REPORT with recommendations to the Commission on the report of the Presidents of the European Council, the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the Eurogroup "Towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union"

24.10.2012 - (2012/2151(INI))

Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs
Rapporteur: Marianne Thyssen
Rapporteur for the opinion (*): Roberto Gualtieri, Committee on Constitutional Affairs
(*) Associated committee – Rule 50 of the Rules of Procedure
(Initiative ­ Rule 42 of the Rules of Procedure)

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

with recommendations to the Commission on the report of the Presidents of the European Council, the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the Eurogroup "Towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union"

(2012/2151(INI))

The European Parliament,

–   having regard to Article 225 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–   having regard to the conclusions of the European Council of 28 and 29 June 2012,

–   having regard to the Statement of the Heads of State or Government of the Euro Area of 29 June 2012,

–   having regard to the report of 26 June 2012 of the Presidents of the European Council, the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the Eurogroup 'Towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union',

–   having regard to Rules 42 and 48 of its Rules of Procedure,

–   having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and the opinions of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs(A7-0339/2012),

A. whereas since the signing of the Treaty of Rome the European Union has made significant steps towards political, economic, fiscal and monetary integration;

B.  whereas the economic and monetary union (EMU) is not an end in itself but rather the instrument to achieve Union and the Member States objectives, in particular a balanced and sustainable growth and a high level of employment; whereas social inclusion and solidarity are the cornerstones of the European social model and of European integration as a whole and cannot be left out of any future reform of the Union;

C. whereas in a globalised information society the need for closer European integration built on the basis of democratic legitimacy, accountability, transparency and citizen's endorsement is becoming ever more clear;

D. whereas closer European integration should provide for a greater parliamentary involvement at both the national and Union level;

E.  whereas the Union is at a crossroads and a clear direction needs to be chosen either to combine the forces within the Union and to build a future for a strong and value-driven and solidarity-based Union in a globalised world, or to fold back on itself and be forced to passively adapt to globalisation;

F.  whereas the economic, financial and banking crisis and the current economic downturn has led to high public and private debt at national level and public financing problems in several Member States and together with the existence of excessive macroeconomic imbalances has affected the socio-economic development of the euro area and of the Union as a whole in a quick, direct and negative way;

G. whereas between 2008 and mid-2012, the EU-27 unemployment rate has climbed from around 7 % to 10,4 %, or 25 million unemployed and more than one out of five young people is unemployed (22 %), with youth unemployment exceeding 50 % in some Member States;

H. whereas job creation, quality employment and decent work are crucial in overcoming the current crisis;

I.  whereas several Member States are currently facing a very demanding economic and financial situation, aggravated by continuous strains on the sovereign bond markets reflected in unsustainable interest borrowing rates for some countries as well as low or negative interest rates for some others and considerable financial and economic instability;

J. whereas the combination of competitiveness evolving in divergent directions and a low growth potential, high unemployment with high deficits and high public and private debt not only causes harm in some Member States, but also makes the euro area vulnerable as a whole;

K. whereas recent events have made clear that the euro area is still not properly equipped to solve the crisis and to react adequately to regional and global economic shocks within it;

L. whereas the important role played by the euro, both within the euro area and at the global level, as the second most important international reserve currency, demands a strong European response and coordinated European action to bring back growth and stability to the economy;

M.       whereas over the last decade the euro has brought Union citizens many benefits, such as price stability, suppression of currency conversion costs within the euro area, the impossibility of nominal competitive devaluations, lower interest rates, the encouragement of the integration of financial markets and easier cross-border capital movement;

N. whereas the Union's single currency should not become a symbol of division which threatens the whole European project, but should remain the currency of the Union as a whole that is decisive and capable of taking far-reaching decisions for a common and prosperous future;

O. whereas progress towards a genuine EMU should respect the will of the Member States that have an opt-out from having to introduce the euro to retain their respective national currencies;

P. whereas euro area membership implies a high degree of economic and financial interdependence between the Member States concerned and therefore requires a much closer coordination of financial, fiscal, social and economic policies with Member States shifting competences to the Union level, linked to stricter supervisory instruments and effective enforcement; whereas, however, this greater integration by the Member States whose currency is the euro, possibly supplemented by a group of other willing Member States, needs to be developed in the framework of "two-speeds, one Europe", with the view of avoiding policy steps that would ultimately lead to creation of two different Europes;

Q. whereas the latest Eurobarometer research indicates that for reason of the persisting crisis there has been a sharp decline in trust in political institutions both at national and at Union level, as well as a sharp decline of public perception of the Union conjuring up a positive image; whereas, nevertheless, the Union remains the actor that Union citizens feel is the most effective in tackling the economic crisis;

R. whereas Union and national policy makers should continuously explain to their citizens the benefits of European integration and the implications and challenges of a single currency, including the costs and risks linked to a break up of the euro area;

S. whereas 17 Member States have already adopted the Union's single currency and most others will join the euro when they are ready;

T. whereas any doubt about the future of EMU in general, including the irreversibility of membership of the euro area, and the Union's single currency in particular is unfounded as a strong Union is the interest of all citizens;

U. whereas restoring confidence is the main task in order to convince European citizens and enterprises to start investing again in the economy and to create conditions for financial institutions to provide the real economy, once again, with credit on a broad but sound basis;

V. whereas the answer to the euro crisis is complex and demands sustained, multifaceted efforts at all institutional and policy levels;

W.      whereas the Union institutions and the Heads of State and Government of the Member States in general and of the euro area Member States in particular, play an important role in creating a fiscal union in a way that all mechanisms of euro area crisis management, such as the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), are embedded in an institutional setting where Parliament is fully involved as co-legislator; whereas the current intergovernmental structure represents a severe lack of democratic legitimacy; whereas the common currency can only be stabilised if Member States are willing to shift competences in fiscal policies to the Union level;

X. whereas restoring confidence also requires those Heads of State and Government and their Ministers to defend and explain in their Member States the policy decisions that have been agreed upon at Union level; whereas by unfairly imputing unpopular decisions to the Union in some instances, a particularly dangerous game of perception is being played which risks eroding the Union from below, undermining solidarity and ultimately damaging the credibility of the national leaders themselves and potentially the European project as a whole;

Y. whereas socially the Union is fragile at the moment; whereas several Member States are under extremely demanding structural reform efforts and consolidation programmes; whereas ultimately political union is the key to overcome such times, encouraging solidarity and carry on with the European project;

Z. whereas the European Council and the euro area summit of 28 and 29 June 2012 confirmed their determination to take the measures required to ensure a financially stable, competitive and prosperous Europe and thus to enhance the welfare of citizens;

AA.  whereas the growing divide between core and peripheral countries in the Union should not become chronic in nature; whereas a permanent framework must be created in which Member States in difficulty should be able to rely on solidarity-based support from other Member States; whereas those Member States which desire solidarity should be obliged to shoulder their responsibility for implementing all their commitments in the budgetary field as well as their country-specific recommendations and their commitments under the European Semester, in particular those related to the stability and growth pact (SGP), the Euro-plus pact, Europe-2020 and the macro-economic imbalances procedure, taking into account country-specific circumstances; whereas ensuring the financial stability of every Member State is a matter of mutual interest of the Member States; whereas Article 121 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides that Member States are to regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern and to coordinate them within the Council;

AB.  whereas it is paramount for a return to growth that the internal market is being completed; whereas the Commission, as the guardian of the Treaties, needs to step up its efforts to enforce implementation of and compliance with existing internal market legislation; whereas for the proper functioning of the internal market it is necessary that market integration rules will be based more on regulations and not on directives;

AC.  whereas it is beyond doubt that European integration is an irreversible and progressive process;

The way ahead: the report of the four Presidents

AD.  whereas from a democratic point of view and in the light of all the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty it is unacceptable that the President of the European Parliament, which is composed of elected Members representing more than 502 million European citizens, has not been involved in the drafting of the abovementioned report entitled ‘Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union’;

AE.   whereas the time has come for the political leaders of and within the Union to demonstrate their determination, creativity, courage, resilience and leadership to remove the remaining deficiencies that continue to hamper the proper functioning of EMU; whereas the intergovernmental method has reached its limits and is not well suited for democratic and efficient decision-making in 21st century; whereas a leap should be made to a truly federal Europe;

AF.   whereas the abovementioned report entitled ‘Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union’ unambiguously chooses the way forward and seeks to break the cycle of distrust by means of structural measures; whereas the report should also pay attention to the social dimension;

AG.  whereas the European Council of 28 and 29 June 2012 requested its President to develop a specific and time-bound roadmap for the achievement of a genuine EMU; whereas developing a global long-term vision via a road map is an important signal that could contribute to restoring confidence which could grow as the road map is carried out step by step;

AH.  whereas steady progress in the implementation of the long-term road map does not provide any immediate solution to the crisis and should not delay the needed short-term measures;

AI.    whereas it cannot be excluded that new Treaty changes might be needed for increasing the democratic legitimacy of a fully operational EMU; whereas the Commission should list current legislative initiatives that must not be delayed by the long-term institutional developments;

AJ.   whereas the completion of a genuine EMU within the Union will require in the medium-term a Treaty change to be completed;

AK.  whereas making full use of the procedures and the flexibility of the existing Treaties to swiftly improve the governance of the EMU in the context of the framing of a true European political space is a condition for building the democratic consensus for a future comprehensive and successful Treaty change;

AL.   whereas Parliament has the right to submit to the Council proposals for the amendment of the Treaties which subsequently need to be examined by a Convention, in order to complete the framing of a genuine EMU by enhancing the Union's competencies, in particular in the field of economic policy, and by strengthening the Union’s own resources and budgetary capacity, the role and democratic accountability of the Commission and Parliament's prerogatives;

AM. whereas it is realistic and appropriate to think that such a Convention should not take place before the next European elections; whereas preparations for such a Convention should start before the next European elections;

AN.  whereas both the measures proposed under the existing Treaties and the future Treaty changes should not exclude opt-ins for Member States and should guarantee the integrity of the Union;

AO.  whereas future Treaty changes should not be an obstacle to the swift implementation of what can already be achieved under the existing Treaties; whereas the existing Treaties allow a broad margin for substantial progress toward an EMU-based on an enhanced and more integrated financial, budgetary and economic policy framework and on a stronger democratic legitimacy and accountability;

AP.   whereas the full potential of the Lisbon Treaty regarding employment and social policies has up to now been untapped, first and foremost regarding:

-       Article 9 TFEU, in accordance with which the promotion of high employment and the guarantee of adequate social protection have to be taken into account in defining and implementing the policies and activities of the Union,

-       Article 151 TFEU, which provides that 'The Union and the Member States, (...), shall have as their objectives the promotion of employment, improved living and working conditions, so as to make possible their harmonisation while the improvement is being maintained, proper social protection, dialogue between management and labour, the development of human resources with a view to lasting high employment and the combating of exclusion',

-       Article 153(1) TFEU in general, and point (h) thereof in particular, which provides for 'the integration of persons excluded from the labour market';

AQ.  whereas Article 48(7) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) provides for a specific procedure for adopting an act for which the TFEU requires a special legislative procedure in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure; whereas Article 333 TFEU also contains provisions that allow for making use of the ordinary legislative procedure in the context of enhanced cooperation;

AR.  whereas the ambition should be that all Member States jointly take steps forward towards greater European integration; whereas decisions that only apply to the euro area might be needed where required or justified on the basis of the specificity of the euro area, including reasonable and fair opt-ins for other Member States with balanced rights and obligations;

AS.   whereas a common European Youth Strategy is essential to fight youth unemployment and the danger of losing a whole generation in Europe;

Banking union

AT.   whereas the measures to stabilise the financial system to date have been insufficient to fully restore confidence; whereas the European Central Bank (ECB) with a series of exceptional temporary assistance measures for both Member States and banks has played a pivotal role in these rescue operations without losing sight of its core objective, namely guaranteeing price stability;

AU.  whereas the Treaty-based operational independence of the ECB in the field of monetary policy remains a cornerstone for the credibility of EMU and the single currency;

