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Dinsdag 10 februari 2015 - Straatsburg Herziene uitgave

12. Toetsingsconferentie Non-Proliferatieverdrag (NPV) in 2015 (debat)
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  Presidente. - L'ordine del giorno reca la discussione sulla dichiarazione del Vicepresidente della Commissione/Alto rappresentante dell'Unione per gli affari esteri e la politica di sicurezza sulla Conferenza di revisione del trattato di non proliferazione delle armi nucleari (TNP) nel 2015 (2015/2555(RSP)).


  Federica Mogherini, Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. – Mr President, let me first of all thank you for this debate. The upcoming NPT Review Conference, which will be held in New York from 27 April to 22 May, is something to which I attach a great deal of importance. It is the most important event on global non-proliferation and disarmament this year. I announced already during the hearing in this Parliament in October that I intended to put in a great deal of work on this and I can confirm that I intend to participate in the Review Conference, in the opening session, and to address the meeting.

I also believe that the role of Parliament in this is crucial. If I am not mistaken, it was the case in 2010 that Parliament adopted a resolution helping to shape the European Union position and I think that it will be extremely good – well, this is our first chance – to have a constant dialogue so that our position is somehow a common European position, taking in the view of Parliament too.

Let me thank you too for all those occasions where the EEAS has been invited to relevant committees on this topic. It is something I appreciate very much.

Now, coming to this year’s Review Conference, there is a mixed outlook, as you know very well. There are different views on the level of implementation of the 2010 Action Plan, and these views are probably quite difficult, or increasingly difficult, to reconcile. I think that, in this context, it is also important not to lose sight of a couple of issues that are regional issues but still relevant to the conference itself.

On one side, the ongoing negotiations with Iran that the European Union, as you know, is facilitating – I am personally facilitating – following a UN Security Council resolution and which could demonstrate that a peaceful solution to a serious issue is possible and mutually profitable for all.

Another element that is likely to influence the outcome of the Review Conference is the fact that the Conference on the Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone in the Middle East, which was one of the key elements of the 2010 Action Plan, has not taken place yet. Here let me thank the facilitator of this for his efforts – his endless efforts – and I hope that all our support can lead to the conference being convened sooner rather than later.

When it comes to the disarmament pillar of the NPT, there has been a growing debate, taking place mostly outside of NPT meetings, on the issue of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons. A major international discussion on this subject was recently held in Vienna, organised by Austria. While some want to elaborate a legal ban on nuclear weapons, others advocate a building-block approach to disarmament with step-by-step nuclear reductions, taking into account the current security environment. It is an ongoing debate.

As you know the European Union has different Member States, with different histories, different positions, and different sensibilities we would say.

But I was encouraged first of all by the fact that during the recent conference in London, the five NPT nuclear-weapon states reconfirmed their commitment to achieving a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the goals of the NPT, and made further contributions to developing the mutual confidence and transparency which is essential to making progress towards multilateral nuclear disarmament.

I think that the conference – even if, as I said, we are still in the process of shaping our formal position on that – should deliver a vision first of all on how to strengthen the Treaty as a whole. We are, as I said, currently preparing with our Member States the common position for the conference and I think that even if the Member States’ mix is complex – nuclear weapon states, NATO members, neutral states – I am confident that we will achieve a common position as we have done in the past.

I believe personally, but this is also the EU position, that the NPT is and has to remain the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, as the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. It is also an important element in the further development of nuclear energy applications for peaceful purposes. We, as you know, support the universalisation and the effective implementation of the NPT.

I believe that we will have to continue to promote a more comprehensive, balanced and substantive implementation of the Action Plan adopted at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and this Action Plan has been our common roadmap to this Review Conference. However, I believe that we will also call on all NPT States Parties to live up to their commitments of 2010 and to do all that we can to ensure that the Conference delivers a common vision on how to implement these commitments.

I know that we do not have so much time but let me quickly go into some of the details of the European Union position, as it is shaping up with regard to the three NPT pillars, with the caveat that the common position is not official yet and is underdeveloped.

