Procedure : 2005/2214(INI)
Document stages in plenary
Document selected : A6-0143/2006

Texts tabled :

A6-0143/2006

Debates :

PV 15/05/2006 - 15
CRE 15/05/2006 - 15

Votes :

PV 16/05/2006 - 10.3
CRE 16/05/2006 - 10.3
Explanations of votes

Texts adopted :

P6_TA(2006)0206

REPORT     
PDF 184kWORD 126k
27 April 2006
PE 370.018v02-00 A6-0143/2006

on the outcome of the screening of legislative proposals pending before the Legislator

(2005/2214(INI))

Committee on Constitutional Affairs

Rapporteur: Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION
 EXPLANATORY STATEMENT
 OPINION of the Committee on Legal Affairs
 PROCEDURE

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on the outcome of the screening of legislative proposals pending before the Legislator

(2005/2214(INI))

The European Parliament,

–   having regard to the Commission communication of 27 September 2005 to the Council and the European Parliament on the outcome of the screening of legislative proposals pending before the Legislator (COM(2005)0462),

–   having regard to the letter from its President to the President of the Commission dated 23 January 2006(1),

–   having regard to the letter from the President of the Commission to the President of the European Parliament dated 8 March 2006,

–   having regard to Rule 45 of its Rules of Procedure,

–   having regard to the report of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs and the opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs (A6-0143/2006),

whereas

A. in its communication of 27 September 2005, the Commission announced its intention to withdraw 68 proposals that it considers inconsistent with the objectives of the Lisbon Strategy and the principles of Better Regulation, while others will be subject to a reviewed economic impact assessment and, if appropriate, modified,

B.  the letter sent by the President of the European Parliament to the President of the Commission at the outcome of the analysis of that communication by the parliamentary committees generally welcomes the intentions of the Commission, but specifically asks it not to withdraw several of those proposals and objects to the possible modification of some other proposals,

C. the reply sent by the President of the Commission to the President of the European Parliament states that the Commission took into due consideration the position of Parliament before adopting its final position and indicates the specific reasons why the Commission did not follow some of the requests of Parliament, as well as the possible initiatives that the Commission plans to undertake, in the future, to address some of those requests,

D. that communication provides an excellent opportunity for a more thorough analysis of the problems connected with the withdrawal or the modification of legislative proposals by the Commission,

E.  with a few exceptions, most of the Community’s legislative acts can only be adopted on the basis of a proposal from the Commission, which enjoys a quasi-monopoly over the legislative initiative,

F.  Article 250(2), of the EC Treaty stipulates that the Commission ‘may alter its proposal’ at any moment of the procedure leading to the adoption of a Community act, ‘as long as the Council has not acted’,

G. although, for historical reasons, the role of Parliament is not mentioned in Article 250(2), that provision must be interpreted in conjunction with Article 251 as concerns its application to the codecision procedure, and with Article 252 as concerns the cooperation procedure,

H. whenever a common position is adopted after the first reading, the third indent of the second subparagraph of Article 251(2) of the EC Treaty only allows the Commission to inform Parliament of its own position and whereas, if the common position is subsequently amended by Parliament, point (c) in the third subparagraph of Article 251(2) only allows the Commission to deliver an opinion, so that it is clear that the Commission is no longer the ‘owner’ of its proposals,

I.   the Treaties are silent as to the possibility of the Commission withdrawing a legislative proposal,

J.   this absence of provisions concerning the withdrawal of legislative proposals has not prevented the Commission from regularly withdrawing legislative proposals,

K. Parliament, Council and the Commission seem not to agree on the exact extent to which the Commission is entitled to withdraw its legislative proposals,

L.  despite these disagreements, the withdrawal of legislative proposals has been a regular practice of the Commission, without ever having given rise to a case brought before the Court,

M. Parliament itself has sometimes in the past asked the Commission to withdraw its proposals,

N. the framework agreement(2) on relations between Parliament and the Commission of 26 May 2005 stipulates that:

–   in all legislative procedures, ‘the Commission undertakes to carefully examine amendments to its legislative proposals adopted by Parliament, with a view to taking them into account in any amended proposal’ (point 31),

–   in all legislative procedures, ‘the Commission shall give Parliament and the Council prior notification before withdrawing its proposals’ (point 32),

–   in legislative procedures not entailing codecision, the Commission undertakes to withdraw legislative proposals that have been rejected by Parliament, ‘if appropriate’, and also to explain the reasons for not doing so if it decides to maintain the proposal (point 33),

O. an understanding, based on common guidelines between the three institutions, regarding the withdrawal and, to the extent necessary, the modification of legislative proposals by the Commission would positively contribute to the smooth running of legislative procedures,

1.  Welcomes the Commission communication of 27 September 2005, and considers that the withdrawal or modification of the great majority of the proposals mentioned in it will in fact contribute to a simplification of the Community legislative environment, but insists that the Commission should take into proper consideration the objections raised by the President of the European Parliament in his letter of 23 January 2006;

2.  Welcomes the fact that, before adopting its final position, the Commission has again reviewed its proposals in the light of Parliament’s objections; acknowledges that, in every case in which the Commission has not accepted those objections, it has stated reasons for not doing so and that in some cases it has also indicated possible initiatives by means of which Parliament’s wishes could be met;

3.  Stresses that in future proceedings of this nature, the Commission should present specific reasons for the withdrawal or the modification of each proposal, and not confine itself to invoking general principles that do not clearly explain the reasons why the Commission believes that a specific proposal should be withdrawn or modified;

4.  Asks the Commission, immediately after it has been appointed, to draw up and submit to Parliament and the Council a list stating which of its predecessor’s legislative proposals it intends to retain;

5.  Asks the Commission to include in its annual legislative and working programme a list of the proposals it intends to withdraw or modify, in order to allow Parliament to express its point of view in accordance with its prerogatives under the Treaties and the procedures laid down in the Framework Agreement of 26 May 2005;

6.  Takes note of the fact that the possibility of withdrawing a legislative proposal by the Commission is not mentioned in any provision of the existing Treaties, while the possibility of modifying a legislative proposal is covered by the principle that the Commission may modify its proposal during the procedure leading to the adoption of a Community act, as expressly provided in Article 250(2) of the EC Treaty; acknowledges that that principle is also applicable to the codecision procedure, provided for in Article 251, and the cooperation procedure, provided for in Article 252;

7.  Recognises, however, that, within clear limits, the ability of the Commission to withdraw a legislative proposal during a procedure leading to its adoption

–   flows from its right of legislative initiative and constitutes a logical complement to its ability to modify a proposal,

–   may contribute to enhancing the role of the Commission in the legislative procedure, and

–   can be considered as a positive element in ensuring that the procedures leading to the adoption of a Community act and the interinstitutional dialogue are aimed at promoting the ‘Community interest’;

8.  Maintains, however, that this possibility must be viewed in the light of the prerogatives of the various institutions in the legislative process, as defined in the Treaties, and in compliance with the principle of loyal cooperation among the institutions;

9.  Stresses that the possibilities of withdrawal or modification must not alter the role of each institution in the legislative process in a way which would endanger the institutional balance, and that the possibility to withdraw does not signify recognition of some kind of ‘right of veto’ by the Commission;

10. Stresses that the withdrawal or modification of legislative proposals must be subject to the same general principles that guide the presentation of proposals by the Commission, namely, they must be guided by the Community interest and must be duly justified;

11. Considers, without prejudging the competence of the Court of Justice to define the exact scope and boundaries of the prerogatives vested in the institutions by the Treaties, that the definition of common guidelines by the institutions concerning the withdrawal or the modification of legislative proposals by the Commission, as a complement to the relevant principles already laid down in the Framework Agreement on relations between Parliament and the Commission and the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making, would constitute a positive step towards facilitating the legislative process and the dialogue between the institutions;

12. Puts forward the following guidelines on the withdrawal and the modification of legislative proposals by the Commission:

(a) the Commission may, in principle, withdraw or modify a legislative proposal at any time during the procedures leading to its adoption as long as the Council has not acted. This means that in codecision and cooperation procedures the Commission may no longer do so after the adoption of the common position by the Council unless, in its decision on the common position, the Council has exceeded its powers to amend the Commission proposal, so that the decision in reality constitutes a legislative initiative by the Council itself, for which the Treaty does not provide,

(b) where Parliament has rejected a legislative proposal or has suggested substantial amendments to it, or where Parliament has in some other way asked the Commission to withdraw or substantially modify a legislative proposal, the Commission shall take this position into proper consideration. If, for important reasons, the Commission decides not to follow the position expressed by Parliament, it shall explain the reasons for that decision in a statement to Parliament,

