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# **DRAFT REPORT**

Annual report on the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security  
Policy  
(2018/2097(INI))

Committee on Foreign Affairs

Rapporteur: David McAllister

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## MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

### Annual report on the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (2018/2097(INI))

*The European Parliament,*

- having regard to the Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy,
  - having regard to Articles 21 and 36 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),
  - having regard to the Charter of the United Nations,
  - having regard to the declaration by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) on political accountability,
  - having regard to the 2016 Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy,
  - having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 7 June 2017 on a Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU's External Action (JOIN(2017)0021),
  - having regard to Rule 52 of its Rules of Procedure,
  - having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A8-0000/2018),
- A. whereas the EU's security environment is now more volatile, unpredictable, complex and ambiguous than at any time since the end of the Cold War; whereas current EU policies may no longer suffice to promote a stable and prosperous neighbourhood;
- B. whereas EU external action has a direct impact on our citizens' lives, be it by supporting security and stability in our neighbourhood or preventing crises before they happen;
- C. whereas the EU's population is in decline and forecast to account for just 5 % of the world's population around 2050, compared to 13 % in 1960;
- D. whereas more than half of the world's population growth by 2050 is expected to occur in Africa, which is expected to account for 1.3 billion of the additional 2.4 billion people on the planet;
- E. whereas by 2050, China, the US and India are expected to be the world's leading economic powers, with even greater political clout, while none of the world's largest economies will be an EU Member State;
- F. whereas the new world order is characterised by asymmetry, with numerous non-state actors becoming increasingly influential over the past decade: from NGOs advocating human rights, to transnational corporations influencing government policy, to social

media activists calling for democratic change; whereas, nevertheless, no emergent state or non-state actor can impose an incontestable world view;

- G. whereas globalisation has increased interdependence, with decisions taken in Beijing or Washington having a direct impact on our lives; whereas, in turn, interdependence has resulted in global public opinion becoming cognisant of transnational problems, which require transnational solutions;
  - H. whereas almost one fourth of the world's population live in fragile states or societies;
  - I. whereas the EU's aspirational global leadership has been undermined as a result of the financial crisis, rising Euroscepticism, the proliferation of crises on our doorstep and rising scepticism of European public opinion on the projection of force abroad, which has given rise to a tendency to respond to events rather than to shape them;
  - J. whereas Western democracies have become more protectionist and inward-looking, and are swinging to the extremes at a time when multilateral cooperation is the only way to respond to global challenges effectively; whereas this power vacuum is being filled by other powers such as China or Russia;
  - K. whereas President Trump's decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal and impose secondary sanctions on European companies doing business with Iran has shown the limits of European economic sovereignty;
1. Stresses that the time has come for the European Union to take its destiny into its own hands; takes the view that the EU should embrace its role as a fully-fledged, sovereign political power in international relations that helps to resolve conflicts worldwide and shapes global governance;
  2. Is convinced that no single EU Member State can respond effectively to today's global challenges on its own; believes that, by pulling their weight together within the EU, the Member States can exert an influence on the world stage that they would not otherwise possess; is convinced that 28 Member States together, representing 500 million citizens, have more leverage in international negotiations and in setting international regulations and standards; believes, moreover, that under the protection of the EU, globalisation can represent an opportunity for EU citizens and not a threat;
  3. Regrets the fact that the Member States all too often prioritise their national interests, regardless of the possible consequences at a European level, thereby undermining the EU's credibility as a global player; calls for a greater division of responsibilities and enhanced coordination between the EU and its Member States; believes that good cooperation among the Member States is essential to safeguard our democracy, our freedom, and our social and environmental standards;
  4. Recalls that, taking the 28 Member States as a whole, the EU is the world's largest economy with more than half a billion people; stresses that the EU is also the world's leading development aid donor;
  5. Stresses that the European approach to external relations is characterised by:

- promoting and safeguarding European values such as freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights;
  - a commitment to multilateralism, with the support of the UN system and regional organisations at its core;
  - the determination to give priority to diplomatic rather than military solutions;
  - an emphasis on conflict prevention, peacebuilding and institution building;
6. Stresses that the EU should stay true to its principles of democracy, human rights and the rule of law; emphasises the importance of assessing whether the promotion of these principles in third countries has been successful;
  7. Calls on the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Commission and the Member States to act strategically by using all the means at their disposal, including trade, development, and diplomatic and military tools, to strengthen the EU's geopolitical influence and protect its interests;
  8. Calls for sufficient financial resources to be made available for the EU's external action under the next multiannual financial framework (MFF) (2021-2027); takes the view that the growing challenges in the EU's neighbourhood and beyond call for significantly higher appropriations for external action;
  9. Calls on the EEAS to invest in collective leadership and develop 'issue-based coalitions' with like-minded countries, to support a rules-based international order, multilateralism and free trade, and to pursue cooperative solutions to global challenges; calls on the EEAS to engage with emerging powers in the provision of global public goods such as peace and security, including by working together on crisis management operations around the world, climate change mitigation, financial stability, and clean air and water;
  10. Notes that the EU has played an important role in de-escalating and resolving foreign policy crises, namely when some Member States have taken the lead under the auspices of the Union overall, such as in the Normandy format or the EU3+3 negotiations with Iran; supports the establishment of ad hoc coalitions of Member States that can intervene to respond to international crises, making EU external action more flexible and responsive by reducing the pressure of having to achieve universal consensus among the Member States;
  11. Welcomes the EU's increasing role in post-conflict reconstruction as a means of securing peace;
  12. Understands that proximity to threats determines policy priorities; calls, nevertheless, on all Member States to respect the principle of solidarity enshrined in the Treaties (Article 80 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) and to take the necessary steps to respond to the migration crisis, just as all Member States have responded with solidarity to the challenges posed by a resurgent and assertive Russia;
  13. Notes that internal and external security are increasingly intertwined; supports the

Commission and the VP/HR in further improving the EU's resilience to terrorist attacks, illegal migration, cyberattacks and other hybrid threats as part of a risk-reduction strategy;

14. Highlights that transatlantic relations are indispensable for the security and prosperity of both sides of the Atlantic; regrets the US's progressive retreat from the multilateral, rules-based world order, namely its withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement;
15. Stresses that investing in the stability and prosperity of the Western Balkans means investing in the security and future of our Union; reiterates the European perspective for the countries in the Western Balkans; highlights that the enlargement process is merit-based and must depend on nothing other than the concrete results achieved by each individual country; reiterates the importance, throughout this process, of the rule of law, reconciliation and good neighbourly relations, security and migration, socio-economic development, transport and energy connectivity and the digital agenda;
16. Calls on the Commission and the EEAS to continue using the EU's transformative power at its Eastern borders, using trade agreements and access to the single market as incentives to foster democratic reforms and the adoption of European rules and standards;
17. Recalls that the Mediterranean is one of the most unequal borders in the world; reiterates the urgent need to stimulate the economic development of the Southern Mediterranean basin and Sub-Saharan Africa in order to create local economic opportunities in the countries of origin of migrants; welcomes, in this regard, Commission President Juncker's proposal to build a new Alliance for Sustainable Investment and Jobs between Europe and Africa, and his initiative to develop the various European-African trade agreements into one continent-to-continent free trade agreement, as an economic partnership between equals;
18. Believes that, despite their importance, soft power and institution building alone are not sufficient to exert influence in a world where power politics and hard power are increasingly significant; believes that the effectiveness of the EU's foreign policy will ultimately depend, to a large extent, on the resources and capabilities that support it;
19. Welcomes the steps taken to increase the EU's military autonomy, namely the establishment of a European single command centre in Brussels for European military training missions, and removing obstacles to the deployment of EU Battlegroups; believes that the establishment of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) on defence projects and the coordinated review of national defence budgets will help the Member States to spend their defence budgets more effectively;
20. Believes that the capacity to dispatch forces to global conflicts is an essential precondition for becoming a credible political power; calls on the EEAS and the Member States to develop sufficient military capabilities to defend their values and interests around the world;
21. Stresses that developing new formats, such as a European Security Council, as

advocated by Chancellor Merkel, could facilitate a more efficient decision-making process for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP);

22. Supports the proposal set out by Commission President Juncker in his State of the Union Address on 12 September 2018 to move to qualified majority voting (QMV) in specific areas of the CFSP where the Treaties currently require unanimity, notably human rights issues, sanctions and civilian missions; believes that the use of QMV would enable the EU to act more resolutely, quickly and effectively; calls on the European Council to take up this initiative by making use of the passerelle clause (Article 31(3) TEU); encourages the European Council to consider extending QMV to other areas of the CFSP;
23. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and the Member States.