MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the EU-Russia summit of 28 January 2014
4.2.2014 - (2014/2533(RSP))
pursuant to Rule 110(2) of the Rules of Procedure
Werner Schulz, Rebecca Harms, Indrek Tarand, Tarja Cronberg, Raül Romeva i Rueda on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
B7‑0149/2014
European Parliament resolution on the EU-Russia summit of 28 January 2014
The European Parliament,
– having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia, in particular those of 17 February 2011 on the rule of law in Russia[1], of 13 September 2012 on the political use of justice in Russia[2], of 13 December 2012 containing Parliament’s recommendations to the Council, the Commission and the European External Action Service on the negotiations of the new EU-Russia Agreement[3], of 13 June 2013 on the rule of law in Russia[4], of 12 September 2013 on the pressure exerted by Russia on Eastern Partnership countries (in the context of the upcoming Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius)[5], of 12 December 2013 on the outcome of the Vilnius Summit and the future of the Eastern Partnership, in particular as regards Ukraine[6],
– having regard to the existing Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation establishing a Partnership between the European Communities and their Member States, of one part, and the Russian Federation, of the other part,
– having regard to the ongoing negotiations for a new agreement providing a new comprehensive framework for EU-Russia relations, as well as to the ‘Partnership for Modernisation’ initiated in 2010 on the basis of a commitment made by Russia to the rule of law as a fundamental basis for the modernisation of Russia,
– having regard to the conclusions of the EU-Russia summit of 28 January 2014,
– having regard to Rule 110(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
A. whereas the EU remains committed to further deepening and developing its relations with Russia, and whereas the EU and Russia have already established deep and comprehensive relations, particularly in the energy, economic and business sectors, and have become intertwined and mutually interdependent in the global economy;
B. whereas enhanced cooperation and good-neighbourly relations between the EU and Russia are crucial for the stability, security and prosperity of Europe and, in particular, the common neighbourhood; whereas the development of a strategic partnership between the EU and the Russian Federation can only be built on shared common values; whereas it is of the utmost importance to step up cooperation at international level between the two partners in all institutions, organisations and forums with a view to improving global governance and addressing common challenges;
C. whereas the EU-Russia summit of 28 January 2014 was reduced to a three-hour restricted meeting that focused on a limited number of issues, reflecting the deterioration in EU-Russia relations, mostly as a result of Russia’s pressure on Eastern Partners;
D. whereas the EU and its Member States are bound by the EU Treaties to support and promote democratic principles and the rule of law in the world, in particular with an important neighbouring country like Russia, which, through its membership of the Council of Europe, has committed itself to sharing and upholding democratic principles, the rule of law and respect for fundamental values;
E. whereas similar commitments and obligations stem from Russia’s membership of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and whereas Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is based on the assumption that the rule of law is upheld in the country;
F. whereas there are serious concerns about developments in the Russian Federation with regard to respect for and protection of human rights, the rule of law, respect for basic democratic principles and the fairness of elections, freedom of the press and media, and freedom of assembly;
G. whereas the adoption of laws on the registration of political parties and NGO financing, of the discriminatory anti-LGBTI law banning ‘propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations’, which equates homosexuality with paedophilia, of laws on the right of assembly, extremism, defamation and of internet filtering restrictions has significantly contributed to a deterioration in the climate as regards the development of a genuine civil society in Russia and has been used to harass and intimidate NGOs, the democratic opposition and the media;
H. whereas Russia stepped up political and economic pressure and imposed a series of targeted sanctions on neighbouring countries prior to the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius in November 2013, with the aim of undermining and preventing these countries from signing or proceeding towards association agreements and free trade regimes with the EU;
I. whereas energy is a key instrument of Russian foreign policy and continues to play a central and strategic role in EU-Russia relations; whereas the EU’s strong dependency on fossil fuels is undermining the development of a balanced, coherent and value-driven European approach vis-à-vis Russia; whereas the competition between the EU and Russia on energy matters is increasing in areas of common interest such as the South Caucasus and Central Asia; whereas it is of the utmost importance for the EU to speak with one voice and show strong internal solidarity;