On disarmament, we have to reaffirm, I believe, that it is our commitment to pursue nuclear disarmament in accordance with Article 6 of the NPT and stress the need for concrete progress in this field, especially through an overall reduction in the global stockpile of nuclear weapons.

We will welcome the considerable reductions made so far, taking into account the special responsibility of the states that possess the largest arsenals, and we will welcome indications of progress reported by the United States and the Russian Federation in implementing the new START Treaty and strongly encourage them to seek further reductions in their nuclear arsenals, including strategic, non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed weapons, and in this atmosphere I guess this will be the most challenging exercise.

We will welcome and encourage the nuclear-weapons states’ conferences on the follow up of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, including confidence-building, transparency, verification activities and discussions on reporting.

We will stay committed to Treaty-based nuclear disarmament and arms control and stress the need to renew multilateral efforts and revitalise multilateral negotiating bodies, in particular the Conference on Disarmament. The ongoing stalemate, including the persistent failure to agree on a programme of work remains, I think, not only troubling but also unacceptable. I think it is time to call for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of the negotiations, in the Conference on Disarmament, on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

One point to which I attach particular importance and on which I have always been active personally is the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which I believe is of crucial importance to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. I would continue, even personally, to work for its entry into force as a top priority (obviously not only by myself but by the European Union), continuing to promote this objective not only to diplomatic action but also to financial engagement. We have contributed substantially to the CTBT Organisation since 2006 and I take the opportunity to thank Parliament for its support for the CFSP financing provided to this end.

As I said, I have been and I will stay personally engaged in the efforts made by the CTBT Organisation regarding the dialogue with the Annex 2 states whose ratifications are needed for the Treaty to enter into force.

On non-proliferation, the European Union view: the international community continues to be faced with major proliferation challenges. This is very evident to us and must be addressed in a resolute way in order to maintain the credibility and the effectiveness of the NPT regime. I would stress the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for maintenance of international peace and security, including the cases of non-compliance. I will not mention individual cases; if necessary, I could go back to some cases that Members might raise in their speeches.

On the peaceful use of nuclear energy: the EU will reaffirm its support for the right of all parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination, and in conformity with the Treaty.

Let me at the very end – last but not least – mention nuclear security. I think that the Nuclear Security Summit process is crucial and stays crucial. I personally followed it when I was a Member of Parliament myself and a minister afterwards. I think it is key to reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism, something that is still very relevant, and to securing all vulnerable nuclear material in the coming years.

We are, and stay, committed to supporting the leading role played by the IAEA, including through financial support provided by the European Union to the Nuclear Security Fund. It has been substantial – EUR 40 million since 2004 – and for that I also have to express my gratitude to Parliament for having chosen to support that financial effort.

Thank you very much and I am looking forward to your ideas.


  Michael Gahler, im Namen der PPE-Fraktion. – Herr Präsident! Frau Hohe Vertreterin, ich danke Ihnen herzlich für Ihr Statement. Ich glaube, bei diesem Thema haben wir einen sehr breiten Konsens hier im Hause. Es ist wichtig, dass auch diese Konferenz von uns Europäern mit einer gemeinsamen Haltung bestritten wird. Auch bei diesem Thema gilt: Da sind wir gemeinsam stark. Ich hoffe, dass wir in den Verhandlungen mit dem Iran doch zu einem Abkommen kommen werden. Also, wir unterstützen hier von ganzem Herzen die Bemühungen der Gruppe 3 + 3. Wenn wir in dem Bereich zu einem Deal mit diesem Land kommen, wird sich das insgesamt doch sehr positiv auf den Non-Proliferation-Prozess auswirken.

Ich mache mir weiterhin große Sorgen über ein Land wie Nordkorea, Stichwort Atomtest-Verbot. Dieses Land hält sich nicht daran. Es ist unberechenbar. Ich glaube, es ist ganz wichtig, dass wir in dem Zusammenhang insbesondere mit China in engem Kontakt bleiben, um diesen Herrn dort in Pjöngjang im Zaum zu halten.

