President. – The next item is the debate on the report by Anna Elżbieta Fotyga, on behalf of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, on a European Parliament recommendation to the Council and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning taking stock of the follow-up taken by the EEAS two years after the EP report on EU strategic communication to counteract propaganda against it by third parties (2018/2115(INI)) (A8—0031/2019).

  Anna Elżbieta Fotyga, Rapporteur. – Mr President, it is my privilege to present recommendations to the Council and the Vice—President/High Representative prepared two years after the adoption of the important report on the EU strategic communication to counteract hostile propaganda against it by third parties. I served as the EP rapporteur for the other report as well.

The first report, adopted in November 2016, was divided into two parts. It indicated major actors in this work against the EU in the presentation of hostile propaganda. It was a state actor, namely the Russian Federation, and non-state actors, predominantly radicalised Islamic organisations like Isis. This time we decided to structure the report’s recommendations differently, thanks to the contribution of representatives of major political groups in the Parliament. We divided the recommendations into parts, indicating the state of play in 2018 and targeting the hybrid warfare methods of this.

We stress there the necessity to avoid censorship while countering the hostile propaganda, disinformation and misinformation that is presented to the EU and its Member States. We stress the importance of quality journalism sustaining freedom of speech and freedom of the media. We also indicate the notion of possible legislative regulatory activity, at both EU and international level. There parties indicated the necessity to even introduce humanitarian law to deal with cyber—warfare or information warfare.

We stress the changing patterns of a variety of actors. In terms of radicalised organisation, we mentioned that, instead of very popular websites that increased the level of radicalisation of young people, there are methods of encrypted messaging services that are very popular. Much has been done, both within the EU institutions, EU-based institutions and organisations, and by civil society during those two years. We mention all of these activities in citations. I would like to stress the importance of the Code of Practice on Disinformation, the activity of the European Endowment for Democracy (EDD), as well as the transatlantic cooperation, and cooperation with like-minded countries and institutions like the Transatlantic Commission on Election Integrity on this.

In the second part of this report, we focus on indicating types of misinformation, disinformation and hostile propaganda. The third part is dedicated to methods for safeguarding our elections. The current year, 2019, is the year of over 29 elections in EU Member States, including the European elections that are to take place at the same time. After the experience of interference by the Russian Federation in elections and referendums in the EU and elsewhere, we have to strengthen our resilience to this kind of activity. We indicate the role of East StratCom and complement its activity, also indicating two other task forces for the Western Balkans, the Middle East and the North African Gulf area.

PRZEWODNICTWO: ZDZISŁAW KRASNODĘBSKI
Wiceprzewodniczący

  Neven Mimica, Member of the Commission, on behalf of the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. – Mr President, honourable Members, many thanks for making time to debate the challenge of disinformation and foreign interference, which is more urgent than ever in view of the European elections. Thanks to all who contributed and in particular to the rapporteur, Anna Elżbieta Fotyga, for delivering such a timely and helpful recommendation. It closely matches the logic and actions set out in the action plan against disinformation which the High Representative and the Commission submitted to the European Council.

The response against hybrid threats should be a joint enterprise. We are doing, and will continue to do, our part, but Member States need to step up efforts collectively too, as the European Council indicated in its conclusions. The recommendation underlines the centrality of freedom of speech and expression, as well as media pluralism, to resilient democratic societies. Indeed, our fundamental values must be at the heart of our response to the challenge of disinformation.

This is precisely the spirit in which we have drafted, and now are implementing, the action plan against disinformation. The report calls on the EU institutions to ensure that EU strategic communication becomes a matter of high priority on the European agenda and that the EU institutions and Member States work hand in hand in fighting against disinformation. I can assure you that all of this is already happening. However, this is a long—term endeavour which goes beyond this year’s European elections, so we are counting on the European Parliament’s continued support, not least in budgetary terms.

With the action plan against disinformation, we are increasing the staffing of our three strategic communication task forces to better enable them to detect, analyse and expose disinformation, and raise awareness of its negative impact, as well as – crucially – to improve the way in which we communicate about our values and policies.

Next week we launch the Rapid Alert System, as set out in the action plan. The system will make it easier for Member States to share assessments, data and best practices in tackling disinformation. This will, ahead of the European elections, bring better situational awareness, make it easier to determine responsibility for attacks and promote joint response, if and when needed, including in terms of awareness raising and increasing our society’s resilience.

I appreciate your acknowledgment of the work done so far by the East StratCom Task Force, both in terms of positive communications and in addressing disinformation. I would also like to praise the other two task forces, for the Western Balkans and the South. The East StratCom Task Force had a pioneering function. To date, it has catalogued, and raised awareness of, more than 5 000 cases of disinformation coming from Russian sources. Unfortunately, the number is likely to rise further, as the problem will not go away anytime soon.

It is our collective duty to keep the European elections clean from foreign interference. One way to do it is to raise awareness about the challenge, closely cooperating with the media, civil society organisations and online social media platforms. The European External Action Service is working on this in full concert with Parliament’s and the Commission’s services. Obviously, the action plan will fully respect the different national approaches, with freedom of expression and freedom of the media as guiding principles of our action.

In parallel, we are building better cooperation in tackling foreign interference and hybrid threats with our international partners, such as NATO and G7. To give an example, our cooperation with NATO already involves sharing assessment reports on the information environment and conducting parallel and coordinated exercises involving hybrid threat scenarios, such as the base exercise.

