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Debates
Tuesday, 4 July 2017 - Strasbourg Revised edition

12. EU defence plan and the future of Europe (topical debate)
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  Elnök asszony. – A következő napirendi pont vita időszerű kérdésekről (az eljárási szabályzat 153a. cikke): „Az EU védelmi terve és Európa jövője” (2017/2752(RSP)).

 
  
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  Sabine Lösing, Verfasserin, im Namen der GUE/NGL-Fraktion. – Frau Präsidentin, sehr geehrte Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Vor etwa einem Jahr wurde die EU-Globalstrategie angenommen. Sie ist Auftakt für einen bislang beispiellosen Ausbau der europäischen Militärstrukturen. Wichtige Interessen sind darin ein offenes und faires Wirtschaftssystem und der Zugang zu Ressourcen.

Um hierfür künftig buchstäblich gerüstet zu sein, fordert die EU-Globalstrategie gleichzeitig den Aufbau militärischer Spitzenfähigkeiten, und genau damit wird nun massiv begonnen. Auch wenn permanent das Gegenteil behauptet wird – die große Mehrheit der Bevölkerung möchte diese Militarisierung nicht. Was die Menschen wollen, ist eine friedliche, demokratische und soziale Europäische Union – heute mehr denn je. Und was tun Sie? Genau das Gegenteil! Einige Beispiele: Im Rahmen der sogenannten Ständigen Strukturierten Zusammenarbeit sollen wichtige Teile der EU-Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik in die Hände einiger weniger Staaten gelegt werden. Wie mag das wirken auf die in vielen Ländern schon jetzt vorhandene EU-Skepsis? Als ein Ziel des Friedensprojekts EU soll kein Land je wieder die Vorherrschaft in Europa haben. Ja, wie sehr will man eigentlich die Realität noch verleugnen? Mehr und mehr sagen die großen und reicheren Länder – allen voran Deutschland – den anderen, wo es wirtschaftlich und militärisch langgehen soll. Das ist schlimm, das ist gefährlich.

Nächstes Beispiel: Seit Juni existiert das neue EU-Hauptquartier. Es soll erklärtermaßen künftig Militäreinsätze vereinfachen, beschleunigen. Das ist aber nicht, was die Bürgerinnen und Bürger wollen. In Deutschland etwa wollen über 80 % der Bevölkerung weniger, nicht mehr Militäreinsätze.

Ja, für viele sind all die westlichen Militärinterventionen der letzten Jahre ein Teil des Problems und nicht der Lösung.

Auch Sie, Frau Mogherini, sagen immer: Die Menschen wollen Sicherheit, sie wollen Sicherheit von der EU. Na klar, wer will denn keine Sicherheit? Aber mehr Waffen und mehr Militär bringen nicht mehr Sicherheit. Hier geht es doch hauptsächlich um den Zugang zu Rohstoffen. Und ganz nebenbei: Sicherheit bedeutet für die Mehrheit der Menschen eben auch soziale Sicherheit, und da hat die EU leider nicht viel zu bieten, schon gar nicht für die Menschen in Südeuropa. Deshalb wollen die meisten angesichts der sozialen Schieflagen auch nicht mehr Geld für Rüstung ausgeben – Geld, das woanders viel dringender gebraucht wird.

Doch nein, es wird zielsicher in die andere Richtung gegangen. Erstmals soll nun im nächsten EU-Haushalt ein Rüstungshaushalt – Verteidigungsfonds genannt – mit insgesamt 38,5 Mrd. EUR eingerichtet werden, obwohl die EU-Verträge es verbieten, Ausgaben für die Militärpolitik dem EU-Haushalt zu entnehmen. Es steht im Absatz zur GSVP. Doch nach der Devise „Was nicht passt, wird passend gemacht“ soll das Verbot umgangen werden, wird einfach ein anderes Kapitel für die Rüstungsgelder genommen – nicht mehr im Kapitel zur GSVP, sondern flugs mal umplatziert in die Wettbewerbsförderung. Also da kann einem wirklich der Glaube an das Recht verloren gehen.

Sehr geehrte Kolleginnen und Kollegen, noch einmal: Die Bürgerinnen und Bürger wollen ein demokratisches, friedliches und soziales Europa. Handeln Sie endlich danach! Handeln wir endlich danach und verlassen den Kriegspfad, auf dem sich die EU derzeit befindet!

 
  
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  Federica Mogherini, Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. – Madam President, as the rapporteur rightly pointed out, work to strengthen the European Union in the security and defence field started with the presentation of the global strategy in the Council exactly one year ago. By the way, this is why, for the first time in two and a half years, I am sitting on this side of the Hemicycle because it is clear in our Treaties and in the work that we have done that the work on EU security and defence lies in the hands of the Council competences.

Last year we started on strong, unanimous – still at 28 – and sustained work to respond to the need for security of our citizens. Let me say first of all that security and a European approach to security is a priority for all European citizens. No matter in which country – east, west, north, south – and no matter what kind of political background our citizens have, European defence and security is mentioned as a top priority in all the Eurobarometer surveys that have been conducted in the last year or so.

Second, we realise that we have to make full use of the instruments that the Lisbon Treaty gives to the European Union. This is an issue on which Parliament has always been very strong, demanding the full use of all the instruments we have – I remember very well that in the hearing I had in the Committee on Foreign Affairs at the beginning of my mandate, this was a point that was very strongly made – so it is not something that was started as a reaction to some external factors, or semi—external factors like the British referendum, but there were some accelerating elements or, I would say, factors that intensified the political will to make security and defence in the European Union one of the fields where the Council wants to relaunch the European Union integration process.

This is why in Rome, during the celebrations for the 60th anniversary of our Treaty, this field was clearly indicated as one of the priority fields for the relaunch of the European Union.

Clearly not the only one, and here comes the picture in which we do our work on security and defence, because I want to clarify, first, that our work is not leading to a militarisation of the European Union. This is not leading to a European Union army. If there is anyone in the world that knows the power of soft power, the need to combine different instruments, the need to have an integrated approach in responding to crises and conflicts, in using all different tools from the diplomatic to the humanitarian, development, economic and cultural, it is the European Union.

There is a genuine European way to security and defence. It is made of civilian and military means together, hard and soft power together, cooperation with our partners, and also strategic autonomy. Let me say that, in particular in times such as these, if we want to be able and free to do security in our own European way, we need to strengthen our own capabilities and capacity to act also as a security provider for our citizens, and also for our partners in the world.

The European Union not only is, but will stay, the most relevant donor of humanitarian and development aid. That is going to remain. We are going to stay the main pillar of the multilateral system based on the UN agencies and UN values and principles, as well as on the approach that preventing a conflict is always better than dealing with it militarily.

We know very well that there is no single crisis or threat in the world that can be dealt with through a purely military approach. This is the European way to security and I want there to be no doubt about the fact that this approach is not changing. But, at the same time, we can – and we must – do better and more efficiently on defence and security in the narrow sense of the word. I often say that security for us is also development cooperation, climate change action, investment in peacekeeping, and so on.

Having said that, we also have a responsibility to use the instruments we have when it comes to security and defence in the narrow sense. As I said, this work has been taken forward in the follow-up to the EU global strategy since last summer. It includes the work done by the Commission – on which Jyrki Katainen and Elżbieta Bieńkowska will share more details with you – and includes work that has been taken forward in full cooperation with NATO in line with the joint declaration signed at the NATO Warsaw Summit last July.

I also want to be very clear on this: the work we are doing to strengthen European defence is also a matter of strengthening NATO and is beneficial for both. Last week I reported with Jens Stoltenberg on the 42 joint actions that the European Union and NATO have taken together as organisations different in nature but both contributing to European security.

Let me also recall that the decision on defence budgets – spending more on defence – is not a matter for the European Union institutions but for national governments and national parliaments. So a debate about how much we should spend is not for here. This is a national competence. The whole two—percent debate is for Member States that are also allied in NATO. It is not for the European Union to tackle this. But, regardless of how much Member States decide to spend, what the European Union can – and must – do is help them spend better and more efficiently, which means spending together.

I always quote two numbers: Europeans invest in defence 50% of what Americans do, but the output of European investments in defence is 15%. So there is an investment gap. This is not for us to tackle. It is a national sovereign choice, but the output gap – how efficient the investment is in output – is something the European Union can help with. So it is not about militarising, but about rationalising. It is about the efficiency of the investments, namely how we can use our resources with economies of scale – that is the point – and also how we can use the instruments for acting together as a Union in the world.

I will mention a few concrete steps that either have already been taken or are ongoing with decisions already taken in the Council – either the Foreign Affairs Council or the European Council recently – with the support of the EEAS and the European Defence Agency. You often think that I have two hats, but I actually have three hats because I also have the European Defence Agency and, in this case, the Agency is proving its added value.

First, we will enhance the coordination of national defence plans through the new coordinated annual review on defence. A trial run of the review will already be carried out this autumn.

Second, we will launch an inclusive and ambitious permanent structure cooperation (PESCO). This is based on more binding commitments between Member States to jointly develop and deploy military capabilities. A few weeks ago the European Council agreed that a common list of criteria and binding commitments will be drawn up within three months. This should pave the way for notifications to the Council to start the formal process of establishing a permanent structure cooperation and I am confident that this process can be done before the December European Council if Member States are coherent with their commitment to proceed in this way.

Third, the Commission – and here I will not enter into the work that has been done with Jyrki Katainen and Elżbieta Bieńkowska – has set up proposals for a European Defence Fund with, by the way, excellent interinstitutional cooperation and coordination that I think is also exemplary for other fields of action. I think that will continue in the months to come. The ideal would be to have PESCO projects financed by the European Defence Fund.

Fourth, work has been launched to make the Battlegroups – launched and established exactly ten years ago – fully deployed. We have never deployed them and this will be addressed during the review of the Athena mechanism in the second half of this year.

Fifth, we have established the first ever command centre in Brussels for the operational planning and conduct of military training and advisory missions. This capability is already providing support and guidance to our training missions in Mali, Somalia and the Central African Republic and is working closely with our civilian command centre to strengthen the synergies between our missions.

Sixth, and finally, we are also working to improve our civilian crisis management to make it more responsive and make sure it has all the capabilities it needs. All six of these measures have either already been taken or are underway with a speed that is quite remarkable – a few months of work – and a unity – all these decisions were taken unanimously at 28 in the Council – and with a great sense of unity and responsibility.

