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Parliamentary question - E-007733/2017Parliamentary question
E-007733/2017

Independence and impartiality of the Turkish judiciary

Question for written answer E-007733-17
to the Commission
Rule 130
Kostas Chrysogonos (GUE/NGL)

According to recent findings, the legal system in Turkey is falling short of the requisite standards of independence and impartiality[1]. In particular, following the constitutional reform of 16 April 2017, the members of the judicial board, which is responsible for matters such as the supervision, recruitment, dismissal and promotion of judges and prosecutors in the courts of first and second instance, as well as the recruitment of third-instance appeal court judges, now have a large say also in matters pertaining to the executive. The 13 members of the council are selected from a list of pro-government judges (six are appointed by the Turkish President and seven by Parliament, in which the governing party holds a majority of seats)[2], thereby seriously compromising, the principles of an independent judiciary and separation of powers.

Given that Turkey is an applicant for EU membership: