dwar il-proposta għal regolament tal-Kunsill li jemenda r-regolament (KE, Euratom) nru 1605/2002 tal-Kunsill dwar ir-Regolament Finanzjarju applikabbli għall-baġit ġenerali tal-Komunitajiet Ewropej
ABBOZZ TA' RIŻOLUZZJONI LEĠIŻLATTIVA TAL-PARLAMENT EWROPEW
dwar il-proposta għal regolament tal-Kunsill li jemenda r-regolament (KE, Euratom) nru 1605/2002 tal-Kunsill dwar ir-Regolament Finanzjarju applikabbli għall-baġit ġenerali tal-Komunitajiet Ewropej
– wara li kkunsidra l-proposta tal-Kummissjoni lill-Kunsill (COM(2005)0181)(1),
– wara li kkunsidra l-Artikolu 279 tat-Trattat KE, li b'konformità miegħu l-Parlament ġie kkonsultat mill-Kunsill (C6-0027/2005),
– wara li kkunsidra l-Artikolu 51 tar-Regoli ta' Proċedura tiegħu,
– wara li kkunsidra r-rapport tal-Kumitat għall-Baġit u l-opinjonijiet tal-Kumitat għall-Iżvilupp u l-Kumitat għall-Kontroll tal-Baġit (A6-0057/2006),
1. Japprova l-proposta tal-Kummissjoni kif emendata;
2. Jistieden lill-Kummissjoni sabiex tbiddel il-proposta tagħha f'dan is-sens, skond l-Artikolu 250(2) tat-Trattat KE u l-Artikolu 119, it-tieni subparagrafu, tat-Trattat Euratom;
3. Jistieden lill-Kunsill biex jinfurmah jekk ikollu l-ħsieb li jitbiegħed mit-test approvat mill-Parlament;
4. Jitlob il-ftuħ tal-proċedura ta' konċiljazzjoni skond id-Dikjarazzjoni Konġunta ta' l-4 ta' Marzu, 1975 jekk il-Kunsill ikollu l-intenzjoni li jitbiegħed mit-test approvat mill-Parlament;
5. Jitlob lill-Kunsill biex jikkonsultah mill-ġdid jekk ikollu l-ħsieb li jimmodifika l-proposta tal-Kummissjoni b'mod sustanzjali;
6. Jagħti istruzzjonijiet lill-President tiegħu sabiex jgħaddi l-pożizzjoni tal-Parlament lill-Kunsill u lill-Kummissjoni.
Test propost mill-Kummissjoni
Emendi tal-Parlament
Emenda 1
PREMESSA 1
(1) Ir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE, Euratom) Nru. 1605/2002, minn hawn 'il quddiem ir-“Regolament Finanzjarju”, jistipula l-pendamenti legali tar-riforma tal-ġestjoni finanzjarja. Fil-fatt, l-elementi essenzjali tiegħu għandhom jinżammu u jiġu msaħħa. Barra minn hekk, dan jistabbilixxi prinċipji tal-budget li għandhom jiġu rrispettati mill-atti leġislattivi kollha u li minnu d-derogi għandhom jinżammu għall-minimu strett.
(1) Ir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE, Euratom) Nr. 1605/2002, minn hawn 'il quddiem imsejjaħ ir-“Regolament Finanzjarju”, jistipula l-pedamenti legali tar-riforma tal-ġestjoni finanzjarja. Fil-fatt, l-elementi essenzjali tiegħu għandhom jinżammu u jiġu msaħħa. Barra minn hekk, ir-Regolament Finanzjarju jistabbilixxi prinċipji tal-baġet,li joħorgu mill-Artikolu 268 u l-artikolu ta' wara dan tat-Trattat KE, li għandhom jiġu rrispettati mill-atti leġislattivi kollha u li minnu d-derogi għandhom jinżammu għall-minimu strett.
Ġustifikazzjoni
Les principes budgétaires sont essentiellement énoncés aux articles 268 et suivants du traité CE.
Emenda 2
PREMESSA 2
(2) Ċerti emendi huma ġustifikati fid-dawl ta’ l-esperjenza prattika sabiex tiġi ffaċilitata l-implimentazzjoni tal-budget u r-realizzazzjoni ta’ l-għanijiet tal-politika tal-bażi u sabiex jiġu aġġustati xi ħtiġijiet proċedurali u dokumentarji sabiex dawn isiru aktar proporzjonati għar-riskji u l-ispiża involuta.
(2) Ċerti emendi huma ġustifikati fid-dawl ta’ l-esperjenza prattika sabiex tiġi ffaċilitata l-implimentazzjoni tal-baġit u r-realizzazzjoni ta’ l-għanijiet tal-politika tal-bażi u sabiex fir-Regolament Finanzjarju jiddaħħal b'mod espliċitu l-prinċipju, msemmi fl-Artikolu 5 tat-Trattat KE, ta' proporzjonalità ta' l-azzjoni tal-Komunità sabiex jiġi enfasizzat il-bżonn li din tinżamm f'proporzjonijiet ġusti mar-riskji u l-ispiża involuta.
Ġustifikazzjoni
Il est opportun de rappeler le principe général de proportionnalité de l'action des institutions de la Communauté afin d'éviter qu'elle ne soit à l'origine de charges disproportionnées pour les citoyens de l'Union et les tiers.
Emenda 3
PREMESSA 3
L-emendi kollha għandhom jikkontribwixxu għall-kisba ta' l-għanijiet tar-riformi tal-Kummissjoni, għandhom jgħinu sabiex itejjbu jew jiżguraw ġestjoni finanzjarja soda, u għandhom isaħħu l-protezzjoni ta’ l-interessi finanzjarji tal-Komunitajiet kontra l-frodi u l-attivitajiet illegali, li b'hekk jikkontribwixxu għall-kisba ta' assigurazzjoni raġonevoli tal-legalità u r-regolarità ta' l-operazzjonijiet finanzjarji.
L-emendi kollha għandhom jikkontribwixxu għall-kisba ta' l-għanijiet tar-riformi tal-Kummissjoni, għandhom jgħinu sabiex itejjbu jew jiżguraw ġestjoni finanzjarja soda, u għandhom jagħmlu l-protezzjoni ta’ l-interessi finanzjarji tal-Komunitajiet kontra l-frodi u l-attivitajiet illegali iktar effikaċi, li b'hekk jikkontribwixxu għall-kisba ta' assigurazzjoni raġonevoli tal-legalità u r-regolarità ta' l-operazzjonijiet finanzjarji.
Emenda 4
PREMESSA 5 a (ġdida)
(5a) Bi qbil mal-punt 1 tal-Protokoll dwar l-applikazzjoni tal-prinċipju ta' sussidjarjetà u ta' proporzjonalità anness mat-Trattat ta' Amsterdam tat-2 ta' Ottubru 1997, kull istituzzjoni, fl-eżerċitar tal-poteri tagħha, għandha tiżgura l-ħarsien tal-prinċipju ta' proporzjonalità skond liema prinċipju l-azzjoni tal-Komunità m'għandhiex tkun iktar minn kemm hu meħtieġ biex l-objettivi tat-Trattat jintlaħqu.
Ġustifikazzjoni
Il est opportun de rappeler le principe général de proportionnalité de l'action des institutions de la Communauté afin d'éviter qu'elle ne soit à l'origine de charges disproportionnées pour les citoyens de l'Union et les tiers.
Emenda 5
PREMESSA 6
Fuq ċerti punti, hemm bżonn ta’ aktar effiċjenza u trasparenza fir-rigward ta’ l-applikazzjoni tal-prinċipji tal-budget, sabiex ikunu aktar xierqa għall-ħtiġijiet operazzjonali.
(6) L-applikazzjoni tar-Regolament Finanzjarju fil-prattika wera li, f'xi każi, l-atturi ma jużawx biżżejjed d-diskrezzjonalità tagħhom fl-eżerċitar tal-kompetenzi tagħhom.Fl-istess ħin, l-eżerċitar ta' dawn il-kompetenzi jfisser li, bħala organi eżekuttivi tal-Komunitajiet, dawn jistgħu jiddeterminaw bl-awtonomija kollha, fil-limiti tad-diskrezzjonalità tagħhom, jekk azzjoni hiex proporzjonata fis-sens ta' l-Artikolu 5 tat-Trattat KE u fis-sens tal-Portokoll dwar l-applikazzjoni tal-prinċipji ta' sussidjarjetà u ta' proporzjonalità mehmuża mat-Trattat ta' Amsterdam tat-2 ta' Ottubru 1997.
Ġustifikazzjoni
Une des raisons de la lourdeur des procédures réside dans le peu d'usage que les personnes qui sont appelées à appliquer le règlement financier font de leur marge d'appréciation.
Emenda 6
PREMESSA 12
Fil-preżent, il-Kummissjoni għandha tkun awtorizzata mill-awtorità tal-budget qabel ma taċċetta donazzjonijiet, bħal rigali jew legati, li jinvolvu ħlas. Biex jiġu evitati proċeduri li mhumiex meħtieġa u li huma twal u ineffiċjenti, l-awtorizzazzjonijiet għandhom isiru obbligatorji biss fil-każ ta’ ħlasijiet konsiderevoli.
Fil-preżent, il-Kummissjoni għandha tkun awtorizzata mill-awtorità tal-baġit qabel ma taċċetta donazzjonijiet, bħal rigali jew legati, li jinvolvu ħlas. Biex jiġu evitati proċeduri li mhumiex meħtieġa u li huma twal u ineffiċjenti, l-awtorizzazzjonijiet għandhom isiru obbligatorji fil-każ ta’ ħlasijiet konsiderevoli.
Ġustifikazzjoni
Sauvegarde des droits du Parlement.
Emenda 7
PREMESSA 13
B’relazzjoni mal-prinċipju ta’ speċifikazzjoni tal-budget, ir-regoli li jgħoddu għat-trasferimenti ta’ approporjazzjonijiet għandhom jiġu ssimplifikati u ċċarati fuq ċerti punti peress illi fil-prattika dawn urew li kienu twal u ineffiċjenti jew mhux ċari.L-intenzjoni kienet li l-Artikolu 22 tar-Regolament Finanzjarju kellu japplika għal istituzzjonijiet oħra ħlief il-Kummissjoni peress illi l-Kummissjoni għandha l-ordni tagħha.B’hekk, dik id-dispożizzjoni għandha tiġi emendata kif imiss.
imħassra
Ġustifikazzjoni
Sauvegarde des droits du Parlement.
Emenda 8
PREMESSA 14
Fir-rigward tal-“proċedura ta’ notifika”, il-Kummissjoni u l-istituzzjonijiet l-oħra jinnotifikaw il-proposti ta’ trasferiment lill-awtorità tal-budget, li tista’ tinvoka l-proċedura normali jekk din tixtieq tqajjem oġġezzjonijiet.F’tali każijiet, in teorija, l-iskadenzi normali japplikaw għad-deċiżjoni ta’ l- awtorità tal-budget dwar it-trasferiment.Madankollu, it-test ma jgħidx meta għandha titqies li bdiet tgħodd l-iskadenza, u dik l-ommissjoni għandha tiġi rimedjata.
imħassra
Ġustifikazzjoni
Sauvegarde des droits du Parlement.
Emenda 9
PREMESSA 16
Għal raġunijiet ta’ effiċjenza, il-Kummissjoni għandha titħalla tiddeċiedi b’mod awtonomu dwar trasferimenti mir-riżerva f’każijiet fejn ma jeżisti l-ebda att bażiku skond l-Artikolu 49 tar-Regolament Finanzjarju għall-ażżjoni kkonċernata fiż-żmien meta ġie stabbilit il-budget, iżda fejn l-att bażiku hu adottat matul is-sena.
imħassra
Ġustifikazzjoni
Sauvegarde des droits du Parlement.
Emenda 10
PREMESSA 17
IR-regoli dwar it-trasferimenti amministrattivi tal-Kummissjoni għandhom ikunu adattati għall-istruttura l-ġdida ta’ bbaġittjar ibbażat fuq l-attività (Activity-Based Budgeting (ABB).B’hekk, il-“proċedura ta’ notifika” għandha tkun limitata għal trasferimenti bejn artikoli, fil-kapitoli amministrattivi ta’ kull titolu, li jeċċedu 10% ta’ l-approporjazzjonijiet tas-sena.Min-naħa l-oħra, trasferimenti bejn artikoli ta’ titoli differenti li jiffinanzjaw l-ispiża ta’ natura identika għandha tkun deċiża b’mod awtonomu mill-Kummissjoni.
imħasara
Ġustifikazzjoni
Sauvegarde des droits du Parlement.
Emenda 11
PREMESSA 22 A (ġdida)
(22a) Ir-reġim dwar ir-responsabilità ta' l-uffiċjali awtorizzanti għandu jiġi ċċarat sabiex ikun hemm iktar siġurtà ġuridika.
Emenda 12
PREMESSA 27
(27) Għandu jiġi introdott perijodu ta’ limitazzjoni fuq il-validità tat-talbiet. Il-Komunità, b’differenza għal bosta mill-Istati Membri tagħha, mhix suġġetta għal perijodu ta’ limitazzjoni li talbiet finanzjarji jiġu meħlusa wara ċertu perijodu ta’ żmien. Il-Komunità lanqas ma hi ristretta minn perijodu ta’ limitazzjoni fl-insegwiment tat-talbiet tagħha kontra terzi persuni. L-introduzzjoni tat-tali perijodu ta’ limitazzjoni f’Artikolu 73b ġdid tikkorrispondi għal ġestjoni finanzjarja soda.
(27) Għandu jiġi introdott perijodu ta’ limitazzjoni fuq il-validità tat-talbiet. Il-Komunità, b’differenza għal bosta mill-Istati Membri tagħha, mhix suġġetta għal perijodu ta’ limitazzjoni li talbiet finanzjarji jiġu meħlusa wara ċertu perijodu ta’ żmien. Il-Komunità lanqas ma hi ristretta minn perijodu ta’ limitazzjoni fl-insegwiment tat-talbiet tagħha kontra terzi persuni. L-introduzzjoni tat-tali perijodu ta’ limitazzjoni f’Artikolu 73b ġdid tikkorrispondi għal ġestjoni finanzjarja soda. Madankollu, min jikkawża preġudizzju volontarju ma jistax jirrikorri għal dan il-perijodu ta' limitazzjoni daqs l-imdejnin l-oħra.Bħala konsegwenza, il-bidu tal-perijodu ta' limitazzjoni għandu jiġi llimitat għall-mument meta l-kontenut tat-talbiet jiġi dokumentat.
Emenda 13
PREMESSA 27 A (ġdida)
(27a) Meta jkun possibbli u xieraq, il-proċeduri ta' kuntratti għandhom isiru fuq livell interistituzzjonali sabiex jitnaqqsu l-ispejjeż amministrattivi ta' l-intrapriżi żgħar.
Emenda 14
PREMESSA 27 B (ġdida)
(27 b) Fil-qasam tal-kuntratti ta' provvisti u ta' servizzi, il-proċeduri għandhom jitwessgħu u jiġu adattati għall-bżonnijiet ta' dawk li jitfgħu l-offerta.F'dan il-qafas, għandu jiġi żgurat, b'mod partikulari, li l-prinċipju ta' proporzjonalità jiġi applikat ukoll għall-dokumenti neċessarji.Ir-Regolament Finanzjarju għandu jikkunsidra kuntratti ta' qafas.Il-kompetizzjoni m'għandhiex tkun llimitata minn obbligi kuntrattwali twal b'mod eċċessiv marbuta ma' kuntratti ta' qafas, u l-intrapriżi żgħar u ta' daqs medju m'għandhomx jitħallew barra mill-proċeduri ta' kuntratti, a priori, minħabba d-daqs tagħhom.
Emenda 15
PREMESSA 29
Ir-regoli tar-Regolament Finanzjarju dwar l-esklużjoni ta’ dawk li jitfgħu l-offerti timponi sistema aktar severa għall-istituzzjonijiet tal-Komunità milli dik pprovduta fid-Direttiva 2004/18/KE. Ir-Regolament Finanzjarju ma jagħmlu l-ebda distinzjoni bejn l-aktar raġunijiet serji għall-esklużjoni u raġunijiet oħra.Id-Direttiva 2004/18/KE, min-naħa l-oħra, tagħmel din id-distinzjoni u dik id-distinzjoni għandha ssir disponibbli għall-istituzzjonijiet tal-Komunità.L-Artikoli 93 u 94 tar-Regolament Finanzjarju għandhom jipprovdu għall-esklużjoni mandatarja fl-aktar każijiet serji, waqt li jippermettu għall-possibbiltà li l-awtorità kontraenti żżid każijiet oħra ta’ esklużjoni, fuq il-bażi ta' valutazzjoni tar-riskju.L-istess distinzjoni għandha ssir fl-Artikolu 114 tar-Regolament Finanzjarju, fir-rigward ta’ l-għotjiet.Ir-regoli fuq il-penalitajiet, ipprovduti fl-Artikolu 96 tar-Regolament Finanzjarju għandhom għalhekk jiġu aġġustati.
Ir-regoli tar-Regolament Finanzjarju dwar l-esklużjoni ta’ dawk li jitfgħu l-offerti timponi sistema aktar severa għall-istituzzjonijiet tal-Komunità milli dik pprovduta fid-Direttiva 2004/18/KE. Fil-qafas ta' l-esklużjoni ta' dawk li jitfgħu l-offerta, għandu japplika l-prinċipju ta' proporzjonalità It-tul ta' l-esklużjoni għandu jiġi llimitat għal massimu ta' għaxar snin sabiex jiġu evitati sanzjonijiet mhux proporzjonati.Esklużjoni ta' iktar minn ħames snin għandha tingħata biss fuq il-bażi ta' sentenza definitiva.
Emenda 16
PREMESSA 30 A (ġdida)
(30a) Id-dokumenti ġustifikattivi mitluba għandhom ikunu l-minimu neċessarju.Id-dokumentazzjoni għandha tkun ibbażata, fost l-oħrajn, fuq il-valur tal-kuntratt.
Ġustifikazzjoni
Afin d'éviter une interprétation restrictive par la Commission, limitant la documentation aux marchés concernant de petites subventions, les termes "entre autres" ont été ajoutés à l'amendement 16 du rapporteur.
Emenda 17
PREMESSA 30 B (ġdida)
(30b) Fil-każ ta' dokumenti esterni li jiċċertifikaw l-integrità u l-onestà ta' l-amministrazzjoni, l-uffiċjali tal-Komunitajiet, qabel ma jipparteċipaw, għandhom jinfurmaw b'mod sistematiku lil ta' fuqhom, fil-qafas tal-proċeduri ta' għoti ta' kuntratti u ta' assistenza, f'kull każ, sabiex tiġi evitata kull possibilità ta' kunflitt ta' interessi.
Emenda 18
PREMESSA 32 A (ġdida)
(32 a) Dawk li jitfgħu l-offerta u li ma jkunux intgħażlu, bħal fil-każ ta' l-Istati Membri, għandu jkollhom mezzi għal rikors legali.Għal dan il-għan, hemm bżonn li jitwaqqfu awtoritajiet ta' kontroll indipendenti biex jivverifikaw ta' malajr u bla formalitajiet mhux proporzjonati l-proċeduri ta' kuntratti u sabiex jiżguraw protezzjoni legali effikaċi.
Emenda 19
PREMESSA 32 B (ġdida)
(32b) Il-ħarsien ta' l-interessi finanzjarji ta' l-Unjoni għandu jkun marbut mal-mezzi tal-fornitur.It-tressiq ta' garanziji minn dan ta' l-aħħar għandu jkun limitat għall-każi li jkunu ġustifikati kif xieraq u m'għandux jaqbeż il-miżuri neċessarji.
Emenda 20
PREMESSA 34
(34) Fir-rigward ta’ l-għotjiet, hemm bżonn ta’ simplifikazzjoni tar-regoli. Il-ħtiġijiet għal iċċekkjar u għal garanziji għandhom ikunu aktar proporzjonali għar-riskji finanzjarji involuti.Xi bidliet essenzjali għandhom isiru l-ewwel fir-Regolament Finanzjarju, sabiex dispożizzjonijiet dettaljati jistgħu isiru aktar tard fir-Regoli ta’ Implimentazzjoni.L-iskop ta’ l-għotjiet għandu bżonn jiġi ċċarat fl-Artikolu 108 tar-Regolament Finanzjarju, partikularment fir-rigward tal-finanzjament li jikkonċerna l-attivitajiet ta’ self u ishma. Għandu jiġi miżjud il-prinċipju tal-proporzjonalità.
(34) Fir-rigward ta’ l-għotjiet, hemm bżonn ta’ simplifikazzjoni tar-regoli. Il-ħtiġiet tal-partijiet fil-proċeduri għandhom dejjem ikunu proporzjonati.Għal dan il-għan, it-talbiet mhux validi għandhom jiġu eliminati mill-iktar fis possibli matul il-proċedura sabiex jiġu evitati sforzi mhux neċessarji għall-fornituri.Il-kamp ta' applikazzjoni ta’ l-għotjiet għandu bżonn jiġi ċċarat fl-Artikolu 108 tar-Regolament Finanzjarju, partikularment fir-rigward tal-finanzjament li jikkonċerna l-attivitajiet ta’ self u ishma. F'dak li jikkonċerna l-għajnuniet ta' importanza minima, għandu jkun hemm il-possiblità li dawn jitwettqu fuq il-bażi ta' deċiżjoni individwali iktar milli permezz ta' ftehima ddettaljata u kumplessa.
Ġustifikazzjoni
Il est opportun de rappeler le principe général de proportionnalité de l'action des institutions de la Communauté afin d'éviter qu'elle ne soit à l'origine de charges disproportionnées pour les citoyens de l'Union et les tiers.
Emenda 21
PREMESSA 36
(36) Ir-regola li l-għotjiet għandhom jiġu aġġudikati fuq il-bażi ta’ sejħiet għal proposti wriet l-importanza tagħha. L-esperjenza wriet, madankollu, li f’ċerti sitwazzjonijiet, in-natura ta’ l-azzjoni ma tħalli l-ebda għażla fl-għażla tal-benefiċjarji, u l-Artikolu 110 tar-Regolament Finanzjarju għandu jirrikonoxxi espressament li tali każijiet eċċezzjonali jistgħu iseħħu.
(36) Ir-regola li l-għotjiet għandhom jiġu aġġudikati fuq il-bażi ta’ sejħiet għal proposti wriet l-importanza tagħha. F'dak li jikkonċerna s-sigurtà ġuridika u fil-qasam tal-pjanifikazzjoni, għandu jiġi żgurat li l-kundizzjonijiet mitluba mill-fornituri fil-bidu ta' proċedura ma jkunux modifikati matul il-proċedura.L-esperjenza wriet, madankollu, li f’ċerti sitwazzjonijiet, in-natura ta’ l-azzjoni ma tħalli l-ebda għażla fl-għażla tal-benefiċjarji, u l-Artikolu 110 tar-Regolament Finanzjarju għandu jirrikonoxxi espressament li tali każijiet eċċezzjonali jistgħu iseħħu.
Emenda 22
PREMESSA 37
(37) Ir-regola li l-istess azzjoni ma għandhiex toħloq aktar minn għotja waħda lil benefiċjarju wieħed, għandha tkun aġġustata peress illi xi atti bażiċi jippermettu li l-iffinanzjar Komunitarju jiġi kkombinat u tali każijiet jistgħu jiżdiedu sabiex jiżguraw l-effettività ta’ l-ispiża.Madankollu, għandha tittieħed din l-opportunita sabiex tagħmilha ċara, fl-Artikolu 111 tar-Regolament Finanzjarju, li l-istess spejjeż ma jistgħu qatt jiġu ffinanzjati darbtejn mill-budget tal-Komunità.
(37) Għandha tittieħed din l-opportunità sabiex tagħmilha ċara, fl-Artikolu 111 tar-Regolament Finanzjarju, li l-istess spejjeż ma jistgħu qatt jiġu ffinanzjati darbtejn mill-baġit tal-Komunità u li limitu massimu ta' 100% mill-ispiża li tista' tibbenifika minn finanzjament ma jistax jinqabeż.
Ġustifikazzjoni
Réagencement des amendements.
Emenda 23
PREMESSA 39
(39) Għal raġunijiet ta’ ċarezza u ta’ trasparenza, l-użu ta’ pagamenti b’rata fissa għandhom ikunu awtorizzati f’Artikolu 113a ġdid tar-Regolament Finanzjarju, biex teżisti bħala sistema flimkien mal-metodu aktar tradizzjonali tar-rimborż ta’ l-ispejjeż li fil-fatt intefqu.
(39) Għal raġunijiet ta’ ċarezza u ta’ trasparenza, l-użu ta’ pagamenti b’rata fissa għandhom ikunu awtorizzati f’Artikolu 113a ġdid tar-Regolament Finanzjarju, biex teżisti bħala sistema flimkien mal-metodu aktar tradizzjonali tar-rimborż ta’ l-ispejjeż li fil-fatt intefqu. L-ispejjeż li jistgħu jibbenifikaw minn finanzjament għandhom jiġu ċċarati.
Emenda 24
PREMESSA 40
(40) Fl-Artikolu 114 tar-Regolament Finanzjarju, ċerti restrizzjonijiet fuq l-eliġibilità tal-benefiċjarji għandhom jitneħħew sabiex jkun hemm il-possibbiltà ta’ għotjiet għal persuni naturali u ċerti tipi ta’ entitajiet li ma għandhomx personalità legali.
(40) L-obbligi fil-qasam ta' dokumenti ġustifikattivi li jintalbu minn dawk li jibbenefikaw minn għotjiet kif ukoll is-sanzjonijiet li jingħatawlhom għandhom f'kull każ ikunu proporzjonati mar-riskju.Barra minn hekk, l-Artikolu 114 tar-Regolament Finanzjarju, ċerti restrizzjonijiet fuq l-eliġibilità tal-benefiċjarji għandhom jitneħħew sabiex jkun hemm il-possibbiltà ta’ għotjiet għal persuni naturali u ċerti tipi ta’ entitajiet li ma għandhomx personalità legali.
Ġustifikazzjoni
Il est opportun de rappeler le principe général de proportionnalité de l'action des institutions de la Communauté afin d'éviter qu'elle ne soit à l'origine de charges disproportionnées pour les citoyens de l'Union et les tiers.
Emenda 25
PREMESSA 40 A (ġdida)
(40a) Sabiex il-persuni li jitolbu finanzjament ikunu infurmati aħjar, għandu jitwaqqaf servizz komuni bl-għan li jarmonizza t-talbiet ta' l-istess natura, li jinforma lil min jagħmel it-talba u li jiżgura segwiment komparattiv (benchmarking) ta' l-iffinanzjar mogħti.
Ġustifikazzjoni
Une légère modification est proposée à l'amendement 95 déposé par le rapporteur, le terme "organe" étant remplacé par "service" pour bien montrer que l'idée est de mettre en commun les connaissances et d'explorer les bonnes pratiques au sein de la Commission en transcendant les différentes interprétations et les différentes pratiques au sein et entre les départements et d'être un point d'information fiable pour les demandeurs.
Emenda 26
PREMESSA 47
(47) Hu meħtieġ li jiġu permessi approprjazzjonijiet diżimpenjati bħala riżultat ta’ nuqqas ta’ implimentazzjoni totali jew parzjali tal-proġetti li għalihom kienu assenjati. Madankollu, l-użu mill-ġdid għandu jkun possibli taħt kondizzjonijiet stretti biss, u biss fil-qasam tar-riċerka peress illi proġetti ta' riċerka jippreżentaw riskju finanzjarju akbar minn dawk f’oqsma oħra ta’ politika.
(47) B'kunsiderazzjoni għall-importanza partikulari ta' l-għajnuna għar-riċerka għall-kompetittività ta' l-Unjoni Ewropea, hu meħtieġ li jiġu permessi approprjazzjonijiet ta' impennji mhux użati jew diżimpenjati bħala riżultat ta’ nuqqas ta’ implimentazzjoni totali jew parzjali tal-proġetti li għalihom kienu assenjati.
Ġustifikazzjoni
Dans le cadre des négociations sur un nouvel accord interinstitutionnel en relation avec les perspectives financières 2007-2013, le Parlement explore la possibilité de réutiliser les crédits d'engagement non utilisés ou dégagés. Une telle réutilisation ne devrait pas être limitée aux fonds de recherche.
Kwalunkwe dispożizzjoni dwar l-implimentazzjoni tad-dħul u n-nefqa tal-budget, f'att leġislattiv ieħor, għandha tkun konformi b'mod partikulari mal-prinċipji tal-budget stipulata fit-Titolu II."
Kwalunkwe dispożizzjoni dwar l-implimentazzjoni tad-dħul u n-nefqa tal-baġit, f'att ġuridiku ieħor, għandha tkun konformi mal-prinċipji tal-baġit stipulata fl-Artikoli 268 u fl-artikoli ta' wara tat-Trattat KE."
Ġustifikazzjoni
La présence des mots "en particulier" est incompréhensible. Ils doivent donc être supprimés. Par contre, les principes budgétaires figurent déjà aux articles 268 et suivants du traité CE.
Kull miżura li permezz tagħha l-istituzzjonijiet iwettqu l-baġit skond dan ir-Regolament għandha tirrispetta l-prinċipju ta' proporzjonalità msemmi fl-Artikolu 5 tat-Trattat KE.
Ġustifikazzjoni
Il est opportun de rappeler le principe général de proportionnalité de l'action des institutions de la Communauté afin d'éviter qu'elle ne soit à l'origine de charges disproportionnées pour les citoyens de l'Union et les tiers.
Jekk, fi proposta għal att legali ieħor, il-Kummissjoni jkollha l-ħsieb li tinqata' mid-dispożizzjonijiet tar-Regolament Finanzjarju, din għandha tinforma b'dan lill-kumitat tal-Parlament Ewropew responsabbli mill-kwistjonijiet baġitarji b'mod espliċitu u separat.
