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Thursday, 10 March 2011 - Strasbourg Final edition
EU approach towards Iran
P7_TA(2011)0096A7-0037/2011

European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2011 on the EU's approach towards Iran (2010/2050(INI))

The European Parliament ,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Iran, including its resolution of 8 September 2010 on the human rights situation in Iran, in particular the cases of Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani and Zahra Bahrami(1) , of 10 February 2010 on the situation in Iran(2) , and of 22 October 2009 on Iran(3) ,

–  having regard to its resolution of 7 October 2010 on the World Day against the Death Penalty(4) ,

–  having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the Covenant on the Rights of the Child, to all of which Iran is a party,

–  having regard to the joint statement by the European Union (EU) and the United States of America (USA) of 8 February 2010 calling on the Iranian Government to fulfil its human rights obligations,

–  having regard to the statement of EU High Representative Catherine Ashton (hereafter referred to as the High Representative) of 24 September 2010 on ‘outrageous and unacceptable’ remarks made by the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad at the UN General Assembly,

–  having regard to the EU Declaration on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction adopted during the Thessaloniki European Council of 19 and 20 June 2003 and the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction of 10 December 2003,

–  having regard to the statement of 23 September 2010 by the High Representative's spokesperson condemning the bombing in Mahabad, Iran,

   having regard to the report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy (ESS) entitled ‘Providing Security in a Changing World’, adopted by the European Council on 12 December 2008,

–  having regard to the High Representative's statement of 22 September 2010 on behalf of the E3+3 on an early negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear issue,

–  having regard to the High Representative's declaration of 12 August 2010 on behalf of the European Union on the sentencing of 7 Baha'i leaders,

–  having regard to the statement of 16 July 2010 by the High Representative's spokesperson condemning the attacks in Iran,

–  having regard to the Council conclusions of 22 March 2010 on free access to information in Iran,

–  having regard to the High Representative's statement of 6 July 2010 on imminent executions in Iran,

–  having regard to the High Representative's declaration of 12 June 2010 on behalf of the European Union on ‘the gravely deteriorated human rights situation in Iran since the Presidential elections of June 2009’,

–  having regard to data from the Statistical Centre of Iran on the increase in Iran's unemployment rate in the spring of 2010 to 14,6%, with the number of unemployed estimated at over 3.5 million,

–  having regard to the fact that Iran is a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and as such has foresworn the acquisition of nuclear weapons and is legally bound to declare all its nuclear activities, including nuclear material, and place them under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards,

–  having regard to the IAEA declaration of 27 September 2005 to the effect that Iran was failing to comply with its obligations under the NPT,

–  having regard to the fact that enrichment suspension and other requirements have been successively affirmed in six United Nations Security Council resolutions (1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1835 and 1929) as preconditions for Iran's rights under the NPT to be restored,

–  having regard to IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano's statement in his quarterly report to the Board of Governors on 18 February 2010 that ‘Iran is not implementing the requirements contained in the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council’,

–  having regard to the IAEA's proposal for an agreement to provide nuclear fuel to the Tehran Research Reactor in exchange for low-enriched uranium from Iran's stocks, and to the bridging proposal sponsored by the governments of Turkey and Brazil in an attempt to build confidence and facilitate negotiations between Iran and the E3+3, as well as Iran and the Vienna Group,

–  having regard to UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1929 (2010) introducing new restrictive measures against Iran imposing a fourth round of sanctions on Iran over its nuclear programme,

–  having regard to the Council conclusions on Iran of 26 July 2010 and to the Council's adoption of a set of restrictive measures to be imposed on Iran in the areas of trade, financial services, energy and transport, and of a regulation extending the list of entities and individuals subject to an assets freeze,

–  having regard to the additional sanctions on Iran announced by the US, Japan, Canada and Australia,

–  having regard to the European Union's long-standing commitment to work for a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue,

–  having regard to Rule 48 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A7-0037/2011),

A.  whereas the Islamic Republic of Iran (hereafter referred to as Iran) is facing an array of governance challenges – from power struggles between competing factions within the country's ruling elites to a crippling social and economic malaise, a problematic regional security environment and rising popular discontent at home – many of which are products of the Iranian regime's own making,

B.  whereas political developments in Iran following the disputed presidential elections of June 2009, widely considered as fraudulent, have shown that there is a great potential for people-led, democratic change in the country, spearheaded by its vibrant and active society; notes that the reformists have become most commonly identified with the Green Movement that took shape during the mass protests against President Ahmadinejad's re-election,