Let me add that the work on the future of European defence should not make us underestimate the current work of European defence. We have today men and women in EU uniforms serving under the EU flag, already contributing to the security of our citizens and our own region. Just last month, a Portuguese surgeon who served in our training mission in Mali was killed in the terrorist attack in Bamako.

We should honour the men and women that are serving peace under the EU flag. Our EU men and women are supporting our African partners in their work for peace and security in extremely challenging environments. Our training missions are supporting the local security forces as they fight against terrorism or against criminal networks. This is the European way.

We are a cooperative power and a multilateral power, always believing in an integrated approach, always believing in prevention. We are a force for peace and human development. This is how and what we are, and this is how and what we will continue to be, with more instruments to serve this way of working on security. We are – even more so – a security provider for our citizens and for our partners and this is how we use our military: in the service of peace, in the service of the UN Charter, and in the service of multilateralism.

Developing EU strategic autonomy to do so is even more important today than it was in all the previous decades. A stronger European Union in the field of security and defence is good for Europeans and good for the rest of the world.

(Applause)

 
  
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  Jyrki Katainen, Vice-President of the Commission. – Madam President, it is a pleasure to be here to discuss the future of European defence and security. We have had excellent team work in the Commission and with the High Representative/Vice-President, so the Member States and the Commission have worked together in order to identify possible tools to deploy for defending our values.

This discussion here in the European Parliament is as important, because we have to identify the strong political will, in which direction, and how deep we want to go in order to protect our values. Actually the rapporteur said rightly that a peaceful, democratic EU is our peoples’ core value. These are not only core values here in Europe, but they are the same values that we represent outside Europe, and that is why we need the capability to defend our core values both inside Europe and outside Europe. And this is the reason we are talking about the future of security and defence today.

The High Representative/Vice President already mentioned a few concrete political issues, like finding solutions to pad up group financing. This would be a significant improvement in our capability to defend our values. Also, a NATO-EU declaration is not only a political declaration, but also a very concrete action plan on how the two organisations can work together in order to get better output, as the High Representative/Vice-President mentioned.

I encourage Member States and the European Parliament to be active in developing deeper security and defence cooperation. PESCO offers an excellent opportunity for this, and, generally speaking, our Treaties allow the Member States to do basically whatever they want. One important and necessary opportunity would be to create a European cyber and hybrid defence capability, but everything depends on the political will – the political will of this House, and the political will of the Member States.

Let us be clear: it is not the Commission’s power trap. It is a matter of timing and the level of ambition on the Member States’ side. Equally important, NATO will remain a provider of security in Europe that a stronger Europe will reinforce. Our proposals are complementary to NATO. Two weeks ago, the Commission adopted its reflection paper on the future of European defence, a communication on the European Defence Fund and a proposal for a European defence industrial development programme.

With the reflection paper, we have launched a debate on what role the EU will have in the future in this very important area. We have proposed three scenarios, which range from a security and defence cooperation scenario, under which Member States would still decide on the need for security and defence cooperation on a voluntary and case-by-case basis, to a much more ambitious common defence and security scenario, which foresees the progressive framing of a common union defence policy, leading to common defence. While the three scenarios differ in the level of ambition, they all present a step in the same direction: strengthening European defence.

Now we need an honest debate on the kind of future we see for Europe in defence policy. Therefore, the debate today in the European Parliament is very welcome. When looking at the economic side of defence cooperation, we do everything 28 times – or, in the future, 27 times – so the problem is that we duplicate everything so many times that the application problem with NATO is not a relevant problem, because nobody wants to do it. Duplication also has a price tag. The lack of cooperation in defence and security between Member States is estimated to cost annually between EUR 25 billion to EUR 100 billion. This is not an efficient way to use our resources. How should such a large amount of money be used? We must do it efficiently to ensure the best security the taxpayers deserve. For this reason, we have created the European defence fund, which has three different angles.

The first angle is defence research funding. Research organisations can apply together for the funding of collaborative research projects from the EU budget. We want to change the way defence research is done in Europe, pulling together both human and material resources. We have allocated this year EUR 25 million, and with your support we will allocate next year EUR 40 million and EUR 25 million in 2019 – altogether EUR 90 million in three years.

The second angle is support for joint development of capabilities, using the EU budget to incentivise joint development of prototypes. To qualify for support under the European defence industrial development programme, there must be at least three companies from a minimum of two countries which can apply to build joint prototypes, for example in drone or satellite projects. For 2019-2020 we have re-allocated resources from the EU budget worth EUR 500 million for these purposes. Our proposal is that for the next Multiannual financial framework (MFF) period the EU budget funding will be EUR one billion per year. With the support of Member States co—financing the programme, we could generate a total investment of EUR five billion per year. This will be a game changer in terms of strengthening defence research and industrial capabilities, and it makes our public spending more effective. Importantly, the fund is not only for big countries and big projects, but also for small countries and for smaller companies in the defence value chain. We want to make sure that everybody can participate.

Finally, the defence fund is meant to help Member States to do joint acquisitions of capabilities. Instead of buying capability separately, Member States could do it jointly using different types of financial models, and these can range from pooling to debt financing and can help overcome challenges of different budget cycles and reduce the cost for individual Member States. Honourable Members, this is one of the biggest challenges for our future. We have to make sure that we can protect our values inside Europe, but also externally.

 
  
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  Michael Gahler, im Namen der PPE-Fraktion. – Frau Präsidentin! Die EVP-Fraktion begrüßt ausdrücklich das neue Verteidigungspaket, und ich möchte mich bei dem Vizepräsident Katainen, bei Kommissarin Bieńkowska und bei Frau Mogherini – mit ihren mindestens drei verschiedenen Hüten, die sie in dem Zusammenhang trägt – herzlich bedanken. Wir unterstützen dieses Paket, weil es die richtigen Anreize liefert, die Verteidigungsanstrengungen der Mitgliedstaaten mit den Verfahren, die wir in der EU kennen, und mit EU-Haushaltsmitteln zu unterstützen. Es geht in der Tat nicht darum, hier eine europäische Armee auf dem Reißbrett zu entwerfen, sondern es geht darum, unter anderem die Effizienz unserer Ausgaben wesentlich zu steigern und natürlich auch im Ergebnis unsere Soldaten mit dem innovativsten und besten Material auszustatten, damit sie zum Erfolg der gemeinsam beschlossenen oder zu beschließenden GSVP-Missionen beitragen können.

Deswegen sind die Stichworte, die wir heute in dieser Debatte hören, die Stichworte, die wir im Parlament schon seit Jahren immer wieder eingefordert haben, spätestens seit Beginn dieser Wahlperiode, aber auch schon mit dem Inkrafttreten des Lissabon-Vertrages. Ich bedanke mich ausdrücklich für den Verteidigungsaktionsplan, für das Reflektionspapier, für den Verteidigungsfonds und auch das europäische Verteidigungsindustrie-Unterstützungsprogramm, das hier Erwähnung gefunden hat. Das sind die Maßnahmen, die, wenn wir es richtig anlegen, dazu führen, dass wir bei diesem Thema endlich vorankommen und damit auch für unsere amerikanischen Partner attraktivere Partner in Sachen Verteidigung sind.

 
  
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  Ioan Mircea Paşcu, on behalf of the S&D Group. – Madam President, our Group also welcomes the defence package and its recently adopted measures, which have to negotiate very carefully the fine line between national responsibility and EU common action. As the EU will act as initiator, facilitator and reinforcer of cooperation and collaboration between the Member States, the latter will remain in control.

But as we begin this journey together, I would like to warn against the possible temptation in the future of imposing certain measures, particularly if considered in line with some other measures representing EU reform in general. To my mind, the highest probability for that to happen is in relation to the single defence market, a major component of the future European defence union. Although eliminating the current fragmentation and duplication in the European defence industry – a product of historical evolution – is desirable, politically this should be done better through integration rather than through buying-out, even if accompanied by compensation, as some suggest.

Moreover, a strict buy-European in defence would be politically justified only in the event that the EU increases its corresponding share in the territorial defence of the Member States. Otherwise, as long as NATO, with the US in the lead, remains the main security provider for the EU NATO Member States, the appeal to buy European, leaving aside the important questions relating to availability, price and location of production, would be likely to remain minimal, particularly in the east.

In general, my feeling is that the eastern-flank Member States would favour the development of cooperation between the EU and NATO along the current lines, with each organisation doing what they are best at, rather than, as some suggest, attempting to create and consolidate an EU pillar within NATO. However, let us remember that working to align the strategic cultures of the Member States would alleviate many of these potential barriers.

 
  
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  Geoffrey Van Orden, on behalf of the ECR Group. – Madam President, listening to Ms Mogherini and Mr Katainen you would imagine we are starting from scratch on defence. We have very fine, capable armed forces right across Europe. We have a well-tried defence alliance, NATO, which binds the United States to European security and in which, with two very minor exceptions, all the EU Member States are fully involved as members.

So why does the European Union want to create autonomous defence structures? We all know it is about European political integration. That is what it is about. Listening to Ms Mogherini you would imagine that an EU army has already been created, although everyone denies that they want an EU army. So you need to make up your minds, Commissioners. Do you want it or don’t you want it?

What is the latest justification? Well, we used to hear a lot about the comprehensive approach. Interestingly, in this reflection paper on European defence, the words ‘comprehensive approach’ are not mentioned once. Instead we get a new justification and it is all about figures. It is all about the numbers of tanks and aircraft and things being produced across Europe, and invidiously comparing these with the capability of the United States. For example, it says the United States has just one type of main battle tank while the European Union has 17. This, of course, is complete nonsense. Realistically, there are two main battle tanks in Europe – the German Leopard II and the British Challenger II. The same with fighter aircraft: the US has six main types in service, and, according to this, the European Union countries have 20. This is complete nonsense. Basically there are two main fighter aircraft in service in the main European Air Forces – Tornado and Euro Fighter. Some also have the American F-16, of course, and the French went their own way with Rafael and the Mirage 2000 series.

These arguments just do not stand up to scrutiny, and why are you doing this, Commissioners? We all know you should come clean: it is all about political integration.

 
  
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  Hilde Vautmans, namens de ALDE-Fractie. – Wij van de ALDE-Fractie staan ook achter dit pakket maatregelen dat hier vandaag voorligt. En als we Europa toekomstbestendig willen maken, als we de burgers willen overtuigen van ons Europese project, dan weten we dat we moeten inzetten op de aanpak van asiel en migratie, op de strijd tegen terreur, maar vooral ook op Europese defensie.

