HELSINKI EUROPEAN COUNCIL 10 AND 11 DECEMBER 1999
The quest for peace and prosperity has been the driving force of European integration. In fifty years we have come a long way towards these goals. We live in a Union where citizens and businesses can freely move and settle regardless of national borders. People from all walks of life benefit from the Single Market, Economic and Monetary Union and common policies fostering competitiveness and social inclusion.
The European Union is based on democracy and the rule of law. The Union's citizens are bound together by common values such as freedom, tolerance, equality, solidarity and cultural diversity.
The European Union is a unique venture, with no model in history. Only together, through the Union, can we and our countries meet tomorrow's challenges.
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On the threshold of a new century and the third millennium, the Union should focus on tasks which are central to its peoples’ security and welfare.
Europe faces the realities of the information society and globalisation. There is a need to provide for an ageing population and respond to the expectations of young people. We shall develop our human resources through life-long learning and innovation and we shall promote a dynamic and open knowledge based European economy to secure growth and to bring down unemployment on a permanent basis.
Europe is acutely aware of the need to combat local and world-wide environmental degradation. We shall act together to achieve sustainable development and guarantee a better quality of life for future generations.
People expect to be protected against crime and to be able to exercise their legal rights everywhere in the Union. We shall make the Union a genuine area of freedom, security and justice.
The Union shares a growing global responsibility for promoting wellbeing, preventing conflicts and securing peace. We shall strengthen stability and prosperity in Europe by enlarging the Union and cooperating with partner countries. We shall work for a more open and stable international economy benefiting also people in less favoured parts of the world. We shall create Union military and civil capabilities in order to manage international crises, and to provide humanitarian assistance to those in need.
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Only an open, democratic and efficient Union can fulfil these pledges.
The Union needs the confidence and active involvement of its citizens and civic organisations. The Union also needs the full support of its Member States in promoting the common interest.
We must rejuvenate the idea of a Europe for all — an idea on which each new generation must make its own mark.
DECLARATION ON CHECHNYA
1. The European Council condemns the intense bombardments of Chechen cities, the threat levelled at the residents of Grozny and the ultimatum set by the Russian military commanders, as well as the treatment of the internally displaced persons as totally unacceptable.
2. The European Council does not question the right of Russia to preserve its territorial integrity nor its right to fight against terrorism. However the fight against terrorism cannot, under any circumstances, warrant the destruction of cities, nor that they be emptied of their inhabitants, nor that a whole population be considered as terrorist.
3. This behaviour is in contradiction with the basic principles of humanitarian law, the commitments of Russia as made within the OSCE and its obligations as a member of the Council of Europe. This war increases the gap between the Chechen people and the rest of Russia, and threatens to destabilise the whole region. Only a political solution can put an end to this crisis. The European Council is deeply concerned at the threat the continuing conflict poses to the stability of the Caucasus region and possible spill-over from the fighting in Chechnya to Georgia and the effects on her territorial integrity.
4. The European Council calls upon the Russian authorities:
- not to carry out the ultimatum against the civilian populations of Grozny;
- to end the bombing and the disproportionate and indiscriminate use of force against the Chechen population;
- to allow for the safe delivery of humanitarian aid and the security of the international relief agencies;
- to start forthwith political dialogue with the elected Chechen authorities.
5. The European Council urged the Chechen authorities to respect the rules and principles of humanitarian law, to condemn terrorism and to aim at the renewal of a political dialogue.
6. The European Council expects Russia to fully honour and implement the commitments made in Istanbul. It pays special attention to the forthcoming visit of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office to the region. The European Council urges Russia to use this visit for a dialogue with the elected leaders of the North Caucasus including Chechnya. A field office of the OSCE Assistance Group in Chechnya should be opened forthwith in Nazran, Ingushetia.
7. In the light of the above, the European Council decides to draw the consequences from this situation:
- for the implementation of the European Union's Common Strategy on Russia, which should be reviewed;
- for the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, some of the provisions of which should be suspended and the trade provisions applied strictly;
- for TACIS, the budgetary authority is asked to consider the transfer of some funds from TACIS to humanitarian assistance. Finance in the budget for 2000 should be limited to priority areas, including human rights, the rule of law, support for civil society and nuclear safety.
It invites the Presidency with the Secretary-General/High Representative to notify this decision and the contents of this declaration urgently at the highest level to the Russian authorities.
It invites the OSCE and the Council of Europe to review, in their field of competence, the modalities of their cooperation with Russia.
8. Russia is a major partner for the European Union. The Union has constantly expressed its willingness to accompany Russia in its transition towards a modern and democratic state. But Russia must live up to its obligations if the strategic partnership is to be developed. The European Union does not want Russia to isolate herself from Europe.
AN EFFECTIVE COUNCIL FOR AN ENLARGED UNION
GUIDELINES FOR REFORM AND OPERATIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS
GUIDELINES FOR REFORM
Reforming the functioning of the Council is an important component of the broader institutional reform process to prepare the Union for enlargement. The scale of the coming enlargements coupled with the wider scope of the Union's action could well slow the Council down, and ultimately even paralyse it. That risk is already perceptible now and represents a threat to the smooth operation of the Union, given the Council's central role in Union decision-making. Hence the need for a comprehensive review of the Council's working methods, as highlighted in the report submitted by the Secretary-General in March 1999 .
The Council must have an overview of all Union policies. For it to do so, there has to be at the heart of the system a single chain of coordination capable of ensuring that Union action is consistent with the will of its political leaders. This chain of command starts in the Member States themselves with effective interdepartmental coordination and arbitration, and extends through COREPER, the General Affairs Council to the European Council. The Council's ability to meet the challenges ahead largely depends on strengthening the effectiveness of this channel — the backbone of the system. Action to preserve the Council's ability to act decisively therefore needs to be taken at all levels.
The European Council must remain an effective forum for policy leadership in providing necessary impetus for the Union's development and defining general political guidelines. It must preserve the flexible way in which it is prepared at present, the restricted format of its meetings and the practical impact of the Presidency conclusions.
The General Affairs Council's central responsibility for general horizontal issues, including overall policy coordination, means that it will have to manage an increasingly complex external and internal agenda, dealing with major multidisciplinary and interpillar dossiers. Effectively handling all aspects of its work by better agenda management and suitable Member State representation is essential if the General Affairs Council is to continue to play its role in ensuring overall coordination and policy consistency, and in preparing European Council meetings.
Given the diversification of the Union's activities and broadening of the areas covered by the Treaties, it is important to prevent fragmentation of the Union's activities and decision-making by limiting the number of Council formations, and by avoiding artificial activities to fill up agendas. This will help focus the Union's action and improve overall policy coordination and consistency by the Council's preparatory bodies.
Efficient legislative practices must be followed. This means ensuring that the correct legislative instruments are used, that texts are drafted in a high quality and legally watertight manner, that the codecision procedure, given its increasing application, operates smoothly and effectively and that the Council's legislative work is more transparent and open to public scrutiny.
While internal coordination in the Member States is, and must remain, the exclusive preserve of each government, effective coordination has a direct bearing on the functioning and coherence of the Council. Therefore Member States have a common and genuine interest in endeavouring to ensure that their internal organisation allows the Council to deliberate more effectively.
