



**2017/2136(DEC)**

13.12.2017

# **AMENDMENTS**

## **1 - 14**

**Draft opinion**

**Doru-Claudian Frunzuliță**

2016 discharge: EU general budget - Commission  
(2017/2136(DEC))



**Amendment 1**  
**Heidi Hautala, Judith Sargentini**

**Draft opinion**  
**Paragraph 1 a (new)**

*Draft opinion*

*Amendment*

***1 a. Highlights the positive findings in the European Court of Auditors' Special Reports 30/2016 on the effectiveness of EU support to priority sectors in Honduras and 3/2017 on EU assistance to Tunisia; underlines the Court's assessment, in line with previous special reports on EU development spending, that EU money has been generally well spent which is a proof for the high quality of EU development spending; notes the stark contrast to other policy fields like external migration spending, where the findings are far more negative<sup>1a</sup>;***

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***<sup>1a</sup> Special Report No 9/2016: EU external migration spending in Southern Mediterranean and Eastern Neighbourhood countries until 2014.***

Or. en

**Amendment 2**  
**Jean-Luc Schaffhauser**

**Draft opinion**  
**Paragraph 3**

*Draft opinion*

*Amendment*

3. Is encouraged by the positive findings in the Court's Special Report 11/2017 on the Bêkou Trust Fund for the Central African Republic, which responds to relief and rehabilitation needs and links this response to development; notes the fundamental difference between trust funds of this kind and the Africa Trust Fund; supports the recommendation to prepare

3. Is encouraged by the positive findings in the Court's Special Report 11/2017 on the Bêkou Trust Fund for the Central African Republic, which responds to relief and rehabilitation needs and links this response to development; notes the fundamental difference between trust funds of this kind and the Africa Trust Fund; supports the recommendation to prepare

guidance on the choice of aid vehicle and underlines that this guidance must reflect the considerable risks and disadvantages with trust funds and the mixed experience of their use so far; calls on the Commission to guarantee, through detailed and regular reporting, effective mechanisms for parliamentary *scrutiny* as to how the Fund is being implemented;

guidance on the choice of aid vehicle and underlines that this guidance must reflect the considerable risks and disadvantages with trust funds and the mixed experience of their use so far; calls on the Commission to guarantee, through detailed and regular reporting, effective mechanisms for parliamentary *scrutinies* to how the Fund is being implemented; ***stresses that security should be genuinely factored in to this type of fund, alongside development, with a view to a holistic development-policy approach combining security, economic development, infrastructure, social development and health care; asks the Commission to study the proposal by the Government of the Central African Republic to create a platform enabling private investors, public donors and the authorities of the country to interact in organising security-and-development projects;***

Or. fr

**Amendment 3**  
**Paul Rübige**

**Draft opinion**  
**Paragraph 3**

*Draft opinion*

3. Is encouraged by the positive findings in the Court's Special Report 11/2017 on the Bêkou Trust Fund for the Central African Republic, which responds to relief and rehabilitation needs and links this response to development; notes the fundamental difference between trust funds of this kind and the Africa Trust Fund; supports the recommendation to prepare guidance on the choice of aid vehicle and underlines that this guidance must reflect the ***considerable*** risks and disadvantages with trust funds and the mixed experience of their use so far; calls on the Commission to guarantee, through detailed and regular

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*Amendment*

3. Is encouraged by the positive findings in the Court's Special Report 11/2017 on the Bêkou Trust Fund for the Central African Republic, which responds to relief and rehabilitation needs and links this response to development; notes the fundamental difference between trust funds of this kind and the Africa Trust Fund; supports the recommendation to prepare guidance on the choice of aid vehicle and underlines that this guidance must reflect the ***possible*** risks and disadvantages with trust funds and the mixed experience of their use so far; calls on the Commission to guarantee, through detailed and regular

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reporting, effective mechanisms for parliamentary scrutiny as to how the Fund is being implemented;

reporting, effective mechanisms for parliamentary scrutiny as to how the Fund is being implemented;