Meer dan twee derde van onze Europese burgers vraagt terecht dat Europa meer inzet op een Europese defensie! Dus ik ben blij met de voorstellen die u hier vandaag doet. Ik denk eerlijk gezegd dat we de afgelopen twee jaar meer vooruitgang hebben geboekt dan de afgelopen zestig jaar. Defensie was een belangrijk punt bij de oprichting van de Europese Unie, maar we hebben veel te lang gesteund op de Amerikanen om onze veiligheid te waarborgen. Voor ons liberalen is het heel erg duidelijk: het meest ambitieuze scenario is het enige scenario dat ons zal helpen.

De Commissie legt drie scenario's voor. Voor ons liberalen een echte Europese defensie-unie, en wat mij persoonlijk betreft: ik zou heel graag in de richting van een echt Europees leger willen gaan. Dat is misschien voor velen een stap te ver, maar ik geloof dat dat – als we de veiligheid van onze burgers willen waarborgen – de meest noodzakelijke stap is. Mevrouw Mogherini heeft terecht de cijfers aangehaald: 50 % van het Amerikaanse defensiebudget, een output van 15 %. Er zijn studies die zeggen dat we tussen de 26 en 100 miljard euro per jaar verspillen door niet samen te werken! Dus alsjeblieft, laten we het nu doen.

Ook het argument van de NAVO, met de verklaringen van Trump, met de brexit die eraan komt. Als we nu die stappen niet zetten, dan is Europa ten dode opgeschreven. Dus alsjeblieft, voor mij en de ALDE-Fractie: heel erg snel die Europese defensie-unie, mét een hoofdkwartier, mét operaties en wat mij betreft mét dat Europese leger. Laten we dan onze burgers verzekeren dat wij hun veiligheid kunnen waarborgen.

 
  
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  Νεοκλής Συλικιώτης, εξ ονόματος της ομάδας GUE/NGL. – Κυρία Πρόεδρε, αγαπητοί συνάδελφοι, το νέο αμυντικό σχέδιο εξαγγέλλει την απαρχή της διαδικασίας για την πλήρη στρατιωτικοποίηση της Ένωσης. Αυτό είναι το μέλλον που θέλετε για την Ευρώπη; Δεν αρκούν οι μέχρι σήμερα πόλεμοι, οι εξωτερικές επεμβάσεις, το αιματοκύλισμα των λαών και τα κύματα προσφύγων; Ζητάτε να γίνουν επενδύσεις στον τομέα της άμυνας, να ενισχυθεί η στρατιωτική βιομηχανία και να αναπτυχθούν οι στρατιωτικές ικανότητες της Ένωσης, ώστε να αποτελέσει ισχυρότερο εταίρο στον στρατιωτικό τομέα. Προτείνετε δημιουργία μόνιμων στρατιωτικών δομών και ενός ευρωπαϊκού ταμείου για την άμυνα, με προϋπολογισμό 5,5 δισεκατομμύρια ευρώ τον χρόνο για χρηματοδότηση πολεμικών συστημάτων.

Αλήθεια, ποιος είναι ο εχθρός από τον οποίον πρέπει να αμυνθούμε; Ιδιαίτερα όταν, αντί να καταγγέλλονται οι πόλεμοι και οι επεμβατικές πολιτικές του ΝΑΤΟ και των ΗΠΑ, εξαγγέλλεται περαιτέρω συνεργασία και πλήρης συμπόρευση με τις πολιτικές τους. Οι προτάσεις αυτές όχι μόνο δεν θα ωφελήσουν την Ένωση, αλλά θα έχουν καταστροφικές συνέπειες. Θα καταδικάσουν τους λαούς στη φτώχεια, την προσφυγιά, την εξαθλίωση και την ανασφάλεια. Αντί να επενδύσετε σε έναν νέο πυλώνα στρατιωτικοποίησης και να προτείνετε μια ακόμα λιγότερο κοινωνική Ευρώπη, αξιοποιήστε τα κονδύλια της Ένωσης για την κοινωνική ανάπτυξη και την κοινωνική αλληλεγγύη.

Η Ένωση έχει καθήκον να λάβει πρωτοβουλίες για πλήρη αποστρατιωτικοποίηση, για επικράτηση της ειρήνης και για προώθηση της κοινωνικής ευημερίας. Αυτό που χρειάζονται οι λαοί είναι αναπτυξιακές πολιτικές για ώθηση της πραγματικής οικονομίας, για καταπολέμηση της ανεργίας και της φτώχειας – όχι κονδύλια για τον πόλεμο. Μόνον έτσι θα πετύχουμε πραγματική ασφάλεια για τους λαούς της Ευρώπης.

 
  
  

PRÉSIDENCE DE MME Sylvie GUILLAUME
Vice-présidente

 
  
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  Bodil Valero, för Verts/ALE-gruppen. – Fru talman! Härom veckan lanserade kommissionen inte mindre än tre förslag om ökade ambitioner på försvarsområdet, och det går inte att debattera försvarsunionen utan att prata om alla tre delarna i paketet och de är ju i sin tur också ett led i en länge pågående trend att flytta fokus från civila insatser till mer militära, inte minst vad gäller budgeten.

Så vi bör alltså diskutera både diskussionsunderlaget kring EU:s framtida försvar, den nya fonden för försvarsstöd till medlemsländerna och ett program för investeringsstöd till vapenindustrin. I de scenarier som kommissionen målar upp i diskussionsunderlaget ligger bland annat ett förslag om att gradvis förvandla EU till en militärallians.

Men istället för att förvandla EU till ett Nato 2.0 så vill vi gröna att vi ökar samarbetet kring de civila uppgifter som Lissabonfördraget redan slår fast att EU ska syssla med, som t.ex. krisberedskap, konfliktförebyggande, medling och fredsinsatser.

De 28 EU-länderna har ju sammanlagt 178 olika vapensystem. USA har 30. Vi har 17 olika tanks, USA har en. Vi har 29 olika fartygsmodeller, USA har 4. Vi har 20 olika stridsflygplan, USA har 6, samtidigt som USA har en dubbelt så hög budget.

Kommissionen tar ju upp det här problemet med överkapacitet, fragmentering och ineffektivitet i sina dokument, och vi kan inte mer än hålla med om det. Om länderna samarbetar och samordnar sin produktion bättre så är alla vinnare.

Men för att lösa problemet så föreslår kommissionen att medlemsländer som samarbetar ska få smörjmedel från EU – medel för att få till det här samarbetet som varit på tapeten redan i flera år, men som inte sker på grund av bristande vilja i medlemsstaterna.

EU spenderar ju redan varje år över 200 miljarder euro på försvar – mest i hela världen efter USA. Problemet är inte att det saknas pengar, utan vad vi får för operativ förmåga för dem, och vi tycker att det är helt fel väg att gå med en militarisering av EU-budgeten eftersom pengarna tenderar att tas från civila utgiftsområden som bistånd eller humanitära fredsinsatser. Det kommer också i det här fallet att handla om minskade budgetar för Europeiska investeringsbanken, fonden för strategiska investeringar, program för små och medelstora företag, regional utveckling, Erasmus+, Kopernikus m.m.

 
  
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  La Présidente. – Au moment où je prends mon siège dans cette tribune, je me permets de vous rappeler que nous sommes dans un débat d’actualité et que, selon le règlement, celui-ci ne comporte ni intervention à la demande ni carton bleu. Voilà, je me permets de le rappeler à un certain nombre de collègues qui me font signe pour des cartons bleus.

 
  
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  Bill Etheridge, on behalf of the EFDD Group. – Madam President, I think that after this I am going to have to report to the doctor because I think I am having a hallucination. I must be having a fantasy because I am sure I saw Ms Mogherini saying that there was going to be EU defence spending and EU armed forces and battle groups.

Now, during the referendum campaign in the UK the Remain side told us this was fantasy. No such thing! It couldn’t possibly be true. They couldn’t have been lying, so I must be dreaming you Ms Mogherini. It is quite a bizarre dream I am having.

The reality is: this money that is being squandered on this crazy political project, which will make no difference to anybody except losing money from the taxpayers, should be within the nation states, and they should be spending it on the one thing that actually does keep our nation safe – that is NATO. I suggest that each and every one of these nation states gets up to their 2% minimum spending, or maybe a bit more to make up for all the money that they have not put in over the years, and we will have a really serious defence plan through NATO, rather than this political fantasy.

 
  
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  Mario Borghezio, a nome del gruppo ENF. – Signora Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, formidabili questi europeisti: stamattina hanno elogiato e ci hanno commossi con le parole in ricordo di Simone Veil, una formidabile pacifista. Passano poche ore e sono diventati tutti guerrafondai: vogliono l'esercito europeo, ci danno delle giustificazioni che con molta educazione definisco risibili, parlano di un grande risparmio affidando all'Europa il controllo delle spese europee sulla difesa. Be', pensiamo a come l'Europa ha gestito l'economia, la moneta, l'euro… e allora viene veramente da pensare che si stia scherzando.

Ci sono molti problemi rimasti aperti, per esempio il ruolo dei paesi membri con la NATO, il ruolo stesso degli eserciti nazionali, che saranno assoggettati a un doppio comando. Non si dice niente di chiaro al riguardo e chiaramente si vogliono nascondere le vere motivazioni, perché non possiamo pensare che non ci siano delle motivazioni. Forse avete paura della rinascita dei patriottismi? Forse avete paura che i singoli paesi riprendano o sperino, cerchino di riprendere le leve della propria sovranità, che è così importante, che appartiene alla nostra tradizione.

Essere europeisti – e io penso di essere europeista – non significa negare, mettere in cantina il senso di appartenenza nazionale, l'orgoglio di appartenere a una propria patria. Certo, esiste anche una più grande patria europea, ma noi non possiamo consentire queste prese in giro della nostra gente. Dite che tutti gli europei, nei vostri sondaggi, vogliono questa difesa europea. Ma come mai nessun parlamento lo ha chiesto? I parlamenti nazionali non hanno mai chiesto niente di questo genere, lo sapete benissimo. È l'ennesima truffa.

 
  
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  Zoltán Balczó (NI). – Elnök Asszony, itt most az európai jövő kapcsán a közös uniós hadsereg felállításáról beszélünk. Holott előbb, a brexit tükrében egy sokkal fontosabb kérdést kellene tisztázni: merre tovább, Európai Unió? A mind szorosabb együttműködés, a szuperállam irányába, vagy pedig a szuverenitást tiszteletben tartó, lazább együttműködés irányába? Itt azok vannak többségben, akik az első változatot támogatják, és magukat Európa-pártiaknak tekintik, és minket, akik lazább együttműködést szeretnénk, Európa-elleneseknek.