C.  whereas Iran's security forces – the Revolutionary Guard, Basij militia and police – have responded with a severe crackdown, arbitrarily arresting thousands of peaceful protesters and dissidents, including students and academics, women's rights activists, trade unionists, lawyers, journalists, bloggers, clerics and prominent human rights defenders, in a clear effort to intimidate critics and stifle dissent; whereas the judiciary have staged mass show trials of hundreds of prominent reformers and activists, resulting in the sentencing of some to lengthy prison terms and even to death,

D.  whereas, since President Ahmadinejad's election in 2005, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps has used funds accumulated since the 1980s to purchase state enterprises and businesses privatised through the Tehran Stock Exchange,

E.  whereas the fundamental human rights of Iranians – the right to life, to freedom of expression and association and to be free from arbitrary arrest, detention and torture and from all forms of discrimination – continue to be violated with impunity,

F.  whereas Iran ranks amongst the most ‘wired’ nations in the Middle East, making it the third largest blogosphere in the world after the United States and China; whereas it is not by accident that telecommunications and the Internet have been routinely disrupted since the June 2009 elections,

G.  whereas Iran still retains the death penalty and is one of the three countries in the world where most executions are carried out; whereas Iran holds the record for the highest number of juvenile offenders executed; whereas Iran still applies the death penalty by stoning, which runs contrary to the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

H.  whereas numerous Iranians have been executed for political reasons, countless remain in prison, and hundreds have been forced to flee the country in fear of their lives and/or indefinite detention, interrogation and torture,

I.  whereas human rights bodies inside Iran (e.g. the Islamic Human Rights Commission and the Article 90 Commission) are allied to the government and remain largely insignificant,

J.  whereas Iran's nuclear programme has a history of concealment, which over time has eroded the credibility of Iran's claims that the programme is only for peaceful purposes,

K.  whereas Iran has still to comply with its obligations under all relevant UNSC resolutions, the most recent of which is Resolution 1929 (2010), and all the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors, which specify full and unconditional access by the Agency to all sites, equipment, people and documents that would allow for proper inspection of Iran's nuclear purposes and would enable the IAEA to fulfil its role as nuclear watchdog,

L.  whereas some of the policies of the Iranian Government pose a threat to stability and peace in the region; whereas Israel and the Gulf region in particular feel intimidated by Iran's aggressive and targeted rhetoric, its ongoing nuclear programme, and its support for Hezbollah and Hamas; whereas, on the other hand the stabilising influence which Iran could potentially regain would be beneficial to the entire region, provided that it normalises its international relations, in particular with its neighbours, dispels once and for all the concerns regarding the real aims of its nuclear programme and guarantees respect for human rights and democracy,

M.  whereas Iran has hosted two generations of Afghan refugees in the country, which have benefitted from basic health and education services; whereas in 2010 more than one million registered Afghans were residing in Iran; whereas Iran has received only limited international support in this area,

N.  whereas Iran ranks among the world's top three holders of proven reserves of both oil and natural gas,

O.  whereas there has been a remarkable deepening of relations between Iran and Turkey; whereas Iran is using its state and non-state allies Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas, and also the Muslim Brotherhood, to destabilise the region,

P.  whereas Article IV of the NPT notes the inalienable right of all parties to that treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful civilian purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of the treaty,

Internal situation

1.  Notes with concern the internal political situation, in particular as regards democracy; notes also the aspirations for democratic change of the Iranian people, in particular the younger generation, and deeply deplores the fact that the Iranian Government and Parliament are apparently incapable of responding to the justifiable demands of Iranian citizens; stresses that popular discontent with the Iranian Government as a result of the grave socio-economic situation combined with an absence of liberty and of basic respect for human dignity within Iran represents the main challenge to the regime's survival;

2.  Underlines that democratic change cannot be imposed from outside or even by military means but has to be achieved through a peaceful democratic process; expresses its admiration for the courage of the tens of thousands of Iranians who continue to risk their professional careers and lives by calling for greater freedom and more democratic rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran;

3.  Points out that, although President Ahmadinejad was elected in 2005 on a platform of social justice and economic populism, Iran's domestic problems have continued to worsen despite burgeoning oil prices; deplores, therefore, Mr Ahmadinejad's aim of shoring up his political position at home by embracing a radical international agenda with the expectation that a stridently anti-Western, anti-Israeli stance will enhance Iran's leadership position in the Muslim world;