In addition, we should partner more with our neighbours to promote a positive European agenda. Investing in the EU’s positive communications and public diplomacy in our neighbourhood is crucial in addressing disinformation and promoting European values and interests. Cultural and economic diplomacy and close cooperation between EU Member Statesʼ missions and the European Union delegations on the ground are powerful tools for projecting a positive image of the EU in the world.

The best antidote against disinformation is, on the one hand, to promote a healthy media environment and, on the other, to spread the word about the positive impact of EU policies. Our citizens, as well as the citizens of our region, have the right to make decisions based on correct information, not on fake news. They have the right to a pluralist media environment and to high—quality information. This is about the quality of our democracies and about the quality of our Union.

  Ramona Nicole Mănescu, în numele grupului PPE. – Domnule președinte, vreau mai întâi să o felicit pe doamna Fotyga pentru un raport excelent, venit chiar la timpul potrivit. Avem un text prin care se recunoaște existența campaniilor de dezinformare și a propagandei ostile și prin care cerem statelor membre măsuri proactive, măsuri de contracarare a propagandei, măsuri eficiente de răspuns la cazurile dovedite de spionaj efectuate de țări terțe, un schimb de informații între statele membre, precum și investiții educaționale și alocarea, nu în ultimul rând, a unor lor fonduri adecvate pentru istrat.com.

Războiul informațional este cât se poate de actual și Uniunea este obligată să acționeze ferm. Să ne amintim că, deja din anul 2013, Valeri Gherasimov declara că „rolul mijloacelor non militare de atingere a obiectivelor politice și strategice a crescut și, în multe cazuri, a depășit puterea armelor prin eficiența lor”. Așadar, nu vorbim doar despre promovarea unor minciuni, vorbim, mai ales, despre anihilarea capacității propriilor noștri cetățeni de a face diferența între adevăr și minciună. Nu întâmplător, de curând Putin îi felicita pe cei care muncesc la conceperea acestei propagande: „îi felicit pentru modul activ, fructuos și cu talent în care muncesc”.

Iată, așadar, că este timpul să acționăm ferm. Europa are nevoie urgentă de măsuri ferme și, mai ales, de coordonare cu partenerii NATO și G7. Altminteri, cei care continuă să susțină contrariul sau să promoveze non acțiunea pun în pericol interesele celor 500 de milioane de cetățeni, pun în pericol valorile, securitatea și chiar integritatea Uniunii Europene.

  Eugen Freund, im Namen der S&D-Fraktion. – Herr Präsident! In etwas mehr als zwei Monaten geht in Europa wieder eine Wahl los, und wie schon beim Brexit, bei der Wahl des amerikanischen Präsidenten und bei der Entscheidung über die französische Präsidentschaft sehen wir uns mit besonderen Herausforderungen konfrontiert, nämlich, dass wir im Internet und ganz besonders in den sozialen Medien mit Desinformation, mit Falschmeldungen und mit Propagandaartikeln bombardiert werden. Und die sind oft so formuliert, dass viele Benutzer Schwierigkeiten haben werden, Fakten von Fiktion, Informationen von Propaganda oder Wahrheit von Lüge zu unterscheiden.

Ich begrüße daher uneingeschränkt, dass sich eine eigene Abteilung des Europäischen Auswärtigen Dienstes mit der Abwehr dieser demokratiefeindlichen Auswüchse befasst. Trotz allem glaube ich, dass es sich dabei nur um erste Schritte handeln kann. Das Problem, das ich sehe, besteht darin, dass der technologische Fortschritt die Gegenmaßnahmen längst überholt hat und das auch ständig tut. Im Großen und Ganzen bekämpfen wir immer noch die gestrige Desinformation mit Mitteln von vorgestern.

Wenn wir uns den Bereich der künstlichen Intelligenz ansehen, dann erschaudern wir vor dem, was da auf uns zukommt oder schon am Markt ist. Da werden Personen Äußerungen im wahrsten Sinne des Wortes in den Mund gelegt, die diese nie getan haben, und das gefälschte Video ist von einem echten dann nicht mehr zu unterscheiden. Wie soll ein Politiker beweisen, dass er das nie gesagt hat, wenn es genauso, wenn auch fiktiv, zu hören und zu sehen war?

Lassen Sie mich zum Abschluss noch allen danken, die an der Erstellung dieses Berichtes beteiligt waren. Es war meine letzte Mitarbeit als Schattenberichterstatter. Ich werde dem nächsten Parlament nicht mehr angehören. Es war mir eine besondere Freude, als ein Vertreter Österreichs die Europäische Union mitgestaltet zu haben. Ich hoffe, dass dieser Prozess nicht durch nationalistische oder populistische Strömungen eingebremst wird, denn nur ein gemeinsames, ein geeintes, ein starkes Europa kann sich den großen Herausforderungen der Zukunft stellen.

  Ryszard Czarnecki, w imieniu grupy ECR. – Panie Przewodniczący! Panie Komisarzu! Szanowni Państwo! Gratulacje dla pani minister Anny Fotygi za to sprawozdanie – bardzo ważne sprawozdanie, bo jesteśmy na froncie. Jest tak, że cyberprzestrzeń, media to są instrumenty wykorzystywane przeciwko Europie, przeciwko wolności europejskiej, przez państwa trzecie – konkretne państwa trzecie i warto je nazywać po imieniu.

Życie polityczne stwarza takie okazje, abyśmy byli atakowani właśnie przez te instrumenty. Mamy wybory europejskie – one mogą być okazją. Mamy brexit – też może być okazją. Mamy również inne sytuacje, o których wręcz już wiemy, że będą wykorzystywane przez wrogów wolności – chociażby dziesięciolecie utworzenia Partnerstwa Wschodniego, które jest solą w oku dla niektórych sąsiadów Unii Europejskiej – także sąsiadów mojego kraju.

  Petras Auštrevičius, on behalf of the ALDE Group. – Mr President, access to information increasingly risks receiving unverified information. All EU Member States and countries that continue to deny the existence of disinformation and hostile propaganda, as well as its impact on public opinion, should recognise them, evaluate the situation within their territories and take proactive means in order to counteract and debunk them. We have to break down the existing market for fake news, lies, disinformation and propaganda in the European Union, which is effectively fuelled from inside and outside.

There are different kinds of terrorism – from military ones to social security threats. Informational terrorism is one of those which we must regard as a threat to public order, security and the fundamentals of life and of our societies. Informational terrorism is directly connected to hybrid warfare and attacks the minds and hearts of our people.

To make the ongoing battle between so-called elves and trolls more successful, we have to address current deficiencies in the East StratCom Task Force as its lack of regional expertise, institutional weaknesses, etc., requires urgent decisions in turning the East StratCom Task Force into a fully-fledged structure with increased support and funding.

  Rebecca Harms, im Namen der Verts/ALE-Fraktion. – Herr Präsident! Anders als beim ersten Bericht Fotyga waren sich die Vertreter der Fraktionen in der Verhandlung des neuen Berichts viel einiger. Das hat meiner Meinung nach damit zu tun, dass unsere Erfahrungen mit organisierter Falschinformation, Propaganda und Hetze in unseren Ländern inzwischen viel tiefer gegangen sind. Das Land, mit dem wir uns in dieser Frage am meisten rumschlagen müssen, ist Russland. Nicht nur die Ukraine ist zu einem Schlachtfeld geworden, sondern inzwischen richtet Russland, richtet der Kreml immer größere Anstrengungen mit immer größeren Mitteln darauf, auch Bürger europäischer Länder gegen ihre Regierungen aufzuhetzen – zuletzt gesehen während der Proteste der Gelbwesten. Gegen Migranten werden Bürger aufgehetzt, aber auch gegen die EU, zum Beispiel während der Brexit-Abstimmung.

Die Abteilung „Strategische Kommunikation zur Erkennung und zur Abwehr organisierter Desinformation“ muss meiner Meinung nach wesentlich gestärkt werden. Da müssen mehr Experten rein, da muss mehr Geld rein. Und sehr wichtig ist, dass diese Abteilung in Zukunft auch mit Behörden der Mitgliedstaaten zusammenarbeiten kann. Dazu gehören unbedingt auch die Geheimdienste und die NATO. Ziffer 1a des Berichts darf aber nicht vergessen werden. Unabhängige freie Medien, Pluralismus in demokratischen Gesellschaften sind das A und O, um gegen Hetze und gegen Propaganda bestehen zu können.

  Javier Couso Permuy, en nombre del Grupo GUE/NGL. – Señor presidente, dos años han pasado ya desde la presentación de este informe. Nadie lo diría. Las mismas acusaciones sin pruebas firmes, las mismas argumentaciones basadas en teorías de la comunicación desacreditadas hace décadas, la misma miopía en lo que se refiere a una política de buena vecindad con Rusia.

Y lo que es peor, la misma voluntad de cargar las culpas de los resultados de procesos políticos internos aquí en Europa a actores externos, cuando es el electorado quien castiga a los partidos mayoritarios por sus políticas neoliberales.

Y, para colmo, este informe incluye una referencia al mal llamado Estado Islámico que a lo único que contribuye es a empeorar nuestras relaciones con Rusia, equiparándola con un grupo designado como terrorista por las Naciones Unidas.

Este Parlamento propone crear grupos independientes de comunicación y periodistas. ¿Pero cómo se puede ser independiente si recibe financiación de la Unión Europea? Este Parlamento hace lo que critica y no critica lo que hace.

  Fabio Massimo Castaldo, a nome del gruppo EFDD. – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, è innegabile che la dimensione delle minacce ibride, soprattutto quelle legate alla diffusione di informazioni, sta diventando sempre più strategica per le nostre società, soprattutto ora che le nuove tecnologie hanno aumentato l'intensità, la velocità e la portata di questi attacchi in un contesto globale interconnesso.

Partendo da questo dato mi e vi chiedo, colleghi, se la relazione che voteremo serva veramente a tutelare i cittadini dalle azioni potenzialmente nocive messe in atto da terzi, siano essi Stati, attori non statali o addirittura terroristi.

Forse sarebbe stato più auspicabile un testo più bilanciato, che affronti tanto la disinformazione quanto la minaccia jihadista on line, un testo che non si limiti a un elenco preciso di paesi, quando sappiamo che di preciso in questo dominio c'è sempre meno, tanto meno da parte di quegli Stati che spesso utilizzano i cosiddetti proxy. Un testo, infine, che affronti la comunicazione strategica in modo olistico e che non si focalizzi, come invece è avvenuto, su una sola dimensione geografica, per di più utilizzando una terminologia vaga e talvolta al limite della censura.

Queste sono a mio avviso le istanze alle quali dovremmo far fronte. Istanze che però non trovano riscontro in questa relazione, perché le intenzioni, pur condivisibili, sono state declinate in modo parziale e, permettetemi, non efficace.

