prepare their contribution for a possible international intervention and monitoring force in the region under the auspices of the United Nations. Parliament had also requested the Council to impose an arms embargo on Israel and Palestine and to suspend the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement with Israel, albeit without success.

The European Parliament demonstrated political and moral support for the Israeli-Palestinian peace coalition at a joint sitting of 13 May 2002 in Strasbourg, in order to show publicly that a majority of people on both sides of this conflict which is so full of hate and terror desire peace.

As regards the much discussed trade and cooperation agreement with Iran, the Council of Ministers only managed to agree to a negotiating mandate after several months, namely in June 2002. As early as December 2001, the European Parliament pleaded in favour of initiating a political dialogue on human rights, weapons of mass destruction, combating terrorism and the conclusion of a trade agreement in order to strengthen the forces of reform in the country. The despatch of an ad hoc delegation to Teheran in July 2002 was also intended to serve this purpose.

### **3. Afghanistan**

Afghanistan shows that the EU interprets its commitment to international crisis management as a global one, which is not confined to its immediate neighbourhood. However, Afghanistan has also shown that the strengths of the EU lie in the economic domain, as a financially powerful donor (EUR 200 million for 2002), and in the political and diplomatic domain, as an organiser and the moving force behind the Bonn-Petersberg conference of December 2001 on the establishment of a transitional government in Afghanistan.

While the EU, as a civil power, reacted promptly and decisively to the crisis in Afghanistan, it played no role in the military management of the crisis, even though 13 Member States are involved in the international security assistance force (ISAF) which acts with a UN mandate (see above).

### **4. India-Pakistan/Kashmir**

The events of September 11 have again highlighted the importance of relations with India and Pakistan. The Union welcomed the support given by both countries to the international coalition against terror, and the Council decided to resume the political dialogue with Pakistan and to sign the EU-Pakistan Cooperation Agreement which had been long delayed.

The Kashmir conflict which broke out again in April/May 2002 and brought both countries to the brink of a nuclear conflict, has showed how dangerous it is to leave latent crises to develop, rather than taking preventive action to solve them.

The European Parliament endeavoured to make a contribution through the hearing on Kashmir held by its Committee on Foreign Affairs on 20 June 2002.

### **III. Progress in ESDP**

In December 2001 the European Council in Laeken noted that the European Union was now in a position to carry out some crisis management operations of both a civil and military nature.

Since at the same time substantial deficits were identified in basic military capabilities and resources at the Capability Improvement Conference in November 2001, primarily as regards mobility and communications, and on the other hand no agreement has been reached with NATO on access to its planning facilities and military capabilities, this means that operations by the European Rapid Response Force can only be carried out at the lower end of the Petersberg tasks - for example, humanitarian rescue operations or monitoring operations, for example to maintain the cease-fire between Albanians and Macedonians in FYROM.

At least the new leadership and decision-making structures of the ESDP have already been set up. The first ESDP manoeuvres entitled CME02 (Crisis Management Exercise 2002) with the scenario 'Save Atlantia' - a virtual island in the ocean where Europeans are entrusted with the task of ensuring peace - took place in May 2002, not on the battlefield, but on paper, in the computer and on the telephone.

The virtual crisis days showed how the PSC, the EU Military Committee and the Military HQ cooperate. The Commission, which is responsible for humanitarian aid and reconstruction in crises, was also involved. It was particularly important to test the link-up to the 15 capitals, since ultimately it is the representatives of the Member States that decide on the options drawn up by the Military HQ, i.e. whether to send in the EU Rapid Response Force (which is still at the planning stage) or police units or only civilian observers.

The sooner ESDP comes to being operational on the ground, the clearer it is that without recourse to NATO'S military structure, the EU Rapid Response Force in the field would find its options severely limited. The European Parliament has pointed this out and also indicated that it is indispensable for Europe to have a competitive and quality armaments industry if it is to be able to act autonomously .

Above all the events after September 11 and the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan have revealed the great military and technological gulf between the USA and its European allies. The intervention of the ISAF in Afghanistan has shown serious deficiencies in the operational readiness of and mobility of European troops and in secure and inter-operable communications and their ability to sustain a lengthy campaign.

Already the proposal is being mooted in some quarters, as one of the lessons of the Afghanistan conflict that, as part of its Rapid Response Force, Europe should set up a permanent command unit of 5 000 special forces in order to acquire greater strategic leverage.

Modernisation and greater professionalisation do not come cheaply. The European Parliament has advocated the establishment of a European armaments agency and a greater division of labour between the Member States in procurement. In the first place this is about optimising the use of financial resources ('more bang for the buck'); however, it is also a question of adapting military budgets to real threats, and not vice versa.

