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Procedimiento : 2013/0025(COD)
Ciclo de vida en sesión
Ciclos relativos a los documentos :

Textos presentados :

A7-0150/2014

Debates :

PV 11/03/2014 - 6
CRE 11/03/2014 - 6

Votaciones :

PV 11/03/2014 - 9.12

Textos aprobados :

P7_TA(2014)0191

Debates
Martes 11 de marzo de 2014 - Estrasburgo Edición revisada

6. Información que acompaña a las transferencias de fondos - Prevención de la utilización del sistema financiero para el blanqueo de capitales y para la financiación del terrorismo (debate)
Vídeo de las intervenciones
PV
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  President. - The next item is the joint debate on

– the report by Mojca Kleva Kekuš and Timothy Kirkhope, on behalf of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on information accompanying transfers of funds (COM(2013)0044 – C7-0034/2013 – 2013/0024(COD)) (A7-0140/2014), and

– the report by Krišjānis Kariņš and Judith Sargentini, on behalf of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing (COM(2013)0045 – C7-0032/2013 – 2013/0025(COD)) (A7-0150/2014).

 
  
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  Krišjānis Kariņš, referents. - Priekšsēdētāja kungs, godājamie kolēģi! Vispirms man jāsaka paldies visiem, kas strādāja pie šī ziņojuma, īpaši manai līdzreferentei Sargentini kundzei, citiem kolēģiem no visām politiskajām grupām. Šis darbs, manuprāt, nebūt nav bijis viegls, bet rezultāts, ko mēs esam sasnieguši –– tas tik tiešām ir vērā ņemams. Padomājam mirkli par šādu situāciju: viens bērns ieiet veikalā, kur pārdod konfektes. Viņš paņem kādu konfektīti, ieliek sev kabatā un iziet ārā pa durvīm nesamaksājis. Ir dzirdēts, ka tāda lieta notiek, un varētu teikt: „Nu, ziniet, varbūt tam veikalniekam nodarītais kaitējums nemaz nav tik liels.” Bet tagad iedomājieties, ja ne tikai viens bērns vienreiz zog no šī veikala konfektes, bet to regulāri dara visi bērni ciematā! Kāds ir rezultāts? Protams, veikals izputēs, veikalniekam vairs nebūs naudas, viņš nevarēs uzturēt savu ģimeni, un būtībā viena daļa šīs sabiedrības sabrūk.

Faktiski pasaulē kaut kas tāds notiek, un es to sauktu par sistemātisku krāpšanos. Līdz 5% no pasaules iekšzemes kopprodukta veidojas no nelegāli iegūtās naudas legalizēšanas, no tā sauktās naudas atmazgāšanas. Kur meklējama lielā problēma? Problēma ir tā, ka, pirmkārt, tas kaitē uzņēmējdarbības videi, jo vairums uzņēmumu maksā nodokļus, bet tie, kas legalizē nelegālos naudas līdzekļus, šajā sistēmā nepiedalās. Tātad viņi bojā konkurences situāciju tirgū. Otrkārt, tas tiešā veidā kaitē mums, visiem sabiedrības locekļiem visā Eiropas Savienībā, jo šī nauda netiek iekasēta nodokļos, tādēļ ar to nevar papildināt ne mūsu veselības aprūpes sistēmas naudas līdzekļus, ne mūsu izglītībai pietiek naudas, ne pensijām un tā tālāk. Tātad cieš visa sabiedrība.

Šī direktīva, manuprāt, ir nopietns solis, lai situāciju mainītu un uzlabotu. Pats galvenais, ko mēs no Parlamenta puses piedāvājam, ir Eiropas Savienības līmenī izveidot patiesā labuma guvēju reģistru. Šāds patiesā labuma guvēju reģistrs visā Eiropas Savienībā atklās to, kurš indivīds stāv aiz kura uzņēmuma. Tas varētu būt tāpat kā līdzībā par veikalu, kurā bērni zog konfektes — ja tajā būtu sargs pie durvīm vai videonovērošanas sistēma, kas redzētu, kurš tad ir paņēmis kuru konfekti un kuram būtu jāmaksā par šo konfekti. Tāpat, ja mums būs šāds patiesā labuma guvēju reģistrs, tad attiecīgie dienesti zinās, kuram indivīdam ir jāmaksā cik un kādi nodokļi kurā dalībvalstī. Tas ir pats galvenais.

Vēl šī direktīva, manuprāt, visai ievērojami stiprinās Komisijas lomu. Komisijas loma būs koordinējoša, palīdzot atrast šos esošos „caurumus”, ko noziedznieki izmanto, un šādā veidā sašaurinot viņu iespējas mūs visus krāpt.

Kolēģi! Atbalstot šo direktīvu, mēs nopietnā veidā kaitēsim noziedzīgajai pasaulei. Šodien balsojumā balsosim „par”. Tā būs laba diena godīgiem Eiropas pilsoņiem, bet slikta diena noziedzniekiem. Paldies par uzmanību!

 
  
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  Peter Simon, deputising for the rapporteur Mojca Kleva Kekuš. - Mr[nbsp ]President, our colleague, Mojca Kleva Kekuš, who is the co-rapporteur on this file, became a mother two months ago so she cannot be here with us today. I wish her and her little daughter all the best. She did a lot of good work on this dossier, so allow me now to present her words and ideas.

A year ago, with the change in international standards, Parliament received a package of Commission proposals for updating and improving European legislation on combating money laundering more effectively. At a time when technology and the means available to criminals are constantly evolving, it is crucial that our legislation should keep pace with the changing realities.

We now have before us an updated regulation, which will enhance the transparency of fund transfers of all types: domestic and cross-border. The regulation lays down rules for our banks and other payment-service providers regarding information on payers and payees which they need to collect and transfer throughout the entire payment chain. This update will make it easier for law enforcement authorities to track funds transferred by criminals and terrorists.

The new rules will help to identify not only the payers but also the receivers of laundered money. The new regulation focuses more closely on the effectiveness of regimes to counter money laundering and terrorist financing, and on ensuring greater clarity and consistency of rules across the Member States. It is also broader in scope, with a view to addressing new threats. The rapporteur, Ms[nbsp ]Kleva Kekuš, is also pleased that, thanks to Parliament’s involvement, the regulation is now more effective in ensuring compliance with European data-protection requirements, guaranteeing that all the safeguards protecting individual rights in relation to personal data will actually be applied.

What remains crucial in making the fight against money laundering effective, however, is the work on enforcement and implementation of the new rules. To combat this problem effectively we need two things at the same time: a coordinated response from law enforcement bodies in the Member States and a standard procedure for financial institutions and payment-service providers. The new rules now centre on a risk-based approach, which should strengthen the capabilities and roles of payment-service providers in identifying transfers that smell fishy.

To conclude, the danger of money laundering is also closely linked with the problems of tax evasion and tax havens. This Parliament has, on numerous occasions, called for concrete and effective action to eliminate the scandalous tax gap. The improvement of these rules on fund transfers will serve as one small piece of the puzzle.

The rapporteur, Ms[nbsp ]Kleva Kekuš, believes that, thanks to good cooperation and hard work on the part of the other co-rapporteur and all the shadows, the text in front of us is something that Parliament can be proud of. She thanks everyone for their contribution.

 
  
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  Judith Sargentini, Rapporteur. - Voorzitter, we stemmen vandaag over de vierde herziening van de wet tegen witwassen en terrorismefinanciering. En voordat ik de inhoud induik, wil ik mijn corapporteur Krišjānis Kariņš bedanken en de schaduwrapporteurs van LIBE, Frank Engel, Emine Bozkurt, Graham Watson, Timothy Kirkhope en Dennis de Jong.

We hebben met zijn allen het voorstel van de Europese Commissie op één cruciaal punt scherp aangepast. Dit Parlement voegt een openbaar register toe voor uiteindelijke belanghebbenden. En daarmee maken we het banken en makelaars makkelijker om hun cliënten te identificeren. En – en daar gaat het mij als Groene primair om – we maken het criminelen en belastingontwijkers en -ontduikers een stuk moeilijker om hun geld in brievenbusmaatschappijen in de Europese Unie te verbergen.

Dat de zoon van de afgezette Oekraïense president Janoekovitsj fondsen van de Oekraïense overheid verduistert en onderbrengt in Nederlandse trusts, zoals afgelopen week in het nieuws kwam, brengt mij als Nederlander het schaamrood op de kaken. Nog afgelopen november belegde de Nederlandse ambassade in Kiev een bijeenkomst met belastingadviseurs waarin rijke Oekraïners uit de doeken werd gedaan hoe zij met hulp van de Staat der Nederlanden hun geld veilig en goedkoop konden wegzetten in ons land.

Stelde niemand dan de vraag waar al die miljoenen vandaan kwamen. En waren we dan allemaal de definitie vergeten van witwassen? Witwassen is geld, verdiend met criminele activiteiten zoals afpersing en fraude, in het officiële circuit brengen.

Nog een voorbeeld: Kadhafi die zijn oliedollars in een brievenbusmaatschappij in Nederland onderbracht. Ik ben er niet trots op. Belasting ontduiken en belasting ontwijken is mijns inziens een ernstige misdaad. Hoeveel wegen worden er niet geplaveid? Hoeveel kinderen gaan er in Afrika niet naar school? Hoeveel wonden worden niet verbonden als de schatkist leeg is, omdat de bedrijven hun winsten in brievenbusmaatschappijen onderbrengen. Thabo Mbeki, voormalig president van Zuid-Afrika en nu voorzitter van de VN-commissie die de kapitaalvlucht uit Afrika onderzoekt, berekende dat er jaarlijks twee keer zoveel geld Afrika uitgaat dan dat er in komt met ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Misgelopen belastingen leiden tot misgelopen ontwikkelingen.