4.  Observes that previous Iranian mass movements were based on a dual quest for welfare and liberty, and that these remain unfulfilled promises of the 1979 revolution; points out that economic shortcomings such as inflation, corruption, high unemployment, energy shortages, an inefficient state sector and the waste of public funds have increased drastically over the last years;

5.  Notes that the reformist movement covers a spectrum of intellectual trends and political agendas ranging from a wish to gradually modernise Iran's governmental institutions to the aim of thoroughly overhauling the regime;

6.  Expresses its solidarity with the millions of Iranians who have taken to the streets since the June 2009 presidential elections in the hope of political change in Iran;

7.  Strongly condemns the illegal detention of Iranian opposition leaders Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi together with their wives by Iranian security forces and calls for their immediate and unconditional release; points out that the detention was carried out in violation of Iranian law; condemns the attitude of the Iranian authorities to the opposition exercising its legitimate right to protest and declares its solidarity with the Iranian people in their democratic aspirations; deplores the hypocrisy of the Iranian government, which used excessive force, intimidation, and arbitrary arrests against peaceful demonstrators demonstrating in solidarity with Egyptian people on 14 February 2011, whilst claiming to support freedom in Egypt;

8.  Strongly rejects the regime's condemnation of protesters and opponents following the 2009 elections as ‘enemies of Allah’ (‘muharib’), who, in accordance with Islam, should receive the severest of punishments; concludes that, while during the Shah's reign criticism of the regime was considered a crime, under the current regime it is tantamount to a sin against Islam;

9.  Warns that the development of an increasingly prominent role for the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Iranian society, in military, political and economic respects, raises fears of further militarisation of the state; expresses its deepest concern at the fact that such tendencies might result in an escalation of violence and oppression against political opponents;

10.  Is gravely concerned about the major role played by the Student Basij Organisation (SBO) in Iranian society in controlling and suppressing student dissent, under central IRGC control, and points out that Iran's student movement has been one of the most prominent actors in the struggle for democracy, freedom and justice;

Human rights

11.  Urges Iran to put an end to all forms of discrimination in the country; is concerned by the discrimination and political and social repression affecting women in particular in Iran; calls on the Iranian authorities to stop discriminating against people on the basis of their sexual orientation; denounces the inhumane and medieval practice of sentencing people to death for alleged offences pertaining to choice of partners or sexual practices;

12.  Is appalled to learn that, according to annual reports on the death penalty in Iran, the number of executions in 2009 was the highest for the past 10 years, making Iran the country with the highest number of executions per capita in the world; calls upon Iran to issue official statistics concerning the application of the death penalty; calls on Iran to abolish definitively the death penalty for crimes committed before the age of 18 and to amend its legislation, which violates the international human rights conventions that Iran has ratified, including the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the ICCPR; calls on the Iranian authorities, in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolutions 62/149 and 63/138, to institute a moratorium on executions pending the abolition of the death penalty; underlines the fact that the EU institutions need to exert constant pressure on Iran in this respect;

13.  Firmly condemns the execution of Dutch-Iranian national Zahra Bahrami in Tehran on 29 January 2011; is dismayed that the Iranian authorities denied consular access to Ms Bahrami and did not ensure a transparent and fair judicial process;

14.  Takes note of the Iranian authorities‘ claim to be against racial discrimination, but stresses that Iran's ethnic minorities lament the economic underdevelopment of the provinces where they are in a majority; condemns the numerous terrorist attacks carried out by Jundullah in Sistan and Baluchistan since its establishment in 2003; at the same time, asks for concrete evidence in support of the official Iranian claim that Jundullah is supported by the American and British intelligence services;

15.  Expresses profound consternation at the fact that Iran continues to be one of the very few countries, together with Afghanistan, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Nigeria, which still practise stoning; calls on the Iranian Parliament to pass legislation outlawing this cruel and inhuman form of punishment;

16.  Urges the Iranian authorities to put an end, in law and in practice, to all forms of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and to uphold the due process of law and end impunity for human rights violations; in particular, calls on the Iranian Parliament and judiciary to abolish such cruel and inhuman punishments as limb amputation, stoning and flogging, which are inconsistent with Iran's international obligations; firmly rejects the notion promoted by the Iranian judicial authorities that such punishments are culturally justified;