Effective Council decision-making requires preparatory work to be undertaken as rationally and cost-effectively as possible while ensuring overall policy consistency. This implies planning all programmable activities, a clear definition of the role of COREPER and Council Working Parties, and improved working methods designed to ensure optimum use of infrastructure and resources. Already now, and all the more so in an enlarged Union, full use must be made of the limited time available in meetings. Without suitable preparation upstream and greater discipline in plenary debates at all levels, discussions risk becoming completely ineffective. At meetings, delegations should be able to react and negotiate on clear options, drafted solutions to known difficulties or clearly identified problems. Therefore it is of the utmost importance that clear and well-structured papers are provided. The Presidency, as part of its particular responsibilities for managing and conducting discussions, should have the means to ensure suitable working methods.
The Presidency must retain overall political responsibility for managing Council business. Over the years its burden has increased substantially, and will continue to do so as the Union enlarges. Optimum use must therefore be made of the various forms of support available, such as the incoming Presidency, the Troïka and the General Secretariat, in order to ease the Presidency's workload. The increasing number of Council members, along with the increase in the Presidency's responsibilities, will also require greater and more upfront support for the Council and the Presidency from the General Secretariat.
Finally, practical issues such as the layout of rooms, translation, interpretation and document production are crucial to the smooth operation of the Council. New imaginative and pragmatic solutions are needed on these issues, while respecting basic principles, if the Council is to continue to operate effectively.
The following operational recommendations will, for the most part, be implemented as soon as possible. Some will require more detailed work before being implemented over the medium-term in connection with enlargement. They are designed to meet the Cologne European Council's call for specific proposals to be made for improving the operation of the Council with a view to enlargement. It is imperative that these recommendations are applied using effective means of enforcement through the Council's rules of procedure  and are coupled with the practical measures already being implemented by the Presidency and the Secretary-General, which must be consolidated over the coming years. The combined impact of these measures should ensure that the Council is properly equipped to welcome new members in the near future with minimum upheaval.
A. THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND THE GENERAL AFFAIRS COUNCIL
1. The European Council's primary purpose must be to continue to provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and define general political guidelines. One means of helping it better fulfil these tasks is to make the Presidency conclusions more concise (maximum 15 pages ) thereby focusing them on the political decisions taken on the items actually discussed at the meeting.
2. The General Affairs Council must be in a position to deal effectively with horizontal internal issues including overall policy coordination. The General Affairs Council agenda shall accordingly be divided into two distinct parts. Member States shall ensure that they are suitably represented at ministerial level at both parts of the session.
3. The General Affairs Council is responsible for the overall coordination of European Council preparatory work.
Role of the Secretary-General/High Representative
4. Subject to the requirement laid down in Article 3 of the TEU for the Council and the Commission to ensure consistency in external relations, and in accordance with their respective responsibilities under the Treaties, the Presidency, the Secretary-General/High Representative and the Commissioner for external relations, will cooperate closely in order to ensure overall continuity and coherence of action by the Union in external relations.
5. The Secretary-General/High Representative shall, in accordance with the Treaties:
6. The Secretary-General/High Representative may receive specified mandates from the Council.
Regular meetings / contacts with third countries
7. Given the increasing administrative burden of organising ministerial level meetings with third countries, in particular under cooperation and association agreements, more effective management of such meetings will be achieved by:
Optimum use of diplomatic networks
8. The Secretary-General/High Representative is invited to draw up a report for the Council examining ways and means of using the networks of Member States' embassies and Commission delegations throughout the world to strengthen implementation of the Union's action and assist him in carrying out his tasks.
C. COUNCIL FORMATIONS
9. In order to improve the coherence and consistency of the Council's work, the number of Council formations shall be reduced to a maximum of 15. The General Affairs Council shall take the necessary steps to achieve this objective as soon as possible by merging certain Council formations, by handling certain matters in other relevant Council formations and by making maximum use of "back to back" arrangements when convening closely-related Council formations.
10. In convening Council sessions, particular attention shall be paid to the management and organisation of the agenda in order to allow Member States to be represented in each Council formation as they deem appropriate on the basis of their own internal organisation. The Presidency shall endeavour to ensure as a rule that each Council formation has a single President.
11. Without prejudice to Article 1(1) of the Council's rules of procedure, Council formations and sessions shall only be convened when a substantive agenda exists (e.g. when policy decisions are to be taken or political orientations are to be given) or when required by objective deadlines. Failure to meet these criteria would imply not convening the Council formation or session in question.
*12. No new formations of the Council may be convened unless the General Affairs Council so decides.
13. Joint sessions of different Council formations shall no longer be convened, save in exceptional circumstances.
14. Each Member State will keep under permanent review its internal coordination arrangements for EU matters so that they are tailored to ensuring the optimum functioning of the Council. On the basis of a contribution from each Member State giving a practical description of internal coordination procedures on EU matters, a summary of coordination systems in the different Member States will be compiled by December 2000.
D. THE COUNCIL'S LEGISLATIVE ROLE
Proper use of legislative instruments and improved drafting quality
*15. Delegations shall ensure that proposed textual amendments are properly drafted, including during the first reading of a text by a Working Party.
*16. The Council shall refrain from adopting resolutions, declarations, or any other non-standard form of act when dealing with legislative matters.
Improved codification procedures
17. In order to speed up work on the codification of legislative texts and increase the amount of legislation available in a codified and more readable form:
Making the co-decision procedure more effective
18. The Presidency shall, as an integral part of its programming, take due account of the requirement to schedule conciliation and preparatory meetings, bearing in mind the deadlines applicable for codecision procedures. Contacts with the European Parliament at the first and second reading stages must be undertaken with the aim of bringing the procedure to a successful conclusion as swiftly as possible.
19. The Presidency and the General Secretariat are invited to propose by the end of 2000 further changes in the Council's working methods in dealing with codecided acts in the light of experience acquired in implementing the Joint Declaration of 4 May 1999.
E. INFORMAL MINISTERIAL MEETINGS
20. Informal meetings of Ministers are designed to permit as free as possible an exchange of views on topics of general scope. They are not Council sessions and cannot replace the Council's normal activities. Such meetings are subject to the following rules:
21. Given that COREPER has responsibility for the final preparation and presentation of all agenda items to the Council , it shall be responsible for assembling all preparatory work undertaken by different vertical bodies for both multidisciplinary and interpillar dossiers. In order to carry out effectively this role:
*22. Preparatory work by COREPER for a legislative item on the Council agenda must be completed by the end of the week preceding the week prior to the Council. Failure to do so will, as a general rule, result in such items automatically being removed from the Council agenda unless considerations of urgency require otherwise.
*23. For any dossiers where substantive preparation is undertaken in other fora, COREPER must in any case be in a position to verify that the following principles and rules are respected:
24. Ad hoc meetings of COREPER may be convened by the Presidency at short notice in order to discuss specific urgent matters.
G. THE COUNCIL PRESIDENCY
*25. The incoming Presidency shall assist the Presidency, while preserving fully the Presidency's powers and overall political responsibility for managing Council business in conformity with the Treaties and the Council's rules of procedure. The incoming Presidency, acting under the Presidency's instructions, shall replace the Presidency as and when required, relieve the Presidency, when needed, of some of its administrative burden and enhance continuity of work in the Council. The Presidency and the incoming Presidency will take all the necessary steps to ensure a smooth transition from one Presidency to the next.
Access to documents
*26. Procedures for public access to Council documents should be streamlined and automated as far as possible using modern technology, including the Internet, without prejudice to general principles governing the right of access to documents to be decided in accordance with Article 255 of the Treaty.
Greater openness by the Council when acting in a legislative capacity.
*27. The General Affairs and ECOFIN Councils shall each hold a public debate every six months on the Presidency's work programme.
*28. At least one public Council debate should be held on important legislative proposals. COREPER shall decide on public debates by qualified majority.
29. In order to ensure more interesting public debates, discussion shall be organised as follows:
I. INFORMATION POLICY
30. The European Parliament, the Council and the Commission are urged to take steps to pool as far as possible efforts to provide coordinated general information about the Union, in particular by optimising use of existing resources; in this context, it might be useful to examine the feasibility of setting up in Brussels a joint European Parliament, Council and Commission information centre for receiving visitors to the institutions and coordinating publications on EU matters for the general public.
31. The Commission is invited to study the general question of the Union's information policy, including improving coordination with its information offices in the Member States and links with national information offices.
J. ORGANISATION AND CONDUCT OF MEETINGS
Programming of Council work
32. Each Presidency shall, in cooperation with the Commission, the General Secretariat and the future Presidency, programme all legislative activities as well as all other aspects of the Council's work not dependent on the latest political developments.
*33. Seven months before the beginning of each Presidency, the incoming President of the Council shall make known the dates envisaged for all Council sessions where it is clear that legislative work needs to be undertaken or operational policy decisions need to be made. The final Presidency programme may provide for additional Council sessions, provided they are warranted for operational reasons. If a programmed session proves to be no longer warranted, it shall be cancelled.
*34. The Presidency programme, in the form of indicative Council provisional agendas indicating operational decisions and legislative work, shall be finalised at the latest one week before the beginning of the Presidency.
35. When deemed useful, the Presidency may invite delegations to submit preliminary comments and positions in writing by a specified deadline before the Working Party begins its work on a new proposal. On the basis of the written contributions, a working paper will be produced setting out in an ordered way the main issues arising in order to guide and structure the initial debate in the Working Party.
37. The Council and COREPER shall refrain from setting up new high level working parties.
*38. All Working Party meetings preparing a legislative item for COREPER must complete their work at least 5 working days prior to the COREPER meeting in question. Failure to do so will, as a general rule, result in the item automatically being postponed to the following COREPER meeting, unless considerations of urgency require otherwise.
Agendas and documents
39. Without prejudice to Article 2 of the Council's rules of procedure, the Presidency and Secretariat shall ensure that items are only proposed for inclusion on Council provisional agendas when decisions or political guidance are necessary.
40. Council discussions shall be based on clear guidelines, options or suggested solutions prepared by COREPER for the key issues under examination.
Conduct of meetings
41. Council and COREPER discussions shall focus on reacting to options or solutions presented in the Presidency or Secretariat paper. Well-known arguments or positions should be developed in written statements.
42. Full table rounds shall be proscribed in principle; they may only be used in exceptional circumstances on specific questions, with a time limit on interventions set by the Presidency.
43. Where a good prospect exists of proposing a compromise for resubmission the same day, the Presidency shall convene a working party in the margins of COREPER or Council meetings. If a compromise emerges in the course of a Council or COREPER debate, the agreed decision shall be framed in parallel with the meeting.
*44. Decisions may only be taken in formal sessions of the Council. The General Secretariat shall verify that a quorum exists for a decision to be taken. The Presidency shall provide for more restricted and super-restricted sessions during formal meetings (which include Ministerial conclaves) in order to discuss politically sensitive or classified subjects, instead of dealing with such matters over lunch.
*45. The Presidency may, inter alia:
K. THE GENERAL SECRETARIAT AND THE PRACTICAL FRAMEWORK
Role of the General Secretariat
46. The General Secretariat's supporting role as advisor to the Council and the Presidency shall be strengthened by being continually and closely associated in programming, coordinating and ensuring the coherence of the Council's work. In particular, it is encouraged to play a more active role, under the Presidency's responsibility and guidance, in assisting it in its "good offices" function and searching for compromise solutions.
47. Documents issued by the General Secretariat and used as a basis for negotiations in the Council and its preparatory bodies must be concise and set out clearly the issues to be decided including, where appropriate, options or avenues for compromise. Lengthy records of meetings describing delegations' positions should be avoided.
*48. The Secretary-General/High Representative shall have full responsibility for managing the Council budget.
Organisation of the General Secretariat
49. The Secretary-General/High Representative is invited to take steps to adapt the General Secretariat rapidly to the changing requirements of the Council, in particular by:
50. The Secretary-General/High Representative is urged to review the Council's and the General Secretariat's working methods in order to improve efficiency by making optimum use of modern technology, including improved use of data processing and electronic means, adapting procedures and the document production and transmission circuit and targeting staff training at the needs of modernisation.
Material aspects of the Council's work
51. The Secretary-General/High Representative is invited to undertake a detailed examination of the technical and methodological means available for increasing the translating and interpreting capability at the disposal of the Council.
52. In the light of the above study, an examination should be undertaken to see how, at the preparatory level, the necessary efficiency of the Council can be ensured while respecting the provisions on the principles of equality of and non-discrimination among the Union's official languages .
Building requirements and configuration of meeting rooms
53. While keeping the Council duly informed, the Secretary-General/High Representative shall have full responsibility for evaluating the building requirements for a substantially enlarged Council and how these requirements can be satisfied, so that detailed proposals can be made to the Council in due course in the light of that evaluation.
54. In order to allow effective deliberations and negotiations after enlargement, it will be essential to reduce numbers present in meeting rooms and at the main table. For meetings of the European Council, each delegation shall have no more than two seats at the table. For meetings of Council preparatory bodies (Committees and Working Parties), each delegation shall have one seat at the table, unless stipulated otherwise. The Secretary-General/High Representative is requested to study the appropriate configuration of meeting rooms for Council sessions and make appropriate proposals. This study shall take account of the various constraints linked to work in different Council formations.
55. The Secretary-General/High Representative shall evaluate implementation of these recommendations and, if appropriate, make further practical suggestions by July 2001 for improving the Council's working methods.
PRESIDENCY REPORTS TO THE HELSINKI EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON "STRENGTHENING THE COMMON EUROPEAN POLICY ON SECURITY AND DEFENCE" AND ON "NON-MILITARY CRISIS MANAGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION"
The Presidency has responded as a matter of priority to the mandate given by the Cologne European Council to strengthen the common European policy on security and defence by taking the work forward in military and non-military aspects of crisis management. The work has been based on the provisions of the Treaty on European Union and the guiding principles agreed at Cologne, which have been reaffirmed by the Member States.
Work has yielded two separate progress reports to the European Council, which are intended to be complementary. The reports propose concrete measures and provide guidance for further work to take the necessary decisions by the end of the year 2000 towards the objectives set at Cologne. During the Portuguese Presidency, consideration will be given as to whether or not Treaty amendment is judged necessary.
To assume their responsibilities across the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the EU Treaty, the Petersberg tasks, the Member States have decided to develop more effective military capabilities and establish new political and military structures for these tasks. In this connection, the objective is for the Union to have an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and then to conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises.
Also in order to assume these responsibilities, the Union will improve and make more effective use of resources in civilian crisis management in which the Union and the Members States already have considerable experience. Special attention will be given to a rapid reaction capability.
All these measures will be taken in support of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and they will reinforce and extend the Union's comprehensive external role. With the enhancement and concertation of military and civilian crisis response tools, the Union will be able to resort to the whole range of instruments from diplomatic activity, humanitarian assistance and economic measures to civilian policing and military crisis management operations.
NATO remains the foundation of the collective defence of its members, and will continue to have an important role in crisis management.
The development of the common European policy on security and defence will take place without prejudice to the commitments under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the Brussels Treaty, which will be preserved for the Member States party to these Treaties. Nor shall the development of the common European policy on security and defence prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.
Further steps will be taken to ensure full mutual consultation, cooperation and transparency between the EU and NATO.
The Union will contribute to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The Union recognises the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. Following up the principles and objectives of the OSCE Charter for European Security, the Union will cooperate with the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe and other international organisations in a mutually reinforcing manner in stability promotion, early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction.
ANNEX 1 to ANNEX IV
PRESIDENCY PROGRESS REPORT TO THE HELSINKI EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON STRENGTHENING THE COMMON EUROPEAN POLICY ON SECURITY AND DEFENCE
Recalling the guiding principles agreed at Cologne, the European Union should be able to assume its responsibilities for the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the EU Treaty, the Petersberg tasks.
The European Union should have the autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and then to conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises in support of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The action by the Union will be conducted in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter and the principles and objectives of the OSCE Charter for European Security. The Union recognises the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.
For this purpose, the following has been agreed:
A common European headline goal will be adopted for readily deployable military capabilities and collective capability goals in the fields of command and control, intelligence and strategic transport will be developed rapidly, to be achieved through voluntary co-ordinated national and multinational efforts, for carrying out the full range of Petersberg tasks.
New political and military bodies will be established within the Council to enable the Union to take decisions on EU-led Petersberg operations and to ensure, under the authority of the Council, the necessary political control and strategic direction of such operations.
Principles for cooperation with non-EU European NATO members and other European partners in EU-led military crisis management will be agreed, without prejudice to the Union's decision-making autonomy.
Determination to carry out Petersberg tasks will require Member States to improve national and multinational military capabilities, which will at the same time, as appropriate, strengthen the capabilities of NATO and enhance the effectiveness of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in promoting European security.
In presenting this report, the Presidency has taken note of the fact that Denmark has recalled Protocol no 5 to the Amsterdam Treaty on the position of Denmark.
Military capabilities for Petersberg tasks
Member States recall their commitment made at Cologne and their determination to give the EU appropriate capabilities, without unnecessary duplication, to be able to undertake the full range of Petersberg tasks in support of the CFSP. Such capabilities will enable them to conduct effective EU-led operations as well as playing, for those involved, their full role in NATO and NATO-led operations. More effective European military capabilities will be developed on the basis of the existing national, bi-national and multinational capabilities, which will be assembled for EU-led crisis management operations carried out with or without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. Particular attention will be devoted to the capabilities necessary to ensure effective performance in crisis management: deployability, sustainability, interoperability, flexibility, mobility, survivability and command and control, taking account of the results of the WEU audit of assets and capabilities and their implications for EU-led operations.
To develop European capabilities, Member States have set themselves the headline goal: by the year 2003, cooperating together voluntarily, they will be able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty, including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000-60,000 persons). These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements. Member States should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days, and within this to provide smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at very high readiness. They must be able to sustain such a deployment for at least one year. This will require an additional pool of deployable units (and supporting elements) at lower readiness to provide replacements for the initial forces.
Member States have also decided to develop rapidly collective capability goals in the fields of command and control, intelligence and strategic transport, areas also identified by the WEU audit. They welcome in this respect decisions already announced by certain Member States which go in that direction:
The General Affairs Council, with the participation of Defence Ministers, will elaborate the headline and capability goals. It will develop a method of consultation through which these goals can be met and maintained, and through which national contributions reflecting Member States’ political will and commitment towards these goals can be defined by each Member State, with a regular review of progress made. In addition, Member States would use existing defence planning procedures, including, as appropriate, those available in NATO and the Planning and Review Process (PARP) of the PfP. These objectives and those arising, for those countries concerned, from NATO’s Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) will be mutually reinforcing.
The European NATO members who are not EU Member States, and other countries who are candidates for accession to the European Union will be invited to contribute to this improvement of European military capabilities. This will enhance the effectiveness of EU-led military operations and will, for those countries concerned, contribute directly to the effectiveness and vitality of the European pillar of the NATO.
Member States welcome the recent progress made towards the restructuring of European defence industries, which constitutes an important step forward. This contributes to strengthening the European industrial and technological defence base. Such developments call for increased efforts to seek further progress in the harmonisation of military requirements and the planning and procurement of arms, as Member States consider appropriate.
The Council decides upon policy relevant to Union involvement in all phases and aspects of crisis management, including decisions to carry out Petersberg tasks in accordance with Article 23 of the EU Treaty. Taken within the single institutional framework, decisions will respect European Community competences and ensure inter-pillar coherence in conformity with Article 3 of the EU Treaty.
All Member States are entitled to participate fully and on an equal footing in all decisions and deliberations of the Council and Council bodies on EU-led operations. The commitment of national assets by Member States to such operations will be based on their sovereign decision. Member States will participate in the ad hoc committee of contributors in accordance with the conditions provided for by paragraph 24.
Defence Ministers will be involved in the common European security and defence policy (CESDP); when the General Affairs Council discusses matters related to the CESDP, Defence Ministers as appropriate will participate to provide guidance on defence matters.
The following new permanent political and military bodies will be established within the Council:
As an interim measure, the following bodies will be set up within the Council as of March 2000:
The Secretary General/High Representative (SG/HR), in assisting the Council, has a key contribution to make to the efficiency and consistency of the CFSP and the development of the common security and defence policy. In conformity with the EU Treaty, the SG/HR will contribute to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions.
In the interim period, the SH/HR, Secretary General of the WEU, should make full use of WEU assets for the purpose of advising the Council under Article 17 of the EU Treaty.
Consultation and cooperation with non-EU countries and with NATO
The Union will ensure the necessary dialogue, consultation and cooperation with NATO and its non-EU members, other countries who are candidates for accession to the EU as well as other prospective partners in EU-led crisis management, with full respect for the decision-making autonomy of the EU and the single institutional framework of the Union.
With European NATO members who are not members of the EU and other countries who are candidates for accession to the EU, appropriate structures will be established for dialogue and information on issues related to security and defence policy and crisis management. In the event of a crisis, these structures will serve for consultation in the period leading up to a decision of the Council.
