Index 
 Previous 
 Next 
 Full text 
Procedure : 2010/2502(RSP)
Document stages in plenary
Select a document: :

Texts tabled :

RC-B7-0137/2010

Debates :

PV 10/03/2010 - 6
CRE 10/03/2010 - 6

Votes :

PV 10/03/2010 - 7.11
Explanations of votes

Texts adopted :

P7_TA(2010)0062

Texts adopted
WORD 53k
Wednesday, 10 March 2010 - Strasbourg Final edition
Non-proliferation Treaty
P7_TA(2010)0062B7-0137, 0141, 0142 and 0143/2010

European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2010 on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The European Parliament ,

–   having regard to its recommendation to the Council of 24 April 2009 on non-proliferation and the future of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (2008/2324 (INI))(1) ,

–   having regard to its previous resolutions of 26 February 2004(2) , 10 March 2005(3) , 17 November 2005(4) and 14 March 2007(5) on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament,

–   having regard to its resolution of 10 February 2010 on Iran(6) ,

–   having regard to the forthcoming 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

–   having regard to the UN Security Council resolutions relating to issues of non-proliferation and disarmament, especially Resolutions 1540 (2004), 1673 (2006) and 1887 (2009),

–   having regard to the EU-US Summit Declaration of 3 November 2009 (Annex 3),

–   having regard to its resolution of 5 June 2008 on implementation of the European Security Strategy and ESDP(7) ,

–   having regard to the European Union Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), adopted by the European Council on 12 December 2003,

–   having regard to the recent six-monthly Progress Report on the implementation of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (2009/II),

–   having regard to the Council statement of 8 December 2008 on tighter international security, in particular points 6, 8 and 9 thereof, which expresses the EU's determination to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery,

–   having regard to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), which expired in 2009, and the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT),

–   having regard to the report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy agreed by the European Council on 11 December 2008,

–   having regard to the questions of 21 December 2009 to the Commission and to the Council on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (O-0170/2009 – B7-0010/2010, O-0169/2009 – B7-0009/2010),

–   having regard to the European Council declaration on Iran of 10-11 December 2009,

–   having regard to Rule 115(5) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.   whereas the proliferation of WMD, and their means of delivery, represents one of the most serious threats to international peace and security, and whereas the most pressing security priorities are to prevent terrorists or additional states from obtaining or using nuclear weapons, to reduce global stockpiles, and to move toward a world without nuclear weapons,

B.   whereas there has been a distinct lack of progress in achieving concrete objectives (such as the so-called ‘13 Practical Steps’(8) ) in pursuit of the goals of the NPT Treaty, as agreed at the previous review conferences, especially now that threats are arising from a variety of sources, including increasing proliferation; whereas this is coupled with greater demand for, and availability of, nuclear technology and the potential for such technology and radioactive material to fall into the hands of criminal organisations and terrorists,

C.   whereas the NPT, as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime, must be strengthened, while bold political leadership and a number of progressive consecutive steps are urgently needed in order to reaffirm the validity of the NPT and reinforce the agreements, treaties and agencies that make up the existing proliferation and disarmament regime, in particular the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),

D.   whereas there is a need further to reinforce all three pillars of the NPT, namely non-proliferation, disarmament and cooperation on the civilian use of nuclear energy,

E.   whereas nuclear weapons states that are signatories to the NPT are delaying action to reduce or eliminate their nuclear arsenals and decrease their adherence to a military doctrine of nuclear deterrence,

F.   calling for further progress on all aspects of disarmament to enhance global security,

G.   whereas the EU has committed itself to making use of all instruments at its disposal to prevent, deter, halt and if possible eliminate proliferation programmes causing concern at global level, as clearly expressed by the EU Strategy against Proliferation of WMD adopted by the European Council on 12 December 2003,

H.   whereas there is a need for the EU to step up its efforts to counter proliferation flows and financing, to sanction acts of proliferation and to develop measures to prevent intangible transfers of knowledge and know-how, using all means available, including multilateral treaties and verification mechanisms, national and internationally coordinated export controls, cooperative threat reduction programmes and political and economic levers,

I.   welcoming the Declaration on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (Annex 3) adopted at the EU-US Summit of 3 November 2009, which highlighted the need to preserve and strengthen the relevant multilateral measures and in particular the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, expressed support for the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and called for the start of negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty in January 2010; noting furthermore that the declaration reiterates the necessity for Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to fulfil their international nuclear obligations,