Or. en

**Amendment 4**  
**Heidi Hautala, Judith Sargentini**

**Draft opinion**  
**Paragraph 3 a (new)**

*Draft opinion*

*Amendment*

***3 a. Is very worried by a noticeable trend in recent Commission proposals to ignore legally binding provisions of Regulation (EU) No 233/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council<sup>1a</sup> when it comes to Official Development Assistance eligible expenditure and eligible countries for Development Cooperation Instrument ("DCI") spending; recalls that legality of EU spending is a key principle of sound financial management and that political considerations should not take precedence over clearly spelled out legal provisions; recalls that DCI is first and foremost an instrument designed to fight poverty;***

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***<sup>1a</sup> Regulation (EU) No 233/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation for the period 2014-2020 (OJ L 77, 15.3.2014, p. 44).***

Or. en

**Amendment 5**  
**Paul Rübzig**

**Draft opinion**  
**Paragraph 4**

*Draft opinion*

4. Supports the use of budget support but urges the Commission to better define the development outcomes to be achieved in each case and above all to enhance control mechanisms concerning recipient states' conduct in the fields of corruption, respect of human rights, rule of law and democracy; notes the Court's Special Report 35/2016 on the use of budget support for domestic resource mobilisation (DRM) in sub-Saharan Africa, which finds that the Commission's ex-ante analyses of DRM are not sufficiently detailed and do not follow its own guidelines, that the Commission often fails to assess tax exemptions and illicit capital outflows and does not properly consider extraction dividends and whether royalties for access to natural resources have been paid; is concerned about the Commission's low and sometimes not relevant use of DRM conditions in budget support contracts;

*Amendment*

4. Supports the use of budget support but urges the Commission to better define ***and clearly assess*** the development outcomes to be achieved in each case and above all to enhance control mechanisms concerning recipient states' conduct in the fields of corruption, respect of human rights, rule of law and democracy; ***expresses deep concern about the potential use of budget support in countries lacking democratic oversight, either due to the lack of a functioning parliamentary democracy, freedoms for civil society and the media, or due to a lack of capacity of oversight bodies***; notes the Court's Special Report 35/2016 on the use of budget support for domestic resource mobilisation (DRM) in sub-Saharan Africa, which finds that the Commission's ex-ante analyses of DRM are not sufficiently detailed and do not follow its own guidelines, that the Commission often fails to assess tax exemptions and illicit capital outflows and does not properly consider extraction dividends and whether royalties for access to natural resources have been paid; is concerned about the Commission's low and sometimes not relevant use of DRM conditions in budget support contracts;

Or. en

**Amendment 6**  
**Jean-Luc Schaffhauser**

**Draft opinion**  
**Paragraph 4**

*Draft opinion*

4. Supports the use of budget support but urges the Commission to better define the development outcomes to be achieved in each case and above all to enhance control mechanisms concerning recipient states' conduct in the fields of corruption,  
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*Amendment*

4. Supports the use of budget support but urges the Commission to better define the development outcomes to be achieved in each case and above all to enhance control mechanisms concerning recipient states' conduct in the fields of corruption,

respect of human rights, rule of law and democracy; notes the Court's Special Report 35/2016 on the use of budget support for domestic resource mobilisation (DRM) in sub-Saharan Africa, which finds that the Commission's ex-ante analyses of DRM are not sufficiently detailed and do not follow its own guidelines, that the Commission often fails to assess tax exemptions and illicit capital outflows and does not properly consider extraction dividends and whether royalties for access to natural resources have been paid; is concerned about the Commission's low and sometimes not relevant use of DRM conditions in budget support contracts;

respect of human rights, rule of law and democracy;***stresses that, in countries where the State has completely collapsed, the priority must be to rebuild the State, and its authority, by restoring its monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force***;notes the Court's Special Report 35/2016 on the use of budget support for domestic resource mobilisation (DRM) in sub-Saharan Africa, which finds that the Commission's ex-ante analyses of DRM are not sufficiently detailed and do not follow its own guidelines, that the Commission often fails to assess tax exemptions and illicit capital outflows and does not properly consider extraction dividends and whether royalties for access to natural resources have been paid; is concerned about the Commission's low and sometimes not relevant use of DRM conditions in budget support contracts;