Ġustifikazzjoni
Transparence pour le champ d'application du règlement financier.
“Madankollu, f’każijiet eċċezzjonali ssostanzjati kif imiss, l-approporjazzjonijiet għall-finijiet ta’ għajnuna għall-ġestjoni tal-kriżijiet u operazzjonijiet ta’ għajnuna umanitarja jistgħu jiġu kommessi mill-15 ta’ Diċembru ta’ kull sena kontra l-approprjazzjonijiet ipprovduti għas-sena finanzjarja li jmiss. Tali impenji ma jistgħux jeċċedu kwart ta’ l-approporjazzjonijiet fuq il-linja tal-budget korrispondenti għall-aħħar budget adottat.”
“Madankollu, f’każijiet eċċezzjonali ssostanzjati kif imiss, l-approporjazzjonijiet għall-finijiet ta’ għajnuna għall-ġestjoni tal-kriżijiet u operazzjonijiet ta’ għajnuna umanitarja jistgħu jiġu kommessi mill-15 ta’ Diċembru ta’ kull sena kontra l-approprjazzjonijiet ipprovduti għas-sena finanzjarja li jmiss. Tali impenji ma jistgħux jeċċedu kwart ta’ l-approporjazzjonijiet fuq il-linja tal-baġit korrispondenti għall-aħħar baġit adottat.” L-awtoritajiet baġitarji għandhom ikunu infurmati b'dawn l-impenji. »
Ġustifikazzjoni
Sauvegarde des droits du Parlement.
Emenda 31
ARTIKOLU 1, PUNT 6 A (ġdid) Artikolu 14, paragrafu 2 (Regolament (KE, Euratom) nru 1605/2002)
6a) L-Artikolu 14(2), l-ewwel subparagrafu hu mibdul b’li ġej:
"2. Mingħajr preġudizzju għall-Artikolu 46(1), punt4, il-Komunità Ewropea u l-Komunità Ewropea ta' l-Enerġija Atomika, kif ukoll l-organi maħluqa mill-Komunitajiet imsemmija fl-Artikolu 185, ma jistgħux jagħtu self, barra l-iffinanzjar dirett neċessarju għall-akkwist ta' assi mobbli maħsuba għall-użu ta' l-istituzzjonijiet li għalihom l-awtorità baġitarja tkun ħarġet opinjoni favorevoli skond l-Artikolu 179(3)."
Ġustifikazzjoni
Pour la réalisation de leurs projets immobiliers, les différentes institutions ont du recourir à des formes de financement indirect, alors que des financements directs, via emprunts bancaires, devraient permettre de bénéficier d'un meilleur taux et d'une plus grande transparence.
“L-aċċettazzjoni ta’ donazzjonijiet li jinvolvu ħlas finanzjarju konsiderevoli għandhom ikunu suġġetti għall-awtorizzazzjoni tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill, li għandhom jaġixxu fuq din il-kwistjoni fi żmien xahrejn mid-data tal-wasla tat-talba mill-Kummissjoni.”
“L-aċċettazzjoni ta’ donazzjonijiet li jinvolvu spejjeż konsiderevoli għandhom ikunu suġġetti għall-awtorizzazzjoni tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill, li għandhom jaġixxu fuq din il-kwistjoni fi żmien xahrejn mid-data tal-wasla tat-talba mill-Kummissjoni.”
Ġustifikazzjoni
Sauvegarde des droits du Parlement.
Emenda 34
ARTIKOLU 1, PUNT 10 Artikolu 22, paragrafu 1, punt b (a) (Regolament (KE, Euratom) nru 1605/2002)
(b a) minn artikolu għal ieħor mingħajr ebda limitazzjoni.
Ġustifikazzjoni
Il s'agit de corriger une erreur technique. Il doit être clair que le statu quo est maintenu.
2. Tliet ġimgħat qabel ma jsiru t-trasferimenti msemmija fil-paragrafu 1, l-istituzzjonijiet għandhom jinformaw lill-awtorità tal-budgetu l-Kummissjoni bl-intenzjonijiet tagħhom. Fil-każ li jitqajjmu raġunijiet iġġustifikati kif imiss f’dan il-perijodu minn waħda mill-fergħat ta’ l-awtorità tal-budget, il-proċedura stabbilita fl-Artikolu 24 għandha tapplika.
2. Tliet ġimgħat qabel ma jsiru t-trasferimenti msemmija fil-paragrafu 1, l-istituzzjonijiet għandhom jinformaw lill-awtorità tal-baġit bl-intenzjonijiet tagħhom. Fil-każ li jitqajjmu raġunijiet f’dan il-perijodu minn waħda mill-fergħat ta’ l-awtorità tal-baġit, il-proċedura stabbilita fl-Artikolu 24 għandha tapplika.
L-awtorità tal-budget għandha tieħu deċiżjonijiet dwar dawn it-trasferimenti fit-termini ta’ żmien stipulati fl-Artikolu 24, li għandhom jitqiesu li bdew fid-data li fiha kienet infurmata mill-istituzzjoni tat-trasferiment maħsub.”
3. Kull istituzzjoni minbarra l-Kummissjoni tista’ tipproponi lill-awtorità tal-budget, fis-sezzjoni tagħha tal-budget, trasferiment minn titolu għal ieħor li jeċċedi l-limitu ta’ 10% ta’ l-approporjazzjonijiet għas-sena finanzjarja fil-linja li minnha għandu jsir it-trasferiment. Din għandha tinforma lill-Kummissjoni kif xieraq. Dawk it-trasferimenti għandhom ikunu suġġetti għall-proċeduri mniżżla fl-Artikolu 24.
Kull istituzzjoni minbarra l-Kummissjoni tista’ tipproponi lill-awtorità tal-baġit, fis-sezzjoni tagħha tal-baġit, trasferiment minn titolu għal ieħor li jeċċedi l-limitu ta’ 10% ta’ l-approporjazzjonijiet għas-sena finanzjarja fil-linja li minnha għandu jsir it-trasferiment. Dawk it-trasferimenti għandhom ikunu suġġetti għall-proċeduri mniżżla fl-Artikolu 24.
Ġustifikazzjoni
La formulation initiale du règlement budgétaire était meilleure. La modification proposée par la Commission ne contribue pas à une clarification.
4. Kull istituzzjoni minbarra l-Kummissjoni tista’, fis-sezzjoni tagħha tal-budget, tagħmel trasferimenti fl-artikoli mingħajr informazzjoni minnn qabel ta’ l-awtorità tal-budget.”
imħassar
Ġustifikazzjoni
Sauvegarde des droits du Parlement.
Emenda 39
ARTIKOLU 1, PUNT 11 A (I) (ġdid) Artikolu 23, paragrafu 1, punt b (Regolament (KE, Euratom) nru 1605/2002)
(i) il-punt (b) hu mibdul b’dan li ġej:
imħassar
"(b) fir-rigward tan-nefqa tal-persunal u dik operattiva, approporjazzjonijiet ta' trasferimenti minn titolu wieħed għall-ieħor bejn artikoli li jiffinanzjaw l-ispiża ta' natura identika biss;"
Ġustifikazzjoni
Sauvegarde des droits du Parlement.
Emenda 40
ARTIKOLU 1, PUNT 11 A (II) Artikolu 23, paragrafu 1, punt d (Regolament (KE, Euratom) nru 1605/2002)
(ii) il-punt (d) hu miżjud:
imħassar
"(d) titrasferixxi approprjazzjonijiet mit-titolu “dispożizzjonijiet” imsemmija fl-Artikolu 43 għall-każijiet fejn ma jeżisti l-ebda att bażiku għall-azzjoni kkonċernata meta l-budget jiġi stabbilit iżda adottat matul is-sena tal-budget."
Ġustifikazzjoni
Sauvegarde des droits du Parlement.
Emenda 41
ARTIKOLU 1, PUNT 11 A (III) Artikolu 23, paragrafu 1, inċiż 2 (Regolament (KE, Euratom) nru 1605/2002)
(iii) it-tieni subparagrafu hu mħassar.
(iii) it-tieni subparagrafu hu mibdul b’li ġej:
"Tliet ġimgħat qabel ma jsiru t-trasferimenti msemmija fil-punti (b) u (c) ta' l-ewwel paragrafu, il-Kummissjoni għandha tinforma lill-awtorità baġitarja bid-deċiżjoni tagħha.Fil-każ ta' raġuni ġġustifikata kif xieraq li titqajjem matul dan il-perijodu minn fergħa jew oħra ta' l-awtorità baġitarja għandha tapplika l-proċedura msemmija fl-Artikolu 24.
Tliet xhur qabel l-aħħar tas-sena baġitarja, il-Kummissjoni għandha tirraporta ma' l-awtorità baġitarja dwar l-użu ta' l-ispejjeż imsemmija fil-punt (b) u għandha tħabbar l-intenzjoni tagħha li tipproċedi bit-trasferimenti li jikkonċernaw il-persunal, il-persunal estern u l-aġenti l-oħra fis-sens tal-punt (b). Jekk wara sitt ġimgħat mit-tħabbir, l-awtorità baġitarja ma toffrix oppożizzjoni għat-trasferimenti previsti, il-Kummissjoni tista' tipproċedi billi tagħmilhom u tinforma l-awtorità baġitarja dwar it-trasferimenti matul ix-xahar li jmiss.
Ġustifikazzjoni
L'amendement reflète l'aspiration de la Commission à une plus grande souplesse concernant les dépenses de personnel. Il fait office de compromis entre cette exigence et le maintien des droits du Parlement.
Emenda 42
ARTIKOLU 1, PUNT 11 B, PARAGRAFU 1 A Artikolu 23, paragrafu 1a (Regolament (KE, Euratom) nru 1605/2002)
(b) Il-paragrafu 1a li ġej hu miżjud::
imħassar
"1a.Il-Kummissjoni għandha tinforma lill-awtorità tal-budget tliet xhur qabel ma tagħmel li ġej:
(a) trasferimenti bejn artikoli fil-kapitolu li jikkorrispondi għal approporjazzjonijiet amministrattivi ta’ l-istess titolu li jeċċedu 10% ta’ l-approporjazzjonijiet tas-sena li jidhru fl-artikolu li minnu jsir it-trasferiment,
Fil-każ li jitqajjmu kif imiss raġunijiet ippruvati f’dak il-perijodu ta’ tliet ġimgħat minn waħda mill-fergħat ta’ l-awtorità tal-budget, il-proċedura mniżżla fl-Artikolu 24 għandha tapplika.L-awtorità tal-budget għandha tieħu deċiżjonijiet dwar dawn it-trasferimenti fit-termini ta’ żmien stipulati fl-Artikolu 24, li għandhom jitqiesu li bdew fid-data li fiha l-awtorità tal-budget kienet infurmata mill-Kummissjoni tat-trasferiment maħsub.”
Ġustifikazzjoni
Sauvegarde des droits du Parlement.
Emenda 43
ARTIKOLU 1, PUNT 11 C Artikolu 23, paragrafu 2 (Regolament (KE, Euratom) nru 1605/2002)
(c) Fil-paragrafu 2, il-“paragrafu 1(c)” hu mibdul b’ “paragrafi 1 u 1a”.
(12) Fl-Artikolu 26(2), l-ewwel sub-paragrafu hu mibdul b’li ġej:
imħassar
"Deċiżjonijiet dwar trasferimenti biex jippermettu l-utilizzazzjoni tar-riżerva għall-għajnuna ta’ emerġenza, għandhom jittieħdu mill-awtorità tal-budget fuq proposta mill-Kummissjoni.Għandha tintbagħat proposta separata għal kull operazzjoni individwali."
Ġustifikazzjoni
Sauvegarde des droits du Parlement.
Emenda 45
ARTIKOLU 1, PUNT 12 A (ġdid) Artikolu 27, paragrafu 1 (Regolament (KE, Euratom) nru 1605/2002)
(12a) L-Artikolu 27(1) hu mibdul bit-test li ġej:
"1. L-approprjazzjonijiet baġitarji għandhom jintużaw b'konformità mal-prinċipju ta' amministrazzjoni finanzjarja tajba, jiġifieri b'konformità mal-prinċipji ta' ekonomija, effiċjenza, effikaċità u proporzjonalità.
Ġustifikazzjoni
Il s'agit d'éviter dépenses ou engagements incontrôlables.
Emenda 46
ARTIKOLU 1, PUNT 12 B (ġdid) Artikolu 27, paragrafu 2, inċiż 3 a (ġdid) (Regolament (KE, Euratom) nru 1605/2002)
(12 b) Fl-Artikolu 27(2), is-subparagrafu 3 li ġej hu miżjud:
"Proporzjonalità għandha tfisser ir-rapport xieraq bejn l-ispiża, inkluża dik tal-verifika, u l-ammonti u r-riskji involuti."
Ġustifikazzjoni
La Commission est invitée à contrôler le coût du contrôle. Objectif: adaptation du coût aux risques.
Emenda 47
ARTIKOLU 1, PUNT 12 C (ġdid) Artikolu 27, paragrafu 4 a (ġdid) (Regolament (KE, Euratom) nru 1605/2002)
(12c) Fl-Artikolu 27, il-paragrafu 4a li ġej hu miżjud:
"4a.Fil-każ ta' l-implimentazzjoni tal-programmi u l-attivitajiet, il-proċedura għandha ssegwi l-kontenut ta' dawn.Ir-regoli ta' implimentazzjoni għandhom jispeċifikaw id-dispożizzjonijiet ta' dan l-Artikolu."
Ġustifikazzjoni
C'est le contenu des politiques de l'UE qui doit déterminer les procédures administratives et pas l'inverse.
(12b) Il-paragrafu li ġej hu miżjud ma' l-Artikolu 27:
"4b.L-istituzzjonijiet għandhom iwaqqfu sistemi ta' tkejjil u ta' tqabbil ta' l-effiċjenza u ta' l-effikaċità tal-proċeduri għall-għoti ta' kuntratti għal xogħlijiet pubbliċi u ta' aġġudikazzjoni ta' għotji."
Ġustifikazzjoni
La Commission s'efforce de suivre les principes de bonne gestion financière dans l'exécution du budget, à savoir les principes d'économie, d'efficience et d'efficacité. Les fonctionnaires ont tendance à se concentrer sur l'économie, autrement dit à chercher le meilleur prix dans le respect des procédures. Le principe d'efficience, que le règlement financier définit comme "le meilleur rapport entre les moyens mis en œuvre et les résultats obtenus" (article 27, paragraphe 2, alinéa 2), devrait contraindre la Commission à ne pas seulement se focaliser sur des "listes de vérification", mais aussi à tenir compte du contexte de l'octroi des subventions et de la passation des marchés, ainsi que de leurs coûts administratifs. Au vu des coûts élevés à la charge des bénéficiaires éventuels, la nécessité de mettre plutôt l'accent sur le critère de l'efficience semble même davantage importer.
Emenda 49
ARTIKOLU 1, PUNT 12 E (ġdid) Artikolu 28, paragrafu 2 (Regolament (KE, Euratom) nru 1605/2002)
(12e) Fl-Artikolu 28, il-paragrafu 2 hu emendat kif ġej:
"2. Matul il-proċedura baġitarja, l-istituzzjonijiet u l-organi għandhom jagħtu l-informazzjoni xierqa li tippermetti paragun bejn l-evoluzzjoni ta' l-approrjazzjonijiet meħtieġa u l-previżjonijiet inizjali li jidhru fil-kotba finanzjarji.Din l-informazzjoni xierqa għandha tinkludi l-progress miksub u l-istat milħuq tax-xogħlijiet ta' l-awtorità leġiżlattiva dwar il-proposti preżentati.Fejn hu xieraq, l-approprjazzjonijiet meħtieġa għandhom jiġu riveduti fid-dawl ta' l-istat tal-progress tad-deliberazzjonijiet dwar l-att ta' bażi."
12f.Fl-Artikolu 28, it-tielet paragrafu hu mibdul b’li ġej:
"(3) L-organi u l-istituzzjonijiet jagħtu informazzjoni fl-iskeda finanzjarja dwar il-miżuri ta' prevenzjoni u ta' protezzjoni li hemm fil-preżent jew li huma previsti, sabiex jiġi evitat ir-riskju ta' frodi u irregolaritajiet."
Begründung
Redaktionelle Anpassung: "Kommission" wurde durch "Institutionen" ersetzt.
13. Fl-Artikolu 29, Paragrafu 2 hu mibdul b’li ġej:
13. L-Artikolu 29 hu mibdul b'dan li ġej:
"Artikolu 29
(1) Għall-ippjanar u l-implimentazzjoni tal-baġit, kif ukoll is-sottomissjoni tal-kontijiet jgħodd il-prinċipju ta' trasparenza.
"(2) Il-President tal-Parlament Ewropew għandu jippubblika l-budget u l-budgets ta’ emenda, kif inhuma adottati fl-aħħar, fil-Ġurnal Uffiċjali ta’ l-Unjoni Ewropew.
(2) Il-President tal-Parlament Ewropew għandu jippubblika l-budget u l-budgets ta’ emenda, kif inhuma adottati fl-aħħar, fil-Ġurnal Uffiċjali ta’ l-Unjoni Ewropew.
Il-budget għandu jkun pubblikat fi żmien tliet xhur wara d-data li fiha l-budget ikun iddikjarat finalment adottat. “Il-kontijiet annwali konsolidati u r-rapport dwar il-ġestjoni tal-budget u dik finanzjarja mfassla minn kull istituzzjoni għandha tkun ippubblikata fil-Ġurnal Uffiċjali ta’ l-Unjoni Ewropea.”
Il-baġit għandu jkun pubblikat fi żmien tliet xhur wara d-data li fiha l-baġit ikun iddikjarat finalment adottat.
Ir-rapporti tal-Kummissjoni għandhom jinkludu wkoll informazzjoni dwar id-dettalji tan-noti spjegattivi tal-baġit."
(13a) Il-Kapitolu u l-Artikolu li ġejjin huma miżjuda mat-Titolu III ta' l-Ewwel Parti:
"Kapitolu 9
Il-prinċipju ta' kontroll intern effettiv u effiċjenti
Artikolu 30a
1. L-implimentazzjoni tal-baġit għandu jiġi assigurat permezz ta' kontroll intern effettiv u effiċjenti skond kull mod ta' tmexxija.
2. Għall-iskop ta' implimentazzjoni tal-baġit, il-kontroll intern huwa definit bħala proċess applikabbli f'kull livell fis-serje ta' kontrolli u huwa ddiżinjat sabiex jipprovdi l-assigurazzjoni li l-obbjettivi li ġejjin jintlaħqu b'mod reġunevoli :
(a) l-effettività u l-effiċjenza ta' l-attivitajiet,
(b) il-kredibilità tar-rappurtar finanzjarju:
(c)is-salvagwardjar ta' l-assi u l-informazzjoni, u l-prevenzjoni u l-iskoperta ta' frodi u irregolaritajiet,
(d) tmexxija adegwata tar-riskji relatati mal-legalità u r-regolarità ta' tranżazzjonijiet relattivi."
Ġustifikazzjoni
In accordance with the proposals made by the Commission in its Action Plan and recital J of the 2004 draft-discharge resolution, efficient internal control should be included as one of the budgetary principles in the Financial Regulation.
"2. Fis-sezzjoni għal kull istituzzjoni, id-dħul u n-nefqa għandhom jintwerew fl-istess struttura bħal fil-punt 1.”
Begründung
Wiedereinsetzung der bisherigen Formulierung zur Wahrung von Informationsrechten des Parlaments im Haushaltsplan.
Emenda 57
ARTIKOLU 1 PUNT 19 C
Artikolu 46, paragrafu 1, Punt 3 c (Regolament (KE, Euratom) Nru 1605/2002)
c) Fil-Punt (3), il-punt hu mibdul b'li ġej:
mħassar
c) fir-rigward tal-persunal xjentifiku u tekniku, il-klassifikazzjoni tista' tkun ibbażata fuq gruppi ta' gradi, skond il-kondizzjonijiet imniżżla f'kull budget.Il-pjan ta’ twaqqif għandu jispeċifika n-numru ta’ persunal tekniku u xjentifiku ta’ kwalifika għolja li jingħataw vantaġġi speċjali taħt id-dispożizzjonijiet speċifiċi tar-Regolamenti tal-Persunal;”
Begründung
Wiederaufnahme des ursprünglichen Textes zur Wahrung der Informationsrechte des Parlaments.
"5. il-linji tal-budget taħt id-dħul u n-nefqa meħtieġa għall-implimentazzjoni tal-Fond ta’ Garanzija għall-azzjonijiet Esterni.”
Begründung
Community loans and loan guarantees are not yet abolished and the new provisioning mechanism for the Guarantee Fund for external actions not yet adopted. They have to appear in the budget.
20a.Fl-Artikolu 48, l-ewwel paragrafu hu mibdul b’li ġej:
"(1) L-istituzzjonijiet ifasslu l-baġit bid-dħul u l-infiq skond il-miżuri ta' dan ir-Regolament b'responsabbiltà tagħhom stess u fil-qafas tal-finanzi mogħtija lilhom."
(jikkorrespondi ma' l-Artikolu 48 (1) tar-Regolament (KE, Euratom) 1605/2002 fejn il-kelma "Kummissjoni" ġiet sostitwita mill-kelma "Istituzzjonijiet".)
Sabiex fl-amministrazzjoni komuni tiġi żgurata li l-fondi jiġu wżati skond ir-regoli applikabbli, l-Istati Membri għandhom jieħdu l-miżuri kollha meħtieġa biex:
Sabiex fl-amministrazzjoni komuni tiġi żgurata li l-fondi jiġu wżati skond ir-regoli applikabbli, l-Istati Membri għandhom jieħdu l-miżuri kollha meħtieġa, leġiżlattivi, regolatorji, amministrattivi jew oħrajn neċessarji għall-protezzjoni ta' l-interessi finanzjarji tal-Komunitajiet, biex
"(2) Meta l-Kummissjoni timplimenta l-baġit skond l-Artikolu 53 paragrafu 2 b'mod ċentralizzat u indirett jew skond l-Artikolu 53 paragrafu 4, tista', fil-limiti ta' paragrafu 1, tiddelega l-aspetti ta' importanza partikulari ta' implimentazzjoni tal-baġit lill-istituzzjonijiet li ġejjin:
Ġustifikazzjoni
Die Übertragung von Haushaltsvollzugsaufgaben auf die unter Artikel 54, Absatz 2 genannten Einrichtungen ist bislang auf die zentrale, indirekte Verwaltung begrenzt.Dies schränkt eine Aufgabenübertragung insbesondere für Maßnahmen im Außenbereich erheblich ein.Diese werden zunehmend unter dezentraler Verwaltung durchgeführt.Um einen effizienten Haushaltsvollzug sicherzustellen, muss daher auch unter dezentraler Verwaltung eine Aufgabenübertragung möglich sein.
"3a.Filwaqt li jeżerċita s-setgħat mogħtija lilu mill-Kummissjoni skond l-Artikolu 50, il-Parlament Ewropew jista', konformi mad-dispożizzjonijiet tar-Regoli ta' Proċedura, u bl-adozzjoni ta' regoli speċifiċi, jiddelega xogħol ta' implimentazzjoni lill-gruppi politiċi tiegħu għal approprjazzjonijiet definiti tajjeb.
Dan ir-regolament speċifiku ma jistax jitbiegħed mill-Artikolu 56, sakemm il-bżonnijiet sabiex jiffunzjonaw il-gruppi politiċi ma jirrikjedux dan."
Ġustifikazzjoni
As it is provided by Article 185 for the bodies set up by the communities and having legal personality which receive grants charged to the budget, the specific nature of the parliamentary groups as administrative entities and the specific requirements of the activities of the Members of the European Parliament may also need to be reflected in the implementation of the current rules.
Meta l-Kummissjoni timplimenta l-budget permezz ta’ ġestjoni ċentralizzata indiretta, għandha l-ewwel tikseb evidenza ta’ l-eżistenza, ir-rilevanza u l-operazzjoni xierqa fi ħdan l-entitajiet li tafdalhom l-implimentazzjoni, skond ir-regoli ta’ ġestjoni finanzjarja soda, ta’ li ġej:
Meta l-Kummissjoni jew il-Parlament Ewropew jimplimentawil-baġit permezz ta’ ġestjoni ċentralizzata indiretta, għandhom l-ewwel jiksbu evidenza ta’ l-eżistenza, ir-rilevanza u l-operazzjoni xierqa fi ħdan l-entitajiet li jafdawlhom l-implimentazzjoni, skond ir-regoli ta’ ġestjoni finanzjarja soda, ta’ li ġej:
Begründung
Durch die Änderung des Artikels 54 werden die Leistungen an die Fraktionen des Europäischen Parlaments als indirekte zentrale Mittelverwaltung eingestuft. Die Änderung in Artikel 56 ist eine notwendige Folge dessen.
(3) Il-Kummissjoni għandha tiżgura s-superviżjoni, l-evalwazzjoni u l-kontroll ta’ l-implimentazzjoni ta’ l-inkarigi fdati. Għandha tieħu f’kunsiderazzjoni l-ekwivalenza tas-sistemi ta' kontroll meta din twettaq kontrolli permezz ta’ l-użu tas-sistemi tagħha ta’ kontroll.
(3) Il-Kummissjoni jew il-Parlament Ewropewgħandhom jiżguraw is-superviżjoni, l-evalwazzjoni u l-kontroll ta’ l-implimentazzjoni ta’ l-inkarigi fdati. Huma Għandhom jieħdu f’kunsiderazzjoni l-ekwivalenza tas-sistemi ta' kontroll meta dawn iwettqu kontrolli permezz ta’ l-użu tas-sistemi tagħhom ta’ kontroll.
Ġustifikazzjoni
Durch die Änderung des Artikels 54 werden die Leistungen an die Fraktionen des Europäischen Parlaments als indirekte zentrale Mittelverwaltung eingestuft. Die Änderung in Artikel 56 ist eine notwendige Folge dessen.
(27) Fl-Artikolu 60, l-ewwel sentenza ta' paragrafu 7 hu sostitwit b'dan li ġej:
"7. L-uffiċjal awtorizzanti permezz ta' delega, għandu jirrapporta lill-istituzzjoni tiegħu/tagħha dwar it-twettiq tad-doveri tiegħu/tagħha fl-għamla ta' rapport ta' attività annwali flimkien ma informazzjoni finanzjarja u ta' amministrazzjoni u dikjarazzjoni ta' assigurazzjoni li tiċċertifika li din l-informazzjoni li tinsab fir-rapport tippreżenta veduta vera u ġusta."
(27)Fl-Artikolu 60, il-paragrafu 7 hu sostitwit b'dan li ġej:
"7. L-uffiċjal awtorizzanti permezz ta' delega, għandu jirrapporta lill-istituzzjoni tiegħu/tagħha dwar it-twettiq tad-doveri tiegħu/tagħha fl-għamla ta' rapport ta' attività annwali flimkien ma informazzjoni finanzjarja u ta' amministrazzjoni u kull riżerva fir-rigward ta' dan flimkien ma' dikjarazzjoni ta' assigurazzjoni li tiċċertifika li din l-informazzjoni li tinsab fir-rapport tippreżenta veduta vera u ġusta."
Dan ir-rapport għandu jindika r-riżultati ta' l-attivitajiet permezz ta' riferenza għall-objettivi stabbiliti, ir-riskji assoċjati ma' dawn l-attivitajiet, l-użu li jsir mir-riżorsi pprovduti u l-mod kif is-sistema ta' kontroll intern tiffunzjona.L-awditur intern għandu jieħu nota tar-rapport annwali u ta' biċċiet ta' informazzjoni oħra identifikati.Sa mhux aktar tard mill-15 ta' Ġunju ta' kull sena, il-Kummissjoni għandha tibgħat lill-awtorità dwar il-baġit sommarju tar-rapporti annwali tas-sena ta' qabel.Dawn ir-rapporti għandhom ifasslu d-dettalji tal-miżuri meħuda sabiex jitnaqqas ir-riskju ta' żbalji fir-rigward ta' attivitajiet trattati fir-rapport u evalwazzjoni ta' dawk il-miżuri."
Ġustifikazzjoni
The deletion of these words was perhaps an error, to be corrected. Furthermore, the possibility of reservations to the management information report is introduced.
Emenda 67
ARTIKOLU 1, PUNT 28 (-A) (ġdid)
Artikolu 61, paragrafu 1, punt (-e a) (ġdid) (Regolament (KE, Euratom) Nru 1605/2002)
(-a) f'paragrafu 1, il-punt li ġej (ea) qed jiżdied:
"(ea) it-tħaddim effettiv ta' dawn is-sistemi;"
Ġustifikazzjoni
Paragraph 1 f) follows directly from the Court of Auditors' Opinion 10/2005 point 30:
"In order for the Accounting Officers to be in a position to certify that the accounts present a true and fair view as provided by Article 123 of the current Financial Regulation, such validation should cover the effective functioning of systems over the period concerned"
2a.L-uffiċjal tal-kontijiet għandu jipprepara l-kontijiet fuq il-bażi ta’ l-informazzjoni ppreżentata taħt il-paragrafu 2. Il-kontijiet finali imfassla taħt l-Artikolu 129(2)u (3) għandhom ikunu akkumpanjati b'ċertifikat stabbilit mill-uffiċjal tal-kontabilità li permezz tiegħu jiddikjara li dawn ġew ippreparati skond it-Titolu VII u permezz tal-prinċipji, regoli u metodi tal-kontabilità stipulati fl-anness għad-dikjarazzjonijiet finanzjarji."
2a.Qabel ma jiġu adottati mill-istituzzjoni, l-uffiċjal tal-kontijiet għandu jiffirma l-kontijiet, u b'hekk jiċċertifika li jagħtu stampa vera u ġusta tas-sitwazzjoni finanzjarja ta' l-istituzzjoni.