J.   whereas Iran missed the end-of-year deadline for complying with calls to open its nuclear facilities to International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors; whereas Iran has so far done nothing to rebuild the confidence of the international community in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme,

K.   encouraged by disarmament proposals called for by Henry Kissinger, George P. Shultz, William J. Perry and Sam Nunn in January 2007 and January 2008, similar endorsements in Europe by former statesmen in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium, the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention and the Hiroshima-Nagasaki Protocol, promoted globally by civic organisations and political leaders, and campaigns such as ‘Global Zero’,

L.   whereas the revision of NATO's Strategic Concept offers an opportunity for reassessing the nuclear policy of the alliance as a whole so as to reach the objective of a world without nuclear weapons; whereas under NATO nuclear-sharing or bilateral arrangements, an estimated 150 to 200 tactical nuclear weapons continue to be deployed in five NATO non-nuclear states (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey),

M.   whereas there is a need for close coordination and cooperation between the EU and its partners, in particular the United States and Russia, with a view to reviving and strengthening the non-proliferation regime,

N.   welcoming, in this respect, the joint British-Norwegian initiative aimed at assessing the feasibility of, and establishing clear procedural steps for, the eventual dismantling of nuclear weapons and the related verification procedures relating thereto, which is a concrete contribution in the right direction,

O.   whereas in 2008 the French and British Governments announced reductions in their operational warheads but decided at the same time to modernise their nuclear arsenals; whereas all Member States have an obligation to contribute successfully to EU non-proliferation and disarmament policies,

1.  Calls on all parties concerned to seize the opportunity of the forthcoming 2010 UN Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference to advance the goal of nuclear disarmament based on an international Treaty for the progressive elimination of nuclear weapons worldwide, and to pursue the goal of complete global nuclear disarmament to be realised on a step-by-step concerted, multilateral basis;

2.  Stresses the need to develop strategies at the 2010 NPT Review Conference aimed at achieving agreement on a treaty to halt the production of fissile material for weapons purposes in a way that is not discriminatory, which means that the treaty thus negotiated should require non-nuclear-weapons States or States currently outside the NPT to forswear the production of fissile material for weapons and to dismantle all their established fissile material production facilities for such weapons;

3.  Stresses that the five UN Security Council members, all of which possess nuclear weapons, should aim at progressively forswearing the production of fissile material for weapons and dismantling all their established fissile material production facilities for such weapons;

4.  Calls on all parties to review their military doctrine with a view to renouncing the first-strike option;

5.  Calls on the Council and the Member States to make a coordinated, positive and visible contribution to the 2010 NPT Review Conference discussions, in particular by proposing an ambitious timetable for a nuclear-free world and concrete initiatives for revitalising the UN Conference on Disarmament and by promoting disarmament initiatives based on the ‘Statement of Principles and Objectives’ agreed at the end of the 1995 NPT Review Conference and on the ‘13 Practical Steps’ unanimously agreed at the 2000 Review Conference;

6.  Expresses its concern about the fact that Israel, India and Pakistan did not become States Parties to the NPT and that North-Korea withdrew from it in 2003; calls on these countries to become States Parties to the treaty;

7.  Urges the Vice-President of the Commission/ High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council and the Commission to keep Parliament regularly informed about all preparatory meetings in the run-up to the 2010 NPT Review Conference and to take due account, with regard to that conference, of its views on non-proliferation and disarmament matters;

8.  Urges, in this respect, the Vice-President of the Commission/ High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council and the Commission to make every effort to raise European awareness on non-proliferation issues, in collaboration with all the parties and non-state actors working for a nuclear-free world, with regard, in particular, to the network of Mayors for Peace;

9.  Welcomes the inclusion of non-proliferation of WMD clauses in the EU agreements with third countries and action plans; points out that such measures must be implemented by all EU partner countries without exception;

10.  Greatly welcomes US President Barack Obama's speech in Prague on 5 April 2009 expressing his commitment to taking nuclear disarmament forward and his vision of a world without nuclear weapons in a concerted effort forward; calls on the Council to express its explicit support for this commitment;

11.  Reiterates the importance of the Council's active support, in cooperation with its partners, for concrete proposals to bring the production, use and reprocessing of all nuclear fuel under the control of the IAEA, including the creation of an international fuel bank; supports, in addition, other initiatives for the multilateralisation of the nuclear fuel cycle aimed at the peaceful use of nuclear energy, bearing in mind that Parliament welcomes the readiness of the Council and the Commission to contribute up to EUR 25 million towards the creation of a nuclear fuel bank under the control of the IAEA and wishes to see speedy approval of joint action on this subject;