J. whereas good-neighbourly relations, peace and stability in their common neighbouring countries are in the interests of both Russia and the EU; whereas an open, frank and result-oriented dialogue should develop on the crises in these countries with regard, in particular, to the frozen conflicts, with a view to strengthening security and stability, supporting the territorial integrity of the countries concerned and developing joint crisis management mechanisms;
1. Notes that the reduced format of the EU-Russia summit is an appropriate reflection of the current state of affairs in EU-Russia relations, which allows for a pragmatic exchange on topical issues, while also symbolising the challenges EU-Russia cooperation currently faces;
2. Takes the view, in this regard, that so long as the conditions for the development of a genuine strategic partnership based on shared common values are not in place EU‑Russia summits should be held once a year, instead of the current biannual format;
3. Underlines the fact that the current deterioration of EU-Russia relations is the result of a long process during Vladimir Putin’s first two terms as President and his time as influential Prime Minister, has continued under his current presidential term of office, and is a direct consequence of his domestic and foreign policy choices;
4. Regrets the fact that, so far, the EU has been unable to convince the Russian leadership of the merits of a fully-fledged democratic system, the rule of law and respect for fundamental rights and that a society where the state protects and serve its citizens is the best way to secure long-term prosperity and stability;
5. Believes that the future development of EU-Russia relations depends on the efforts to strengthen democracy, the rule of law and respect for fundamental rights and civil liberties inside Russia;
6. Regrets the fact that the Russian leadership regards the EU’s Eastern Partnership as a threat to its own political and economic interests and has turned the common neighbourhood into an area of confrontation and competition; underlines the fact that, on the contrary, Russia will gain from increased trade and economic activities and that its security will be enhanced by a stable and predictable neighbourhood;
7. Stresses the importance of developing synergies so as to allow the countries in the common neighbourhood to benefit from and make the most of bilateral relations with both the EU and the Russian Federation;
8. Points out that the ongoing mass protests and mobilisation on the Maidan square are partly due to the fact that the Russian Federation derailed the association agreement between Ukraine and the EU through political pressure and financial blackmailing;
9. Underlines the fact that Russia’s systematic failure to respect democratic principles, the rule of law and fundamental rights must be reflected more clearly in the EU’s policy positions and in all aspects of EU-Russia relations up to summit level, in particular as regards the work on a new cooperation agreement;
10. Reiterates its support for a comprehensive, legally binding agreement that covers political, economic and social issues and includes all areas related to democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights, particularly fundamental rights, provided that Russia is ready to take steps to enhance the rule of law and respect for human rights;
11. Calls on the Commission to consider possible counter-measures which the EU could evoke if Russia breaks WTO trade rules for short-sighted political ends; emphasises that, while Russia should not be given the chance to veto the political choices of the Eastern Partnership countries, the EU must be ready and willing to engage over Russia’s legitimate concerns and interests, in particular as regards trade and commercial interests;
12. Welcomes the presidential amnesty and the release of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, of the two ‘Pussy Riot’ activists and of the Greenpeace members, but notes that it appears that these moves are mere cosmetic gestures aimed at boosting Russia’s image before the Sochi Olympic Games; calls on EU political leaders and public figures who will be attending the Sochi Olympics to raise human rights and democracy issues and to refrain from taking part in publicity stunts with the Russian leadership;
13. Is appalled by the reports of widespread corruption and lack of transparency, the forced resettlement of citizens without compensation, the precarious working and living conditions of migrant workers and the dramatic destruction of the environment, especially in areas designated as world heritage sites, because of the construction of Olympic facilities;