Upon a decision by the Council to launch an operation, the non-EU European NATO members will participate if they so wish, in the event of an operation requiring recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. They will, on a decision by the Council, be invited to take part in operations where the EU does not use NATO assets.
Other countries who are candidates for accession to the EU may also be invited by the Council to take part in EU-led operations once the Council has decided to launch such an operation.
Russia, Ukraine and other European States engaged in political dialogue with the Union and other interested States may be invited to take part in the EU-led operations.
All the States that have confirmed their participation in an EU-led operation by deploying significant military forces will have the same rights and obligations as the EU participating Member States in the day-to-day conduct of such an operation.
In the case of an EU-led operation, an ad-hoc committee of contributors will be set up for the day-to-day conduct of the operation. All EU Member States are entitled to attend the ad-hoc committee, whether or not they are participating in the operation, while only contributing States will take part in the day-to-day conduct of the operation.
The decision to end an operation will be taken by the Council after consultation between the participating states within the committee of contributors.
Modalities for full consultation, cooperation and transparency between the EU and NATO will be developed. Initially, relations will be developed on an informal basis, through contacts between the SG/HR for CFSP and the Secretary General of NATO.
Follow-up for the Portuguese Presidency
The Portuguese Presidency is invited, together with the Secretary General/High Representative, to carry forward the work within the General Affairs Council on strengthening the common European security and defence policy. The Portuguese Presidency is also invited to report to the European Council in Feira on the progress made, including:
ANNEX 2 to ANNEX IV
Presidency Report on Non-Military Crisis Management of the European Union
The Presidency was mandated by the European Council in Cologne to continue the work on all aspects of security including the enhancement and better coordination of the Union's and the Member States' non-military crisis response tools. Developments inter alia in Kosovo have for their part underlined the importance of this task. To this end, a thorough discussion has been carried out within the Council instances.
Work listing all available resources of the Member States and the Union has been initiated and has led to inventories of the tools available to the Union and to Member States, which are contained respectively in doc. 11044/99 REV 1 for the Union and in doc. 12323/99 for the Member States.
The inventories which have been drawn up clearly show that Member States, the Union, or both have accumulated considerable experience or have considerable resources in a number of areas such as civilian police, humanitarian assistance, administrative and legal rehabilitation, search and rescue, electoral and human rights monitoring, etc. This inventory should be pursued further. Regular updating will be necessary to better identify lacunae as well as strongpoints.
In order to be able to respond more rapidly and more effectively to emerging crisis situations, the Union needs to strengthen the responsiveness and efficiency of its resources and tools, as well as their synergy.
It is therefore appropriate to draw up an Action Plan which would show the way ahead and indicate the steps the Union has to undertake to develop a rapid reaction capability in the field of crisis management using non-military instruments.
A. The Union should aim at:
B. To that end:
Member States and the Union should develop a rapid reaction capability by defining a framework and modalities, as well as by pre-identifying personnel, material and financial resources that could be used in response to a request of a lead agency like the UN or the OSCE, or, where appropriate, in autonomous EU actions.
An inventory of national and collective resources should be pursued to give an overview of resources that could be marshalled within such a rapid reaction framework. In this process Member States and the EU institutions could, if they wish, highlight sectors in which they find that they have acknowledged expertise.
A database should be set up to maintain and share information on the pre-identified assets, capabilities and expertise within all areas relevant to non-military crisis management. The availability and quality of these assets would need to be clearly defined.
A study should be carried out, taking into account lessons learned, to define concrete targets for EU Member States' collective non-military response to international crises (e.g. the ability to deploy at short notice and sustain for a defined period a set number of civilian police as a contribution to civpol missions; to deploy a combined search and rescue capability of up to 200 people within twenty-four hours). This work should be taken forward by the Portuguese Presidency together with the SG/HR.
The inventory, the database project and the study should help identify areas of relative strength and weakness and could promote improved training standards, sharing of experience and best practice, as well as bilateral or multilateral projects between Member States (e.g. 'pairing' one Member State's helicopter lift with a specialist medical team from another).
A coordinating mechanism, fully interacting with the Commission services, should be set up at the Council Secretariat. It would run the database project and the different capabilities initiatives. In particular crises, depending on the EU's role, it may set up an ad hoc centre to coordinate the effectiveness of EU Member States' contributions. This should be a lean, efficient, non-bureaucratic structure permitting close interaction with the Commission (ECHO in particular).
In establishing a rapid reaction capability urgent consideration will be given to developing civil police capabilities.
Rapid financing mechanisms such as the creation by the Commission of a Rapid Reaction Fund should be set up to allow the acceleration of the provision of finance to support EU activities, to contribute to operations run by other international organisations and to fund NGO activities, as appropriate.
DECISION-MAKING AND IMPLEMENTATION
The Union should develop a comprehensive approach with a view to marshalling national and collective non-military instruments within the time limits called for by the situation on the ground.
For the coordination of civilian crisis management tools, the co-ordinating mechanism for a civilian crisis management will be established. This mechanism, which will be of inter-pillar nature, will provide expert advice in support of the management of crises. Decision-making and implementation of non-military crisis management tools under the first pillar will remain subject to institutions and procedures of the EC Treaty.
As an interim practice, this work to develop the co-ordinating mechanism for civilian crisis management may draw on experts from the Member States.
If appropriate, the Union will lay down general guidelines ensuring inter-pillar coherence and setting out the means which should be made available. Arrangements for rapid financing mechanisms for a prompt response to crisis situations could be devised in this context.
EUROPEAN COUNCIL COMMON STRATEGY 1999/ /CFSP of on Ukraine
THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, in particular Article 13(2) thereof,
Whereas the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation (PCA) between the European Communities, their Member States and Ukraine entered into force on 1 March 1998,
HAS ADOPTED THIS COMMON STRATEGY:
VISION OF THE EU FOR ITS PARTNERSHIP WITH UKRAINE
1. The strategic partnership between the European Union (EU) and Ukraine, based on shared values and common interests, is a vital factor enhancing peace, stability and prosperity in Europe. The freedom, independence and stability of Ukraine rank among the greatest achievements in the new Europe rid of old dividing lines. Geography as well as size, the resources of its population as well as its location along the North-South and East-West axes give Ukraine a unique position in Europe and makes it a determinant regional actor.
2. Ukraine enjoys today excellent relations with all its neighbours and has taken important steps in nation-building and towards consolidating its democracy. The fact that Ukraine has since independence been a source of regional stability, despite its domestic difficulties and diversities, is a laudable achievement. The EU welcomes the close involvement of Ukraine in the stabilisation of its region and encourages the strengthening of Ukraine's role in regional cooperation fora. The EU also welcomes Ukraine's commitment to nuclear disarmament as well as its cooperation in the maintenance of European and international peace and security, namely through the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations.
3. The strategic partnership between the EU and Ukraine has been continuously reinforced since the independence of Ukraine. In this context, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement is a significant achievement. Ukraine was the first of the Newly Independent States to sign such an agreement, thus marking the EU's and Ukraine's wish to strengthen cooperation. Through macro-financial assistance, the Tacis-programme, as well as through bilateral programmes, valuable support is provided by the EU to help Ukraine in her transition and reform process.