Għal dan l-iskop l-uffiċjal tal-kontijiet għandu jissodisfa ruħu li l-kontijiet kienu ppreparati skond ir-regoli, il-metodi u s-sistemi tal-kontabilità stabbiliti b'responsabbiltà tiegħu kif stipulat f'dan ir-Regolament għall-kontijiet ta' l-istituzzjoni tiegħu, u li kull dħul u nfiq huma inklużi fil-kontijiet.
Huwa għandu jkollu s-setgħa li jiċċekkja l-informazzjoni li jirċievi kif ukoll li jagħmel il-verifiki li jqis neċessarji sabiex jiffirma l-kontijiet.
Huwa għandu jagħmel ir-riżervi neċessarji, filwaqt li jispjega esattament in-natura u l-iskop ta' dawn ir-riżervi.
L-uffiċjali awtorizzanti b'delega għandhom jgħaddu l-informazzjoni kollha li jkollu bżonn l-uffiċjal tal-kontijiet sabiex jaqdi d-dmirijiet tiegħu.L-uffiċjali awtorizzanti għandhom jibqgħu totalment responsabbli għall-użu xieraq tal-fondi li jamministraw kif ukoll il-legalità u r-regolarità ta' l-ispiża taħt il-kontroll tagħhom.
L-uffiċjali tal-kontijiet ta' l-istituzzjonijiet u l-aġenziji l-oħra għandhom jiffirmaw il-kontijiet annwali tagħhom u jibagħtu ċ-ċertifikat lill-uffiċjal tal-kontijiet tal-Kummissjoni.
Ġustifikazzjoni
This follows the principles set out in Parliament's 2003 discharge report:
The Accounting Officer shall assume overall responsibility for the integrity of the accounts for the Institution as a whole (Paragraph 7).
The Accounting Officer shall sign off the accounts and if there are qualifications
(s)he shall explain exactly the nature and scope of the reservations made (Paragraph 8).
Parliament agrees with the thrust of the recent reform of financial management in the Commission which was to give responsibility to each Director-General but takes the view that the assurance given by the Directors-General must be supported by an overall assurance by the Accounting Officer, who shall be fully accountable and have the necessary means to fulfil this duty (Paragraph 9).
a). Fl-ewwel paragrafu, l-ewwel sentenza hi mibdula b'li ġej:
a). Il-Paragrafu 1 hu mibdul b'li ġej:
“L-uffiċjal awtorizzanti għandu jkun responsabbli għall-ħlas ta’ kumpens kif stipulat fir-Regolament tal-Persunal, li jispeċifikaw li membru ta’ l-istaff kopert mid-dispożizzjonijiet rilevanti jista’ jinħtieġ li jagħmlu tajjeb, b’mod sħiħ jew f’parti, kwalunkwe ħsara li sofrew il-Komunitajiet bħala riżultat ta’ nuqqas ta’ kondotta serja mill-parti tiegħu/tagħha waqt jew b’konnessjoni mat-twettiq tad-doveri tiegħu/tagħha, b’mod partikulari jekk hu/hi jiddetermina/tiddetermina li għandhom jiġu rkuprati drittijiet jew jippubblika/tippubblika ordnijiet ta' rkuprar, jikkommetti/tikkommetti spiża jew jiffirma/tiffirma ordni ta' ħlas mingħajr ma jkun/tkun konformi ma' dan ir-Regolament u r-regoli ta’ implimentazzjoni tiegħu.”
“L-uffiċjal awtorizzanti għandu jkun responsabbli għall-ħlas ta’ kumpens kif stipulat fir-Regolament tal-Persunal.
L-obbligu tal-kumpens jeżisti speċjalment, meta
– l-uffiċjal awtorizzanti jiddetermina/tiddetermina li għandhom jiġu rkuprati drittijiet jew jippubblika/tippubblika ordnijiet ta' rkuprar, jikkommetti/tikkommetti spiża jew jiffirma/tiffirma ordni ta' ħlas mingħajr, b'negliġenza kbira jew intenzjonalment, ma jkun/tkun konformi ma' dan ir-Regolament u r-regoli ta' implimentazzjoni tiegħu."
– l-uffiċjal awtorizzanti jonqos b'negliġenza kbira jew deliberatament milli joħroġ dokument li jiġġustifika talba, jittraskura jew jittardja milli jippubblika ordnijiet ta' rkuprar jew jittardja b'negliġenza kbira jew deliberatament milli jiffirma/tiffirma ordnijiet ta' ħlas, u bħala konsegwenza ta' dan tista' ssir azzjoni ċivili kontra l-istituzzjoni minn terza parti.
Meta jkunu eżaminati l-każ u gravità tan-nuqqas, kull ċirkostanza għandha tiġi kkunsidrata, b'mod partikulari r-riżorsi li l-uffiċjal awtorizzanti għandu għad-dispożizzjoni tiegħu sabiex jeżerċita dmiru.
Il-livell tan-nuqqas ta' l-uffiċjal awtorizzanti huwa kkalkulat fuq il-bażi tal-priċipju ta' proporzjonalità, prinċipalment skond il-gravità tan-nuqqas.Jekk l-uffiċjal awtorizzanti jaġixxi b'mod negliġenti, ir-responsabilità hija limitata għal massimu ta' 12-il xahar salarju.Jekk l-uffiċjal awtorizzanti jaġixxi deliberatament jew intenzjonalment, huwa responsabbli għan-nuqqas sħiħ.
Ġustifikazzjoni
Klarstellung. Einführung des Verhältnismaβigheitsgrundsatzes.
(ba)fil-paragrafu 4, l-ewwel subparagrafu qiegħed jiġi sostitwit b'dan li ġej:
"4. Kull istituzzjoni għandha toħloq jew tipparteċipa fil-ħolqien ta' bord speċjalizzat dwar irregolaritajiet finanzjarji flimkien ma' oħrajn u tiddetermina jekk tkunx saret irregolarità finanzjarja u x'għandhom ikunu l-konsegwenzi, jekk dawn ikunu neċessarji.Bordijiet konġunti jistgħu jiġu ffurmati minn grupp ta' istituzzjonijiet.Il-membri ta' bord speċjalizzat jistgħu jiġu maħtura minn kwalunkwe istituzzjoni."
Ġustifikazzjoni
The smaller institutions in particular could benefit greatly from pooling administrative resources in this way.
(33a) Fl-Artikolu 72, il-paragrafu li ġej hu miżjud:
"2a.Ammonti eċċessivi mħallsa jagħmlu parti mill-baġit tal-Komunità u għandhom jiġu rkuprati, filwaqt li jiġi kkunsidrat il-prinċipju tal-proporzjonalità, u jiżdiedu mal-baġit.
Meta l-Istati Membri jew istituzzjonijiet oħra jittrattaw il-proċeduri ta' rkuprar, il-baġit tal-Komunità jista' jintuża biex jitħallsu lura l-ispejjeż assoċjati ma' dan l-irkuprar.Dan l-irkuprar għandu jkun ibbażat fuq ir-Regoli ta' Implimentazzjoni."
Bla preġudizzju għad-dispożizzjonijiet ta’ regolamenti speċifiċi u l-applikazzjoni tad-deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill dwar is-sistema tar-riżorsi proprji tal-Komunitajiet, drittijiet tal-Komunitajiet fir-rigward ta’ partijiet terzi u drittijiet ta’ partijiet terzi fir-rigward tal-Komunitajiet għandhom ikunu suġġetti għal perijodu ta’ limitazzjoni ta’ ħames snin.
Bla preġudizzju għad-dispożizzjonijiet ta’ regolamenti speċifiċi u l-applikazzjoni tad-deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill dwar is-sistema tar-riżorsi proprji tal-Komunitajiet, drittijiet tal-Komunitajiet fir-rigward ta’ partijiet terzi u drittijiet ta’ partijiet terzi fir-rigward tal-Komunitajiet għandhom ikunu suġġetti għal perijodu ta’ limitazzjoni ta’ ħames snin.
Jekk id-drittijiet huma r-riżultat ta' danni intenzjonati, il-perijodu ta' limitazzjoni jibda mill-mument meta d-danni u t-talba għall-kumpens u l-livell tiegħu ġew rikonoxxuti b'mod konkret u legalment, u ddokumentati.Il-perijodu ta' limitazzjoni jiġi interrott meta titressaq it-talba fil-qorti.Jekk bosta debituri huma responsabbli bħala entità waħda, l-interruzzjoni fir-rigward ta' debitur wieħed tapplika għal kull wieħed mid-debituri li qed jaġixxu flimkien.
Id-data biex jiġi kkalkulat il-perijodu ta’ limitazzjoni u l-kondizzjonijiet għall-interruzzjoni tal-perijodu għandhom jitniżżlu fir-regoli ta’ implimentazzjoni.”
Id-data biex jiġi kkalkulat il-perijodu ta’ limitazzjoni u l-kondizzjonijiet għall-interruzzjoni tal-perijodu inkella għandhom jitniżżlu fir-regoli ta’ implimentazzjoni.”
Begründung
Vorsätzliche Schädiger sollen sich nur dann auf die Verjährung berufen können, wenn der eingetretene Schaden voll umfänglich bekannt ist und dennoch innerhalb der Verjährungsfrist keine Klage anhängig gemacht wird.
"Id-dħul li jkun ġej minn multi, ftehim, ħlasijiet ta' penali perjodiċi, ammonti rkuprati u interessi akkumulati m'għandux jiġi rreġistrat bħala dħul fil-baġit sakemm id-deċiżjonijiet li jimponuhom jistgħu jiġu annullati mill-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja."
"Fejn isiru ħlasijiet perjodiċi fir-rigward ta' servizzi pprovduti jew oġġetti forniti u jkunu soġġetti għall-analiżi tar-riskju ta' l-uffiċjal awtorizzanti, huwa jista' jordna li tiġi applikata sistema ta' debitu dirett."
Ġustifikazzjoni
Application of Financial Regulation to modern means of banking. In particular th administration of running costs (e.g. for electricity, water, communication lines etc.) shall be facilitated.
37c.Fl-Artikolu 83, il-paragrafu li ġej hu miżjud:
"L-Istituzzjonijiet għandhom jissottomettu lill-awtorità għall-baġit rapport dwar l-osservanza ta' l-ispeċifikazzjonijiet dwar il-limiti ta' żmien stipulati u s-sospensjoni ta' dawn il-limiti ta' żmien."
Begründung
Die Haushaltsbehörde über die Implementierung besser unterrichten.
aa) Fil-paragrafu 1, il-paragrafu li ġej hu miżjud:
"L-implimentazzjoni tal-kuntratt tista' tibda biss wara li jkun iffirmat."
Begründung
Die jetzige Praxis - Beginn der Durchführung vor Vertragsunterzeichnung - birgt Risiken für alle Beteiligten und kann zu schweren Verstößen gegen die Haushaltsordnungen von Mitgliedsstaaten führen. Ziel ist mehr Rechtssicherheit und Beschleunigung der Vertragsunterzeichnung.
(39a) Fl-Artikolu 89, il-paragrafu li ġej hu miżjud:
"3. Bil-ħsieb li jonqsu l-ispejjeż marġinali u li jiġu evitati proċeduri ta' aġġudikazzjoni paralleli, l-awtorità aġġudikanti għandha tieħu l-miżuri xierqa sabiex tiżgura li l-proċeduri ta' aġġudikazzjoni jsiru fuq bażi interistituzzjonali.
4. Għandhom jiġu kkunsidrati l-interessi ta' intrapriżi żgħar u ta' daqs medju primarjament billi l-kuntratti jinqasmu f'partijiet speċjalizzati jew separati.Il-limiti stipulati fl-Artikoli 105 u 167 ma jistgħux jiġu evitati b'dan il-qsim."
Ġustifikazzjoni
High costs must not serve to deter economic operators from submitting tenders. The measure is designed to facilitate access for market participants and, at the same time, strengthen competition. Steps should be taken to improve administrative efficiency and cost-effectiveness in connection with procurement procedures. At the same time, smaller units which rarely carry out procurement procedures should be able to benefit from the expertise acquired by larger units. When procurement takes place, small- and medium-sized undertakings should not be economically disadvantaged simply because they are unable to cope with the full volume of a contract. In such cases, the contracting authority should consider the scope for awarding contracts on the basis of part- and/or specialist lots, subject to compliance with the relevant thresholds.
39b.Fl-Artikolu 90 il-paragrafu li ġej hu miżjud mas-sottoparagrafu 1:
"Dan għandu japplika wkoll għall-kuntratti kkonkużi bħala kuntratt ta' qafas, jekk bħala riżultat ta' kuntratt singolu jew il-volum sħiħ ta' kuntratti ffirmati bħala kuntratt ta' qafas jinqabeż il-limitu li jipprevedu l-Artikoli 105 u 107."
Begründung
Erstreckung der Veröffentlichungspflicht und damit verbundene Verbesserung der Transparenz im Bereich der Rahmenverträge.
Emenda 80
ARTIKOLU 1 PUNT 41 A (ġdid)
Artikolu 91 a, (ġdid) (Regolament (KE, Euratom) Nru 1605/2002)
41a.L-Artikolu li ġej huwa miżjud:
"Artikolu 91a
(1) Jekk l-awtorità li tagħti l-kuntratti tistabbilixxi li
a)l-ispejjeż previsti ta' amministrazzjoni sabiex jiġu implimentati proċeduri simultanji jew suċċessivi ta' aġġudikazzjoni fir-rigward ta' oġġetti simili, jaqbżu l-ammonti ffrankati mill-implimentazzjoni ta' dawk il-proċeduri ta' aġġudikazzjoni u huma għalhekk ineffiċjenti, jew
b) l-oġġett tal-kuntratt jippresupponi dan u
c) il-kompetizzjoni ma tiġix limitata b'mod sproporzjonat minħabba dan,
tista' tiddeċiedi allura li tiffirma ta' kuntratt ta' qafas.L-uffiċjal awtorizzanti għandu jinkludi mad-dokumenti kopja tad-deċiżjoni ġustifikata li jikkonkludi kuntratt ta' qafas.
(2) It-tul ta' żmien ta' kuntratt ta' qafas sabiex jiġu pprovduti s-servizzi ma jistax jaqbeż 24 xahar, għalkemm ftehim taċitu għal estensjoni ta' 24 xahar huwa permess (tul ta' żmien bażiku).Sakemm l-iskop tal-kuntratt jippermetti, it-tmiem parzjali huwa previst.
(3) Il-ftehim taċitu dwar l-estensjoni tal-kuntratt jista' jsir biss jekk il-kundizzjonijiet ta' l-ewwel paragrafu huma sodisfatti waqt il-mument ta' l-estensjoni.L-uffiċjal awtorizzanti għandu jiċċekkja jekk il-kundizzjonijiet ġewx sodisfatti u jinkludi r-riżultati fid-dokumenti.
(4) Jekk wara l-valutazzjoni li tkun saret meta ġie konkluż il-kuntratt, l-eżekuzzjoni tal-kuntratt tkun tista' ssir biss f'perijodu li jaqbeż it-tul ta' żmien bażiku, l-uffiċjal awtorizzanti għandu jinkludi mad-dokumenti r-raġunijiet għaliex inqabeż dan iż-żmien.
(5) Jekk il-kuntratt jittratta dwar il-provvista ta' oġġetti, meta jiġi konkluż kuntratt ta' qafas, minkejja l-kundizzjonijiet meħtieġa stipulati fl-ewwel paragrafu, għandu jkun assigurat, permezz ta' regolamenti xierqa, li l-awtorità li tagħti l-kuntratt ma' ssofrix danni finanzjarji għall-perijodu tal-qafas ta' kuntratt."
Begründung
Rahmenverträge bergen erhebliche wirtschaftliche Risiken. Sie sind gängige Verwaltungspraxis und sollten daher ihre gesetzliche Grundlage in der Haushaltsordnung finden. Durch den Abschluss von Rahmenverträgen soll der Wettbewerb so wenig als möglich beeinträchtigt werden. Gleichzeitig sind die Vermögensinteressen der Union so umfangreich als möglich zu schützen. Insbesondere ist Vorsorge bei Preisverfall zu treffen. Dies kann bei Lieferverträgen z.B. durch die Vermeidung einer Exklusivbindung oder eine Preisanpassungs- oder Kündigungsklausel erreicht werden.
(1) L-oġġett tal-kuntratt għandu jiġi definit b'mod ċar u preċiż fid-dokument ta' sejħa għall-offerti.
(2) Il-kriterji għall-għażla sabiex tiġi eżaminata l-kapaċità tal-kandidati jew ta' l-appaltaturi u l-kriterji ta' l-aġġudikazzjoni sabiex jiġi eżaminat il-kontenut ta' l-offerti għandhom jiġu ddefiniti minn qabel u speċifikati fis-sejħa għall-offerti.
(3) Il-kandidati jew l-appaltaturi għandhom jiġu infurmati dwar ir-raġunijiet ta' esklużjoni (Artikoli 93 u 94).
(4) Suġġett għad-dispożizzjonijiet ta' l-Artikolu 93a, l-obbligu li jindikaw l-eżistenza ta' kriterji ta' esklużjoni għandu jkun ikkomunikat lill-kandidati jew l-appaltaturi u dawn għandhom jikkonfermaw jekk dawn jeżistux, jekk ikun neċessarju.L-implikazzjonijiet legali ta' l-Artikolu 96 għandhom ikunu kkomunikati lilhom.
(5) Fil-każ ta' qafas ta' kuntratt il-possibilità li istituzzjonijiet oħra jirċievu provvisti fuq il-bażi tal-kundizzjonijiet stipulati fil-kuntratt għandha tkun ikkomunikata lill-kandidati jew l-appaltaturi.
Begründung
Verbesserung der Lesbarkeit und systematische Zusammenfassung der über verschiedene Artikel verteilen Regelungen zum Inhalt der Ausschreibungsunterlagen. Klarstellung, dass sich die Anwendung der Ausschlussgründe von Gesetzes wegen ergibt. Begründung der Hinweispflicht des Bieters oder Bewerbers. Der Hinweis auf mögliche Sanktionen bei Verstößen ist zur Vermeidung von Überraschungseffekten erforderlich. Auch den anderen Institutionen muss die Möglichkeit gegeben sein, an den wirtschaftlichen Vorteilen eines Rahmenvertrages zu partizipieren.
Emenda 82
ARTIKOLU 1 PUNT 42
Artikolu 93, paragrafu 1 a) (Regolament (KE, Euratom) Nru 1605/2002)
a) dawk li kienu s-suġġett ta’ sentenza li għandha s-saħħa ta’ res judicata għal frodi, korruzzjoni, involviment f’organizzazzjoni kriminali, ħasil ta’ flus jew kwalunkwe attività illegali oħra li hi ta’ detriment għall-interessi finanzjarji tal-Komunità;
a) dawk li fi żmien perijodu ta' ħames snin qabel id-data ta' meta nħarġet is-sejħa għall-offerti kienu s-suġġett ta’ sentenza għal frodi, korruzzjoni, involviment f’organizzazzjoni kriminali, ħasil ta’ flus, jew azzjoni kriminali simili; it-tul ta' l-esklużjoni jista' jiġi mtawwal sa għaxar snin, jekk il-kandidat jew l-appaltatur kien is-suġġett ta' sentenza li għandha s-saħħa ta' res judicata li hi ta' detriment għall-interessi finanzjarji tal-Kumunità;
Begründung
Aus Gründen der Rechtssicherheit und der Normenhierarchie ist die Dauer des Ausschlusses wegen einer strafrechtlichen Verurteilung in der Haushaltsordnung festzulegen. Dabei kann eine Differenzierung dahingehend vorgenommen werden, ob es sich bei der Verurteilung um eine Vermögensstraftat handelt, die gegen Dritte gerichtet ist oder, ob die Vermögensstraftat gegen das Vermögen der Gemeinschaften gerichtet ist. In letzterem Fall kann sich eine Ausschlussdauer bis zu 10 Jahren nach Art. 96 rechtfertigen. Auf Grund der langen Verfahrensdauern in Wirtschaftssachen wird nicht auf den Eintritt der Rechtskraft abgestellt, um Rechtsunklarheit und überlange Ausschlussdauern zu vermeiden. Das erstinstanzliche Urteil hat in diesen Fällen auch ohne Rechtskraft Indizwirkung.
(1) Kandidati jew appaltaturi għandhom jiċċeritifkaw li ma humiex f’waħda mis-sitwazzjonijiet elenkati fil-paragrafu 1 u, kif inhu xieraq, li ma humiex f’waħda mis-sitwazzjonijiet elenkati fil-paragrafu 2.
(1) Kandidati jew appaltaturi għandhom, suġġett għad-dispożizzjonijiet ta' l-Artikolu 93a, jiċċeritifkaw li ma humiex f’waħda mis-sitwazzjonijiet elenkati fil-paragrafu 1 u, kif inhu xieraq, li ma humiex f’waħda mis-sitwazzjonijiet elenkati fil-paragrafu 2.
Begründung
Dient der Verwaltungsvereinfachung im Verhältnis zu Bewerbern oder Bietern:Der Anwendungsbereich der ehrenwörtlichen Bestätigung soll dem Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatz entsprechend ausgestaltet werden.
Fejn il-kandidat jew appaltatur hu entità legali, għandha tingħata informazzjoni dwar il-propjetarju/i jew dwar it-tmexxija, kontroll u poter ta’ rappreżentazzjoni tal-entità legali, kull meta hu mitlub mill-awtorità kontraenti.
mħassar
Begründung
Dieser Absatz wurde in Artikel 93 a Absatz 1 Buchstabe d) erfasst im Rahmen einer systematischen Zuordnung zu den Vorschriften über Nachweiserhebung und -pflichten. ".
Emenda 86
ARTIKOLU 1 PUNT 42
Artikolu 93 a, (ġdid) (Regolament (KE, Euratom) Nru 1605/2002)
Artikolu 93a
(1) Minkejja d-dispożizzjonijiet ta' l-Artikolu 89, f'kull stadju tal-proċedura ta' aġġudikazzjoni, il-kundizzjonijiet amministrattivi u ta' dokumentazzjoni għandhom ikunu definiti b'mod ċar u relatati direttament mal-proċedura in kwistjoni.B'mod partikulari:
a) apparti l-kuntratti ta' valur żgħir, fejn offerta singola hija permessa waqt il-proċedura negozjata, l-uffiċjal awtorizzanti jista', fuq il-bażi ta' evalwazzjoni tar-riskju, jonqos milli jipproduċi dokument jew numru ta' dokumenti.
b) fil-każ ta' proċeduri oħra ta' aġġudikazzjoni skond l-Artikolu 91(3), l-awtorità pubblika li toħroġ il-kuntratti tista' titlob ċertifikat u/jew dokumenti oħra li jagħtu xhieda li l-kandidat mhuwiex inkluż f'waħda mis-sitwazzjoniniet mniżżla f'Artikoli 93 u 94 u li jissodisfa l-kriterji l-oħra ta' aġġudikazzjoni.
c) fil-każijiet l-oħra kollha l-awtorità pubblika li toħroġ il-kuntratti tista' titlob lill-kandidati u l-appaltaturi li jippreżentaw dawk id-dokumenti li hija tqis bħala essenzjali għall-implimentazzjoni tal-proċedura ta' aġġudikazzjoni.
Fejn il-kandidat jew appaltatur hu entità legali, għandha tingħata informazzjoni dwar il-propjetarju/i jew dwar it-tmexxija, kontroll u poter ta’ rappreżentazzjoni tal-entità legali, kull meta hu mitlub mill-awtorità li toħroġ il-kuntratti.
(2) Minkejja d-dispożizzjonijiet ta' paragrafu 4 il-ħlasijiet fil-kont m'għanhomx jiġu miżmuma eslużivament għaliex ma jkunx sar użu mill-possibilità li titlob lill-kandidati u appaltaturi li jippreżentaw id-dokumenti meħtieġa.
Ġustifikazzjoni
Durch die Regelung wird der Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatz auf die Nachweispflichten angewandt. Hierdurch soll ein angemessenes Verhältnis zwischen dem Schutz des Gemeinschaftsinteresses einerseits und Verwaltungsaufwand andererseits erreicht werden. Sprachliche Anpassung des Wortes "Management" an das deutsche Wort "Geschäftsführung" in Absatz 4.
Minkejja kull dispożizzjoni oħra rigward il-konflitti ta' interessi, b'mod partikulari dawk stipulati fl-Artikolu 52, għandu jitqies li jeżisti konflitt ta' interessi fl-ambitu tat-tifsira ta' punt (a), jekk fi kwalunkwe stadju ta' proċedura relatata ma' l-aġġudikazzjoni ta' għotja, il-kandidat jew appaltatur kien impeġat mal-Komunitajiet, sakemm il-parteċipazzjoni tiegħu fil-proċedura ta' aġġudikazzjoni ma kinitx awtorizzata minn qabel mis-superjur tiegħu.
Justification
Restricts the application of this article to grants procedures since Communities' employees are per se forbidden to conclude contracts with the Communities.
(43a) Fl-Artikolu 95, il-paragrafu li ġej hu miżjud:
(43) L-Artikolu 95 qed jiġi sostitwit b'dan li ġej:
“Madankollu, għal raġunijiet vantaġġużi f'sens ta' nefqa, żewġ istituzzjonijiet jew aktar jistgħu jaqblu li jużaw database komuni, taħt l-istess kondizzjonijiet.”
"Artikolu 95
1. Kull istituzzjoni għandha tikkomunika d-dettalji tal-kandidati u appaltaturi li jinsabu f'waħda mis-sitwazzjonijiet deskritti fl-Artikoli 93 u 94 lil database ċentrali operata mill-Kummissjoni.
2. Id-"database" għandha tiġi kkonsultata mill-uffiċjali awtrorizzanti ta' l-istituzzjonijiet u l-aġenziji kollha qabel ma' tiġi aġġudikata l-offerta.L-awtoritajiet rilevanti ta' l-Istati Membri għandu jkollhom aċċess għad-"database".Għandu jingħata aċċess ukoll lil pajjiżi terzi u lill-organizzazzjonijiet internazzjonali għal raġunijiet ta' interess pubbliku importanti mingħajr preġudizzju għar-regoli tal-Komunità dwar l-ipproċessar tad-dejta personali.
3. L-Istati Membri għandhom jikkomunikaw lill-Kummissjoni d-dettalji ta' l-operaturi ekonomiċi f'waħda mis-sitwazzjonijiet imsemmija fl-Artikoli 93(1)(a) u (2)(b) u (c) fejn l-imġiba ta' dawn l-operaturi kien ta' detriment għall-interessi finanzjarji tal-Komunitajiet u l-Komunitajiet ma kinux diġà parti mill-proċeduri ġudizzjarji.L-awtoritajiet ta' l-Istati Membri għandhom jikkonsultaw id-"databases" tal-Kummissjoni fl-aġġudikazzjoni tal-kuntratt jekk ikunu involuti riżorsi finanzjarji mill-fondi ta' l-UE u jużaw l-informazzjoni kif meħtieġ.
(2a) Kandidat jew appaltatur jista' biss jiġi eskluż għal perijodu ta' aktar minn ħames snin fuq il-bażi ta' sentenza jew dokument simili li għandhom is-saħħa ta res judicata, fejn il-kandidat jew appaltatur ġie kkundannat għal azzjoni li tiġġustifika l-esklużjoni għad-detriment tal-Komunitajiet.
Ġustifikazzjoni
Gleichlauf mit Artikel 93.
Emenda 90
ARTIKOLU 1 PUNT 44 A
Qabel l-Artikolu 97, paragrafu 3 a, (ġdid) (Regolament (KE, Euratom) Nru 1605/2002)
44a.Qabel l-Artikolu 97 il-paragrafu ġdid 3a li ġej huwa miżjud
"Paragrafu 3a
Id-drittijiet tal-partijiet involuti fil-proċedura ta' aġġudikazzjoni"
Begründung
Stellt klar, das die Beteiligten nicht nur Pflichten, sondern auch Rechte haben, die vom öffentlichen Auftraggeber zu beachten sind.
"2. F'każijiet ġġustifikati biss l-awtorità li toħroġ il-kuntratti tista' titlob lil dawk li jitfgħu l-offerti, kif jipprovdu r-regoli ta' implimentazzjoni, sabiex jagħtu garanzija minn qabel li l-offerti magħmula ma jiġux irtirati."
Ġustifikazzjoni
Minimisation of the need to require tenderers to lodge securities.
46a.Fl-Artikolu 100, il-paragrafu li ġej hu miżjud:
(2a) Il-kuntratt m'għandux jiġi ffirmat qabel ma jiskadi l-perijodu ta' 14-il jum ta' xogħol mill-mument meta l-kandidat jew appaltatur ġie nnotifikat bir-rifjut ta' l-offerta (paragrafu 2, l-ewwel frażi), sakemm minħabba dan il-Komunitajiet ma jsofrux danni kunsiderevoli.Il-limitu ta' perijodu jibda jgħodd minn meta l-kandidat jew l-appaltatur ġie nnotifikat bil-miktub dwar ir-rimedji bil-liġi li jeżistu kontra d-deċiżjoni, partikularment fir-rigward ta' l-istanza, il-perijodu u l-forma.Kuntratt iffirmat qabel ma jiskadi l-limitu tal-perijodu huwa null."
Begründung
Erfolglose Bieter sollen über die rechtlichen Möglichkeiten zur Anfechtung von Vergabeentscheidungen informiert werden. Dies dient der effektiven Überwachung der Vergabeentscheidung und mithin der Transparenz.