AV.  whereas the precarious situation of the banking sector in several Member States and the Union as a whole threatens the real economy and the public finances and the cost of management of the banking crisis falls heavily on taxpayers and the development of the real economy thus hampering growth; whereas the existing mechanisms and structures are insufficient to prevent negative spill-over effects;

AW. whereas Member States suffer from an apparent mismatch between banks carrying out operations on a European market basis, and contingent liabilities shouldered by their sovereigns; whereas during the current crisis it has become self-evident that the bank-sovereign link is stronger and more damaging within a monetary union, where the internal exchange rate is fixed and there exists no mechanism at Union level to alleviate the costs of bank restructuring;

AX.  whereas breaking up the negative feedback loops between sovereigns, banks and the real economy is crucial for a smooth functioning of the EMU;

AY.  whereas the crisis has created a dispersion of lending rates and has also de facto fragmented the single market for financial services;

AZ.   whereas Parliament has repeatedly and consistently asserted that there is an urgent need for additional and far-reaching measures to solve the crisis in the banking sector; whereas a distinction should be made between short-term measures to stabilise an acute bank crisis situation and medium and long-term measures, including the G-20 commitment to the timely, full and consistent implementation of internationally agreed rules on bank capital, liquidity and leverage, aimed at the realisation of a fully operational European banking union;

BA.  whereas all measures taken in the context of such a banking union should not hamper the continued proper functioning of the internal market for financial services and the free movement of capital;

BB.   whereas financial institutions and their representatives should act responsibly and according to high moral standards, serving the real economy;

BC.  whereas the Union needs the establishment of a single European supervisory mechanism for banking institutions; whereas in order to ensure the necessary confidence in the financial market and stability in a common internal market for financial services European framework for sound and efficient deposit guarantee and banking resolution are essential;

BD.  whereas all measures to achieve a banking union should be accompanied by an improvement of transparency and accountability of the institutions implementing it;

BE.   whereas the question whether it is necessary to require legal separation of certain particularly risky financial activities from deposit-taking banks within the banking group, in line with the Liikanen report, should be examined;

BF.   whereas supervisory authorities in general should detect and correct problems at an early stage to prevent crises from occurring and maintaining financial stability and resilience;

BG.  whereas most of the banking supervisory powers in the Union today remain in the hands of national supervisors with the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) (EBA), established by Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010[1] in a coordinating role; whereas the current system of national supervision has proven to be too fragmented to face current challenges;

BH.  whereas a high-quality and effective European supervisory mechanism is indispensable to ensure that problems are detected and tackled vigorously, to guarantee a level playing field between all banking institutions to restore cross-border confidence and to avoid fragmentation of the internal market;

BI.    whereas a clear division of operational responsibilities should be agreed between a European supervisory mechanism and the national supervisory authorities, depending on the size and business models of banks and the supervisory tasks, in application of the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity;

BJ.    whereas European supervision of banking institutions within the EMU, as well as the strengthening of the role of the EBA in preserving the internal market are absolute priorities to tackle the crisis; whereas it should, however, be ensured that, for the purpose of internal financial market stability, countries whose currency is not the euro, which decide to participate in the single supervision mechanism via close cooperation, should be granted a participation formula which guarantees symmetric relations between accepted obligations and impact on decision-making;

BK.  whereas the single supervisory mechanism should from the very start cover the financial institutions requiring direct support from the Union as well as systemically important financial institutions;

BL.   whereas the independence of the European single supervisory mechanism from political and industry influence does not exempt it from explaining, justifying and being accountable to Parliament, on a regular basis and whenever the situation requires, for the actions and decisions taken in the field of European supervision, given the impact that supervisory measures may have on public finances, banks, employees and customers; whereas an effective democratic accountability require inter alia Parliamentary approval of the chairman or chairwoman of the supervisory board of the single supervisory mechanism selected after an open selection procedure, the obligation of the chair to report to and be heard in Parliament, the right of Parliament to ask written or oral questions and the right of inquiry of Parliament in accordance with the TFEU;

BM.  whereas in the future the ESM will, under certain conditions, be able to fund banks in difficulties directly; whereas for this reason making the single supervisory mechanism operational is the first and most urgent task in the realisation of the banking union;

BN.  whereas the single set of rules (single rule book) being developed by EBA, should ensure fully harmonised rules and their uniform application across the Union; whereas the completion of the single rule book on banking supervision and more broadly harmonised and enhanced prudential requirements are necessary for the effective functioning of the single supervisory mechanism, since the European supervisor cannot work with divergent national prudential rules;

BO.  whereas, following the creation of the single supervisory mechanism, voting rules within the EBA should be carefully adapted so that constructive cooperation between euro area and non-euro area Member States is facilitated and so that the interests of all Member States are fully taken into account;

BP.   whereas the pending legislative procedures relating to the single supervisory mechanism should be completed without delay;

BQ.  whereas in order to implement the new financial architecture it is essential urgently to unblock the negotiations on the directives on deposit guarantee schemes and on investor compensation scheme, on which negotiations between Parliament and the Council are suspended, despite their crucial importance in providing common mechanisms to resolve banks and guarantee customer deposits;

BR.   whereas a single European deposit guarantee framework necessitates uniform, common, stringent requirements applicable to all deposit guarantee schemes in the Union in order to achieve the same protection and the same stability of deposit guarantee schemes and guarantee a level playing field; whereas only in this way can the preconditions for the requisite flexibility be created so as to take sufficient account of specific national circumstances in the financial sector;

BS.   whereas a single European deposit guarantee fund with functioning deposit guarantee schemes backed by appropriate levels of funding, which therefore enhance credibility and investor confidence could be the long-term goal, once an effective resolution framework and an effective single supervisory mechanism are working;

BT.   whereas ex-ante planning, speed, early intervention, due diligence, access to quality information and credibility are essential in managing bank crises;

BU.  whereas a single European recovery and resolution regime should be established, ideally in parallel with the entry into force of the single supervisory mechanism, for restoring the viability of banks in difficulties and resolving non-viable financial institutions;

BV.  whereas, for the short term, the adoption of the current crisis management framework proposal of the Commission for banks in crisis has absolute priority;

BW. whereas the overall purpose of an effective resolution scheme and recovery framework is to minimise the potential use of tax payer resources needed for the recovery and resolution of banking institutions;

BX.  whereas it is necessary for the protection of private savings to keep a functional separation while ensuring an effective articulation of European funds for deposit guarantee and recovery and resolution;

BY.  whereas resolution and deposit guarantee mechanisms should have a strong financial structure, in the first place ex-ante, built on contributions from the industry, whereby the contribution of a given financial institution should mirror the riskiness of that institution, with European public money only serving as an ultimate backstop, reduced to its minimum possible extent;

Fiscal union

BZ.   whereas in this regard, the abovementioned report entitled 'Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union' marks an important step forward, as it acknowledges that "the smooth functioning of the EMU requires not only the swift and vigorous implementation of the measures already agreed under the reinforced economic governance framework (notably the SGP and the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG)), but also a qualitative move towards a fiscal union";

CA.  whereas sound public finances, balanced budgets over-the-cycle and sustainable growth prospects over the medium term as well as adequate levels of public investment are a basic requirement for long-term economic and financial stability, for the welfare state and for the payment of the costs of the expected demographic development;

CB.  whereas the smooth functioning of the EMU requires a full and swift implementation of the measures already agreed upon under the reinforced economic governance framework such as the reinforced SGP and the European semester complemented with growth enhancing policies; whereas within five years, at most, of the date of entry into force of the TSCG, on the basis of an assessment of the experience with its implementation, the necessary steps shall be taken, in accordance with the TEU and the TFEU, with the aim of incorporating the substance of the TSCG into the legal framework of the Union;

CC.  whereas the Growth and Jobs Compact insists on the need to pursue growth-friendly fiscal consolidation and calls for particular attention to investments into future-oriented areas; whereas the Commission should make proposals to identify investments to be prioritised within the boundaries of the Union and national fiscal frameworks;

CD.  whereas the crisis has made clear the need for a qualitative step towards a more robust and democratic fiscal union with an increase of the own-resources of the Union, more effective mechanisms to correct unsustainable fiscal trajectories, debt levels and set the upper limits of budget balance of Member States;

CE.   whereas a "genuine EMU" must be supported and accepted by the citizens of the Union; whereas the necessity to incorporate policy makers, social partners and civil society organisations at all political levels must therefore be stressed;

CF.   whereas supplementary mechanisms to ensure that all Member States respect their engagements in their individual budgetary procedures should strengthen, and not weaken, the current economic governance framework; whereas the independent role of the European Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs needs to be reinforced, accompanied by strong accountability mechanisms to both Parliament and the Council; whereas a European Treasury should be set up headed by a European finance minister, individually accountable to Parliament;

CG.  whereas under the existing Treaties the flexibility clause (Article 352 TFEU) can be used to this purpose and to create an European Treasury Office; which is a key feature of a genuine EMU;

CH.  whereas Article 136 TFEU allows for the adoption, in accordance with the relevant legislative procedure from those referred to in Articles 121 and 126 TFEU, of specific measures to strengthen the coordination and surveillance of the budgetary discipline of the Member States whose currency is the euro; whereas such legislation may provide delegation of powers to the Commission to adopt non-legislative acts of general application to supplement or amend certain non essential elements of the legislative act; whereas the TFEU provides for the possibility to confer on Parliament or the Council the right to revoke the delegation to the Commission;

CI.    whereas, in compliance with the general rule of the Union legal order, the Court of Justice of the European Union is empowered to ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the Union law is observed unless it is explicitly excluded;

CJ.   whereas the trilogue negotiations on the so-called 'two-pack' regulations should soon lead to concrete political results;

CK.  whereas the SGP is, by design, a cyclical stabilisation instrument which, by allowing Member States to run a deficit up to 3 %, enables to counter and absorb economic shocks in the Member State concerned; whereas this anti-cyclical policy can only work if the Member States achieve budgetary surpluses during good times; whereas financial assistance mechanisms such as the ESM are a measure of last resort;

CL.   whereas Member State parties to the TSCG in the EMU need to report their public debt issuance plans to the Commission and to the Council, allowing an early coordination of debt issuance at Union level;

CM. whereas under the existing Treaties the Member States whose currency is the euro can finance an increased EU budget in the framework of the own resources procedure by introducing specific taxes or fees in accordance with an enhanced cooperation procedure; whereas it should be done with a specific preference given to its liaison with the already existing EU budgetary framework and without undermining the EU budget traditional;

CN.  whereas the common issuance of debt could, in the longer run, and after fulfilment of strict conditions, be a possible way to supplement the EMU; whereas common issuance of debt, with joint and several liabilities, in the euro area may require changes to the Treaties;

CO.  whereas as a necessary precondition for common issuance of debt a sustainable fiscal framework is being established, aimed at both enhanced economic governance, fiscal discipline and SGP compliance, as well as control instruments to prevent moral hazard;

CP    whereas a stronger and more integrated fiscal union should include a gradual roll-over into a redemption fund;

CQ.  whereas it must be kept in mind that the introduction in a not credible way of instruments for common issuance of debt may lead to uncontrollable consequences and the loss of long-term trust in the euro area's capacity to act decisively;

CR.  whereas the debt crisis has prompted the Union, and especially the euro area, to set up new financial solidarity instruments in Europe: the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), the ESM and other projects related to the roadmap towards a genuine EMU; whereas the financial impact of those instruments is much greater, in terms of the amounts involved, than the Union Budget and whereas the innovative idea of a central budget for the euro area funded by members of the euro area is now being proposed as the ultimate guarantee for this new financial solidarity;

CS.   whereas the multiplication of these solidarity instruments makes it difficult to evaluate the actual contribution made by each Member State to European solidarity, which far exceeds the Member States' respective financial contributions to the Union Budget; whereas, moreover, the diversity of existing instruments, in terms of legal bases, intervention mode and the Member States concerned, is likely to make the whole set-up hard to steer by European leaders, difficult to understand for the European citizens at large and not amenable to any parliamentary control;

CT.   whereas the ESM could be integrated into the Union legal framework through the flexibility clause (Article 352 TFEU) in conjunction with the revised Article 136 TFEU;