The head of the European Parliament delegation for relations with the NATO parliamentary assembly, General Philippe Morillon, has therefore publicly proposed the establishment of a common European military budget for research and procurement in which the Member States would pay 0.5% of their GNP.<sup>1</sup> If we add existing national military budgets, for instance 2.4% in France, this would amount to 2.9%, close to the current US military budget of 3.1% of GNP (by comparison with the EU average: 1.97%; the UK 2.5%; Germany 1.5%; and Greece: 4.9%).

The Council of Ministers was long divided about how future military EU operations should be financed. Article 28 of the EU Treaty states that military expenditure may not be funded out of the Community budget. However, countries such as the Benelux countries, France, Italy and Greece argued that at least the 'joint costs' of EU operations should be borne jointly, for instance for accommodation, transport, interpreters etc.. The neutral states and the United Kingdom, on the other hand, took the view that defence spending for ESDP operations should remain strictly in national hands.

The Council of Foreign Ministers meeting on 17 June 2002 managed to reach a compromise: there will be two categories of costs: joint costs (for staff quarters - transport, administration, communications and public relations); and for the troops (medical care, additional equipment and infrastructures) and individual costs to be borne individually by each state involved in the military action. Decisions are to be taken on two important items of expenditure on a case-by-case basis: the transport of troops to the place of deployment and their accommodation there.

The European Parliament should become more involved in this debate and highlight the community nature of ESDP, not least from the point of view of civil-military cooperation. The particular comparative advantage enjoyed by the EU in crisis

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<sup>1</sup> Le Figaro, 3 June 2002

management is the fact that it disposes of a broad spectrum of civil capabilities which must now be linked to the new military ESDP capabilities in fulfilment of the Petersberg task. This would entail amending Article 28 of the EU Treaty so that the joint costs for military interventions could be funded from the Community budget in future and not by direct contributions from the Member States.

There is one lesson above all to be learnt from crisis management in the Balkans and the Middle East and elsewhere: there must be more synergy than in the past between political and diplomatic efforts to solve conflicts, military and police efforts to establish security and economic and social efforts to create the preconditions for lasting peace and development.

The EU is very well placed to put this lesson into effect.

#### **IV. Strategic partnerships**

##### **1. Transatlantic Relations**

The changed international political landscape in the wake of September 11 2001 has highlighted how important a strategic partnership between Europe and the USA is in an insecure world, if we are to preserve and foster common values and interests.

In the worldwide fight against terrorism Europe and the USA are working together in order to bring the perpetrators to justice, to expel them from their hiding places and cut them off from their sources of funding. In Afghanistan Europeans and Americans are working together to secure a better future for the country; European states are the most important sources of funds for reconstruction and are making the greatest contribution to the international stabilisation force. In the Balkans cooperation between Europeans and the USA has brought tangible success in bringing stability to the region and in preventing fresh crises. At the WTO Conference in Doha in November 2001 a comprehensive agenda for development and combating poverty was adopted in cooperation between the EU and the USA.

The task is now to further develop the transatlantic agenda on the basis of what has been achieved so far and to further expand it. The priority is to seek a lasting and just solution to the Middle East crisis. This can, however, only be achieved if the shared views on both sides of the Atlantic about peaceful coexistence between two states within recognised and secure borders are realised.

Open differences of opinion exist with the USA concerning the International Court of Justice, global warming and customs duties for steel products. The European Parliament would welcome it if the USA, like the Europeans, supported multinational institutions which will boost their ability to influence events and not constitute a barrier to freedom of trade.

##### **2. Russia**

Thanks to its positive role in its international coalition against terror, Russia has become an important strategic partner for the West. This is clear not only in relation to the USA and NATO – with the treaties on the dismantling of nuclear arsenals and the establishment of the Russia-NATO Council of 28 May 2002, but also vis-à-vis the EU, as evidenced by the EU-Russia summit of 29 May 2002 where the following areas were designated as areas of long-term cooperation: foreign and security policy, the establishment of a common European economic area, the development of a dialogue in the energy sector and cooperation between police forces.

The European Parliament has also advocated considering to what extent Russian special military units with their experience could be used in stationing and deploying peace-keeping troops in future joint operations in the area of crisis management. In this connection we would do well to remember that the European Rapid Response Force will have no strategic air transport capability at least until 2008, when the first Airbus 400M transport planes become operational. Until then, a realistic option would be to lease Russian transport aircraft.

It is particularly important to involve Russia in the EU and USA peace initiatives in the Middle East and also in preventing conflict in the increasingly fragile Black Sea region where there are conflicts of interests about gas and oil pipelines; this region is also increasingly developing into a dangerous transit region for smuggling drugs, illegal immigration and trafficking in women.

The sticking points in relations with Russia remain the questions of freedom of the media, Chechnya and the future of Kaliningrad.