Emenda 94
ARTIKOLU 1 PUNT 46 B (ġdid)
Artikolu 100 a, (ġdid) (Regolament (KE, Euratom) Nru 1605/2002)
46b.L-Artikolu li ġej huwa miżjud:
"Artikolu 100a
(1) Il-Kummissjoni għandha tieħu l-miżuri kollha neċessarji sabiex tiżgura li, fir-rigward tal-proċeduri biex jiġu aġġudikati l-kuntratti pubbliċi fil-qafas ta' regolamenti tal-baġit, id-deċiżjonijiet meħuda mill-awtoritajiet li joħorġu l-kuntratti jistgħu jiġu vverifikati b'mod effettiv u fuq kollox kemm jista' jkun malajr skond l-Artikolu 100b (7) li jiddetermina jekk ikunx sar ksur tal-Liġi Komunitarja fil-qasam tal-proċedura ta' aġġudikazzjoni jew ta' regolamenti oħra li jimplimentaw din il-liġi.
(2) Il-Komunità għandha tiżgura li l-proċedura ta' verifika tkun aċċessibbli, skond il-kundizzjonijiet li għandhom jitniżżlu fir-regoli ta' implimentazzjoni, għall-inqas lil kull persuna li għandha jew kellha interess f'kuntratt ta' provvista jew ta' xogħol pubbliku u li sofriet jew tirriskja li ssofri danni permezz ta' ksur tal-liġi li jkun allegat li sar.Il-Kummissjoni tista' b'mod partikulari titlob li l-persuna li tkun qed tfittex verifika għandha tkun avżat minn qabel lill-awtorità li toħroġ il-kuntratti dwar il-ksur allegat u dwar l-intenzjoni li tfittex rimedju.
Ġustifikazzjoni
Gleichbehandlung mit der Verpflichtung der Mitgliedstaaten aus Richtlinie 89/665/EWG vom 21. Dezember 1989.
(1) Il-Kummissjoni għandha tiżgura li għall-proċeduri ta' verifika msemmija fl-Artikolu 100a jkunu neċessarji dawn il-poteri,
a) sabiex malajr kemm jista' jkun u permezz ta' miżuri preċedenti meħuda provviżorjament jitneħħa l-allegat ksur tal-liġi jew sabiex jiġu evitati aktar danni kontra l-interessi tal-parti konċernata; dawn jinkludu miżuri li jissospendu jew li jwasslu għas-sospensjoni tal-proċedura ta' aġġudikazzjoni ta' kuntratti pubbliċi jew miżuri għall-implimentazzjoni ta' kull deċiżjoni oħra ta' l-awtorità li toħroġ il-kuntratti;
b) sabiex jitneħħew deċiżjonijiet illegali, inklużi t-tneħħija ta' speċifikazzjonijiet tekniċi, ekonomiċi jew finanzjarji diskriminatorji fid-dokumenti tas-sejħa għall-offerti, fit-termini tad-dokumenti għall-kuntratti jew f'kull dokument ieħor relatat mal-proċedura ta' l-aġġudikazzjoni tal-kuntratt;
c) sabiex dawk li jkunu sofrew danni minħabba l-ksur tal-liġi jkunu jistgħu jieħdu kumpens.
(2) Il-poteri speċifikati fl-ewwel paragrafu jistgħu jiġu mgħoddija lil bosta istanzi separati li huma responsabbli għall-proċedura ta' verifika minn aspetti differenti tal-proċedura ta' reviżjoni.
(3) Il-proċeduri ta' verifika m'għandhomx minnhom infushom neċessarjament l-effett li awtomatikament jissospendu l-proċedura ta' aġġudikazzjoni.
(4) Il-Kummissjoni tista' tipprovdi li l-istanza responsabbli, meta tikkunsidra jekk għandhomx jitttieħdu miżuri intermedjarji, tista' tqis il-konsegwenzi tal-miżuri fuq il-partijiet interessati li jistgħu jsofru danni, kif ukoll l-interess pubbliku, u tista' tiddeċiedi li ma tiħux dawn il-miżuri jekk l-effetti negattivi jistgħu jkunu akbar mill-benefiċċji relatati magħhom.Id-deċiżjoni li ma jittiħdux miżuri provviżorji mgħandhiex tippreġudika drittijiet oħra tal-persuna li titlob għal dawn il-miżuri.
(5) Il-Kummissjoni tista' tipprovdi li fil-każ ta' talbiet għal kumpens li jkunu saru fuq bażi ta' deċizjoni meħuda illegalment, l-ewwel ħaġa, l-istanza li tingħata l-awtorità neċessarja għandha tannulla din id-deċiżjoni kkontestata.
(6) L-effetti ta' l-eżerċitar tal-poteri msemmija fl-ewwel paragrafu fuq kuntratt iffirmat wara li ġie aġġudikat għandhom jiġu stipulati fir-regoli ta' implimentazzjoni.
Barra minn hekk, ħlief fejn deċiżjoni għandha tiġi annullata qabel ma jingħata kumpens, il-Kummissjoni tista' tipprovdi wkoll li, wara li jiġi ffirmat kuntratt u li jkun ġie aġġudikat, il-poteri ta' istanza responsabbli mill-proċedura ta' verifika, għandha tkun limitata għall-għotja ta' kumpens lill-persuna li tkun sofriet id-danni minħabba l-ksur tar-regolamenti.
(7) Il-Kummissjoni għandha tiżgura li d-deċiżjonijiet meħuda mill-awtoritajiet responsabbli mill-proċedura ta' verifika jistgħu jiġu implimentati b'mod effettiv.
(8) Istanza responsabbli mill-proċedura ta' verifika li mhijiex qorti għandha dejjem tiġġustifika d-deċiżjoni bil-miktub.Barra minn hekk, f'dan il-każ, għandu jiġi żgurat, li miżura li allegatament tikser ir-regolamenti ta' istanza responsabbli jew il-ksur ta' deċiżjoni meħuda mill-istanza ta' verifika jew kull nuqqas allegat fl-eżerċitar tal-poteri mogħtija lilha, jista' jkun suġġett għal vertifika ġudizzjarja jew minn awtorità oħra li mhijiex qorti jew tribunal skond l-Artikolu 234 tat-Trattat KE u indipendenti kemm mill-awtorità aġġundikanti kif ukoll mill-istanza tal-verifika.
Il-membri ta' din l-istanza indipendenti għandhom jibdew u jtemmu l-uffiċċju tagħhom taħt l-istess kundizzjonijiet tal-ġudikatura fir-rigward ta' l-awtorità responsabbli mill-ħatra tagħhom, il-perijodu ta' l-kariga u t-tmiem tagħha.Għall-inqas il-president ta' din l-istanza indipendenti għandu jkollu l-kwalifiki legali u professjonali ta' mħallef.L-istanza indipendenti għandha tipproċedi b'mod li jinstemgħu iż-żewġ naħat; id-deċiżjonijiet għandhom jorbtu legalment skond proċedura li tiġi determinati mill-Kummissjoni."
Ġustifikazzjoni
Gleichbehandlung mit der Verpflichtung der Mitgliedstaaten aus Richtlinie 89/665/EWG vom 21. Dezember 1989.
F'xi każijiet, u għal raġuni valida, l -awtorità li tiffinanzja titlob garanzija min-naħa tal-kuntratturi sabiex:
a) tassigura li l-kuntratt jiġi onorat kif suppost;
b)tjillimita r-riskji finanzjarji assoċjati ma' l-iffinanzjar minn qabel u ta' avvanzi.Fil-każ ta' avvanzi l-garanzija għandha tintalab biss jekk il-ħlas ma jsirx għal kunsenja jew għal servizi li diġà saru skond rati li ġew miftehma minn qabel."
Ġustifikazzjoni
Simplification administrative. L'objet de la garantie disparaît avec la concrétisation de la fourniture/du service.
a) Fil-paragrafu 1 il-parti introduttorja ġiet sostitwita permezz tat-test li ġej:
"1. L-għotjiet huma kontribuzzjonijiet finanzjarji diretti mill-baġit tal-Komunitajiet Ewropej, mogħtija ġenerożament bil-għan li jiffinanzjaw:"
Ġustifikazzjoni
Reprend l'amendement original 91 des rapporteurs en le précisant sur le plan juridique. La référence au budget des "institutions" pourrait s'avérer trompeuse et source de confusion. Il semble plus juste de parler de "budget des communautés européennes". Quelle que soit l'institution à laquelle l'ordonnateur est rattaché, la subvention reste toujours une libéralité à la charge du budget communautaire.
–a a) Il-paragrafu 1, subparagrafu 2, jiġi emendat hekk:
"L-għotjiet finanzjarji huma l-oġġett ta' konvenzjoni miktuba jew ta' deċiżjoni ta' sussidju li għandu jiġi avżat dwarha l-applikant.Id-deċiżjoni li jingħata sussidju tista' tkun akkumpanjata minn kundizzjonijiet, obbligi jew skadenzi, sakemm dawn id-dispożizzjonijiet xorta setgħu kienu l-oġġett ta' ftehima ta' għotjiet finanzjarji.
Ġustifikazzjoni
L'amendement permet d'accorder des subventions par la voie non seulement d'accords mais aussi de décisions de la Commission. L'article 249 du traité CE dispose que les décisions sont des instruments juridiques des Communautés. L'octroi de subventions sur la base de décisions peut dès lors contribuer de façon notable à réduire les contraintes administratives, surtout dans le cas de montants peu importants, et à raccourcir la procédure. Prévoir la possibilité de conditions, délais ou obligations dans le cadre structurel de l'accord de subvention, voilà qui accroît la flexibilité de la mise en œuvre.
Emenda 99
ARTIKOLU 1, PUNT 50
Artikolu 108(2), punt (g a) (ġdid) (Regolament (KE, Euratom) nru 1605/2002)
g a) l-infiq ta' organizzazzjonijiet magħmula minn (ex-) membri u minn impjegati ma' l-istituzzjonijiet li:
- jagħmlu sforz sabiex jippromwovu l-interessi ta' l-istituzzjoni jew sabiex jiffaċilitaw il-mod kif taħdem u/jew
- jorganizzaw attivitajiet kulturali, sportivi, soċjali u oħrajn għall-ġid ta' l-istituzzjoni u/jew ta' l-(ex) membri u tal-impjegati,
u l-infiq li jsir fil-qafas tal-koperazzjoni ma' terzi, mhux irregolati mid-dispożizzjonijiet dwar swieq pubbliċi, u relatati mal-politika ta' informazzjoni ta' l-istituzzjoni.
Dawn il-kategoriji huma kkunsidrati bħala infiq amministrattiv skond kif mifhum fl-Artikolu 49. Għandhom jiġu kkusidrati bħala imputazzjoni distinta fil-baġit."
Ġustifikazzjoni
Sortir, du champ d'application des subventions, les soutiens financiers accordés à des organisations internes aux institutions, nécessaires à leur bon fonctionnement. En effet, différents principes liés aux subventions, dont l'appel à proposition annuel et la dégressivité, sont inadaptés pour les soutiens financiers réalisés par les institutions à des organisations formées par leurs membres ou agents.
Dawn ma jistgħux ikunu kumulattivi jew iġġudikati retrospettivament u għandhom jinvolvu l-ko-finanzjament.
Dawn ma jistgħux ikunu kumulattivi jew iġġudikati retrospettivament u għandhom, mingħajr preġudizzju għad-dispożizzjonijiet dwar l-għotjiet bħala iffinanzjar b'rata fissa jew fuq il-bażi ta' ammonti fissi (Artikolu 113(1) punti b u c)), jinvolvu l-kofinanzjament.
Ġustifikazzjoni
Ces dispositions suppriment l'exigence de cofinancement pour les subventions sous la forme d'un financement à taux forfaitaire ou sur la base de montants forfaitaires.
Emenda 101
ARTIKOLU 1, PUNT 52
Artikolu 109(3), punt d) (Regolament (KE, Euratom) nru 1605/2002)
d) għotjiet ta’ valur baxx li jieħdu waħda mill-forom fl-Artikolu 113a(1)(b) jew (c), jew għaqda ta’ dawk, kif ipprovdut fir-regoli ta’ implimentazzjoni.
d) għotjiet li jieħdu waħda mill-forom fl-Artikolu 113a(1)(b) jew (c), jew għaqda ta’ dawk, kif ipprovdut fir-regoli ta’ implimentazzjoni.
Ġustifikazzjoni
Limiter l'exception de la règle du non profit à des sommes forfaitaires et à un financement forfaitaire des subventions de faible montant n'améliorerait pas sensiblement la situation pour les bénéficiaires. Actuellement, ceux-ci sont souvent pénalisés pour la constitution de ressources propres en raison de la règle du pourcentage selon laquelle ils constatent une réduction des subventions communautaires lorsque leurs ressources augmentent, avec l'effet contreproductif de décourager la constitution de ressources propres. Il conviendrait donc de recourir davantage aux subventions forfaitaires et aux sommes forfaitaires, le cas échéant en combinaison avec un pourcentage de cofinancement maximum plutôt qu'un pourcentage de cofinancement fixe. Cet amendement doit être considéré en liaison avec l'amendement à l'article 113 bis du même auteur.
Emenda 102
ARTIKOLU 1, PUNT 52 Artikolu 109(3), punt (d a) (ġdid) (Regolament (KE, Euratom) nru 1605/2002)
d a) riżorsi proprji, b'mod speċjali kontribuzzjonijiet u ħlasijiet miġbura waqt l-operazzjonijiet annwali ta' partit politiku fuq livell Ewropew skond kif mifhum fl-Artikolu 2, punti 1) u 2), tar-Regolament (KE) nru 2004/2003, li jaqbżu l-25% ta' l-infiq eliġibbli li għandu jkun ir-responsabbiltà tal-benefiċjarju skond l-Artikolu 10(2) ta' dak ir-Regolament.
Servizz konġunt għandu jkollu l-għan li jinforma u jagħti pariri lill-applikanti.Dan is-servizz għandu partikolarment:
- jistabbilixxi normi komuni għall-formoli ta' l-applikazzjoni dwar għotjiet simili, u jimonitorja l-importanza u l-leġibilità tal-formoli ta' l-applikazzjoni,
- jinforma lill-applikanti potenzjali (b'mod partikulari permezz ta' seminars u billi jipprovdi ktejjeb ta' istruzzjonijiet), kif ukoll
- jopera bażi ta' dejta li tgħin lill-Kummissjoni sabiex tinforma lill-applikanti."
Ġustifikazzjoni
Une légère modification est proposée à l'amendement 95 déposé par le rapporteur, le terme "organe" étant remplacé par "service" pour bien montrer que l'idée est de mettre en commun les connaissances et d'explorer les bonnes pratiques au sein de la Commission en transcendant les différentes interprétations et les différentes pratiques au sein et entre les départements et d'être un point d'information fiable pour les demandeurs.
l-ewwel subparagrafu jiġi sostitwit bit-test li ġej:
"1. L-għotjiet huma l-għan ta' programmazzjoni annwali ppubblikata fil-bidu ta' eżerċizzju u mhux aktar tard mill-31 ta' Marzu, bla ħsara għall-għajnuniet finanzjarji għal sitwazzjonijiet ta' kriżi u għal operazzjonijiet ta' għajnuna umanitarja.
L-għotjiet ta' ħidma, hekk kif definiti fl-Artikolu 112 ta' dan ir-Regolament, huma wkoll l-iskop ta' programmazzjoni annwali li tista' tiġi ppubblikata sa mis-sena ta' qabel, sakemm l-approprjazzjonijiet ikunu disponibbli s-sena ta' wara."
Ġustifikazzjoni
Il importe de bien distinguer la problématique des subventions de fonctionnement et des subventions d'actions qui répondent à des contraintes différentes.
En outre, suite aux réformes des modalités d'exécution du règlement financier en octobre 2005 et compte tenu des contraintes administratives, il semble plus réaliste de fixer la date de publication du programme annuel pour les subventions (en action) au 31 mars.
“Dak il-programm ta’ ħidma għandu jiġi implimentat permezz tal-pubblikazzjoni ta’ sejħiet għal proposti ħlief f’każijiet eċċezzjonali ta’ urġenza sostanzjati kif imiss jew meta l-karatteristiċi tal-benefiċjarju jew ta’ l-azzjoni ma jħallu l-ebda għażla oħra għal azzjoni partikulari.”
“Dak il-programm ta’ ħidma għandu jiġi implimentat permezz tal-pubblikazzjoni ta’ sejħiet għal proposti ħlief f’każijiet eċċezzjonali ta’ urġenza sostanzjati kif imiss jew meta l-karatteristiċi tal-benefiċjarju jew ta’ l-azzjoni ma jħallu l-ebda għażla oħra għal azzjoni partikulari.” L-appell għall-proposti jista' jiġi ppubblikat sa mis-sena ta' qabel sakemm l-approprjazzjonijiet tas-sena ta' wara jkunu disponibbli.Indipendentament mid-data tal-pubblikazzjoni u mingħajr preġudizzju għall-Artikolu 115, huwa jikkomunika r-regolamenti kollha applikabbli sabiex issir l-għotja (b'mod partikulari r-raġunijiet ta' esklużjoni ta' l-Artikoli 93 u 94), u f'dan il-każ jistgħu jsiru referenzi għan-normi.Id-dispożizzjonijiet applikabbli jorbtu għat-tul ta' żmien tal-proċedura fil-verżjoni li tkun fis-seħħ fil-mument tal-pubblikazzjoni."
Ġustifikazzjoni
La publication dès l'année précédente permettrait d'éviter la concentration des procédures de subvention au début de l'année et les retards en résultant. Les demandeurs devraient pouvoir prétendre à la sécurité juridique pour la durée de la procédure. Empêcher toute modification pendant la procédure en cours, voilà qui limite les charges administratives pour le bénéficiaire et la Commission, qui renforce la procédure et qui uniformise la politique d'aide.
(53a) Fl-Artikolu 110, il-paragrafu 2 jiġi sostitwit permezz tat-test li ġej:
"2. L-għotjiet kollha attribwiti matul eżerċizzju jiġu ppubblikati kull sena u, skond il-każ, jintużaw mezzi elettroniċi, b'kunsiderazzjoni sħiħa għall-kunfidenzjalità u għas-sikurezza."
Ġustifikazzjoni
Application du règlement financier aux moyens de communication modernes.
Penali ta' dan it-tip jistgħu jkunu imposti fuq benefiċjarji li waqt l-implimentazzjoni tal-ftehima dwar għotja finanzjarja, għamlu dikjarazzjonijiet foloz fil-preżentazzjoni ta' l-informazzjoni meħtieġa mill-uffiċċjal awtorizzanti jew li ma ppreżentawx din l-informazzjoni.
Penali ta' dan it-tip jistgħu jkunu imposti fuq benefiċjarji li waqt l-implimentazzjoni tal-ftehima dwar għotja finanzjarja, intenzjonalment jew minħabba negliġenza ovvja, għamlu dikjarazzjonijiet foloz fil-preżentazzjoni ta' l-informazzjoni meħtieġa mill-uffiċċjal awtorizzanti jew li ma ppreżentawx din l-informazzjoni.
Azzjoni waħda tistax tagħti lok għall-aġġudikazzjoni ta’ għotja waħda biss mill-baġit lil kwalunkwe benefiċjarju, ħlief fejn hu awtorizzat xort’oħra mill-atti bażiċi kkonċernati.
1. Azzjoni waħda ma tistax tagħti lok għall-aġġudikazzjoni ta' għotja waħda biss mill-baġit lil kwalunkwe benefiċjarju.
Benefiċjarju jista’ jkun aġġudikat għotja operazzjonali waħda biss mill-baġit għal kull sena finanzjarja.
Benefiċjarju jista’ jkun aġġudikat għotja operazzjonali waħda biss mill-baġit għal kull sena finanzjarja. L-applikant għandu jinforma immedjatament lill-uffiċjali dwar kull ripetizzjoni ta' domanda u ta' l-għotja għall-proġett.
F’kwalunkwe każ, l-istess spejjeż ma għandhomx jiġu ffinanzjati darbtejn mill-budget.”
3. Fl-ebda każ ma jista' jinqabeż l-ammont totali ta' l-ispejjeż eliġibbli għall-iffinanzjar.
Ġustifikazzjoni
L'obligation qui est faite au bénéficiaire des subventions - lequel est mieux au fait de la situation - à savoir communiquer des informations, contribue à éviter des subventions répétées illicites ou un dépassement du montant maximal admissible.
(55a) Fl-Artikolu 113, il-paragrafu 2 jiġi sostitwit permezz tat-test li ġej:
"2. Ħlief jekk speċifikat mod ieħor fl-att bażiku dwar organi li jippruvaw jilħqu għan ta' interess ġenerali Ewropew u minkejja d-dispożizzjonijiet dwar l-għotjiet bħala ammonti fissi jew fuq bażi ta' ffinanzjar fiss (Artikolu 113a(1) punti b) u c)), meta l-għotjiet jiġu mġedda huma jitnaqqsu b'mod progressiv, proporzjonali u ġust."
Ġustifikazzjoni
Le financement forfaitaire et le financement de sommes forfaitaires ne devraient pas être soumis à la dégressivité afin de réduire les charges administratives.
Emenda 110
ARTIKOLU 1, PUNT 56 Artikolu 113(1), punt (d) (Regolament (KE, Euratom) nru 1605/2002)
a) ħlas lura ta’ proporzjon speċifiku ta’ l-ispejjeż eliġibbli li fil-fatt intefqu;
a) ħlas lura ta’ proporzjon massimu jew speċifiku ta’ l-ispejjeż eliġibbli li fil-fatt intefqu;
Ġustifikazzjoni
Actuellement, les bénéficiaires sont souvent pénalisés pour la constitution de ressources propres en raison de la règle du pourcentage selon laquelle ils constatent une réduction des subventions communautaires lorsque leurs ressources augmentent, avec l'effet contreproductif de décourager la constitution de ressources propres. Il conviendrait donc de recourir davantage aux subventions forfaitaires et aux sommes forfaitaires, le cas échéant en combinaison avec un pourcentage de cofinancement maximum plutôt qu'un pourcentage de cofinancement fixe. Cet amendement doit être considéré en liaison avec l'amendement à l'article 109 du même auteur.
1a.Jistgħu b'mod speċjali jiġu kkunsidrati spejjeż eliġibbli għal finanzjament:
a) l-ispejjeż ta' garanzija bankarja jew ta' garanzija komparabbli li għandha tingħat mill-benefiċjarju ta' l-għotja skond l-Artikolu 118;
b) l-ammonti ta' taxxa fuq .... li l-benefiċjarju ta' l-għotja ma jistax ... tnaqqis mit-taxxa....;
c) l-ispejjeż ta' verifika esterna (Artikoli 117 u 119);
d) l-ispejjeż amministrattivi, l-ispejjeż għal impjegati u għal apparat;
e) l-iżvalutar.
Ġustifikazzjoni
Les petites entreprises et les petites organisations en particulier ne peuvent supporter elles-mêmes les coûts qu'implique la fourniture de garanties. Toutefois, il convient qu'elles ne soient pas exclues de fait du bénéfice des subventions. Il en va de même pour les organisations non gouvernementales qui ne peuvent prétendre à la déduction de la taxe en amont.
L-applikanti għandhom jiċċertifikaw li huma m'humiex f'waħda mis-sitwazzjonijiet imsemmija fl-ewwel subparagrafu.
L-applikanti jiċċertifikaw, b'kunsiderazzjoni ta' l-Artikolu 109, fuq it-talba ta' l-uffiċjali, li huma m'humiex f'waħda mis-sitwazzjonijiet imsemmija fl-ewwel subparagrafu.
Ġustifikazzjoni
Il faut donner à l'ordonnateur la possibilité de recourir à l'attestation de façon flexible et sur la base de sa propre évaluation des risques, ce qui a pour effet de réduire les charges administratives.
Tali penalitajiet jistgħu wkoll jiġu mposti fuq benefiċjarji li, waqt l-implimentazzjoni tal-ftehim ta’ l-għotja, għamlu dikjarazzjonijiet foloz fl-għoti ta’ informazzjoni meħtieġa mill-uffiċjal li jawtorizza jew jonqsu milli jagħtu tali informazzjoni.”
Tali penalitajiet jistgħu wkoll jiġu mposti fuq benefiċjarji li, waqt l-implimentazzjoni tal-ftehim ta’ l-għotja, b'mod intenzjonat jew b'negliġenza, għamlu dikjarazzjonijiet foloz fl-għoti ta’ informazzjoni meħtieġa mill-uffiċjal li jawtorizza jew jonqsu milli jagħtu tali informazzjoni.”
4a.L-uffiċjal awtorizzanti għandu jipproponi li d-dikjarazzjonijiet jinħarġu, li l-applikazzjonijiet isiru jew li d-dikjarazzjonijiet jew l-applikazzjonijiet jiġu korretti jekk ikun jidher ċar li ma nħarġux, jew li ma sarux jew li nħarġu jew saru ħażin minħabba żvista jew minħabba nuqqas ta' għarfien biss.Sakemm ikun neċessarju u fattibbli u permessibbli fid-dawl tal-possibiltajiet disponibbli, huwa għandu jipprovdi informazzjoni dwar id-drittijiet u l-obbligi tal-parteċipanti fil-proċedura.
L-uffiċjal awtorizzanti għandu jżomm dokumentazzjoni xierqa ta' kuntatti ma' l-applikanti waqt il-proċedura.
Ġustifikazzjoni
This provision is intended to make it possible for applicants to submit successful applications for grants even if they are not used to dealing with subsidising agencies and have no legal advisor.Nongovernmental organisations have complained about the lack of cooperation.This is intended to make the European Union a more attractive funding partner.Transparency and certainty of the procedure are the aims of the requirement to keep records.
(57a) Fl-Artikolu 115, paragrafu 1 jinbidel kif ġej:
"1. Waqt li jitqiesu l-prinċipji msemmija fl-Artikolu 109(1) ubl-użu tal-kriterjita' għażla stabbiliti minn qabel fis-sejħa għal proposti, tiġi evalwata l-kapaċità ta' l-applikant li jwettaq l-azzjoni jew il-programm ta' ħidma proposti.Dan għandu jsir bla preġudizzju għall-Artikolu 110(1).Il-kriterji għall-għoti għandhom juru il-karatteristiċi speċifiċi tal-proġetti u tal-kwalità u ta' l-implimentazzjoni tagħhom."
Ġustifikazzjoni
A small modification is made to amendment 104 of the rapporteur, making it more explicit that the principles of article 109, namely transparency, proportionality and equal treatment, need to be taken into account also when specifying selection and award criteria. This is of importance also in view of the two step procedure, proposed by the rapporteur in amendment 105. Moreover a small error is corrected: where the rapporteur's amendment mentions selection criteria twice, here the words award criteria is used in the second sub paragraph in line with the distinction made in article 115.S
Emenda 116
ARTIKOLU 1, PUNT 57 B (ġdid)
Artikolu 115, paragrafi 2 a (ġdid) u 2 b (ġdid) (Regolament (KE, Euratom) Nru 1605/2002)
57b.Il-paragrafi 2a u 2b li ġejjin huma mdaħħla fl-Artikolu 115:
'2a.Il-proċedura ta' l-għoti, bħala prinċipju għandha tkun maqsuma f'ħafna stadji ta' proċedura u l-ewwel wieħed minnhom għandujagħmel biss evalwazzjoni approssimattiva ta'l-applikazzjonijiet permissibbli li ġew ippreżentati.Jekk wara dan l-istadju applikazzjoni diġà tidher li ma jista' jkollha ebda prospett ta' suċċess, l-applikant għandu jiġi infurmat kif xieraqskond l-Artikolu116, paragrafu 3. Kull stadju segwenti tal-proċedura jrid ikun distint b'mod ċar minn dak ta' qablu, b'mod partikolari fil-kwantità us-sustanza tal-provi li jridu jkunu sottomessi mill-applikant.Jekk ikun hemm bżonn ta' provi mill-applikant, dawn jistgħu jintalbu darba biss waqt il-proċedura.Id-dejta li nġabret għandha tinħażen f' 'database' (Artikolu 109a).Għandhom isiru sforzi biex il-proċedura titlesta malajr.
2b.Minkejja l-prinċipji fl-Artikolu 109, parafgrafu 1, l-uffiċjal awtorizzanti għandu, matul il-proċedura, jieħu ħsieb partikolari biex jiżgura li l-isforz meħtieġ minn applikant għall-finijiet ta' pubblikazzjoni, dokumentazzjoni u l-għoti ta' evidenza obligatorja oħrali għandha x'taqsam ma' għotja ta' fondi, ma jkunxdisproporzjonat mal-valur ta' l-għotja ta' fondi li trid tingħata.'
Ġustifikazzjoni
Dividing the procedure into several stages should facilitate a prior selection. This can also reduce the submission of substantial documentation during the early stage of the procedure. The same purpose will be served by the checking function of the authorising officer.
1. Il-proposti għandhom jiġu evalwati, fuq il-bażi ta' kriterji għal selezzjoni u għotja mħabbrin minn qabel, bil-għan li jkun determinat liema proposti jistgħu jkunu finanzjati.
1. Il-proposti għandhom jiġu evalwati fi żmien xahrejn fuq il-bażi ta' kriterji għal selezzjoni u għotja mħabbrin minn qabel, bil-għan li jkun determinat liema proposti jistgħu jkunu finanzjati.
Ġustifikazzjoni
The provision seeks to establish clear time frame for decision making.
(58a) Fl-Artikolu 116, paragrafu 3 jinbidel kif ġej:
"3. L-uffiċjal awtorizzanti responsabbli għandu jinforma lill-applikanti bil-miktub dwar id-deċiżjoni li tikkonċerna l-applikazzjoni tagħhom u jiffirma l-kuntratt wara li jiskadi ż-żmienimsemmi fl-Artikolu 100(2a).
Jekk l-għotja li ġiet mitluba ma tingħatax, l-istituzzjoni għandha tagħti raġunijiet għar-rifjut ta' l-applikazzjoni, b'referenza partikolari għall-kriterji tas- selezzjoni u l-għotja diġà mħabbra.
Ġustifikazzjoni
The provision seeks to establish clear time frame for decision making.