Ich fürchte, dass wir bei einem Punkt – nämlich, Anreize zu schaffen – ein sehr schlechtes Beispiel erlebt haben in Zusammenhang mit Russland und der Ukraine. Denn das Budapester Übereinkommen von 1994 hatte ja als zentralen Punkt, dass die Ukraine auf ihre Atomwaffen verzichtet und im Gegenzug dafür von den Großen, von den USA, Russland und Großbritannien, seine Grenzen garantiert bekommt. So, wie Russland sich in diesem Fall verhält, ist das natürlich kein Anreiz für ein Land, auf Atomwaffen zu verzichten. Im Gegenteil, es hat auch den Effekt, dass sich manche Länder überlegen, ob es nicht vielleicht eine bessere Versicherung wäre, sich Atomwaffen überhaupt erst zuzulegen. Das kann nicht in unserem Interesse sein. Auch aus diesem Grunde sollten wir hoffen, dass Russland auf den Weg des Friedens in Europa zurückkehrt.


  Ana Gomes, em nome do Grupo S&D. – Assinalam-se setenta anos sobre as catástrofes de Hiroshima e Nagasaki e desde que temos o Tratado de Não Proliferação. Apesar dele quase duplicou o número de Estados com arsenais nucleares fora do regime de monitorização internacional. É altura de exigirmos e de nos empenharmos para que o NPT conduza à eliminação total de armas nucleares no mundo. O momento é de urgência, e não apenas por causa da Conferência de Revisão este ano. Mais uma vez assistimos a um conflito de geoestratégico na Europa, com guerra na Ucrânia, provocada perigosamente por uma potência nuclear, a Rússia, em violação de um tratado de regulação nuclear, o Protocolo de Budapeste de 1994.

Mas o ressurgimento da guerra e do conflito armado e do terrorismo em solo europeu e na vizinhança mais próxima, Médio Oriente e Norte de África, por atores estatais e não estatais, não pode justificar uma corrida aos armamentos. Pelo contrário, o mundo tem de demonstrar que aprendeu com os erros do passado. As armas nucleares não são dissuasoras, muito pelo contrário, proliferação conduz a mais proliferação. Temos de conseguir a adesão ao Tratado de Não Proliferação Nuclear por parte de Israel, da Índia, do Paquistão, e o reingresso da Coreia do Norte no regime de desarmamento e no controlo pela Agência Internacional de Energia Atómica.

Até aqui falhámos em dar eficácia ao NPT. Falham os estados nucleares mais antigos: Estados Unidos, França, Reino Unido, Rússia e China, que, enquanto mantiveram arsenais nucleares. Não terão autoridade moral para pregar o desarmamento a outros países e falham aqueles que, nas últimas décadas, entraram no clube dos estados nucleares recusando aderir ao NPT. Não divulgam o número de ogivas nucleares, recusam o controlo internacional e assim alimentam mutuamente suspeitas e desconfiança. Casos da Índia, Paquistão, Israel e Irão. Para garantir o reforço do NPT é também preciso, como sublinhou a Senhora Alta Representante, que o CTBT entre definitivamente em vigor.

Senhora Alta Representante, para além da posição comum para a próxima conferência de revisão do NPT, precisamos que a adesão ao NPT, por parte de quem ainda não o fez, integre os diálogos regulares da União Europeia com os países implicados. É vital que a União use as suas capacidades diplomáticas como ator de segurança global, desenvolvimento, comércio, potência energética, etc. para fazer do NPT um verdadeiro regime global vinculativo que elimine os arsenais nucleares e isto implica também fazer o trabalho de casa, com as potências nucleares da União Europeia, França e Reino Unido.


  Ангел Джамбазки, от името на групата ECR. – Г-н Председател, уважаеми колеги, уважаема г-жо Комисар, на първо място държа да кажа, че съм впечатлен от Вашата издръжливост за пореден ден в залата, за което Ви поздравявам. А сега по темата.

Договорът за неразпространение на ядреното оръжие е единствен по рода си международен договор, целящ да предотврати разпространението на ядрени оръжия и се насърчава мирното използване на ядрената технология. Но днес, предвид обстоятелствата и заплахите от Ислямска държава и въобще от ислямския екстремизъм, трябва много да внимаваме, когато говорим за разоръжаването на ядрените арсенали. Именно затова призовавам участниците в предстоящата конференция за преглед на договора да концентрират усилията си върху опасността ядрени арсенали да попаднат в нежелани ръце, а не само в начините те да бъдат разоръжени.