CU.  whereas under the existing Treaties the definitions for the application of the “no bailout clause” can be specified by the Council on a proposal of the Commission and after consulting Parliament (Article 125(2) TFEU);

CV.  whereas high standards of democratic accountability at European level should apply to the Troika;

CW. whereas the Commission activities in the contexts of fiscal and economic union should be based on proper social dialogue and should fully respect the autonomy of social partners;

CX.  whereas the independence of the European Statistical System must be safeguarded at both national and European level in order to maintaining the credibility of European statistics in their core supporting role to a fully-fledged fiscal union (by means of high quality standards and systemic approach to develop, produce and verify the accuracy of public sector finance statistics);

CY.  whereas public accounting standards should apply in all Member States in a standardised manner and should be subject to internal and external audit mechanisms, as an essential complement to the Commission's greater powers and to greater coordination role by the European Court of Auditors and by national courts of auditors in verifying the quality of national sources used to establish debt and deficit figures;

Economic union

CZ.   whereas much emphasis has been put so far on the monetary side of the EMU while there is an urgent need for building a true economic union, where the 'Europe 2020' strategy should give the binding framework for designing and implementing of economic policies;

DA.  whereas the Euro Plus Pact, the Europe 2020 strategy and the Growth and Job compacts should be integrated into Union law and pave the way for the introduction of a convergence code for Member States' economies;

DB.  whereas the European Semester, as outlined in the preventive arm of the SGP, offers an appropriate framework to coordinate economic policies and budgetary choices implemented at national level in line with the country-specific recommendations adopted by the Council;

DC.  whereas Article 9 TFEU calls for the promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight against social exclusion and a high level of education, training and protection of human health;

DD.  whereas fiscal consolidation, reduction of excessive macro-economic imbalances, structural reforms and investments are needed to get out of the crisis and to ensure qualitative and sustainable growth and employment in a in a knowledge-driven society, reflecting the reality of membership of EMU within a social market economy; whereas structural reforms yield only in the long term;

DE.   whereas the Pact for Growth and Jobs, which was approved at the European Summit of 28 and 29 June 2012, can bring an important contribution to growth, employment and improved European competition capacities; whereas the Union and the Member States must take on their responsibility and act quickly to complete the internal market and unlock its potential; whereas the shift in focus by adopting a Growth Pact is welcomed even though the mobilisation of funds for growth enhancing measures from structural funds only concern a reallocation of existing funds, thus not providing additional financial resources;

DF.   whereas the Member States need to deliver without delay on the agreed reforms in their national reform programmes, and up to national parliaments to deliver timely and informed scrutiny of the actions of their governments in this regard;

DG.  whereas the full functioning of the internal market is hindered by the barriers still present in certain Member States; whereas to benefit of the full growth potential of the Union economy is necessary to complete the internal market specially in areas such as services, energy, telecommunications, standardisation, simplification of public procurement rules, network industries, e-commerce, and copyright regime;

DH.  whereas deeper economic and budgetary integration will be undermined without closer coordination in the field of taxation; whereas the unanimity rule in the field of taxation hampers developments in this area, the instrument of enhanced cooperation should be used more frequently; whereas reference can be made to Parliament's position on the common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB) and the financial transactions tax (FTT); whereas in the field of taxation, convergence between the structures of tax systems and tax base in Member States is clearly needed; whereas harmful tax competition between Member States is clearly against the logic of the internal market and needs addressing;

DI.    whereas it is important that the recovery of the economy goes along with a labour market policy that stimulates job search and entrepreneurial spirit and reduces structural unemployment, especially for youth, old persons and women, while safeguarding the European social model and fully respecting the role of the social partners and the right to negotiate, conclude or enforce collective agreements or take collective action in accordance with national law and practices; whereas in that sense the integration of labour markets of the Member States should be fostered to enhance cross-border labour mobility;

DJ.   whereas binding coordination at Union level should be used for certain key economic policy issues particularly relevant for growth and employment;

DK.  whereas sustainable lasting public finance is not only a matter of an economic use of the scarce government resources, but also of a fair taxation, of progressive tax, of a well-organised collection of taxes, of a better fight against all forms of tax fraud and tax evasion, of tax cooperation and coordination aimed at limiting harmful tax competition and of a well-designed tax system that promotes business development and jobs creation;

DL.   whereas the Member States should be accountable for the implementation of the 'Europe 2020' Strategy;

DM. whereas the Europe 2020 Strategy should undergo a mid-term review, in which it would be wrong to shrink from naming and shaming and which should examine whether the objectives need to be refined or adjusted and how the pressure on Member States to attain the objectives can be increased;

DN.  whereas the availability of high-quality European Statistics play an essential role at the heart of the new economic governance and in particular, they are a prerequisite to support the correct functioning of its main surveillance and enforcement processes, such as the European Semester, the macroeconomic imbalances procedure and EU-2020 Strategy;

DO.  whereas efforts must be pursued to modernise production methods of European Statistics in order to warrant their high-quality standards, cost‑effectiveness and adequacy of resources and to facilitate due dissemination and access to public authorities, economic actors and citizens;

From democratic legitimacy and accountability to political union

DP.   whereas the Union owes its legitimacy to its democratic values, the objectives it pursues and its competences, instruments and institutions;

DQ.  whereas that legitimacy is derived from a dual citizenry, that of the people represented by Parliament and that of the Member States represented by the Council;

DR.  whereas due to the ongoing crisis and the way some counter crisis measures have been taken, the debate has grown on need to increase the democratic nature of the decision making within EMU;

DS.   whereas political leaders and representatives of the institutions, the agencies and other Union bodies should be politically accountable before Parliament; whereas regular reporting and annually presentations of their work and forecasts should be made before the competent committee of Parliament;

DT.   whereas over the past years the European Council has sought to find a way out of the crisis and formulated numerous proposals for which in the Treaties not always a clear competence to the Union has been assigned;

DU.  whereas its choice to take the intergovernmental route, failing to include Parliament as an important actor to find a way out of the crisis, though inevitable in some instances, can be deplored;

DV.  whereas for proposals falling within the competence of the Union decisions should be taken in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, fully involving Parliament;

DW. whereas the executive powers of the Commission in the rules-based approach to the economic governance framework, as established in particular in the reinforced SGP and the macroeconomic surveillance mechanism, should be subject to ex post democratic control by, and accountability to, Parliament;

DX.  whereas the intergovernmental instruments that have been created since the start of the crisis in December 2009 should be communitarised;

DY.  whereas more democratic scrutiny, participation and codecision in relation to economic, monetary and social policy, taxation, the Multiannual Financial Framework and own resources is required; whereas currently existing passerelle clauses should be activated with that purpose;

DZ.   whereas it is not acceptable that the President of the European Parliament cannot be present for the whole duration of the meetings of the European Council and the Euro Area Summit; whereas a solution for this lack of democratic legitimacy should be found urgently through a political agreement between the two institutions;

EA.   whereas addressing the current democratic deficit of the EMU and strictly linking any further step toward a banking union, a fiscal union and an economic union with increased democratic legitimacy and accountability at Union level is urgent;

EB.   whereas wherever new competences are transferred to or created at Union level or new Union institutions established, corresponding legitimacy, democratic control by, and accountability to, Parliament should be ensured;

EC.   whereas no intergovernmental agreements between Member States may create parallel structures to those of the Union; all agreements establishing inter- or supranational regimes must be subjected to Parliament's full democratic scrutiny;

ED.   whereas ensuring the production, verification and dissemination of high-quality European Statistics by a genuine European Statistical System is a crucial contribution to enhancing full transparency and effective public accountability in the design, management, implementation and enforcement of the Union policies at both Union and national levels.

EE.   whereas cooperation between Parliament and national parliaments on the basis of Protocol No 1 should be reinforced in order to improve exchange of views and the quality of the parliamentary activity in the field of the EMU governance both at Union and national level; whereas such a cooperation should not be seen as the creation of a new mixed parliamentary body which would be both ineffective and illegitimate on a democratic and constitutional point of view;

1.  Considers it necessary to place the governance of the EMU within the institutional framework of the Union, which is a precondition for its effectiveness and for filling the current political gap between national politics and European policies;

2.  Calls on all institutions to proceed swiftly by maximising the possibilities given by the existing Treaties and their elements of flexibility and at the same time to prepare for the necessary Treaty changes in order to guarantee legal certainty and democratic legitimacy; reiterates that the option of a new intergovernmental agreement should be excluded;

3.  Stresses that both the measures proposed under the existing Treaties and the future Treaty changes should not exclude opt-ins and should guarantee the integrity of the Union;

4.  Calls on the Council – which issued the mandate to the authors of the abovementioned report entitled ‘Towards a genuine economic and monetary union’ – immediately to co-opt the President of the European Parliament as a co-drafter of this proposal with equal rights in order to increase its democratic legitimacy;

5.  Welcomes the fact that, although involvement has been only informal so far, the Parliament's Conference of Presidents has requested the competent committee of the Parliament to examine the substantive proposals jointly with the three representatives (sherpas) who are negotiating with the permanent President of the European Council on behalf of Parliament;

6.  Confirms that it shall make full use of its prerogative to submit to the Council proposals for the amendment of the Treaties which subsequently need to be examined by a Convention, in order to complete the framing of a genuine EMU by enhancing the Union's competencies, in particular in the field of economic policy, and by strengthening the Union’s own resources and budgetary capacity, the role and democratic accountability of the Commission and Parliament's prerogatives;

7.  Calls on national parliaments to engage in the process of preparing their governments' fiscal and reform plans before their submission to the Union; intends to propose at the Convention to add this explicit responsibility to the functions enjoyed by national parliaments under the provisions of Article 12 TEU;

8.  Calls on the President of the Council, without delay, to bring to a conclusion in agreement with Parliament the legislative procedures under the ordinary legislative procedure pursuant to the Lisbon Treaty which are being blocked by the Council and adopt them, particularly those concerning CRD IV (capital requirements) and national deposit guarantee schemes;

9.  Considers a substantial improvement of the democratic legitimacy and accountability at Union level of the EMU governance by an increased role of Parliament as an absolute necessity and a precondition for any further step toward a banking union, a fiscal union and an economic union;

10. Considers that under the existing Treaties the coordination and surveillance of the budgetary discipline of the Member States whose currency is the euro could be made binding and subject to the control of the Court of Justice of the European Union on the simple basis of Article 136 TFEU in conjunction with Article 121(6), but that, from a constitutional point of view, this step should be taken into consideration only if it would substantially strengthen Parliament's role as far as the detailed implementation of Articles 121(3) and 121(4) TFEU is concerned and in order to complete and implement the multilateral surveillance procedure with delegated acts on the basis of Article 290 TFEU; reminds that according to the Treaties the promotion of high employment and the guarantee of adequate social protection has to be taken into account in defining and implementing the policies and activities of the Union, namely by introducing, building upon existing strategies, a new set of guidelines for Member States, including social and economic benchmarks with minimum standards to be applied to the main pillars of their economies;

11. Is of the opinion that a "genuine EMU" cannot be limited to a system of rules but requires an increased budgetary capacity based on specific own-resources (including an FTT) which should, in the framework of the EU budget, support growth and social cohesion addressing imbalances, structural divergences and financial emergencies which are directly connected to the monetary union, without undermining its traditional functions to finance common policies.

12. Is of the opinion that under the existing Treaties Article 136 TFEU allows the Council, on a recommendation from the Commission and with the vote of the only Member States whose currency is the euro, to adopt binding economic policy guidelines for the euro area countries in the framework of the European Semester; stresses that an incentive mechanism would reinforce the binding nature of the economic policy coordination; calls for an Interinstitutional Agreement to involve Parliament in the drafting and approval of the Annual Growth Survey and the Economic Policy and Employment Guidelines;

13. While reaffirming its intention to intensify the cooperation with national parliaments on the basis of Protocol No 1, stresses that such a cooperation should not be seen as the creation of a new mixed parliamentary body which would be both ineffective and illegitimate on a democratic and constitutional point of view; stresses the full legitimacy of Parliament, as parliamentary body at the Union level for a reinforced and democratic EMU governance;

14. Requests the Commission to submit to Parliament as soon as possible after consultation of all interested parties, with Parliament being a co-legislator, proposals for acts on following the detailed recommendations set out in the Annex hereto;

15. Confirms that the recommendations respect the principle of subsidiarity and the fundamental rights of citizens of the Union;

16. Calls on the Commission, in addition to the measures which can and must be taken swiftly under the existing Treaties, to list the institutional developments which may prove necessary in order to establish a stronger EMU architecture, based on the need for an integrated financial framework, an integrated budgetary framework and an integrated economic-policy framework built on enhancing the role of Parliament;

17. Considers that the financial implications of the requested proposal should be covered by appropriate budgetary allocations;

18. Instructs its President to forward this resolution and the detailed recommendations set out in the Annex to the Commission, the European Council, the Council, the European Central Bank, the President of the Euro Group and the parliaments and governments of the Member States.

