Procedure : 2014/2841(RSP)
Document stages in plenary
Document selected : B8-0122/2014

Texts tabled :


Debates :

Votes :

OJ 18/09/2014 - 42

Texts adopted :


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See also joint motion for a resolution RC-B8-0118/2014

to wind up the debate on the statement by the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

pursuant to Rule 123(2) of the Rules of Procedure

on the situation in Ukraine (2014/2841(RSP))

Charles Tannock, Ryszard Antoni Legutko, Anna Elżbieta Fotyga, Ryszard Czarnecki, Tomasz Piotr Poręba, Geoffrey Van Orden, Roberts Zīle, Ruža Tomašić, Zdzisław Krasnodębski, Valdemar Tomaševski, Bastiaan Belder on behalf of the ECR Group

European Parliament resolution on the situation in Ukraine (2014/2841(RSP))  

The European Parliament,

–       having regard to the European Council conclusions on Ukraine,

–       having regards to its previous resolutions on Ukraine,

–       having regards to its previous resolutions on Russia,

–       having regard to the Joint Declaration of the Vilnius Eastern Partnership Summit of 29 November 2013,

–       having regard to the NATO Wales Summit Declaration,

–       having regard to Rule 123(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.     whereas violence erupted in eastern Ukraine in April, when separatists declared independence in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, following Russia’s illegal annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea;

B.     whereas at least 3 000 people have been killed since mid-April, while the numbers of Ukrainian refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) have reached 350 000;

C.     whereas pro-Russian insurgents directly supported by regular Russian armed forces, estimated by the Ukrainian side to be at a strength of six battalions supported by artillery, have closed on Mariupol, a strategically important Black Sea port, and have begun shelling the city;

D.     whereas, according to NATO sources, Russia has been sending main battle tanks, artillery and other weapons to the rebels, and allowing fighters from its territory to cross the border to join rebel militias; whereas Russia still has about 1 000 heavily armed troops in eastern Ukraine and around 20 000 more soldiers stationed near the Ukrainian border;

E.     whereas Russia has used its military to seize control and then illegally annex Ukrainian Crimea, after lending support to local separatist groups; whereas this scenario has been repeated in the case of eastern Ukraine, thus breaching in the process all principles of the Helsinki Accords;

F.     whereas Russia’s aggression and seizure of Crimea has been in breach of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, at least three Ukrainian-Russian agreements on bilateral relations from 1997, and in particular the Budapest NPT Memorandum of 1994 and the main acts of the OSCE;

G.     whereas on 17 July 2014 Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 from Amsterdam was shot down near the village of Grabove in rebel-held territory close to the border with Russia, resulting in the deaths of almost 300 people; whereas the evidence points to a Russian-supplied missile fired by the rebels;

H.     whereas the EU has agreed to impose further sanctions on Russia over its role in the Ukraine crisis, targeting big Russian state oil companies and expanding a blacklist of Russian officials subject to visa bans and asset freezes;

I.      whereas the September NATO Summit in Wales brought together more than 60 national leaders, who discussed the situation in Ukraine and Afghanistan and the future of the alliance;

J.      whereas on 27 June 2014 the EU signed an Association Agreement with Ukraine, as well as similar agreements with Georgia and Moldova; whereas the signing of the agreement implies recognition of the aspirations of the people of Ukraine to live in a country governed by European values and by democracy and the rule of law;

K.     whereas Russian political leaders have attempted to use historical revanchist and irredentist sentiments in order to legitimise separatist actions, and have been publicly stating that what is now south-east Ukraine was, under the Tsars, a Russian region called Novorossiya;

L.     whereas on 5 September 2014 an Estonian Internal Security Service officer, Eston Kohver, was abducted near the Luhamaa border checkpoint in Estonia and detained on Russian territory in an undisclosed location under charges of spying;

M.    whereas amid tensions over Ukraine, Russia’s gas supplies to Poland have dropped by 45 %;

N.     whereas France has decided to halt Mistral-class warship delivery to Russia;

1.      Expresses its solidarity with Ukraine and the Ukrainian nation; expresses cautious optimism regarding the ceasefire agreement, and stresses that in order to reach a lasting truce and implement the peace plan, Russia should cease any financial, political or military support for the separatists in eastern Ukraine and withdraw from any previously annexed territories, including Crimea;

2.      Strongly condemns the Russian Federation for waging an undeclared hybrid war against the Ukraine with use of regular Russian forces and supporting illegally armed groups; urges Russia to stop the flow of weapons and militants into eastern Ukraine; stresses that Russia’s actions against Ukraine constitute an act of aggression;

3.      Reiterates its commitment to the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of borders and European choice of Ukraine;

4.      Welcomes full respect of the ceasefire provisions by Ukraine despite numerous provocations and violations on behalf of the Russian troops and terrorists;

5.      Warns that in the political dialogue that follows the ceasefire a strong emphasis should be put on rejecting any proposals for the future status of Ukraine which could be used by Russia to further influence or even divide the country;

