Procedure : 2010/2504(RSP)
Document stages in plenary
Document selected : B7-0079/2010

Texts tabled :

B7-0079/2010

Debates :

Votes :

PV 10/02/2010 - 9.6
CRE 10/02/2010 - 9.6

Texts adopted :

P7_TA(2010)0016

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION
PDF 131kWORD 78k
See also joint motion for a resolution RC-B7-0078/2010
3.2.2010
PE432.932v01-00
 
B7-0079/2010

to wind up the debate on the statement by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

pursuant to Rule 110(2) of the Rules of Procedure


on Iran


Barbara Lochbihler, Isabelle Durant, Heidi Hautala, Emilie Turunen on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

European Parliament resolution on Iran  
B7‑0079/2010

The European Parliament,

–   having regard to the presidential elections of 12 June 2009 and the subsequent unrest in the Islamic Republic of Iran,

–   having regard to the resolution adopted on 27 November 2009 by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and the relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran,

–   having regard to its earlier resolutions on Iran, in particular those of 7 May and 22 October 2009,

–   having regard to the UN General Assembly resolution of 29 October 2009 on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran,

–   having regard to the declaration issued by the European Council at its meeting of 10 and 11 December 2009,

–   having regard to the 4th EP-Iran interparliamentary meeting scheduled to be held in Tehran from 9 to 11 January 2010, which was 'postponed' by the Iranian side,

–   having regard to Rule 110(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

On democracy and human rights

A. whereas there are serious indications that the June presidential elections were marred by massive fraud; whereas this gave rise to a large scale protest movement (the 'Green Movement'); whereas mass demonstrations have been continuing over the past months inside and outside Iran,

B.  whereas Iran’s security forces, Revolutionary Guards, Basij militia, and police have reacted with a severe crack-down, arbitrarily arresting thousands of peaceful protesters and dissidents, including students and academics, women’s rights activists, trade unionists, lawyers, journalists, bloggers, clerics and prominent human rights defenders, in a clear effort to intimidate critics and stifle dissent,

C. whereas, in addition, the security forces have stepped up their systematic harassment of members of religious minorities, such as Baha’is (all seven members of whose former leadership have been arrested and are now standing trial) and Sunnis, and have carried out a campaign of arbitrary arrests and executions against Kurdish, Azeri, Baluch, and Arab civil society and political activists; whereas, in particular, 21 Kurds are on death row at the moment,

D. whereas dozens of protesters have died as a result of attacks by security forces or in detention; whereas thousands have been detained, and some 300 activists remain in jail; whereas many of those arrested have reportedly been beaten and tortured, and in some cases sexually assaulted in prisons and secret detention facilities; whereas hundreds of Iranians involved in the demonstrations have reportedly left the country out of fear of retaliation and are desperately seeking a safe haven in neighbouring countries and in Europe,

E.  whereas a parliamentary inquiry determined in early 2010 that Deputy Prosecutor Saeed Mortazavi was directly responsible for the deaths of at least three detainees from torture and neglect in Kahrizak prison,

F.  whereas on 28 January 2010 Mohammad Reza Ali-Zamani and Arash Rahmanipour were executed; whereas these were the first death sentences to be carried out on persons linked by official sources to the protest movement despite the fact that at least one of them, if not both, were already imprisoned at the time of the elections; whereas at least nine people have reportedly been condemned to death for alleged links to the Green Movement,

G. whereas since the beginning of August the judiciary has staged mass show trials of hundreds of prominent reformers and activists, with apparently coerced TV confessions resulting in some of the defendants being sentenced to lengthy prison terms and even to death,

H. whereas on December 27 2009, the final day of the Ashura rites, Ali Mousavi, the 35-year-old nephew of Mir Hossein Mousavi, the main opposition candidate in the June presidential elections, was shot to death and deliberately run over by a car in what bears all the hallmarks of a targeted assassination intended to serve as a strong warning to his uncle,

I.   whereas on 8 January an assassination attempt was made on Mehdi Karroubi, the second most prominent opposition candidate in the presidential elections, with two bullets being fired at his car – which, fortunately, was bullet-proofed – while Basij militia and Revolutionary Guards members assembled to protest against Mr Karroubi's presence in Qazvin,

J.   whereas the physicist Masoud Ali Mohammadi was murdered in a bomb blast in what many believe was a warning to university professors and students because Mr Mohammadi reportedly played an important role in securing the public support of 400 other scientists for the opposition leader, Mr Moussavi, while encouraging his students to participate in peaceful demonstrations after the June elections,

K. whereas in the aftermath of the mass demonstrations of 27 December 2009 Iran accused Western powers of fomenting the unrest, expelled two British diplomats, detained a Swedish diplomat for 24 hours and claimed that German embassy staff were actively supporting the protest movement,

L.  whereas in the aftermath of the elections the Iranian authorities engaged in large scale and frequent jamming of international radio and TV networks, many international websites, including Facebook and Twitter, as well as local opposition sites and mobile-phone services in Tehran, thereby also causing transmission problems on networks in other Middle Eastern countries and even in Europe,

M. whereas European and Russian companies have been providing Iran with the necessary filtering and jamming devices, some of which might even pose a health risk to those living in the vicinity of the installations,

On the nuclear issue

N. whereas, in breach of its obligation under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran has clandestinely constructed an enrichment facility at Qom, and only notified the IAEA of its existence long after its construction commenced; whereas this violation of the rules raises suspicions that there may be other secret nuclear sites and further undermines confidence in Iranian assurances about the purely civil character of its nuclear programme,

O. whereas, in the interests of finding a diplomatic solution to the issue of Iran's nuclear programme, the EU, the United States, China and Russia had proposed that an agreement be reached, under the auspices of the IAEA, to ship Iran's existing low-enriched uranium to Russia and France for processing into fuel rods to keep the Tehran Medical Research reactor running,