58c.L-Artikolu 117 qed jiġi sostitwit b'dan li ġej:
'Artikolu 117
1. Il-mod kif jitqassmu l-pagamenti għandu jkun stabbilit skond ir-riskji finanzjarji involuti, mit-tul u mill-progress ta' l-azzjoni, jew mill-ispejjeżmagħmula mill-benefiċjarju.Il-pagamenti jridu jsiru fi żmien raġjonevoli.
Jekk l-iskeda ta' pagamenti hija stipulata kuntrattwalment jew b'deċiżjoni, il-pagamenti għandhom isiru mingħajr l-ebda talba oħra meta jkunu dovuti.Dan għandu jsir bla preġudizzju għall-Artikolu 119, paragrafu 2.
2. Sabiex ikunu aċċertati r-riskji finanzjarji, l-uffiċjal awtorizzanti jista', waqt li jqies il-prinċipji fl-Artikolu 109, paragrafu 1, jitlob lill-benefiċjarju ta' l-għotja finanzjarja biex jissottometti attestazzjoni minn awditur indipendenti.Id-dispożizzjonijiet ta' implimentazzjoni jistgħu jipprovdu għal każijiet fejn attestazzjoni għandha tinkiseb minn awditur estern jew fejn attestazzjoni mhijiex meħtieġa.
(L-ewwel sentenza ta' paragrafu 2 hija identika għall-Artikolu 117 tar-Regolament (KE, Euratom) Nru 1605/2002)
Ġustifikazzjoni
The provision is intended to help speed up the procedure. Institutions which have their own audit offices should be allowed to use them rather than having to resort to external auditors. This will avoid procedural costs.
58c.L-Artikolu 118 qed jiġi sostitwit b'dan li ġej:
'Artikolu 118
L-uffiċjal awtorizzanti responsabbli, jista' jitlob lill-benefiċjarju biex jiddepożita garanzija bil-quddiem sabiex jiġu limitati r-riskji konnessi mal-ħlas ta' qabel l-iffinazjar sakemm ma jkunx hemm mezzi oħra daqshekk effettivi biex jiġi minimizzat ir-riskju.'
(Bħall-Artikolu 118 tar-Regolament (KE, Euratom) Nru 1605/2002 biż-żieda tal-kliem 'sakemm ma jkunx hemm mezzi oħra daqshekk effettivi biex jiġi minimizzat ir-riskju')
Ġustifikazzjoni
Requiring security in the form of bank guarantees would cause considerable difficulties, particularly to small businesses, businesses in certain Member States and small nongovernmental organisations. It should therefore be made clear that this is intended only to be the last resort if other equally effective forms of security cannot be considered.
58d.L-Artikolu 119 qed jiġi sostitwit b'dan li ġej:
'Artikolu 119
1. L-ammont ta' l-għotja m'għandux isir definittiv qabel ma l-istituzzjoni taċċetta r-rapporti finali u l-kontijiet, mingħajr preġudizzju għal kontrolli segwenti mill-istituzzjoni.F'dan il-każ iż-żmien ta' limitazzjoni (Artikolu 73b) kontra l-istituzzjoni għandu jibda meta jsir l-aħħar pagament.Iż-żmien ta' limitazzjoni (Artikolu 73b) kontra l-benefiċjarju għandu jibda meta l-ammont ta' l-għotja jsir definittiv.
2. Jekk il-benefiċjarju ma jkunx konformi ma' l-obbligazzjonijiet legali jew kuntrattwali tiegħu/tagħha jew ma' obbligazzjonijiet stipulati fid-deċiżjoni dwar aġġudikazzjoni ta' għotja, l-għotja tista' tiġi sospiża, imnaqqsa jew imwaqqfa skond id-dispożizzjonijiet ipprovduti mir-regoli ta' implimentazzjoni wara li l-benefiċjarju jkun ingħata l-opportunità li jagħmel l-osservazzjonijiet tiegħu/tagħha.
It-tnaqqis irid ikun proporzjonali ma' l-iżball li għalih saret l-oġġezzjoni.
Jekk in-nuqqas ta' dmir m'huwiex minħabba l-kondotta tal-benefiċjarju, l-għotja għandha tiġi sospiża, imnaqqsa jew imwaqqfa f'każijiet speċjali biss, partikularment jekk l-implimentazzjoni jew it-tkomplija ta' l-għotja twassal biex jinqabeż il-limitu ta' l-ispejjeż tal-proġett eleġibbli għall-iffinanzjar jew jekk in-nuqqas ta' attenzjoni għad-dmir ikollu l-effett li jagħmilha impossibli li jintlaħaq l-għan ta' l-għotja.'
Ġustifikazzjoni
Applies the principle of proportionality. In particular, automatic reduction of the EU grant if one or more co-financers withdraws through no fault of the beneficiary might result in failure of the overall project. Care should be taken to avoid this. The reference to the provisions concerning limitation is intended to compel the institution to conduct the final evaluation, at the latest, before the limitation period expires. This should increase legal certainty for the beneficiary of the grant.
1. Fejn l-implimentazzjoni ta' azzjoni teħtieġ l-għotja ta’ kuntratti ta’ prokurament mill-benefiċjarju, il-proċeduri relevanti għandhom ikunu kif stipulat fir-regoli ta' implimentazzjoni.
1. Fejn l-implimentazzjoni ta' azzjoni teħtieġ l-għotja ta’ kuntratti ta’ prokurament, dingħandha tkun suġġetta għall-prinċipji fit-Titolu V ta' dan il-Parti.
Id-dispożizzjonijiet ta' l-implimentar jistgħu jipprovdu għal arranġamenti għal proċedura simplifikata, skond id-daqs tal-kuntratt.
61. Fl-Artikolu 122, 'Artikolu 185' issir 'Artikolu 121'.
61. L-Artikolu 122 qed jiġi sostitwit b'dan li ġej:
'Artikolu 122
Għandu jiġi mehmuż mal-kontijiet finanzjarji ta' l-istituzzjonijiet u tal-korpi msemmija fl-Artikolu 121, rapport dwar l-immaniġġjar baġitarju u finanzjarju matul is-sena tal-baġit ikkonċernat, li jagħti rendikont, inter alia, tar-rata ta' l-implimentazzjoni ta' l-approprijazzjonijiet u tat-trasferimenti ta' l-approprjazzjonijiet fost id-diversi oqsma tal-baġit.'
Ġustifikazzjoni
The aim is to clarify the objectives and substance of the various reports provided for by the Financial Regulation. It would be desirable for the annual reports of authorising officers to focus on the use of resources, the attainment of objectives, the development of activities and the internal control framework, while the report on budgetary and financial management focuses on aspects of budget implementation.
68a.L-Artikolu 139, Paragrafu 2, qed jiġi sostitwit b'dan li ġej:
'2. L-istituzzjonijiet għandhom jgħaddu r-regoli finanzjarji interni tagħhom lill-Qorti ta' l-Awdituri u lill-awtorità baġitarja, għall-informazzjoni tagħhom.'
Ġustifikazzjoni
To ensure that the budgetary authority is informed.
(69b) Fl-Artikolu 143, il-Paragrafu 3 jiġi sostitwit b'li ġej:
"3. Ir-rapport annwali għandu jkun fih evalwazzjoni tal-validità ta' l-immaniġġjar finanzjarju.Għandu jkun fih evalwazzjoni ta' l-effiċjenza u r-regolarità ta' l-immaniġġjar baġitarju u ekonomiku."
Ġustifikazzjoni
The differentiation is intended to make clear that, in its auditing remit, the Court of Auditors should confine itself to assessing the formal legality of revenue and expenditure but should also assess the substantive appropriateness of the transactions audited.
75. Fl-Artikolu 153, il-paragrafu 1 ġie sostitwit b'dan li ġej:
'1. Fejn il-Kummissjoni tista' tittrasferixxi approprijazzjonijiet skond l-Artikolu 23, għandha tieħu d-deċiżjoni tagħha mhux aktar tard mill-31 ta' Jannar tas-sena finanzjarja li jkun imiss u għandha tgħarraf lill-awtorità baġitarja tliet ġimgħat qabel ma tagħmel it-trasferimenti imsemmija f'punt (a) ta' l-Artikolu 21(1).'
imħassar
(Article 153, paragraph 1, as amended, corresponds to the original version in Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
Justification
Preservation of Parliament's prerogatives.
Emenda 127
ARTIKOLU 1, PUNT 82 A (ġdid)
Artikolu 160 b (ġdid) (Regolament (KE, Euratom) Nru 1605/2002)
82a.L-Artikolu 160b, kif ġej, jidħol wara l-Artikolu 160a:
'Artikolu 160b
Minkejja l-Artikolu 110, sejħa għal proposti tista' tkun diġà nħarġet fis-sena ta' qabel, soġġetta għad-disponibilità ta' l-approprijazzjonijiet fis-sena li jkun imiss.Irrispettivament minn meta ssir il-pubblikazzjoni u minkejja l-Artikolu 115, il-Kummissjoni għandha tindika r-regoli kollha li japplikaw għall-għoti ta' l-għajnuna (b'mod partikulari l-kriterji ta' esklużjoni kif imsemmija fl-Artikoli 93 u 94), li fihom huma permissibbli riferenzi konnessi mad-dispożizzjonijiet.Matul il-proċedura, ir-regoli li jiġu applikati jkunu jorbtu fil-verżjoni li tkun applikabbli meta ssir it-tħabbira.'
Ġustifikazzjoni
See the amendment to Article 110. Publication the previous year is intended to prevent grant procedures from being concentrated at the beginning of the year, which causes delays. Applicants should enjoy legal certainty throughout the procedure. The prohibition on any amendment while a procedure is in progress will reduce the quantity of administrative work for the beneficiaries, tighten up procedures and unify policy on grants.
(85a) Fl-Artikolu 168 (1), jiżdied is-subparagrafu li ġej:
"Fir-rigward ta' l-assistenza esterna Komunitarja, għandhom japplikaw ir-regoli tal-parteċipazzjoni fil-proċeduri tas-sejħiet għall-offerti msemmija fir-Regolament (KE) Nru 2110/2005 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill ta' l-14 ta' Diċembru 2005 dwar l-aċċess għal assistenza esterna Komunitarja1 u fir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 2112/2005 tal-21 ta' Novembru 2005 dwar l-aċċess għall-assistenza esterna Komunitarja2.
_______________
1 ĠU L 344, 27.12.2005, p. 1.
2 ĠU L 344, 27.12.2005, p. 23."
Ġustifikazzjoni
The two regulations for the untying of aid were adopted in 2005. They open the tendering procedures for persons from non-EU and non-beneficiary countries favouring developing countries and applying the principle of reciprocity for non-EU developed countries. These rules have to be applied and should be incorporated in the Financial Regulation.
Li ġej, b'mod partikulari, jista' jiġi kklejmjat bħala nfiq eliġibbli għall-finanzjament:
(a) l-ispejjeż ta' garanzija bankarja jew garanzija komparabbli li trid tkun sottomessa minn min jingħata l-għajnuna skond l-Artikolu 118;
(b) l-ammonti ta' taxxa fuq il-fatturat li min jingħata l-għajnuna ma jistax jikklejmja bħala tnaqqis mit-taxxa fuq ix-xiri;
(c) l-ispejjeż għal verifika esterna (Artikoli 117 u 119);
(d) l-ispejjeż tan-nefqa amministrattiva u ta' nfiq għall-impjegati u għall-makkinarju;
(e) deprezzament.
Ġustifikazzjoni
See the amendment to Article 113a: small nongovernmental organisations, in particular, working in the field of development aid cannot themselves bear the costs of lodging surety. However, these should not in consequence in effect be excluded from subsidisation. The same applies to the problem of nongovernmental organisations, which do not have the benefit of a deduction of input tax.
(94a) Fl-Artikolu 179 (3), l-ewwel subparagrafu jinbidel kif ġej:
"3. L-istituzzjonijiet għandhom jgħarrfu liż-żewġ fergħat ta' l-awtorità baġitarja kemm jista' jkun malajr, iżda mill-inqas 3 ġimgħat qabel kwalunkwe data ta' skandenza li qabilha tkun trid tittieħed deċiżjoni minn awtorità baġitarja, dwar kwalunkwe proġett ta' bini li x'aktarx ikollu implikazzjonijiet finanzjarji sinjifikanti għall-baġit."
Ġustifikazzjoni
In order to be able to make sound financial judgements as a budgetary authority on a building project with implications for the European Union's budget, the Institutions referred to under paragraph 179.3 need to inform the two branches at least 3 weeks prior to any deadline before which a decision has to be taken by the budgetary authority. This will enable both arms of the budgetary authority to ask for more clarification and further inquiries when deemed necessary.
Emenda 131
ARTIKOLU 1, PUNT 94 B (ġdid)
Artikolu 183, it-tieni sentenza (ġdida) (Regolament (KE, Euratom) Nru 1605/2002)
94b.Is-sentenza li ġejja għandha tidħol f'183:
'Għandha tisma' l-opinjoni ta' l-awtorità baġitarja u, fejn ikun xieraq, tagħti kasha.'
"1. Il-Kummissjoni għandha tadotta qafas ta' regolament finanzjarju għall-korpi maħluqa mill-Unjoni u li għandhom personalità legali.Ir-regoli finanzjarji li jirregolaw lil dawn il-korpi ma jisgħux jitbiegħdu mill-qafas regolatorju ħlief fejn jitolbu hekk il-ħtiġijiet speċifiċi ta' l-operat tagħhom u bil-kunsens minn qabel tal-Kummissjoni."
Ġustifikazzjoni
For reasons of transparency, accountability and consistency, all agencies that act on behalf of the Union, irrespective of whether they receive grants charged to the budget, should be subject to the framework financial regulation.
3.Kull korp imsemmi fil-paragrafu 1 għandu jistabbilixxi funzjoni ta' verifika interna li trid titħaddem b'konformità ma' l-istandards internazzjonali rilevanti.L-uffiċjal tal-verifika intern tal-Kummissjoni għandu jiċċertifika li l-operat tal-funzjoni tal-verifika tkun tirrispetta l-istandards internazzjonali tal-verifika u, għal dawk il-fini, jista' jagħmel verifiċi dwar il-kwalità.
3.L-uffiċjal tal-verifika intern tal-Kummissjoni għandu jagħmel il-verifika għall-korpi msemmija fil-Paragrafu 1. Il-korpi msemmija fil-Paragrafu 1 jistgħu joħolqu funzjoni interna ta' verifika.L-uffiċjal tal-verifika intern tal-Kummissjoni jista', f'każi ssostanzjati kif imiss, jiddelega x-xogħol tiegħu lill-uffiċjali tal-verifika interni tagħhom.Din id-delegazzjoni għandha ssir bil-miktub, issemmi r-raġunijiet għad-delegazzjoni u l-ismijiet ta' l-uffiċjali tal-verifika responsabbli (min iddelega u lil min iddelega).Minkejja d-delegazzjoni, l-uffiċjal tal-verifika intern tal-Kummissjoni jista' jagħmel verifiċi interni għall-korpi msemmija fil-Paragrafu 1 u jirrevoka d-delegazzjoni kulmeta jħoss li hekk ikun xieraq.
F'każi fejn funzjoni interna ta' verifika tinħoloq mill-korpi msemmija fil-Paragrafu 1, dan għandu jsir b'konformità mal-linji gwida stabbiliti mill-uffiċjal tal-verifika intern tal-Kummissjoni.Dawn il-linji gwida għandhom jinkludu d-dmir li jkunu sottomessi r-rapporti kollha li jkunu saru għall-uffiċjal tal-verifika intern tal-Kummissjoni.L-uffiċjal tal-verifika intern tal-Kummissjoni għandu jiċċertifika li l-operat tal-funzjoni tal-verifika jkun jirrispetta l-istandards internazzjonali tal-verifika u, għal dawk il-fini, jista' jagħmel verifiki dwar il-kwalità."
Ġustifikazzjoni
Clarify position of Commission's Internal Auditor. Commission's Internal Auditor is being empowered to delegate tasks to agencies' internal audit services while maintaining control over and responsibility for accounting within the agencies.
4. Il-korpi msemmija fl-Artikolu 121 għandhom japplikaw ir-regoli dwar il-kontijiet imsemmija fl-Artikolu 133 sabiex il-kontijiet tagħhom ikunu jistgħu jiġu kkonsolidati mal-kontijiet tal-Kummissjoni.
There is hardly any other item of legislation which has such a practical impact on staff at the Commission and the other institutions as the Financial Regulation. Some 40% of the Commission's employees have dealings with its rules and instructions, most of them on a daily basis. Yet the Regulation lacks clarity and structure, making it untransparent; the numerous cross-references impede understanding and render it difficult to find the answers to questions quickly. Nearly three years after the Financial Regulation was adopted, the helpdesk of DG Budget is still receiving an average of five queries from users every working day, seeking answers to their problems with the Financial Regulation and its implementing provisions. Sizeable manuals have been compiled: each DG has drawn up its own rules and procedures on the basis of the Regulation. In addition, DG Budget has adopted its own internal rules. A complex, contradictory and confusing body of law on the implementation of the budget has come into being, which, even after lengthy training, may be only partly comprehended.
The consequences of the complex procedural provisions are bureaucratisation of processes, protracted procedures and attempts to evade responsibility by involving as many hierarchies and procedural stages as possible. 'Clients' - applicants for grants and bidders for contracts - are increasingly frustrated at a Europe which not only makes it difficult for citizens, organisations, industry and research centres to obtain money but also, by means of complex and costly application procedures, renders unobtainable substantial sums intended for disbursement in Europe.
Insoluble, fundamental contradictions remain: for example, competing legislation. The scope of the Financial Regulation and its general validity are restricted by legislation which goes further, for example the basic legal acts. These may at any time contradict even key provisions of the Financial Regulation. Thus a weapon which was thought to be keen-bladed is in reality blunted. Moreover, the Financial Regulation covers only the direct, central administration: other administrative bodies adopt their own rules and where they are concerned, the picture so far remains vague at best.
The Commission has submitted a proposal for a revision which in part certainly represents a step in the right direction. It has made proposals for dealing with a number of pressing administrative problems. One of its answers is to encroach upon Parliament's prerogatives. Life will be made easier for applicants for EU funding only if at the same time the administration also benefits from the changes. The Commission has not attached much importance to more user-friendly access to EU markets and subsidies, building up a joint capacity for problem-solving, databases and harmonisation of procedures, which are applied differently from DG to DG, in order to reduce work and costs and simplify procedures, both for the Commission and for users. Much also remains to be done to tackle the administrative problems of the Commission and the other institutions. In its Opinion no 10/2005, the Court of Auditors therefore criticises the excessive scale of the revision (Paragraph 50) while at the same objecting that the revision does not provide 'the solution to certain management needs' and that it is not 'radical' enough (Paragraph 53).
The rapporteurs of the European Parliament are tabling amendments relating to 63 articles. Parliament's priorities here are not the same as the Commission's: Parliament highlights preserving Parliament's powers of control and rights to information and measures to reduce the difficulties facing anybody wishing to work with the EU. There is a particular focus on Parts V and VI of the Financial Regulation, markets and grants, i.e. those parts with which members of the public come into contact via organisations, research establishments and enterprises. In the view of the rapporteurs, easing of procedures and the proportionality of the effort involved to the size of a contract or grant are the criteria for assessing administrative action.
Of the Commission's 95 amendments concerning 93 articles, 28 are modified. In another 28 cases, the Commission's proposed amendments are rejected entirely. In 34 articles both the Commission and Parliament agree that reform is needed. Parliament's amendments concern 63 articles. Altogether, the Commission and the rapporteurs are proposing 185 amendments to 122 of the 187 articles in the Financial Regulation.
The rapporteurs realise that this will not make the Financial Regulation any simpler to understand and apply. They therefore advocate in addition that, in the medium term, the Financial Regulation should be completely overhauled with the assistance of experts on grants and tender procedures, and one of their key observations to the Commission and Council is that, in its current form, the Financial Regulation can only be reformed to a limited extent. A new version drafted with a view to simplification, better comprehensibility and output budgeting would be the appropriate answer and the best for Europe and its administration.
The main considerations underlying our amendments are as follows:
1. Preserving Parliament's prerogatives
·The amendments concerning transfers of appropriations (Art. 2, 19, 22, 23, 26, 153 and 160a) and rights to information (Art. 28, 29, 46(1)(1)(f), 33, 83 and 110) are rejected.
·In Art. 183 the adoption of implementing provisions is made conditional on an opinion from the budgetary authority.
2. Europe - acting more efficiently, using simpler procedures
·Proportionality of administrative action: the required effort and the work to be put into checking should be proportionate to the amounts and risks involved (Art. 2(1)a; Art. 27(1) and 27(2)(4)).
·The administration should review its actions in relation to the costs and risks involved (Art. 89(1), 93a, 117 to 119).
·In procurement procedures, the time expended on documentation, and its cost, should be minimised (Art. 93a, Art. 89(3)).
·So that the other institutions can also benefit from the experience and economies of scale of large units, procurement procedures should in principle be interinstitutional (Art. 89(3)).
·A central standardisation agency (dealing with a particular 'family' of grants - e.g. research) with uniform forms, provisions and, wherever possible, procedures to provide information to applicants and carry out benchmarking should help to improve access to grants (Art. 109 a (new) and to streamline application procedures.
·A database for the notification of participants in procurement procedures (Art. 109 a (new)) is intended to facilitate application procedures and avoid the hitherto customary requirement for applicants to submit multiple copies of the same documents and for the Commission to consider them more than once.
·In procurement procedures, small and medium-sized enterprises should, if possible, not be excluded in advance on account of their size (Art. 89(4)).
·Competition should not be impeded by long-term commitments in framework contracts (Art. 91 a (new)).
·A two-stage procedure should make it possible in advance to screen out at the earliest possible stage applications which are doomed to failure in advance, and only to request further documentationafter that, in order to keep the costs of unsuccessful applications down (Art. 115(2)a)).
·A review body should ensure that awards are made lawfully in a speedy and relatively informal procedure (Art. 100a, 100b), in accordance with the obligations which also apply to the Member States.
3. Europe - acting more reliably
·The costs of applying for grants must be proportionate to the amount to be awarded (Art. 115(4)).
·Commission decisions rather than voluminous contracts may be the basis for grants (Art. 108). This will make procedures less protracted and burdensome in the case of small grants.
·Authorising officers should assistapplicants for grants with the procedure, particularly if they are inexperienced (Art. 114(5)).
·Applicants should be able to assess the prospects of success of their application from the outset, but should then also enjoy legal certainty, which is the purpose of compulsory indication of all rules applicable to a grant (Art. 110(1)(2)).
·Eligible costs should be defined for the grants procedure (Art. 113a (1) a); in particular, costs of sureties and audits should be included (Art. 117(3)).
·If the preconditions for a project which is to be subsidised change, this should not automatically lead to a cut in the EU's financial contribution, which can have undesirable effects (e.g. forcing the closure of a project) (Art. 119(2)).
·Reductions must be proportionate to the error objected to (Art. 119). The aim is to make the EU more predictable for beneficiaries of grants, thus increasing legal certainty, including in the field of research (Art. 160b).
4. Europe - acting more quickly and cost-effectively
·Award procedures should become more efficient. In particular, their duration should be reduced and the costs to bidders and applicants should be cut. For this purpose, requirements to produce evidence should accord with the principle of proportionality.
·Annual programmes for grants should be published as early as possible (i.e. by 1 March). Invitations to tender may also be issued even before the beginning of the year, in order to avoid peaks in work during the year (Art. 110(1)(1)), provided that reference is made to the fact that the budget procedure has not yet been completed.
·During grant procedures, and to conclude them, independent rather than external audits may be provided for, in order to cut costs, in which connection audit costs must be proportionate to the amount of the grant being audited (Art. 117(2)).
5. Europe - acting in a transparent and consistent manner
·Community staff must inform their superior if they participate in a tender procedure, including a grant application procedure, in order to improve the image of the Union and transparency (Art. 94).
·In order to avoid duplication of grants, anyone who applies for a grant must make it known that he has applied for more than one grant, and the total costs eligible for financing must not be exceeded (Art. 111).
·Bidders who have committed criminal offences in the past should be debarred from awards for five or ten years (Art. 93).
Art. 66(1) applies the principle of liability of authorising officers. Deliberate damage should give rise to an obligation to compensate the damage in full, and should be subject to strict requirements as regards the limitation period (Art. 73b). Otherwise, liability should be limited to 12 months' salary.
OPINJONI TAL-KUMITAT GĦALL-IŻVILUPP (22.2.2006)
for the Committee on Budgets
on the proposal for a Council regulation amending Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities
The Financial Regulation of 2002 and its implementing rules have caused many problems for beneficiaries of EU programmes, not least for beneficiaries of development programmes (Development NGOs and other beneficiaries). The Financial Regulation gives the frame and the general rules for the implementation of the EU budget. The Regulation laying down detailed rules for the implementation of the Financial Regulation of 2002 is specifying the rules of the Financial Regulation. Many issues that cause problems are of a more technical nature and can only be tackled with a revision of the implementing rules, such as the problems relating to rule of nationality and rule of origin, the questions of payment periods and the possibility to change a grant agreement after approval.
The draftsman proposes to introduce a couple of elements in the Financial Regulation which would help to improve the implementation such as the establishment of systems to measure and compare efficiency, the budgetary principle which is rather neglected in budget implementation, the introduction of risk analysis for the validation of payments, the connection of the untying of aid regulations to the Financial Regulation and the cost-neutrality of currency conversion operations.
AMENDMENTS
The Committee on Development calls on the Committee on Budgets, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following amendments in its report:
(27a) Risk analysis is already used for ex post verification.Its use for the validation of expenditure will make this part of the budget implementation more efficient and should be introduced in Article 79 of the Financial Regulation.
Justification
The implementation rules for the Financial Regulation provide under Article 99 that the payment of grants be dependent on the endorsement 'passed for payment'. This endorsement "shall certify that: … (b) the payment request itself, or an internal document accompanying the payment request received, has been endorsed 'certified correct' and signed by an official or other servant technically competent, empowered by the authorising officer responsible; by such endorsement he certifies that the action or work programme carried out by the beneficiary is in all respects in compliance with the grant agreement; …"
As regards ex post verification of the payments, the same implementing rules (Article 47) allow that these "verifications may be organised on a sample basis using risk analysis." If a statistically based sample check is carried out, then it is only possible to certify that 'on the balance of probability' (to a level of confidence) the claim is correct.
In the recasting of the Financial Regulation in 2002, the liability of officials and other servants has been increased (Article 66). Together with increased liability, the requirement to issue an endorsement 'certified correct' has led to insecurity and reluctance on the side of officials to treat payments for grants, requesting more and more documents and certificates from the beneficiaries. As it is sufficient for the ex post verification to "be organised on a sample basis using risk analysis" it should be possible to introduce the notion of risk analysis in the process of validation of expenditure. Risk analysis cannot generally replace other requirements for a "passing of payment of grants", but it would give the official a margin of discretion to pass payments for grants in the absence of a strictly limited number of formal requirements (documentation, certificates). This would allow setting the risks in correlation with efficiency and effectiveness.
Amendment 2
RECITAL 36 A (new)
(36a) The Commission should provide for the possibility of awarding grants for projects in the sector of Community external assistance without resorting to a tendering procedure even when the general limit set for awarding grants without a tendering procedure is bypassed, if the project is of a very specific and exceptional nature.
Justification
The possibility to award grants without tendering procedure is strictly limited, which is in principle welcomed by the draftsman. However, there may be project proposals which are of such exceptional and specific nature that it is highly unlikely that they could be proposed or carried out by another tenderer. In this case, the Commission should have the possibility to exceed the limit given for awarding grants without tendering procedure.
Amendment 3
ARTICLE 1, POINT 7 A (new)
Article 16, paragraph 2 a (new) (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(7a) In Article 16, the following paragraph is added:
"Currency conversion operations shall be carried out in such a way that there is no major change to the level of Union cofinancing for project grants."
Justification
This amendment modifies the amendment proposed by the rapporteur of the Committee on Budgets (Amendment 31 of the draft report by Ingeborg Gräßle) and seeks to make the text clearer. The amendment is intended to help avoid situations where the currency conversion leads to losses for the beneficiaries or problems to justify the level of expenses, which would be the level planned in the foreign currency, while it is different in EURO, due to the changes in the exchange rate.
Amendment 4
ARTICLE 1, POINT 12 A (new)
Article 27, paragraph 4 a (new) (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(12a) In Article 27, the following paragraph is added:
"4a.Institutions set up systems for measuring and comparing efficiency and effectiveness as regards procurement procedures and the procedure for the award of grants."
Justification
The Commission seeks to follow the principles of sound financial management in implementing the budget. Three main elements of sound financial management are economy, efficiency and effectiveness. Commission officials are mainly concentrating on 'economy', which can be broken down as "best value through procedural compliance". The principle of efficiency described in the Financial Regulation (Article 27(2)2) as "best relationship between resources employed and results achieved". Taking into account this principle would force the Commission not only to focus on "procedure check lists" but to take into account the context of the grant and procurement procedures and the administrative costs resulting from the procedures. Looking on the high costs involved for the potential beneficiaries, the need for emphasising the efficiency criteria seems even more important.
Amendment 5
ARTICLE 1, POINT 37 A (new)
Article 79, paragraph 1 a (new) (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(3) In Article 79, the following paragraph is added:
" Risk analysis can be a criterion used for validation of expenditure."
Justification
See justification of amendment 1.
Amendment 6
ARTICLE 1, POINT 85 A (new)
Article 168, paragraph 1, subparagraph 1 a (new) (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(85a) In Article 168, paragraph 1, the following subparagraph is added :
"As regards Community external assistance the rules for the participation in tendering procedures laid down in Regulation(EC) No 2110/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2005 on access to Community external assistance1 and Council Regulation (EC) No 2112/2005 of 21 November 2005 on access to Community external assistance2 shall apply."