Да признаем, да, има мнение, че тези оръжия за масово унищожение са заплаха за човечеството, но те също така представляват основен елемент от националната сигурност на много страни и са гарант за стабилност, сигурност и мир в много региони. Съвременните условия налагат по-скоро да поставим акцент върху повишаването на сигурността на ядрените оръжейни системи.

Именно затова смятам, че разоръжаването на ядрените арсенали трябва да бъде постигнато постепенно и само посредством международни договори и сътрудничество в тази сфера, като същевременно продължаваме да насърчаваме мирното използване на ядрената технология, защото първото ми убеждение е, че по-чиста, по-сигурна и по-евтина енергия от ядрената няма. Примерите за това в Европа са много, например централата в Козлодуй.


  Sabine Lösing, im Namen der GUE/NGL-Fraktion. – Herr Präsident! Ich frage mich, warum diesem Parlament die Überprüfungskonferenz des Atomwaffensperrvertrags heute nur eine Aussprache wert ist und nicht doch eine Entschließung zu diesem wirklich lebenswichtigen Thema. Das wäre ein wichtiges und notwendiges Zeichen gewesen.

Der Atomwaffensperrvertrag war die Konsequenz nach den US-Atombombenabwürfen auf Hiroshima und Nagasaki. Die Drohung mit Atomwaffen ist kein politisches oder militärisches Mittel und darf es nie wieder sein. Doch auch zwei Jahrzehnte nach Ende des Kalten Kriegs ist die Erde noch immer von Tausenden Kernwaffen verseucht. Der Bürgerkrieg in der Ukraine darf nicht der Anlass sein, den Vertrag zu gefährden. Im Gegenteil! Wir müssen diskutieren, welche Rolle die EU spielen soll, kann und, ja, besonders spielen will.

Es ist doch unbestritten, dass es Hardliner auf verschiedenen Seiten gibt. Und doch haben am vergangenen Wochenende die fünf Atommächte China, Großbritannien, Russland, die USA und Frankreich eine gemeinsame Erklärung verfasst, die den Willen zu nuklearer Abrüstung und die diplomatische Konfliktlösung bekräftigt. Doch nicht nur hier in diesem Haus scheint das nicht von großem Interesse zu sein. Auch die Presse berichtet kaum darüber, obwohl genau solche Konferenzen gerade in dieser Zeit eine vertrauensbildende Maßnahme sein können und dem Friedenswillen aller Parteien Glaubwürdigkeit verleihen würden.

Was diese Welt braucht, ist die Stärkung der Stimmen der Vernunft und eine ständige Politik der Entspannung. Atomwaffen bedrohen schließlich das Leben aller.


  Bodil Ceballos, för Verts/ALE-gruppen. – Herr talman! Jag är glad att höra att det finns ett engagemang hos kommissionären i den här frågan. Jag tyckte också att jag uppfattade mig höra att kommissionären gärna har ett brett samarbete med oss i parlamentet och gärna ser en resolution i frågan. Precis som Sabine Lösing alldeles nyss tog upp så ser det inte ut att bli en resolution här från parlamentet den här gången, till skillnad mot tidigare NPT-översyner.

Jag skulle därför vilja uppmana mina kollegor här att vi faktiskt också ställer oss bakom en gemensam resolution, de partigrupper som ännu inte har gjort det. Precis som också Michael Gahler sa så har vi ju egentligen en bred samsyn. Varför är vi då rädda att uttrycka den och ge kommissionären det stöd som vi vill ge henne i det här väldigt viktiga arbetet? Som vi ser det så är icke-spridningsavtalet en oerhört viktig fråga, och det är viktigt att vi inte låter det urvattnas.

Vi hade en hearing om det här härom veckan i utskottet. Som jag förstod det då så är förutsättningarna inte så där jättegoda att få till skärpningar av avtalet. Snarare ser det idag ut som att parterna i icke-spridningsavtalet under 2015 års översynskonferens bara kommer att konstatera att de inte kunde genomföra den handlingsplan som antogs 2010. Detsamma gäller de handlingsplaner som antagits innan dess. Så om vi eller medlemsstaterna inte är ute efter att lägga ner det här avtalet så är vi i en avgörande tid just nu.