### **3. The Mediterranean**

The Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue is becoming increasingly important in its political and security policy dimension. The European Parliament therefore proposed for the 'Barcelona V' Ministerial Conference in April 2002 in Valencia that crisis prevention and the ESDP should be integrated in the Barcelona process with a view to ensuring reciprocal security.<sup>1</sup> By despatching an ad hoc delegation to Libya in June 2002 the European Parliament wished to show the importance it attaches to cooperation with all the Mediterranean States. Parliament views the Barcelona process as a key element in finding a solution to the Middle East conflict.

### **4. Africa/Latin America/Asia**

The events of September 11 have again clearly demonstrated the importance of a forward looking crisis prevention policy in which the EU works closely together with the United Nations and the OSCE.

In Africa a policy of conflict prevention is needed to address the trade in small arms and support peace enforcement capabilities. This also includes the question of water management in developing countries.<sup>2</sup> In November 2001 the EU supported the

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<sup>1</sup> European Parliament resolution of 11 April 2002.

<sup>2</sup> COM(2002) 132: Water management in developing countries: policy and priorities for EU development

creation of a transitional multinational security presence in Burundi to protect the transitional government and co-funded it to the tune of EUR 9.5 million.

Prior to the presidential elections in Zimbabwe in March 2002, the EU had a number of opportunities to induce President Mugabe to restore a state of law and prevent an escalation of violence: diplomatic pressure, a reduction in financial aid, the dispatch of election monitors, the threat of economic sanctions. However, the Member States were unable to agree on a course of action apart from criticising Mugabe, which left the impression of inept crisis management by the EU.

In Latin America the EU has engaged in continuous cooperation with the various regional groups of states (Mercosur, the Andean Community, the San José Group) and also devoted particular attention to the peace process in Colombia to which it has allocated over EUR 330 million out of contributions by the Member States and the EU under a special programme.

The dialogue with Cuba was officially resumed in December 2001 at senior official level. In January 2002 the EU sent a large election monitoring team to Nicaragua to monitor the elections.

In Asia, Afghanistan and the India/Pakistan conflict were naturally at the top of the EU's foreign policy agenda.

Sanctions were twice extended against Burma/Myanmar.

## **V. The incomplete agenda – a glance at the Convention**

A genuine common foreign and security policy can do as much to mould the identity of the EU and its citizens as the single market and the common currency have done.

But the EU needs to acquire the efficiency and consistency which it found, for instance, in the common trade policy. The question of an institutional reform of foreign and security policy is therefore on the agenda for the European Constitutional Convention.

The task of the Convention will be to propose solutions which neither make foreign policy a purely Community matter, which would be hardly compatible with a military dimension for Europe, nor link it more closely to the national governments, which would mean that the powers of the Member States or the High Representative would be expanded at the expense of the Commission.

The present coexistence of two centres of gravity in European foreign policy, with the High Representative as a spokesman for the common will of the Member States, and the Commission whose role has so far been limited to mobilising common resources and instruments and which can undertake no diplomatic initiatives, is a source of inefficiency, despite the undisputed progress made in the Union's crisis management, as described above.

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cooperation, 12 March 2002.

The European Parliament has therefore repeatedly called for the tasks of the High Representative and the Commissioner for External Relations to be merged. This High Representative/Commissioner for External Relations should be accorded a determining role in daily crisis management and be answerable to the Council and the European Parliament.

The High Representative/Commissioner for External Relations would have to be able to draw on a reinforced network of external delegations.

The common foreign and security policy should be allocated sufficient resources from the Community budget, which is not the case at present. In military operations within the framework of ESDP joint costs (for instance, for headquarters – transport, accommodation, equipment and communications facilities) should be borne jointly and also entered in the Community budget. To this end Article 28 TEU should be revised, since a subsidiary budget in the Council can be controlled neither by the national parliaments nor by the European Parliament. This is unacceptable, also from the point of view of democratic controls.

In the decision-making process at Council level, the principle of unanimity must be waived and it must be possible to take decisions by qualified majority. In matters of security and defence policy there should be scope for increased cooperation, so as to allow a coalition of those Member States prepared to carry out military Petersberg operations and capable of doing so.

In the European Parliament transparency and democratic controls must be strengthened. Instead of the Council Presidency being bound by a simple notification and consultation requirement under Article 21, a requirement which it meets more or less as it chooses, it should be answerable in writing on the basis of specific recommendations by Parliament, notably in questions of security and defence policy.

The Council's report on the financial implications of decisions within the framework of the CFSP does not yet go far enough, since it fails to refer to specific positions of the European Parliament.

At least in the long term consideration must be given to overcoming the three pillar structure, if aspects of external and internal security are to be dealt with consistently and efficiently. For example, support measures for police operations are currently dealt with simultaneously in all three pillars, in each case with a different mandate, objective and means of funding.

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