4. Following the current enlargement process, some future EU Member States will share an external border with Ukraine. The enlargement of the Union will further enhance economic dynamism and political stability in the region, thus increasing the possibilities for cooperation with Ukraine.
5. The European Union has the following strategic goals with regard to Ukraine:
6. The EU acknowledges Ukraine's European aspirations and welcomes Ukraine's pro-European choice. The EU remains firmly committed to working with Ukraine at national, regional and local levels, in order to support a successful political and economic transformation in Ukraine, which will facilitate Ukraine's further rapprochement with the EU. The EU and its Member States offer to share with Ukraine their various experiences in building modern political, economic, social and administrative structures, fully recognising that the main responsibility for Ukraine's future lies with Ukraine itself.
7. The European Council therefore adopts this Common Strategy to strengthen the strategic partnership between the EU and Ukraine. The European Council recognises that a successful, stable and secure Ukraine is in the best of interests of the EU. The legal basis of the relationship between the EU and Ukraine is the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). The full implementation of this agreement is a prerequisite for Ukraine's successful integration into the European economy and will also help Ukraine assert its European identity.
8. The EU and its Member States will develop the coordination, coherence and complementarity of all aspects of their policy towards Ukraine. The Union, the Community and its Member States will also work together with and within regional and international organisations as well as with like-minded partners to meet the objectives set out in the PCA and this Common Strategy. The positions taken by the Community and its Member States in all relevant fora will conform to this Common Strategy. The European Council invites Ukraine to work with the EU on the basis of this Common Strategy to the benefit of both.
The European Council has identified the following principal objectives:
I. Support for the democratic and economic transition process in Ukraine
II. Ensuring stability and security and meeting common challenges on the European continent
III. Support for strengthened cooperation between the EU and Ukraine within the context of EU enlargement
I. Support for the democratic and economic transition process in Ukraine
The EU and Ukraine have a common interest in accelerating the democratic and economic transition process in Ukraine. The successful transformation in Ukraine will bring prosperity not only to Ukraine but to the entire region. In order for this transition process to be successful, reforms must take place to consolidate democracy and the rule of law as well as economic and social reform in view of establishing a functioning market economy.
The EU proposes to strengthen cooperation with Ukraine in the following priority areas:
I.i. The consolidation of democracy, the rule of law and public institutions in Ukraine.
9. The EU welcomes Ukraine's achievements in laying the foundations of a democratic system namely in establishing a multiparty system and adopting a parliamentary constitution. The EU acknowledges Ukraine's achievements in maintaining its unity despite the country's diverse make up.
10. The EU supports Ukraine in all its efforts aiming at the consolidation of democracy and good governance, human rights and the rule of law. The Union considers that the rule of law is a prerequisite for the development of a functioning market economy which offers opportunities and benefits to all the citizens of Ukraine. The EU supports Ukraine's efforts to reform the legal system in the framework of the PCA. A properly functioning independent judiciary, a professional police-force, the development of a meritocratic, well-trained public administration at national, regional and local levels are all key elements in the effective implementation of government decisions. The EU encourages Ukraine's efforts to develop the efficiency, transparency and democratic character of its public institutions, including the development of free media. These are prerequisites for economic and social development and contribute to the building of a modern civil society.
11. The EU attaches importance to the development of civil society and a competitive, investor friendly business environment in Ukraine and encourages closer links between the peoples and non governmental organisations of the Union and Ukraine. The EU welcomes Ukraine's agreement of a Memorandum of Understanding with the OSCE and strongly recommends Ukraine to work in close cooperation with the OSCE project-coordinator in Ukraine. The EU supports Ukraine's efforts aiming at the protection and promotion of rights of minorities and calls upon Ukraine to continue its good work in this domain, including in cooperation with the High Commissioner for National Minorities.
12. The EU attaches particular importance to close cooperation with Ukraine in the framework of the Council of Europe and the OSCE. In this context, the EU urges Ukraine to fulfil its commitments and to adapt its legislation to meet the norms and standards of the Council of Europe, in particular the obligations to which Ukraine signed up on its accession to the Council of Europe in 1995. The EU takes note of the findings of the OSCE/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) election monitoring mission on the conduct of the 1999 presidential elections in Ukraine, to the effect that the conduct of these elections failed to meet a number of OSCE commitments and calls on Ukraine to heed the recommendations made by the OSCE monitoring mission in its report with a view to future elections.
I.ii. Support for the economic transition process in Ukraine
13. The EU is committed to supporting Ukraine's efforts in establishing an environment that is conducive to economic activity and will support Ukraine in its economic and social reforms.
14. The EU encourages Ukraine to establish macro-economic policies aiming at price stability, sound public finances and a sustainable current account position. In order to proceed further to price stability it is important that the central bank is allowed to operate independently of political interference. Existing prudential regulations for financial sector supervision need to be strengthened. Tax collection must be improved, and ad hoc tax amnesties and tax exemptions for specific sectors of the economy should be avoided.
15. The EU strongly encourages Ukraine to intensify its efforts to build a functioning market economy through greater structural, economic and administrative reforms in the context of a comprehensive reform programme agreed with the International Monetary Fund. This should include establishing and enforcing clear property rights, further privatisation, further liberalisation of prices, the raising of communal tariffs for energy, water and rents to full cost recovery levels, restructuring of business, and encouraging the growth of small and medium size enterprises. The overall pace of these reforms needs to be accelerated. As far as sectoral reform is concerned, the agriculture, energy and transport sectors deserve particular attention.
16. The introduction of a land reform process is required to facilitate, inter alia, the long term lease of land as collateral for loans, paving the way for more investment in the agriculture sector.
17. Attracting and protecting domestic and foreign investment also plays a key role in Ukraine's development. In this context, the EU notes that allegations of corruption and poor governance are damaging to Ukraine's economic reputation. The Union will support Ukraine in developing and adopting the economic policies needed to increase domestic and foreign investment and to meet the requirements of international lenders.
18. In view of Ukraine's heavy debt service obligations, Ukraine's economic recovery will require the continued involvement of private creditors. Collaborative solutions to Ukraine's debt service problems must be found.
19. The EU is fully aware of the fact that Ukraine's economic reforms sometimes have to be pursued in a difficult external environment. EU macro-financial assistance would be pursued as appropriate, in accordance with established criteria and procedures, aiming at supporting macro-economic stabilisation and comprehensive structural reform, consistent with programmes of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The EU will continue to stand ready to support economic reforms in Ukraine in those circumstances. EU macro-financial assistance helps Ukraine to open up its economy, improve economic adjustment, enhance competition, and further integrate the Ukrainian economy into the European and global economy.
20. The EU will support Ukraine through the promotion of progressive approximation of legislation towards that of the EU, especially in such areas as competition policy, standards and certification, intellectual property rights, data protection, customs procedures and environment.
21. In implementing a programme that establishes a functioning market economy, a well targeted social security system must be put in place, so that the social aspects of the transition to a market economy are taken into account.