_______________
1 OJ L 344, 27.12.2005, p. 1.
2 OJ L 344, 27.12.2005, p. 23.
Justification
The two regulations for the untying of aid were adopted in 2005. They open the tendering procedures for persons from non-EU and non-beneficiary countries favouring developing countries and applying the principle of reciprocity for non-EU developed countries. These rules have to be applied and should be incorporated in the Financial Regulation.
PROĊEDURA
Title
Proposal for a Council regulatiion amending Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities
Danutė Budreikaitė, Marie-Arlette Carlotti, Thierry Cornillet, Alexandra Dobolyi, Michael Gahler, Glenys Kinnock, Ģirts Valdis Kristovskis, Maria Martens, Miguel Angel Martínez Martínez, Gay Mitchell, Luisa Morgantini, Józef Pinior, Pierre Schapira, Frithjof Schmidt, Jürgen Schröder, Feleknas Uca
Substitute(s) present for the final vote
John Bowis, Milan Gaľa, Fiona Hall, Linda McAvan, Manolis Mavrommatis, Karin Scheele, Anne Van Lancker, Anders Wijkman, Zbigniew Zaleski, Gabriele Zimmer
Substitute(s) under Rule 178(2) present for the final vote
on the proposal for a Council regulation amending Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities
(*) Enhanced cooperation between committees - Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure
SHORTJUSTIFICATION
There is hardly any other item of legislation which has such a practical impact on staff at the Commission and the other institutions as the Financial Regulation. Some 40% of the Commission's employees have dealings with its rules and instructions, most of them on a daily basis. Yet the Regulation lacks clarity and structure, making it untransparent; the numerous cross-references impede understanding and render it difficult to find the answers to questions quickly. Nearly three years after the Financial Regulation was adopted, the helpdesk of DG Budget is still receiving an average of five queries from users every working day, seeking answers to their problems with the Financial Regulation and its implementing provisions. Sizeable manuals have been compiled: each DG has drawn up its own rules and procedures on the basis of the Regulation. In addition, DG Budget has adopted its own internal rules. A complex, contradictory and confusing body of law on the implementation of the budget has come into being, which, even after lengthy training, may be only partly comprehended.
The consequences of the complex procedural provisions are bureaucratisation of processes, protracted procedures and attempts to evade responsibility by involving as many hierarchies and procedural stages as possible. 'Clients' - applicants for grants and bidders for contracts - are increasingly frustrated at a Europe which not only makes it difficult for citizens, organisations, industry and research centres to obtain money but also, by means of complex and costly application procedures, renders unobtainable substantial sums intended for disbursement in Europe.
Insoluble, fundamental contradictions remain: for example, competing legislation. The scope of the Financial Regulation and its general validity are restricted by legislation which goes further, for example the basic legal acts. These may at any time contradict even key provisions of the Financial Regulation. Thus a weapon which was thought to be keen-bladed is in reality blunted. Moreover, the Financial Regulation covers only the direct, central administration: other administrative bodies adopt their own rules and where they are concerned, the picture so far remains vague at best.
The Commission has submitted a proposal for a revision which in part certainly represents a step in the right direction. It has made proposals for dealing with a number of pressing administrative problems. One of its answers is to encroach upon Parliament's prerogatives. Life will be made easier for applicants for EU funding only if at the same time the administration also benefits from the changes. The Commission has not attached much importance to more user-friendly access to EU markets and subsidies, building up a joint capacity for problem-solving, databases and harmonisation of procedures, which are applied differently from DG to DG, in order to reduce work and costs and simplify procedures, both for the Commission and for users. Much also remains to be done to tackle the administrative problems of the Commission and the other institutions. In its Opinion no 10/2005, the Court of Auditors therefore criticises the excessive scale of the revision (Paragraph 50) while at the same objecting that the revision does not provide 'the solution to certain management needs' and that it is not 'radical' enough (Paragraph 53).
The rapporteurs of the European Parliament are tabling 116 amendments relating to 63 articles. Parliament's priorities here are not the same as the Commission's: Parliament highlights preserving Parliament's powers of control and rights to information and measures to reduce the difficulties facing anybody wishing to work with the EU. There is a particular focus on Parts V and VI of the Financial Regulation, markets and grants, i.e. those parts with which members of the public come into contact via organisations, research establishments and enterprises. In the view of the rapporteurs, easing of procedures and the proportionality of the effort involved to the size of a contract or grant are the criteria for assessing administrative action.
Of the Commission's 95 amendments concerning 93 articles, 28 are modified. In another 28 cases, the Commission's proposed amendments are rejected entirely. In 34 articles both the Commission and Parliament agree that reform is needed. Parliament's amendments concern 63 articles. Altogether, the Commission and the rapporteurs are proposing 185 amendments to 122 of the 187 articles in the Financial Regulation.
The rapporteurs realise that this will not make the Financial Regulation any simpler to understand and apply. They therefore advocate in addition that, in the medium term, the Financial Regulation should be completely overhauled with the assistance of experts on grants and tender procedures, and one of their key observations to the Commission and Council is that, in its current form, the Financial Regulation can only be reformed to a limited extent. A new version drafted with a view to simplification, better comprehensibility and output budgeting would be the appropriate answer and the best for Europe and its administration.
The main considerations underlying our amendments are as follows:
1. Preserving Parliament's prerogatives
·The amendments concerning transfers of appropriations (Art. 2, 19, 22, 23, 26, 153 and 160a) and rights to information (Art. 28, 29, 46(1)(1)(f), 33, 83 and 110) are rejected.
·In Art. 183 the adoption of implementing provisions is for the first time made conditional on the assent of the budgetary authority.
2. Europe - acting more efficiently, using simpler procedures
·Proportionality of administrative action: the required effort and the work to be put into checking should be proportionate to the amounts and risks involved (Art. 2(1)a; Art. 27(1) and 27(2)(4)).
·The administration should review its actions in relation to the costs and risks involved (Art. 89(1), 93a, 117 to 119).
·In procurement procedures, the time expended on documentation, and its cost, should be minimised (Art. 93a, Art. 89(3)).
·So that the other institutions can also benefit from the experience and economies of scale of large units, procurement procedures should in principle be interinstitutional (Art. 89(3)).
·A central standardisation agency (dealing with a particular 'family' of grants - e.g. research) with uniform forms, provisions and, wherever possible, procedures to provide information to applicants and carry out benchmarking should help to improve access to grants (Art. 109 a (new) and to streamline application procedures.
·A database for the notification of participants in procurement procedures (Art. 109 a (new)) is intended to facilitate application procedures and avoid the hitherto customary requirement for applicants to submit multiple copies of the same documents and for the Commission to consider them more than once.
·In procurement procedures, small and medium-sized enterprises should, if possible, not be excluded in advance on account of their size (Art. 89(4)).
·Competition should not be impeded by long-term commitments in framework contracts (Art. 91 a (new)).
·A two-stage procedure should make it possible in advance to screen out at the earliest possible stage applications which are doomed to failure in advance, and only to request further documentationafter that, in order to keep the costs of unsuccessful applications down (Art. 115(2)a)).
·A review body should ensure that awards are made lawfully in a speedy and relatively informal procedure (Art. 100a, 100b), in accordance with the obligations which also apply to the Member States.
3. Europe - acting more reliably
·The costs of applying for grants must be proportionate to the amount to be awarded (Art. 115(4)).
·Commission decisions rather than voluminous contracts may be the basis for grants (Art. 108). This will make procedures less protracted and burdensome in the case of small grants.
·Authorising officers should assistapplicants for grants with the procedure, particularly if they are inexperienced (Art. 114(5)).
·Applicants should be able to assess the prospects of success of their application from the outset, but should then also enjoy legal certainty, which is the purpose of compulsory indication of all rules applicable to a grant (Art. 110(1)(2)).
·Eligible costs should be defined for the grants procedure (Art. 113a (1) a); in particular, costs of sureties and audits should be included (Art. 117(3)).
·If the preconditions for a project which is to be subsidised change, this should not automatically lead to a cut in the EU's financial contribution, which can have undesirable effects (e.g. forcing the closure of a project) (Art. 119(2)).
·Reductions must be proportionate to the error objected to (Art. 119). The aim is to make the EU more predictable for beneficiaries of grants, thus increasing legal certainty, including in the field of research (Art. 160b).
4. Europe - acting more quickly and cost-effectively
·Award procedures should become more efficient. In particular, their duration should be reduced and the costs to bidders and applicants should be cut. For this purpose, requirements to produce evidence should accord with the principle of proportionality.
·Annual programmes for grants should be published as early as possible (i.e. by 1 March). Invitations to tender may also be issued even before the beginning of the year, in order to avoid peaks in work during the year (Art. 110(1)(1)), provided that reference is made to the fact that the budget procedure has not yet been completed.
·During grant procedures, and to conclude them, independent rather than external audits may be provided for, in order to cut costs, in which connection audit costs must be proportionate to the amount of the grant being audited (Art. 117(2)).
5. Europe - acting in a transparent and consistent manner
·Community staff must inform their superior if they participate in a tender procedure, including a grant application procedure, in order to improve the image of the Union and transparency (Art. 94).
·In order to avoid duplication of grants, anyone who applies for a grant must make it known that he has applied for more than one grant, and the total costs eligible for financing must not be exceeded (Art. 111).
·Bidders who have committed criminal offences in the past should be debarred from awards for five or ten years (Art. 93).
Art. 66(1) applies the principle of liability of authorising officers. Deliberate damage should give rise to an obligation to compensate the damage in full, and should be subject to strict requirements as regards the limitation period (Art. 73b). Otherwise, liability should be limited to 12 months' salary.
CONCLUSIONS
The Committee on Budgetary Control calls on the Committee on Budgets, as the committee responsible, to accept the legislative proposal as submitted by the Commission with the following amendments:
AMENDMENTS
The Committee on Budgetary Control calls on the Committee on Budgets, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following amendments in its report:
Text proposed by the Commission
Amendments by Parliament
Amendment 1
RECITAL 1
(1) Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002, hereinafter “the Financial Regulation”, lays down the legal foundations of the financial management reform. As such, its essential elements should be maintained and strengthened. Moreover, it establishes budgetary principles which should be respected by all legislative acts and from which derogations should be kept to a strict minimum.
(1) Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002, hereinafter “the Financial Regulation”, lays down the legal foundations of the financial management reform. As such, its essential elements should be maintained and strengthened. Moreover, it establishes budgetary principles, derived from Article 268 et seq. of the EC Treaty, which should be respected by all legislative acts and from which derogations should be kept to a strict minimum.
Justification
Budgetary principles are mainly derived from Article 268 et seq. of the EC Treaty.
Amendment 2
RECITAL 2
(2) Certain amendments are justified in light of practical experience in order to facilitate budget implementation and the realisation of the underlying policy objectives and to adjust some procedural and documentary requirements so as to make them more proportionate to the risks and cost involved.
(2) Certain amendments are justified in light of practical experience in order to facilitate budget implementation and the realisation of the underlying policy objectives and to enshrine expressly the principle of proportionality of administrative action set forth in Article 5 of the EC Treaty, so as to make it clear that it is proportionate to the risks and cost involved.
Justification
Reference should be made to the universal principle of proportionality of the Community institutions' actions so as to prevent Union citizens and third parties from being overburdened as a result of administrative action.
Amendment 3
RECITAL 3
(3) All amendments must contribute to achieving the objectives of the Commission's reforms, should help improve or ensure sound financial management, and should enhancethe protection of the Communities’ financial interests against fraud and illegal activities, thus contributing to obtaining a reasonable assurance of the legality and regularity of financial operations.
(3) All amendments must contribute to achieving the objectives of the Commission's reforms, should help improve or ensure sound financial management, and should more effectively protect the Communities’ financial interests against fraud and illegal activities, thus contributing to obtaining a reasonable assurance of the legality and regularity of financial operations.
Amendment 4
RECITAL 5 A (new)
(5a) Pursuant to point 1 of the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, annexed to the EC Treaty and appended to the Treaty of Amsterdam of 2 October 1997, each institution, in exercising the powers conferred on it, is required to comply with the principle of proportionality, according to which any action by the Community must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaty.
Justification
Reference should be made to the universal principle of proportionality of the Community institutions' actions so as to prevent Union citizens and third parties from being overburdened as a result of administrative action.
Amendment 5
RECITAL 6
(6) On certain points, more efficiency and transparency is needed with regard to the application of budgetary principles, in order better to suit operational needs.
(6) Practical experience of applying the Financial Regulation has shown that, when exercising their powers in individual instances financial actors make too little use of their discretion.That also means that they may use their discretion to decide independently, in individual instances, when a measure is proportionate within the meaning of Article 5 of the EC Treaty and the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, annexed to the EC Treaty and appended to the Treaty of Amsterdam of 2 October 1997.
Justification
The failure of those who apply the Financial Regulation to use their discretionary powers is one reason why procedure is so cumbersome.
Amendment 6
RECITAL 12
(12) At present, the Commission must be authorised by the budgetary authority before accepting donations, such as gifts or bequests, which involve a charge. To avoid unnecessary and cumbersome procedures, authorisations should be made compulsory only in the case of significant charges.
(12) At present, the Commission must be authorised by the budgetary authority before accepting donations, such as gifts or bequests, which involve a charge. To avoid unnecessary and cumbersome procedures, authorisations should be made compulsory where there are follow-up costs.
Justification
To safeguard Parliament’s rights.
Amendment 7
RECITAL 13
(13) In relation to the principle of specification of the budget, the rules governing transfers of appropriations should be simplified and clarified on certain points because in practice they have proven cumbersome or unclear.The intention was for Article 22 of the Financial Regulation to apply to institutions other than the Commission since the Commission has its own regime.That provision should therefore be amended accordingly.
deleted
Justification
To safeguard Parliament’s rights.
Amendment 8
RECITAL 14
(14) As regards the "notification procedure", the Commission and the other institutions notify their transfer proposals to the budgetary authority, which may invoke the normal procedure if it wishes to raise objections.In such cases, in theory, the normal deadlines apply for the decision of the budgetary authority on the transfer.However, the text does not state when time for the purposes of the deadline is to be deemed to start running, and that omission should be remedied.
deleted
Justification
To safeguard Parliament’s rights.
Amendment 9
RECITAL 16
(16) For reasons of efficiency, the Commission should be allowed to decide autonomously on transfers from the reserve in cases where no basic act, within the meaning of Article 49 of the Financial Regulation, exists for the action concerned at the time when the budget is established, but where the basic act is adopted in the course of the year.
deleted
Justification
To safeguard Parliament’s rights.
Amendment 10
RECITAL 17
(17) The rules on the Commission's administrative transfers should be adapted to the new Activity-Based Budgeting (ABB) structure.Thus, the "notification procedure" should be limited to transfers between articles, within the administrative chapter of each title, which exceed 10% of the appropriations of the year.On the other hand, transfers between articles of different titles financing expenditure of identical nature should be decided autonomously by the Commission.
deleted
Justification
To safeguard Parliament’s rights.
Amendment 11
RECITAL 22 A (new)
(22a) The rules on the liability of authorising officers should be more clearly defined for greater legal certainty.
Amendment 12
RECITAL 27
(27) A period of limitation on the validity of claims should be introduced.The Community, unlike many of its Member States, is not subject to a period of limitation under which financial claims are extinguished after a certain period of time. Nor is the Community restricted by a period of limitation in the pursuit of its claims against third persons. The introduction of such a period of limitation in a new Article 73b corresponds to sound financial management.
(27) A period of limitation on the validity of claims should be introduced.The Community, unlike many of its Member States, is not subject to a period of limitation under which financial claims are extinguished after a certain period of time. Nor is the Community restricted by a period of limitation in the pursuit of its claims against third persons. The introduction of such a period of limitation in a new Article 73b corresponds to sound financial management. However, perpetrators of deliberate damage should not be able to invoke limitation to the same extent as other debtors.The start of the limitation period should therefore be confined to the point in time when the entire scope of a claim has been established.
Amendment 13
RECITAL 27 A (new)
(27a) Supply and service contract award procedures must be streamlined and brought more into line with the needs of tenderers.In this connection, attention should be paid in particular to ensuring that the principle of proportionality also extends to documentation efforts.Framework contracts should be reflected in the Financial Regulation.Competition should not be constrained as a result of unnecessarily long contractual ties in framework contracts, and small and medium-sized undertakings should not be effectively debarred right from the outset, because of their size, from contract award procedures.
Amendment 14
RECITAL 27 B (new)
(27b) Award procedures should be carried out on an interinstitutional basis so as to ease the administrative burden on smaller entities too.
Amendment 15
RECITAL 29
(29) The Financial Regulation rules on the exclusion of tenderers impose a stricter regime for the Community institutions than that provided for in Directive 2004/18/EC. The Financial Regulation makes no distinction between the most serious grounds for exclusion and other grounds.Directive 2004/18/EC, on the other hand, does make such a distinction and that distinction should be made available for the Community institutions.Articles 93 and 94 of the Financial Regulation should provide for mandatory exclusion in the most serious cases, while allowing the possibility for the contracting authority, on the basis of a risk assessment, to add other cases of exclusion.The same distinction should be made in Article 114 of the Financial Regulation, as regards grants.The rules on penalties, laid down in Article 96 of that Regulation, should be adjusted accordingly.
(29) The Financial Regulation rules on the exclusion of tenderers impose a stricter regime for the Community institutions than that provided for in Directive 2004/18/EC. The exclusion of tenderers should be subject to the principle of proportionality.The exclusion period should be limited to no more than 10 years so as to prevent disproportionate penalties.Exclusions for more than five years should take place only on the basis of an unappealable judgment.
Amendment 16
RECITAL 30 A (new)
(30a) The requirement to provide supporting documents should be confined to what is necessary.The documentation effort required should be based on the value of the contract concerned.
Amendment 17
RECITAL 30 B (new)
(30b) For externally documenting administrative fairness and propriety, Community servants involved in award procedures or grant procedures should always notify their superiors accordingly so as to rule out any conflict of interest.
Amendment 18
RECITAL 32 A (new)
(32a) Tenderers who have been passed over should have effective legal safeguards, as the Member States are also required to provide.To that end, independent vetting bodies should be set up which can verify award procedures quickly, and without disproportionate efforts, and provide effective legal protection.
Amendment 19
RECITAL 32 B (new)
(32b) Protecting the Union’s financial interests must not demand too much of contractors.The provision of security by contractors should therefore be restricted to instances where this is justified and must not go beyond the purpose of providing the security.
Amendment 20
RECITAL 34
(34) As regards grants, simplification of the rules is needed. Requirements for checks and guarantees should be more proportionate to the financial risks involved.Some essential changes need to be made first in the Financial Regulation, so that detailed provision can later be made in the implementing rules. The scope of grants needs to be clarified in Article 108 of the Financial Regulation, in particular as regards financing related to loan activities and share-holdings. The principle of proportionality has to be added.
(34) As regards grants, simplification of the rules is needed. The requirements of the administrative procedure made of the parties involved in it must be proportionate at all times.Accordingly, unsuccessful applications should be screened out at as early a stage in the procedure as possible, in order to spare applicants needless efforts. The scope of grants needs to be clarified in Article 108 of the Financial Regulation, in particular as regards financing related to loan activities and share-holdings. Particularly in the case of small amounts, it must be possible to provide assistance on the basis of an individual decision instead of a voluminous, complex assistance agreement.
Justification
Reference should be made to the universal principle of proportionality of the Community institutions' actions so as to prevent Union citizens and third parties from being overburdened as a result of administrative action.
Amendment 21
RECITAL 36
(36) The rule that grants should be awarded on the basis of calls for proposals has proved its worth. Experience has shown, however, that in certain situations the nature of the action leaves no choice in the selection of beneficiaries, and Article 110 of the Financial Regulation should expressly recognise that such exceptional cases arise.
(36) The rule that grants should be awarded on the basis of calls for proposals has proved its worth. In this connection, it should be ensured in the interests of legal certainty and planning certainty that requirements notified to applicants at the start of the tendering process do not change during the procedure.Experience has shown, however, that in certain situations the nature of the action leaves no choice in the selection of beneficiaries, and Article 110 of the Financial Regulation should expressly recognise that such exceptional cases arise.
Amendment 22
RECITAL 37
(37) The rule that the same action should not give rise to more than one grant to any one beneficiary should be adjusted because some basic acts do permit Community funding to be combined and such cases may increase in future in order to ensure the effectiveness of expenditure.However, the opportunity should be taken to make clear in Article 111 of the Financial Regulation that the same costs can never be financed twice by the Community budget.
(37) The opportunity should be taken to make clear in Article 111 of the Financial Regulation that the same costs can never be financed twice by the Community budget and that cost eligibility may not exceed 100%.
Justification
Reflects amendments to articles.
Amendment 23
RECITAL 39
(39) For reasons of clarity and transparency, the use of flat-rate payments should be authorised in a new Article 113a of the Financial Regulation, to co-exist with the more traditional method of reimbursing costs actually incurred.
(39) For reasons of clarity and transparency, the use of flat-rate payments should be authorised in a new Article 113a of the Financial Regulation, to co-exist with the more traditional method of reimbursing costs actually incurred. There should be a clearer definition of eligible costs.
Amendment 24
RECITAL 40
(40) In Article 114 of the Financial Regulation, certain restrictions on the eligibility of beneficiaries should be removed in order to allow for grants to natural persons and certain types of entity which lack legal personality.
(40) Obligations for grant beneficiaries to provide supporting documents and the penalties to which they are subject should at all times be proportionate to the risk involved.Furthermore, in Article 114 of the Financial Regulation, certain restrictions on the eligibility of beneficiaries should be removed in order to allow for grants to natural persons and certain types of entity which lack legal personality.
Justification
Reference should be made to the universal principle of proportionality of the Community institutions' actions so as to prevent Union citizens and third parties from being overburdened as a result of administrative action.
Amendment 25
RECITAL 40 A (new)
(40a) To enhance information for applicants, a joint body should be set up to deal with standardising applications for similar types of funding, providing applicants with information, and benchmarking for awarding funding.
Amendment 26
RECITAL 47
(47) It is necessary to allow appropriations which have been decommitted as a result of total or partial non-implementation of the projects for which they were earmarked to be made available again. However, that should be possible only under strict conditions,and only in the area of research, since research projects present a higher financial risk than those in other policy areas.
(47) Because of the special importance of research support for European Union competitiveness, it is necessary to allow appropriations which have been decommitted as a result of total or partial non-implementation of the projects for which they were earmarked to be made available again. However, that should be possible only under strict conditions.
Justification
Reflects amendments to articles.
Amendment 27
ARTICLE 1, POINT 2
Article 2, paragraph 1 (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
Any provision concerning the implementation of the revenue and expenditure of the budget, contained in another legislative act, must comply in particular with the budgetary principles set out in Title II.
Any provision concerning the implementation of the revenue and expenditure of the budget, contained in another legislative act, must comply with the budgetary principles set out in Article 268 et seq. of the EC Treaty.
Justification
It is incomprehensible why the term ‘in particular’ has been added; it should therefore be deleted. Budgetary principles are already laid down in Article 268 et seq. of the EC Treaty, however.
Amendment 28
ARTICLE 1, POINT 2
Article 2, paragraph 1 a (new) (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
Any measure taken by institutions to implement the budget pursuant to this Regulation shall comply with the principle of proportionality laid down in Article 5 of the EC Treaty.
Justification
Reference should be made to the universal principle of proportionality of the Community institutions' actions so as to prevent Union citizens and third parties from being overburdened as a result of administrative action.
Amendment 29
ARTICLE 1, POINT 6
Article 12, paragraph 2 (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
However, in duly substantiated exceptional cases, the appropriations for the purposes of crisis management aid and humanitarian aid operations may be committed as from 15 December of each year against the appropriations provided for the following financial year. Such commitments may not exceed one quarter of the appropriations on the corresponding budget line for the last adopted budget.
However, in duly substantiated exceptional cases, the appropriations for the purposes of crisis management aid and humanitarian aid operations may be committed as from 15 December of each year against the appropriations provided for the following financial year. Such commitments may not exceed one quarter of the appropriations on the corresponding budget line for the last adopted budget. The budgetary authority shall be notified of these commitments.
Justification
To safeguard Parliament’s rights.
Amendment 30
ARTICLE 1, POINT 6 A (new)
Article 14, paragraph 2 (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(6a) Article 14(2) is replaced by the following:
"Without prejudice to Article 46(1)(4), the European Community and the European Atomic Energy Community, as well as the bodies set up by the Communities as referred to in Article 185, may not raise loans except in the case of direct financing necessary for the acquisition of immovable property intended to be used by the institutions on which the budgetary authority has issued a favourable opinion under Article 179(3)."
Justification
To carry out their building projects, the various institutions have had to make use of indirect-financing arrangements, whereas direct financing through bank loans ought to make it possible to secure better rates and greater transparency.
Acceptance of donations which involve a significant financial charge shall be subject to the authorisation of the European Parliament and the Council, both of which shall act on the matter within two months of the date of receipt of the request from the Commission.
Acceptance of donations which involve follow-up costs shall be subject to the authorisation of the European Parliament and the Council, both of which shall act on the matter within two months of the date of receipt of the request from the Commission.
Justification
To safeguard Parliament’s rights.
Amendment 33
ARTICLE 1, POINT 10
Article 22, paragraph 1 (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
1. Any institution other than the Commission may, within its own section of the budget, make transfers:
1. Any institution other than the Commission may, within its own section of the budget, make transfers from one title to another, from one chapter to anotherand from one article to another within a total limit of 10% of the appropriations for the financial year on the line from which the transfer is to be made.
(a) from one title to another within a total limit of 10% of the appropriations for the financial year on the line from which the transfer is to be made;
2. Three weeks before making the transfers referred to in paragraph 1, the institutions shall inform the budgetary authority and the Commission of their intentions. In the event of duly substantiated reasons being raised within this period by either branch of the budgetary authority, the procedure laid down in Article 24 shall apply.
2. Three weeks before making the transfers referred to in paragraph 1, the institutions shall inform the budgetary authority of their intentions. In the event of reasons being raised within this period by either branch of the budgetary authority, the procedure laid down in Article 24 shall apply.
The budgetary authority shall take decisions on these transfers within the time limits laid down in Article 24, which shall be deemed to begin on the date on which the budgetary authority was informed by the institution of the intended transfer.
deleted
Justification
To safeguard Parliament’s rights.
Amendment 36
ARTICLE 1, POINT 10
Article 22, paragraph 3 (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
3. Any institution other than the Commission may propose to the budgetary authority, within its own section of the budget, transfers from one title to another exceeding the limit of 10% of the appropriations for the financial year on the line from which the transfer is to be made. The budgetary authority shall inform the Commission accordingly. Those transfers shall be subject to the procedure laid down in Article 24.
3. Any institution other than the Commission may propose to the budgetary authority, within its own section of the budget, transfers from one title to another exceeding the limit of 10% of the appropriations for the financial year on the line from which the transfer is to be made. Those transfers shall be subject to the procedure laid down in Article 24.
Justification
The original wording in the Financial Regulation was better. The amendment proposed by the Commission does not in any way help to clarify matters.
Amendment 37
ARTICLE 1, POINT 10
Article 22, paragraph 4 (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
4. Any institution other than the Commission may, within its own section of the budget, make transfers within chapters without first informing the budgetary authority.
deleted
Justification
To safeguard Parliament’s rights.
Amendment 38
ARTICLE 1, POINT 11 (A) (I)
Article 23, paragraph 1, point b (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(i) point (b) is replaced by the following:
deleted
"(b) as regards staff and operating expenditure, transfer appropriations from one title to another only between articles financing expenditure of identical nature";
Justification
To safeguard Parliament’s rights.
Amendment 39
ARTICLE 1, POINT 11 (A) (II)
Article 23, paragraph 1, point d (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(ii) the following point (d) is added:
"(d) transfer appropriations from the "provisions" title referred to in Article 43 for the cases where no basic act exists for the action concerned when the budget is established but is adopted during the course of the budget year";
Article 23, paragraph 1 a (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(b) the following paragraph 1a is inserted:
deleted
“1a.The Commission shall inform the budgetary authority three weeks before making the following:
(a) transfers between articles within the chapter corresponding to administrative appropriations of the same title which exceed 10% of the appropriations of the year shown on the article from which the transfer is made;
(b) transfers referred to in point (c) of paragraph 1.
In the event of duly substantiated reasons being raised within that three-week period by either branch of the budgetary authority, the procedure laid down in Article 24 shall apply.The budgetary authority shall take decisions on these transfers within the time limits laid down in Article 24, which shall be deemed to begin on the date on which the budgetary authority was informed by the Commission of the intended transfer.”
Justification
To safeguard Parliament’s rights.
Amendment 42
ARTICLE 1, POINT 11 (C)
Article 23, paragraph 2 (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(c) in paragraph 2, "paragraph 1(c)" is replaced by "paragraphs 1 and 1a".
(12) In Article 26(2), the first subparagraph is replaced by the following:
deleted
"Decisions on transfers to allow the utilisation of the reserve for emergency aid shall be taken by the budgetary authority on a proposal from the Commission.A separate proposal must be submitted for each individual operation."
Justification
To safeguard Parliament’s rights.
Amendment 44
ARTICLE 1, POINT 12 A (new)
Article 27, paragraph 1 (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(12a) In Article 27, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:
"1. Budget appropriations shall be used in accordance with the principle of sound financial management, namely in accordance with the principles of economy, efficiency, effectiveness and proportionality."
Justification
The aim is to avoid uncontrollable expenses or commitments
Amendment 45
ARTICLE 1, POINT 12 B (new)
Article 27, paragraph 2, subparagraph 3 a (new) (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
12b.In Article 27(2), the following subparagraph is added:
"Proportionality is concerned with an appropriate relationship between effort, including effort on checks, and the amounts and risks involved."
Justification
The Commission is called on to review the effort it makes on checks, the aim being to bring costs into line with risks.