• [1]               OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 12.

ANNEX TO THE MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION:DETAILED RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO THE CONTENT OF THE PROPOSAL REQUESTED

1.  An integrated financial framework

Recommendation 1.1 relating to a single supervisory mechanism

The European Parliament considers that the legislative act to be adopted should aim to regulate as follows:

The current Commission proposals on the single European supervisory mechanism should be adopted as soon as possible to ensure the effective application of prudential rules, risk control and crisis prevention concerning credit institutions throughout the Union.

The legal basis, form and content of the proposal should provide for the possibility of full participation of all Member States in the European single supervisory mechanism, in a form which ensures the full involvement in the decision making process of the participating Member States whose currency is not the euro, guaranteeing a symmetric relation between accepted obligations and the impact on decision-making.

Participation of euro area Member States in the European supervisor should be mandatory.

The proposal should be subject to democratic and extensive scrutiny by the European Parliament, within the boundaries of the Treaties.

The legal basis should involve the European Parliament as a co-legislator when the European Parliament’s co-decision role cannot be achieved by way of a ‘supervisory package’ concept. In accordance with Article 263 TFEU the European Court of Justice of the European Union shall review the legality of acts of the ECB, other than recommendations and opinions, intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties.

The proposal should ensure that all tasks of EBA, as provided for in Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, continue to be exercised at Union level and that the proposals are consistent with the sound functioning of the European Supervisory Authorities as envisaged in Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.

The single supervisory mechanism needs to be accountable to the European Parliament and the Council for the actions and decisions taken in the field of European supervision and should report to the competent committee of the European Parliament. Democratic accountability requires, inter alia, Parliamentary approval of the chairman or chairwoman of the supervisory board of the single supervisory mechanism selected after an open selection procedure, the obligation of the chair to report to and be heard in the European Parliament, the right of the European Parliament to ask written or oral questions and the right of inquiry of the European Parliament in accordance with the TFEU.

The European single supervisory mechanism should be independent from national political interest and should ensure that the interests of the Union prevail over national interests through a Union mandate and adequate governance.

The decision-making processes within the single supervisory mechanism should be specified in the relevant legislative proposal under ordinary legislative procedure.

The European supervisor should have the competence and responsibility to:

-    supervise credit institutions within the countries included in the system but with a clear division of operational responsibilities between the European and national supervisors depending on the size and business models of banks and the nature of the supervisory tasks;

-    act in a way that is consistent with the need to maintain the unity and integrity and international competitiveness of the internal market, for example, to ensure that no barriers to competition exist between Member States;

-    take due account of the impact of its activities on competition and innovation within the internal market, the integrity of the Union as a whole, the Union's global competitiveness, financial inclusion, consumer protection and the Union's strategy for jobs and growth;

-    protect the stability and resilience of all parts of the financial system of participating Member States, the transparency of markets and financial products and the protection of depositors and investors and taxpayers, taking into account the diversity of markets and institutional forms;

-    prevent regulatory arbitrage and guarantee a level playing field;

-    strengthen international supervisory coordination and, where appropriate, represent the Union in international financial institutions;

-    in the event of inaction by relevant national authorities, take the necessary measures to restructure, rescue and wind down financial institutions that are failing or whose failure would create concerns as regards the general public interest.

Bodies responsible for supervision at supra-national level should be allocated sufficient resources, including staffing, to ensure that they have the necessary operational capacities to carry out their mission.

Recommendation 1.2 relating to deposit guarantees

The European Parliament considers that the legislative act to be adopted should aim to regulate as follows:

The European Parliament calls on the Commission must do everything possible to ensure that the legislative procedure relating to the recast directive on Deposit Guarantee Schemes can be completed as soon as possible on the basis of the European Parliament's position of 16 February 2012.

Given the long-term goal of the single European deposit framework uniform, stringent requirements should apply to all deposit guarantee schemes in the Union in order to achieve the same comprehensive protection and the same stability of deposit guarantee schemes and guarantee a level playing field. Only in this way can the preconditions for the requisite flexibility be created so as take sufficient account of specific national circumstances in the financial sector.

Options for a single European deposit guarantee fund with functioning deposit guarantee schemes backed by appropriate levels of funding, which therefore enhance credibility and investor confidence, should be explored, once an effective resolution scheme and an effective single supervisory mechanism are working.

For the protection of private savings it is necessary to keep a functional separation while ensuring an effective articulation of funds for deposit guarantee and recovery and resolution.

Deposit guarantee mechanisms, as well as recovery and resolution schemes, should have a strong financial structure, in the first place ex-ante, built on contributions from the industry, whereby the contribution of a given financial institution should mirror the riskiness of that institution, with public money only serving as an ultimate backstop reduced to its minimum possible extent.

Recommendation 1.3 relating to recovery and resolution

The European Parliament considers that the legislative act to be adopted should aim to regulate as follows:

The current proposal for a directive establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms should be adopted as soon as possible in order to create a European scheme for the application of resolution measures and open up in the medium term the creation of a single European recovery and resolution regime. The fact that certain banking sectors already have mechanisms of full protection and tools of recovery and resolution that should be recognised, supported and articulated within the legislative act, should be taken into account.

The overall purpose of an effective resolution scheme and recovery scheme needs to be to minimise the potential use of tax payer resources needed for the recovery and resolution of banking institutions.

For the protection of private savings it is necessary to keep a functional separation while ensuring an effective articulation of funds for deposit guarantee and recovery and resolution.

Recovery and resolution schemes, as well as deposit guarantee schemes, should have a strong financial, in the first place ex-ante, structure built on contributions from industry, whereby the contribution of a given financial institution should mirror the riskiness of that institution, with public money only serving as an ultimate backstop reduced to its minimum extent possible.

The proposal should also accord with other aspects of the European Parliament's resolution of 7 July 2010 with recommendations to the Commission on Cross-Border Crisis Management in the Banking Sector, such as harmonisation of insolvency laws and common risk assessments, a single tool box and a 'ladder of intervention'.

Recommendation 1.4 relating to additional elements of a banking union

The European Parliament considers that the legislative act to be adopted should aim to regulate as follows:

-    the requirement, where necessary, for legal separation of certain particularly risky financial activities from deposit-taking banks within the banking group, in line with the Liikanen report;

-    a "same risk, same rule” regulatory framework that ensures that non-banks performing bank-like activities and interacting with banks are not beyond the reach of regulators;

-    credible and regular stress-testing of banks' financial health that promotes the early detection of problems and effective dimensioning of intervention;

-    a uniform single rule book for the prudential supervision of all banks and a single macro-prudential framework to forestall further financial fragmentation.

2.  An integrated fiscal framework

Recommendation 2.1 on the two-pack

The European Parliament considers that the legislative act to be adopted should aim to regulate as follows:

In the following domains the Commission should be required to implement effectively the compromises that will be reached in the context of the two-pack trilogue negotiations between the European Parliament and the Council:

-    creating a common budgetary timeline;

-    reforming national budgetary frameworks;

-    assessing the budgetary plans including a qualitative assessment of public investments and expenditures related to 'Europe-2020' objectives;

-    establishing economic partnership programmes;

-    closer monitoring for Member States whose currency is the euro and that are in excessive deficit procedure;

-    closer monitoring for Member States whose currency is the euro and that are at risk of non-compliance with their obligation under their excessive deficit procedure;

-    reporting on debt issuance;

-    an initiative specifying a set of programmes required for mobilising additional long-term investment of around 1 % of GDP for enhancing sustainable growth and complementing the required structural reforms;

Recommendation 2.2 on the communautarisation of the Fiscal Compact

The European Parliament considers that the legislative act to be adopted should aim to regulate as follows:

On the basis of an assessment of the experience with its implementation and in accordance with the TEU and the TFEU, the Fiscal Compact should be transposed into secondary Union legislation as soon as possible.

Recommendation 2.3: Taxation

The European Parliament considers that the legislative act to be adopted should aim to regulate as follows:

Within an ever-closer economic, fiscal and budgetary Union more must be done to coordinate systems of taxation, and to address harmful tax competition between Member States which is clearly against the logic of an internal market. In the first instance, when all avenues of discussion and compromise have failed, enhanced cooperation should be used more frequently in the field of taxation (such as for establishment of a CCCTB or a financial transaction tax) since harmonised frameworks for taxation will enhance budgetary policy integration.

Recommendation 2.4: A central European budget funded by own resources

The European Parliament considers that the legislative act to be adopted should aim to regulate as follows:

When formulating policy options, the Commission and the Council should be required to take into account the positions of the European Parliament on the multi-annual financial framework and own resources. The European Parliament has repeatedly expressed the urgent need for a reform of the own resource system and a return to the spirit and letter of the TFEU, stating that the Union budget shall be funded solely by own resources.

The situation whereby the financing needs of the EU Budget conflict with the necessary budget consolidation in Member States should be addressed urgently. The time has come, therefore, to engage in a progressive return to a situation in which the EU Budget is financed by genuine own resources, which would relieve national budgets accordingly. It is furthermore reminded that in its resolutions of 29 March 2007, 8 June 2011, 13 June 2012 and of 23 October of 2012 , the European Parliament explained its views on what a genuine own resources system means and how to make this system compatible with the needed fiscal consolidation at national level in short term.

Further budgetary coordination within the Union requires consolidated data on the public accounts of the Union, Member States and local and regional authorities, reflecting the Union's objectives. The Commission should therefore include the establishment of such consolidated data in upcoming legislative proposals.

Recommendation 2.5: gradual roll-over in redemption fund

The European Parliament considers that the legislative act to be adopted should aim to regulate as follows:

There should be a gradual roll-over of excessive debt into a redemption fund based on the proposal of the German Economic Council of Experts, which foresees the temporary creation of a fund that would be fed with all the debt over 60 % of Member states which fulfil certain criteria; the debt being redeemed over a period of about 25 years; thus creating a fund which, together with the enforcement of all existing mechanisms, will help keeping the total debt of Member States below 60 % in the future.

Recommendation 2.6 for fighting tax evasion

The European Parliament considers that the legislative act to be adopted should aim to regulate as follows:

The free movement of capital cannot be used as a way to evade tax, in particular for Member States whose currency is the euro and that are experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability in the euro area. Therefore the Commission should, in line with its important initiative of the 27 June 2012 to reinforce the fight against tax fraud and evasion and aggressive tax planning, finalise international agreement rounds and table proposals to improve cooperation and coordination between tax authorities.

A financial transaction tax under enhanced cooperation in accordance with Articles 326 to 333 TFEU should be established.

Recommendation 2.7 on ensuring democratic oversight of the ESM

The European Parliament considers that the legislative act to be adopted should aim to regulate as follows:

The ESM should evolve towards Community-method management and be made accountable to the European Parliament. Key decisions, such as the granting of financial assistance to a Member State and the conclusion of memorandums, should be subject to proper scrutiny of the European Parliament.

The Troika appointed to ensure the implementation of the memorandums should be heard in the European Parliament before taking up duties and should be subject to regular reporting and democratic scrutiny to the European Parliament.

