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Verbatim report of proceedings
Wednesday, 17 May 2017 - Strasbourg Revised edition

Powers and control of the European Central Bank (topical debate)
MPphoto
 

  Roberto Gualtieri, on behalf of the S&D Group. – Mr President, it is no surprise that Mr Starbatty’s positions are in a minority in this House because they are factually weak and wrong. A broad majority of this House supports the ECB, its independence and its policies because the ECB is the main pillar of EMU and has been a fundamental anchor of its stability and integrity.

That such a great responsibility would fall on the shoulders of the ECB was unavoidable, taking into account the peculiar construction of EMU, with the explosive components of monetary policy, coordination competence on economic policy, and a small budget for the single market but not for the single currency. With the soaring debt crisis these responsibilities have been successfully honoured in full compliance with the task and the powers conferred by the Treaties and the Protocol in order to achieve the primary objective of maintaining price stability and to support the general economic policies of the Union, which of course include the integrity of the EMU.

The Treaties are crystal clear. In order to achieve its objectives, the ECB and national central banks can conduct open market and credit operations. So it is not surprising that the OMT programme has been declared by the Court of Justice fully compatible with EU law. In the post-crisis phase of low growth and low interest rates, and with the additional negative impact of financial fragmentation on proper monetary policy transmission, other unconventional policy tools have proven to be necessary to meet the inflation objective. I do not need to recall them, but is important to underline that, without quantitative easing (QE), Europe would have fallen into deflation. QE has been – and is – an economic success and for all stakeholders the potential negative side effects have clearly been outpaced by the positive ones. Moreover, economic data clearly show that the necessary sustained adjustment in the path of inflation has not yet materialised. Enhanced non-standard monetary policy measures are to continue until that time.

The ECB is, and has to be, fully independent. Nevertheless, we welcome and appreciate the accountability framework vis—à-vis the European Parliament and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and the improvements in transparency of the ECB’s monetary policy. As far as the SSM is concerned, a stronger accountability framework is appropriate and we are in line with our interinstitutional agreement to fulfil our democratic role.

It is evident that the current EMU construction, while it is not unsustainable, is sub-optimal and we need to complete it. We cannot rely only on common monetary policy and national fiscal and economic policies. Instead of contesting the excellent job of the ECB, it would be good if political groups and Member States would contribute to providing the instruments and policies that we need in order to face our current challenges.

 
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