  Jean-Luc Schaffhauser, au nom du groupe ENF. – Monsieur le Président, Madame Fotyga, vous ne traitez pas vraiment de la communication stratégique. Vous proposez des mesures coercitives pour lutter contre une propagande non définie, qui émanerait de pays hostiles à l’Union européenne. Vous vous inspirez de la même logique conspirationniste et, j’ose dire, bolchevique, que le rapport Kalniete. Vous voyez la main de l’étranger derrière toute dissidence à l’égard du projet européiste: le Brexit? C’est Poutine! Les gilets jaunes? C’est Moscou! Il pleut à Varsovie? C’est la faute aux Russes!

Il faut désormais déployer la censure pour condamner la volonté populaire qui monte partout en Europe. Nous sommes dans une approche stalinienne. À quand les camps de rééducation? C’est le bon vieux temps communiste: tout opposant est un traître.

Madame, vous trahissez l’héritage d’un grand Polonais, Saint Jean-Paul II, qui voulait travailler pour une Europe avec la Russie, une Europe chrétienne, capable de donner son souffle de l’esprit à un monde désormais multipolaire, à une Europe sans âme. Vous coupez ainsi l’Europe de son âme russe et de son âme tout court.

(L’orateur accepte de répondre à une question «carton bleu» (article 162, paragraphe 8, du règlement))

  Indrek Tarand (Verts/ALE), blue-card question. – Mr Schaffhauser, would you agree with me that comparing Ms Kalniete with Stalinism and all sorts of things is a little bit inappropriate because, according to my knowledge, she was born in a Siberian gulag? That’s the end of the question. You can answer now.

  Jean-Luc Schaffhauser (ENF), réponse "carton bleu". – J’ai eu l’occasion de parler hier à Mme Kalniete de son expérience du goulag. Malheureusement, elle ne m’écoutait pas pendant que je lui parlais. Je lui ai dit qu’il s’agissait d’intervenir vis-à-vis de la Russie, non pas uniquement par sentiment, voire par ressentiment, mais qu’il fallait aussi un peu de raison dans son analyse de la situation. Je dirais que je peux d’autant plus me permettre de le dire que j’ai combattu le communisme et que, le 8 septembre 1989, c’est ici, à Strasbourg, que nous avons réuni toutes les forces anticommunistes avant la chute du mur.

  Λάμπρος Φουντούλης (NI). – Κύριε Πρόεδρε, ας πούμε μια φορά την αλήθεια μέσα σε αυτή την αίθουσα. Δεν σας ενοχλεί η προπαγάνδα, κύριοι της Ευρωπαϊκής Ενώσεως. Άλλωστε, από την ίδια την Ένωση εκπορεύεται το μεγαλύτερο ποσοστό προπαγάνδας που κατευθύνεται προς τους πολίτες. Σας ενοχλεί μόνο οτιδήποτε στρέφεται εναντίον των δικών σας συμφερόντων. Η Ένωση χρηματοδοτεί εκατοντάδες μη κυβερνητικές οργανώσεις, οι οποίες προπαγανδίζουν τα ιδεολογήματα των κρατούντων αυτή τη στιγμή σχηματισμών. Μάλιστα, είχατε το θράσος να βαφτίσετε τις δικές σας πεποιθήσεις ως αξίες της Ενώσεως, χωρίς ποτέ, βέβαια, να ερωτηθούν οι πολίτες των κρατών μελών για κάτι τέτοιο.

Το χειρότερο, όμως, είναι πως με τη στάση σας αυτή αποδεικνύετε το γεγονός πως θεωρείτε τους πολίτες ανίκανους να κρίνουν τις πληροφορίες που δέχονται και να επιλέξουν τις θέσεις που τους εκπροσωπούν. Αντίθετα, με μια πατερναλιστική λογική, θεωρείτε πως μόνο εσείς μπορείτε να τους υποδείξετε τη «σωστή» άποψη. Για εσάς, οι πολίτες είναι ελεύθεροι να ψηφίζουν ό,τι θέλουν, αρκεί να συμφωνεί με εσάς. Για εμάς, οι πολίτες της Ένωσης έχουν τον νου και τη γνώση να κρίνουν και να αποφασίζουν ποιος τους αντιπροσωπεύει.

  Sandra Kalniete (PPE). –Mr President, if there is one recommendation to be repeated over and over again, it is that the East StratCom Task Force should urgently be turned into a permanent fully fledged structural unit of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and properly supported with adequate financial and personnel resources.

Secondly, we have to continue support for the work of the European Endowment for Democracy (EED) aimed at strengthening democratic and independent national language media in the EU neighbourhood and within the EU itself.

And thirdly, a recommendation aimed at all political parties in the EU: be transparent about donors, big and small. European voters deserve to know which parties are directly or indirectly funded by the Russian intelligence services or global mega companies to make them into mouthpieces for these foreign and not always democratic interests.

  Julie Ward (S&D). – Mr President, propaganda against the EU is not just about homegrown far-right nationalist Eurosceptics, who sit in this House with the intention of destroying the European peace project. As I discovered whilst working on the 2016 report, this phenomenon is about Russia and other countries who do not share our European values. Having successfully influenced the 2016 UK referendum, Putin’s agents could have a huge impact on the forthcoming European elections. The EU therefore needs to take proactive measures.

Firstly, tech companies should invest much more in tools to identify propaganda and ensure better identity checks of platform users in order to eliminate bots, and to reduce financial incentives for those who profit from disinformation.

Secondly, we need more awareness at political level. For example, the French far-right MEP, Aymeric Chauprade, gave employment to the daughter of President Vladimir Putin’s spokesman here in the European Parliament and this should not have been allowed.

Finally, the UK Government continues to ignore the hostile propaganda that proliferated in the Brexit campaign, so we must have a Mueller-style investigation in the UK regarding the dark money and the interference that clearly entered the campaign.