17.  Recalls the widespread – and justifiable – cries of ‘Where is my vote?’ by Iranian demonstrators on 13 June 2009 with reference to their conviction that there had been widespread fraud in the previous day's elections, which will remain a stain on President Ahmadinejad's second term of office;

18.  Is appalled by the fact that shooting into demonstrating crowds was considered acceptable by the security forces from the night of 15 June 2009 onwards, as shown in video footage; is deeply concerned by the stepping up of repression one year after the popular uprising in Iran, including the reports of arbitrary arrests, torture, ill-treatment and executions of political dissidents; condemns the efforts of the Iranian Government to silence all political opposition, as well as its attempts to avoid all international scrutiny of the violations that occurred during the post-election unrest; urges the EU institutions to present to the Iranian authorities a detailed list of all known incidents/violent actions against Iranian civilians in the aftermath of the election and insist that there be an independent international investigation, whose findings should be made public;

19.  Calls on the Iranian authorities immediately to free all those detained for peacefully exercising their rights to free expression, association and assembly, and to investigate and prosecute government officials and members of the security forces responsible for the killing, abuse and torture of family members of dissidents, demonstrators and detainees;

20.  Insists that in any future negotiations with Iran, the High Representative should make the situation of human rights in the country a top priority; calls on the Commission to implement all the instruments at its disposal for the protection and promotion of human rights in Iran; urges it in particular to devise additional measures in the context of the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights in order to actively protect human rights defenders; stresses that facilitating the provision of shelter to human rights defenders and access to organisational resources and communication platforms is of particular importance; encourages the Member States to support the European Shelter City Programme and programmes to develop measures against media interception technology;

21.  Deplores the fact that Iranian husbands can claim that their adulterous relationships are in fact lawful temporary marriages, whereas married women accused of adultery cannot secure a reprieve in this way; deplores also the fact that Article 105 of the Penal Code of the Islamic Republic enables a judge to sentence an adulterer to stoning based only on his ‘knowledge’, as well as the fact that Iran tries to limit international knowledge of its brutality by not announcing stoning verdicts publicly;

22.  Condemns the systematic harassment of labour activists carried out by the Iranian authorities, contrary to the pledges Iran made during the United Nations Universal Periodic Review process to respect the social and economic rights of its citizens and their right to freedom of expression; urges the Iranian authorities to release all arrested labour activists and respect the right of trade union activists and teachers to participate in International Workers‘ Day (1 May) and National Teachers’ Day (2 May); calls on the Iranian Government to respect workers‘ basic rights, as laid down under international labour standards;

23.  Condemns the campaign of dismissals of prominent university professors on political grounds as an intolerable attack on their human rights and academic freedom; believes that these policies will further politicise and debase Iranian universities, long a source of national pride and an object of admiration for scholars around the world; calls on the Iranian authorities to take immediate steps to restore academic freedom in the country;

24.  Deplores the fact that, contrary to the Constitution, members of religious minorities endure discrimination in housing, education and official jobs, which is leading young members of these minorities to opt for emigration; condemns in particular the systematic persecution of the Baha'i community, the wave of arrests of Christians in 2009, and the harassment of religious dissidents, converts and Sufi and Sunni Muslims; reiterates its call for the release of the seven Baha'i leaders and calls on the Iranian Parliament to change Iranian legislation so as to ensure that all adherents of different beliefs in Iran, whether or not recognised by the Constitution, can follow their convictions free from persecution and be guaranteed equal rights under the law and in practice;

25.  Notes that the position of Iranian NGOs worsened considerably in the wake of the protests following the controversial presidential election of 12 June 2009; strongly criticises the fact that all international contacts or financial support for NGOs in Iran are systematically exploited by the authorities in an attempt to discredit these organisations and their work;

26.  Expresses grave concern over the numerous executions of minors and the public stonings of women carried out every year despite international appeals for Iran to abide by human rights standards;

27.  Calls for the re-establishment of a UN mandate for a Special Rapporteur to investigate human rights abuses and seek to ensure accountability for those perpetrating human rights violations in Iran; urges the Iranian authorities to react positively to longstanding requests by several UN Special Rapporteurs (e.g. on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions; torture; freedom of religion or belief; independence of judges and lawyers) for official visits to Iran;