De nézzük meg, hogy a közvélemény hogy nyilatkozik erről. A mind szorosabb európai együttműködést Németországban csak 26% támogatja, és 43% a tagállamnak adna vissza hatáskört Brüsszelből. Magyarországon 17% és 40% ez az arány, Lengyelországban csak 9% támogatja a mind szorosabb együttműködést.

Megkérdezem: akkor ebben a Parlamentben, amelyik büszke arra, hogy a népet képviseli, kinek van igaza? Ki áll a nép pártján? Ki képviseli azt, amit a többség akar?

 
  
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  Arnaud Danjean (PPE). – Madame la Présidente, on ne peut que se féliciter que les institutions européennes, Commission comprise, soient enfin en phase avec le souhait de nos concitoyens européens de consacrer un effort important à la sécurité et à la défense. En effet, contrairement à ce que disent certains collègues, toutes les enquêtes d’opinion depuis dix ans montrent, dans tous les pays, y compris les plus eurosceptiques, qu’au premier rang des préoccupations de nos concitoyens, des domaines où ils attendent que l’Union européenne fasse mieux et fasse plus, il y a la sécurité, la défense et la diplomatie.

Merci, Madame la haute représentante, de votre persévérance. On ne peut que se réjouir des annonces qui ont été faites et des efforts qui sont entrepris. Je voudrais simplement mettre en garde contre deux aspects, l’un pour la Commission et l’autre pour le Conseil.

Pour la Commission, bien sûr, veiller à la compétitivité et éviter les duplications, c’est important. La dimension économique de l’effort de défense est quelque chose de primordial, mais nous ne parlons pas d’un marché comme les autres. Tout ne se mesure pas à l’aune de la compétitivité. Nous parlons de stratégie, nous parlons d’autonomie stratégique, nous parlons de capacité critique et nous parlons d’opérations. Par conséquent, nous devons avoir des matériels qui sont, certes, compétitifs, mais nous devons avoir des matériels qui sont efficaces pour protéger nos forces et pour protéger nos concitoyens.

Puis, à l’adresse du Conseil, et de la Commission aussi, d’ailleurs, je vois bien que les annonces qui sont faites sont très concentrées sur le volet capacitaire. C’est tout à fait louable, utile et important. Je voudrais toutefois que l’on n’oublie pas le volet opérationnel. Il est très important de savoir que, comme vous l’avez rappelé, Madame la haute représentante, nombre de nos forces servent sous le drapeau européen dans des missions qui ont besoin d’aide, d’aide financière également, et je vous serais très reconnaissant de pousser les États membres à enfin réformer le mécanisme Athena pour mieux partager le fardeau et exprimer la vraie solidarité européenne.

 
  
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  Victor Boştinaru (S&D). – Apărarea europeană este probabil unul dintre cele mai importante proiecte în care trebuie să investim în perioada următoare, dar este unul dintre cei mai importanți factori de consolidare politică a Uniunii Europene dacă este cu atenție gestionat și răspunde într-adevăr nevoilor directe și cotidiene ale cetățenilor europeni. În ciuda câtorva ezitări în această sală, majoritatea dintre noi putem cădea de acord asupra primilor pași pe care trebuie să-i facem: utilizarea potențialului deplin al Uniunii, a capacităților civile și militare, utilizarea tuturor instrumentelor pe care le avem la dispoziție, crearea Fondului european pentru apărare, în primul rând pentru cercetare și dezvoltare, dezvoltarea și consolidarea cooperării structurate permanente PESCO, ambițioasă și deschisă tuturor statelor membre cu finanțare europeană. Nu în ultimul rând, și insist asupra acestui lucru, garantarea și consolidarea cooperării și complementarității, nu a competiției cu NATO. Dacă ne uităm la regiunile noastre, Estul, Orientul Mijlociu sunt regiuni de mare insecuritate și instabilitate și Europa trebuie să tragă singură concluzia între soft power și hard power. Singura șansă ca Uniunea să fie global relevantă este să-și consolideze propria capacitate de apărare.

 
  
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  Anna Elżbieta Fotyga (ECR). – Madam President, within the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) the majority of competences still belong to the Council, and therefore I would like to mention and emphasise the importance of the common perception of threats while discussing CSDP, and this common perception is still lacking within the EU. Do we honestly foresee the deployment of real CSDP missions in our eastern neighbourhood, thus challenging the ambitions of the Russian Federation in this area? Do we assess, for example, the energy security situation that deteriorates the position of these countries? There are many aspects of security, and we have to take these into account as well.

 
  
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  Urmas Paet (ALDE). – Madam President, we are in a unique situation today where we have the support of the people and of governments to do more on the defence and security of the European Union. We need to take advantage of this and make things happen. The latest steps taken by the Commission and the Council in launching the Defence Fund and establishing a command centre in Brussels are good and encouraging, and we need to continue.

Let me just remind you that the European Parliament adopted a report on the European Defence Union last November and there are still many things, 20 to be precise, on the list in the report that need to be ticked off in order to reach the goal of a truly functional defence policy. We need better coordination of investments in the areas of security and defence, full use of fiscal and crisis-management capacities, to name but a few. I am glad to see that the EU is moving from ideological discussions about the Union’s defence to real, concrete action.

 
  
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  Malin Björk (GUE/NGL). – Fru talman! Det finns många medborgare som är besvikna på EU för att det är en alltför stor marknadsplats för storföretagen, för att man inte lyckas upprätthålla rättsstatens principer, för att man tillåtit social dumping, men jag har inte träffat en enda väljare som ber om att EU behöver mer militär kapacitet. Inte en enda.

Så var kommer denna urusla idé ifrån att man ska militarisera EU? Det är omdömeslöst. Jag tror att mycket av idéerna kommer från säkerhets- och militärindustrin, naturligtvis. Men varför öppnar ni dörren för dem? Varför öppnar ni dörren för dem?

Jag tror att ni när en idé om att EU måste vara sin egen herre och ska man, MAN vara det, då måste man ha egna kanoner och puffror. Det är patriarkalt och det är endimensionellt.

Det rör sig om mycket pengar, pengar som under 10 år skulle kunna finansiera alla kvinnors preventivsmedelsbehov i världen. Så skäms på er, att vi får lägga dem på kanoner och puffror som medborgarna inte har bett om.

Om EU ska vara ett fredsprojekt så ska man bidra till nedrustning, inte upprustning. Man ska se till att minska den europeiska vapenexporten, inte öka den och man ska lägga all sin utrikespolitiska energi på diplomati, mänskliga rättigheter, demokratiutveckling och hållbar utveckling.

Medborgarna vill ha vård, skola, omsorg, välfärd, demokratiutveckling och en planet att leva på. De vill inte ha mer kanoner.

 
  
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  Tamás Meszerics (Verts/ALE). – Madam President, there is much to be supported in this defence package. I am not going to go through all the details but we are able to support many elements of the three different scenarios worked out in the package. I would just like to highlight one missing element and the crucial question around it: the missing element is the capability requirement in the different scenarios. That is important, because that will define four structures. Somebody should do the planning for four structures, and it would be better if those who do this planning were answerable to somebody, possibly a parliamentary body, at the same time.

Put simply, we should not let R&D and procurement be driven by the needs of the defence industry. They should be driven by the strategic needs of the European Union.

 
  
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  Fabio Massimo Castaldo (EFDD). – Signora Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, difesa comune europea: cui prodest? Se fosse solo per tagliare sprechi, colmare lacune tecnologiche, sfruttare economie di scala e avere un mercato della difesa più trasparente, direi senz'altro ai cittadini europei. E noi ci siederemmo al tavolo con vivo interesse. Ma, visti i precedenti, più di un sospetto aleggia nell'aria.

Mi e vi chiedo: quando nel documento di riflessione si sottolinea la centralità dell'assistenza reciproca e della solidarietà, di quale solidarietà si parla? Quella del sedicente paladino europeista Macron, che nega l'accesso ai porti francesi e riporta i migranti a Ventimiglia? Quella di Juncker, che si limita a una pacca sulla spalla del mio paese, definendolo eroico? O forse la solidarietà della Germania di Angela Merkel che, forte del suo pauroso avanzo commerciale, in barba alle regole, schiaccia le economie degli altri Stati membri, grazie a una moneta, l'euro, disegnata su misura per le sue esigenze?

L'occasione appare ghiotta per Berlino, ed è militare, geopolitica e industriale. L'instabilità alle frontiere e l'imprevedibilità degli USA targati Trump sono l'alibi perfetto per giustificare un massiccio riarmo di un paese che se spendesse davvero il 2 % del PIL in difesa, in pochi anni diventerebbe la terza potenza militare al mondo. Chiediamo cautela e anche chiarezza, perché non vorrei che come al solito, al posto di avere una Germania europea, finissimo per ritrovarci, anche nella difesa, un'Europa tedesca.

 
  
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  Jean-Luc Schaffhauser (ENF). – Madame la Présidente, Monsieur le Commissaire, chers collègues, quelle occasion manquée! L’Europe de la sécurité et de la défense aurait un sens si nous mettions nos intérêts communs au service de la lutte contre le terrorisme, de la sécurité et du développement.

Je prends pour exemple le G5 Sahel du 2 juillet: un véritable plan de sécurité, sans le volet développement, est estimé à 500 millions. L’Europe s’engage à hauteur de 50 millions et sans calendrier; le Tchad, le Mali, le Niger, la Mauritanie et le Burkina Faso sont bien incapables de combler ce manque. Cela veut dire, pour l’Europe, plus de trafic d’immigrés lié au grand banditisme et à la route de la drogue.

L’Europe de la défense est un leurre. Pour les uns – les pays baltes et la Pologne –, il s’agit de lutter contre la Russie, qui est pourtant un partenaire pour la paix et la lutte contre le terrorisme. Pour d’autres, il s’agit de payer pour la servitude à l’OTAN et aux États-Unis, comme autrefois pour le Pacte de Varsovie. Pour d’autres encore, c’est la rationalisation sur étagères pour détruire toute notre base industrielle européenne ou plutôt le peu qu’il nous en reste.

L’Europe n’a qu’un mot, l’abandon de la souveraineté nationale pour la servitude, avec l’incompétence et l’inefficacité en plus.