  Cristian Dan Preda (PPE). – Domnule președinte, ca să contracarezi propaganda trebuie să-i înțelege mecanismele. Ele pot fi diferite de la țară la țară. În România, de pildă, tezele lui Dughin sunt difuzate de fundația unui fost prim-ministru socialist, prin conferințele unui actor de la Teatrul Național și cu ajutorul unui colonel în rezervă. Toate astea în condițiile în care guvernul actual este el însuși sursă de fake news referitor la Comisia Europeană și la Parlamentul European. MCV este descris de către miniștrii ca instrument bazat pe informații eronate, iar rezoluțiile adoptate aici ca niște manipulări electorale. Nu-i de mirare, de aceea, că premierul, fosta noastră colegă Dăncilă, e lăudată de Sputnik în fiecare săptămână.

Să adăugăm că principalele posturi TV de știri sunt controlate de condamnați pentru corupție, care susțin că statul de drept este o manipulare a lui George Soros. În fine, Facebook a închis 31 de pagini care manipulau opinia în favoarea social—democraților români. Iată ce propagandă trebuie să fie contracarată în țara mea!

  Tonino Picula (S&D). – Gospodine predsjedavajući, skandal Cambridge Analitica jasno potvrđuje razmjere vanjskog utjecaja na izbore i referendume. Dok čekamo vijesti iz Londona, sjetimo se svih lažnih informacija prenesenih bez sankcija građanima Britanije koje su u značajnoj mjeri utjecale na rezultat Brexita.

Što se tiče nadolazećih europskih izbora, ne treba zanemariti ruski utjecaj preko raznih medijskih kanala i društvenih mreža, a koji dopire i do Europskog parlamenta. To sigurno nije agenda za snažniju Europsku uniju, upravo suprotno.

Naglasimo i utjecaj hibridnog ratovanja na naše zapadnobalkansko susjedstvo uključeno u eurointegracijske procese. Sumnja se i na jedan pokušaj državnog udara.

No Rusija nije jedini izvor ovakvog djelovanja. Lažna propaganda dolazi i sa zapada i Bliskog Istoka. Svi imaju slično operativno djelovanje i isti cilj – slabljenje europskih demokratskih institucija.

Podržavam ovo izvješće i predložene mjere. Uoči europskih izbora od presudne je važnosti osigurati da građani donose odluke temeljene na istinitim informacijama jer o njihovim odlukama ovisi budućnost europskog projekta.

  Андрей Ковачев (PPE). – Имайки предвид мащабите на водената активна хибридна пропагандна война срещу Европейския съюз, трябва да признаем, че мерките, които досега вземаме, не са достатъчни. Аз твърдо подкрепям оперативната група за стратегически комуникации към Външната служба да прерасне в постоянно звено за противодействие на дезинформационните кампании, както и да бъде адекватно финансово и кадрово обезпечена.

Нужно е не само Европейският съюз, но и страните членки да направят такива структури. Например, България създаде такава структура. Знам, че и други страни също имат такива. Под ръководството на комисар Мария Габриел Европейската комисия също предложи координиран отговор на това предизвикателство: кодекс за поведение на онлайн платформите, мерки за насърчаване на образованието и критичното мислене, особено на младите поколения на Европейския съюз, подкрепа за обективна разследваща журналистика. Всичко това трябва да бъде приведено в действие възможно най-скоро.

Нашият отговор на хибридната война трябва да включва и мерки за идентифициране и санкциониране на лицата, отговорни за организирането и провеждането на дезинформационни кампании чрез онлайн медии, агенти на влияние и други.

Разбира се критиката към Европейския съюз – не всяка критика е хибридна война. Европейският съюз не е свещена крава. Ние всички трябва да сме критични към това, което се случва около нас, но и да не позволяваме на трети страни да водят враждебна пропаганда срещу нас.

  Michael Gahler (PPE). – Herr Präsident! Ich wollte eigentlich dem Kollegen Eugen Freund zurufen, dass ich seiner gesamten Rede zu hundert Prozent zustimmen kann – er ist jetzt leider nicht mehr da –, aber dass ich mich gewundert habe, dass er es in zwei Minuten nicht geschafft hat, den Namen „Russland“ zu nennen. Das ist vielleicht eine österreichische Besonderheit, es wird euch aber nichts helfen. Ich möchte das Kind beim Namen nennen. Das wichtigste Anliegen Russlands ist es, die EU zu destabilisieren. Die Hauptsache ist, den Mainstream zu schwächen. Alles, was dazu beiträgt, ist attraktiv. Die Zeiten, in denen Russland wie die frühere UdSSR eine eigene Ideologie vertritt, sind vorbei.

Wir müssen uns in allen Ländern der EU der Tatsache bewusst werden, dass dies stattfindet, um die Widerstandsfähigkeit unserer Bevölkerung zu schwächen. Dort, wo Geld fließt, um Gleichgesinnte zu unterstützen, Herr Schaffhauser, brauchen wir gesetzliche Regelungen, die das verbieten, und wir brauchen den entsprechenden Informationsaustausch unserer zuständigen Behörden. Die EU könnte da eine koordinierende Rolle spielen. Ich wünsche mir deshalb, dass die East-Stratcom-Arbeitsgruppe der EU gestärkt wird und sich weiter mit entsprechenden Experten in den Mitgliedstaaten vernetzt.

  Eduard Kukan (PPE). – Mr President, Europe faces a grave threat to our democracies. The ability to argue with facts against lies, disinformation and propaganda from third countries, is becoming more and more difficult. We must strive at both EU and national level to defend our values and fight off cyber- and information warfare.