14. Reiterates its concern at the overall human rights situation in Russia and the absence of any evolution on the modalities of the EU-Russia human rights consultations; regrets, in particular, the fact that this dialogue has become a process rather than a means to achieve measurable and tangible results; insists once more on the need to include public indicators of progress in these human rights consultations, to improve the dialogue’s modalities, for example by alternating the location of the consultations, through interaction between Russian NGOs and the Russian authorities as part of this process and on the composition of the Russian delegation, and to issue public assessments of progress on the occasion of EU-Russia summits and following the Partnership Council meetings;
15. Notes the widespread protests and demonstrations in Russia following the presidential elections of March 2012, which continued for several months; regrets the fact that the Russian leadership ignored and suppressed this popular movement, which was a sign of a deep attachment to democracy among Russian citizens; calls on the Russian authorities to release all political prisoners, to stop the harassment and imprisonment of activists such as Yevgeny Vitishenko and the clampdown on critical NGOs such as Memorial ADC and religious groups such as Jehovah’s Witnesses, and to engage with civil society and the democratic opposition;
16. Reiterates its call on the Commission, with a view to the ongoing programming of the EIDHR and CSO/LA financial instruments, to significantly step up efforts to provide assistance to the oppressed civil society by doubling its financial allocations to the country;
17. Is alarmed by President Putin’s recent attempts to reassure gay visitors to Sochi that they should not fear ‘being rounded up or criminal punishment’, but warning them to ‘leave children alone’;
18. Recalls that, although the ban on protest rallies during the Olympic Games has been eased, the measures in place disproportionately target groups campaigning for gay rights and political reform, limit the number of demonstrators and only allow protests in certain pre-approved areas, thus undermining freedom of assembly;
19. Welcomes Russia’s efforts, together with the USA and the international community, to approve a UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution regarding the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons and the launch of the Geneva II talks; urges Russia, nevertheless, as a permanent member of the Security Council, to face up to its responsibilities in the Syrian crisis and to facilitate the approval of a UNSC binding humanitarian resolution and the referral of the Syrian situation to the International Criminal Court;
20. Recalls its recommendation on common visa restrictions for Russian officials involved in the Sergei Magnitsky case, and asks the Council and the Commission to implement an EU-wide visa ban and to freeze the financial assets in the EU of all officials involved in the death of Magnitsky, who is being prosecuted posthumously, and of other serious human rights violators in Russia; stresses that those individuals must not benefit from any EU-Russia visa facilitation agreement; expresses deep concern over the plans to include a large number of Russian officials with so-called ‘service passports’ in the visa facilitation agreement currently under discussion;
21. Welcomes, in this regard, the recent resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe which calls on Russia to end impunity for Russian officials by bringing to account those responsible for Magnitsky’s death, stopping his posthumous prosecution and the pressure on his family, and closing criminal cases against other Hermitage Fund lawyers;
22. Notes the first European Commission report on the implementation by Russia of the Common Steps towards a visa free-regime with the EU; urges that steps be taken to speed up work on achieving the common steps with a view to a visa liberalisation agreement which would provide for visa-free short-term travel for Russian and EU citizens; underlines the fact that non-discrimination against citizens and respect for fundamental rights form an integral part of this roadmap;
23. Calls for a centralisation of EU policy responsibility towards Russia in the next term of the European Commission, with a clear and central role for the High Representative / Vice-President and with the Member States committed to speaking to Russia with one voice;
24. Urges the Russian Federation to step up its contribution to addressing climate change, through domestic greenhouse gas reductions and its participation in the international negotiations for a comprehensive post-2012 climate policy framework under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol; stresses, in this connection, that, to achieve the necessary reductions by 2020 compared with 1990 emissions for Annex I countries, all industrialised countries need to commit to targets that represent significant reductions from current emission levels and to increasing carbon capture in forests; calls, in particular, on Russia to assume a second commitment period target by ratifying the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC;
25. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European External Action Service, the Member States and the Government, the Parliament and President of the Russian Federation.
- [1] OJ C 188 E, 28.6.2012, p.37.
- [2] OJ C 353 E, 3.12.2013, p. 134.
- [3] Texts adopted, P7_TA(2012)0505.
- [4] Texts adopted, P7_TA(2013)0284.
- [5] Texts adopted, P7_TA(2013)0383.
- [6] Texts adopted, P7_TA(2013)0595.