Een Europees publiek register voor uiteindelijke belanghebbenden maakt bedrijfsstructuren transparant en geeft onze samenleving de kans om immorele belastingontwijking aan te pakken in door openbaarheid en publieke pressie. Er kan een trend gezet worden in de wereld. Laat Amerika goed meekijken wat we hier doen. Premier Cameron en president Hollande zijn al voorstander van een publiek register. Zij zien dat het uiteindelijk de burgers zijn die de voordeeltjes van de multinationals betalen.

Angela Merkel is tegen en de Nederlandse regering bij monde van mister euro himself, meneer Dijsselbloem, is ook tegen. Hij denkt waarschijnlijk dat Nederland kansen gaat mislopen en laat de verdenking op zich dat hij belastingontduiking blijft faciliteren. Nog vorige week beweerde minister Dijsselbloem dat een openbaar register niet kon omdat dat de privacy niet ten goede kwam.

Nou, laat ik hem gerust stellen. Wat wij in dit Europees Parlement nu voorstellen is juist heel precies op het punt van de gegevensbescherming. Er staat niets meer in dat register dan strikt noodzakelijk en we hebben klanten van banken die op de een of andere manier worden afgewezen ook nog de mogelijkheid gegeven om in beroep te gaan zónder dat wij ze hun gegevens geven, want we willen criminelen natuurlijk geen inzicht geven in hun situatie.

Dit Parlement is klaar voor onderhandelen met de Raad, maar helaas loopt de periode af. Wij stemmen hier vandaag over, maar wij nodigen de Raad die er vandaag niet is, uit om met ons rond de tafel te gaan zitten.

 
  
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  Timothy Kirkhope, rapporteur. - Mr President, what we are discussing here today is an essential crime-fighting measure. Money laundering may seem like a less dangerous form of crime in some people’s minds, but in reality it goes right to the heart of criminality in Europe. These offences fund some of society’s worst crimes, such as terrorism and drug smuggling – and indeed people smuggling too.

The fight against money laundering is not an easy one: it requires often lengthy and laborious processes in following trails; it involves dedicated individuals sifting through reams of information looking for anomalies; but it is worth it. At the end of the process, they end up catching real criminals: the leaders of crime gangs who are responsible for the vast majority of organised crime in Europe.

Our most central aim is to make it easier for our law enforcement bodies to prevent the abuse of our financial systems and to prosecute criminals. We must make it harder for illegitimate money to be hidden in Europe’s legal economy. Money laundering does not restrict itself to the borders of individual countries. Money changes hands and legal jurisdictions constantly. The very nature of organised crime and of money laundering requires us all to be prepared to put in place nothing short of the most robust rules. I have always believed that, in any fight against fraud and money laundering, sunshine is the best disinfectant. My hope with this package of legislation is that it will shine a very bright light on the dark and murky depths of organised crime.

I am rapporteur on the fund transfer regulation and shadow rapporteur on the anti-money laundering directive. Both go hand in hand and set out to update the current anti-money laundering (AML) rules by changing the way we use information to spot fraudsters. We are all aware of the problems created by the last money laundering directive, but I believe this is our opportunity to learn from those mistakes. This package is about making life easier for those who are innocent and harder for those who commit crimes.

I welcome the main changes, which mean that, when the new rules are implemented, we will adopt a risk-based approach, extend the scope to cover gambling and open up company ownership to the public. These are fundamental changes, and there will be profound consequences. However, I believe they will be viewed positively by citizens and businesses and negatively by criminals. I hope these new rules will help us to tackle not just money laundering but also tax evasion, and that they will eventually breed even greater confidence in our economy.

There have been some big talking points. On my report, my co-rapporteur and I saw a number of amendments tabled which would strip away the simplified payments regime that exists within Europe, but we were both of the opinion that this was unnecessary and would disproportionately disadvantage many payment providers and their customers, while providing little AML value. On the directive itself, we found that the main areas of debate were how to deal with beneficial ownership, gambling and politically-exposed persons. We worked hard to find good compromises.

I would like to touch on trusts. It is well known that the UK has a special situation regarding trusts. They provide the legal basis for a number of transactions and institutions such as property ownership, estate planning, wills and insurance. It is thought that the mandatory registration of trusts would not only compromise the privacy of individuals but also add red tape and costs to family financial planning. The fact that they fall under the UK’s common law system also adds complications and, as a lawyer, I am aware of the difficulties that this poses. I have worked hard to find language that limits the risk of public exposure for vulnerable people and in cases where the trusts themselves pose little or no risk of money laundering, such as in relation to wills. I am happy that this has been taken on board, but I have tabled a further amendment. It is a debate we repeatedly have in this House that the fight against crime must not be pursued at the cost of a person’s right to privacy and in the absence of proportionality.

Finally, this is about making sure that our payment institutions and law enforcement bodies are better able to spot anomalies that occur in financial data and stop serious criminal activity. Colleagues have worked hard on this proposal and I fully support it.

 
  
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  Tonio Borg, Member of the Commission. - Mr President, I would first like to congratulate Parliament, and in particular the rapporteurs, for the swift progress they have made in recent months on both the directive and the regulation. I view this as an expression of support for the Commission’s proposal and a clear signal from Parliament of its commitment to take a firm stance against those seeking to abuse the EU financial system for money laundering or even terrorist financing purposes.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has estimated the amount of funds laundered annually through the global financial system to be USD[nbsp ]1.6[nbsp ]trillion – or 2.7[nbsp ]% of global GDP. With a strong system of financial regulation, Europe is by no means immune to the problems of money laundering and terrorist financing. This is why the Commission has proposed strengthening the existing rules in line with internationally agreed standards and, where necessary and appropriate, beyond the international standards.

With respect to the amendments Parliament has been asked to vote on, I would like to make the following comments. It appears likely that, even after this debate, Parliament will take a clear position in favour of publicly-accessible beneficial ownership registries. We salute the aims behind this important amendment. They are fully in line with our objective to enhance transparency on the ownership of companies and trusts.

However, it is also important to ensure that there are adequate guarantees that the information contained in such registries is reliable and up-to-date, and that obliged entities must not neglect their duties to further investigate beneficial ownership. We also need to ensure proper respect of data protection laws. I think most of the debates until now have touched on striking the right balance between, to quote Mr Kirkhope, ‘sunshine being the best disinfectant’, while at the same time providing data protection so that access to the registries is carefully tailored and provided on a need-to-know basis.

I note that Parliament wishes to see the Commission play a strong role in a number of important areas, such as carrying out a supranational risk assessment, compiling lists of politically-exposed persons, making evaluations about the equivalence of third countries and assessing the effectiveness of national regimes. We share the concerns that Parliament seeks to address, which are very often motivated by the need for a more European internal market approach. We are ready to look at practical ways in which the Commission might play an enhanced role in the various processes, bearing in mind, however, that we should not duplicate existing and effective processes.

With respect to the proposed derogations or exemptions for gambling services and electronic money, the Commission would, in principle, prefer not to introduce such exemptions as there is a risk that, if accepted, any exemption might be interpreted too widely and be misused. This is an issue that will have to be looked at further as negotiations on this file continue.

With respect to the proposed strengthening of data protection provisions, the Commission agrees that it is critically important to protect privacy and personal data. However, it is also important to ensure that a correct balance is struck so that the anti-money laundering directive does not lose its raison d’être. Repeating already-applicable general data protection principles, which may lead to differences in interpretation and legal uncertainty, should – in the Commission’s view – be avoided.

The rapporteur’s report rightly draws attention to the connections between the fight against money laundering and the fight against tax evasion. It calls upon the Commission to increase the pressure on tax havens to improve their cooperation and exchange of information in order to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. However, while the Commission fully shares Parliament’s objectives, we need to take care that we address such concerns using the right legal instrument. The Commission has indicated, in its 2012 action plan to strengthen the fight against tax fraud and tax evasion, that it will study the possibility and feasibility of aligning the definition of certain types of tax offences, including administrative and criminal sanctions.

Finally, I will say a few words about the fund transfers regulation. I wish to take note of the broadly supportive stance taken by the rapporteurs and the ECON/LIBE Joint Committee. We believe that several of the more technical amendments helpfully clarify the interaction with other financial services legislation. However, we have similar concerns to those already expressed on the directive with respect to the proliferation of data protection roles. As I said before, the important thing is to find the right balance.

In conclusion, the Commission welcomes the progress on this file. We hope that similar progress will be made by the Council in the near future, so that both legislators can work towards a speedy final adoption of these important files.

 
  
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  Bill Newton Dunn, rapporteur for the opinion of the Committee on Development. - Mr[nbsp ]President, I am speaking for the Committee on Development to give its opinion. We are very concerned that EU aid to countries in need of it should not fall into the hands of dictators and their supporters, who money-launder it away into Swiss bank accounts, but that it should go to the people of those countries. This is very obvious, but it is an extremely important issue.

The second point I want to make is that – as those who followed the work of the Special Committee on Organised Crime, Corruption and Money Laundering (the CRIM Committee) will know – money laundering is extremely easy, so there is a great deal of work to be done. Member States do not even implement existing legislation: this is truly shocking, and we look to the Commission to make sure that they start to do so, and to follow through and abolish tax havens, rather than just saying they will take action but actually doing nothing.

Finally, Commissioner, with regard to small-scale gambling operations such as racecourse bookies, please remember that these are SMEs, and that we need jobs, and do not just sweep them away because you want to. Small on-course bookies cannot be home to large-scale money laundering. We need to protect small-scale employment, so please do that.

 
  
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  Antonio López-Istúriz White, Ponente de opinión de la Comisión de Asuntos Jurídicos. - Señor Presidente, como ya he expuesto en esta casa con anterioridad, se estima que el blanqueo de capitales representa un importe de unos 330[nbsp ]000[nbsp ]millones de euros. Para hacernos una idea, representa el producto interior bruto de países del tamaño e importancia de Malasia, Chile o Finlandia.