It’s a problem we face both in the EU and in the regions on our borders, in the western Balkans and the eastern neighbourhood. In this respect, we need the European External Action Service (EEAS) East StratCom Task Force with particular regional focuses, which need to improve communication on EU topics.

I also support the call for improving the funding and resources for these structures and their cooperation with official EU bodies such as EU delegations in third countries. Countering this information and hostile propaganda needs to be a priority, not only in the European elections but also for the incoming European Commission, Council and Parliament. We need to do a much better job in communicating the EU’s values and policies effectively. Otherwise our democracies might not survive this external pressure.

  Tunne Kelam (PPE). – Mr President, East StratCom has delivered excellent results. It has analysed and collected more than 5 000 examples of pro-Kremlin disinformation. We keep demanding that East StratCom is turned into a fully-fledged structure within the European External Action Service with adequate financial and personnel resources. Financing has finally increased but is still lagging behind exponentially growing tasks – because next to East StratCom, there’s also the Western Balkans StratCom and Task Force South.

The EU Action Plan has an important task – to improve capabilities, enhance coordination and joint responses by EU institutions and Member States, develop better cooperation with the private sector, raise public awareness and promote education on disinformation, and not least provide adequate resources. Networkers and fact-checkers could be helpful in tackling disinformation, and the Commission task is to coordinate their activities into the European network.

  Jaromír Štětina (PPE). – Pane předsedající, zpráva paní Fotygové obsahuje celkem třicet osm doporučení Radě a vysoké představitelce Unie. Cílem doporučení je bojovat proti propagandě, kterou proti Evropské unii vedou třetí strany. Jedno z nejdůležitějších doporučení se ve zprávě skrývá pod písmenem h): zvyšovat povědomí o dezinformačních kampaních Ruska, neboť jsou hlavním zdrojem dezinformací v Evropě.

V roce 2014 vytyčil ruský generál Gerasimov doktrínu o nových druzích útoků, podle které jsou vhodně použitá slova silnější, než raketové systémy a tanky. Mluví-li Gerasimov o vhodně užitých slovech, není pochyby, že má na mysli lež. Lež se stala oficiální doktrínou kremelské politiky. Je nejvyšší čas, abychom si to v Evropské unii uvědomili. Abychom si uvědomili, že hybridní válku s Ruskem prohráváme. Ztratili jsme schopnost nazývat věci pravými jmény. Ztratili jsme schopnost Evropskou unii bránit. Rusko není náš spojenec, Rusko je náš nepřítel.

  Dubravka Šuica (PPE). – Gospodine predsjedavajući, u svakom sam slučaju zabrinuta zbog dezinformacija koje u posljednje vrijeme kolaju po Europskoj uniji, a koje dolaze od strane trećih zemalja. Svakako se trebamo zabrinuti. Stoga maksimalno podržavam ovo izvješće koje vodi računa o tome da se na neki način koordinirano borimo protiv takvih dezinformacija. Razumijem da borba treba biti na nacionalnoj razini, ali s obzirom na to da internet ima prekograničnu dimenziju, sigurna sam da trebamo razmjenjivati najbolje prakse i dogovarati se.

Također i ja podržavam ovo stajalište koje kaže da je ruska propaganda jako bitna, odnosno jako negativna i da je definitivno utjecala na referendum u Velikoj Britaniji. I danas trpimo posljedice tog referenduma, ne samo mi nego, vjerujem, i britanski građani, štogod o tome mislili. U svakom je slučaju potrebna snažna borba protiv dezinformacija i onemogućavanje miješanja trećih strana u izborni proces, posebice imajući u vidu izbore za Europski parlament koji nam slijede.

  Bogdan Andrzej Zdrojewski (PPE). – Panie Przewodniczący! Na początku obecnej kadencji zwracałem uwagę na to, że konflikty hybrydowe, wojny hybrydowe wymagają hybrydowych odpowiedzi, hybrydowych reakcji, czyli bardzo złożonych. Na składniki takie podstawowe tych właściwych odpowiedzi powinny się składać właśnie: walka z propagandą, walka z dezinformacją, ale także bezpieczeństwo w cyberprzestrzeni, edukacja na każdym szczeblu czy też współdziałanie, czyli to co w sprawozdaniu nazywane jest strategicznością. Muszę powiedzieć, że w jakimś sensie Komisją jestem zawiedziony. Trzeba zwrócić uwagę na to, że to sprawozdanie, do którego się dziś odwołujemy z 2016 r., także to z obecnego roku, nie jest inicjatywą Komisji. Jest inicjatywą pani przewodniczącej Komisji Obrony i Bezpieczeństwa. Wydaje mi się, że w tej materii akurat Komisja powinna wyprzedzać fakty. To że w cyberbezpieczeństwie czy w informacji, w walce z dezinformacją, przodują eurodeputowani, nie jest dobrym sygnałem. Jest sygnałem, że Komisja Europejska zbyt późno reaguje na rozmaite problemy, które pojawiają się w przestrzeni publicznej i w przestrzeni bezpieczeństwa. Chcę podkreślić, że te zalecenia – jest ich blisko czterdzieści – są dobrze adresowane, dobrze napisane, dobrze opisane i we właściwym czasie. Ważne dziś, aby reakcje na nie, nie były spóźnione.

Zgłoszenia z sali

  Paulo Rangel (PPE). – Mr President, I apologise, but I was having a meeting with Mr Barnier who, as you can imagine, at this moment is quite busy. So it was impossible for me to attend here on time.