(c) where the Commission intends to withdraw or modify a legislative proposal on its own initiative, it shall give Parliament prior notification of its intention. This notification shall be given in good time, allowing Parliament the opportunity to give its view on the matter, and shall include a clear explanation of the reasons for which the Commission believes that a specific proposal should be withdrawn or modified. The Commission shall take the view of Parliament into proper consideration. If, for important reasons, the Commission decides to withdraw or modify its proposal, against the wishes of Parliament, it shall explain the reasons for that decision in a statement to Parliament;

13. Stresses that the extent to which the Commission takes into consideration the views of Parliament in so far as concerns the withdrawal or the modification of legislative proposals constitutes an essential element of the political trust that forms the basis of sound cooperation between the two institutions;

14. Considers that, should the Commission withdraw or substantially modify a legislative proposal in a way that affects the legislative prerogatives of Parliament, the question should be referred to the appropriate political bodies of Parliament for political consideration; furthermore, considers that, should the Commission withdraw a legislative proposal in a way that affects the prerogatives of the two branches of the legislative authority, these could consider this withdrawal as non-effective and continue the procedure as provided for in the Treaties until the eventual adoption of the act in question;

15. Considers that, where a legislative proposal has been formulated in accordance with Article 138, the Commission should duly inform the European social partners about its intention to withdraw or substantially modify the legislative proposal;

16. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

(1)

Ref. Pres-A-Courrier D(2006)300689).

(2)

Texts Adopted, P6_TA(2005)0194, Annex.


EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

The Commission has screened all of its proposals currently being dealt with by a legislative procedure. Its communication of 27 September 2005 to Parliament and the Council sets out the findings of that review and contains, among other things, a list of 68 legislative proposals which the Commission intends to withdraw. The communication has prompted the Committee on Constitutional Affairs to look into the institutional aspects of this matter.

1.  Introduction

One of the hallmarks of Community law-making, in the form established by the EC Treaty, is the virtually all-embracing exclusive right of initiative accorded to the Commission, tantamount almost to a monopoly. Barring rare exceptions, all legislative acts in the EC are adopted ‘on a proposal from the Commission’. But the Commission is not the Legislator. Instead, the laws proposed by the Commission are adopted either by the Council alone or by Parliament and the Council acting jointly. The EC Treaty thus brings the three institutions into an institutional balance where legislation is concerned.

To preserve that balance, each institution must, first of all, allow for the powers of the others and refrain from overstepping its own powers. The principle of institutional balance, however, also requires the institutions to work in active and honest cooperation extending beyond the written procedural rules. That is a sine qua non if the Union is to operate democratically under the rule of law. The institutional balance principle accordingly entails specific legal obligations that the institutions have to observe when exercising the powers conferred on them by the Treaty. Consequently, in law-making as in other areas, the substance and extent of the institutions’ powers do not derive solely from the written text of the Treaties.

2.  Basis of the Commission’s power to modify and withdraw its proposals

Under Article 250(2) TEC the Commission may alter a proposal even after the legislative procedure has got under way. It can alter a proposal by replacing, adding to, or removing given provisions. The partial withdrawal of a legislative proposal is thus a modification expressly provided for in Article 250(2) TEC.

On the other hand, the Commission’s power to withdraw an entire legislative proposal is not mentioned in the EC Treaty in so many words. It does, however, constitute the logical extension to the power to modify proposals under Article 250(2) TEC because both powers together, the power to alter proposals and the power to withdraw them, are needed in order to provide the counterpart to the Commission’s right of initiative.

3.  Time limit applying to the Commission’s power to modify and withdraw its proposals

Article 250(2) TEC stipulates that after the Commission has submitted a legislative proposal, it may alter it at any time as long as the Council has not acted. This arrangement therefore not only establishes the basis for the Commission’s power to modify its proposals, but also limits it in time. The limit applies equally to the complementary power to withdraw proposals also deriving from Article 250(2) TEC.

In addition, this provision applies to all of the legislative procedures set out in the Treaty. Interpretations diverge, however, especially where the cooperation and codecision procedures are concerned, as to the stage described in Article 250(2) TEC. The Court of Justice has had no occasion to date to rule on this point. In its opinion delivered at the request of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, Parliament’s Legal Service reached the following conclusion:

In the codecision procedure the Commission may withdraw its proposal at first reading. However, once the Council has adopted its common position, that option is no longer open.