 
  
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  Janusz Korwin-Mikke (NI). – Pani Przewodnicząca! Rozmowy o siłach zbrojnych Unii zaczynamy w momencie niebezpiecznym. W Europie podnosi głowę faszyzm, na przykład parę dni temu Bundestag ustanowił prawo grożące grzywną 50 milionów euro za umieszczanie w sieci treści nieprawdziwych – nawet Adolf Hitler tak wysokich grzywien nie stosował. Przypominam, że parę dni temu nie zdołałem się od pani komisarki Maryi Gabriel dowiedzieć, kto będzie ustalał, jakie treści są nieprawdziwe, a w czasach PRL kilka lat siedziałem w więzieniu za głoszenie fałszywych informacji, mogących wyrządzić istotną szkodę interesom PRL. Siły zbrojne Unii nie będą miały żadnego znaczenia wojskowego. Doskonałym przykładem ich wartości była Srebrenica. Francja ma jako jedyna 300 głowic jądrowych, w porównaniu z 7 tysiącami w Rosji i tyle samo w USA. Jest dla mnie oczywiste, że siły te tworzone są tylko po to, by w razie czego nieść tak zwaną bratnią pomoc krajowi, który zbuntowałby się przeciwko okupacji Unii Europejskiej. A poza tym sądzę, że Unia Europejska musi być zniszczona.

 
  
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  Reinhard Bütikofer (Verts/ALE). – Madam President, this is indeed a point of order. Mr Korwin-Mikke accused the Bundestag of fascism. I think you should check the protocol, the minutes, and you should censor him for that remark.

 
  
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  La Présidente. – Je rappelle au public qu’il n’est pas autorisé à s’exprimer non plus. Monsieur Bütikofer, nous ferons effectivement le nécessaire pour réécouter cette intervention, aussi pénible que cela puisse être.

 
  
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  Jaromír Štětina (PPE). – Paní předsedající, prvotním účelem evropské integrace byla obrana míru. Právě kvůli míru a bezpečnosti je emancipace evropské obrany nutná.

Vítám proto návrhy předložené Komisí začátkem června. Ze tří cest, vytyčených v tomto diskusním dokumentu o budoucnosti společné obrany, jsem jednoznačně pro třetí variantu. Tou je cesta vedoucí ke společné obraně v maximální koordinaci s NATO.

Co postrádám v textu, je jasné pojmenování bezpečnostních hrozeb. Nazývat hrozby pravými jmény je nutné a zdravé. Agrese Ruska není jediným důvodem budování společné evropské obrany, ale jasné pojmenování této bezpečnostní hrozby by zaznít mělo. Někdy mám pocit, že Komise nemá dost odvahy pojmenovat ruské hrozby pravým jménem.

Jednoznačně vítám vznik Evropského obranného fondu. Ten by měl napomoci odstranit duplicity a vysokou míru roztříštěnosti. Vždyť jen bojových tanků je v zemích EU 17 různých typů.

Předseda vojenského výboru NATO generál Petr Pavel minulý týden definoval identitu evropské obrany jako zdravý proces. NATO a EU si v obranném procesu nekonkurují, vzájemně se doplňují. Proces této spolupráce nebude laciný, měli bychom se zeptat, kolik stojí jeden kilogram míru. Mír je drahá komodita. Bezpečnost není zadarmo.

 
  
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  Knut Fleckenstein (S&D). – Frau Präsidentin, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Lassen Sie mich gleich mit zwei Gerüchten abrechnen, die hier aufgekommen sind. Nirgendwo, lieber Kollege, steht in diesen Papieren etwas von 2 %. Streuen Sie nicht solche Gerüchte! Das ist eine ganz andere Diskussion zwischen anderen Partnern. Und zweitens geht es ausdrücklich nicht darum, mehr militärische Einsätze statt ziviler durchzuführen. Wir sind doch nicht plötzlich waffenbesoffen! Sondern es geht darum, effizientere, wenn nötig auch militärische Unterstützung zu leisten für zivile, friedenssichernde und -erhaltende Maßnahmen. Darum geht es in erster Linie: um mehr Effizienz und um mehr zeitgemäßes Material, nicht um mehr militärische Aufrüstung.

Und lassen Sie mich sagen: Für uns Sozialdemokraten ist die Richtung in Ordnung, und deshalb unterstützen wir Sie. Aber das heißt nicht, dass wir nicht noch viel zu diskutieren haben, zum Beispiel über die Frage, welche Rechte dieses Parlament eigentlich hat, außer Ihnen zu sagen: „Das habt Ihr gut gemacht.“

Und zweitens: Woher kommt das Geld für den Fonds? Sie wissen, das ist ein Hobby von mir: Wer mehr bestellt, muss auch mehr bezahlen. Das gilt auch für das Europäische Parlament.

 
  
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  Charles Tannock (ECR). – Madam President, stretched defence budgets in Europe and an isolationist President Trump in America, who is ambivalent about NATO, and soaring populations across some of the poorest parts of the world without jobs to match, have led to political instability in many countries ,whilst a rising China and an assertive Russia are unwinding the post-1991 international consensus.

Therefore, moves towards a European defence fund, a European defence industrial development programme, in addition to exploring the viability of permanent structured cooperation and the funding of EU battle groups via the Athena mechanism are all interesting developments in this direction. These are sensible measures aimed at improving European collective security, and strengthening the role of the EU Member States that they can play together in association and within NATO.

I am pleased that the UK Government has announced it will not be making any moves to block these plans as an exciting EU Member State. And I hope that as Brexit negotiations progress, creative ways will be found for the UK to stay as plugged-in as possible into the common foreign and security policy and the common security and defence policy.

 
  
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  Merja Kyllönen (GUE/NGL). – Arvoisa puhemies, hyvät komission edustajat, kollegat, aikakautemme suurimmat uhat eivät ole sotilaallisia, vaan meidän ihmisten omalla toiminnallamme edistämiä uhkia, kuten ilmastonmuutos, nälänhätä, juomaveden puute, tartuntataudit, köyhyys ja eriarvoistuminen. Eurooppa on vastaamassa näihin uhkiin puolustusrahastolla ja puolustusunionin kehittämisellä, vaikka virallinen konsensus on tähän saakka ollut aina se, ettei EU:n budjettivaroja käytetä puolustustarkoituksiin.

Mielestäni viranomaisyhteistyön kehittäminen, riittävä resursointi, laajempi yhteistyö siviilikriisinhallinnassa ja kehitysyhteistyössä sekä ihmisten välisen eriarvoisuuden purkaminen vastaisivat enemmän tämän aikakauden tarpeisiin. Jos Euroopassa ohjattaisiin puolustusteollisuudelle suunnitellut varat suoraan siviilisektoreille ja laitettaisiin koko arvovaltamme peliin sen puolesta, että kasvava eurooppalainen ja maailmanlaajuinen eriarvoistuminen pysähtyisi, ja kansainvälisen asevarustelun sijaista ryhdyttäisiin purkamaan jännitteitä, ratkomaan käynnissä olevia konflikteja ja vaatimaan jälleen kansainvälistä aseriisuntaa. Paluu Euroopan rauhan juurille on mielestäni kansakuntien kannalta viisaampi ratkaisu kuin jatkuva jännitteiden kasvattaminen lisääntyvän varustelun hengessä.

 
  
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  Reinhard Bütikofer (Verts/ALE). – Frau Präsidentin! Herr Danjean hatte Recht, Frau Präsidentin. Unsere Bürgerinnen und Bürger wollen, dass Europa mehr für die Verteidigung tut. Ich habe nicht die Zeit aufzuzählen, was an diesem Defence-Paket mir dabei durchaus richtig zu sein scheint – Herr Tannock hat einiges genannt. Aber ich will einige Kritikpunkte nennen. Erstens: Wir haben nicht eine Investitionslücke, sondern wir haben einen riesigen Krater der Ineffizienz. Wir dupslizieren nicht nur, wir triplizieren und quadruplizieren, und das macht keinen Sinn! Das Erste wäre, dass man einmal die Beschaffungsrichtlinie von 2009 konsequent anwendet, bevor man noch mehr Geld ausgeben will.

Zweitens: In einer Zeit, in der Herr Oettinger darüber diskutiert, ob uns zwölf oder 20 Milliarden im europäischen Budget fehlen, zu sagen, wir geben praktisch aus allen Fonds, die man überhaupt finden kann, nun zusätzlich Geld für Verteidigung aus, macht keinen Sinn!

Drittens: Im dritten Szenario die EU als eine Art Zweit-NATO zu konzipieren, ist völlig widersinnig. Zweit-NATO ohne die USA würde bedeuten entweder, man ergibt sich mit dem Gedanken der strategischen Autonomie einem gefährlichen Selbstbetrug, oder man muss konsequent zur europäischen Atombombe greifen.

Und viertens: Ich finde es völlig unerträglich, dass in der Vorstellung über die Governance dieser Ausgaben mit vorgesehen wird, dass die Industrie Selbstbedienung betreiben darf, weil sie mitentscheiden soll, welches Geld für Rüstung ausgegeben wird.

 
  
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  Janice Atkinson (ENF). – Madam President, another new shiny building, stuffed full of six-figure salary functions. Ms Mogherini, where is your army coming from? All military personnel joined their forces to serve their nation-state, not the EU. Will you recruit from the millions of unemployed young people the EU has created? Perhaps it is your idea of a job-creation scheme.

You oppose the nation-states erecting external borders, but you cannot control the millions of marauding migrants invading our continent. Yet you propose this military force. It’s just grandstanding. The EU shouldn’t be allowed to lead a group of boy scouts, let alone army tanks.

The enemy is ISIS. What are you doing to tackle this? Instead of an EU army we should be lifting Russian sanctions and working with them and the US to defeat ISIS. Ms Mogherini, this is a very dangerous proposal, led by you, a low-grade socialist, promoted beyond your capabilities.

 
  
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  Steven Woolfe (NI). – Madam President, René Magritte, the famous Belgian surrealist painter, used to paint pictures of pipes, and he would then say ‘this is not a pipe’. The EU has actually copied Magritte. Firstly, they said that the EU created peace in Europe, when in fact it was NATO. And secondly, they say they don’t want an EU army – in fact, what they want is a European Security and Defence Force, when everybody can see that what you want is an EU army. The European Rapid Operational Force (Eurofor) had 12 000 personnel: the size of an armed division.

EU money for extra drones and the military industrial complex will get tax deductions under proposals from this Chamber. And of course, as I see today, more and more MEPs want to have war with Russia – the new bogeyman. The idea that we have to have an army, so therefore we must have an enemy. The EU is attempting to create a new world order with a new EU army. This is what Magritte would have called surreal.