Detta samtidigt som vår säkerhetsmiljö i öst och syd har förändrats dramatiskt till det sämre och därmed också ökat risken att vapnen faktiskt kommer att användas. Så om EU inte är med och är pådrivande i arbetet så är risken väldigt stor att vi snart kommer att stå inför en kärnvapenanarki i en alltmer instabil värld.

Jag vill därför uppmana kommissionär Mogherini att göra sitt yttersta för att få till en stark och progressiv gemensam ståndpunkt inför översynskonferensen. Det är viktigt att EU är en stark aktör för nedrustning. Jag skulle också gärna vilja höra hur kommissionären ser förutsättningarna för att faktiskt få till en skärpning av avtalet istället för en urvattning.


  Mike Hookem, on behalf of the EFDD Group. – Mr President, since the signing of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons a lot of work has been done by signatories to reduce, and ultimately abolish, nuclear arsenals, including the UK.

The end of the Cold War did not bring relief from the threat posed by nuclear weapons and, in many ways, with their potential proliferation to more States and even terrorist organisations, the situation is worse. Recent events in Eastern Europe and the Middle East have shown just how quickly security can break down. I have no doubt there are some fanatics within this Chamber who would wish to see further centralisation of Member States’ security and defence. But in the perilous world we live in it is vital for British national security that the levels of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation policy remain firmly in Member State hands.


  Doru-Claudian Frunzulică (S&D). - Mr President, High Representative, first of all the good side of the apple: lack of progress in nuclear arms control shows the need for a higher level of ambition in the upcoming 2015 Review Conference of the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). There is one very positive recent element which gives us an opportunity to restore confidence in the possibility of limiting sensitive nuclear activities: progress in the talks with Iran since the election of their new government.

Fundamental disagreements on key issues seem to have been overcome. I believe we should translate progress in the talks with Iran into an agreement that establishes a comprehensive joint action plan enacting strong non-proliferation instruments for verification and as safeguards. Such a forward-looking and meaningful agreement, if translated into broad international norms, would be a great boost to the NPT talks. This is my opinion: it is absolutely necessary. More transparency and disarmament on the part of nuclear weapon states are a fundamental step forward in the European security strategy.

Now the bad side of the apple: let me remind you, High Representative, of the Budapest Memorandum that already was mentioned here from 1994, that led to the fact that Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons in exchange for security guarantees. That risks undermining the non-proliferation process, while the crisis in Ukraine shows disrespect for the security guarantees. Let me, personally, thank you for your patience and for your cooperation.


  Marek Jurek (ECR). - Panie Przewodniczący! Tak jak musimy przeciwdziałać rozpowszechnianiu broni jądrowej, tak też musimy reagować na państwa, które grożą jej użyciem. Wiemy przecież, że broń jądrowa była nie tylko narzędziem masowego zniszczenia, ale również narzędziem terroru państwowego. Od początku tego już wcale nie krótkiego wieku Rosja w swojej doktrynie wojennej zakłada użycie broni jądrowej przeciwko państwu nienuklearnemu. Bardzo zachęcam Panią, Pani Wiceprzewodnicząca, żeby na nadchodzącej konferencji powiedzieć o niedopuszczalności takiego stanowiska. W praktyce stanowisko rosyjskie oznacza groźbę użycia broni jądrowej przeciwko jednemu z członków Unii Europejskiej. Uzyskanie deklaracji o niedopuszczalności użycia przez państwo nuklearne broni jądrowej przeciwko państwu, które tą bronią nie dysponuje, byłoby bardzo ważnym krokiem w kierunku uczynienia świata bardziej bezpiecznym i przede wszystkim w kierunku większego bezpieczeństwa narodów, za które odpowiadamy. Zachęcam Panią, Pani Wiceprzewodnicząca, do wystąpienia z taką inicjatywą na konferencji, która nadchodzi.