This interpretation does not, moreover, clash with Article 251(2) TEC, which requires the Commission merely to inform Parliament before second reading of its attitude to the Council common position and to such amendments as Parliament might table at second reading. These provisions thus clearly demonstrate that, for the purposes of the EC Treaty, the Commission is at this stage of the procedure no longer considered the ‘owner’ of the area to be legislated for; accordingly, they confirm the view that once the procedure has progressed to this stage, the Commission has no power whatsoever to withdraw or alter the proposed legislation.

Obviously, the foregoing applies equally to the cooperation procedure. In that procedure, therefore, when the Council acts as provided for in Article 250(2) TEC, in so doing establishing the cut-off point for the power to modify or withdraw the initial proposal, it adopts a common position as referred to in Article 252(a) TEC.

A Council common position naturally cannot serve to limit the Commission’s power to modify or withdraw its initial proposal unless it has itself been adopted in accordance with the rules. An unlawful common position would produce no effect. This would be the case especially if the Council, in acting to adopt a common position, were to overstep its power to amend the Commission proposal, for instance by replacing the proposed area to be regulated with something completely new. An act of that kind would in reality constitute an independent legislative initiative by the Council, which would have no effect, because it would have no basis in the Treaty. It follows that it could not serve either to limit the Commission’s power to modify or withdraw its proposal, even if it had been formally adopted as a ‘common position’.

4.  Exercise of the Commission’s power to modify and withdraw its proposals.

There is nothing in the EC Treaty that expressly dictates how the Commission should exercise its power to modify and withdraw its proposals. This does not mean, however, that there is a legal vacuum. In particular, the principles of institutional balance and honest cooperation among the institutions impose a general obligation on the Commission to take account of Parliament’s role in the legislative process and refrain from using its powers in such a way as to circumvent it. There is no dispute between the Commission and Parliament about the fact that such an obligation exists; to some extent, points 31 to 33 of the framework agreement of 26 May 2005 on relations between Parliament and the Commission (Framework Agreement) have already translated it into a mutual understanding.

It would obviously be highly desirable if the institutions concerned, instead of just giving partial effect to this general obligation, could reach a common understanding to translate it comprehensively into practice. Parliament should, in any event, put forward guidelines setting out its point of view. To that end, a distinction needs to be made between two types of situations:

- cases where the Commission modifies or withdraws proposed legislation at the instigation of Parliament, and

- cases where the Commission modifies or withdraws proposed legislation on its own initiative.

(a) Modification and withdrawal at the instigation of Parliament

In points 31 and 33 of the Framework Agreement the Commission and Parliament have laid down the following arrangement:

‘The Commission undertakes to carefully examine amendments to its legislative proposals adopted by Parliament, with a view to taking them into account in any amended proposal.’

‘For legislative procedures not entailing codecision, the Commission ... undertakes, if appropriate, to withdraw a legislative proposal that Parliament has rejected. If, for important reasons and after consideration by the College, the Commission decides to maintain its proposal, it shall explain the reasons for that decision in a statement before Parliament.’

Within their respective areas of application these two provisions are entirely in keeping with the institutional balance established by the EC Treaty. They do not, however, cover every case that needs to be regulated. In the first place, as regards the current rule that the Commission is obliged as a matter of principle to withdraw a proposal rejected by Parliament, its scope is explicitly restricted to those legislative procedures not entailing codecision. Secondly, the agreement requires the Commission to explain its position to Parliament only when, despite Parliament’s rejection, it wishes to keep its proposal on the table. No such arrangement applies when the Commission intends to disregard substantial amendments by Parliament. There is, however, no apparent reason why cases not covered by the Framework Agreement, but of a comparable type, should be treated differently from cases expressly regulated by the agreement.

(b) Modification and withdrawal on the initiative of the Commission

In point 32 of the Framework Agreement on relations between Parliament and the Commission the two institutions have laid down the following arrangement:

‘The Commission shall give Parliament and the Council prior notification before withdrawing its proposals.’

The Commission’s undertaking to give Parliament prior notification is undoubtedly a necessary precondition: any failure to satisfy it would rule out the possibility of a withdrawal procedure according to the spirit of honest cooperation. But it is definitely not sufficient. Earlier on the Commission accordingly took another step in the same direction with its communication of 27 September 2005, in which, rather than wiating to report on decisions already reached, it spelled out its intentions regarding the withdrawal of proposals. Yet even this is not enough on its own to completely fulfil the requirements of honest cooperation.