En mi calidad de ponente de opinión, he tratado de destacar algunos puntos que, dada la desgraciada realidad que nos ha tocado vivir en España con el terrorismo, hemos tenido y tenemos muy presentes —lo digo en el aniversario de la terrible masacre del 11 de marzo en mi ciudad, Madrid, en 2004—.

Todos sabemos que, tras una máscara de idealismo —supuesto idealismo—, no se esconden más que unas bandas mafiosas que buscan con su actividad el mayor lucro posible con el menor y terrible esfuerzo realizable. La experiencia nos ha enseñado que el terrorismo ha sabido adaptarse a los nuevos tiempos, canalizando sus réditos a través del sistema financiero y mediante el blanqueo de capitales.

Por ello propongo una serie de enmiendas, simplemente para modificar y mejorar algunos aspectos, como es, por ejemplo, que los profesionales del Derecho tengan el deber de diligencia de garantizar que los servicios que se prestan no se utilicen con el fin de la evasión fiscal y la elusión fiscal abusiva; también, que los inversores tengan derecho a saber quién es el titular real de las empresas remuneradas; la definición de financiación del terrorismo, que debe ser conforme a las recomendaciones del Grupo de Acción Financiera Internacional; y que los empleados que comuniquen sus sospechas de este blanqueo sean protegidos y no teman ser despedidos de sus puestos de trabajo.

Por supuesto, dedico esta intervención y este informe a las víctimas del 11 de marzo.

 
  
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  Peter Simon, im Namen der S&D-Fraktion. – Herr Präsident! Der Umfang der weltweiten Geldwäsche beträgt jedes Jahr Schätzungen zufolge 1,6[nbsp ]Billionen Euro. Das ist mehr als der EU-Finanzrahmen insgesamt für sieben Jahre! Wir in der EU sind gefordert, sowohl bei der Bekämpfung von Geldwäsche als auch bei all den damit einhergehenden Mechanismen, die Geldtransfers verschleiern sollen, drastisch durchzugreifen. Da Geldwäscher ständig neue Methoden finden, die von den bisherigen EU-Vorschriften nicht abgedeckt sind, bzw. Schlupflöcher nutzen, die sich aufgetan haben, unterstützen wir Sozialdemokraten die Vorschläge der Kommission, zum Beispiel im Bereich des Glücksspiels.

Allerdings reicht dies unserer Meinung nach allein nicht aus. Dreh- und Angelpunkt der Gesetzgebung, über die wir heute reden, ist im Kampf gegen die Geldwäsche die Feststellung der Identität der wirklichen Nutznießer hinter verschachtelten, undurchsichtigen Unternehmenskonstruktionen oder Briefkastenfirmen. Manchmal muss man doch, wenn man sich heute Unternehmen anschaut, diese erst wie eine Matrjoschka-Puppe zerlegen, um nach und nach der Antwort näherzukommen, wem denn eigentlich eine Firma gehört. Dem müssen wir in Zukunft einen Riegel vorschieben. Wir fordern öffentliche Unternehmensregister mit Informationen zu den wirklichen wirtschaftlich Berechtigten von Unternehmen, Trusts und Stiftungen, um Kriminellen den Fluchtweg in die Anonymität abzuschneiden.

Da Geldwäsche keine Grenzen kennt, dürfen Transparenz und Informationsflüsse aber auch nicht an Ländergrenzen haltmachen. Deshalb wollen wir Sozialdemokraten eine EU-weite Vernetzung der öffentlichen Register sehen. Es würde die Arbeit der Ermittler, wenn sie Sachverhalte hinter der Grenze ermitteln müssen, ungemein erleichtern, wenn sie nicht an der Grenze mit bürokratischen Hindernissen konfrontiert würden.

Allerdings bringen uns auch die besten Gesetze nichts, wenn sie nicht richtig oder nur unzureichend umgesetzt oder angewendet werden. Denn wenn bei Einzelfalluntersuchungen in der Vergangenheit immer mal wieder ans Licht kam, dass die Banken teilweise gar nicht wussten, wer ihre Kunden sind, dann lief dort etwas gehörig schief. Das sollte in der EU künftig nicht mehr vorkommen. Deshalb müssen wir dafür Sorge tragen, dass diese Vorschriften in den Mitgliedstaaten nicht nur dem Wortlaut nach umgesetzt werden, sondern auch im Tagesgeschäft zur Anwendung kommen.

 
  
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  Sylvie Goulard, au nom du groupe ALDE. – Monsieur le Président, ce texte est un texte important qui s'intègre à mon avis dans un effort de transparence beaucoup plus général.

Dans un certain nombre de textes que nous avons eu à traiter au sein de la commission des affaires économiques et monétaires, nous nous sommes efforcés de limiter l'évasion et la fraude fiscales, et de faire en sorte que les recettes puissent rentrer dans les caisses des États du Sud en difficulté. Ce qui m'a beaucoup frappée dans mon activité ici, c'est qu'on avait nettement insisté sur la discipline budgétaire jusqu'à présent, mais que, dans le fond, les autorités publiques s'étaient assez peu préoccupées de savoir où était passé une partie de l'argent généré par des activités honnêtes ou moins honnêtes.

Nous ne pouvons donc que saluer cette quatrième directive antiblanchiment qui va encore plus loin et qui traite, pour le coup, des activités criminelles. Il est bon que nous ayons des registres centraux. La question des fiducies a été largement débattue. Il y a de grandes différences d'un État membre à l'autre. J'espère que nous avons trouvé une solution satisfaisante. Je suis frappée par le fait que le texte identifie très clairement des personnes qui sont politiquement exposées; cette nouveauté est assez intéressante et fait écho au débat qui se déroule en ce moment dans un certain nombre d'États membres.

Je crois aussi qu'il y a des avantages à avoir des listes aussi bien positives que négatives des pays présentant des risques ou de ceux qui, à l'extérieur de l'Union européenne, font des efforts.

Une fois encore, je pense que nous sommes loin du compte avec ce texte, mais que ce travail collectif va dans le bon sens. Pour ma part, je souhaiterais effectivement que nous fassions également des progrès dans ce qui n'est pas de l'ordre criminel, mais de l'ordre de la non-opportunité.

 
  
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  Ruža Tomašić, u ime kluba ECR. – Gospodine predsjedniče, pranje novca i financiranje terorizma ozbiljna su kaznena djela, međusobno povezana i kao takva traže našu punu pozornost.

Uvođenjem ovakvog sustava koji informacije o platitelju i primatelju pri prijenosu financijskih sredstava čini lakše dostupnima, borba protiv pranja novca i financiranja terorizma bit će uvelike olakšana.

No, pri uvođenju ovakve regulative treba uvijek na prvo mjesto staviti prava korisnika usluga unatoč neospornim potrebama za višom razinom sigurnosti u platnom prometu. Svaki odgovorni zakonodavac mora uspostaviti ravnotežu između sigurnosti sustava i subjektivnog osjećaja privatnosti građana koji zaziru od povećanih mjera nadzora, a o čijem teško zarađenom novcu cijeli sustav ovisi.

Također, slažem se s izvjestiteljima da uvođenje veće razine sigurnosti platnog prometa mora pretpostavljati zaštitu prikupljenih podataka te da bi pristup tim podacima trebao biti omogućen samo u iznimnim situacijama za koje bih željela da budu strogo zakonski definirane.

 
  
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  Κυριάκος Τριανταφυλλίδης, εξ ονόματος της ομάδας GUE/NGL. – Κύριε Πρόεδρε, κανείς δεν αμφιβάλλει πως η ροή χρήματος που προέρχεται από παράνομες δραστηριότητες είναι σημαντικό πρόβλημα, το οποίο χρήζει αντιμετώπισης παράλληλα με τη λήψη μέτρων για την αντιμετώπιση της εγκληματικότητας αυτής καθεαυτής. Και αποτελεί πράγματι κρίσιμο στοιχείο ο έλεγχος των πληροφοριών που συνοδεύουν τις μεταφορές χρηματικών ποσών με απώτερο στόχο τον εντοπισμό δραστών εγκληματικών πράξεων. Στο πλαίσιο αυτό τίθεται πρακτικά και η παράμετρος της συνεργασίας με τρίτες χώρες, η οποία, αν και χρήσιμη, δεν μπορεί να γίνεται με κόστος την έκπτωση στην προστασία προσωπικών δεδομένων, όπως έχουμε δει να συμβαίνει και με άλλες εκθέσεις με αφορμή την αντιμετώπιση του εγκλήματος και της τρομοκρατίας. Γι' αυτό και λυπούμαστε που δεν απαγορεύεται ρητά στην έκθεση η διαβίβαση προσωπικών δεδομένων σε τρίτες χώρες, που δεν εξασφαλίζουν ικανοποιητικό επίπεδο προστασίας σύμφωνα με τη νομοθεσία μας. Περαιτέρω, η έκθεση επικεντρώνεται στο πρόβλημα κυρίως από πλευράς κύρους του χρηματοπιστωτικού τομέα, αγνοώντας πως η εγγενής λειτουργία του τομέα αυτού, μαζί με την ελεύθερη διακίνηση των κεφαλαίων, που διαλαλείται ως θεμελιώδης ευρωενωσιακή αρχή, είναι κρίσιμα στοιχεία στη δημιουργία ενός περιβάλλοντος που ευνοεί το πρόβλημα και το ξέπλυμα βρόμικου χρήματος.