6.      Welcomes the new set of sanctions against Russia which have come into force, blocking loans for five big state banks and curbing EU business with oil and defence firms; is of the opinion that any sanctions should be designed in a way which would not allow Kremlin-linked companies to circumvent them; calls for the EU to closely monitor such forms of economic cooperation as equity swaps and joint ventures;

7.      Takes note of the partial withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Ukraine, but considers it to be insufficient for loosening the sanctions against Russia adopted by the EU; in this regard, expresses its concern over the recent premature statement by the President of the European Council regarding the possible lifting of sanctions;

8.      Calls on the Member States and the EEAS to adopt a clear set of benchmarks which, when achieved, could prevent adoption of the new restrictive measures against Russia or lead to the lifting of the previous ones; believes these benchmarks should include: complete withdrawal of Russian troops and mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine; ending the supply of arms and equipment to terrorists; full respect for the ceasefire regime by Russia; establishment of effective international control and verification of the ceasefire regime; and the restoration of Ukraine’s control over its entire territory, including Crimea;

9.      Condemns Russian’s aggression against Crimea as a grave violation under international law of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and rejects Russia’s ‘fait accompli’ policy in its foreign relations; considers the annexation of Crimea to be illegal; refuses to recognise Russia’s de facto rule in the peninsula, and endorses the decision to prohibit imports of goods from Crimea and Sevastopol which do not have a Ukrainian certificate;

10.    Recalls that the existing borders of Ukraine were fully guaranteed, when it relinquished its nuclear weapons and joined the NPT, by the US, the Russian Federation and the UK in the Budapest memorandum on security assurances; also reminds the Russian Federation that, in the same act and together with the two other countries mentioned above, it undertook to refrain from economic coercion designed to subordinate to its own interest the exercise by Ukraine of the rights inherent to its sovereignty or to secure advantages of any kind;

11.    Invites the Member States to proceed with rendering the necessary military and technical assistance to Ukraine;

12.    Calls on the Council to put the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk people’s republics on the list of terrorist organisations;

13.    Invites the Commission and the Member States to step up their efforts in rendering humanitarian assistance to Ukraine;

14.    Is concerned at the decision to postpone the implementation of the DCFTA with Ukraine, taken at the meeting in which Russian representatives also took part; calls for the agreements to be implemented as originally envisaged and in a form negotiated solely between the Ukraine and the EU;

15.    Takes note of the decisions taken during the NATO summit, including the setting up of a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) and increasing overall spending on defence, and welcomes the strong condemnation of illegal Russian intervention in Ukraine in the Wales Summit Declaration; welcomes the statement by President Obama that the alliance must leave the door open to new members to counter a Russian aggression and to take concrete commitments to help strengthen the defence capabilities of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova; regrets, however, the fact that no decision was taken as to locating NATO troops in East European countries on a permanent basis and that no clear decision was taken with regard to direct and immediate support for the Ukrainian army;

16.    Calls for the EU, in view of the recent hostile actions of Russia in Ukraine and Estonia, to establish a special European Security Fund (ESF) that would enable low-interest loans that could be used by EU Member States, mainly in the east, to modernise their armies and improve their defence capabilities;

17.    Welcomes the signing of the Association Agreement with Ukraine and underlines Ukraine’s legally recognized perspective for eventual membership in the EU, which is granted in principle by Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union;

18.    Takes note of the decision of the French President to halt the delivery of Mistral-class ships to Russia; believes this to be a step in the right direction, and calls on France to completely revoke this contract, which contradicts the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Export and the 2008 Common Position defining common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment;

19.    Calls on Russia and the pro-Russian separatists in the region to ensure immediate, safe, and unrestricted access to the crash site of MH17 so as to allow resumption of the investigation and the repatriation of the remains and belongings of the victims still present at the site, and calls for the swift bringing to justice of those directly and indirectly responsible for the downing of MH17;

20.    Condemns the abduction of the Internal Security Service officer Eston Kohver from the territory of Estonia, and calls on the Russian authorities to ensure his immediate release and safe return to Estonia;

21.    Recalls the speech of President Putin in which he said that Russia reserves the right to stand up for ethnic Russians living outside its borders, remarks which may be seen as a veiled threat to Moldova and the Baltic States; warns that the current situation in Transnistria might spark off another stand-off with Russia, especially given the signing of the Association Agreement with Moldova;

22.    Reiterates its call on Russia not to use gas and oil as a tool for coercion and pressure on its neighbours; in this regard, underlines the need to ensure a secure energy supply for Ukraine and those EU Member States which are already affected by gas cuts from Russia, notably Poland;

23.    Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Member States, the President of Ukraine, the governments and parliaments of the Eastern Partnership countries and of the Russian Federation, the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly, and the Parliamentary Assemblies of the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Last updated: 16 September 2014Legal notice