Recommendation 2.8 on ensuring democratic accountability and legitimacy of fiscal coordination

The European Parliament considers that the legislative act to be adopted should aim to regulate as follows:

All newly created mechanism for fiscal policy coordination should be matched with sufficient provisions to ensure democratic accountability and legitimacy.3. An integrated economic policy framework

Recommendation 3.1 on the better ex-ante coordination of economic policy and improving the European Semester

The European Parliament considers that the legislative act to be adopted should aim to regulate as follows:

The Commission should make sure that the compromises that will be reached in the context of the two-pack trilogue negotiations between the European Parliament and the Council are implemented comprehensively.

Union instruments for European social protection and minimum social standards should be diligently explored, including for tackling Youth unemployment, such as a European youth guarantee.

The Commission should put forward proposals immediately in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure to translate into secondary legislation the commitments of the Heads of State or Government on 28 June 2012 for a "Growth and Job compact"; In particular, the economic coordination framework should take due account of the commitment of the Member State to "pursuing differentiated growth-friendly fiscal consolidation, respecting the SGP and taking into account country-specific circumstances" and to promote "investment into future-oriented areas directly related to the economy's growth potential".

The Commission should put forward a clarification concerning the status of the annual growth survey. The European Semester should involve the European Parliament and national parliaments.

Further budgetary coordination within the Union requires consolidated data on the public accounts of the Union, Member States and local and regional authorities, reflecting the Union's objectives. The Commission should therefore include the establishment of such consolidated data in upcoming legislative proposals.

Based on a consideration of the various steps of the European Semester as established in the reinforced SGP and the macroeconomic surveillance mechanism, the need for additional legislation should be assessed, taking into account:

-    The development and strengthening of the internal market and fostering international trade links are central to stimulating sustainable economic growth, increasing competitiveness and addressing macroeconomic imbalances. Therefore, the Commission should be required to take into account in its Annual Growth Survey what steps remain to be taken by Member States have taken to complete the internal market;

-    National reform programmes (NRPs) and national stability programmes (NSPs) should be closely linked. Adequate monitoring should ensure the coherence of NRPs and NSPs;

-    The European Semester should allow the development of greater synergy between Union and Member State budgets in view of achieving the targets of the Europe-2020 strategy; with this, the European Semester should also be developed to include resource-efficiency indicators;

-    The involvement of regional and local authorities as well as partners in the planning and implementation of relevant programmes should be increased, in order to increase the feeling of responsibility for the goals of the strategy at all levels and ensure greater awareness on the ground of its objectives and results;

-    The Commission should adopt the Annual Growth Survey and the alert mechanism by 1 December each year with a specific chapter for the euro area. The Commission should fully disclose its underlying macroeconomic methodologies and assumptions;

-    The Commission should clearly assess, in the Annual Growth Survey, the main economic and fiscal problems of the Union and individual Member States, propose priority measures to overcome those problems, and identify the initiatives taken by the Union and the Member States to support enhanced competitiveness and long-term investment, to remove obstacles to sustainable growth, to achieve the targets laid down in the Treaties and the current Europe-2020 strategy, to implement the seven flagship initiatives and to reduce macroeconomic imbalances;

-    The Member States and their regions should, in particular, involve national and regional parliaments, social partners, public authorities and civil society more closely in the formulation of national reform, development and cohesion programmes, and consult them regularly;

-    The Commission should identify explicitly in the Annual Growth Survey potential cross-border spill-over effects of major economic policy measures implemented at Union level as well as in Member States;

-    The Commissioners responsible for the European Semester should come and debate the Annual Growth Survey with the relevant committees of the Parliament as soon as they have been adopted by the Commission;

-    The Council should come to the competent committee of the European Parliament in July to explain any significant changes it has made to the Commission's proposed country-specific recommendations; the Commission should take part in this hearing to provide its views on the situation;

-    The Member States should provide information which is as detailed as possible on the measures and instruments provided for in the national reform programmes to attain the national objectives set, including the deadline for implementation, the expected effects, the potential spill-over effects, the risks of unsuccessful implementation, the costs and, if applicable, the use of EU Structural Funds;

-    Incentive mechanisms would reinforce the binding nature of the economic policy coordination.

Recommendation 3.3 on a social pact for Europe

The European Parliament considers that the legislative act to be adopted should aim to regulate as follows:

According to the Treaties the promotion of high employment and the guarantee of adequate social protection has to be taken into account in defining and implementing the policies and activities of the Union.

The specific rules for a binding supervision of the budgetary discipline in the euro area can and should complement fiscal and macroeconomic benchmarks with employment and social benchmarks to ensure the appropriate implementation of the abovementioned provision through adequate Union financial provisions.

A social pact for Europe should be set up to promote:

-    youth employment, including initiatives such as a European youth guarantee;

-    high quality and appropriate financing of public services;

-    decent living wages;

-    access to affordable and social housing;

-    a social protection floor to guarantee universal access to essential health services regardless of income;

-    the implementation of a social protocol to protect fundamental social and labour rights;

-    European standards to manage restructuring in a social and responsible way;

-    a new health and safety strategy including stress-related diseases;

-    equal pay and equal rights for work of equal value for all.

4. Strengthening democratic legitimacy and accountability

Recommendation 4.1 on Economic dialogue

The European Parliament considers that the legislative act to be adopted should aim to regulate as follows:

The Commission should be required to implement comprehensively the compromises that will be reached in the context of the two-pack trilogue negotiations between the European Parliament and the Council.

Recommendation 4.2: European financial backstops

The European Parliament considers that the legislative act to be adopted should aim to regulate as follows:

The operations of the EFSF/ESM and any future similar structure, should be subject to regular democratic control and oversight by the European Parliament and the Court of Auditors and the OLAF should be involved in that control and oversight. The ESM should be Communautarised.

Recommendation 4.3 on increasing the role of the European Parliament and inter-parliamentary cooperation in the context of the European Semester

The European Parliament considers that the legislative act to be adopted should aim to regulate as follows:

-    The President of the European Parliament shall present at the European Spring Council the Parliament’s views on the Annual Growth Survey. An interinstitutional agreement should be negotiated to involve the European Parliament in the drafting and approval of the annual growth survey and the economic policy and employment guidelines;

-    The Commission and the Council should be present when inter-parliamentary meetings between representatives of national parliaments and representatives of the European Parliament are organised at key moments of the Semester (i.e.: after the release of the Annual Growth Survey, and after the release of the country-specific recommendations), notably allowing national parliaments to take into account a European perspective when discussing the national budgets.

Recommendation 4.4 on increasing transparency, legitimacy and accountability

The European Parliament considers that the legislative act to be adopted should aim to regulate as follows:

-    in order to reinforce transparency, Ecofin and the Eurogroup should be required to transmit to the European Parliament key internal documents, agendas and background material in advance of their meetings; in addition, the president of the Eurogroup should regularly appear before the European Parliament, e.g. in the form of hearings to be organised under the auspices of the European Parliament's Committee for Economic and Monetary Affairs;

-    the European Parliament must be fully involved in the further drafting of the report of the four Presidents, in line with the Community method; this involvement can be organised at working group level (preparatory work) as well as on the Presidential level (decision-taking);

-    the President of the European Parliament should be invited to participate in the European Council meetings and the euro area summits;

-    when new competences are transferred to or created at Union level or when new Union institutions are established, a corresponding democratic control by, and accountability to, the European Parliament should be ensured;

-    the European Parliament should hold a hearing and consent to the appointment of the ESM Chairperson. The Chairperson should be subject to regular reporting to the European Parliament;

-    the Commission representative(s) in the Troika should be heard in the European Parliament before taking up duties and should be subject to regular reporting to the European Parliament;

-    the strengthening of the role of Commissioner for Economic and Monetary affaires or the creation of a European treasury office must be linked to adequate means for democratic accountability and legitimacy, involving approbation and control procedures by the European Parliament;

-    only the respect for the Community method, Union law and Union institutions can ensure the respect for democratic accountability and legitimacy in the Union; under the Treaties, the EMU can only be established by the Union;

-    the currency of the Union is the euro and its parliament is the European Parliament; the future architecture of the EMU must recognise that the European Parliament is the seat of accountability at Union level;

-          the process by which a blueprint for the future of the EMU is elaborated must fully involve the Parliament in accordance to the Community method.

All decisions related to the strengthening of EMU must be taken on the basis of the Treaty on European Union; any departure from the Community method and increased use of intergovernmental agreements would divide and weaken the Union, including the euro area.

OPINION of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (*) (12.10.2012)

for the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs

on Towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union
(2012/2151(INI))

Rapporteur (*): Roberto Gualtieri

(Initiative – Rule 42 of the Rules of Procedure)

(*)       Associated committee – Rule 50 of the Rules of Procedure

Mod

SUGGESTIONS

The Committee on Constitutional Affairs calls on the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions in its report:

Suggestion  1 Recital O
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
O. whereas 17 Member States have already adopted the Union's single currency and most others will join the euro when they are ready;	O. whereas 17 Member States have already adopted the Union's single currency and all others except the United Kingdom are obliged to join the euro once they have met the convergence criteria and have fulfilled their domestic constitutional requirements;
Suggestion  2 Recital X
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
X. whereas from a democratic point of view it is incomprehensible that the President of the European Parliament, who represents more than 502 million European citizens, has not been involved in the drafting of the report of 26 June 2012 of the President of the European Council, in collaboration with the Presidents of the European Commission, the Eurogroup and the European Central Bank, entitled ‘Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union’;	X. whereas the European Parliament was not directly involved in the drafting of the report of 26 June 2012 of the President of the European Council, in collaboration with the Presidents of the European Commission, the Eurogroup and the European Central Bank, entitled ‘Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union’;
Suggestion  3 Recital AC
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
AC. whereas it cannot be excluded that new Treaty changes might be needed for increasing the governance of a fully operational EMU; whereas the Commission should list without delay the necessary institutional developments in the long term;	AC. whereas the existing European Treaties offer a broad margin for substantial progress towards an Economic and Monetary Union based on an enhanced, more integrated and more balanced financial, budgetary and economic policy framework, and on a stronger democratic legitimacy and accountability; whereas the completion of a genuine Economic and Monetary Union within the EU will require in the medium term a Treaty change to be completed;
Suggestion  4 Recital ACa (new)
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
	ACa. whereas the Treaties already provide appropriate procedures for multitier governance which allow to move closer towards a genuine EMU without undermining the integrity of the EU legal and institutional order, by adopting provisions in the framework of fiscal and economic policies specifically applying to those Member States whose currency is the euro, and by establishing enhanced cooperation between Member States in the framework of the Union’s non-exclusive competencies;
Suggestion  5 Recital AD
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
AD. whereas future Treaty changes should not be an obstacle to the swift implementation of what can already be achieved under the existing Treaties; whereas much can be achieved within the current institutional framework;	AD. whereas making full use of the procedures and the flexibility of the existing Treaties to swiftly improve the governance of the EMU in the context of the framing of a true European political space is a condition for building the democratic consensus for a future comprehensive and successful Treaty change;
Suggestion  6 Recital ADa (new)
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
	ADa. whereas the European Parliament has the right to submit to the Council proposals for the amendment of the Treaties which subsequently need to be examined by a Convention, in order to complete the framing of a genuine EMU by enhancing the EU competencies, notably in the field of economic policy, and by strengthening the Union’s own resources and budgetary capacity, the role and democratic accountability of the Commission and the prerogatives of the European Parliament;
Suggestion  7 Recital ADb (new)
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
	ADb. whereas it is realistic and appropriate to think that such a Convention should not take place before the next European elections; whereas preparations for such a Convention should start already before the next European elections;
Suggestion  8 Recital AE
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
AE. whereas the ambition should be that all Member States jointly take steps forward towards greater European integration; whereas decisions that only apply to the euro area might be needed where required or justified on the basis of the specificity of the euro area, not excluding opt-ins for other Member States;	AE. whereas both the measures proposed under the existing Treaties and the future Treaty changes should not exclude opt-ins for Member States and should guarantee the integrity of the EU;
Suggestion  9 Recital AYa (new)
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
	AYa. whereas the establishment of a Single supervisory mechanism will be more legitimate, more transparent and more effective if adopted in co-decision with the European Parliament;
Suggestion  10 Recital AYb (new)
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
	AYb. whereas Article 48(7) TEU provides for a specific procedure for adopting an act for which the TFEU requires a special legislative procedure in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure; whereas article 333 TFEU also contains provisions that allow for making use of the ordinary legislative procedure in the context of enhanced cooperation;
Suggestion  11 Recital AYc (new)
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
	AYc. whereas a democratic parliamentary oversight must be established on banking supervision activities;
Suggestion  12 Recital BV
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
BV. whereas supplementary mechanisms are needed to ensure that all Member States respect their engagements in their individual budgetary procedures, where it cannot be excluded that the role of the European Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs needs to be reinforced;	BV. whereas supplementary mechanisms are needed to ensure that all Member States respect their engagements in their individual budgetary procedures, where it cannot be excluded that the role of the European Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs needs to be reinforced; whereas under the existing Treaties the flexibility clause ( Article 352 TFEU) can be used to this purpose and to create an European Treasury Office; which is a key feature of a genuine Economic and Monetary Union;
Suggestion  13 Recital BVa (new)
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
	BVa. whereas Article 136 TFEU allows to adopt, in accordance with the relevant legislative procedure from those referred to in Articles 121 and 126 TFEU, specific measures to strengthen the coordination and surveillance of the budgetary discipline of the Member States whose currency is the euro; whereas such legislation may provide delegation of powers to the Commission to adopt non-legislative acts of general application to supplement or amend certain non essential elements of the legislative act; whereas the TFEU provides for the possibility to confer to the European Parliament or the Council the right to revoke the delegation to the Commission;
Suggestion  14 Recital BVb (new)
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
	BVb. whereas according to the Treaties the promotion of high employment and the guarantee of adequate social protection has to be taken into account in defining and implementing the policies and activities of the EU; whereas building upon existing strategies, a new set of guidelines for Member states, including social and economic benchmarks with minimum standards to be applied to the main pillars of their economies, should be introduced;
Suggestion  15 Recital BVc (new)
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
	BVc. whereas, in compliance with the general rule of the EU legal order, the Court of Justice of the European Union is empowered to ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the EU law is observed unless it is explicitly excluded;
Suggestion  16 Recital BW
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
BW. whereas the trilogue negotiations on the so-called ‘two-pack’ regulations should soon lead to concrete political results; the Council should abandon its reluctance on the dossier;	BW. whereas it is essential in the first place to conclude the negotiations on the so-called ‘two-pack’ regulations which will further strengthen the existing powers of the Commission in budgetary matters;
Suggestion  17 Recital BXa (new)
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
	BXa. whereas under the existing Treaties the Member States whose currency is the euro can finance an increased EU budget in the framework of the own resources procedure by introducing specific taxes or fees in accordance with an enhanced cooperation procedure; whereas it should be done with a specific preference given to its liaison with the already existing EU budgetary framework and without undermining the EU budget traditional functions to finance common policies; whereas such an increased budgetary capacity should support growth and social cohesion addressing imbalances, structural divergences and financial emergencies which are directly connected to the Monetary Union;
Suggestion  18 Recital BXb (new)
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
	BXb. whereas the ESM should be subject to proper scrutiny by the European Parliament;
Suggestion  19 Recital CBa (new)
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
	CBa. Whereas the ESM could be integrated into the EU legal framework through the flexibility clause (Article 352 TFEU) in conjunction with the revised Article 136 TFEU;
Suggestion  20 Recital CBb (new)
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
	CBb. whereas under the existing Treaties the definitions for the application of the “no bailout clause” can be specified by the Council on a proposal of the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament ( Article 125(2) TFEU);
Suggestion  21 Recital CBc (new)
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
	CBc. whereas high standards of democratic accountability at European level should apply to the Troika;
Suggestion  22 Recital CG
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
CG. whereas it is up to the Member States to deliver without delay on the agreed reforms in their national reform programmes;	CG. whereas it is up to the Member States to deliver without delay on the agreed reforms in their national reform programmes, and up to national parliaments to deliver timely and informed scrutiny of the actions of their governments in this regard;
Suggestion  23 Recital CJ
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
CJ. whereas binding coordination at Union level might be considered for certain key economic policy issues particularly relevant for growth and employment;	CJ. whereas convergence criteria at Union level should be considered for certain key economic policy issues particularly relevant for productivity and competitivity measures outlined in the "Europe 2020" strategy;
Suggestion  24 Recital CJa (new)
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
	CJa. whereas Article 136 TFEU allows the Council, on a recommendation from the Commission and with the vote of the only Member States whose currency is the euro, to adopt binding economic policy guidelines for the euro area countries in the framework of the European Semester; whereas an incentive mechanism would reinforce the binding nature of the economic policy coordination;
Suggestion  25 Recital CJb (new)
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
	CJb. whereas under the existing Treaties the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission may conclude an interinstitutional agreement to provide for on the one hand the prior involvement of the European Parliament in the drafting of the Annual Growth Survey, the Commission’s recommendation to the Council on the economic policy guidelines for the euro area countries and the Commission’s recommendation to the Council on the employment guidelines; and on the other hand the Council’s commitment, to discuss and take into account the Parliament recommendations on the economic policy and employment guidelines, and to introduce the control through the protocol No 1 on the role of national parliaments in the European Union;
Suggestion  26 Recital CL
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
CL. whereas the Union owes its legitimacy to its democratic values, the objectives it pursues and its competences, instruments and institutions,	deleted
Suggestion  27 Recital CM
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
CM. whereas due to the ongoing crisis the debate has grown not only on the governance of EMU but also on the democratic nature of the decision making within EMU;	CM. whereas the intense financial and economic crisis since 2008 has radically changed the debate on the future of the European Union and poses important questions about the political and constitutional development of Europe and our place in the world;
Suggestion  28 Recital CN
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
CN. whereas the European Council has acted responsibly for the past years in the management of the crisis, formulating numerous proposals to find a way out of the crisis for which in the Treaties not always a clear competence to the Union has been assigned;	CN. whereas the European Council has had to resort to crisis management over these years, and the time has now come for a more rigorous analysis of the weaknesses of EMU as crafted in the Treaty of Maastricht, and for a profound examination of the implications of fiscal union for economic governance of the Union, including the competences conferred and the powers of its institutions;
Suggestion  29 Recital CP
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
CP. whereas measures taken at Union level are often perceived as being ‘too little, too late’ due to the procedures arising from the democratic legislative process, the lack of a European institutional substructure or own Union resources to intervene directly to tackle a crisis situation;	deleted
Suggestion  30 Recital CQ
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
CQ. whereas the flaws in EMU have been detected and should be definitively resolved;	deleted
Suggestion  31 Recital CR
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
CR. whereas the interim and final reports that will be submitted by the President of the European Council in October and December 2012, respectively, should be drawn up in close collaboration with the European Parliament which insists on being fully involved as an equal partner in line with the Community method; whereas this can be organised through the involvement of the President of the European Parliament in the work of the four Presidents, as well as through the representatives to be appointed by the Conference of Presidents of the Parliament in the ad-hoc Council working group on the report of the four Presidents;	CR. whereas the President of the European Parliament has been associated to the preparation of the report to be submitted to the December 2012 European Council by its President; whereas the European Parliament has appointed its representatives in the ad-hoc working group;
Suggestion  32 Recital CS
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
CS. whereas it is no longer acceptable that the President of the European Parliament cannot be present for the whole duration of the meetings of the European Council and the Euro area Summit; whereas a solution for this lack of democratic legitimacy should be found urgently through a political agreement between the two institutions;	deleted
Suggestion  33 Recital CSa (new)
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
	CSa. whereas it is urgent to address the current democratic deficit of the EMU and strictly link any further step toward a Banking Union, a Fiscal Union and an Economic Union with increased democratic legitimacy and accountability at EU level;
Suggestion  34 Recital CTa (new)
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
	CTa. whereas cooperation between the European Parliament and national parliaments on the basis of Protocol No 1 should be reinforced in order to improve exchange of views and the quality of the parliamentary activity in the field of the EMU governance both at European and at national level; whereas such a cooperation should not be seen as the creation of a new mixed parliamentary body which would be both ineffective and illegitimate on a democratic and constitutional point of view;
Suggestion  35 Paragraph -1 (new)
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
	-1. Considers necessary to place the governance of the Economic and Monetary Union within the institutional framework of the Union, which is a precondition for its effectiveness and for filling the current political gap between national politics and European policies;
Suggestion  36 Paragraph -1 a (new)
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
	-1a. Considers a substantial improvement of the democratic legitimacy and accountability at EU level of the EMU governance by an increased role of the European Parliament as an absolute necessity and a precondition for any further step toward a Banking Union, a Fiscal Union and an Economic Union;
Suggestion  37 Paragraph -1 b (new)
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
	-1b. Calls on all institutions to swiftly proceed by maximising the possibilities given by the existing Treaties and their elements of flexibility and at the same time prepare for the necessary Treaty changes in order to guarantee legal certainty and democratic legitimacy; reiterates that the option of a new intergovernmental agreement should be excluded;
Suggestion  38 Paragraph -1 c (new)
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
	- 1c. points out that the European Parliament will deal with the regulation conferring specific tasks on the ECB concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions in conjunction with the proposals on the European Banking Authority and will treat them as a single package;
Suggestion  39 Paragraph -1 d (new)
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
	-1d. Considers that under the existing Treaties the coordination and surveillance of the budgetary discipline of the Member States whose currency is the euro could be made binding and subject to the control of the Court of Justice of the European Union on the simple basis of Article 136 TFEU in conjunction with Article 121(6), but that, from a constitutional point of view, this step should be taken into consideration only if it would substantially strengthen the European Parliament's role as far as the detailed implementation of Articles 121(3) and 121(4) TFEU is concerned and in order to complete and implement the multilateral surveillance procedure with delegated acts on the basis of Article 290 TFEU; reminds that according to the Treaties the promotion of high employment and the guarantee of adequate social protection has to be taken into account in defining and implementing the policies and activities of the EU i.e by introducing, building upon existing strategies, a new set of guidelines for Member states, including social and economic benchmarks with minimum standards to be applied to the main pillars of their economies;
Suggestion  40 Paragraph -1 e (new)
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
	-1e. Is of the opinion that a "genuine Economic and Monetary Union" cannot be limited to a system of rules but requires an increased budgetary capacity based on specific own-resources (including a financial transactions tax) which should, in the framework of the EU budget, support growth and social cohesion addressing imbalances, structural divergences and financial emergencies which are directly connected to the Monetary Union, without undermining its traditional functions to finance common policies;
Suggestion  41 Paragraph -1f (new)
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
	- 1f. Is of the opinion that under the existing Treaties Article 136 TFEU allows the Council, on a recommendation from the Commission and with the vote of the only Member States whose currency is the euro, to adopt binding economic policy guidelines for the euro area countries in the framework of the European Semester; underlines that an incentive mechanism would reinforce the binding nature of the economic policy coordination; calls for an Interinstitutional Agreement to involve the European Parliament in the drafting and approval of the Annual Growth Survey and the Economic Policy and Employment Guidelines;
Suggestion  42 Paragraph -1 g (new)
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
	- 1g. while reaffirming its intention to intensify the cooperation with national parliaments on the basis of Protocol No 1, underlines that such a cooperation should not be seen as the creation of a new mixed parliamentary body which would be both ineffective and illegitimate on a democratic and constitutional point of view; stresses the full legitimacy of the European Parliament as parliamentary body at the EU level for a reinforced and democratic EMU governance;
Suggestion  43 Paragraph -1 h (new)
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
	-1h. underlines that both the measures proposed under the existing Treaties and the future Treaty changes should not exclude opt-ins and should guarantee the integrity of the EU;
Suggestion  44 Paragraph 1
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
1. Requests the Commission to submit to Parliament as soon as possible after consultation of all interested parties, with the European Parliament being a co-legislator, proposals for acts on following the detailed recommendations set out in the Annex hereto;	1. Requests the Commission to submit to Parliament as soon as possible, after consultation of all interested parties and with comprehensive impact assessments, all legislative proposals necessary to accomplish the building of a genuine economic and monetary union and to take good note of Parliament's detailed recommendations as set out in the Annex hereto;
Suggestion  45 Paragraph 2
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
2. Confirms that the recommendations respect the principle of subsidiarity and the fundamental rights of citizens of the European Union;	deleted
Suggestion  46 Paragraph 3
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
3. Calls on the Commission, in addition to the measures which can and must be taken swiftly under the existing Treaties, to list the institutional developments which may prove necessary in order to establish a stronger EMU architecture, based on the need for a banking union, a fiscal union and an economic union;	3. Confirms that it shall make full use of its prerogative to submit to the Council proposals for the amendment of the Treaties which subsequently need to be examined by a Convention, in order to complete the framing of a genuine EMU by enhancing the EU competencies, notably in the field of economic policy, and by strengthening the Union’s own resources and budgetary capacity, the role and democratic accountability of the Commission and the prerogatives of the European Parliament;
Suggestion  47 Paragraph 3 a (new)
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
	3a. Calls on national parliaments to engage in the process of preparing their governments' fiscal and reform plans before their submission to the EU; intends to propose at the Convention to add this explicit responsibility to the functions enjoyed by national parliaments under the provisions of Article 12 TEU;
Suggestion  48 Paragraph 4 a (new)
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
	4a. Insists on the urgent completion of the single market action plan, not least in the field of services;
Suggestion  49 Annex – Recommandation 1.1 – Paragraph 8
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
The body or bodies with ultimate authority under the European supervisor should be headed by officers appointed after confirmation by the European Parliament.	The representatives of the ECB in the supervisory board shall be elected by the Executive Board of the ECB after confirmation by the European Parliament.
	The Chair and Vice-Chair of the supervisory board shall be elected by and from the members of the Governing Council of the ECB after confirmation by the European Parliament.
Suggestion  50 Annex – Recommandation 4.4 – indent 1 a (new)
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
	The Euro is the currency of the European Union; the European Parliament is the parliament of the European Union; therefore the European Parliament is the parliament of the EMU;
Suggestion  51 Annex – Recommandation 4.4 – indent 3
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
- The President of the European Parliament should be invited to participate in the European Council meetings and the euro area summits;	deleted
Suggestion  52 Annex – Recommandation 4.4 – indent 5
Draft report of the committee responsible	Suggestion
The European Parliament should hold a hearing and consent to the appointment of the ESM Chairperson. The Chairperson should be subject to regular reporting to the European Parliament;	The European Parliament should hold a hearing and give its consent to the appointment of the ESM Managing Director. The Managing Director should be subject to regular reporting to the European Parliament;

