MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the situation in Ukraine and the state of play of EU-Russia relations
16.9.2014 - (2014/2841(RSP))
pursuant to Rule 123(2) of the Rules of Procedure
Cristian Dan Preda, Elmar Brok, Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, Othmar Karas, Andrej Plenković, Sandra Kalniete, Ivo Belet, Jerzy Buzek, David McAllister, Michael Gahler, Anna Maria Corazza Bildt, Andrzej Grzyb, Tunne Kelam, Andrey Kovatchev, Agnieszka Kozłowska-Rajewicz, Eduard Kukan, Gabrielius Landsbergis, Elżbieta Katarzyna Łukacijewska, Monica Luisa Macovei, Gabriel Mato, György Schöpflin, Davor Ivo Stier, Dubravka Šuica, Jarosław Leszek Wałęsa, Bogdan Andrzej Zdrojewski, Valdis Dombrovskis, Albert Deß, Lorenzo Cesa on behalf of the PPE Group
See also joint motion for a resolution RC-B8-0118/2014
B8‑0123/2014
European Parliament resolution on the situation in Ukraine and the state of play of EU- Russia relations
The European Parliament,
– having regard to its previous resolutions on the European Neighbourhood Policy, on the Eastern Partnership (EaP) and on Ukraine, with particular reference to its resolution of 17 July 2014 on Ukraine[1],
– having regard to the joint statement of G7 Leaders at the Brussels Summit of 4 June 2014,
– having regard to the Foreign Affairs Council conclusions of 22 July and 15 August and of the European Council conclusions of 30 August 2014 on Ukraine,
– having regard to the statement of the NATO Summit of 7 September 2014,
– having regard to the statement by the President of the European Council on further EU restrictive measures against Russia of 11 September 2014,
– having regard to the statement by the EEAS spokesperson of 11 September 2014 on the abduction of the Estonian police officer,
– having regard to Rule 123(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
A. whereas the Trilateral Contact Group agreed on 5 September in Minsk on a ceasefire which entered into force the same day; whereas the agreement also contained a 12-point protocol which covers the release of hostages, measures to improve the humanitarian situation, the withdrawal of all illegal armed groups, military equipment and mercenaries from Ukraine and measures on decentralisation in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions;
B. whereas the ceasefire has been violated repeatedly by mercenaries since 5 September in areas near Mariupol and Donetsk airport, with attempts to probe Ukraine’s defences in several other localities;
C. whereas the NATO summit in Newport reaffirmed that NATO stands with Ukraine in the face of Russia’s destabilising influence, offered support in strengthening the Ukrainian armed forces and called on Russia to pull back its troops from Ukraine and end the illegal annexation of Crimea;
D. whereas the European Council of 30 August requested proposals to enhance the EU’s restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions in destabilising eastern Ukraine; whereas these proposals came into force on 12 September;
E. whereas Mr Mykola Zelenec, Lithuania’s Honorary Consul in Luhansk, was abducted and brutally killed by the rebels;
F. whereas the new Delegation to the EU-Ukraine Parliamentary Cooperation Committee was set up on 8 September 2014 as a matter of priority, and Parliament stands ready to accompany the process of political, legislative and economic reforms in Ukraine through the future work of the Parliamentary Association Committee;
G. whereas the first findings by crash investigators state that Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 broke up in the air over eastern Ukraine after it was struck by multiple ‘high-energy objects from outside the aircraft’;
H. whereas on 12 September the Commission announced that the provisional application of the AA/DCFTA will be postponed until 31 December 2015; whereas this will result in a prolongation of the unilateral trade preferences granted by the EU to Ukraine, which were to expire on 1 November this year;
I. whereas on 7 August the Russian Government adopted a list of products from the EU, US, Norway, Canada and Australia to be banned from the Russian market for a period of one year; whereas the EU will be affected the most as Russia is the second-largest export market for EU agricultural products and the sixth-largest for fishery products and 73 % of the banned imports come from the EU;
J. whereas the overall restrictions currently applied by Russia could jeopardise EUR 5 billion worth of trade and affect the incomes of 9.5 million people in the EU working on the agricultural holdings most concerned;
K. whereas the ban on EU food products to the Russian market that has hit the fruits and vegetables sector in particular, as well as the dairy and meat sectors, could have a possible knock-on effect leading to over-supply in the internal market; whereas the value of banned fisheries products amounts to almost EUR 144 million;
L. whereas the ban on EU fisheries products to the Russian market could potentially pose severe problems in some Member States such as Spain, France, the UK, Denmark, Latvia, Estonia and Ireland;
M. whereas Russia undermines EU security by regularly violating the airspace of Finland, the Baltic States and Ukraine, as well as through the recent gas cut to Poland which amounts to 45 % of Russian exports to this country;