P.  whereas, following Iran's rejection of this proposal, discussions on stronger sanctions against Iran are under way in the UN Security Council,

On democracy and human rights

1.  Expresses its grave concern at the fact that the alleged widespread electoral fraud during the presidential elections of June 2009 has not resulted in any serious investigations being conducted by the Iranian Parliament or Supreme Leader, and considers the legitimacy of Mr Ahmedinejad's presidency to be seriously compromised, despite his confirmation by Supreme Leader Khamenei;

2.  Expresses its admiration and moral support for the tens of thousands of courageous Iranians who continue to risk their professional careers and lives in calling for greater freedom and more democratic rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran;

3.  Deplores the fact that the Iranian Government and Parliament are apparently incapable of responding in a constructive way to the justified demands of a young, educated and dynamic generation of Iranians who have seen their hopes for economic and social development stifled for too long;

4.  Is appalled by attempts by the government and/or the security forces to assassinate presidential candidates or members of their families, and holds Supreme Leader Khamenei responsible for the safety of Iranian opposition leaders;

5.  Strongly condemns the systematic and brutal targeting of peaceful demonstrators and government critics by security forces, as well as the shutting down of newspapers and the forcible closure of offices of human rights organisations;

6.  Calls on the Iranian authorities immediately to release all those detained for peacefully exercising their right to free expression, association and assembly, and to investigate and prosecute government officials and members of the security forces responsible for the killing, abuse and torture of family members of dissidents, demonstrators and detainees;

7.  Calls on the Iranian authorities to stop the crack-down on workers' protests and to release the hundreds of workers and trade unionists who have been arrested solely for supporting the right of collective bargaining or in the lawful pursuit of trade union activities;

8.  Calls once again on the Iranian judiciary to issue a moratorium on capital punishment and unambiguously to prohibit juvenile executions;

9.  Calls on the Iranian authorities to put an immediate stop to the practice of televised show trials, and on the Iranian Parliament to amend the Iranian law allowing the government to deny due-process rights, such as the right of defendants to adequate legal representation;

10. Condemns the Iranian authorities' efforts to censor the print media and to jam radio, television and Internet services, such as the BBC, and calls on the EU and its Member States to address the international fallout from these methods within the International Telecommunications Union (ITU);

11. Strongly criticises international companies, in particular Nokia Siemens, for providing the Iranian authorities with the necessary censorship and surveillance technology, thus being instrumental in the persecution and arrest of Iranian dissidents;

12. Sees Iranian allegations of interference in internal matters by staff at European embassies as being in line with the method frequently used by the authorities to stigmatise Iranian critics of the government by fabricating accusations of contacts with foreign governments and state treason in order to distract from the fact that the opposition movement is a genuine Iranian phenomenon;

13. Believes that a more democratic Iran could be the most important contribution to de-escalation in the Middle East and would take a more cautious approach to the nuclear issue;

On the nuclear issue

14. Deplores the fact that the Iranian Government has again rejected all attempts to compromise over the nuclear issue, and regrets that the Ahmedinejad regime is apparently seeking to use this issue as a means of distracting attention away from the crisis within the country;

15. Supports the European Council's twin-track approach and all efforts to find a negotiated long-term solution to the Iranian nuclear issue; stresses that any further sanctions in the context of the nuclear threat should exclude measures that would have negative consequences for the Iranian population as a whole;

16. Reiterates its opposition to the use of nuclear energy, notably because of the inherent serious risk of its dual use for civil and military purposes, and deplores the nuclear agreements concluded between the US, France and India, which defy the logic of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by making India the only known country with nuclear weapons that is allowed to engage in nuclear trade – including enrichment – with the rest of the world, despite not being a party to the NPT;

17. Reiterates its call on the Iranian Parliament and Government to ratify and implement the Additional Protocol and fully to implement the provisions of the Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement;

18. Expresses its grave concern over President Sarkozy's recent nuclear proliferation policy, in view of the dual-use risks inherent in nuclear technology;

19. Calls on Iran and those countries in the Middle East that are considering investing in nuclear power not to repeat the error made by many EU Member States in opting for a dangerous and outdated technology; appeals instead to those countries to develop all forms of modern renewable energy technologies and efficiency and conservation methods;

20. Reiterates its call on all nuclear weapons states to take progressive steps to reduce nuclear warhead numbers, to phase out the role of nuclear weapons in security policy and to support efforts to make Europe and the Middle East a nuclear-weapon-free zone;

On future EU-Iran relations

21. Calls on the Council, when discussing further sanctions against Iran, to consider expanding the list of individuals subject to visa bans and asset freezes to include senior members of the security forces responsible for the repressive measures which have been taken in the aftermath of the contested presidential elections;

22. Calls on the Commission and Council to take immediate steps to ban the export of surveillance technology by European companies to governments and countries, such as Iran, where it could be instrumental in the violation of human rights;

23. Calls on the Commission and Council to devise additional measures under the EIDHR and European immigration policy to actively protect the safety of Iranian human rights defenders;

24. Calls on the Council and Commission to downscale Member States' diplomatic representations in Tehran and, in view of the creation of the External Action Service, to rationalise EU and Member State activities by establishing a European Union Delegation in Iran;

25. Underlines the importance of the continuation of dialogue with Iran on all levels, in particular with civil society; deplores the fact that the Iranian side postponed the visit of the European Parliament delegation and expresses the hope that the Iranian Government and Parliament will review their position on direct contacts;

26. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the High Representative of the CFSP, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the UN Security Council, the UN Commission on Human Rights, and the Government and Parliament of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Last updated: 13 May 2010Legal notice