II. Ensuring stability and security and meeting common challenges on the European continent
The EU and Ukraine have a common interest in the maintenance of stability and security in a free and democratic Europe. The geopolitical situation of Ukraine, situated along the North-South and East-West axes gives Ukraine a unique position in Europe. The EU recognises Ukraine's regional importance. In this context, the EU proposes to strengthen cooperation with Ukraine paying particular attention to nuclear safety and to the strengthening of political dialogue, as provided for in the framework of the PCA, with a view of making it more coherent and operational.
The EU wishes to deepen cooperation with Ukraine in order to find effective responses to common challenges facing the continent on the following issues:
II.i. Cooperation to strengthen stability and security in Europe
22. The EU supports Ukraine's efforts to promote cooperation and stability in its region, including in the context of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organisation, the Council of Baltic Sea States and Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldovo. The EU welcomes the positive development of Ukraine's relationship with all its neighbours and believes it has an interest in those relationships remaining strong and stable. The EU also notes Ukraine's contribution to European stability through its role as an observer to the Stability Pact for South-East Europe.
23. The EU and Ukraine share a common interest in the maintenance of stability and security in a free and democratic Europe. Strengthened mechanisms for consultations between the EU and Ukraine in the framework of the PCA, Council of Europe and United Nations, and strong cooperation between the OSCE and Ukraine, are needed to respond jointly and effectively to European and global security challenges.
24. The EU congratulates Ukraine on its election to the United Nations Security Council (2000/1). This fact reinforces the need for the EU further to deepen and broaden its political dialogue with Ukraine at official and ministerial level, bilaterally and through EU mechanisms. The adoption of the European Security Charter will enhance the cooperation between the Member States of the OSCE.
25. The EU promotes and supports the dialogue on general and specific issues relating to crisis management and security building as developed over the past years between the Western European Union and Ukraine as well as the intensification of practical cooperation in this field, in particular through the implementation of the action plan recently drawn up between the Western European Union and Ukraine.
26. The EU is also interested in strengthening cooperation with Ukraine in the field of export-controls and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles, and encourages Ukraine to fulfil its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention.
27. Moreover, the EU encourages Ukraine to achieve the goals of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction. The EU also encourages Ukraine to develop a strategy to combat the destabilising accumulation and the spread of small arms and light weapons.
II.ii. Cooperation in the field of environment, energy and nuclear safety
28. The EU will seek to enhance European stability and work with Ukraine in the fields of energy and nuclear safety, by supporting a comprehensive energy sector reform, inter alia, by continued cooperation with Ukraine on the implementation of the financial Recovery Plan for the energy sector, including price liberalisation, improved cash collection and privatisation of distribution companies. In this context, the EU will promote the efficient and environmentally responsible use of energy in Ukraine and the strengthening of new energy institutions and authorities and their policy-making capacity.
29. Nuclear safety and the decommissioning of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant are a priority in EU-Ukraine relations. The EU encourages the development of an independent nuclear regulatory authority in Ukraine and urges Ukraine to stand by its commitment to implement the G7/Ukraine Memorandum of Understanding of 1995 on the closure of Chernobyl. In return, the EU will support Ukraine in financing replacement energy generating capacity in Ukraine.
30. The EU is also interested in enhancing cooperation with Ukraine on such issues as radiation protection, waste management, decontamination and dismantling of nuclear installations, and studies in the field of fusion technology. The recently signed cooperation agreements in the fields of nuclear safety and thermonuclear fusion between EURATOM and Ukraine will facilitate this cooperation.
31. Moreover, the EU encourages Ukraine to take resolute measures in the field of environmental protection. The protection of public health against pollution of drinking water, air and soil, and the sustainable and responsible use of natural resources as well as the limitation of transboundary pollution of air and water are priorities in this area.
III. Support for strengthened cooperation between the EU and Ukraine within the context of EU enlargement
Following the current enlargement process, some future EU Member States will share an external border with Ukraine. The EU wishes to contribute to the mutual benefit of the Union and Ukraine in this process. In this context, the EU proposes strengthened cooperation with Ukraine, paying particular attention to cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs. The EU also encourages Ukraine's participation in regional, European and world structures.
The EU could strengthen cooperation with Ukraine in the following fields:
III.i. Support for Ukraine's integration into European and world economy
32. The Union supports Ukraine and urges it to redouble its efforts to meet the requirements of World Trade Organisation membership. The Union encourages Ukraine to take full advantage of the possibilities offered by the PCA to facilitate two-way trade and investment. The Union will also examine the circumstances which might, in addition to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) accession, allow for the future establishment of an EU-Ukraine Free Trade Area, as foreseen in the PCA.
33. In order to facilitate a favourable investment climate in Ukraine, the EU encourages Ukraine to negotiate and ratify further bilateral investment protection agreements with EU Member States so as to stimulate foreign direct investment. The EU also encourages local, regional and national Ukrainian authorities to avail themselves of the opportunities of the new law on public concession to attract investment in public infrastructure and services.
III.ii. Cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs
34. The EU and Ukraine have a common interest in developing cooperation to combat illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings. The EU and Ukraine also have a common interest in developing their cooperation in the area of border security and the fight against the common scourges of organised crime, including money laundering and illegal trafficking in weapons and drugs.
35. In view of the current EU enlargement process, the EU will seek to intensify dialogue with Ukraine on the adjustment of Ukraine's visa policy with the EU through the introduction of visa requirements in accordance with EC provisions and introduction of travel documents which are sufficiently non-forgeable.
III.iii. Regional and cross-border cooperation with neighbouring countries
36. The EU encourages the development and strengthening of regional and cross-border cooperation initiatives involving Ukraine and its neighbouring countries. In this context, the EU will put increased emphasis on border management issues.
37. As to the development of infrastructure networks, especially in the fields of transport, telecommunications, electricity and energy-pipelines, the EU, through TACIS, pays particular attention to regional initiatives, such as INOGATE (Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe) and TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Central Asia), with the aim of improving economic cooperation in the region. The EU will explore the scope for working towards linking the Ukrainian transportation systems (road and rail) with the Trans-European networks. and will seek mutually satisfactory ways to address transport issues. In so doing so, special care will be taken to reinforce coordination with other donors and with international financial institutions, as well as to stimulate the involvement of the private sector, which will be crucial to the success of this endeavour.
INSTRUMENTS AND MEANS
38. This Common Strategy shall be implemented in accordance with the applicable procedures of the Treaties. The Council and the Commission shall in accordance with Articles 3 and 13 of the Treaty on European Union ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of the Union's actions in implementing this Common Strategy.
39. The EU will contribute to the cited objectives of this Common Strategy by making appropriate use of all relevant instruments and means available to the Union, the Community and to the Member States.
40. In accordance with Articles 18 and 26 of the Treaty on European Union, the Secretary-General of the Council, High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), in the framework of his obligations under the Treaties, shall assist the Council and the Presidency in implementing this Common Strategy with regard to those objectives and initiatives falling under the CFSP. The Commission shall be fully associated in accordance with Articles 18 and 27 of the Treaty on European Union.