 
  
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  Diane Dodds (NI). - Mr President, I welcome this continued focus on tackling organised crime and its links with terrorism. As a Member of Parliament for Northern Ireland, a part of the United Kingdom which shares a border with the Republic of Ireland, I know all too well the relationship between criminals laundering money and fuel and financial backing for terrorist campaigns. It is an undeniable fact that in parts of South Armagh and other areas in the border counties of my constituency, criminals have used illegal smuggling operations to generate cash for the murderous activities of the Provisional IRA. Of course, money laundering has been a danger too.

It is therefore right that we should ensure as much transparency as possible in relation to the identity of business owners and those who ultimately gain from transactions. However, this must be done in a manner that does not place disproportionate burdens on traders or consumers and should be secondary to support for robust criminal authorities, such as the National Crime Agency or the Organised Crime Unit of the Police Service of Northern Ireland. Sadly, in Northern Ireland, to the shame of nationalists and republican politicians, they have yet to support the National Crime Agency operating there.

 
  
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  Rui Tavares (Verts/ALE). - Senhor Presidente, gostaria de começar por agradecer aos relatores destas quatro importantes peças legislativas que vão a partir de agora enquadrar a atualização da luta da União Europeia contra a lavagem de dinheiro. É dito muitas vezes, inclusive aqui neste Parlamento, que a democracia tem um custo e que a democracia europeia tem um custo. Bem, esse custo, feitas as contas, por exemplo deste Parlamento Europeu dividido por todos os cidadãos europeus é de 1[nbsp ]euro e meio por ano. Mas, se por outro lado, fizermos as contas ao custo que tem a lavagem de dinheiro, a evasão fiscal, o planeamento fiscal agressivo e todas estas atividades correlacionadas em grande medida mas não só com o mundo criminoso, com o tráfico de armas, de drogas, de seres humanos, esses custos, como já foi dito aqui, no caso da União Europeia podem ascender a 1 bilião, ou seja, um milhão de milhões de euros, o que dá cerca de 2.000 euros por cidadão europeu.

Se estas peças legislativas que estamos aqui a discutir conseguirem recuperar pelo menos uma parte desse dinheiro, esse dinheiro que faz falta para as escolas, para os jardins, para as bibliotecas, para os hospitais, para a sustentabilidade dos nossos sistemas de segurança social, nesse caso estaremos a fazer um dos serviços mais relevantes que poderíamos fazer ao cidadão europeu e, embora estas coisas não se meçam só por dinheiro, estaremos a dar efetivamente muito lucro. Os custos da democracia são muito menores do que os custos da não democracia. De cada vez que a democracia avança o cidadão ganha com isso em termos monetários, evidentemente, em termos também de confiança nas instituições e em termos de progresso moral e humano.

Nós necessitamos, como está dito nestes relatórios, para poder identificar, digamos, os rostos por trás destas transferências bancárias, nós precisamos de acabar com este sistema de biombos em que uma companhia é detida por outra companhia que oculta outra companhia que depois por sua vez é detida por uma companhia num país offshore atrás das quais se escondem as caras efetivas dos últimos beneficiários.

Por isso a legislação para o estabelecimento de um registo europeu de últimos beneficiários é absolutamente essencial. Precisaremos de mais. Do meu ponto de vista precisamos de uma unidade europeia especial para a investigação do crime económico e financeiro e precisamos também de saber exatamente quem faz cada transferência. Mas estes são bons avanços. Dou os meus parabéns e o meu obrigado, também enquanto cidadão, aos meus colegas.

 
  
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  Sławomir Nitras (PPE). - Nie mam oczywiście najmniejszych wątpliwości, że zjawisko prania brudnych pieniędzy to proceder, który podważa zaufanie obywateli do prawa i należy temu procederowi stanowczo przeciwdziałać. Uważam, że jednolite europejskie procedury – ze względu na coraz bardziej międzynarodowy i transgraniczny charakter tego procederu – są oczywiście rozwiązaniem niezbędnym. Równie ważne jednak jest, w mojej ocenie, stosowanie w tym wypadku zasady proporcjonalności – ponieważ obowiązki dotyczące załączania informacji i weryfikowania nie mogą być zbyt uciążliwe – aby nie ograniczać sprawności europejskiego systemu płatniczego jako elementu rynku wewnętrznego.

Chciałbym zwrócić uwagę, że w toku prac w komisji ECON udało nam się poprawić propozycję Komisji Europejskiej w kilku ważnych aspektach. Mam na myśli przede wszystkim harmonizację definicji zawartych w rozporządzeniu z powstającą równolegle dyrektywą w sprawie usług płatniczych. Uważam, że ujednolicenie definicji płatnika, odbiorcy i transferu pieniężnego wprowadza wymaganą od dobrego prawa klarowność i precyzyjność, a z drugiej strony pozwala objąć zakresem rozporządzenia szeroki wachlarz operacji funkcjonalnie podobnych do przelewów bankowych, w tym popularnych poleceń zapłaty, ale także transakcji dokonywanych w oparciu o instrumenty przedpłaty. Ponadto podkreślenia wymaga fakt, że rozszerzyliśmy zakres tzw. informacji uproszczonej, biorąc jednak pod uwagę uwarunkowania wynikające ze standardów SEPA. Informacja, która będzie przypisana do każdego transferu środków w obrębie Unii, będzie musiała zawsze zawierać imię i nazwisko płatnika. Jakkolwiek brak tego wymogu w propozycji Komisji mógłby ułatwić realizację przekazów pieniężnych w ramach Unii, to z drugiej strony w komisji uznaliśmy, że stwarza to nadmierne ryzyko wykorzystania systemów finansowych do prania brudnych pieniędzy. Brak takiego wymogu mógłby poważnie utrudnić monitorowanie transakcji przez banki.

Poza wspomnianymi zmianami zaproponowaliśmy także rozszerzenie obowiązków dostawców pośredniczących w usługach płatniczych oraz dodatkowo uszczegółowiliśmy procedury oceny ryzyka i weryfikacji komplementarności informacji dla agentów płatniczych.

Na koniec niech będzie mi wolno jako kontrasprawozdawcy podziękować obydwojgu sprawozdawcom oraz pozostałym kontrasprawozdawcom za sprawną i efektywną współpracę.

 
  
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  Emine Bozkurt (S&D). - Mr[nbsp ]President, why should it be a secret that someone owns a part of a certain company? It seems only logical to want to know who you are doing business with, or to know that the business you are doing is legitimate. Hiding company owners and using obscure corporate constructions to avoid detection by the authorities are tactics used by criminal networks to launder money. Citizens are looking to us to take action. To quote one of many (a Dutch lady), ‘The European Parliament can stop criminals hiding money and robbing poor countries.’ So please help to reveal who is behind European companies and trusts.

Criminals use such networks and operate on an increasingly international level, further complicating transparency of ownership. We want to prevent drug lords, people[nbsp ]traffickers, gun[nbsp ]runners and corrupt businesses from setting up companies to launder their dirty money. In order to tie criminal activity to its perpetrators and facilitate prosecutions, we must be able to uncover who owns a given company.

The rapporteurs, Judith Sargentini and Krišjānis Kariņš, did not initially propose the full openness of registers. For us, the Social Democrats, full openness was a key priority. Without that, we would not have supported the proposal for a directive. We want a public register in full compliance with EU data protection rules. Therefore I am glad that, in the end, Parliament is supporting that approach.

Another important element put forward by our group and adopted in committee concerns better witness protection. Whistle-blowers who are brave enough to share information in order to dismantle criminal networks should have the protection they deserve.

 
  
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  Nils Torvalds (ALDE). - Arvoisa puhemies, olemme tapelleet tämän rahanpesudirektiivin kanssa aika pitkään ja sitkeästi. Se ei johdu siitä, että Suomi olisi erityisen riskialtis maa, eikä se johdu edes siitä, että meillä on Venäjä naapurina, vaikka Venäjä on varmasti tunnettu aika monen rahanpesuongelman tyyssijana. Olemme tapelleet tämän direktiivin kanssa itse asiassa pelkästään siitä syystä, että on ollut välillä vaikeaa saada kollegoita ymmärtämään, mitä risk based approach eli toimenpiteiden suhteellisuus itse asiassa tarkoittaa.

Meillä on Suomessa kohtalaisen erikoinen tilanne. Suomessa huomattava osa rahapeleistä tapahtuu niin sanottujen yksikätisten rosvojen kautta. Se tarkoittaa, että suomalaiset eläkeläiset seisovat jossain kaupassa ja työntävät yhden euron kolikoita laitteeseen ja vetävät kahvasta ja saavat joskus rahaakin siitä. Se joka luulee, että me tällä tavalla voimme pestä suuria rahamääriä, on tietenkin ymmärtänyt tämän riskin arvioinnin aivan väärin. Jos vaaditaan, että kaikilla pitäisi olla samanlaiset säännöt, samanlaiset sukkahousut, niin menee taas pieleen.

Huomattava osa suomalaisesta sosiaaliturvasta saa rahoituksensa tämän yksikätisen rosvon kautta. Siitä syystä olemme tiukasti sitä mieltä, että jokaisen pitää ymmärtää, miten tärkeää suhteellisuus on tässä asiassa.

 
  
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  Sven Giegold (Verts/ALE). - Herr Präsident, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Erst einmal ein herzliches Dankeschön an die beiden Berichterstatter – Herrn Kariņš und Frau Sargentini – für diesen Bericht. Er ist ein wichtiges Zeichen für die Bürgerinnen und Bürger, gerade aus der Zivilgesellschaft, die über Jahre gefordert haben, dass es endlich ein öffentliches Unternehmensregister gibt.