Senhor Presidente, gostaria de frisar essencialmente o seguinte: a questão da propaganda e, em particular, daquela que, na verdade, visa essencialmente enganar os públicos e que, como sabemos, é paralela, no fundo, de toda uma discussão que temos tido das fake news, é hoje, sabemos, extremamente dominada por terceiros países.

E penso que aqui nós temos que ter uma ação muito determinada no sentido de bloquear toda a possibilidade de interesses estratégicos muitas vezes malignos, de terceiros países e de alguns bem conhecidos, como o caso da Rússia, poderem influenciar as nossas campanhas eleitorais, os nossos debates, os nossos referendos.

E, por isso, saúdo bastante esta atitude da Comissão no sentido de combater este tipo de atuação.

  Ruža Tomašić (ECR). – Gospodine predsjedavajući, hibridno ratovanje nije novitet, ali je ubrzani razvoj informacijskih tehnologija otvorio nove kanale i danas je lakše nego ikad propagandom doći do ljudi.

S druge strane, povjerenje građana u institucije na povijesno je niskoj razini, što onima koji žele utjecati na demokratske procese i javno mnijenje u Europi, otvara puno prostora za djelovanje. Kolegica Fotyga odradila je sjajan posao, pa preporuke iz ovog izvješća mogu samo podržati.

Mislim da ipak vrijedi istaknuti, iako bi to u jednoj razvijenoj demokraciji trebalo biti jasno, da postoje i opravdane kritike na račun Europske unije, njezinog vodstva i pojedinih država članica, te da nije svaka kritika neprijateljsko djelovanje. Ovo naglašavam zato što vodstvo Unije već neko vrijeme svaku kritiku pokušava pripisati vanjskim i unutarnjim neprijateljima, umjesto da sluša građane i donese promjene sukladne njihovim zahtjevima.

  Γεώργιος Επιτήδειος (NI). – Κύριε Πρόεδρε, στη σημερινή εποχή που χαρακτηρίζεται από την αλματώδη εξέλιξη της τεχνολογίας, οι αρχές και οι μέθοδοι της προπαγάνδας είναι δυνατό να εφαρμοστούν με πολλούς και διαφόρους τρόπους, οι κυριότεροι από τους οποίους είναι η παραποίηση της αλήθειας και η διασπορά ψευδών ειδήσεων. Βασική αρχή για μια δημοκρατική κοινωνία, ώστε να μπορέσει να αντιμετωπίσει την εχθρική προπαγάνδα, είναι η παρουσίαση της αλήθειας στο κοινό και όχι η δίωξη των πολιτικών αντιπάλων και των δημοσιογράφων, οι οποίοι ασκούν κριτική στην κυβέρνηση είτε παρουσιάζουν διάφορα σκάνδαλα.

Σε εθνικό επίπεδο, η ενημέρωση του κοινού, η αντικειμενική και αμερόληπτη, επιτυγχάνεται μέσω της δημιουργίας ενός λειτουργικού συστήματος ραδιοτηλεοράσεως. Πολλές φορές όμως, το σύστημα αυτό δεν λειτουργεί σωστά. Αυτό συμβαίνει στην Ελλάδα όπου οι εθνική ραδιοτηλεόραση έχει μεταβληθεί σε όργανο κομματικό του κυβερνώντος κόμματος και μάλιστα φτάνει στο σημείο να μην καλεί στις εκπομπές τους βουλευτές και τους ευρωβουλευτές του κόμματος στο οποίο ανήκω, της Χρυσής Αυγής, που είναι η τρίτη πολιτική δύναμη της χώρας. Όπως αντιλαμβάνεστε, με τέτοιες μεθόδους υπάρχει αναξιοπιστία και δεν είναι δυνατόν να αντιμετωπίσει την οποιαδήποτε εχθρική προπαγάνδα.

  Pirkko Ruohonen-Lerner (ECR). – Arvoisa puhemies, sosiaalisessa ja perinteisessäkin mediassa yleistyvä disinformaatio uhkaa kansanvaltaa.

On tärkeää, että kansalaiset saavat paikkansapitäviä tietoja, jotta voidaan muodostaa perusteltuja ja faktoihin perustuvia äänestyspäätöksiä. Facebookin kaltaisilla sosiaalisen median yhteisöpalveluilla on suuri vastuu disinformaation tunnistamisessa ja poistamisessa alustoiltaan. Väärään ja valheelliseen tietoon perustuvat vaikutuspyrkimykset on tärkeää havaita mahdollisimman nopeasti ennen kuin ne leviävät laajalle.

Verkkoalustojen velvollisuutena on myös taata poliittisen mainonnan avoimuus ja selvittää, mitkä tahot ovat mainosten takana. Aktiiviset valekäyttäjätilit, joita on miljoonittain, on myös poistettava mahdollisimman nopeasti. Teknologisen kehityksen johdosta esimerkiksi aidolta näyttävien valevideoiden tekeminen on helpompaa kuin koskaan. Valeuutisten purevuutta on ehkäistävä ennen kaikkea koulutuksen ja tietoisuuden lisäämisen avulla. Korostaisin medialukutaidon edistämistä ongelman ratkaisemisessa.