The only situation that could rightly be termed honest cooperation between the Commission and Parliament would be one in which the Commission informed Parliament in sufficient time and detail to enable it to deliver an opinion on the intended withdrawal of a proposal. The substance of Parliament’s opinion could naturally not be regarded as binding on the Commission under the Treaty as it presently stands. On the other hand, the opinion would be reduced to a mere formality if the Commission did not offer a quid pro quo by at the very least promising to consider Parliament’s views carefully and take them duly into account in its final decision. Needless to say, the Commission would also have to tell Parliament why it had disregarded its opinion if that case arose.

For the reasons described above the applicability of these principles should not be confined to cases in which the Commission withdraws a legislative proposal (as a whole). When the Commission substantially alters a proposal (for instance by withdrawing large parts of the text), an approach along these lines is again the only way in which the imperatives of the honest cooperation principle can be properly satisfied.

5.  Conclusion

The roles to be played by the individual institutions in the legislative process are assigned to them by the EC Treaty. By definition, apportionment of powers by this means cannot likewise deal expressly with all points related to their exercise. That task is conferred under the Treaty on the institutions themselves, which have to agree on how they are to work together. That is what is already laid down at present in Article 218(1) of the EC Treaty and also provided for in Article III-397 of the European Constitution. What is involved, therefore, is a constitutional duty of the institutions to flesh out the Union’s institutional structure. By producing this report the Committee on Constitutional Affairs is making its own contribution to help accomplish the task.


OPINION of the Committee on Legal Affairs (22.3.2006)

for the Committee on Constitutional Affairs

on the outcome of the screening of legislative proposals pending before the Legislator

(2005/2214(INI))

Draftswoman: Maria Berger

SUGGESTIONS

The Committee on Legal Affairs calls on the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions in its motion for a resolution:

A.   whereas, as an outcome of its screening of pending legislation, the Commission is envisaging the withdrawal of 68 proposals regarded as inconsistent with the Lisbon objectives or Better Regulation principles,

B.    whereas the withdrawal of the four proposals concerning the Statute for a European association, the Statute for a European mutual society and the involvement of employees therein cannot be justified in the light of Better Regulation principles, since, in point of fact, those proposals aim at actually improving the regulatory environment in the interests of European citizens and, therefore, can in no way be equated with the imposition of needless bureaucratic burdens,

C.   whereas it is commonly believed that the Commission has the right to withdraw pending proposals, pursuant to Article 250(2) of the EC Treaty, as long as the Council has not acted, and that, within the codecision procedure, that provision allows such withdrawal as long as the first reading has not been completed within the European Parliament and ‘sealed’ by the Council’s adoption of a common position,

D.   whereas Article 250(2) of the EC Treaty, although originally conceived for the consultation procedure, has to be interpreted in the light and in the spirit of Article 251 of that Treaty and whereas, as a result, it can never compromise the position of the European Parliament within the decision-making process,

E.    whereas, whenever a common position is adopted after the first reading, the third indent of the second subparagraph of Article 251(2) of the EC Treaty only allows the Commission to inform the European Parliament of its own position and whereas, if the common position is subsequently amended by Parliament, point (c) in the third subparagraph of Article 251(2) only allows the Commission to deliver an opinion, so that it is clear that the Commission is no longer the ‘owner’ of its proposals and is not free to withdraw them,

F.    whereas in any case, pursuant to Article 10 of the EC Treaty, the principle of genuine cooperation allows the Commission to withdraw its proposals only if this does not affect the role and the competence of the European Parliament as a democratic decision-maker,

1.    Considers that, within the codecision procedure, even if from a legal point of view the Commission may withdraw its proposals pending the adoption of the common position by the Council, any such withdrawal must, in any case, be consistent with the principle of genuine cooperation as laid down in Article 10 of the EC Treaty and as applicable between the European Institutions;

2.    Calls on the Commission to respect the principle of genuine cooperation whenever, pursuant to Rule 55 of its own Rules of Procedure, the European Parliament asks the Commission to withdraw its proposals;

3.    Considers that after the common position has been adopted, the Treaty does not empower the Commission to withdraw its legislative proposal and that this limitation concretely applies to the package of pending legislation listed in the Annex to the Commission’s communication COM(2005)0462;