 
  
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  Arne Lietz (S&D). – Frau Präsidentin, Hohe Vertreterin! Die SPD ist langjähriger Verfechter des pooling and sharing-Ansatzes. Dabei muss das oberste Ziel sein, nationale Verteidigungskapazitäten zu europäisieren, um das Verteidigungsbudget effizienter einzusetzen und Kosten einzusparen. Eine Europäisierung der Rüstungspolitik halte ich für sinnvoll, da sie den NATO-Mitgliedstaaten der EU hilft, von dem absurden 2 %-Ziel der NATO abzurücken. Wir müssen uns stattdessen darauf konzentrieren, gemeinsam benötigte Verteidigungskapazitäten zu verbessern.

Der Kommissionsvorschlag sieht vor, mehrere Milliarden Euro aus dem EU-Haushalt für Rüstungsforschung, -entwicklung und -beschaffung bereitzustellen. Dabei werden der Europäischen Union die Rechte an den so finanzierten Technologien und Produkten jedoch nicht übertragen. Das kann nicht sein! Entgegen dem Wortlaut des Kommissionsvorschlags fordere ich eine echte Mitbestimmung der EU und speziell des Europäischen Parlaments beim Export von Waffen und Munition, die mit EU-Mitteln finanziert wurden. Darüber hinaus sollte die Kommission den Verteidigungsplan durch ein Programm zur Konversion von Rüstungsindustrien in Zivilindustrien ergänzen, wenn wir hier eine Änderung vornehmen wollen.

 
  
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  Anders Primdahl Vistisen (ECR). – Fru formand! Det tragiske er, at man i forbindelse med Brexit nu igen er begyndt at tale om et europæisk forsvar. Jeg er glad for, at mit eget land, Danmark, har et forbehold på området. Det er mig dog ubegribeligt, hvorfor store NATO-lande som Italien, Frankrig, Spanien og Tyskland insisterer på et nyt europæisk forsvarsinitiativ, når de selvsamme store europæiske lande igen og igen svigter deres NATO-forpligtelser, herunder deres forpligtelser om at levere to procent af BNP til det fælles forsvar, men også de mange NATO-missioner og andre missioner, der er forbundet med samarbejdet i NATO, og som man ikke ønsker at deltage i, eller deltager i i proportionalt mindre grad end mindre lande. Vores holdning til dette spørgsmål er helt klar: NATO er grundstenen i det europæiske forsvar. USA er en forudsætning for et fælles europæisk forsvar, og jeg vil prise mig lykkelig over Storbritanniens og USA’s sikkerhedsgarantier, i langt højere grad end jeg vil prise mig lykkelig over franske og tyske sikkerhedsgarantier i forsvarspolitikken.

 
  
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  Brando Benifei (S&D). – Signora Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, vorrei innanzitutto ringraziare l'Alto rappresentante per l'ingente lavoro svolto in questi mesi sulla politica di sicurezza e difesa comune.

Dall'ultimo dibattito dello scorso novembre sono stati compiuti molti passi in avanti. In meno di un anno, infatti, la difesa comune europea non è più un sogno federalista, ma inizia davvero a essere realtà. Cito solo due tra le tante azioni intraprese: il lancio del fondo europeo per la difesa da parte della Commissione, che avrà come uno dei suoi ambiti fondamentali quello della ricerca, con un impatto importante anche per gli Stati membri, e l'accordo, da parte del Consiglio di giugno, di lanciare un'ambiziosa cooperazione strutturata permanente, con indicazioni concrete di tempi e modi di adesione da parte degli Stati membri che intendano parteciparvi. Un avvenimento storico che permetterà di sfruttare maggiormente le disposizioni dei trattati finora inutilizzate.

Il Parlamento seguirà questa fase cruciale con molto interesse assieme ai parlamenti nazionali. Dovrà essere coinvolto e informato, e su questo ci aspettiamo un impegno chiaro. Questi passi avanti consentiranno all'Unione di risparmiare, evitare sprechi e generare investimenti e di assumere una piena autonomia strategica, pur in piena cooperazione e complementarità con la NATO, in un contesto globale sempre più instabile.

 
  
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  Roberts Zīle (ECR). – Prezidentes kundze, godātā viceprezidentes kundze! Eiropas aizsardzības plānā ir acīmredzamas divas finansiālas iezīmes: viena — dosim no Eiropas Savienības budžeta naudu pētniecībai un attīstībai militārajā jomā un otra — pasūtīsim dalībvalsts militāros pasūtījumus tikai Eiropas Savienības militārās industrijas kompānijām.

Manuprāt, tas ir vairāk reģionāla rakstura reģionālas politikas instruments, jo, ja mēs paskatāmies, tikai dažās Eiropas Savienības valstīs ir nopietna militārā industrija, un pēc Lielbritānijas aiziešanas to kļūs vēl mazāk. Bieži vien Junkera kungam patīk minēt, ka mums jāsamazina tanku modeļu skaits no septiņpadsmit uz vienu, kā tas ir ASV. Tad es tomēr gribētu teikt, ka mums ir vajadzīgi gan tādi tanku modeļi, kas varētu labi darboties tuksnešainās Subsahāras operācijās, gan tādi, kas strādātu purvos Krievijas pierobežā.

ASV ilgus gadus ir finansiāli ieguldījusi lielus resursus un tehnoloģiski militārā ziņā aizgājusi daudz, daudz tālāk nekā Eiropa. Un tādām valstīm, kas robežojas ar Krieviju, svarīgi ir saņemt šo labāko tehnoloģiju militārajā jomā tagad, nevis pēc desmit gadiem, kad, iespējams, mēs noķersim ASV.

 
  
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  Εύα Καϊλή (S&D). – Κυρία Πρόεδρε, κύριε Αντιπρόεδρε, κυρίες και κύριοι συνάδελφοι, η συγκυρία ενός Trump, του νέου προέδρου της Αμερικής, ενός Erdoğan, συμμάχων στο ΝΑΤΟ, αλλά και του Brexit, που αφαιρεί μεγάλες δυνατότητες αμυντικές από την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση, καθώς και οι νέες προκλήσεις του δημογραφικού στις γειτονικές μας χώρες και -φυσικά- το μεταναστευτικό, αποτελούν προκλήσεις για την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση που μας εξαναγκάζουν να κάνουμε άλματα μπροστά και να βάζουμε πλέον στις προτεραιότητές μας την κοινή αμυντική πολιτική.

Είναι εξαιρετικά σημαντικό, όχι μόνο γιατί πρέπει να διασφαλίσουμε εσωτερικά και εξωτερικά τα σύνορά μας, αλλά γιατί θα έχουμε και πολύ μεγάλη μείωση των αμυντικών δαπανών, τουλάχιστον κατά 30%, όχι μόνο από τη συνεργασία μεταξύ των κρατών μελών και τη συνεργασία σε επίπεδο έρευνας και ανταλλαγής τεχνογνωσίας, αλλά και από την ανταλλαγή πληροφοριών που απαιτείται. Οι εχθροί μας πλέον δεν γνωρίζουν σύνορα και οι νέες προκλήσεις είναι οι κυβερνοεπιθέσεις και η κυβερνοάμυνα, και είναι απαραίτητο να ανταλλάσσουμε πληροφορίες. Για να γίνει εξίσου ισότιμο και επωφελές όμως για τα κράτη μέλη, ώστε να αυξήσουν τις δαπάνες, τον προϋπολογισμό και τη συμμετοχή, πρέπει να είμαστε έτοιμοι να μιλήσουμε για ακεραιότητα συνόρων σε όλα τα κράτη μέλη, ανεξαρτήτως προέλευσης της απειλής.

 
  
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  Marek Jurek (ECR). – Pani Przewodnicząca! Jeżeli ceni się wolność, to na aspiracje władz Unii Europejskiej do przejmowania kontroli nad obroną naszych państw jest tylko jedna odpowiedź: nie zwiększa się władzy tym, którzy sprawują ją nieodpowiedzialnie. Bo tak naprawdę chodzi o władzę – bardzo dobrze mówił o tym Geoffrey Van Orden – chodzi o integrację polityczną, czyli przejmowanie władzy państw, i nie chodzi o obronę, dlatego że pani przewodnicząca Mogherini bardzo szczerze powiedziała, że naszym celem nie jest militaryzacja. Stosunek kierownictwa Unii Europejskiej do naszego bezpieczeństwa widzieliśmy w czasie kryzysu imigracyjnego, a testem solidarności w zakresie obrony jest po prostu szanowanie bezpieczeństwa innych państw europejskich i reagowanie na ich stanowisko. Wystarczy więc spojrzeć na budowę Nord Stream2, żeby zobaczyć jak wygląda fikcja sankcji wobec Rosji, które miały nas bronić, i żeby zobaczyć cały absurd konceptu wspólnej obrony europejskiej, czyli przejmowania kontroli nad bezpieczeństwem naszych państw.

 
  
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  Ana Gomes (S&D). – Senhora Presidente, presto tributo ao sargento português Paiva Benido, que perdeu a vida num ataque terrorista em missão da União Europeia, em Bamaco, com a Vice-Presidente Mogherini.

Em Portugal, na semana passada, ocorreu um grave roubo de material militar que pode ser usado para fins terroristas – não só, mas também por falta de investimento em segurança e defesa num país em que o Estado foi desarmado em todas as dimensões pelas políticas neoliberais de austeridade.

Esta é uma das razões por que precisamos absolutamente de um plano europeu de defesa e de investir numa Europa da segurança e da defesa, com autonomia estratégica para agir pelos nossos cidadãos, pelo direito internacional, pela paz, pela responsabilidade de proteger e pela resolução de conflitos globalmente, no quadro europeu, da NATO, da ONU e de outras parcerias.

Para isso, precisamos de uma sólida base industrial da defesa, com cooperação e pulling and sharing de recursos entre Estados-Membros e investimento europeu em pesquisa e tecnologia. Para isso, o Fundo Europeu de Defesa tem de ser injetado com contribuições, sem sobrecarregar mais o orçamento europeu.

Também precisamos absolutamente de reforçar o controlo democrático, incluindo para os nossos Estados-Membros não continuarem a gastar estupidamente o dinheiro dos contribuintes em duplicações, sobreposições e desperdício. Sobretudo, precisamos de mais do que o Presidente Trump para nos unir; precisamos de visão e de direção estratégica europeia, que articule política externa, segurança e defesa, segurança interna. A Síria e a Líbia aí estão para demonstrar a Europa da Defesa de que precisamos e que não temos até agora.