Es ist eigentlich völlig selbstverständlich, dass man, wenn man mit einer anderen Person Geschäfte macht, weiß, wem man gegenübersitzt. Bei einer natürlichen Person ist das ohnehin so, und bei Unternehmen sollte das in Zukunft auch der Fall sein. Wir haben in Zypern gesehen, wohin es führt, wenn wir Geldwäscherichtlinien auf dem Papier, und eine andere Realität bei der Umsetzung haben. Die Kommission hat in der Vergangenheit dabei versagt, dafür zu sorgen, dass die europäischen Geldwäscherichtlinien tatsächlich umgesetzt werden. Erst hinterher musste das mühsam aufgearbeitet werden. Deshalb ist es richtig, dass die Position des Parlaments jetzt die Position der Kommission stärkt.

Das zentrale Problem im Bereich der Geldwäsche ist nicht, ob man auch noch das letzte Glücksspiel unter die Geldwäschekontrolle setzt, sondern die zentrale Frage ist: Werden die Gesetze, die wir bereits haben, tatsächlich umgesetzt und gibt es Aktivitäten, um dafür zu sorgen, dass Geldwäschekontrolle effektiv stattfindet? Da haben wir große Umsetzungsprobleme, nicht zuletzt in Deutschland, aber auch in vielen anderen Ländern.

Ich erwarte von der Kommission, dass sie – statt sich wie hier jetzt gegen Instrumente, gegen ein verbindliches Register auszusprechen – endlich ihre Maßnahmen ernst nimmt und den Mitgliedstaaten bei der Umsetzung auf die Finger schaut. Umso besser, wenn wir strenge Regeln dafür haben!

 
  
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  Willy Meyer (GUE/NGL). - Señor Presidente, este paquete legislativo en contra del blanqueo de dinero nos parece un avance muy importante, pero con una consideración: este sistema financiero privado y desregulado es un sistema que, si no se modifica, dará origen siempre a la corrupción, a la estafa, a los paraísos fiscales y al blanqueo de dinero. Es un problema del sistema.

No cabe duda de que este paquete legislativo hace más difícil el blanqueo de dinero y la evasión fiscal. Por lo tanto, creo que este paquete puede ayudar, en primer lugar, a que la investigación de las agencias en contra del fraude se centre en donde se crea ese blanqueo de dinero, que es, en un 70[nbsp ]%, en las grandes empresas. No en la pequeña empresa: en las grandes empresas.

En segundo lugar, se trata de reforzar todas las unidades contra el delito fiscal. Por ejemplo, en mi país, España, cada vez se debilitan más y no se consigue acabar con esta lacra que ataca, fundamentalmente, a toda la ciudadanía.

Y, por último, una medida muy fácil y sin coste alguno que, evidentemente, plantearía un ataque directo al blanqueo de dinero: retirar los billetes de quinientos euros.

 
  
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  Sampo Terho (EFD). - Arvoisa puhemies, rahanpesu on Euroopan unionissa valtavan kokoluokan ongelma. Siksi olenkin tukenut ja tulen jatkossakin tukemaan kaikkia tehokkaita keinoja sen kitkemiseksi.

Pelkään kuitenkin pahoin, että huonolla muotoilulla toteutuessaan rahanpesudirektiivi tekisi myös paljon tarpeetonta vahinkoa lailliselle ja yleishyödylliselle toiminnalle. Siksi sen sanamuodoissa tulisi vielä varmistaa, ettei näin tapahdu.

Jos jäsenmaan täytyy hakea jokaista kolikkopeliautomaattia varten poikkeuslupa komissiolta, vaikka jäsenvaltio olisi jo todennut pelien sisältämät riskit rahanpesua ajatellen minimaalisiksi, direktiivi haittaisi suomalaista kolikkopeliautomaattijärjestelmää kohtuuttomalla tavalla.

Muistutan myös, että Suomessa kolikkopeliautomaatit omistaa valtionyhtiö ja tuotot käytetään yleishyödylliseen toimintaan. Rahanpesuun automaatteja on käytännössä mahdoton käyttää. Yleisellä tasolla kuitenkin siis kannatan direktiiviä.

 
  
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  Frank Engel (PPE). - Mr President, I am glad that this directive proved to be rather consensual among the Groups of this House. This proves that, in Europe, we do not actually disagree on the necessity of eliminating money laundering, which means the laundering of proceeds from activities far worse than the money laundering itself. Even though we had a small hiccup in the sense that it took some time and conviction to include the British trust instrument, I am nonetheless glad that we did, because at the end of the day any sort of corporate structures – and this can be likened to a corporate structure – can be abused for money laundering, and anything that can be abused for money laundering has to be included in these endeavours.

But our problem is not really in the European Union; our problem is that a number of territories – some very friendly to us, at least nominally – continue to do exactly as they please in terms of acting like financial centres and, indeed, being launderettes. I am talking about British Crown dependencies, which are, apparently, independent of the will of Mr Cameron, who speaks out very loudly for all sort of transparency but seems to be rather unable to contain anything that his boys and girls do in the Channel Islands, the British Virgin Islands or territories more exotic than these.

I am talking about the half-dozen or so full offshore jurisdictions contained within the United States of America. We do not have any sort of influence on what happens to money that ends up there or on what sort of money gets out of there. Furthermore, we will never be able – whether the register is public or not – to find out who is behind structures there, because they will never yield any information about beneficial ownership, in contrast to what European Union jurisdictions have been doing for years. So let us now focus our efforts on convincing all those who are not yet convinced that our approach is right. That also means talking very seriously to friends.

 
  
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  Arlene McCarthy (S&D). - Mr President, I wish to thank our joint rapporteurs, Mr[nbsp ]Kariņš and Ms[nbsp ]Sargentini. I want to focus on this very fundamental issue of public disclosure of beneficial ownership of companies. Introducing public disclosure of the beneficial owners of a company is, of course, a vital step forward in enhancing transparency, but it is equally important that it cannot be easily circumvented. There is ample evidence that some shell companies are at the forefront of criminal activities, from money laundering to tax evasion.

Criminal money laundered into the financial system accounts for an estimated 2 to 5[nbsp ]% of yearly global GDP. In 2010, African countries lost EUR[nbsp ]44.3 billion through illicit financial flows – which is more than the EUR[nbsp ]32.9 billion that Africa received in aid the same year. This robs African countries of the resources they need to invest in health, agriculture, infrastructure and poverty reduction. So while in principle the EU’s public disclosure rules are designed to deliver accurate and up-to-date information on the beneficial ownership of all EU companies, in practice they may prove not to be robust or effective. That is because, regrettably, Parliament’s proposal simply follows the Council weak position on the definition of a beneficial owner. The 25[nbsp ]% threshold for disclosure will limit transparency and may only assist those intent on dodging the rules. Perhaps those are the jurisdictions that Mr[nbsp ]Engel just mentioned, and perhaps that is why the Council went for this higher threshold, because – perhaps – the UK Government wanted this owing to its offshore concerns.

In a recent case we also saw that a Swiss commodities giant was able to use 18.75[nbsp ]% in a multinational oil company to set up a series of shell companies. It bribed corrupt officials in Angola. If the threshold had not been at 25[nbsp ]%, this corrupt company would have had to divulge what was actually going on behind the company. That is why my group has set a threshold for 10[nbsp ]%. I urge colleagues here to vote in favour of that, because if we are serious about setting global standards, we should not go for a low threshold on public disclosure.

 
  
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  Graham Watson (ALDE). - Mr President, the new rules on money laundering will make it harder for fraudsters and organised criminals to spend their dirty money. It is important that we have EU measures in place to tackle the cross-border element of such crime efficiently. This proposal is bold; for the first time we ask companies to reveal publicly who stands behind them. Such a measure will, in particular, help businesses to help identify who their counterparts are, judge if they are reliable and trustworthy and help them identify seemingly anonymous shell companies.

The proposal also asks Member States to hold information about those who stand behind trusts; this measure is important especially in relation to opaque offshore establishments hiding in tax havens or non-cooperative jurisdictions. The OECD has recently developed standards which will require countries automatically to report to their home companies those people who stand behind such trusts, and that will help us tackle a serious problem.

I am surprised that my Labour and Green colleagues seek to make no distinction between low-risk trusts and high-risk trusts or those offshore. Their proposal as it stands calls for the publication of delicate details, including trusts for vulnerable people, in a central registry accessible to all. This has serious data privacy implications, particularly in Britain, where such trusts are commonplace. Moreover, it is perverse that amendments should be adopted to treat gaming on line differently from gambling in casinos.

This measure is a good one, and we will vote accordingly, including in view of the amendments we disagree with.

 
  
  

PRESIDE: MIGUEL ÁNGEL MARTÍNEZ MARTÍNEZ
Vicepresidente

 
  
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  Слави Бинев (EFD). - Г-н Председател, уважаеми колеги, приветствам регламента за пране на пари. Уеднаквените правила ще дадат резултати в тази битка. Сега вече управлявалите България ще имат проблеми. За тях винаги има съмнения, но няма никакви резултати. Пример за това са 39 кандидат депутати от Атака, обвързани със запис на заповеди за 6 милиона евро, на което съдебната система не реагира. Управляващите идваха пеша в парламента, но си тръгваха с множество имоти, близките им се сдобиха с банки и икономически империи от престъпната приватизация.

След влизане в сила на поетите правила, трябва да започне мащабна европейска акция. В България само външен натиск би имал ефект, защото всяко пране на пари започва с кражба, а най-голямата кражба е извършиха управляващите и за да покаже Европейската комисия, че не е майка за тях, а мащеха за гражданите, трябва да започне от върха.

 
  
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  Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE). - Nyilvánvalóan látszik, hogy a gazdaság kifehérítése érdekében tett lépéseink még nem voltak elegendőek. Ön említette, hogy ez néhány százalék. Egyetértek azzal, hogy ez nem magas százalék. Ugyanakkor, ha hozzáteszem, hogy ez a néhány százalék bűncselekményből származik, akkor ez egy nagyon magas szám, ezért óriási tennivalóink vannak.