N. whereas about 1 million children are affected by the ongoing conflict in Eastern Ukraine and many children have been killed and injured;
1. Welcomes the simultaneous ratification of the AA/DCFTA by the Verkhovna Rada and the European Parliament; considers this an important step which shows a commitment by both sides to successful implementation; takes note of the postponement of the provisional implementation of the EU-Ukraine DCFTA until 31 December 2015, to be replaced by the prolongation of unilateral trade measures which represent a de facto asymmetrical implementation of the agreement; deplores Russian pressure and blackmailing;
2. Reiterates that Russia aims to undermine and eventually prevent the coming into force of this agreement; stresses therefore that the new timeline will not affect the process of ratification ending in fully-fledged implementation; states that the agreement will not be changed and that the European Union made it very clear through this ratification that there is no possibility of change;
3. Stresses that the coming months until implementation of the AA/DCFTA should be used to tackle the necessary transformation and modernisation of Ukraine’s political system, its economy and society in accordance with the Association agenda; welcomes the reform programme announced by President Poroshenko that includes laws on anti-corruption, decentralisation and amnesty; calls on the Commission and Member States to offer all possible enhanced and accelerated economic and financial assistance to Ukraine in order to help it tackle those reforms; reiterates that this should done as a unilateral act by the EU and not be dictated by Russian threats or intrusions into EU-Ukraine relations, or at the price of putting at risk the entry into force of a fully-fledged EU-Ukraine AA/DCFTA with the danger of contagion from such a diluted Association format on other partner countries’ agreements;
4. Calls on Member States with previous experience of implementing Association Agreements with the EU to draw on and lend that experience and know-how to Ukraine;
5. Emphasises that Russia has less grounds than ever before to criticise the EU-Ukraine Agreement or to react with unjustified trade restrictions and military aggression; expresses concern that this new development is an incentive for Russia to escalate its policy of intimidating Ukraine and drawing it into its own sphere of influence; fears a danger of spill-over into Georgia and Moldova;
6. Reiterates that the EU planned to launch in November the EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine), a civilian mission under the Common Security and Defence Policy that aims to assist Ukraine in civilian security sectors reforms, including the police and the rule of law; calls on the EU to provide it with the resources required to fulfil its mandate;
7. Emphasises that the reform and Association agenda has to proceed in parallel with the continued struggle to ensure Ukraine’s territorial integrity and unity; reiterates that these two tasks are inextricably and synergistically intertwined; stresses the need for peaceful dialogue and decentralisation which ensures that authority over the whole territory remains with the central government, thus guaranteeing Ukraine’s unity;
8. Welcomes the ceasefire reached by the Trilateral Contact Group on 5 September in Minsk and hopes that the 12-point Minsk protocol establishes conditions for fully fledged implementation of the Poroshenko Peace Plan, including permanent and effective control of the Ukrainian border verified by the OSCE, the full and unconditional withdrawal of Russian troops, illegal armed groups, military equipment and mercenaries from the internationally recognised territory of Ukraine and the release of hostages; deplores that the ceasefire agreement is being constantly violated by separatists and Russian forces and that their ongoing build-up continues;
9. Is of the firm opinion that the escalation of Russian-determined imperialist policy and warfare against Ukraine seriously undermines the EU’s ability to implement its own policies; highlights the urgency of stepping up the EU’s determination to enhance and defend its own neighbourhood policy and counteract Russia by further isolating it in the field of international economic and political relations in order to raise the price tag for conducting rogue policies;
10. Expresses its strong concern that the ceasefire is a pretext for Russian troops to regroup in order to continue their offensive towards establishing a ‘land corridor’ to Crimea and beyond to Transnistria, thereby de facto establishing a new iron curtain; draws attention, in this regard, to the dangerous public claims made by President Putin regarding Noworossiya, which originates from the tsarist, colonialist policy of the 18th century;
11. Strongly condemns the intrusion of Russian military personnel in the East, the continuous illegal flows of manpower and military equipment from the Russian Federation to Ukraine, and deliveries by so-called ‘humanitarian convoys’ that have no prior authorisation from the Ukrainian counterpart and grant no access to international humanitarian organisations; expresses deep concern that after the Russian Federation’s intensive involvement in ‘peacekeeping’, the territory experiencing instability doubled and Ukrainian battalions were surrounded and shelled while walking through the humanitarian corridors;