Amendment 46
ARTICLE 1, POINT 12 C (new)
Article 27, paragraph 4 a (new) (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(12c) In Article 27, the following paragraph is added:
"4a.Institutions shall set up systems for measuring and comparing efficiency as regards procurement procedures and the procedure for the award of grants."
Justification
The Commission seeks to follow the principles of sound financial management in implementing the budget. Three main elements of sound financial management are economy, efficiency and effectiveness. Commission officials are mainly concentrating on 'economy', which can be broken down as "best value through procedural compliance". The principle of efficiency described in the Financial Regulation (Article 27(2)2) as "best relationship between resources employed and results achieved". Taking into account this principle would force the Commission not only to focus on "procedure check lists" but taking into account the context of the grant and procurement procedures and the administrative costs resulting from the procedures. Looking on the high costs involved for the potential beneficiaries, the need for emphasising the efficiency criteria seems even more important.
Amendment 47
ARTICLE 1, POINT 12 D (new)
Article 27, paragraph 4 a (new) (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(12d) In Article 27, the following paragraph is added:
"4a.For carrying out programmes and activities, procedure shall be governed by their content.The requirements of this Article shall be specified in the implementing rules."
Justification
EU policy content must influence administrative procedures, and not vice versa.
Amendment 48
ARTICLE 1, POINT 12 E (new)
Article 28, paragraph 2 (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(12e) Article 28(2) shall be replaced by the following:
"2. During the budgetary procedure, institutions and other bodies shall provide the necessary information for a comparison between changes in the appropriations required and the initial forecasts made in the financial statements.This information shall include progress made and the stage reached by the legislative authority in its consideration of proposals presented.The appropriations required shall, where appropriate, be revised in the light of the progress of deliberations on the basic act."
(Corresponds to Article 28(2) of Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002, with the word ‘Commission’ being replaced by 'institutions and other bodies’.)
Justification
Rewording: ‘Commission' has been replaced by 'institutions and other bodies'.
Amendment 49
ARTICLE 1, POINT 12 F (new)
Article 28, paragraph 3 (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(12f) Article 28(3) shall be replaced by the following:
"3. In order to prevent risk of fraud or irregularity, institutions and other bodies shall record in the financial statement any information regarding existing and planned fraud prevention and protection measures."
(Corresponds to Article 28(2) of Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002, with the word ‘Commission’ being replaced by 'institutions and other bodies’.)
Justification
Rewording: ‘Commission' has been replaced by 'institutions and other bodies'.
Amendment 50
ARTICLE 1, POINT 13
Article 29, paragraph 2 (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(13) In Article 29, paragraph 2 is replaced by the following:
(13) Article 29 is replaced by the following:
"Article 29
1. The budget shall be established and implemented and the accounts presented in compliance with the principle of transparency.
"2. The President of the European Parliament shall have the budget and amending budgets, as finally adopted, published in the Official Journal of the European Union.
2. The President of the European Parliament shall have the budget and amending budgets, as finally adopted, published in the Official Journal of the European Union.
The budget shall be published within three months following the date on which the budget is declared finally adopted.
The budget shall be published within three months following the date on which the budget is declared finally adopted.
The consolidated annual accounts and the report on budgetary and financial management drawn up by each institution shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union."
The consolidated annual accounts and the report on budgetary and financial management drawn up by each institution shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union."
The Commission reports shall also contain information on action taken on the remarks in the budget."
Justification
Providing the budgetary legislative authority with information.
Amendment 51
ARTICLE 1, POINT 13 A (new)
Article 30 a (new) (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(13a)The following Article 30a is inserted:
"Article 30a
Principle of effective and efficient internal control
1. The implementation of the budget shall be ensured through effective and efficient internal control in accordance with each management mode.
2. For the purpose of the implementation of the budget, internal control is defined as a process applicable at all levels in the chain of control and designed to provide reasonable assurance as to the achievement of the following objectives:
(a) effectiveness and efficiency of operations;
(b) reliability of financial reporting;
(c) safeguarding of assets and information and prevention and detection of fraud and irregularities; and
(d) adequate management of the risks related to the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions."
Justification
In accordance with the proposals made by the European Commission in their Action Plan and recital J of the 2004 draft-discharge resolution, efficient internal control should be included as one of the budgetary principles in the Financial Regulation.
(a) in the second subparagraph of paragraph 1, "Article 24" is replaced by "Articles 23 and 24";
deleted
Justification
To safeguard Parliament’s rights.
Amendment 53
ARTICLE 1, POINT 16 (B)
Article 43, paragraph 2 (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(b) in paragraph 2, "Article 24" is replaced by "Articles 23 and 24".
deleted
Justification
To safeguard Parliament’s rights.
Amendment 54
ARTICLE 1, POINT 19 (A) (II)
Article 46, paragraph 1, point (1), point (f) (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(ii) point (f) is deleted;
deleted
Justification
Reinstatement of current wording so as to safeguard Parliament’s rights concerning information in the budget.
Amendment 55
ARTICLE 1, POINT 19 (B)
Article 46, paragraph 1, point (2) (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(b) point (2) is replaced by the following:
"2. In the section for each institution, the revenue and expenditure shall be shown in the same structure as in point 1";
deleted
Justification
Reinstatement of current wording so as to safeguard Parliament’s rights concerning information in the budget.
Amendment 56
ARTICLE 1, POINT 19 (C)
Article 46, paragraph 1, point (3), point (c) (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(c) in point (3), point (c) is replaced by the following:
deleted
“(c) as regards scientific and technical staff, the classification may be based on groups of grades, in accordance with the conditions laid down in each budget; the establishment plan must specify the number of highly qualified technical or scientific personnel who are accorded special advantages under the specific provisions of the Staff Regulations;”
Justification
Reinstatement of original wording so as to safeguard Parliament’s rights concerning information.
Amendment 57
ARTICLE 1, POINT 19 (D)
Article 46, paragraph 1, point 5 (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(d) point (5) is replaced by the following:
deleted
"(5) the budget lines under revenue and expenditure necessary for implementing the Guarantee Fund for external actions."
Justification
Community loans and loan guarantees are not yet abolished and the new provisioning mechanism for the Guarantee Fund for external actions not yet adopted. They have to appear in the budget.
Amendment 58
ARTICLE 1, POINT 20 A (new)
Article 48, paragraph 1 (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(20a) Article 48(1) shall be replaced by the following:
"1. The institutions shall implement the revenue and expenditure of the budget in accordance with this Regulation, on its own responsibility and within the limits of the appropriations authorised."
(Corresponds to Article 48(1) of Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002, with the word ‘Commission’ being replaced by 'institutions’.)
In order to ensure in shared management that the funds are used in accordance with the applicable rules and principles, the Member States shall take all the measures necessary to:
In order to ensure in shared management that the funds are used in accordance with the applicable rules and principles, the Member States shall take all the legislative, regulatory, administrative or other measures necessary for protecting the Communities’ financial interests in order to:
Justification
More precise.
Amendment 60
ARTICLE 1, POINT 22 (A)
Article 53, paragraph 3, point (b) (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(b) prevent and deal with irregularities and fraud;
(b) prevent and deal with irregularities,mismanagement and fraud;
Justification
The Commission must devote as much attention to the fight against mismanagement as to the fight against fraud and irregularities.
Amendment 61
ARTICLE 1, POINT 23 (B) (-I) (new)
Article 54, paragraph 2, introduction (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(– i) The introduction is amended as follows:
'2. Where the Commission implements the budget on a centralised, indirect basis, pursuant to Article 53(2), or pursuant to Article 53(4), subject to compliance with the restrictions laid down in paragraph 1 it may delegate sovereign tasks, in particular budget-implementation tasks, to the following bodies:'
Justification
The delegation of budget-implementation tasks to the bodies referred to in Article 54(2) has thus far been confined to the area of centralised, indirect management.This considerably restricts the scope for the delegation of tasks, in particular in respect of measures in the external policy sphere.Such measures are increasingly being implemented on the basis of decentralised management.In order to guarantee effective budget implementation, it must therefore also be possible to delegate tasks carried out on the basis of decentralised management.
Amendment 62
ARTICLE 1, POINT 23 (C A) (new)
Article 54, paragraph 3 a (new) (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(ca) The following paragraph is added:
"3a.When exercising the powers conferred on it by the Commission pursuant to Article 50, the European Parliament may, in keeping with the provisions of its Rules of Procedure, and by adopting specific rules, delegate implementation tasks to its political groups for well defined appropriations.
This specific regulation cannot deviate from Article 56, unless the specific requirements of the functioning of the political groups necessitate it."
Justification
As it is provided by Article 185 for the bodies set up by the communities and having legal personality which receive grants charged to the budget, the specific nature of the parliamentary groups as administrative entities and the specific requirements of the activities of the Members of the European Parliament may also need to be reflected in the implementation of the current rules.
Amendment 63
ARTICLE 1, POINT 24
Article 56, paragraph 1, introduction (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
1. Where the Commission implements the budget by indirect centralised management, it shall first obtain evidence of the existence, relevance and proper operation within the entities to which it entrusts implementation, in accordance with the rules of sound financial management, of the following:
1. Where the Commission or the European Parliament implements the budget by indirect centralised management, they shall first obtain evidence of the existence, relevance and proper operation within the entities to which they entrust implementation, in accordance with the rules of sound financial management, of the following:
Justification
By virtue of the amendment to Article 54, payments to Parliament's political groups fall into the category of indirect centralised management. The amendment to Article 56 is an automatic consequence of that change.
Amendment 64
ARTICLE 1, POINT 24
Article 56, paragraph 3 (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
3. The Commission shall ensure supervision, evaluation and control of the implementation of the tasks entrusted.It shall take the equivalence of control systems into account when it carries out controls using its own control systems.
3. The Commission and/or the European Parliament shall ensure supervision, evaluation and control of the implementation of the tasks entrusted.They shall take the equivalence of control systems into account when they carry out controls using their own control systems.
Justification
By virtue of the amendment to Article 54, payments to Parliament's political groups fall into the category of indirect centralised management. The amendment to Article 56 is an automatic consequence of that change.
(27) In Article 60, the first sentence of paragraph 7 is replaced by the following:
"7. The authorising officer by delegation shall report to his/her institution on the performance of his/her duties in the form of an annual activity report together with financial and management information and a declaration of assurance certifying that the information contained in the report presents a true and fair view."
(27) In Article 60, paragraph 7 is replaced by the following:
"7. The authorising officer by delegation shall report to his/her institution on the performance of his/her duties in the form of an annual activity report together with financial and management information and any reservations in relation to the latter accompanied by a declaration of assurance certifying that the information contained in the report presents a true and fair view.
This report shall indicate the results of the operations by reference to the objectives set, the risks associated with these operations, the use made of the resources provided and the way the internal control system functions.The internal auditor shall take note of the annual report and any other pieces of information identified.The Commission shall no later than 15 June each year send to the budgetary authority a summary of the annual reports for the previous year.These reports shall set out details of the measures taken to limit the risk of errors in connection with the operations dealt with in the report and an assessment of the effectiveness of those measures."
Justification
The deletion of these words was perhaps an error, to be corrected. Furthermore, the possibility of reservations to the management information report is introduced.
Amendment 66
ARTICLE 1, POINT 28 (-A) (new)
Article 61, paragraph 1, point (-e a) (new) (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(-a) In paragraph 1, the following point (ea) is inserted:
(ea) the effective functioning of these systems;
Justification
Paragraph 1 f) follows directly from the Court of Auditors' Opinion 10/2005 point 30:
"In order for the Accounting Officers to be in a position to certify that the accounts present a true and fair view as provided by Article 123 of the current Financial Regulation, such validation should cover the effective functioning of systems over the period concerned"
Amendment 67
ARTICLE 1, POINT 28 (A)
Article 61, paragraph 2a (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
2a.The accounting officer shall prepare the accounts on the basis of the information presented under paragraph 2. The final accounts drawn up under Article 129(2) and (3) shall be accompanied by a certificate established by the accounting officer, by which he declares that they were prepared in accordance with Title VII and with the accounting principles, rules and methods set out in annex to the financial statements.
2a.Before their adoption by the institution, the accounting officer shall sign off the accounts, certifying that they present a true and fair view of the financial situation of the institution.
For this purpose the accounting officer shall satisfy himself that the accounts have been prepared in accordance with the accounting rules, methods and accounting systems established under his responsibility as laid down in this Regulation for the accounts of his institution, and that all revenue and expenditure is entered in the accounts.
He is empowered to check the information received as well as to carry out any further checks he deems necessary in order to sign off the accounts.
He will make reserves if necessary, explaining exactly the nature and scope of such reserves.
The authorising officers by delegation shall forward all information the accounting officer needs in order to exercise his duties.The authorising officers remain fully responsible for the proper use of the funds they manage as well as the legality and regularity of the expenditure under their control.
The accounting officers of the other institutions and agencies shall sign off their annual accounts and send the certificate to the Commission's accounting officer.
Justification
This follows the principles set out in Parliament's 2003 discharge report:
The Accounting Officer shall assume overall responsibility for the integrity of the accounts for the Institution as a whole (Paragraph 7).
The Accounting Officer shall sign off the accounts and if there are qualifications
(s)he shall explain exactly the nature and scope of the reservations made (Paragraph 8).
Parliament agrees with the thrust of the recent reform of financial management in the Commission which was to give responsibility to each Director-General but takes the view that the assurance given by the Directors-General must be supported by an overall assurance by the Accounting Officer, who shall be fully accountable and have the necessary means to fulfil this duty (Paragraph 9).
Amendment 68
ARTICLE 1, POINT 32 (A)
Article 66, paragraph 1 (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
Article 66 is amended as follows:
(a) in paragraph 1, the first sentence is replaced by the following:
‘The authorising officer shall be liable for payment of compensation as laid down in the Staff Regulations, which specify that a member of staff covered by the relevant provisions may be required to make good, in whole or in part, any damage suffered by the Communities as a result of serious misconduct on his/her part in the course of or in connection with the performance of his/her duties, in particular if he/she determines entitlements to be recovered or issues recovery orders, commits expenditure or signs a payment order without complying with this Regulation and the implementing rules.’
Article 66 is amended as follows:
(a) in paragraph 1, the first sentence is replaced by the following:
‘The authorising officer shall be liable for payment of compensation as laid down in the Staff Regulations.
The requirement to pay compensation shall apply in particular if
– the authorising officer, whether intentionally or through serious negligence on his part, determines entitlements to be recovered or issues recovery orders, commits expenditure or signs a payment order without complying with this Regulation and the implementing rules,
– the authorising officer, whether intentionally or through serious negligence on his part, omits to draw up a document establishing a debt, neglects to issue a recovery order or is late in issuing it or is late in issuing a payment order, thereby rendering the institution liable to civil action by third parties.
When the case and the degree of misconduct are considered, all circumstances, in particular the resources made available to the authorising officer to enable him to perform his duties, must be taken into account.
In keeping with the principle of proportionality, the level of liability of the authorising officer shall be assessed primarily on the basis of the degree of misconduct.If the authorising officer acts negligently, the liability shall be restricted to a maximum of 12 months’ salary.If the authorising officer acts intentionally or deliberately, he shall be liable for the entire loss suffered.’
Justification
Clarification. Incorporation of the principle of proportionality.
Amendment 69
ARTICLE 1, POINT 32 (B A) (new)
Article 66, paragraph 4 (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(ba) Paragraph 4 replaced by the following:
4. Each institution must set up or participate in the joint establishment of a specialised financial irregularities panel which shall function independently and determine whether a financial irregularity has occurred and what the consequences, if any, should be. Joint panels may be set up by a group of institutions.The members of a specialised panel may be appointed from any institution.
Justification
The smaller institutions in particular could benefit greatly from pooling administrative resources in this way.
Amendment 70
ARTICLE 1, POINT 33 A (new)
Article 72, paragraph 2 a (new) (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(33a) In Article 72, the following paragraph 2a is added:
"2a.Unduly paid amounts belong to the Community budget and should be recovered, taking into account the principle of proportionality, and entered into the budget.
When recovery procedures are dealt with by the Member States or by other organisations, the Community budget may be used to reimburse the costs associated with these recoveries.The Implementing Rules will govern these reimbursements."
Amendment 71
ARTICLE 1, POINT 35
Article 73b (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
Without prejudice to the provisions of specific regulations and the application of the Council Decision relating to the Communities' own resources system, entitlements of the Communities in respect of third parties and entitlements of third parties in respect of the Communities shall be subject to a limitation period of five years.
Without prejudice to the provisions of specific regulations and the application of the Council Decision relating to the Communities' own resources system, entitlements of the Communities in respect of third parties and entitlements of third parties in respect of the Communities shall be subject to a limitation period of five years.
If the entitlement is the result of deliberate damage to the Communities’ interests, the limitation period shall commence at the earliest on the date on which the damage and the justification for and level of the entitlement to compensation were actually and legally recognised and placed on record.The limitation period shall be interrupted by the assertion of the claim in the courts.If a number of debtors are jointly and severally liable, the interruption with regard to one debtor shall apply to all those jointly and severally liable.
The date for calculating the limitation period and the conditions for interrupting this period shall be laid down in the implementing rules.
The date for calculating the limitation period and the conditions for interrupting this period shall otherwise be laid down in the implementing rules.
Justification
Persons who deliberately damage the Communities’ interests should be able to invoke the statute of limitations only if no action is brought within the limitation period even though the damage has been recognised in full.
Amendment 72
ARTICLE 1, POINT 35 A (new)
Article 74, paragraph 1 (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(35a) In Article 74, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:
"Revenue received by way of fines, agreements, periodic penalty payments and other penalties, amounts recovered and any accrued interest shall not be finally recorded as budgetary revenue as long as the decisions imposing them can be annulled by the Court of Justice."
Amendment 73
ARTICLE 1, POINT 37 A (new)
Article 79, paragraph 1 a (new) (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(37a) In Article 79, the following paragraph is added:
‘Claims for payment shall give rise to payments by the Commission only in duly substantiated cases.’
Justification
Speeding up procedures and avoiding red tape.
Amendment 74
ARTICLE 1, POINT 37 B (new)
Article 83, paragraph 1 a (new) (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(37b) In Article 83, the following paragraph is added:
'The institutions shall submit to the budgetary authority a report on compliance with the time-limits laid down in the implementing rules and on the suspension of those time-limits.’
Justification
The budgetary authority should be more fully informed about the implementation of the budget.
(aa) In paragraph 1, the following subparagraph 1a is added:
'A start may be made on implementing the contract only after it has been signed.'
Justification
The current practice - that of making a start on implementation before the contract has been signed - brings with it risks for all the parties involved and can lead to serious breaches of the Member States' financial regulations. The objective of this amendment is to create greater legal certainty and to speed up contract-signing procedures.
Amendment 76
ARTICLE 1, POINT 39 A (new)
Article 89 (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(39a) Article 89 is amended as follows:
'Article 89
1. All public contracts financed in whole or in part by the budget shall comply with the principles of transparency, proportionality, equal treatment and non-discrimination.
2. All procurement contracts shall be put out to tender on the broadest possible base, except when use is made of the negotiated procedure referred to in Article 91(1)(d).
3. With a view to minimising marginal costs and avoiding parallel procurement procedures, the contracting authority shall take appropriate measures to ensure that procurement procedures are carried out on an interinstitutional basis.
4. Due account should be taken of the interests of small- and medium-sized undertakings primarily by splitting contracts, where appropriate, into specialist or part-lots.The thresholds laid down in Articles 105 and 167 may not be circumvented by means of such splitting.
Justification
High costs must not serve to deter economic operators from submitting tenders. The measure is designed to facilitate access for market participants and, at the same time, strengthen competition. Steps should be taken to improve administrative efficiency and cost-effectiveness in connection with procurement procedures. At the same time, smaller units which rarely carry out procurement procedures should be able to benefit from the expertise acquired by larger units. When procurement takes place, small- and medium-sized undertakings should not be economically disadvantaged simply because they are unable to cope with the full volume of a contract. In such cases, the contracting authority should consider the scope for awarding contracts on the basis of part- and/or specialist lots, subject to compliance with the relevant thresholds.
(39b) In Article 90(1), the following sentence is added to the subparagraph:
'This shall also apply to contracts concluded under a framework contract if, as a result of the conclusion of an individual contract or of the aggregate volume of the contracts concluded under the framework contract, the thresholds provided for in Articles 105 and 167 are exceeded.
Justification
Broadening of the requirement to publish and, as a result, improved transparency in the area of framework contracts.
Amendment 78
ARTICLE 1, POINT 41 A (new)
Article 91 a (new) (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(41a) The following article is added:
'Article 91a
1. If the contracting authority establishes that
(a) the likely administrative costs of implementing several simultaneous or successive procurement procedures in respect of similar items exceed the likely savings to be achieved by implementing those procurement procedures and are therefore inefficient, or
(b) the subject of the contract necessitates such a step, and
(c) competition would not be disproportionately restricted as a result, it may decide to conclude a framework contract.The authorising officer must include a copy of the duly substantiated decision to conclude a framework contract in the relevant files.
2. The duration of the framework contract for the provision of services may not exceed 24 months, although tacit extension for a period of up to 24 months shall be admissible (basic duration).Provision may be made for partial termination, provided that this is consistent with the purpose of the contract.
3. The contract may be tacitly extended only if the requirements laid down in paragraph 1 have been met at the time the decision to extend the contract is taken.The authorising officer must check that the requirements have been met and include a document setting out the results in the relevant files.
4. If, on the basis of an assessment carried out at the time when the contract is concluded, the purpose of the contract can be achieved only if the contract is concluded for a period in excess of the basic duration, the authorising officer must also include a document setting out the reasons for exceeding that basic duration in the relevant files.
5. If the contract is for the supply of goods, when the framework contract is concluded, and notwithstanding the requirements laid down in paragraph 1, suitable arrangements must be made to ensure that the contracting authority does not suffer any economic disadvantage for the period of the framework contract.'
Justification
Framework contracts bring substantial economic risks with them. They are standard administrative practice and a legal basis for their use should therefore be laid down in the Financial Regulation. Competition should be restricted as little as possible through the conclusion of framework contracts. At the same time, the Union's financial interests should be protected as comprehensively as possible. In particular, precautions must be taken against price deterioration. In the case of supply contracts, this can be achieved, for example, by avoiding exclusive contracts or by incorporating a price revision or termination clause.
Amendment 79
ARTICLE 1, POINT 41 B (new)
Article 92 (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(41b) Article 92 is amended as follows:
'Article 92
1. A full, clear and precise description of the subject of the contract must be given in the documents relating to the invitation to tender.
2. The selection criteria for evaluating the capability of candidates or tenderers and the award criteria for evaluating the content of the tenders shall be defined in advance and set out in the call for tender.
3. Candidates or tenderers shall be informed in advance of the grounds for exclusion (Articles 93 and 94).
4. Subject to the provisions of Article 93a, candidates' or tenderers' attention shall be drawn to the requirement that they must notify the contracting authority without delay if one or more of the exclusion criteria applies to them and, if necessary, confirm that none of the criteria applies.Attention shall be drawn to the legal implications of Article 96.
5. In the case of a framework contract, candidates' or tenderers' attention shall be drawn to the fact that other institutions are also entitled to receive deliveries on the basis of the terms and conditions laid down in the framework contract.'
Justification
The aim of the amendment is to improve readability and systematically bring together in one place the provisions governing the content of tender documents, which are currently spread over several separate articles. It also seeks to make clear that the grounds for exclusion are applied on the basis of the law and to substantiate the notification requirement imposed on tenderers and candidates. The reference to the possible imposition of penalties in the event of breaches of the rules is necessary to avoid developments which parties have no reason to expect. Other institutions must also be able to benefit from the economic advantages offered by a framework contract.
Amendment 80
ARTICLE 1, POINT 42
Article 93, paragraph 1, point (a) (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(a) they have been the subject of a judgment which has the force of res judicata for fraud, corruption, involvement in a criminal organisation, money laundering or any other illegal activity detrimental to the Communities' financial interests;
(a) during a period of five years prior to the date on which the invitation to tender is issued they have been the subject of a judgment which has the force of res judicata for fraud, corruption, involvement in a criminal organisation, money laundering or a similar criminal activity; the duration of the exclusion may be extended to up to 10 years if the candidate or tenderer has been the subject of a judgment which has the force of res judicata for an action detrimental to the Communities' financial interests;
Justification
For reasons of legal certainty, and in keeping with the hierarchy of norms, the duration of the exclusion as a result of a criminal conviction must be laid down in the Financial Regulation. In that connection, the duration of the exclusion should vary depending on whether the conviction is for offences involving the assets of third parties or of the Communities. In the latter case, an exclusion period of up to 10 years pursuant to Article 96 can be justified. Given the protracted nature of proceedings in cases involving economic crimes, the date when a judgment becomes final is not taken as the start of the exclusion period, in order to rule out any legal uncertainty and excessively long exclusion periods. In such cases, the date of the judgment at first instance, even if not final, is the determining factor.
Amendment 81
ARTICLE 1, POINT 42
Article 93, paragraph 3, (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
3. The situations of exclusion shall be defined in advance and communicated to candidates or tenderers.
4. Candidates or tenderers must certify that they are not in one of the situations listed in paragraph 1 and, as appropriate, that they are not in one of the situations listed in paragraph 2.
4. Subject to the provisions of Article 93a, candidates or tenderers must certify that they are not in one of the situations listed in paragraph 1 and, as appropriate, that they are not in one of the situations listed in paragraph 2.
Justification
Simplification of administrative arrangements vis-à-vis candidates or tenderers: certification should be required in a manner consistent with the principle of proportionality.
Where the candidate or tenderer is a legal entity, information on the ownership or on the management, control and power of representation of the legal entity must be provided, whenever requested by the contracting authority.
deleted
Justification
This matter has been dealt with in the second paragraph of Article 93a(1)(c) as part of the systematisation of the provisions on the requirement to produce supporting documents.
Amendment 84
ARTICLE 1, POINT 42
Article 93a (new) (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
Article 93a
(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 89, at all stages of the procurement procedure administrative requirements and requirements to produce supporting documents must be clearly defined and directly linked to the procedure in question.
In particular:
(a) except in the case of contracts involving small amounts for which a single tender lodged under the negotiated procedure is admissible, authorising officers may, on the basis of their risk assessment, waive the requirement to supply one or more supporting documents;
(b) in the case of other procurement procedures conducted pursuant to Article 91(3), the contracting authority may require a certificate and/or other supporting documents which prove that the candidate is not in one of the situations listed in Articles 93 and 94 and that he meets the other award criteria;
(c) in all other cases, the contracting authority may require candidates or tenderers to produce those supporting documents which it regards as essential to the implementation of the procurement procedure.
In addition, at the request of the contracting authority candidates or tenderers must state who owns the legal entity submitting a tender, or who makes up its management, or who exercises control or power of representation.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 4, payments on account may not be retained on the sole grounds that no use was made of the possibility of requiring candidates or tenderers to produce supporting documents.'
Justification
This provision applies the principle of proportionality to the requirements to produce supporting documents. The aim is to strike a balance between protection of the Communities' interests, on the one hand, and administrative effort, on the other.
Amendment 85
ARTICLE 1, POINT 42
Article 94, paragraph 1 a (new) (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
Notwithstanding any other provisions concerning conflicts of interest, in particular those laid down in Article 52, a conflict of interest within the meaning of letter (a) shall be presumed to exist if, at any stage of a procedure relating to the award of a grant, the candidate or tenderer was an employee of the Communities, provided that his participation in the procurement procedure was not authorised in advance by his superior.
Justification
Restricts the application of this article to grants procedures since Communities' employees are per se forbidden to conclude contracts with the Communities.
Amendment 86
ARTICLE 1, POINT 43
Article 95 (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(43) In Article 95, the following paragraph is added:
(43) Article 95 is replaced by the following:
"However, for cost-effectiveness reasons, two or more institutions may agree to use a common database."
"Article 95
1. Each institution shall communicate the details of candidates and tenderers who are in one of the situations described in Articles 93 and 94 to a central database operated by the Commission.
2. The database shall be consulted by authorising officers in all institutions and agencies before awarding a tender.Access to the database shall be granted also to the relevant authorities of the Member States.Access may be granted to third countries and international organisations if this is necessary on important public interest grounds without prejudice to Community rules on the processing of personal data.
3. The Member States shall communicate to the Commission details of economic operators in one of the situations mentioned in Article 93(1)(a) and (2)(b) and (c) where the conduct of these operators was detrimental to the Communities' financial interest and the Communities have not already been part of judicial proceedings.The Member States' authorities shall consult the Commission's databases when awarding a contract if financial resources from EU funds are involved and apply the information accordingly."
Amendment 87
ARTICLE 1, POINT 44
Article 96, paragraph 2 a (new) (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(2a) A candidate or tenderer may be excluded for a period of more than five years only on the basis of a judgment or analogous decision against the candidate or tenderer which has the force of res judicata for an action justifying exclusion which is detrimental to the Communities’ interests.
Justification
In line with Article 93.
Amendment 88
ARTICLE 1, POINT 44 A
Article 97, paragraph 2 a, Section 3a (new) (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(44a) Before Article 97, the following new Section 3a is added:
‘Section 3a
Rights of the parties involved in procurement procedures’
Justification
Makes clear that the parties involved in procurement procedures not only have obligations, but also rights which the contracting authority must respect.
Amendment 89
ARTICLE 1, POINT 44 B (new)
Article 97, paragraph 1 (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(44b) Article 97(1) is deleted.
Justification
Improved readability and systematisation.
Amendment 90
ARTICLE 1, POINT 46 (A A) (new)
Article 97, paragraph 2 (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(aa) Paragraph 2 is amended as follows:
‘(2)Only in duly justified cases, the contracting authority may require tenderers, as provided in the implementing rules, to lodge a security in advance as a guarantee that the bids made will not be withdrawn.’
Justification
Minimisation of the need to require tenderers to lodge securities.