Or. fr

**Amendment 7**  
**Mireille D'Ornano, Florian Philippot**

**Draft opinion**  
**Paragraph 4**

*Draft opinion*

4. Supports the use of budget support but urges the Commission to better define the development outcomes to be achieved in each case and above all to enhance control mechanisms concerning recipient states' conduct in the fields of corruption, respect of human rights, rule of law and democracy; notes the Court's Special Report 35/2016 on the use of budget support for domestic resource mobilisation (DRM) in sub-Saharan Africa, which finds that the Commission's ex-ante analyses of DRM are not sufficiently detailed and do not follow its own guidelines, that the Commission often fails to assess tax exemptions and illicit capital outflows and does not properly consider extraction

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*Amendment*

4. Supports the use of budget support but urges the Commission to better define the development outcomes to be achieved in each case and above all to enhance control mechanisms concerning recipient states' conduct in the fields of corruption, respect of human rights, rule of law and democracy; notes the Court's Special Report 35/2016 on the use of budget support for domestic resource mobilisation (DRM) in sub-Saharan Africa, which finds that the Commission's ex-ante analyses of DRM are not sufficiently detailed and do not follow its own guidelines, that the Commission often fails to assess tax exemptions and illicit capital outflows and does not properly consider extraction

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dividends and whether royalties for access to natural resources have been paid; is concerned about the Commission's low and sometimes not relevant use of DRM conditions in budget support contracts;

dividends and whether royalties for access to natural resources have been paid; is concerned about the Commission's low and sometimes not relevant use of DRM conditions in budget support contracts; *calls on the Commission to improve its ex post evaluation of action financed by budget support, which will enable the most effective kinds of intervention in the field of development to be more precisely determined in the future; stresses in addition that Member States with fiscal difficulties (in particular the net contributors), being unable to achieve the official development assistance objectives they have set, cannot put up with any failure, in connection with budget support, to meet these basic requirements as regards transparency and evaluation.*

Or. fr

## **Amendment 8** **Joachim Zeller**

### **Draft opinion** **Paragraph 4**

#### *Draft opinion*

4. *Supports* the use of budget support but urges the Commission to better define the development outcomes to be achieved in each case and above all to enhance control mechanisms concerning recipient states' conduct in the fields of corruption, respect of human rights, rule of law and democracy; notes the Court's Special Report 35/2016 on the use of budget support for domestic resource mobilisation (DRM) in sub-Saharan Africa, which finds that the Commission's ex-ante analyses of DRM are not sufficiently detailed and do not follow its own guidelines, that the Commission often fails to assess tax exemptions and illicit capital outflows and does not properly consider extraction dividends and whether royalties for access to natural resources have been paid; is

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#### *Amendment*

4. *Notes* the use of budget support but urges the Commission to better define the development outcomes to be achieved in each case and above all to enhance control mechanisms concerning recipient states' conduct in the fields of corruption, respect of human rights, rule of law and democracy; notes the Court's Special Report 35/2016 on the use of budget support for domestic resource mobilisation (DRM) in sub-Saharan Africa, which finds that the Commission's ex-ante analyses of DRM are not sufficiently detailed and do not follow its own guidelines, that the Commission often fails to assess tax exemptions and illicit capital outflows and does not properly consider extraction dividends and whether royalties for access to natural resources have been paid; is

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concerned about the Commission's low and sometimes not relevant use of DRM conditions in budget support contracts;

concerned about the Commission's low and sometimes not relevant use of DRM conditions in budget support contracts;

Or. de

**Amendment 9**  
**Heidi Hautala**

**Draft opinion**  
**Paragraph 4 a (new)**

*Draft opinion*

*Amendment*

***4 a. Is worried by the Court of Auditors' statement<sup>2a</sup> that there is a serious risk for the EU not to meet its aim of mainstreaming climate change throughout the EU budget and that the goal of spending 20 % of its expenditure for climate-related action will not be met;***

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***<sup>2a</sup> Special Report No 31/2016: Spending at least one euro in every five from the EU budget on climate action: ambitious work underway, but at serious risk of falling short.***