12. Expresses its unwavering support for the territorial integrity, unity, independence and sovereignty of Ukraine; reiterates that the international community will not recognise the illegal annexing of Crimea and Sevastopol or the attempts at creating quasi-republics in Donbas; calls on the EU to enhance its policy of non-recognition of the illegal annexation of Crimea, including by banning EU investment across all public and private sectors in Crimea and Sevastopol; condemns furthermore the enforced passportisation of Ukrainian citizens in Crimea, the persecution of Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars, and the threats made by the self-proclaimed leaders against Crimean citizens who expressed their interest in voting in the upcoming parliamentary elections;
13. Repeats its call on Russia to return to the path of international law by respecting its own commitments on inter alia the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and the Budapest Memorandum, withdrawing its troops from Ukraine and stopping the flow of mercenaries over its border into Ukraine and any direct and indirect support for them, and releasing hostages, including Nadiya Savchenko, who was captured in Ukraine, illegally taken to Russia and is held in custody in Moscow;
14. Strongly condemns the unlawful abduction of an Estonian counterintelligence officer from Estonian territory to Russia and calls on the Russian authorities to immediately release Mr Kohver and allow his safe return to Estonia;
15. Calls on the EU and Member States to learn lessons from the extreme and dramatic situation in south-east Ukraine and the role Russia continues to play in it, which constitutes a threat to the indivisible security of the European Union and its eastern flank Member States in particular; warns of further menacing scenarios that Russia might be entertaining to pressurise and test EU Member States and NATO by deploying hybrid warfare or playing the energy card;
16. Strongly believes that the EU’s only viable answer to Russia’s threats is to stand together and speak with one voice to Russia; believes that the EU needs to rethink its relations with Russia and to find a new, unified approach towards Russia, including a genuine Common External Energy and Defence Policy;
17. Calls on the Member States to strengthen their own military capabilities and complement those of NATO, in order to increase the EU’s resilience against different types of war, in particular hybrid warfare; calls on the EU, its institutions and political forces to enhance our common determination, capacity to contain external threats, unity and solidarity;
18. Calls for the continuation of the trilateral talks on Ukraine’s gas supplies which have been suspended since June in order find a solution to reinstate them; reiterates the need to ensure the gas supply through reverse gas flows from EU neighbouring states to Ukraine;
19. Underlines the need to radically enhance the EU’s energy security, independence and resilience to external pressure through the consolidation of energy sectors, further development of the energy infrastructure in the EU’s neighbourhood countries and the development of energy interconnectors between these countries and with the EU, in accordance with the objectives of the Energy Community, and to implement these priority projects of common interest with the utmost urgency in order to build a fully functioning free gas market in Europe;
20. Welcomes NATO’s renewed pledge to prioritise collective security and the commitment to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty; welcomes the decisions at the Newport NATO Summit to increase the security level of the eastern allies, including the creation of the ‘spearhead’ task force, a permanent rotating NATO military presence and the establishment of logistical infrastructure, as well as the support offered for strengthening the Ukrainian armed forces;
21. Takes note of the fact that Member States on a bilateral level can provide Ukraine with the necessary weapons, technology and know-how for security and defence; stresses that this possibility was endorsed at the NATO Summit in Newport; takes the view that the EU should encourage Member States to do so; calls on the EU to consider sending instructors and military technology, to support Ukraine’s land army with Mulino-type training know-how, and to enhance its maritime capabilities to defend the Black Sea coast and its air defence system;
22. Welcomes the decision by the French President, Francois Hollande, to put on hold the sale of two Mistral-class warships to Russia, hence making the delivery subject to the evolution of the situation in Ukraine; encourages Member States to consider, in the event of the contract being cancelled, compensatory measures and ways of using the Mistral ships in EU-related missions instead, in order to alleviate the financial losses for France of more than EUR 1.2 billion;