Amendment 91
ARTICLE 1, POINT 46 A (new)
Article 100, paragraph 2 a (new) (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(46a) In Article 100, the following paragraph is added:
‘(2a) The contract may not be signed prior to the expiry of a 14-week period commencing on the date on which the candidate or tenderer was notified of the rejection of its tender (paragraph 2, first phrase), provided that the Communities would not suffer a significant financial loss as a result.The time-limit shall begin to run only once the candidate or tenderer has been informed in writing of the legal remedies available against the decision, in particular as regards the instance, time-limit and form.A contract signed prior to expiry of the time-limit shall be null and void.’
Justification
Unsuccessful tenderers should be informed about the possibilities for challenging contract award decisions. This will make for effective scrutiny of such decisions and, by extension, greater transparency.
Amendment 92
ARTICLE 1, POINT 46 B (new)
Article 100 a (new) (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(46b) The following article is added:
'Article 100a
(1) The Commission shall take the measures necessary to ensure that, as regards procedures for the award of public contracts falling within the scope of the Financial Regulation, decisions taken by the contracting authorities may be reviewed effectively and, in particular, as rapidly as possible in accordance with the conditions set out, in particular, in Article 100b(7) in order to determine whether such decisions have infringed Community law in the field of public procurement or other provisions implementing that law.
(2) The Commission shall ensure that the review procedure is available, in accordance with conditions to be laid down in the implementing rules, at least to any person having or having had an interest in obtaining a particular public supply or public works contract and who has been or risks being harmed by an alleged infringement.In particular, the Commission may require that the person seeking the review must have previously notified the contracting authority of the alleged infringement and of his intention to seek review.’
Justification
Requirements equivalent to those imposed on Member States under Directive 89/665/EEC of 21 December 1989.
Amendment 93
ARTICLE 1, POINT 46 C (new)
Article 100 b (new) (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(46c) The following article is added:
'Article 100b
1. The Commission shall ensure that the measures taken concerning the review procedures specified in Article 100a include provision for the powers required to:
(a) take, at the earliest opportunity and by way of interlocutory procedures, interim measures with the aim of correcting the alleged infringement or preventing further damage to the interests concerned, including measures to suspend or to ensure the suspension of the procedure for the award of a public contract or the implementation of any decision by the contracting authority;
(b) either set aside or ensure the setting aside of decisions taken unlawfully, including the removal of discriminatory technical, economic or financial specifications in the invitation to tender, the contract documents or in any other document relating to the contract award procedure;
(c) award damages to persons harmed by an infringement.
2. The powers specified in paragraph 1 may be conferred on separate bodies responsible for different aspects of the review procedure.
3. Review procedures need not in themselves have an automatic suspensive effect on the contract award procedures to which they relate.
4. The Commission may provide that when considering whether to order interim measures the body responsible may take into account the probable consequences of the measures for all interests likely to be harmed, as well as the public interest, and may decide not to grant such measures where their negative consequences could exceed their benefits.A decision not to grant interim measures shall not prejudice any other claim of the person seeking these measures.
5. The Commission may provide that where damages are claimed on the grounds that a decision was taken unlawfully, the contested decision must first be set aside by a body having the necessary powers.
6. The effects of the exercise of the powers referred to in paragraph 1 on a contract concluded subsequent to its award shall be laid down in the implementing rules.
Furthermore, except where a decision must be set aside prior to the award of damages, the Commission may provide that, after the conclusion of a contract following its award, the powers of the body responsible for the review procedures shall be limited to awarding damages to any person harmed by an infringement.
7. The Commission shall ensure that decisions taken by bodies responsible for review procedures can be effectively enforced.
8. Where bodies responsible for review procedures are not judicial in character, written reasons for their decisions shall always be given.Furthermore, in such a case, provision must be made to guarantee procedures whereby any allegedly illegal measure taken by the review body or any alleged defect in the exercise of the powers conferred on it can be the subject of judicial review or review by another body which is a court or tribunal within the meaning of Article 234 of the EC Treaty and independent of both the contracting authority and the review body.
The members of such an independent body shall be appointed and leave office under the same conditions as members of the judiciary as regards the authority responsible for their appointment, their period of office, and their removal.At the least the President of this independent body shall have the same legal and professional qualifications as members of the judiciary.The independent body shall take its decisions following a procedure in which both sides are heard, and these decisions shall, by means determined by the Commission, be legally binding.'
Justification
Requirements equivalent to those imposed on the Member States under Directive 89/665/EEC of 21 December 1989.
Amendment 94
ARTICLE 1, POINT 46 D (new)
Article 102 (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(46d) Article 102 is amended as follows:
'Article 102
In certain duly substantiated cases, the contracting authority may require contractors to lodge a guarantee in advance in order to:
(a) ensure full performance of the contract;
(b) limit the financial risks connected with pre-financing and payments on account.In the case of payments on account, guarantees shall be required only if the payment does not relate to supplies already delivered or services provided on the basis of instalments agreed in advance.'
Justification
Administrative simplification. In cases where supplies have already been delivered or services provided, a security is superfluous.
(-a) In paragraph 1, subparagraph 1, the introduction is amended as follows:
‘1. Grants are direct financial contributions, by way of donation, from the budgets of the institutions in order to finance:’
(Same wording as the first subparagraph of Article 108(1) of Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 with the addition of the words 'of the institutions')
Justification
The implementing rules create ambiguity by sometimes making ‘the Commission’ and sometimes ‘the authorising officer’ responsible for practical implementing measures. The proposed clarification would do away with the current ambiguity and clearly extend the scope of the provisions of Title VI, ‘Grants’, to cover all the institutions.
(-aa) Paragraph 1, subparagraph 2, is amended as follows:
‘Grants shall be the subject of a written award agreement or an award decision to be notified to the applicant.The decision to award a grant may lay down terms and conditions, requirements or time-limits provided that those provisions could also have been the subject of a grant award agreement.’
Justification
The amendment seeks to make it possible for grants to be awarded by means of Commission decisions, rather than just grant award agreements. Article 249 of the EC Treaty includes decisions among the range of legal measures which the Communities may take. The award of grants on the basis of decisions can therefore do much to reduce red tape, in particular where small sums are involved, and to shorten the procedure. The possibility of incorporating terms and conditions, time-limits or requirements in the grant award agreement will make for more flexible implementation.
Amendment 97
ARTICLE 1, POINT 50 (A)
Article 108, paragraph 2, point g a and g b (new) (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(ga) expenditure on organisations mainly consisting of (former) members and staff of an Institutions that:
- promote the interest or support the functioning of the institution; and/or
- organize cultural, sportive, social and other activities to the benefit of the Institution and/or its (former) members and staff; and
(gb) expenditure in the framework of cooperation with third persons, not governed by the provisions on procurement, and related to the information policy of the institution.
These categories are considered administrative expenditure within the meaning of Article 49. They shall be dealt with in a separate budget item.
Justification
Financial support granted to in-house organisations which is essential to their proper functioning should be removed from the scope of the provisions on grants, since a number of principles applied to grants, such as the annual call for proposals and degressivity, are not appropriate when it comes to dealing with financial support provided by the institutions for organisations consisting of their Members or staff.
They may not be cumulative or awarded retrospectively and they must involve co-financing.
They may not be cumulative or awarded retrospectively; notwithstanding the provisions governing the award of grants as lump sums or on the basis of flat-rate financing (Article 113a(1)(b) and (c)), they must involve co-financing.
Justification
These provisions do away with the co-financing requirement for grants awarded as lump sums or on the basis of flat-rate financing.
Amendment 99
ARTICLE 1, POINT 52
Article 109, paragraph 3, point (d a) (new) (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(da) own resources, in particular contributions and membership fees, aggregated in the annual operations of a political party at European level in accordance with Article 2(1) and 2(2) of Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003, which exceed the 25% of eligible cost to be borne by the beneficiary according to Article 10(2) of Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003.
Amendment 100
ARTICLE 1, POINT 52 A (new)
Article 109 a (new) (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(52a) The following article is added:
‘Article 109a
Bodies which award grants shall cooperate in setting up a joint body with the task of providing information to and advising applicants.In particular, this body shall:
- lay down joint standards for the application forms for similar grants and monitor the size and readability of the application forms,
- supply information to potential applicants (in particular by means of seminars and the provision of handbooks) and
- maintain a database with the help of which the Commission can notify applicants.’
Justification
The body to be set up on the basis of cooperation will establish uniform standards to govern dealings with grant beneficiaries. This will substantially reduce administrative costs for both beneficiaries and the award body. In that connection, with a view to simplifying the application procedure standards which are as similar as possible should be laid down for similar forms of grants (e.g. support for youth activities, research). The establishment of a centralised database will ensure that supporting documents need only be submitted once, generating time and cost savings for both the Commission and applicants.
(52b) Article 110(1), subparagraph 1, is amended as follows:
‘1. Grants shall be subject to an annual programme, to be published at the start of the year, and at all events not later than 1 March, with the exception of crisis management aid and humanitarian aid operations.’
(Same wording as the first subparagraph of Article 110(1) of Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 with the addition of the words 'and at all events not later than 1 March')
Justification
The shortening of the time-limit will serve to speed up grant award procedures.
That work programme shall be implemented through the publication of calls for proposals save in duly substantiated exceptional cases of urgency or where the characteristics of the beneficiary or of the action leave no other choice for a given action.
That work programme shall be implemented through the publication of calls for proposals save in duly substantiated exceptional cases of urgency or where the characteristics of the beneficiary or of the action leave no other choice for a given action. The call for proposals may already be published in the previous year, subject to the availability of the appropriations in the following year.Irrespective of the time of publication and notwithstanding Article 115, it shall indicate all the rules which apply to the award of the grant (particularly the exclusion criteria as referred to in Articles 93 and 94), in which connection references to provisions are permissible.Throughout the procedure, the rules to be applied shall be binding in the version applicable at the time of the announcement.
Justification
Publication the previous year is intended to prevent grant procedures from being concentrated at the beginning of the following year, which causes delays.Applicants should enjoy legal certainty throughout the procedure.The prohibition on any amendment while a procedure is in progress will reduce the quantity of administrative work for the beneficiaries and the Commission, tighten up procedures and unify policy on grants.
Amendment 103
ARTICLE 1, POINT 53 A (new)
Article 110, paragraph 2 a (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(53a) The following paragraph 2a is inserted in Article 110:
'2a.Simultaneously with publication pursuant to paragraph 2, the Commission shall forward to the European Parliament a report on:
(a) the number of applicants in the past year;
(b) the number and percentage of successful applications per call for proposals and per subsidising agency;
(c) the mean duration of the procedure from publication of the call for proposals to the conclusion of the grant agreement or the issuing of a decision on awarding a grant per call for proposals and per subsidising agency;
(d) the mean period until the final assessment and final payment (Article 119, paragraph 1).'
Justification
In view of the long duration of procedures relating to grants, reporting is essential, as a vital precondition for improvements.This will make it possible to compile a differentiated assessment of the degree of success by comparing the plan of work and its implementation.
Amendment 104
ARTICLE 1, POINT 54
Article 111 (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
One action may give rise to the award of only one grant from the budget to any one beneficiary, except where otherwise authorized by the basic acts concerned.
1. One action may give rise to the award of only one grant from the budget to any one beneficiary.
A beneficiary may be awarded only one operating grant from the budget per financial year.
2. A beneficiary may be awarded only one operating grant from the budget per financial year. The applicant shall immediately inform the authorising officers of any multiple applications and multiple grants for the project.
In any case, the same costs shall not be financed twice by the budget.
3. In any case, the same costs shall not be financed twice by the budget.On no account may the combined total costs eligible for financing be exceeded.
Justification
The obligation for the beneficiary of a grant, who is closer to the matter in hand, to provide information will help to avoid unlawful parallel grants or exceeding of the maximum permissible grant.
Amendment 105
ARTICLE 1, POINT 56
Article 113 a, paragraph 1 a (new) (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
1a.The following, in particular, may be claimed as costs eligible for financing:
(a) the costs of a bank guarantee or comparable surety to be lodged by the beneficiary of the grant pursuant to Article 118;
(b) the amounts of turnover tax which the beneficiary of the grant cannot claim as a deduction of input tax;
(c) the costs of an external audit (Articles 117 and 119)
(d) administrative expenditure and staff and equipment costs;
(e) depreciation.
Justification
Small enterprises or organisations, in particular, cannot themselves bear the costs of lodging surety. However, these should not in consequence in effect be excluded from subsidisation. The same applies to nongovernmental organisations, which do not have the benefit of a deduction of input tax.
Applicants must certify that they are not in one of the situations referred to in the first subparagraph.
Applicants shall certify, taking account of the principles in Article 109, at the request of the authorising officer, that they are not in one of the situations referred to in the first subparagraph.
Justification
It should become possible for the authorising officer to make use of certification flexibly and in accordance with his own assessment of the risk. This will reduce the amount of administrative work.
Such penalties may also be imposed on beneficiaries who, during the implementation of the grant agreement, have made false declarations in supplying the information required by the authorising officer or fail to supply this information.
Such penalties may also be imposed on beneficiaries who, during the implementation of the grant agreement, intentionally or through gross negligence, have made false declarations in supplying the information required by the authorising officer or fail to supply this information.
Justification
Clarification.
Amendment 108
ARTICLE 1, POINT 57
Article 114, paragraph 4 a (new) (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
4a.The authorising officer shall propose that declarations be issued, applications made or declarations or applications be corrected if it is clearly only due to an oversight or ignorance that they have not been issued or made or have been issued or made incorrectly.In so far as necessary and feasible and permissible in the light of the possibilities available, he shall provide information about the rights and obligations of the participants in the procedure.
The authorising officer shall keep appropriate records of contacts with applicants during the procedure.
Justification
This provision is intended to make it possible for applicants to submit successful applications for grants even if they are not used to dealing with subsidising agencies and have no legal advisor. Nongovernmental organisations have complained about the lack of cooperation. This is intended to make the European Union a more attractive funding partner. Transparency and certainty of the procedure are the aims of the requirement to keep records.
Amendment 109
ARTICLE 1, POINT 57 A (new)
Article 115, paragraph 1 (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(57a) Article 115, paragraph 1, is replaced by the following:
'1. Using selection criteria stated in advance in the call for proposals, the applicant's ability to complete the proposed action or work programme shall be evaluated.This shall be without prejudice to Article 110, paragraph 1.
The selection criteria shall give a picture of the specific characteristics of the projects and their quality and implementation.'
(Same wording as Article 115(1) of Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 with the addition of the words ' stated in advance in the call for proposals' and of the second sentence and second subparagraph.).
Justification
The provision will create a parallel with Articles 110 and 116, pursuant to which applicants must be informed in advance of all provisions relevant to the grant. Publishing the selection criteria in advance will make the procedure more transparent. Moreover, applicants will be given a better opportunity to assess the likelihood of success of their application at an early stage, thereby avoiding the unnecessary effort of submitting applications which will manifestly fail.
Amendment 110
ARTICLE 1, POINT 57 B (new)
Article 115, paragraphs 2 a (new) and 2 b (new) (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(57b) The following paragraphs 2a and 2b are inserted in Article 115:
'2a.The award procedure shall as a matter of principle be divided into several procedural stages, the first of which shall solely comprise an approximate evaluation of the permissible applications submitted.If an application already cannot have any prospect of success after this stage of the procedure, the applicant shall be informed accordingly in accordance with Article 116, paragraph 3. Each subsequent stage of the procedure must be clearly distinct from the previous one, particularly as regards the quantity and substance of the evidence to be submitted by the applicant.If evidence is required from an applicant, it may be required only once in the course of the procedure.Data which have been obtained shall be stored in a database (Article 109a).Efforts shall be made to complete the procedure speedily.
2b.Notwithstanding the principles in Article 109, paragraph 1, the authorising officer shall, throughout the procedure, take particular care to ensure that the effort required of an applicant for purposes of publication, documentation and the provision of other compulsory evidence pertaining to a grant is not disproportionate to the value of the grant to be awarded.'
Justification
Dividing the procedure into several stages should facilitate a prior selection. This can also reduce the submission of substantial documentation during the early stage of the procedure. The same purpose will be served by the checking function of the authorising officer.
Amendment 111
ARTICLE 1, POINT 58
Article 116, paragraph 1, (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
1. Proposals shall be evaluated, on the basis of pre-announced selection and award criteria, with a view to determining which proposals may be financed.
1. Proposals shall be evaluated in the course of two months on the basis of pre-announced selection and award criteria, with a view to determining which proposals may be financed.
Justification
The provision seeks to establish clear time frame for decision making.
Amendment 112
ARTICLE 1, POINT 58 A (new)
Article 116, paragraph 3 (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(58a) In Article 116, paragraph 3 is replaced by the following:
"3. The authorising officer responsible shall inform applicants in writing of the decision concerning their application and sign the contract after the expiry of the period referred to in Article 100(2a).
If the grant requested is not awarded, the institution shall give the reasons for the rejection of the application, with reference in particular to the selection and award criteria already announced."
Justification
The provision seeks to establish clear time frame for decision making.
Amendment 113
ARTICLE 1, POINT 58 B (new)
Article 117 (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(58b) Article 117 is replaced by the following:
'Article 117
1. The pace of payments shall be determined by the financial risks involved, the duration and progress of the action or the costs incurred by the beneficiary.Payments must be made within a reasonable period.
If the schedule of payments is laid down contractually or by a decision, payments shall be made without any further demand when they fall due.This shall be without prejudice to Article 119, paragraph 2.
2. In order to ascertain the financial risks, the authorising officer may, taking account of the principles in Article 109, paragraph 1, require the beneficiary of the grant to submit an attestation by an independent auditor.The implementing provisions may provide for cases in which an attestation is to be obtained from an external auditor or in which an attestation is not required.'
(The first sentence of paragraph 2 is identical to Article 117 of Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
Justification
The provision is intended to help speed up the procedure. Institutions which have their own audit offices should be allowed to use them rather than having to resort to external auditors. This will avoid procedural costs.
Amendment 114
ARTICLE 1, POINT 58 C (new)
Article 118 (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(58c) Article 118 is replaced by the following:
'Article 118
The authorising officer responsible may, if other equally effective ways of minimising risk are not available, require the beneficiary to lodge a guarantee in advance in order to limit the financial risks connected with the payment of pre-financing.'
(As Article 118 of Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 with the addition of the words 'if other equally effective ways of minimising risk are not available')
Justification
Requiring security in the form of bank guarantees would cause considerable difficulties, particularly to small businesses, businesses in certain Member States and small nongovernmental organisations. It should therefore be made clear that this is intended only to be the last resort if other equally effective forms of security cannot be considered.
Amendment 115
ARTICLE 1, POINT 58 D (new)
Article 119 (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(58d) Article 119 is replaced by the following:
'Article 119
1. The amount of the grant shall not become final until after the institution has accepted the final reports and accounts, without prejudice to subsequent checks by the institution.In this case the limitation period (Article 73b) against the institution shall commence when the last payment is made.The limitation period (Article 73b) against the beneficiary shall commence when the amount of the grant becomes final.
(2) Should the beneficiary fail to comply with his/her legal or contractual obligations or with obligations laid down in the decision on the award of a grant, the grant may be suspended, reduced or terminated in accordance with the provisions provided for by the implementing rules after the beneficiary has been given the opportunity to make his/her observations.
Reductions must be proportionate to the error objected to.
If the breach of duty is not due to the conduct of the beneficiary, the grant shall be suspended, reduced or terminated only in exceptional cases, particularly if implementing or upholding the grant would result in the ceiling for project costs eligible for financing being exceeded or if the dereliction of duty has the effect of making it impossible for the aim of the grant to be achieved any longer.'
Justification
Applies the principle of proportionality. In particular, automatic reduction of the EU grant if one or more co-financers withdraws through no fault of the beneficiary might result in failure of the overall project. Care should be taken to avoid this. The reference to the provisions concerning limitation is intended to compel the institution to conduct the final evaluation, at the latest, before the limitation period expires. This should increase legal certainty for the beneficiary of the grant.
Amendment 116
ARTICLE 1, POINT 59
Article 120, paragraph 1 (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
1. Where implementation of the action requires the award of procurement contracts by the beneficiary, the relevant procedures shall be as set out in the implementing rules.
1. Where implementation of the action requires the award of procurement contracts, this shall be subject to the principles in Title V of this Part.
The implementing provisions may provide for arrangements for a simplified procedure, depending on the size of the contract.
Justification
Administrative simplification.
Amendment 117
ARTICLE 1, POINT 61
Article 122 (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
61. In Article 122, 'Article 185' is replaced by 'Article 121'.
61. Article 122 is replaced by the following:
'Article 122
A report on budgetary and financial management in the budget year concerned shall be attached to the accounts of the institutions and of the bodies referred to in Article 121, which gives an account, inter alia, of the rate of implementation of the appropriations and of transfers of appropriations among the various budget items.'
Justification
The aim is to clarify the objectives and substance of the various reports provided for by the Financial Regulation. It would be desirable for the annual reports of authorising officers to focus on the use of resources, the attainment of objectives, the development of activities and the internal control framework, while the report on budgetary and financial management focuses on aspects of budget implementation.
Amendment 118
ARTICLE 1, POINT 68 A (new)
Article 139, paragraph 2 (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(68a) Article 139, paragraph 2, is replaced by the following:
'2. The institutions shall forward their internal financial rules to the Court of Auditors and the budgetary authority, for information.'
Justification
To ensure that the budgetary authority is informed.
Amendment 119
ARTICLE 1, POINT 69 B (new)
Article 143, paragraph 3 (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(69b) In article 143, paragraph 3 is replaced by the following:
"3. The annual report shall contain an assessment of the soundness of financial management.It shall contain an evaluation of the efficiency and regularity of the budgetary and economic management."
Justification
The differentiation is intended to make clear that, in its auditing remit, the Court of Auditors should confine itself to assessing the formal legality of revenue and expenditure but should also assess the substantive appropriateness of the transactions audited.
Amendment 120
ARTICLE 1, POINT 75
Article 153, paragraph 1 (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
75. In Article 153, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:
deleted
'1. Where the Commission may transfer appropriations pursuant to Article 23, it shall take its decision by 31 January of the following financial year at the latest and shall inform the budgetary authority three weeks before making the transfers referred to in point (a) of Article 23(1).'
(Article 153, paragraph 1, as amended, corresponds to the original version in Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
Justification
Preservation of Parliament's prerogatives.
Amendment 121
ARTICLE 1, POINT 82 A (new)
Article 160 b (new) (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(82a) The following Article 160b is inserted after Article 160a:
'Article 160b
Notwithstanding Article 110, a call for proposals may already be published in the previous year, subject to the availability of the appropriations in the following year.Irrespective of the time of publication and notwithstanding Article 115, the Commission shall indicate all the rules which apply to the award of the grant (particularly the exclusion criteria as referred to in Articles 93 and 94), in which connection references to provisions are permissible.Throughout the procedure, the rules to be applied shall be binding in the version applicable at the time of the announcement.'
Justification
See the amendment to Article 110. Publication the previous year is intended to prevent grant procedures from being concentrated at the beginning of the year, which causes delays. Applicants should enjoy legal certainty throughout the procedure. The prohibition on any amendment while a procedure is in progress will reduce the quantity of administrative work for the beneficiaries, tighten up procedures and unify policy on grants
Amendment 122
ARTICLE 1, POINT 85 A (new)
Article 168, paragraph 1, subparagraph 1 a (new) (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(85a) In article 168, paragraph 1, the following subparagraph is inserted:
"As regards Community external assistance, the rules for the participation in tendering procedures laid down in Regulation (EC) No 2110/2005 of the European Parliament and the Council of 14 December 2005 on access to Community external assistance1 and Council Regulation (EC) No 2112/2005 of 21 November 2005 on access to Community external assistance2 apply.
1 OJ L 344, 27.12.2005, p. 1.
2 OJ L 344, 27.12.2005, p. 23."
Justification
The two regulations for the untying of aid were adopted in 2005. They open the tendering procedures for persons from non-EU and non-beneficiary countries favouring developing countries and applying the principle of reciprocity for non-EU developed countries. These rules have to be applied and should be incorporated in the Financial Regulation.
Amendment 123
ARTICLE 1, POINT 87
Article 169a, paragraph 1a (new) (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
The following, in particular, may be claimed as costs eligible for financing:
(a) the costs of a bank guarantee or comparable surety to be lodged by the beneficiary of the grant pursuant to Article 118;
(b) the amounts of turnover tax which the beneficiary of the grant cannot claim as a deduction of input tax;
(c) the costs of an external audit (Articles 117 and 119);
(d) the costs of administrative expenditure and staff and equipment costs;
(e) depreciation.
Justification
See the amendment to Article 113a: Small nongovernmental organisations, in particular, working in the field of development aid cannot themselves bear the costs of lodging surety. However, these should not in consequence in effect be excluded from subsidisation. The same applies to the problem of nongovernmental organisations, which do not have the benefit of a deduction of input tax.
Amendment 124
ARTICLE 1, POINT 94 A (new)
Article 179, paragraph 3 (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(94a) In article 179, paragraph 3 is replaced by the following:
"3. The institutions shall inform the two branches of the budgetary authority as soon as possible, but at least 3 weeks prior to any deadline before which a decision has to be taken by the budgetary authority, of any building project likely to have significant financial implications for the budget."
Justification
In order to be able to make sound financial judgements as a budgetary authority on a building project with implications for the European Union's budget, the Institutions referred to under paragraph 179.3 need to inform the two branches at least 3 weeks prior to any deadline before which a decision has to be taken by the budgetary authority. This will enable both arms of the budgetary authority to ask for more clarification and further inquiries when deemed necessary.
Amendment 125
ARTICLE 1, POINT 94 B (new)
Article 183 (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(94b) Article 183 is replaced by the following:
'Article 183
The budgetary authority shall give its assent to the implementing provisions of this Financial Regulation.'
Justification
Preservation of Parliament's prerogatives.
Amendment 126
ARTICLE 1, POINT 95 -A (new)
Article 185, paragraph 1 (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
(95 -a) In article 185, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:
"1. The Commission shall adopt a framework financial regulation for the bodies set up by the Union and having legal personality.The financial rules of these bodies may not depart from the framework regulation except where their specific operating needs so require and with the Commission's prior consent."
Justification
For reasons of transparency, accountability and consistency, all agencies that act on behalf of the Union, irrespective of whether they receive grants charged to the budget, should be subject to the framework financial regulation.
Amendment 127
ARTICLE 1, POINT 95
Article 185, paragraph 3 (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
3.Each body referred to in paragraph 1 shall establish an internal audit function which must be performed in compliance with the relevant international standards.The Commission's internal auditor shall certify that the operation of the audit function respects international audit standards and, for that purpose, may conduct quality audits.
3.The Commission's internal auditor shall conduct the audits for the bodies referred to in paragraph 1. The bodies referred to in paragraph 1 may establish an internal audit function.The Commission's internal auditor may, in duly substantiated cases, delegate his task to their internal auditors.This delegation shall be made in writing, setting out the reasons for delegation and the names of the responsible auditors (delegating and delegate).Notwithstanding the delegation, the Commission's internal auditor may conduct internal audits for the bodies referred to in paragraph 1 and revoke the delegation at any time he thinks fit.
In cases in which an internal audit function is set up by the bodies referred to in paragraph 1, it shall be performed in compliance with guidelines established by the Commission's internal auditor.These guidelines shall include a duty to submit all and any reports made to the Commission's internal auditor.The Commission's internal auditor shall certify that the operation of the audit function meets internal audit standards and, for that purpose, may conduct quality audits."
Justification
Clarify position of Commission's Internal Auditor. Commission's Internal Auditor is being empowered to delegate tasks to agencies' internal audit services while maintaining control over and responsibility for accounting within the agencies.
Amendment 128
ARTICLE 1, POINT 95
Article 185, paragraph 4 (Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002)
4. The bodies referred to in Article 121 shall apply the accounting rules set out in Article 133 so that their accounts can be consolidated with the Commission's accounts.
deleted
Justification
Superfluous. Covered by Article 133.
PROĊEDURA
Title
Proposal for a Council regulation amending Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities
Herbert Bösch, Simon Busuttil, Mogens N.J. Camre, Paulo Casaca, Petr Duchoň, Szabolcs Fazakas, Markus Ferber, Christofer Fjellner, Béla Glattfelder, Ingeborg Gräßle, Umberto Guidoni, Rodi Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou, Véronique Mathieu, Jan Mulder, Borut Pahor, José Javier Pomés Ruiz, Paul Rübig, Bart Staes, Margarita Starkevičiūtė, Alexander Stubb, Kyösti Virrankoski
Substitute(s) present for the final vote
Jens-Peter Bonde, Daniel Caspary, Robert Goebbels, Joel Hasse Ferreira, Edit Herczog, Silvana Koch-Mehrin, Ashley Mote, Esko Seppänen
Substitute(s) under Rule 178(2) present for the final vote
María del Pilar Ayuso González
PROĊEDURA
Titolu
Proposta għal regolament tal-Kunsill li jemenda Refolament (KE, Euratom) Nru 1605/2005 dwar ir-Regolament Finanzjarju applikabbli għall-baġit ġenerali tal-Komunitajiet Ewropej,
Reimer Böge, Herbert Bösch, Simon Busuttil, Paulo Casaca, Brigitte Douay, James Elles, Szabolcs Fazakas, Salvador Garriga Polledo, Neena Gill, Ingeborg Gräßle, Louis Grech, Catherine Guy-Quint, Ville Itälä, Anne E. Jensen, Wiesław Stefan Kuc, Janusz Lewandowski, Vladimír Maňka, Jan Mulder, Gérard Onesta, Wojciech Roszkowski, Antonis Samaras, László Surján, Ralf Walter
Sostituti preżenti għall-votazzjoni finali
Etelka Barsi-Pataky, Lidia Joanna Geringer de Oedenberg, Alfred Gomolka, José Albino Silva Peneda, Margarita Starkevičiūtė
Sostituti skond l-Artikolu 178(2) preżenti għall-votazzjoni finali