Két tényezőre szeretném felhívni a figyelmet: az egyik a cégnyilvántartás, a cégnyilvántartások összekapcsolásának fontossága. Hallottam olyan véleményeket, hogy itt akadályok vannak. Biztos úr, én nem akadályokat szeretnék hallani, hanem azt szeretném, hogyha tudnánk, hogy ezt meg lehet tenni. Szeretném tudni, hogy kik a végső kedvezményezettek. Hogyha egy ügyletnél, amit természetes személyek kötnek, tudjuk, hogy ki kivel áll szemben, azt gondolom, hogy ez minimálisan elvárható a vállalatoknál is. Hallottuk azt is, hogy nem csak a vállalatokról van szó, hanem alapítványokról. Ukrajnából a kormányzati pénzek holland alapítványokhoz kerültek. A regisztereket nyilvánossá kell tenni. Azon jogi alanyok számára, akiket érintenek, hozzáférhetővé kell tenni.

Az utolsó téma, amivel szeretnék foglalkozni, a kockázatvállalásnak a fontossága, és a megelőzés fontossága. Egyik kollégám, akivel utaztam idefelé a parlamenti ülésre, említette, hogy nagyon rossz, ha a pénzmosásnál pontosan azokat a kisnyugdíjasokat vagy kisbefektetőket érjük el, akiknek a pénze tiszta, és közben a nagy halak ki fognak kerülni újra, akik bűncselekményből szerezték a pénzüket. Ezért a kockázatvállalásnál az arányosságra szeretném felhívni a figyelmet, és a kockázatbecslésnél is egy átfogóbb, holisztikusabb megközelítést szeretnék látni. Azt szeretném látni, hogy ezt a témát kezelni tudjuk. Fontosak a nemzetközi sztenderdek, de úgy gondolom, hogy az Európai Unión belül is fontos lépéseket kell megtenni.

 
  
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  Sylvie Guillaume (S&D). - Monsieur le Président, Monsieur le Commissaire, chers collègues, nous partageons tous certainement la même conviction: celle de la nécessité de revoir régulièrement les règles en matière de blanchiment d'argent sale et de lutte contre la fraude fiscale. Cela doit nous permettre d'être mieux armés pour assécher les sources des circuits financiers susceptibles de soutenir des activités criminelles en Europe. Aussi, j'apprécie tout particulièrement les progrès qui pourront être réalisés grâce au texte que le Parlement européen va voter aujourd'hui.

L'un des meilleurs moyens pour mettre fin aux sociétés écrans derrière lesquelles certains s'abritent pour blanchir l'argent sale issu d'activités criminelles est le registre public des bénéficiaires effectifs. On le sait: quand les pratiques sont trop divergentes en matière d'identification des bénéficiaires effectifs des sociétés et des personnes morales, cela facilite le recours à des structures opaques, surtout quand ceci est doublé de réglementations nationales insuffisamment contraignantes qui favorisent le développement de structures non réglementées. En répertoriant les bénéficiaires ultimes de sociétés ou de fiducies dans les registres centraux publics des États membres de l'Union européenne, nous pourrons en finir avec l'anonymat des sociétés et des comptes offshore exploités par les fraudeurs pour dissimuler leurs transactions financières.

Un registre public obligatoire centralisé et accessible au public est donc un outil indispensable pour parvenir à une lutte efficace contre le blanchiment. C'est ce même raisonnement qui me guide contre les exemptions du secteur des jeux de ses obligations de vigilance, même en cas de faible risque de blanchiment.

J'estime, en effet, qu'une telle dérogation pourrait non seulement entraîner de graves distorsions de concurrence mais aussi permettre aux auteurs d'activités de blanchiment de choisir les territoires où la législation est plus permissive.

Il serait donc, selon moi, préférable d'adopter un système de vigilance gradué et donc, pour certains cas, allégé pour tenir compte des contraintes des petits opérateurs, ainsi que le suggère le GAFI.

 
  
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  Agustín Díaz de Mera García Consuegra (PPE). - Señor Presidente, expreso mi dolor y solidaridad con las víctimas en el aniversario del 11 de marzo.

Por otra parte, aplaudo la aprobación de este paquete sobre el blanqueo de dinero. Me gustaría mencionar algunas de las mejoras que se han incluido y que considero de gran eficacia: la mejora de la claridad y consistencia de la normativa de los Estados mediante la creación de un mecanismo de identificación; el aumento de la transparencia de las transferencias de fondos de todo tipo, con el fin de facilitar el rastreo de fondos de delincuentes y terroristas; el refuerzo de la cooperación entre las distintas unidades nacionales de inteligencia financiera; la mejora del funcionamiento de los registros mercantiles en los Estados miembros, porque, para prevenir la financiación del terrorismo, es absolutamente indispensable identificar al titular; la actualización de los sistemas de sanciones; y, por último, el respeto a la protección de los datos de carácter personal.

Este delito financiero perjudica a todos. Según estimaciones del Fondo Monetario Internacional, la magnitud del blanqueo representa el 5[nbsp ]% del PIB mundial y trae como consecuencia corrupción y una amenaza a la integridad de las instituciones financieras. Por tanto, celebro la aprobación de este paquete formado por el Reglamento y la Directiva, con vistas a prevenir, investigar y detectar el blanqueo y la financiación del terror.

No olvidemos que la yihad tiene cuatro principios, que son: captar, combatir, rezar y recaudar. Sin recaudar, no hay financiación y, sin financiación, no hay yihad.

Felicito de todo corazón y sinceramente a los ponentes por tan buen trabajo realizado.

 
  
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  Saïd El Khadraoui (S&D). - Voorzitter, commissaris, collega's, ik wil om te beginnen natuurlijk de rapporteurs danken voor het geleverde werk.

Net als belastingontwijking en belastingontduiking heeft het witwassen van geld kolossale vormen aangenomen en dat vraagt om een urgente, grensoverschrijdende en Europese aanpak. Via fraude, corruptie, drugshandel en andere zware misdaden, wordt er blijkbaar door allerhande criminelen enorm veel geld verdiend dankzij het witwassen via legale kanalen zoals banken en verzekeringsmaatschappijen.

Dat creëert op zichzelf een gigantische reputatieschade voor de financiële sector, maar leidt vooral ook tot enorme maatschappelijke kosten. Die lopen in de honderden miljarden euro's per jaar. En dan zwijg ik nog over de vele slachtoffers van die criminele activiteiten.

Om dat aan te pakken moet er een systematisch antwoord gevonden worden op de heel eenvoudige vraag: Met wie precies worden er zaken gedaan? Wat is de identiteit van de personen die werkelijk achter de vennootschap staan en die voordeel halen uit die transacties? Vandaar het belang van een verplicht centraal publiek register en natuurlijk ook het belang van een goede samenwerking tussen de lidstaten. Van schermvennootschappen, trusts en andere juridische constructies met belastingparadijzen moet in kaart gebracht worden wie er precies achter zit.

Op enkele maanden voor de verkiezingen, op een moment dat de jongerenwerkloosheid piekt in Europa, en dat er negatieve berichten zijn over de armoedecijfers, is een doortastende aanpak van de witteboordencriminaliteit een sterk signaal dat het de Unie menens is met de aanpak ervan. Wat dat betreft kunnen we stappen vooruit zetten.

 
  
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  Markus Ferber (PPE). - Herr Präsident, sehr geehrter Herr Kommissar, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Es ist nicht das erste und wahrscheinlich auch nicht das letzte Mal, dass wir uns mit einer Geldwäscherichtlinie beschäftigen. Das zeigt, dass diejenigen, die Geld waschen, sehr findig sind, und der Gesetzgeber immer wieder hinterher eilt, wenn es darum geht, entstandene Schlupflöcher wieder zu schließen. Trotzdem glaube ich, dass wir dieses Mal ein sehr gutes Regelwerk vorgelegt haben, das all die Dinge umfasst, die notwendig sind, um Geldwäsche dauerhaft wirksam zu bekämpfen.

Wir müssen aber auch aufpassen, dass wir nicht mit Kanonen auf Spatzen schießen. Gerade im Online-Bereich gibt es große Möglichkeiten der Geldwäsche. Es gibt aber auch Online-Angebote, die mit Geldwäsche nichts zu tun haben. Das ein bisschen sauberer voneinander zu trennen, ist jeder Mühe wert. Deswegen hatte ich in dieser Richtung entsprechende Vorschläge mit eingebracht.

Das zweite Thema ist – es wurde gerade schon angesprochen: Es muss auch klar sein, wer hinter einer Firma, wer hinter einem Konglomerat steckt. Es muss klar sein, dass Eigentümerstrukturen transparent sind. Nur so kann ein Beitrag dazu geleistet werden, dass man Geldwäsche auch wirksam bekämpfen kann und dass diejenigen, die nicht die Absicht haben, als Geldwäscheeinrichtung missbraucht zu werden, entsprechend geschützt werden. Das gehört ja auch mit dazu. Es soll ja auch noch anständige Menschen auf dieser Welt geben, und die dürfen nicht unter Generalverdacht gestellt werden.

Insgesamt meine ich also, dass wir einen sehr ausgewogenen Vorschlag vorgelegt haben, der hoffentlich jene Schlupflöcher schließt, die sich technisch ergeben haben, und hoffentlich so umfassend ist, dass diejenigen, die Geld waschen, viele Gedanken darauf verwenden müssen, wie sie ihn umgehen können, und dass es zweitens auch möglich ist, sie dingfest zu machen und ihrer habhaft zu werden. Das ist unsere gemeinsame Verantwortung in Europa!

(Der Redner ist damit einverstanden, eine Frage nach dem Verfahren der „blauen Karte“ gemäß Artikel[nbsp ]149 Absatz[nbsp ]8 der Geschäftsordnung zu beantworten.)