 
  
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  Zdzisław Krasnodębski (ECR). – Pani Przewodnicząca! Jednym z wielu problemów w propozycjach Komisji jest odwrócenie hierarchii zagrożeń. Dla bezpieczeństwa całej Europy największym zagrożeniem jest obecnie Rosja i próby destabilizacji kluczowych krajów Unii. Jednak plany Komisji zdają się sugerować, że chce ona rywalizować w dziedzinie przemysłu zbrojeniowego ze Stanami Zjednoczonymi. I to jest drugi główny cel obok tego, o którym mówił Geoffrey Van Orden, tego celu politycznego – wzmocnienia integracji europejskiej. Komisja chce skupić się na finansowaniu badań naukowych nad nowymi systemami zbrojeniowymi, które dla bezpieczeństwa Europy mogą mieć znaczenie za kilkanaście lat, i to w przypadku konfliktu o wymiarze strategicznym. Tymczasem – moim zdaniem – Komisja powinna skoncentrować się raczej na wykonaniu tego wszystkiego, do czego zobowiązała się we wspólnej deklaracji Unia–NATO podpisanej w Warszawie, na przykład na przeprowadzeniu ćwiczeń w związku z zagrożeniami hybrydowymi – były one planowane wspólnie z NATO na bieżący rok. Powinna też skupić się na wypełnianiu decyzji Rady Europejskiej z czerwca tego roku, na przykład na zwiększeniu współfinansowania końcowego rozmieszczenia grup bojowych.

 
  
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  Monica Macovei (ECR). –Angajamentul Uniunii pentru apărare și securitate este vital în aceste momente și a fost întotdeauna. În același timp, nu trebuie să subminăm în niciun fel dezvoltarea industriei de apărare în fiecare stat membru. Dimpotrivă, trebuie să mărim investițiile. NATO și Uniunea Europeană trebuie să lucreze împreună. Nu suntem dușmani. Trebuie să investim și să lucrăm împreună pentru apărarea Europei și pentru apărarea lumii, așa cum am făcut-o întotdeauna.

Salut lansarea Fondului european pentru apărare, dar, înainte de orice plan al unei armate comune, se află schimbul crescut de informații între agențiile de informații. Un schimb crescut poate salva vieți chiar de astăzi. Știu că agențiile de informații sunt reticente în a face un schimb total de informații cu toate serviciile din statele membre. E vorba de încredere, nu există chiar în toate, dar e vital ca volumul și calitatea acestui schimb de informații să crească.

 
  
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  Mirosław Piotrowski (ECR). – Pani Przewodnicząca! Co pewien czas z różnym nasileniem pojawiają się pomysły tworzenia armii europejskiej. Trzeba jasno stwierdzić, że budowa odrębnej unijnej armii obok NATO szkodziłaby Paktowi Północnoatlantyckiemu. Jak przypomniał niedawno w Parlamencie Europejskim Jens Stoltenberg, czyli szef NATO, obecnie 90 % obywateli Unii jest obywatelami państw członkowskich NATO, stąd nie ma żadnej potrzeby budowy odrębnej armii. Najprawdopodobniej inicjatywie tej położy kres wyjście z Unii Europejskiej Wielkiej Brytanii, która – jak niedawno przyznał przewodniczący Komisji Europejskiej Jean-Claude Juncker – ma prawdziwą armię, podczas gdy inni mają ambicje. Te ambicje jednak nie mogą prowadzić do rozbijania NATO. Trzeba wzmacniać Pakt Północnoatlantycki. Jak przypomniał niedawno prezydent USA Donald Trump, realną gwarancją bezpieczeństwa krajów Unii Europejskiej jest wywiązywanie się ze zobowiązań wobec NATO, to znaczy przeznaczanie 2 % PKB państw członkowskich na obronność. Należy także pomyśleć o konsolidacji systemów obrony poszczególnych krajów w ramach NATO.

 
  
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  Elżbieta Bieńkowska, Member of the Commission. – Madam President, I would like to thank the honourable Members for this discussion. As you have probably observed during the last few months, defence policy has become very high on the political agenda, and such discussions are very much needed and welcomed. I am sure that defence will be a cornerstone of the future of Europe.

In the Commission, we made very decisive and concrete steps towards a Union that is secure and protects, as Federica Mogherini mentioned before: this is very high on our citizens’ agenda. Citizens want a Europe that protects and that is secure. We moved decisively with the defence package. Of course, the reflection paper launched a much wider and forward-looking debate, and the European defence fund encourages Member States to cooperate on defence research, development and acquisitions.

It was never clearer that Europe must become a security provider and to ensure progressively its own security, because currently no Member State is strong enough to meet on their own the evolving threats and challenges we are facing. So this is definitely – and I want to underline this – not about militarisation. This is definitely not about grabbing any power from the Member States. This is about securing and ensuring Europe’s strategic autonomy, and for this we need a very competitive European defence industrial base, a European defence industrial sector, and with the European defence fund this is what we aim to achieve. This is the industrial pillar of our action; this is the one we are moving together quite fast. The defence fund will support the whole capability development life cycle, as we mentioned before – as Jyrki Katainen mentioned – from research through prototype development to joint procurement and acquisition, which is very important for us.

The Commission is for the first time making all its efforts, using all its tools – including the EU budget – to support and promote stronger defence cooperation, especially on the industrial front. This is important, both from a strategic perspective and from an economic perspective.

A few more details: a single market in defence is not in contradiction with the European defence fund. On the contrary, with the European defence fund we want to open the defence supply chain cross-border. There is a very high need to build trust at the level of industrial cooperation, and through the EDF I hope – and I am sure – we will do that. I also want to underline the importance of the procurement and transfer directive, and I want to commit to doing my best to execute both of them.

On one more thing – maybe a little too detailed, but I think it is important to answer the question – we have taken the specificities of defence in building the European defence industrial plan. We are fully aware of those specificities. That is why, as I said, it is not about grabbing power. The Member States will stay in the lead; they will decide on the priorities, on the capabilities, and finally on the projects, so this is not the role of the European Commission. Everything will be owned by the Member States, and the Member States only.

Thank you very much for your cooperation; I am looking forward to our future discussions, and I also count on your support during our work on the adoption of the whole plan.

 
  
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  Federica Mogherini, Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. – Madam President, let me start by picking up on something that some of you mentioned during the debate. The European Union is not a military alliance. It is not meant to become a military alliance, and that is why the work we are doing, in parallel to strengthen European defence and to strengthen EU-NATO cooperation, is working so well.

I do not know where one of the speakers got the information that NATO and the NATO Secretary-General are not supportive of this process because the Secretary-General has repeatedly, publicly and privately, stressed the fact that strengthening European defence also strengthens the Transatlantic Alliance.

I am ready and, as always, willing to discuss different political views, but at least starting from the facts and the actual objectives that we have in reality. Let me clarify this too: there is a cost for the European Union not working together on defence, and what the Commission is doing in relation to the industrial base is a clear demonstration of that. The fragmentation of investment has a cost for the budget – for the taxpayers’ money that we often refer to. It is not the case that we are investing more on defence, because you might have noticed that Member States – as I see every day in dealing with Defence Ministers, Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers –have their own national defence budgets. They have their own investments; they have their own capabilities. We are not working to increase that. We are working to make that spending and investment more efficient by making investments together among Member States, with the support of all the EU institutions.

Also, Member States own one single set of forces and they are perfectly capable of deciding whether to use their forces in EU missions and operations, in UN missions, in NATO missions or in their own bilateral or multilateral initiatives. Investing in strengthening cooperation among Member States on defence makes it possible for Member States, which in some cases are also NATO allies (there are five Member States that are not NATO allies), free to make their own strategic choices.

We are not building a European army. I understand that, for political reasons, or propaganda reasons, some of you want to continue to refer to this, but this is not the reality of the facts. We do have headquarters of our military and civilian missions and operations and, by the way, I would like to remind our friends in the UK that one of our headquarters is currently in the UK. It is the headquarters of the European Union’s Operation Atalanta. After the UK leaves we will probably have to move the headquarters somewhere else. But we do have EU mission and operation headquarters currently working to support ongoing EU operations and missions.

What is the reality here? It is that we need to make the system of command and planning of the existing operations and missions more effective because having a fragmented system of headquarters – as anyone who deals with military issues a little bit knows and understands – is not necessarily the most effective way of managing a military operation.

So this is not about building a big headquarters. It is not about creating a headquarters of the same kind as the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE): it is about rationalising the existing headquarters that we have spread around everywhere, including in the UK.

By the way, I would like to stress that all the decisions we have taken so far, the ones that have been already implemented and the ones that have yet to be implemented but are on the way, have been decided unanimously by all the 28 Member States, with the UK fully involved, sitting at the table of the Council that I chair and fully participating in the decision making. And I am very happy about that. Some of you mentioned, I think, that this can be one of the fields in which future cooperation with the future third-party UK might be explored.

Another point: what are our militaries doing? I would like to clarify this because our militaries are not making war. Our militaries are supporting peace. This is the European Union way to security, and I would like us to be very clear about that, because it is also a way of honouring our men and women serving under the EU flag. They are there for us. Just as national parliaments are responsible for the national participation of men and women in uniform in military missions or civilian operations, we as European institutions have the responsibility to recognise and honour the work that men and women in uniform are doing serving the EU around the world.

I believe we need a reality check here. Our militaries are saving people in the Mediterranean Sea. Our militaries are training and supporting African security forces in trying to implement agreements or carrying out peacekeeping. This is the kind of work that our EU militaries are doing. I would ask some of the honourable Members, please, to refer to the reality of the facts and not to ideas they want to use for a political purpose, because this is where the roots of so many European problems lie. We have to start from the reality of the work we are doing.

Last, but not least, two small points. One of you referred, and rightly so, to the need for all our work on defence to start from the security needs we have assessed. That is perfectly correct: it is exactly what we are doing. That is why the sequence of our work began with an assessment of the security environment. That was done last year. Then came the presentation of the global strategy identifying the strategic priorities for our foreign policy and security policy, including in the defence sector. Only after having shared a common level of ambition, which was achieved in November, are we now strengthening our approach to capabilities and the industrial base. So the sequence is clearly this: we start from the security needs and then we develop the instruments we need to fulfil this level of ambition.

A last point on financial resources. If we, the Commission, Council and Parliament, set a target for our level of ambition, a target for what we want to do on security and defence at European Union level, then – and I see Commissioner Oettinger here in the room, so it is an appropriate time to say this – we also have to define how we finance the level of ambition we set ourselves. This will be part of a necessary further discussion in the future.

 
  
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  La Présidente. – Le débat est clos.