12.  Supports further efforts to strengthen the mandate of the IAEA, including the generalisation of the Additional Protocols to the IAEA Safeguard Agreements and other steps designed to develop confidence-building measures; seeks to ensure that sufficient resources are made available to that organisation to enable it to fulfil its vital mandate in making nuclear activities secure; encourages the Council and the Commission to pursue their efforts to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency capacities, including the modernisation the IAEA's Safeguards Analytical Laboratory at Seibersdorf, Austria;

13.  Stresses the importance of the earliest possible entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); welcomes in this respect the US Administration's intention to secure the treaty's ratification; asks the Council to fully support the negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices as soon as possible; looks forward to the new Nuclear Posture Review, that should commit the USA not to develop new nuclear weapons including nuclear bunker-busters, foresee a dramatic reduction of the nuclear stockpile and steer the USA towards increased emphasis on non-nuclear defence;

14.  Calls for a deepening of the dialogue with the new US administration and all nuclear-weapons powers, with a view to pursuing a common agenda aimed at progressive reduction of the nuclear warheads stockpile; in particular, supports those steps being taken by the US and Russia to substantially reduce their nuclear weapons as agreed in START 1 and in SORT;

15.  Welcomes in this connection the decision of the Russian Federation and the US to conduct negotiations with a view to concluding a new, comprehensive, legally binding agreement to replace the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which expired in December 2009, and the signature of the ‘Joint understanding for a follow-on agreement to START-1’ by Presidents Barack Obama and Dmitri Medvedev in Moscow on 6 July 2009; welcomes the recent progress in US-Russian negotiations and looks forward to a final agreement in the context of the next round of talks starting on 9 March 2010 in Geneva;

16.  Takes note of the fact that the USA has abandoned its original plans for a missile defence shield in Europe; supports a new approach involving all of Europe and Russia;

17.  Calls for the establishment of nuclear-free zones as a positive step towards a nuclear-free world; takes the view, in this regard, that a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East is of fundamental importance for the achievement of lasting and comprehensive peace in the region; points out that the withdrawal of all tactical warheads in Europe could, in the meantime, set a precedent for further nuclear disarmament;

18.  Draws attention to the strategic anachronism of tactical nuclear weapons and the need for Europe to contribute to their reduction and to eliminate them from European soil in the context of a broader dialogue with Russia; against this background, notes the German coalition agreement of 24 October 2009 to work towards the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Germany as part of the overall process of achieving a nuclear-free world; welcomes the letter sent on 26 February 2010 by the Foreign Ministers of Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and Norway to the Secretary General of NATO calling for a comprehensive discussion in the Alliance on how it can move closer to the overall political objective of a world without nuclear weapons;

19.  Supports the dual-track approach concerning Iran's nuclear programme; urges once again Iran to comply fully and without further delay with its obligations under the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and the IAEA, notably to meet the requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors‘ resolution of 27 November 2009; urges the Council to support action by the United Nations Security Council if Iran continues not to cooperate with the international community over its nuclear programme; calls on the Council to be ready to take the necessary ’smart‘, targeted and non-proliferation-focused measures including sanctions to accompany this UNSC process;

20.  Deplores the latest nuclear testing conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the rejection by that country of UN Security Council Resolution 1887 (2009) of 24 September 2009; supports, nevertheless, the US bilateral dialogue approach, within the framework of the Six-Party Talks, in pursuit of denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula and notes that China plays a special role in this regard;

21.  Supports the convening of the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, recognising that the unauthorised trade in and use of nuclear materials is an immediate and serious threat to global security, and looks forward to concrete proposals to increase the security of vulnerable nuclear materials, which could include measures to effectively investigate instances where material has been unlawfully diverted and prosecute those responsible;

22.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Member States, the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the UN Secretary-General, the President of the 2010 NPT Review Conference and the Director-General of the IAEA.

(1) Texts adopted, P6_TA(2009)0333.
(2) OJ C 98 E, 23.4.2004, p. 152.
(3) OJ C 320 E, 15.12.2005, p. 253.
(4) OJ C 280E, 18.11.2006, p.453.
(5) OJ C 301 E, 13.12.2007, p.146.
(6) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2010)0016.
(7) Texts adopted, P6_TA(2008)0255.
(8) United Nations: 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II).

Last updated: 30 November 2010Legal notice