 
  
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  Paul Rübig (PPE), Frage nach dem Verfahren der „blauen Karte“. – Herr Ferber, ich möchte Sie fragen: Wir hatten unlängst ein Hearing darüber, dass die Kommission 4,5[nbsp ]Milliarden Euro an NGOs auszahlt. Ich möchte gerne wissen, ob es in Ordnung ist, dass an NGOs, die selber Gelder aus Steuerparadiesen oder Offshore-Gesellschaften bekommen, Gelder bezahlt werden bzw. dass die Kommission Steuergelder an NGOs in Steuerparadiesen und Offshore-Gesellschaften überweist. Glauben Sie, dass das in Ordnung ist?

 
  
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  Markus Ferber (PPE), Antwort auf eine Frage nach dem Verfahren der „blauen Karte“. – Vielen Dank, Herr Kollege. Ich bin jetzt ein bisschen überfordert. Sie wissen scheinbar mehr als ich. Ich habe jedenfalls die Absicht, am 25.[nbsp ]Mai für das Europaparlament zu kandidieren. Dass ich danach der Kommission angehöre, ist mir bisher nicht bekannt. Aber wenn Sie mir das quasi hier schon voraussagen können, ein herzliches Dankeschön.

Das ist eine Frage, die sich an die Kommission richtet und nicht an einen Europaabgeordneten. Darum bitte ich den Kollegen, die einschlägigen Instrumente, die sich aus der Geschäftsordnung ergeben, entsprechend zu nutzen.

 
  
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  Claude Moraes (S&D). - Mr[nbsp ]President, we are voting on the revision of this third anti-money-laundering directive because, as other colleagues have said, the sophisticated means for money laundering and terrorist financing are constantly evolving, and we need to keep up. The rapporteurs have done a good job, and this report is a central element in Parliament’s efforts to tackle this type of cross-border criminal activity. As civil society organisations have already publicly stated, enhancing transparency on beneficial owners will make it easier and quicker for law enforcers to follow the criminal money trail. It will allow citizens to hold businesses accountable and will enable businesses to understand who is behind their partners and suppliers.


The 2011 World Bank study The Puppet Masters found that 70[nbsp ]% of corruption cases involved phantom firms with unknown owners. Achieving transparency on payment sources, fund deposits and transfers, in order to counter terrorism and money laundering, is a legitimate interest of the European Parliament, but the proposals must be fully in line with data-protection requirements. Our group strongly supports the Commission’s list of effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions but, in our amended text, we ask it to report back to Parliament, within three years of implementation of the regulation, on the implications of the application of sanctions and monitoring.

This is a good piece of work by the rapporteurs: it is what citizens expect in response to the sophisticated way that criminals operate, and I commend it. I also commend our group’s political movement on this dossier, and I welcome what the Commission is doing.

 
  
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  Emer Costello (S&D). - Mr President, I too welcome this report on money laundering today, as we know that money laundering is not a victimless crime. Behind the money there are murky criminal underworlds of prostitution, drug trafficking, cigarette smuggling, fuel laundering and, indeed, welfare fraud. A recent report in Ireland reported over 39[nbsp ]000 suspicious activities over a two-year period. Yet during the same period there were just ten convictions.

The view is that money laundering is a secondary offence to the actual crime and that criminals are caught or charged for the crime and not for the subsequent crime of laundering the cash. We need to change this mind-set.

There are many positive aspects to this report; I particularly welcome the provision to ensure the traceability of payments with the public register on beneficial owners. This will ensure transparency by providing for full public access to the information on beneficial ownership. However, on the level of shareholding, which may constitute evidence, I would support the S&D amendment to lower the level from 25[nbsp ]% to 10[nbsp ]%. I am also concerned at the proposal to allow exemptions for certain aspects of the gambling industry. This report will need to be implemented in full.

 
  
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  Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD). - Walka ze[nbsp ]zorganizowaną przestępczością, która czerpie swoje dochody z popełnienia najcięższych zbrodni, takich jak handel narkotykami na wielką skalę, handel bronią, handel ludźmi czy wreszcie wielka korupcja, wymaga zastosowania bardzo skutecznych metod w[nbsp ]zakresie śledzenia przepływu środków finansowych, które wprowadzane są następnie do legalnego obiegu. Dlatego tak ważna jest ta dyrektywa i[nbsp ]dobrze, że rozszerza możliwości podejmowania działań przez organy ścigania, które pozwoliły w sposób transparentny i[nbsp ]przejrzysty śledzić przepływy pieniędzy.

Dobrze, że jednocześnie rozmawiamy też o[nbsp ]skutecznej interwencji wtedy, gdy okaże się, że pieniądze pochodzą z nielegalnego źródła, ze[nbsp ]zorganizowanej przestępczości. Niezwykle ważne jest, aby sankcje były skuteczne, abyśmy mogli stosować kary konfiskaty majątkowej nie tylko bezpośrednio do tych pieniędzy, ale i[nbsp ]tzw. konfiskaty rozszerzonej, o[nbsp ]czym już w Parlamencie Europejskim kilkakrotnie rozmawialiśmy.

Nie ulega najmniejszej wątpliwości, że gdy patrzymy na charakter i strukturę działalności organizacji terrorystycznych, zauważamy, że ich skuteczność jest uwarunkowana dobrą bazą i[nbsp ]zapleczem finansowym. Dlatego dobrze również z tego powodu, że niniejsza dyrektywa rozszerza możliwości działania organów ścigania, aby skutecznie przeciwdziałać zagrożeniom terrorystycznym, które są tak wielkim wyzwaniem współczesnych czasów.

 
  
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  James Nicholson (ECR). - Mr President, I would like to congratulate all those involved in producing this report. There are few corners of my constituency that have not been touched by the challenges posed by organised criminal gangs, which are often inextricably linked to paramilitary activities. While the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) has had significant successes in tackling money laundering and disrupting the activities of organised criminal gangs, I have to say that the revision of this directive is extremely welcome.

In order to respond effectively to the evolution of criminal activities – particularly sophisticated money laundering operations – it is extremely important that we adopt the legislative package, which will strengthen the ability to respond effectively to this situation in a flexible way. The famous Northern Bank robbery in Northern Ireland, where GBP[nbsp ]25 million was stolen from the Northern Bank, is just one example of how this criminal activity goes on. We have cigarette smuggling, human smuggling and drugs all inextricably linked to terrorist organisations.

 
  
 

Intervenciones con arreglo al procedimiento de solicitud incidental de uso de la palabra («catch the eye»)

 
  
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  Jaroslav Paška (EFD). - Deravá legislatíva Európskej únie vytvára široký priestor pre nekontrolované pohyby peňazí. Udalosti z posledných dní na Ukrajine nám napríklad ukázali, že ukrajinskí oligarchovia si svoje špinavé peniaze schovávali v[nbsp ]holandských trustoch. Veľký priestor pre okrádanie štátov zakladajú aj súčasné rôznorodé národné mechanizmy dane z pridanej hodnoty, ktoré umožňujú cez medzištátne karuselové obchody generovať podnikateľom obrovské zisky.

Preto vytvorenie centrálneho verejne dostupného registra právnických subjektov podnikajúcich v[nbsp ]obchode, rovnako ako aj odhaľovanie vlastníkov týchto spoločností, je veľmi dôležitým krokom, ktorý je potrebné čím skôr zrealizovať. Z toho pohľadu si myslím, že navrhované riešenie je dobrým krokom do budúcnosti.

 
  
 

(Fin de las intervenciones con arreglo al procedimiento de solicitud incidental de uso de la palabra («catch the eye»))

 
  
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  Tonio Borg, Member of the Commission. - Mr President, I would like to thank all those who have participated in this debate, which shows that our only differences are about the most efficient means to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism. Many subjects have been mentioned – tax havens and on-course gambling, as well as the beneficial ownership registries.

Let me start with tax havens. Of course, the Commission shares the concerns expressed about the loss of tax revenue through tax havens, and about the possibility of tax havens being linked with money laundering. I think the Fourth Money Laundering Directive makes a start on a subject on which there is no general consensus among the Member States. Why? Because the directive explicitly recognises that tax crimes give rise to a money-laundering offence. However, I think we need to be cautious about what can be achieved with this legal instrument, because work is under way in other forums in the taxation field to address the problems associated with tax havens themselves more explicitly.

I said in my opening remarks that the Commission is against granting exemptions or derogations to gambling. During the debate the opinion has been expressed that a lot of small and medium-sized enterprises do on-course betting, and it is not usual for these enterprises to be linked with money laundering. Indeed in one case – I believe it was in Finland – most of the slot machines are run by state agencies, which are not of course linked to money laundering.

So I do understand the need to reduce burdens. However, I believe that where money laundering risks arise, we have to be very careful and ensure that there are preventive systems. Therefore, the Commission remains reluctant to consider any broad-based derogations.

Almost half the interventions made reference to the beneficial ownership registries. We take note of this strong call for these registries by Parliament, and I repeat that the Commission sympathises with Parliament’s position on this. I pledge to explore practical ways in which to bridge the gap between this co-legislator – Parliament – and the position of the Council.

Another suggestion which was put forward during this debate was to lower the threshold for beneficial ownership. In response to Ms[nbsp ]McCarthy’s intervention in particular, I can say that the reason for a 25[nbsp ]% threshold on beneficial ownership in the directive is – and I must say this very openly – because the threshold is an indicative one. That is to say that, if money laundering is suspected, then an obliged entity must probe further, even beyond the 25[nbsp ]% threshold. The figure of 25[nbsp ]% has been chosen because, although it is an indicative threshold, it is the indicative threshold which is accepted by an international standard-setter, the Financial Action Task Force.