28.  Deplores the fact that, contrary to the UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, the situation of lawyers in Iran has deteriorated considerably since the presidential election of June 2009, as the Iranian authorities are resorting to oppressive methods (e.g. arrests, disbarments, violation of freedom of expression, unwarranted tax investigations and other financial pressure) to prevent lawyers from practising their profession freely;

29.  Regrets the fact that the situation of human rights defenders, including human rights lawyers and women's rights defenders, who are especially targeted, is deteriorating; is deeply concerned by the fact that human rights defenders have suffered various attacks and been subjected to unfair trial and are being deterred from making use of their constitutional rights; calls for the immediate release of all those human rights defenders and prisoners of conscience who are still imprisoned;

30.  Calls on the Islamic Republic of Iran to sign, ratify and implement the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW);

31.  Supports the ‘One Million Signatures Demanding Changes to Discriminatory Laws’ campaign, which aims to collect one million signatures in support of changes to discriminatory laws against women in Iran; urges the Iranian authorities to put an end to acts of harassment, including by the judicial authorities, against members of this campaign;

32.  Urges the Iranian Government to improve women's rights, so as to recognise the crucial role women play in society, and to respect Iran's commitments within the framework of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; reiterates its call to the Iranian Parliament to pass legislation outlawing the cruel and inhuman practice of stoning; calls on the High Representative to pay particular attention to women's rights in Iran and to raise the cases of Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani and Zahra Bahrami with the Iranian authorities;

33.  Stresses that representatives of EU institutions should develop contacts with representatives of a broad range of Iranian political and social organisations, including prominent Iranian human rights defenders; calls on the Commission and the Member States to increase support for grassroots activities and people-to-people contacts;

34.  Condemns the repression by the Iranian authorities of the independent media, including the censorship of video and photographic materials, in order to limit access to, and the flow of, communications and information; is extremely concerned at the fact that the arbitrary administration of justice in Iran results in strong (self-)censorship by the media; urges official representatives of the EU and its Member States to remind Iran of its international obligation to uphold media freedom; calls on the EU and its Member States, when meeting their Iranian counterparts, to insist on the re-opening of the many forcibly closed daily newspapers, as well as the release of political prisoners, and to present lists of names in both cases; condemns the practice of expulsion of foreign correspondents by the Iranian Government, including reporters from major European newspapers; welcomes the launch of a Euronews Farsi language service;

35.  Expresses concern about the repression of cultural, musical and artistic expression through censorship, prohibition, as well as the repression of artists, musicians, film directors, writers and poets;

36.  Calls for impunity to be brought to an end in Iran through the establishment of an independent judicial review procedure inside the country or referral through the UN Security Council to institutions that operate under international law, such as the International Criminal Court;

37.  Welcomes steps taken by several Member States to provide shelter to those Iranian human rights defenders, dissidents, journalists, students, women, children and artists who are persecuted for their religious beliefs, opinions, sexual orientation, or other aspects of the exercise of their human rights;

The nuclear dossier

38.  Reiterates, notwithstanding Iran's right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the rules of the non-proliferation regime, that the proliferation risks in connection with the Iranian nuclear programme remain a source of serious concern to the European Union and to the international community, as expressed very clearly in many UNSC resolutions;

39.  Calls on the Iranian authorities to fulfil Iran's obligations under the NPT; calls forcefully on Tehran to ratify and implement the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement; condemns Iran's continuing refusal to fully cooperate with the IAEA, obstructing the IAEA's work, denying full and unconditional access to key facilities and objecting to the appointment of inspectors;

40.  Stresses, furthermore, the fact that, in accordance with a central tenet of the NPT, Iran has the right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes and to receive technical assistance for the same objectives;

41.  Supports the Council's twin-track approach aimed at finding a negotiated and peaceful solution to the nuclear stand-off, and commends it on its new common position of 26 July 2010 introducing new and far-reaching targeted autonomous measures applicable to Iran; regrets the fact that Iran was not prepared to accept the offers on the table at the latest round of P5+1 talks with Iran hosted in Istanbul, and the subsequent collapse of those talks; remains convinced, however, that the EU should devise a broader strategy towards Iran which goes beyond the nuclear issue and also addresses Iran's human rights situation and its regional role;

42.  Recalls that the issue of its nuclear programme pits Iran against the entire United Nations, not just against ‘the West’;