  Fabio Massimo Castaldo (EFDD). - Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, NTP e CTBT sono acronimi purtroppo perfettamente sconosciuti per troppi milioni di cittadini europei e acronimi che strappano un sorriso amaro a coloro che si occupano di relazioni internazionali. Il sorriso è davvero amaro pensando alle bellissime aspirazioni di questi trattati che, nella stragrande maggioranza dei casi, vengono disattese proprio da quelli Stati ai quali sono prioritariamente rivolte. Mi rivolto in particolare ai cinque che siedono nel Consiglio di sicurezza dell'ONU con diritto di veto, per non parlare di India, Pakistan, Nord Corea e Israele. Nessuno di questi Stati ha mai tolto l'impiego di queste armi dalla propria dottrina militare e quindi è normale vedere rinvii, posizioni tattiche, assenze ingiustificate e ingiustificabili. Lo sa bene chi era presente a Oslo nel marzo 2013, a Nayarit nel febbraio 2014 e da ultimo a Vienna.

Il nostro impegno per un disarmo nucleare multilaterale, come lei diceva prima, signora Alto rappresentante, deve essere comune e totale verso i nostri Stati membri e verso tutti gli altri Stati che hanno simili arsenali, specie in un momento come questo in cui sappiamo bene che tipo di confronto geopolitico sta avvenendo sul terreno ucraino. Dobbiamo dotarci di uno strumento giuridicamente vincolante e, da questo punto di vista, saluto con favore la possibilità di una risoluzione del Parlamento.

Un pensiero per chiudere sui test nucleari e il CTBT. Chiedessero agli abitanti delle Isole Marshall che hanno fatto da cavia per un inferno nucleare che cosa vuol dire e quanto è importante la necessità di avere un bando totale di questi tipi di esperimenti e noi sosteniamo la loro richiesta di un risarcimento da parte degli Stati Uniti.


  Jeppe Kofod (S&D). - Mr President, I would like to thank the Vice-President for a very strong statement on proliferation. Nuclear non-proliferation is no longer headline news. For many of my generation and those of younger years it seemed like a problem of the past, conjuring images of a Cold War thought long gone. But tensions between nuclear power states are now at their highest point for decades.

Most pressing is of course the situation in Ukraine, where a proxy war is being fought with Russian weapons and combatants. East and West are again locked in an icy conflict. Whilst our American allies consider weapon deliveries, the European Union must press on for de-escalation of conflicts and for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Current tensions call for renewed trust and perhaps indeed renewed inspections to ensure that current agreements are honoured. The EU must do all it can to ensure that the NPT framework does not evolve into another forum for conflict. I urge you therefore to state clearly, on behalf of the European Union, that current tensions with Russia and the West must not halt, slow or any way impede already agreed reduction targets for nuclear arms.


  Zigmantas Balčytis (S&D). - Branduolinio ginklo plėtros klausimas yra įvairiapusis, sudėtingas ir priklauso nuo bendros situacijos pasaulyje. Todėl realiai žvelgiant į būsimą susitikimą dėl branduolinio ginklo neplatinimo sutarties peržiūros yra visiškai aišku, kad lengvo sprendimo nebus. Iki šiol tebeturime neišspręstas problemas su Iranu dėl jo branduolinės programos vystymo, Šiaurės Korėja, kurios veiksmų prognozuoti yra neįmanoma, šiandien yra iškilusi Ukrainos krizė ir tam tikros jos dalies okupacija. Todėl šiandien mes esame įžengę į naują etapą, kuriame aštrėja Rusijos ir Vakarų priešprieša, todėl branduolinio ginklo klausimas tampa ypatingos politinės svarbos. Ši sutartis buvo vienas reikšmingiausių Šaltojo karo metais sudarytų susitarimų, kuris leido iki šiol išvengti branduolinio ginklo panaudojimo kariniams tikslams. Todėl norisi tikėti, jog tariantis dėl sutarties peržiūros ir šiuo itin sudėtingu laikotarpiu politinė valia bei bendras siekis užtikrinti ilagalaikę taiką ir stabilumą pasaulyje bus pagrindas naujam susitarimui.


