Motion for a resolution - B7-0018/2012Motion for a resolution
B7-0018/2012

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on Iran and its nuclear programme (2012/2512(RSP))

25.1.2012

to wind up the debate on the statement by the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
pursuant to Rule 110(2) of the Rules of Procedure

Cornelia Ernst, Sabine Lösing, Willy Meyer on behalf of the GUE/NGL Group

Procedure : 2012/2512(RSP)
Document stages in plenary
Document selected :  
B7-0018/2012
Texts tabled :
B7-0018/2012
Debates :
Texts adopted :

B7‑0018/2012

European Parliament resolution on Iran and its nuclear programme (2012/2512(RSP))

The European Parliament,

–   having regard to Rule 110(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the November 2011 IAEA of report expresses ‘serious concerns regarding possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme’ because ‘some activities’ ‘relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device’ ‘may still be ongoing’;

B.  whereas this report further takes note of the fact that Iran continues its nuclear enrichment and reprocessing activities, which it is obliged to suspend under several Security Council Resolutions; whereas however the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) Treaty as such does not rule out enrichment activities by its state parties and whereas Iran's enrichment program is therefore not in breach with the NPT;

C. whereas in breach of its obligation under the NPT, Iran has clandestinely constructed an enrichment facility at Fordo close to the saint city of Qom and only notified the IAEA of its existence long after its construction started;

D. whereas while Iran announced that Fordo facility will be operational in February and enrich uranium to 20 per cent, Iran has confirmed that inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency are expected by the end of January for a one month inspection;

E.  whereas the United States and other major Western powers took significant steps to cut Iran off from the international financial system, announcing coordinated sanctions aimed at its central bank and commercial banks; whereas the United States also imposed sanctions on companies involved in Iran’s nuclear industry, as well as on its petrochemical and oil industries;

F.  whereas the EU Foreign Affairs Council on 23 January decided to reinforce sanctions against Iran, banning notably the import, purchase and transport of Iranian crude oil and petrochemical products from Iran into the EU; whereas the oil embargo will take away 20 percent of Iran's current oil sales; whereas the Council also froze the assets of the Iranian central bank within the EU and banned the delivery of Iranian-denominated banknotes and coinage to the Iranian central bank;

G. whereas a senior commander of the Revolutionary Guard force has been quoted saying that Tehran's leadership has decided to order the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, if the country's petroleum exports are blocked and whereas French and British warships joined a US carrier aircraft group on 22 January 2012 and passed through the Strait of Hormuz;

H. whereas the Obama Administration reacted by warning that closing the Strait of Hormuz was a ‘red line’ that would provoke an American response, whereas Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that the U.S. would ‘take action and reopen the strait’, which could be accomplished only by military means, including minesweepers, warship escorts and potentially airstrikes;

I.   whereas experience shows that the sanctions against Iran have not produced any useful result for the solution of the dispute over Iran's nuclear programme; whereas the new sanctions are counterproductive since they give the government the best argument that Iran is under threat and needs nuclear deterrence and weaken the democratic forces in the country;

J.   whereas the new sanctions will increase considerably the hardship for the general population as the Iranian economy depends with some 80% on the oil revenues;

K. whereas the human rights situation in Iran is continuing to deteriorate, with no indication from the Iranian Government that it intends to address the legitimate demands of the civil society for the respect of democratic and human rights;

1.  Expresses its serious preoccupation at the political and military escalation of the relations between Iran and the United States and EU Member States; calls on both sides to restrain from any measures which could further deepen the tensions, to reduce the military presence in the region and to return to the negotiation table;

2.  Insists on a peaceful political settlement to the dispute over Iran's nuclear programmes; reaffirms its opposition to any military action or threat of use of force and warns that any military action would lead to a deeper crisis with severe repercussions for peace and stability in the region;

3.  Expresses deep concern at the military exercises of the United States and Israel in the region and at the violation of the territorial integrity of Iran by US military drones; calls on Israel and United States to refrain in their relations with Iran as with any other country from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence; takes the view that confidence building measures, such as grating negative security insurances to Iran would promote the stabilization of the region;

4.  Deeply deplores the decision of the Council on new sanctions and calls on the Council to immediately review it; reminds that the sanction policy of the US and the EU did not result in any progress towards a solution of the nuclear dispute with Iran; takes the view that new sanctions are counterproductive, will not lead to the resumption of the negotiations but to new tensions and have negative consequences for the Iranian population;

5.  Urges the E3+3 and Iran to return to the negotiating table and calls on the negotiators to forge a mutually acceptable compromise; takes the view that the participation of Brazil and Turkey in the negotiations would facilitate the search for compromise;

6.  Calls on the United States and the EU not to apply double standards and to accept Iran's right to enrich uranium to a limited extent under the condition that Iran ratifies the Additional Protocol and grants full access for the IAEA to all its nuclear installations and accepts the gradual replacement of its heavy water reactors by light water technology;

7.  Calls on Iran and those countries in the Middle East which are considering investing in nuclear power not to repeat the errors of many EU countries in favouring a dangerous and outdated technology; instead appeals to those countries to develop all options of modern renewable energy technologies, efficiency and conservation methods;

8.  Reiterates its call for strict application of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) by all sides and in all respects;

9.  Calls on the Iranian Parliament and government to ratify and implement the Additional Protocol of the IAEA and to fully implement the provisions of the Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement;

10. Reiterates its call on all nuclear weapons states to take progressive steps to reduce their nuclear arsenals, phase out the role of nuclear weapons in security policy and support a nuclear weapon-free zone in Europe and the Middle East;

11. Expresses its concern at the fact that Israel, India and Pakistan have not become States Parties to the NPT; calls on those countries to become States Parties to that Treaty;

12. Takes the view that negotiations on the establishment of a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East and the Mediterranean could be an important step towards meeting the security concerns of the countries of that region;

13. Supports wholeheartedly the democratic aspirations of the Iranian people and deeply deplores the fact that the Iranian Government and Parliament are apparently incapable of responding to the justified demands of Iranian citizens, in particular the young generation, who have seen their hopes for economic and social development stifled for too long;

14. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the EU President, the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the UNSC, the Director-General of the IAEA, the governments and parliaments of the Mashreq countries, of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Israel, Palestine, Iraq, Turkey and the Government and Parliament of the Islamic Republic of Iran.