23. Welcomes the restrictive measures the EU adopted against Russia during the summer due to Russia’s continued aggression, armed invasion and destabilisation of eastern Ukraine; supports further economic sanctions in the financial, energy and military sectors and on dual use goods and sensitive technologies, and increasing the number of targeted individuals, including the new leadership in Donbas, the government of Crimea and Russian decision-makers and oligarchs; welcomes their enforcement on 12 September 2014;
24. Calls on the EU to continue, extend and enhance sanctions to achieve a full-scale economic blockade of Russia’s finances and economy, to exclude Russia from nuclear cooperation and the Swift system, and to implement a full arms export embargo on Russia;
25. Stresses the need to set clear benchmarks which, when achieved, could prevent the adoption of further levels of restrictive measures against Russia or reverse those already in place; stresses that these benchmarks should include the full withdrawal of Russian troops and mercenaries from Ukrainian territory, the cessation of direct and indirect support for separatists, respect by Russia of the ceasefire , effective international control of the Ukrainian border and the restoration of Ukraine’s control over its whole territory;
26. Underlines the importance of the independent, rapid and full investigation into the causes of the downing of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17, delegated to the Dutch Safety Board, and the need to bring those responsible for the crash to justice; notes that the Dutch Safety Board issued its preliminary report on the investigation into the crash of MH17 on 9 September 2014; stresses that, based on the preliminary findings to date, no indications of any technical or operational issues were found with the aircraft or crew, and that the damage observed in the forward section appears to indicate that the aircraft was penetrated by a large number of high-energy objects from outside the aircraft;
27. Calls on international sporting bodies to withdraw Russia’s right to organise the F1 Grand Prix in autumn 2014 and the FIFA football World Cup in 2018;
28. Welcomes the decision to hold early parliamentary elections in Ukraine on 26 October 2014 and expects the government to ensure free and fair elections; calls on Ukraine to establish transparency in the financing of parties and their political campaigns; hopes for a strong majority for the important challenges and necessary reforms ahead; is committed to sending election observers in order to monitor these elections and calls for a substantial international election monitoring mission to oversee this crucial election that will take place under ongoing difficult conditions;
29. Expresses its deep concern as regards the catastrophic humanitarian situation in eastern Ukraine, especially with regard to the upcoming winter; outlines the importance of massive humanitarian assistance under EU auspices to show our support for the people suffering in eastern Ukraine; calls therefore for urgent efforts from the EU, including a humanitarian aid convoy to help support the most deprived;
30. Commends the continuous efforts made by the Ukrainian authorities to ensure the right to education and in particular to ensure that all children will be able to return to schools affected by the conflict as soon as possible; highlights the importance of providing psychosocial support for all children who have been directly exposed to violent events;
31. Welcomes the swift action by the Commission in response to the temporary exceptional measures for the fruits and vegetables sector and for products most affected by the ban; calls on the Commission to launch adequate, non-discriminatory and targeted support measures for those farms, food operators and fishermen worst affected by Russia’s ban on EU food products;
32. Calls on the Commission to closely monitor the agricultural, food, fisheries and aquaculture markets, to inform the Council and Parliament of any changes and to assess the impact of the measures taken in order to possibly extend the list of products covered and to increase the EUR 125 million envelope; urges the EU Commission not to restrict itself to market measures but to also take medium-term measures to strengthen the EU’s presence on third-country markets (e.g. promotional activities);
33. Considers the possibility of drawing on EU funds other than agricultural funds, since the crisis is first and foremost of a political nature and not the result of a market failure or adverse weather conditions;
34. Calls on the Commission to negotiate the appropriate quota flexibility in the coastal states agreements;
35. Calls on Member States to use the EMFF as extraordinary financial assistance to provide financial support to the European fisheries sector and aquaculture products;
36. Calls on the Commission and the Members States to momentarily modify the year-to-year quota flexibility rules in order to provide for the possibility of transferring more than 10% of the quota to the next year (the flexibility rule currently applicable), and to help fishermen sell banned products to other markets.
37. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments of the Member States, the President, Government and Parliament of Ukraine, the Council of Europe, and the President, Government and Parliament of the Russian Federation.
- [1] Texts adopted, P8_TA(2014)0009.