  Brando Benifei (S&D). - Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, signora Alto rappresentante, in vista della nona revisione quinquennale dell'NPT è un peccato che il Parlamento abbia deciso per questa volta di non presentare una risoluzione, interrompendo una pratica consolidata sino agli anni precedenti. Ci furono infatti risoluzioni sia nel 2005 che nel 2010. In questo modo rinunciamo a esprimere la nostra voce pienamente. In un momento incerto come quello che stiamo attraversando, penso ai tesi negoziati con la Russia sull'Ucraina, ma anche al momento cruciale per una possibile conclusione dei colloqui con l'Iran sul nucleare, il lavoro del nostro Alto rappresentante avrebbe senza dubbio beneficiato di un sostegno politico formale da parte del Parlamento.

Questa volta, infatti, non si tratta soltanto di pensare nel lungo termine, non è una questione sullo sfondo. La non proliferazione nucleare ha un impatto su alcuni degli scenari più delicati per l'azione esterna dell'Unione. Ecco perché a mio parere abbiamo perso un'occasione, ma ciò non ci esime dal proseguire il nostro lavoro e, perché no, dall'immaginare nuove strade per uscire dallo stallo attuale. Penso in particolare all'iniziativa umanitaria per il disarmo nucleare, che nella Conferenza di Vienna dello scorso dicembre ha raggiunto un vero e proprio momentum con l'adesione di 44 Stati, e che dovremmo considerare seriamente come possibile opzione per rilanciare l'ambizione originaria dell'NPT.


Procedura "catch-the-eye"


  Julie Ward (S&D). - Mr President, I am working very closely with civil society and would therefore ask the relevant authorities to take into account the growing concern of these organisations and of the non-nuclear arms states regarding the threats to human life and to the planet posed by the very existence of nuclear weapons. Along with political representatives from more than 160 countries, I attended the Vienna conference hosted by the Austrian Government to discuss the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. This was preceded by an equally significant civil society forum. The concerns of these organisations and the people they represent must be taken into account regarding non-proliferation and an eventual ban.


  Ivan Jakovčić (ALDE). - Gospodine predsjedniče, pridružujem se onim kolegicama i kolegama koji su ovdje govorili cijelo vrijeme o tome kako nam treba rezolucija.

Mislim da ovaj Europski parlament na ovoj temi je, i ovoga puta, pokazao da razmišlja zajedno i da smo svjesni opasnosti od nuklearnog naoružanja. Ne samo zato što mislimo da bi neke zemlje to možda mogle iskoristiti protiv demokracije i protiv svega onoga za što se mi zalažemo, nego prije svega zato što bi čitav svijet došao u pitanje. Zato želim naglasiti da nam rezolucija treba, pogotovo kada sam čuo sve one principe o kojima gospođa Mogherini govori, a to su razoružanje, smanjenje zaliha, efektivno smanjenje zaliha.

Postignimo barem nešto. Postignimo barem zabranu nuklearnih pokusa. Mislim da je to nešto što smo dužni ovoj planeti i barem na taj način završimo ovu Revizorsku konferenciju.


  João Ferreira (GUE/NGL). - Senhor Presidente, o desarmamento nuclear a nível internacional é de vital importância. É necessário defender e reforçar o Tratado de Não-Proliferação e a sua ratificação por todos os Estados. No atual contexto internacional, os perigos são evidentes. No respeito pelo espírito e pela letra do Tratado, impõe-se o desarmamento e o fim do desenvolvimento, produção e armazenamento de novas armas nucleares.

Os Estados Unidos e a NATO, mantendo uma esmagadora supremacia em forças convencionais, não prescindem do seu vasto potencial nuclear, insistindo na manutenção de armas nucleares na Europa e na Ásia e inviabilizando a criação de uma zona livre de armas nucleares no Médio Oriente. A retórica subjacente à doutrina nuclear dos Estados Unidos, revista por Obama, assenta na duplicidade de critérios e na instrumentalização do Tratado de Não-Proliferação e representa um fator de perversão do seu conteúdo e um fator de ameaça à paz mundial.