Or. en

**Amendment 10**  
**Heidi Hautala**

**Draft opinion**  
**Paragraph 4 b (new)**

*Draft opinion*

*Amendment*

***4 b. Is worried by the European Court of Auditors' finding that the EU certification system for the sustainability of biofuels is not fully reliable<sup>3a</sup>; underlines the potential negative consequences for developing countries as stated by the Court: "the Commission did not require voluntary***

*schemes to verify that the biofuel production they certify does not cause significant risks of negative socioeconomic effects, such as land tenure conflicts, forced/child labour, poor working conditions for farmers and dangers to health and safety" and requests the Commission to address this issue;*

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*<sup>3a</sup> Special Report No 18/2016: The EU system for the certification of sustainable biofuels.*

Or. en

**Amendment 11**  
**Heidi Hautala**

**Draft opinion**  
**Paragraph 4 c (new)**

*Draft opinion*

*Amendment*

*4 c. Highlights the Court's findings in its Special Report No 8/2017 on EU fisheries' control and regrets the significant weaknesses detected; underlines the substantial risk that declared catches are actually lower than in reality which may have serious consequences for fish stocks in waters of developing countries; urges Member States to fully implement the Council Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009<sup>1a</sup>;*

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*<sup>1a</sup> Council Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009 of 20 November 2009 establishing a Union control system for ensuring compliance with the rules of the common fisheries policy, amending Regulations (EC) No 847/96, (EC) No 2371/2002, (EC) No 811/2004, (EC) No 768/2005, (EC) No 2115/2005, (EC) No 2166/2005, (EC) No 388/2006, (EC) No 509/2007, (EC) No 676/2007, (EC) No 1098/2007, (EC) No 1300/2008, (EC) No 1342/2008*

*and repealing Regulations (EEC) No 2847/93, (EC) No 1627/94 and (EC) No 1966/2006 (OJ L 343 22.12.2009, p. 1).*

Or. en

**Amendment 12**  
**Mireille D'Ornano, Florian Philippot**

**Draft opinion**  
**Paragraph 5**

*Draft opinion*

5. Looks forward to being fully informed and consulted on the mid-term review of the Development Cooperation Instrument which is supposed to take into account the Agenda 2030 and a new European Consensus on Development;

*Amendment*

5. Looks forward to being fully informed and consulted on the mid-term review of the Development Cooperation Instrument which is supposed to take into account the Agenda 2030 and a new European Consensus on Development; ***stresses that, to be properly comprehensive, the mid-term review should contain an analysis of the synergies observed between development aid delivered by the EDF and that delivered by each Member State under its development assistance policy.***

Or. fr

**Amendment 13**  
**Mireille D'Ornano, Florian Philippot**

**Draft opinion**  
**Paragraph 6**

*Draft opinion*

6. Recalls the Union's collective commitment to raise the Union's and its Member States' official development assistance (ODA) to 0.7% of their Gross National Income (GNI).

*Amendment*

6. Recalls the Union's collective commitment to raise the Union's and its Member States' official development assistance (ODA) to 0.7% of their Gross National Income (GNI); ***notes that an increase in EU budget contributions by Member States that are net contributors complicates their fiscal position, and thus makes them less able to achieve the goal***

*of increasing ODA to 0.7 % of their GNI, thus heightening legitimate expectations for more effective EU ODA to beneficiary states.*

Or. fr

**Amendment 14**  
**Paul Rübzig**

**Draft opinion**  
**Paragraph 6 a (new)**

*Draft opinion*

*Amendment*

**6 a.** *Calls on the Commission to incorporate an incentive-based approach to development by introducing the more-for-more principle, taking as an example the European Neighbourhood Policy; believes that the more and the faster a country progresses in its internal reforms to the building and consolidation of democratic institutions, the eradication of corruption, the respect for human rights and the rule of law, the more support it should receive from the Union; stresses that this “positive conditionality” approach, accompanied by a strong focus on financing small-scale projects for rural communities, can bring real change and guarantee that Union tax payers’ money is spent in a more sustainable manner; on the other hand, strongly condemns any attempt to make aid conditional on border control;*

Or. en