43.  Notes that additional sanctions are the logical consequence of Iran's lack of full cooperation with the IAEA; calls on the High Representative and the EU Member States to assess all mechanisms for enforcing implementation of the EU common position – especially with regard to export licensing, customs and border controls, air cargo and shipping – in order to prevent Iran from evading the sanctions regime and to be able to make a realistic evaluation of whether or not sanctions produce the anticipated results; reiterates its position that these measures should not negatively affect the general population; welcomes in this context the US decision to impose targeted sanctions on Iranian officials deemed to be responsible for or complicit in serious human rights abuses in Iran since the disputed presidential election of June 2009; calls on the Council to adopt similar measures;

44.  Believes that renewed efforts are needed worldwide to rid the globe of the threat of nuclear weapons; welcomes President Obama's appeal for nuclear disarmament and calls on the High Representative to make this issue one of her priorities, both in her dealings with Member States and in her contacts with governments in the Middle East and Asia;

45.  Calls on the Commission, Council and EU Member States to assess trade relations with Iran beyond sanctions, with the goal of limiting human rights violations through the export of technologies meeting European standards, including mobile phones, communication networks, (dual-use) technologies, surveillance technologies and software for Internet scanning and censorship and data mining, including personal data, to Iran; asks the Commission to table a proposal for a regulation on a new licensing system if this review suggests that legislative action is needed;

46.  Calls on the Commission and Council to take immediate steps to ban the export of surveillance technology (especially monitoring centres) by EU companies to Iran;

47.  Calls on the European Council to expand the list of Iranian individuals with links to Iran's nuclear and ballistic programmes and their attendant procurement networks; calls on the relevant authorities to move quickly to freeze their assets and prevent them from entering EU territory and using EU jurisdictions to conduct any activity related to those programmes;

48.  Calls on the High Representative to keep the Iranian nuclear dossier and the human rights of the Iranian people high on the agenda, and on Iran to engage in meaningful negotiations with a view to securing a comprehensive and long-term settlement of the nuclear issue;

External relations

49.  Condemns in the strongest possible terms the desire expressed by Iranian President Ahmadinejad to ‘wipe out’ Israel and his anti-Semitic rhetoric, especially his denial of the Holocaust and his underlying agenda of delegitimising the Israeli state; reaffirms its full support for the existence of Israel and a two-state solution for Palestine;

50.  Calls on the Council and the Commission to closely monitor the situation in the Gulf region and to do their utmost to promote peace and stability in this region;

51.  Recognises Turkey's role as an influential regional actor and commends its joint efforts with Brazil to bring about a negotiated settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue; notes with regret, however, that the terms of the tripartite agreement of 17 May 2010 only partially meet the requirements laid down by the IAEA; calls on the Turkish authorities to follow the European approach towards the Iranian nuclear threat; encourages Turkey to include the human rights situation in its dialogue with Iran;

52.  Underlines the fact that Russia has been one of the major suppliers of modern weapons and enriched uranium to Iran; welcomes the decision by the Russian Federation this year to halt the sale of the S-300 to Iran and its support for the UN sanctions against Iran over its nuclear programme; calls forcefully on Russia to stop any kind of weapons proliferation and uranium exports to Iran, so that the effectiveness of the sanctions against Iran and the fulfilment of the NPT requirements may be ensured;

53.  Encourages the High Representative to enhance transatlantic coordination and complementarity regarding Iran and to consult on action towards Iran with the permanent members of the UN Security Council and all relevant global and regional partners sharing concerns on Iran;

54.  Takes note of the EU's and Iran's shared interest in securing peace and stability in Afghanistan; welcomes the constructive role being played by Iran in refurbishing infrastructure and reviving the economy, as well as in preventing drug trafficking from Afghanistan; stresses, however, that sustainable peace and stability in Afghanistan will require all neighbours to refrain from political interference in the country;

55.  Calls on the High Representative to open an EU delegation in Tehran, now that the European External Action Service has taken over responsibility from the rotating Presidency for representing the European Union in third countries;

56.  Calls on the Commission and the Council to encourage Iran to play a constructive role with regard to the future development of Afghanistan, and emphasises the shared goals of the EU and Iran as regards the stability of Afghanistan and taking effective action to combat opium production and drug trafficking;

o
o   o

57.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the EU Member States and the government and parliament of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

(1) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2010)0310.
(2) OJ C 341 E, 16.12.2010, p. 9.
(3) OJ C 265 E, 30.9.2010, p. 26.
(4) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2010)0351.

Last updated: 19 June 2012Legal notice