RESULT OF FINAL VOTE IN COMMITTEE

Date adopted	9.10.2012
Result of final vote	+: –: 0:	18 3 1
Members present for the final vote	Alfredo Antoniozzi, Andrew Henry William Brons, Carlo Casini, Andrew Duff, Roberto Gualtieri, Enrique Guerrero Salom, Zita Gurmai, Gerald Häfner, Stanimir Ilchev, Constance Le Grip, David Martin, Morten Messerschmidt, Paulo Rangel, Algirdas Saudargas, Indrek Tarand, Rafał Trzaskowski, Manfred Weber, Luis Yáñez-Barnuevo García
Substitute(s) present for the final vote	Zuzana Brzobohatá, Andrea Češková, Marietta Giannakou, Anneli Jäätteenmäki, Vital Moreira, Helmut Scholz, György Schöpflin

OPINION of the Committee on Budgets (11.10.2012)

for the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs

on Towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union
(2012/2151(INI))

Rapporteur: Alain Lamassoure

(Initiative – Rule 42 of the Rules of Procedure)

SUGGESTIONS

The Committee on Budgets calls on the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, as the committee responsible:

–   to incorporate the following suggestions in its motion for a resolution:

A. Whereas the debt crisis has prompted the Union and especially the euro area to set up new financial solidarity instruments in Europe: the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and other projects related to the roadmap towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union; whereas the financial impact of those instruments is much greater, in terms of the amounts involved, than the Union Budget and whereas the innovative idea of a central budget for the euro area funded by members of the euro area is now being proposed as the ultimate guarantee for this new financial solidarity;

B. Whereas the multiplication of these solidarity instruments makes it difficult to evaluate the actual contribution made by each Member State to European solidarity, which far exceeds the Member States' respective financial contributions to the Union Budget; whereas, moreover, the diversity of existing instruments, in terms of legal bases, intervention mode and the Member States concerned, is likely to make the whole set-up hard to steer by European leaders, difficult to understand for the European citizens at large and unamenable to any parliamentary control;

C. Whereas, in addition, the diversity of existing stabilisation mechanisms makes their possible combined impact difficult to assess, especially on Member States that have not yet adopted the euro or have an opt-out, and could lead to systemic control deficiencies, mutual spill-over effects between the participating countries of the 'banking union' and the non-participating ones;

D. Whereas, without appropriate consolidated data on the public accounts of the Union, Member States and local and regional authorities, it is impossible to assess the right policy mix within the euro area and within the rest of the Union; whereas such data should also make it possible to evaluate which proportion of national, regional and local budgets is dedicated to the financing of the Union's objectives, such as the Europe 2020 strategy; whereas, currently, even the magnitude of such basic data is unknown;

E. Whereas all risks and benefits of the euro area affect the entire Union; whereas  the stability of the euro is a concern of all EU Member States; whereas any departure from the community method and increased use of intergovernmental agreements shall divide and weaken the European Union, including the euro area;

F. Whereas any division of the EU, being on the line of the euro area membership or elsewhere threatens the achievements of the Union and impairs its capabilities;

G. Whereas the Pact for Growth and Jobs, which was approved at the European Summit of 28 and 29 June 2012, can bring an important contribution to growth, employment and improved European competition capacities, the Union and the Member States must take on their responsibility and act quickly by allowing the necessary resources;

H. Whereas the instrument of enhanced cooperation should be used more frequently in the field of taxation; whereas reference can be made to the European Parliament's position on the common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB) and the financial transactions tax (FTT) as a genuine own resource;

I. Whereas, regardless of which institutional option is chosen, the Single Supervisory Mechanism envisaged for the European banking sector will have budgetary consequences for the existing European Supervisory Authorities;

–   to incorporate the following recommendations in the annex to its motion for a resolution:

1. All commitments and guarantees undertaken by the Union or by some of its Member States in the framework of the new European solidarity instruments, such as the EFSF, ESM or other projects related to the roadmap towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union, should be summed up in an overview annexed to the Union Budget;

2. Further budgetary coordination within the Union requires consolidated data on the public accounts of the Union, Member States and local and regional authorities, reflecting the Union's objectives. The Commission should therefore include the establishment of such consolidated data in upcoming legislative proposals;

3. The situation whereby the financing needs of the Union Budget conflict with the necessary budget consolidation in Member States should be addressed urgently. The time has come, therefore, to engage in a progressive return to a situation in which the Union Budget is financed by genuine own resources, which would relieve national budgets accordingly. It is furthermore reminded that in its resolutions of 29 March 2007[1], 8 June 2011[2], 13 June 2012[3] and of 23 October of 2012[4], the Parliament explained its views on what a genuine own resources system means and how to make this system compatible with the needed fiscal consolidation at national level in short term;

4. In the meantime, the Commission should explore the possibility of excluding, in a spirit of solidarity and consistency, Member States' gross GNI-based contributions to the Union Budget from the calculation of the structural deficit as defined in the 'two-pack', the 'six-pack" and in the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, while strictly avoiding the risk of creating a precedent which may lead to distortion of the unified method by which structural deficits are calculated;

5. All decisions related to the strengthening of the Economic and Monetary Union have to be taken on the basis of the Treaty on the European Union; any departure from the community method and increased use of intergovernmental agreements shall divide and weaken the European Union, including the euro area;

6. The Commission must take into account the budgetary consequences of the Single Supervisory Mechanism, particularly with regard to the existing European Supervisory Agencies.

RESULT OF FINAL VOTE IN COMMITTEE

Date adopted	10.10.2012
Result of final vote	+: –: 0:	30 2 5
Members present for the final vote	Marta Andreasen, Richard Ashworth, Francesca Balzani, Reimer Böge, Zuzana Brzobohatá, Jean Louis Cottigny, James Elles, Göran Färm, José Manuel Fernandes, Eider Gardiazábal Rubial, Salvador Garriga Polledo, Jens Geier, Ivars Godmanis, Ingeborg Gräßle, Lucas Hartong, Jutta Haug, Sidonia Elżbieta Jędrzejewska, Ivailo Kalfin, Sergej Kozlík, Jan Kozłowski, Alain Lamassoure, Giovanni La Via, George Lyon, Barbara Matera, Juan Andrés Naranjo Escobar, Nadezhda Neynsky, Dominique Riquet, Potito Salatto, Alda Sousa, Helga Trüpel, Derek Vaughan, Angelika Werthmann
Substitute(s) present for the final vote	Alexander Alvaro, Jürgen Klute, Georgios Papastamkos, Nils Torvalds, Catherine Trautmann

• [1]  OJ C 27 E, 31.1.2008, p. 214
• [2]  Texts adopted, P7_TA(2011)0266
• [3]  Texts adopted, P7_TA(2012)0245.
• [4]  in the interests of achieving a positive outcome of the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020 approval procedure (COM(2012)0388 – 2011/0177(APP))

OPINION of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (12.10.2012)

for the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs

on towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union
(2012/2151(INI))

Rapporteur: Pervenche Berès(Initiative - Rule 42 of the rules of Procedure)

SUGGESTIONS

The Committee on Employment and Social Affairs calls on the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, as the committee responsible

- to incorporate the following suggestions in its motion for a resolution:

A. whereas between 2008 and mid-2012, the EU27 unemployment rate has climbed from around 7% to 10.4%, or 25 million unemployed and more than one out of five young people is unemployed (22%), with youth unemployment exceeding 50% in some Member States;

B. whereas job creation, quality employment and decent work are crucial in overcoming the current crisis;

C. whereas the roadmap «For a stable and prosperous EU» presented to the June 2012 European Council by President Van Rompuy does not adequately address employment and social policies, though they are a fundament element as the Union and especially the Euro zone countries move towards a true monetary and economic union; whereas by not addressing these aspects there is a risk of following economic policies which ignore the consideration of other indicators, and which would therefore not deliver in terms of work and social inclusion;

D. whereas Member States need to adopt economic policies aimed at maintaining and creating jobs in an ever more competitive environment while supporting the transition towards a more sustainable economy; whereas, the constraint of policy making on economic and monetary matters and the lack of a balanced and holistic approach increases the risk of pro-cyclical impacts of initiatives originally designed to stabilise financial markets;

E. whereas restructuring and relocation processes on a large scale have resulted in the loss of almost 2 million jobs during the last 3 years in the EU, and whereas there has not been a European answer to facilitate the management of restructuring in a more social and economic responsible way;

F. whereas the EU needs to embark in some Member States outside of the vicious circle of austerity measures/recession and to make full use of the EU added value which is not only about rules but also about common policies;

G. whereas a European Economic and Monetary Union should first and foremost serve the people and the real economy as a basis for increasing the living standards of all;

H. whereas the full potential of the Lisbon Treaty regarding employment and social policies has up to now been untapped, first and foremost regarding:

- Article 9 TFEU following which the promotion of high employment and the guarantee of adequate social protection have to be taken into account in defining and implementing the policies and activities of the EU,

- Article 151 TFEU which states that 'The Union and the Member States, (...), shall have as their objectives the promotion of employment, improved living and working conditions, so as to make possible their harmonization while the improvement is being maintained, proper social protection, dialogue between management and labour, the development of human resources with a view to lasting high employment and the combating of exclusion',

- Article 153(1) TFEU in general and in particular 153(1)(h) 'the integration of persons excluded from the labour market';

I. whereas the Euro is the currency of the Union and its management foreseen by the Treaty first and foremost in the framework of economic and social policies design by articles 121 and 148 that apply to all Member States;

Towards an integrated employment and social policy framework

J. whereas the four building blocks outlined in the EMU roadmap, should be complemented by a fifth one, «Towards an integrated employment and social policy framework», in order to promote:

- respect of the autonomy of social partners as recognized by article152 of the Treaty, and setting up, an EU tripartite format for monitoring and exchange views on wage developments in relation to productivity, inflation and internal demand, unemployment and income inequalities,

- the introduction of a European Youth Guarantee,

- an European quality framework for internships and apprenticeships,

- the implementation of a social protocol to protect fundamental social and labour rights,

- a social investment pact, including the allocation of 25% of cohesion funding for the European Social Fund,

- a re-newed health and safety strategy;

and in complementarily to actions undertaken by Member states,

- decent and accessible public services,

- decent living wages with minimum incomes preventing in-work poverty,

- equal pay and equal rights for work of equal value for all,

- access to affordable and adequate social housing,

- an integrated active employment policy,

- the creation of a social protection floor which would provide for universal access to essential health services and subsistence security,

K. whereas regarding global imbalance in the Euro zone and the current situation of unemployment, the Commission should elaborate on the feasibility and the added value of introducing a minimum unemployment allowance;

L. whereas the Commission must strengthen and promote mobility, which may contribute to reducing the unemployment, on a fair basis to avoid brain drain and social inequality by granting access to social protection and portability of pension rights; whereas it should be recalled that posted workers should be properly paid and not employed as a form of unfair competition;

M. whereas there is a need for enhanced surveillance of the effects of economic and monetary policies on the social situation and the labour markets and measures to eliminate the negative social consequences of these policies; whereas social policies linked with job creation have therefore to be added to the provisions on the surveillance of national economic policies in the framework of the European Semester;

N. whereas an enhanced surveillance of different macroeconomic dimensions, such as investment and consumption, inequalities in income distribution, unemployment, poverty and regional inequalities, is essential as the current crisis has aggravated macro-economic imbalances thereby reducing real convergence within the Euro zone;

O. whereas the Commission should include, in its assessment of Member States national budgetary plans, the promotion of the EU2020' growth, employment and social targets and should develop a systematic approach to recommendations, addressing all cases where Member States are not on track to achieve the different targets;

P. whereas the Council's commitment to eliminate further existing barriers to labour mobility is welcome and Member States should urgently remove all restrictions on free labour access to workers from Romania and Bulgaria;

Q. whereas the Council and Commission underlined their commitment to tackle youth unemployment as an EU top policy priority; whereas the Member Sates with the highest rate of youth unemployment have not submitted National Youth Job Plans how to prevent youth unemployment from becoming structural unemployment;

R. whereas a common European Youth Strategy is essential to fight youth unemployment and the danger of losing a whole generation in Europe;

Towards a banking Union

S. whereas the Euro is a corollary to the internal market meaning that all parties concerned by the latter must be fully engaged in restoring a well functioning Euro zone;

T. whereas a banking Union should be accompanied by stronger regulation and supervision; whereas the role of the financial system is also to support growth, job creation and the sustainability of social protection;

U. whereas the establishment of a banking union will have an impact on jobs in the banking sector in Member States;

Towards an integrated fiscal framework

V. whereas fiscal consolidation and economic recovery require a stable level of internal consumption and adequate contribution to the welfare state and social security systems, which can only be achieved with high levels of quality employment in a competitive economy, decent living wages and a fair burden sharing;

W. whereas Commission and Council should ensure that policy guidance for fiscal consolidation is fully coherent with the Union's objectives of social and sustainable development, based on Article 9 TFEU and that it is complementary with the objectives of the growth and employment package, -in a way that allows to reduce public debt-, particular those dedicated to sustainable development and quality jobs; whereas it should be kept in mind that wages and pensions are not merely an economic variable but, above all, the income that people need to live on;

X. whereas social governance at the European level should be improved and better coordinated in parallel with European economic governance in order to ensure strong surveillance and monitoring of the employment and social targets of the Europe 2020 strategy as well as synergy effects and coherent policy making;

Y. whereas a "Genuine Economic and Monetary Union" must be supported and accepted by the EU citizens and therefore underlines the necessity to incorporate policy makers, social partners and civil society organisations at all political levels;

Z. whereas any upgrade of the role of the Commissioner for economic and monetary affairs will need to be echoed by an upgrade of the role of the Commissioner for employment and social affairs so as to ensure a balanced approach of the social market economy, in the same spirit the EPSCO Council should be upgraded and organized in a euro zone formation;

AA. whereas the current crisis has demonstrated the existence and aggravation of internal imbalances that call for the settlement of automatic stabilisers at the EU or the Euro area level;

Towards an integrated economic policy framework

AB. whereas a balanced interaction between economic and monetary policies on the one hand and employment and social policies on the other hand is essential since the European social model is an important factor in ensuring the equitable distribution of income without a breakdown in social cohesion, which could compromise economic recovery; whereas minimum social benchmarks should be established in order to stop aggravating social inequalities and to ensure adequate social protection;

AC. whereas most Member States have not submitted a National Job Plan as part of their National Reform Programme 2012 and the Commission has not insisted on Member States to submit them; whereas an integrated and strengthened economic policy framework must include the principles of sustainable development, employment as well as social welfare and social cohesion;

AD. whereas the adoption of the Growth pact is a step in the right direction that should be adequately implemented; whereas comparable policy initiatives in the social sector should follow;

AE. whereas the monitoring of access to capital market should depend on the employment content of investments; whereas the instrument of enhanced cooperation could also be used with the aim to alleviate taxation on labour, shifting the burden notably to environmentally harmful activities;

AF. whereas the democratic dimension of the European Semester needs to be reinforced, including by strengthening the European Parliament's role through a co-decision procedure and by allowing it to define its calendar, content and methodology in close cooperation with National parliaments and in interaction with social partners and civil society;

AG. whereas the Commission must ensure a greater comparability of the National Reform Programmes and establish common benchmarks for their assessment;

– to incorporate the following recommendations in the annex to its motion for a resolution:

Recommendation 1

Towards an integrated employment and social policy framework as a Social Pact for Europe

The European Parliament considers that the legislative act to be adopted should aim to regulate as follows:

The specific rules for a binding supervision of the budgetary discipline in the euro area can and should complement fiscal and macroeconomic benchmarks with explicit reference to employment and social benchmarks to ensure the appropriate implementation of the abovementioned provision and to ensure the sustainability of the social model as a tool of the EU competitiveness;

It should be built on four blocks:

1) regarding policies:

According to the Treaties the promotion of high employment and the guarantee of adequate social protection has to be taken into account in defining and implementing the policies and activities of the EU. Hence social governance, with an integrated active employment policy as one of the corner stones, must be improved in parallel with the establishment of European economic governance. This needs to respect the autonomy of the social partners and of the social dialogue.

2) definition of instruments for:

- the introduction of a European Youth Guarantee,

- a quality framework for internships and apprenticeships,

- decent and accessible public services,

- decent living wages with minimum incomes preventing in-work poverty,

- social protection and portability of pension rights,

- access to affordable and adequate social housing;

- a social protection floor to guarantee equal access to essential health services and subsistence security,

- the implementation of a social protocol to protect fundamental social and labour rights,

- equal pay and equal rights for work of equal value for all

- a re-newed health and safety strategy

3) new legislative initiative regarding:

- allowing National Parliaments to require a legislative initiative from the Commission as a 'green card' based on article 352 of the Treaty;

4) proper financial means for social investment to be laid down in a social investment pact:

- 25% of cohesion funding for the ESF,

- project bonds for social investment

- common targets for investment in education.

Recommendation 2

The European supervisor should have the competence and responsibility to:

-    include supervision based on corporate social responsibility and the role of the financial system to support growth, job creation and the sustainability of social protection;

Recommendation 3

Each mission of the Troika in a Member State must be enlarged to include a member of the ILO.

Recommendation 4

Enhanced cooperation should be used more frequently when an EU approach has proved to be impossible in the field of taxation (such as for establishment of a CCCTB or a financial transaction tax, shift of burden between labour and capital or environmental friendly taxation) since harmonised frameworks for taxation will enhance budgetary policy integration, favour public service financing, job creation and energy transition.

Recommendation 5

The free movement of capital cannot be used as a way to avoid tax, in particular for Member States whose currency is the euro and that are experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability in the euro area and therefore the financing of their public services. Therefore the Commission should finalise international agreement rounds and table proposals to improve cooperation and coordination between tax authorities.

Recommendation 6

The various steps of the European Semester should be enshrined in legislation, as follows:

-    The development and strengthening of the internal market, of the social model and fostering international trade links are central to stimulating economic growth, increasing competitiveness and addressing macroeconomic imbalances; therefore, the Commission should be required to take into account in its Annual Growth Survey what steps Member States have taken to complete the internal market and to favour the sustainability of the social model;

-    A tripartite bi-annual conference, including all Members of the Council, needs to be established to discuss national social matters that have a EU spill-over effect, the youth guarantee and the EU minimum unemployment allowance;

-    The Commission should clearly assess, in the Annual Growth Survey, the main economic and fiscal problems of the Union and individual Member States, propose priority measures to overcome those problems, and identify the initiatives taken by the Union and the Member States to support enhanced competitiveness, energy transition, job creation and long-term investment, to remove obstacles to sustainable growth, to achieve the targets laid down in the Treaties and the current "Europe 2020" strategy, to implement the seven flagship initiatives and to reduce macroeconomic imbalances;

-    The Member States and their regions should involve national and regional parliaments, social partners, public authorities and civil society more closely in the formulation of national reform, development and cohesion programmes, and consult them regularly;

-    The Member States should provide information which is as detailed as possible on the measures and instruments provided for in the national reform programmes to attain the national objectives set, including in the National job plan and the deadline for implementation, the expected effects, the potential spill-over effects, the risks of unsuccessful implementation, the costs and, if applicable, the use of EU Structural Funds.

RESULT OF FINAL VOTE IN COMMITTEE

Date adopted	9.10.2012
Result of final vote	+: –: 0:	27 16 1
Members present for the final vote	Regina Bastos, Edit Bauer, Heinz K. Becker, Jean-Luc Bennahmias, Phil Bennion, Pervenche Berès, Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Philippe Boulland, Milan Cabrnoch, Alejandro Cercas, Ole Christensen, Derek Roland Clark, Minodora Cliveti, Emer Costello, Karima Delli, Richard Falbr, Thomas Händel, Marian Harkin, Nadja Hirsch, Stephen Hughes, Danuta Jazłowiecka, Ádám Kósa, Jean Lambert, Patrick Le Hyaric, Veronica Lope Fontagné, Olle Ludvigsson, Thomas Mann, Elisabeth Morin-Chartier, Csaba Őry, Siiri Oviir, Konstantinos Poupakis, Sylvana Rapti, Licia Ronzulli, Elisabeth Schroedter, Joanna Katarzyna Skrzydlewska, Jutta Steinruck, Traian Ungureanu, Andrea Zanoni
Substitute(s) present for the final vote	Malika Benarab-Attou, Edite Estrela, Ria Oomen-Ruijten, Antigoni Papadopoulou, Csaba Sógor, Gabriele Zimmer

RESULT OF FINAL VOTE IN COMMITTEE

Date adopted	15.10.2012
Result of final vote	+: –: 0:	32 8 1
Members present for the final vote	Burkhard Balz, Jean-Paul Besset, Sharon Bowles, George Sabin Cutaş, Rachida Dati, Leonardo Domenici, Derk Jan Eppink, Diogo Feio, Elisa Ferreira, Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz, Jean-Paul Gauzès, Sven Giegold, Sylvie Goulard, Liem Hoang Ngoc, Gunnar Hökmark, Philippe Lamberts, Werner Langen, Astrid Lulling, Hans-Peter Martin, Sławomir Witold Nitras, Anni Podimata, Antolín Sánchez Presedo, Peter Simon, Theodor Dumitru Stolojan, Kay Swinburne, Sampo Terho, Marianne Thyssen, Ramon Tremosa i Balcells
Substitute(s) present for the final vote	Marta Andreasen, Philippe De Backer, Vicky Ford, Roberto Gualtieri, Sophia in ‘t Veld, Olle Ludvigsson, Thomas Mann, Gay Mitchell
Substitute(s) under Rule 187(2) present for the final vote	Alejandro Cercas, Knut Fleckenstein, Vittorio Prodi, José Ignacio Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra, Wim van de Camp