4.    Invites the Commission to consult the European Parliament in respect of each proposal which the Commission intends to withdraw and to take Parliament’s opinion into the fullest consideration; invites the Commission, in any case, to treat Parliament and the Council on equal terms;

5.    Invites the Commission to use the right to withdraw its proposals with a view to greater consistency of pending legislation with the Better Regulation principles and Lisbon objectives, such as high rates of employment, social protection, economic growth and administrative simplification;

6.    Strongly deplores the fact that the Commission has already decided to withdraw the following proposals:

(a)   proposal for a regulation on the Statute for a European association (COD/1991/0386)(1),

(b)   proposal for a directive supplementing that Statute with regard to the involvement of employees (COD/1991/0387)(2),

(c)   proposal for a regulation on the Statute for a European mutual society (COD/1991/0390)(3) and

(d)   proposal for a directive supplementing that Statute with regard to the involvement of employees (COD/1991/0391)(4).

PROCEDURE

Title

The outcome of the screening of legislative proposals pending before the Legislator

Procedure number

2005/2214(INI)

Committee responsible

AFCO

Opinion by
  Date announced in plenary

JURI
17.11.2005

Enhanced cooperation – date announced in plenary

 

Drafts(wo)man
  Date appointed

Maria Berger
12.12.2005

Previous drafts(wo)man

 

Discussed in committee

23.2.2006

21.3.2006

 

 

 

Date adopted

21.3.2006

Result of final vote

+:

–:

0:

17

0

0

Members present for the final vote

Maria Berger, Rosa Díez González, Bert Doorn, Monica Frassoni, Giuseppe Gargani, Piia-Noora Kauppi, Klaus-Heiner Lehne, Katalin Lévai, Hans-Peter Mayer, Aloyzas Sakalas, Francesco Enrico Speroni, Gabriele Hildegard Stauner, Andrzej Jan Szejna, Diana Wallis, Rainer Wieland, Jaroslav Zvěřina, Tadeusz Zwiefka

Substitute(s) present for the final vote

Jean-Paul Gauzès

Substitute(s) under Rule 178(2) present for the final vote

 

Comments (available in one language only)

...

(1)

OJ C 99, 21.4.1992, p. 1.

(2)

OJ C 99, 21.4.1992, p. 14.

(3)

OJ C 99, 21.4.1992, p. 40.

(4)

OJ C 99, 21.4.1992, p. 57.


PROCEDURE

Title

The outcome of the screening of legislative proposals pending before the Legislator

Procedure number

2005/2214(INI)

Committee responsible
  Date authorisation announced in plenary

AFCO
17.11.2005

Committee(s) asked for opinion(s)
  Date announced in plenary

All
17.11.2005

 

 

 

 

Not delivering opinion(s)
  Date of decision

AFET
23.1.2006

DEVE
25.1.2006

INTA
23.11.2005

BUDG
15.3.2006

CONT
25.1.2006

 

ECON
16.11.2005

EMPL
27.10.2005

ENVI
21.2.2006

ITRE
13.12.2005

IMCO
30.1.2006

 

TRAN
11.10.2005

REGI
21.11.2005

AGRI
29.11.2005

PECH
21.11.2005

CULT
23.11.2005

 

LIBE
23.1.2006

FEMM
29.11.2005

PETI
24.4.2006

 

 

Enhanced cooperation
  Date announced in plenary

 

 

 

 

 

Rapporteur(s)
  Date appointed

Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann
17.11.2005

 

Previous rapporteur(s)

 

 

Discussed in committee

29.11.2005

23.1.2006

21.2.2006

22.2.2006

20.3.2006

Date adopted

25.4.2006

Result of final vote

+

-

0

13

0

0

Members present for the final vote

Jens-Peter Bonde, Richard Corbett, Jean-Luc Dehaene, Andrew Duff, Maria da Assunção Esteves, Ingo Friedrich, Bronisław Geremek, Genowefa Grabowska, Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, Jo Leinen, Íñigo Méndez de Vigo, Johannes Voggenhuber

Substitute(s) present for the final vote

Jacek Protasiewicz, György Schöpflin

Substitute(s) under Rule 178(2) present for the final vote

 

Date tabled

26.4.2006

Comments
(available in one language only)

 

Last updated: 1 August 2006Legal notice