Déclarations écrites (article 162)

 
  
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  Birgit Collin-Langen (PPE), schriftlich. – Ich unterstütze das neue Verteidigungspaket, das die Kommission vorgestellt hat. Wir müssen die bereits beschlossenen Ziele unserer gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik konsequent umsetzen. Die vorgeschlagenen Maßnahmen werden dazu beitragen, die Effizienz der jeweiligen Ausgaben der einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten zu steigern und die Rolle der EU als strategischer Player in der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik in der Welt zu stärken.

 
  
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  João Ferreira (GUE/NGL), por escrito. – Os monopólios europeus e as potências que defendem os seus interesses, que colonizaram mercados do centro às periferias da UE, em alargamentos sucessivos, e que se lançam mundo fora com a sua conhecida e natural avidez, precisam de um Estado pronto a defender os seus interesses, a sua pulsão imperialista, a sua taxa de lucro.

Contam, para isso, com as grandes potências nacionais (os seus Estados “de origem”), mas, mais do que isso, com o “superestado europeu” – a UE. No confronto à escala global pela disputa de mercados, de matérias-primas e de zonas de influência, as potências da UE não prescindem de uma UE intervencionista e militarizada, ao seu serviço.

O “documento de reflexão” da Comissão Europeia sobre “o futuro da defesa europeia” aponta o caminho: o impulso à indústria militar, de armamento e defesa, e sua integração à escala da UE; mais cooperação nos domínios da investigação e desenvolvimento na área da defesa, do desenvolvimento de novo armamento e das operações externas civis ou militares; a estreita articulação com a NATO. O rumo que a UE simboliza e defende para a Europa é um perigo, uma enorme ameaça para o futuro do continente e dos seus povos.

 
  
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  Илхан Кючюк (ALDE), в писмена форма. – През последните няколко години с тревога наблюдаваме как атмосферата на сигурност и стабилност в Европа постоянно се влошава. Гражданска война в Украйна, неспирните терористични атаки срещу мирни граждани в Европа, намаляващото доверие и сътрудничество между страните на континента създават атмосфера на непредсказуемост и напрежение, която може да доведе до ескалация и нови вълни на насилие.

В тази връзка вярвам, че ЕС трябва да направи всичко възможно, за да задълбочи сътрудничеството в областта на сигурността и отбраната между държавите членки. Съюзът трябва да гарантира бъдещето и спокойствието на всички европейски граждани, а това може да се случи само чрез увеличение на инвестициите за развитие на отбранителната техника и укрепване на единия пазар в областта на сигурността. Не на последно място, бих желал да подчертая, че сигурността в Европа зависи от партньорството с НАТО. Създаването на обща европейска армия, в пълна кохезия с НАТО, ще създаде пряка връзка между ЕС и НАТО и ще гарантира мира и стабилността в Европа.

 
  
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  Κωνσταντίνος Παπαδάκης (NI), γραπτώς. – Η ΕΕ, ως ένωση των ευρωπαϊκών μονοπωλίων, κινείται σε τροχιά ανταγωνισμού με τη Ρωσία και την Κίνα, αλλά και με τις ΗΠΑ, για τις πλουτοπαραγωγικές πηγές και τον έλεγχο των αγορών. Η τοποθέτηση Γιούνκερ ότι «ο πόλεμος δεν είναι κάτι που ανήκει στο παρελθόν» αποτυπώνει την κατεύθυνση της πολιτικής της ΕΕ κατά των λαών. Όλα αυτά αντανακλώνται στη συγκρότηση της Ευρωπαϊκής Αμυντικής Ένωσης και του σχετικού Ταμείου, στον ευρωστρατό, τα Στρατηγεία, τη συνοριοφυλακή-ακτοφυλακή και, γενικότερα, στην περαιτέρω στρατιωτικοποίηση της ΕΕ και στην κοινή της δράση με το ΝΑΤΟ. Η ελληνική κυβέρνηση δίνει «γη και ύδωρ» για την προώθηση των ιμπεριαλιστικών σχεδιασμών, παίρνει άριστα σε επιδόσεις στις δαπάνες για τις ανάγκες των Ευρωατλαντικών μηχανισμών και εμπλέκει τον λαό μας σε μεγάλους κινδύνους. Οι λαοί έχουν συμφέρον να δυναμώσουν τον αγώνα τους κατά της ΕΕ και του ΝΑΤΟ, ενάντια στους ιμπεριαλιστικούς πολέμους και επεμβάσεις, και να απαιτήσουν να μην υπάρχει καμιά εμπλοκή των χωρών τους, ούτε στρατιωτικές αποστολές στο εξωτερικό, και να κλείσουν οι Ευρωατλαντικές βάσεις.

 
  
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  Julia Pitera (PPE), na piśmie. – Dyrektywa o ochronie interesów finansowych UE pozwoli na wprowadzenie do unijnego prawa wspólnej definicji przestępstw na szkodę interesów finansowych Unii. Dyrektywa związana jest również z powołaniem Europejskiej Prokuratury. Jej zadania będą polegać m.in. na prowadzeniu postępowań przygotowawczych, wnoszeniu oskarżeń oraz doprowadzaniu do osądzenia sprawców przestępstw finansowych. Pomoże to w pokonaniu impasu między OLAF-em a państwami członkowskimi, które nie zawsze stosują się do jego zaleceń. Trzeba jednak pamiętać, że obywatele mogą traktować Prokuraturę Europejską jako instytucję ingerującą w sprawy wewnętrzne państw członkowskich, a nie jako instytucję chroniącą interesy finansowe Unii. Polski rząd swój brak akceptacji dla tego projektu tłumaczy właśnie zagrożeniem dla niezależności polskiej prokuratury. Dlatego tak ważne jest wyjaśnienie, że celem powołania Europejskiej Prokuratury jest ochrona pieniędzy europejskich podatników wydawanych przez kraje członkowskie.

 
  
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  Σωτήριος Ζαριανόπουλος (NI), γραπτώς. – Η ΕΕ, ως ένωση των ευρωπαϊκών μονοπωλίων, κινείται σε τροχιά ανταγωνισμού με τη Ρωσία και την Κίνα, αλλά και με τις ΗΠΑ, για τις πλουτοπαραγωγικές πηγές και τον έλεγχο των αγορών. Η τοποθέτηση Γιούνκερ ότι «ο πόλεμος δεν είναι κάτι που ανήκει στο παρελθόν» αποτυπώνει την κατεύθυνση της πολιτικής της ΕΕ κατά των λαών. Όλα αυτά αντανακλώνται στη συγκρότηση της Ευρωπαϊκής Αμυντικής Ένωσης και του σχετικού Ταμείου, στον ευρωστρατό, τα Στρατηγεία, τη συνοριοφυλακή-ακτοφυλακή και, γενικότερα, στην περαιτέρω στρατιωτικοποίηση της ΕΕ και στην κοινή της δράση με το ΝΑΤΟ. Η ελληνική κυβέρνηση δίνει «γη και ύδωρ» για την προώθηση των ιμπεριαλιστικών σχεδιασμών, παίρνει άριστα σε επιδόσεις στις δαπάνες για τις ανάγκες των Ευρωατλαντικών μηχανισμών και εμπλέκει τον λαό μας σε μεγάλους κινδύνους. Οι λαοί έχουν συμφέρον να δυναμώσουν τον αγώνα τους κατά της ΕΕ και του ΝΑΤΟ, ενάντια στους ιμπεριαλιστικούς πολέμους και επεμβάσεις, και να απαιτήσουν να μην υπάρχει εμπλοκή των χωρών τους, ούτε στρατιωτικές αποστολές στο εξωτερικό, και να κλείσουν οι Ευρωατλαντικές βάσεις.

 
  
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  Bogdan Andrzej Zdrojewski (PPE), na piśmie. – Opublikowany przez Komisję Europejską dokument do refleksji nad europejską obronnością zbiega się w czasie nie tylko z serią podobnych dokumentów na temat przyszłości UE. Zbiega się także z szeregiem konkretnych działań Komisji Europejskiej, z upoważnienia państw członkowskich, mających na celu sprawić, aby wspólna polityka bezpieczeństwa i obrony przestała być nią tylko z nazwy. Wszystkie zaproponowane scenariusze zakładają pewien postęp we współpracy obronnej. Jak zauważają sami autorzy dokumentu, trzy wizje przyszłości różni przede wszystkim głębokość współpracy, a nie jej poszczególne elementy. Cieszy podkreślanie roli NATO w europejskiej architekturze bezpieczeństwa. Warto zwrócić uwagę także na potrzebę większej synchronizacji zakupów zbrojeniowych oraz planowania, by uniknąć marnotrawienia ogromnych przecież środków, które są wydawane na sprzęt i zdolności wojskowe. Chciałbym także, by w przyszłości zwiększono zakres użytkowania istniejącej już infrastruktury, której pierwotne przeznaczenie jest cywilne, ale która może być ogromnie pomocna w zwiększaniu naszej odporności i bezpieczeństwa. Przykładem są budowane i wdrażane już systemy satelitarne Copernicus i Galileo. Taka sugestia pojawiła się w przedstawionych scenariuszach i zasługuje na pełne poparcie.

 
  
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  Janusz Zemke (S&D), na piśmie. – Unia Europejska słusznie zajmuje się coraz częściej kwestią swojej obrony i bezpieczeństwa. Chcę w tym kontekście zwrócić uwagę na narastający problem. Suma budżetów obronnych wszystkich państw członkowskich Unii Europejskiej stanowi około 50 % budżetu obronnego USA. W Europie wydajemy na obronę 1,3 % unijnego PKB, podczas gdy w USA około 4 %. Problem nie polega jednak tylko na zbyt niskich budżetach obronnych, lecz także na bardzo słabej efektywności ich wykorzystania. Wydając 50 % budżetu USA, Europa dysponuje jedynie 15 % zdolności bojowych armii Stanów Zjednoczonych. Fatalna sytuacja dotyczy zwłaszcza badań nad nowymi technologiami wojskowymi i wdrażaniem nowych technologii. Za celowe uważam zatem stworzenie w budżecie Unii specjalnego funduszu obronnego, który w skali roku przeznaczałby 500 mln euro na badania i 500 mln euro na wdrażanie nowych technologii. Powinno to poprawić europejskie zdolności wojskowe w sferze rozpoznania, produkcji wojskowych dronów, uzyskania zdolności do tankowania w powietrzu i innego uzbrojenia nowej generacji.

 
Last updated: 7 December 2017Legal notice