Mr Moraes and others referred to the importance of implementing the directive. Of course there is the usual problem that it takes years to pass a law, and sometimes the laws approved by this Parliament – and also those approved by the governments of Member States – are not then implemented by the national authorities. The Commission, as the guardian of the Treaties, starts infringement proceedings every now and then, because it is not acceptable if someone does not abide by a law which that government itself had approved.

So, in the implementation of the anti-money laundering rules in the Member States, we shall continue to monitor the situation. There already exist robust procedures by international standard-setters to evaluate the implementation of anti-money laundering rules. As I said, under the Treaty the Commission has the obligation to monitor implementation. At the same time, we should be careful not to duplicate effective processes, because I think that would weaken rather than strengthen the monitoring.

In conclusion, before you proceed with the vote, I would like to thank Parliament for its support and efficient work on this important package. We need strong rules to protect the integrity of our financial system, we need to implement them in ways which ensure their effective application, and we need to safeguard the internal market and ensure that Europe remains an open and competitive place in which to do business – but clean business – inside the European Union.

 
  
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  Timothy Kirkhope, rapporteur. - Mr President, this has been an interesting debate. It was just slightly negatively affected by the remarks of Mr Engel about tax havens: particularly the reference to the United Kingdom. Mr Engel perhaps should not have remarked in that way, coming from Luxembourg as he does and bearing in mind the remarks of the Global Forum on Transparency relating to Luxembourg, in relation to its own act, as it were. We all need to clean up our acts, and both he and we have a job to do. I commend my Prime Minister, David Cameron for the work that he has been doing – certainly with the European Union – in leading international efforts to combat tax evasion and increase transparency which, of course, is what this is all about.

The only other problem I have is that, when this file has received so much goodwill, as it has – including, as it needs to do, the reference to millions of items of data sets every year and involving the use of profiling, perhaps I should just mention that it is rather sad that, in view of all that goodwill, my file on the EU Passenger Name Record Directive (PNR) – which is effectively doing the same thing but protecting us from terrorism and criminals – has for some reason found itself blocked in this Parliament for a long time. I hope that is a matter which will now be redressed, following the successful outcome of our discussions on this matter.

In conclusion I want to make it very clear that what we are trying to do here is to tighten up rules to make sure that a new set of standards is in place but, at the same time, to make absolutely certain that we do not penalise those that are going about their work and the transactions in which they are involved innocently and positively. We are after criminals; we are after terrorists; we are after dealing with the transfers of funds for illicit purposes, not legal and proper purposes.

 
  
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  Krišjānis Kariņš, Referents. - Godājamais priekšsēdētāja kungs, komisāra kungs! Kolēģi, vispirms ir tiešām jāsaka paldies visiem, kuri piedalījās šodienas debatēs. Svarīgi mums ir tagad mūsu vārdus pārvērst darbos – nobalsot par šo ziņojumu. Būtu naivi domāt, ka, pieņemot vienu likumu, mēs varēsim atbrīvoties no noziedzības Eiropā. Tas, protams, nav iespējams. Bet, pieņemot šo likumu, kas izveidos Eiropas Savienības mērogā patiesā labuma guvēju reģistru, tiks sniegta nopietna palīdzība tām tiesībsargājošām iestādēm, kuras aktīvi cīnās pret noziedzību.

Es atkārtoju, ja veikalā viens bērns vienreiz ieiet iekšā, paņem konfekti, ieliek kabatā un iziet ārā nemaksājis, tas varbūt neatstāj veikalam vai sabiedrībai kopumā lielu iespaidu. Bet, ja tas notiek sistemātiski, tad šādu veikalu izputinās. Un sistemātiski Eiropas Savienībā mums notiek noziedzīgi iegūtas naudas legalizēšana vai tā saucamā „naudas atmazgāšana”, un, izveidojot šo patieso labumu guvēju reģistru, atklāsies, kurš indivīds stāv aiz kura uzņēmuma, lai varētu saprast, kam ir jāmaksā cik lieli nodokļi. Tas ir tieši tāpat, kā mēs tajā pašā veikalā, kur bērni zog konfektes, uzstādītu video novērošanas sistēmu vai ieviestu vairākus sargus, kuri redzētu, kurš bērns ir paņēmis kuru konfekti, un zinātu, kuram pie kases ir jāmaksā. Darīsim savu darbu kā likumdevēji, atbalstīsim šo direktīvu. Paldies par uzmanību!

 
  
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  Judith Sargentini, Rapporteur. - Commissaris Borg, ik hoorde u aan het begin van uw bijdrage zeggen dat u een register zou willen vormgeven op basis van need to know, wat volgens mij iets heel anders is dan een openbaar register waar dit Parlement voor staat. Ik ben daar eigenlijk een beetje verbaasd over, want ik heb signalen uit de Europese Commissie gekregen dat de Commissie wel geïnteresseerd was in een openbaar register.

Laten we heel eerlijk zijn: het voorstel dat u had voorgelegd, was simpelweg niet goed genoeg. U suggereerde dat een bedrijf zelf maar moest weten wie zijn uiteindelijke belanghebbende is. De banken zeiden, als dat zo is en wij gaan informeren bij dat bedrijf, dan geven we meteen een signaal dat ze hun uiteindelijke belanghebbende nog wat dieper weg moeten stoppen.

Hetzelfde geldt voor uw verhaal over de balans tussen gegevensbescherming en privacy versus effectief opsporen. U had helemaal niets over gegevensbescherming in uw voorstel staan, met als consequentie dat het bedrijfsleven zei: Wij worden hier tussen twee wetgevingen geplet. Hoe moeten wij de wetgeving tegen witwassen zien in het licht van de wetgeving over gegevensbescherming?

Daar heeft dit Parlement een oplossing voor bedacht, die volgens mij zeer effectief is. Een openbaar register leidt tot een zelfreinigende samenleving. Want laten we nou even eerlijk zijn. Het was toch niet zo dat die Nederlandse trustkantoren die die miljoenen van die Oekraïners faciliteerden, niet hadden gedacht: dat is misschien een beetje dodgy business. Die hadden toch op hun Nederlandse klompen kunnen aanvoelen dat dit geld uit een verkeerde activiteit afkomstig was. En zij gingen ervoor want ze vonden het eigenlijk wel goed verdienen.

Een openbaar register geeft journalisten mogelijkheden om onderzoek te doen. Dát is wat we zoeken, want wij willen dat onze samenleving zichzelf reinigt.

 
  
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  El Presidente. - Se cierra el debate.

La votación tendrá lugar hoy a las 12.00 horas.

Declaraciones por escrito (artículo 149 del Reglamento)

 
  
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  Ana Gomes (S&D), por escrito. As alterações votadas nas Comissões LIBE e ECON à proposta da Comissão para a revisão da Diretiva contra o branqueamento de capitais constituem um avanço decisivo na luta contra a corrupção e a evasão fiscal e todas as outras formas de criminalidade. Gostaria de felicitar os relatores LIBE e ECON, assim como os shadows, por terem conseguido acordar um compromisso difícil sobre a necessidade de transparência dos beneficiários reais das empresas instaladas na Europa. Esta legislação é deveras importante, porque determina um novo paradigma - o da criação de um registo público dos detentores reais das empresas, combatendo o fenómeno da criação de estruturas opacas e empresas-fantasma utilizadas por criminosos para esconder os proveitos do crime e fugir ao fisco. A UE deve promover este padrão de transparência no mundo, cortando o combustível que alimenta os paraísos fiscais e jurisdições de secretismo, desde os Estados Unidos às Ilhas Caimão, da Suíça a Hong Kong. O Parlamento Europeu fez a sua parte: cabe agora aos Estados-Membros assumirem as suas responsabilidades perante os cidadãos europeus, aceitando que este é o único caminho a seguir se queremos, de facto, ser sérios na luta contra o crime organizado, a corrupção e a evasão fiscal.

 
  
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  Andreas Mölzer (NI), schriftlich. Der Geldwäsche-Sumpf soll nun also weltweit trockengelegt werden. Schließlich wurde etwa in Hongkong der Besitzer des Fußballvereins Birmingham City wegen Geldwäsche verurteilt. Währenddessen laufen in den USA Ermittlungen gegen zwei französische Banken. Und der Vatikan reagiert auf Geldwäsche-Vorwürfe. Bei den Geldern aus dem Janukowytsch-Clan wird ebenfalls wegen Geldwäsche ermittelt. Wobei es – wie das Beispiel der Mubarak-Millionen zeigt – schwer ist, die illegale Herkunft von Geldern zu belegen. Zu vielseitig sind die Möglichkeiten, zu lax werden die Vorschriften ausgelegt, zu selten wird kontrolliert.

Für mehr Transparenz zu sorgen, indem etwa gegen Briefkastenfirmen vorgegangen wird, mag ein guter Ansatzpunkt sein. Dabei darf jedoch nicht über das Ziel hinaus geschossen werden. Die italienischen Pläne der 20-%-Abgabe bei jeder Überweisung aus dem Ausland mit einer Beweislastumkehr sind so ein Beispiel. Sämtliche Privatpersonen unter Geldwäsche-Generalverdacht zu stellen und den Bargeldverkehr gezielt einzuschränken, um besseren Zugriff auf Privatvermögen zu erhalten – dieses Beispiel darf keineswegs Schule machen! Die EU muss mit Maß und Ziel vorgehen. Und will man eine der illegalen Haupteinnahmequellen trockenlegen, muss man illegaler Migration den Riegel vorschieben.

 
  
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  El Presidente. - Antes de pasar al punto siguiente del orden del día, quiero saludar a un grupo de jóvenes socialistas de mi provincia —de Ciudad Real— que se encuentran en la tribuna y a quienes recibimos con el cariño y la amistad que sentimos por ellos, por la provincia de Ciudad Real y por su organización.

 
Última actualización: 9 de mayo de 2014Aviso jurídico