  Νότης Μαριάς (ECR). – Κύριε Πρόεδρε, συζητούμε εδώ για την παραπληροφόρηση, την προπαγάνδα, τις ψευδείς ειδήσεις, αλλά αυτά πρέπει να εφαρμοστούν και εναντίον του ίδιου του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου, διότι, όπως ξέρετε όλοι, το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο ανέθεσε σε μια δημοσκοπική εταιρεία να κάνει δημοσκόπηση για τις ευρωεκλογές, η οποία δημοσκοπική εταιρεία, αντί να κάνει δημοσκόπηση, πήρε τις δημοσκοπήσεις σε εθνικό επίπεδο, δημοσκοπήσεις που έγιναν για εθνικές εκλογές και έβγαλε συμπεράσματα για το ποιοι εκλέγονται και ποιοι δεν εκλέγονται από αυτή εδώ την Ευρωβουλή, πόσοι ευρωβουλευτές από εμάς δεν θα εκλεγούν και πόσοι δήθεν θα εκλεγούν. Αυτό είναι μαύρη προπαγάνδα, παραμονές των ευρωεκλογών, είναι fake news, είναι καθοδηγημένη προπαγάνδα εναντίον συγκεκριμένων ευρωβουλευτών.

Αυτό πρέπει να καταγγελθεί και να απαγορευθεί και να σταματήσει αυτή την τακτική το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο, διότι είναι αίσχος και γι’ αυτό πρέπει να τοποθετηθείτε όλοι οι συνάδελφοι. Να μην επιτρέπουμε τα fake news, ότι ορισμένοι δήθεν από μας δεν θα εκλεγούν επειδή το λέει μια δημοσκοπική εταιρεία και αυτό έχει αναπαραχθεί σε όλα τα μίντια, σε όλη την Ευρώπη. Είναι ντροπή, είναι αίσχος!

  Przewodniczący. – Dziękuję Panu bardzo za to pełne pasji wystąpienie.

  Karol Karski (ECR). – Panie Przewodniczący! Padło tu wiele wskazań na to, iż mamy do czynienia z fałszywymi informacjami przekazywanymi przez media elektroniczne, także przez media tradycyjne, ale także takie informacje padają na tej sali w Parlamencie Europejskim i także w trakcie tej debaty. Dzisiaj mieliśmy przykład takiego działania ze strony posła Schaffhausera, który wycierał sobie usta pamięcią św. Jana Pawła II. Posunął się do tego, iż osoby, które działają zgodnie z nauczaniem Jana Pawła II, które realizują ten program przez niego wytyczony, wskazywał, że one działają wręcz przeciwnie. To jest sytuacja, to jest podstawa wyjątkowo zła, wymagająca potępienia. Te osoby, które akurat zajmują się tą problematyką, działają zgodnie z nauczaniem Jana Pawła II, to jest dla nich wszystkich oczywiste. Natomiast ta wypowiedź posła Schaffhausera zapewne gdzieś będzie potem transmitowana, reprodukowana, a może nawet w niektórych państwach podawana jako główna linia wypowiedzi w trakcie dzisiejszej debaty Parlamentu Europejskiego. I to jest też właśnie przykład takiego działania, dezinformowania, mówienia oczywistych nieprawd, które tu dla nas na tej sali są oczywistymi nieprawdami, a już poza tą salą w określonych miejscach mogą być prezentowane jako coś zupełnie odmiennego, jako główna linia wręcz tej debaty.

(Koniec zgłoszeń z sali)

  Neven Mimica, Member of the Commission, on behalf of the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. – Mr President, this has been a very useful exchange. I thank the rapporteur, Ms Fotyga, and the honourable Members for their interventions.

From this debate, I conclude that we overwhelmingly share a common interest in tackling the challenge of disinformation and foreign interference ahead of the European elections. This debate has been a further opportunity to increase awareness about the subject. I close by reiterating once again my appreciation of Parliament’s role in keeping this important issue on the agenda.

  Anna Elżbieta Fotyga, Rapporteur. – Mr President, disinformation poisons the minds and conscience of people affected. The best example of this was accusations delivered against persons like Sandra Kalniete and myself. Well, it is Putin who affirms the policy of Stalin, not ourselves; he tells it himself. And there are well—known fans of Putin in this Chamber from time to time.

I would like to very warmly thank all shadow rapporteurs. Their contribution was really excellent. I’m aware of deep debates about this topic within each political group. I think that the final outcome is a real contribution to further work by all EU institutions in countering hostile propaganda. I would like to thank especially Charles Tannock, who assisted me in a very difficult period of preparation for this report when I had certain health problems. Thank you very much indeed.

  Przewodniczący. – Zamykam debatę.

Głosowanie odbędzie się w środę 13 marca 2019 r.

Oświadczenia pisemne (art. 162)

  Urmas Paet (ALDE), kirjalikult. – Venemaa, Hiina, Iraani ja Põhja-Korea üha agressiivsemad sammud, millega püütakse õõnestada Euroopa demokraatia aluseid ning idapartnerluse riikide suveräänsust, ei ole vastuvõetavad ning nende vastu tuleb järjepidevalt võidelda. On oluline välja töötada õigusraamistik ELi ja rahvusvahelisel tasandil hübriidohtude, sh küber- ja infosõja vastu võitlemiseks. Venemaa väärinfokampaaniad on Euroopas peamine väärinfo allikas ja seetõttu tuleks kujundada idanaabruse strateegilise kommunikatsiooni töörühmast kiiresti Euroopa välisteenistuse raames tegutsev täieõiguslik struktuuriüksus, et võidelda Venemaa propagandaga. Kolmandate isikute sekkumine valimistesse tuleb lõpetada ning selleks on oluline, et ELi riigid muudaksid oma valimisseadusi, võttes arvesse väärinfokampaaniatest, küberrünnetest ja küberkuritegudest tulenevaid võimalikke ohte.