Veja-se como Israel – que, ao contrário do Irão, possui armas nucleares e não assinou o tratado – goza de uma total impunidade. Aliás, com a cumplicidade da União Europeia, como fica, mais uma vez, aqui à vista. E deixe-me apenas acrescentar: é lamentável, já aqui foi dito, que os maiores grupos políticos, como o PPE e os Socialistas, tenham inviabilizado a possibilidade de discussão e aprovação neste Parlamento de uma resolução sobre o Tratado de Não-Proliferação.


  Ignazio Corrao (EFDD). - Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, parliamo della revisione del trattato di non proliferazione delle armi nucleari che avrà luogo a New York nel maggio 2015. È triste parlare dopo settant'anni ancora di armi nucleari. Perché la verità è questa: ancora si ritiene l'arma nucleare come una cosa importante, una cosa di cui non si può fare a meno, tanto è vero che in molti Stati non occidentali si fa la corsa al know how per capire come ci si può dotare di armi nucleari che possano offendere non che possano difendere o che possano garantire la sicurezza.

Sento ancora parlare di garantire la nostra sicurezza attraverso le armi nucleari, ma la sicurezza di chi? Penso che ormai siamo arrivati al punto in cui le armi nucleari dovrebbero scomparire proprio dalla faccia della terra, perché sono soltanto una minaccia al genere umano, non servono proprio a niente. Purtroppo noi diplomaticamente, come Unione, non abbiamo nessun potere e quindi chi ce le ha e chi le vuole fare continuerà a farle, sono parole e resteranno al vento, purtroppo.


Fine della procedura "catch-the-eye"


  Federica Mogherini, Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. - Mr President, I will start with a remark made by one of the last speakers, which was very clear and said it all: we have to protect the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), we have to strengthen it, we have to make sure that it achieves universal membership and application, and we have to respect it formally and substantively. This is the core of the European Union message to the NPT Review Conference.

Someone else said, with a generational reference – and I very much share their view, and I guess some of the Members here will also share it – that it seems obvious to a large part of the European population that we should not even need to discuss these issues. However, I believe that we have a long way to go in the world. Obviously, we have a long way to go on the non-proliferation pillar, and the negotiations on the Iranian nuclear programme will, as I said, impact on the conference itself. I hope that we will see substantial developments by then, and I can assure you that I am playing my personal role, with all the dedication possible, to make those talks positive. This could be a historic opportunity because, while we are talking about disarmament, the non-proliferation pillar is just as important as disarmament. One reinforces the other in a sort of credibility cycle, which is why we have to work on the three pillars of the Treaty together.

Just let me mention two things from the debate that I would like to underline. The issue of a resolution is obviously in your hands and not in mine. Still, I take this debate as an encouragement, and I would very much appreciate keeping this channel open, as you mentioned, through the committees here, with a view to the preparation for the conference – firstly because the European Parliament has a voice to raise, and also because it is important that we keep the channel open for communication on these issues with civil society organisations, public opinion movements and national parliaments. I believe that this is one of the things that affect our security and the security of our citizens very much. Sometimes there is an illusion that the NPT is about goodwill, good feelings or the good sentiments of some naive persons around the world: in fact, it is very much linked to our security and it is a security debate that we are having.

The last thing I would say is that it is precisely because of the security threat and the tensions around us that we need to work on this: on implementation, on all sorts of disarmament measures and on the steps that have been started in the last decade and the last few years. Someone mentioned the Obama doctrine, with the Prague speech, and the fact that it provided an impetus which was very relevant. We should not allow the tensions that we are facing in the world – not only in Europe but also elsewhere – to detract from the real purpose of our work on the NPT and the connected treaties, which is to increase our security, and not to relinquish it. I want you to be assured of my personal dedication to that, and I will obviously try to do my best to make sure that the European Union’s voices are not only united but also strong at the conference in New York.


  Presidente. - Grazie Alto rappresentante Mogherini. La ringrazio anche per la lunga maratona che l'ha impegnata oggi pomeriggio. Ci sono stati dibattiti molto civili, ci sono state però delle parole sgradevoli – e a nome dell'Ufficio di presidenza le esprimo la nostra solidarietà –, parole che comunque saranno valutate dall'Ufficio di presidenza.

La discussione è chiusa.

Laatst bijgewerkt op: 26 maart 2015Juridische mededeling