The Council, the Commission and Member States
41. The Council, the Commission and Member States shall:
42. Member States shall make additional efforts to coordinate their actions vis-à-vis Ukraine, including in regional and international organisations such as the Council of Europe, the UN, the OSCE, the OECD and the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), and including coordination with the Community where it has competencies.
43. Coordination between the Member States and the Commission shall also be consolidated, including through regular consultations between their respective representatives in Ukraine.
44. The Council, the Commission and Member States shall work towards more effective cooperation with regional and international organisations, and will seek with other like-minded countries to achieve the objectives of the Strategy.
45. The European Union will invite the candidate countries in the accession process launched in the Luxembourg European Council in December 1997 to associate themselves within the framework of this Common Strategy.
Implementation and review
46. The Council shall:
47. The Commission will contribute to the above within its powers.
Cooperation with Ukraine
48. The EU and its Member States will work closely together with Ukraine to implement this Common Strategy, in particular through the PCA and its institutions.
49. The EU shall pursue the specific initiatives set out in Part III of this Common Strategy which are based on the principal objectives identified in Part II. These initiatives shall be adapted when necessary and do not preclude possible new initiatives during the duration of this Common Strategy. The Council, the Commission and the Member States shall, in accordance with their respective powers and capacities, support and work towards the achievement of these specific initiatives.
The following specific initiatives shall be pursued not precluding possible new initiatives:
The consolidation of democracy, the rule of law and public institutions in Ukraine
50. The EU will undertake efforts to foster democracy, good governance, human rights and the rule of law in Ukraine, by:
Support of the economic transition process in Ukraine
51. The EU will help Ukraine advance the process of economic reform by enhancing the impact of economic policy advice, including through appropriate high-level dialogue, in the framework of the PCA, so as to promote the development of a modern, liberal market economy.
52. The EU stands ready to provide technical assistance in support of Ukraine's economic and social reform process provided that Ukraine takes steps designed to establish the necessary conditions to make reform possible. The EU will examine the possibility of providing technical assistance to Ukraine with a view of:
53. The Member States will consider means to assist Ukraine in:
Cooperation to strengthen stability and security in Europe
54. The EU will consider ways to give more continuity, flexibility and substance to the cooperation with Ukraine on stability and security in Europe and to render it more operational and effective, within the framework of the existing political dialogue, as instituted under the PCA, by:
55. The EU will, as soon as the year 2000, take up the following specific initiatives concerning the strengthening of security and stability in Europe:
Cooperation in the field of environment, energy and nuclear safety
56. The Community stands ready to support the efforts of the special Task Force established to support the Ukrainian authorities in their effort to reform the energy sector.
57. The Community support to the G7 Action Plan includes a contribution to financing the short term safety improvements of Chernobyl via the Nuclear Safety Account managed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development before closure, decommissioning, addressing the social consequences of closure, contributing to the Shelter Implementation Plan and participating in the financing of substitution facilities in line with previous commitments compensating for Ukraine's energy losses, provided that all necessary due diligence procedures can be concluded satisfactorily, including the establishment of an agreed position regarding the loan conditionality and the wording of the loan and guarantee agreement and provided that Ukraine stands by its commitment to implement the 1995 Memorandum of Understanding.
58. The EU will seek to support Ukraine in its effort to reduce the negative impact on public health of the environmental situation in Ukraine - notably as regards the quality of drinking water, waste water treatment, waste collection and disposal as well as air pollution. The EU will support institutional reform in the public utilities responsible for environmental services, other technical assistance projects and environmental investments.
59. The next "Environment for Europe" conference will be held in September 2002 in Kyiv and will provide the opportunity to increase awareness in Ukraine of environmental issues. Member States and the Commission will consider the possibility of offering technical assistance/support to the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety with the preparation and planning of the conference.
Support for Ukraine's integration into European and world economy
60. The EU remains ready to maintain and, if appropriate, to enhance its support for Ukraine's efforts to meet the requirements of WTO accession. Special attention will be given to removing obstacles to trade and investment in Ukraine, starting with the elimination of trade measures incompatible with PCA and WTO.
61. The EU will examine the circumstances which might, in addition to WTO accession, allow for the future establishment of an EU-Ukraine Free Trade Area as provided for in Article 4 of the PCA. The on-going joint economic feasibility study of the Free Trade Area will provide important input to evaluate the situation.
62. The Commission will examine ways to deepen the investment dialogue with Ukraine in the framework of the PCA Sub-Committee on trade and investment and will report to the Council by June 2000.
Cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs
63. In view of the EU's current enlargement process, also taking into account Ukraine's position as an important transit country providing a conduit for the cross-border flow of a wide range of non-legal activities, the EU and Ukraine have a particular interest in stepping up cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs. The EU proposes to concentrate its efforts with a view to:
64. An informal network will be established in Kyiv consisting of EU Member States Embassies, Commission and relevant international organisation representatives in order to improve the exchange and analysis of information in justice and home affairs. A dialogue, within the framework of the PCA, between the Member States, the Commission, including the liaison officers in Kyiv and competent Ukrainian bodies will make it possible to analyse Ukraine's requirements in this area more precisely. A report will be submitted to the Council by the end of 2000.
Regional and cross-border cooperation with neighbouring countries
65. The EU will seek to encourage the development and strengthening of regional and cross-border cooperation initiatives involving Ukraine and its neighbouring countries, by:
Cooperation in the fields of culture, twinning and exchange programmes
66. The EU will support the fostering of closer links between public institutions, civil society and non governmental organisations of the Union and Ukraine, by:
The Commission and the Member States will coordinate their programmes. The Commission will study the possibility of bringing Community programmes into play for this purpose (Tacis, Tempus and Democracy). The Member States' bilateral instruments will also be used.
On the basis of an inventory of existing instruments (to be drawn up by the Commission in cooperation with the General Secretariat of the Council) and an identification mission to Ukraine, the Commission will report to the Council by June 2000 and will thereafter submit proposals for action as appropriate.
67. This Common Strategy shall apply from the date of its publication for an initial period of four years. It may be prolonged, reviewed and, if necessary, adapted by the European Council on the recommendation of the Council.
68. This Common Strategy shall be published in the Official Journal.
Done at Helsinki,
For the European Council
European Council Declaration
on the Common Strategy on Ukraine
The Council acts by qualified majority when adopting joint actions, common positions or any other decisions within the scope of Title V of the Treaty on European Union (Common Foreign and Security Policy), on the basis of the Common Strategy.
Acts adopted outside the scope of Title V of the Treaty on European Union shall continue to be adopted according to the appropriate decision-making procedures provided by the relevant provisions of the Treaties, including the Treaty establishing the European Community and Title VI of the Treaty on European Union.
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL IN HELSINKI
· Commission composite paper on enlargement
· Report on the European Conference
· Efficient institutions after enlargement: Presidency report on options for the Intergovernmental Conference
· An effective Council for an enlarged Union: Guidelines for reform and operational recommendations
· Presidency reports on strengthening the common European policy on security and defence and on non military crisis management of the European Union
· Presidency report on the implementation of the common strategy on Russia
· Common strategy on Ukraine
· Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe : Report on EU action in support of the Stability Pact and South-Eastern Europe
· Presidency report "Reinforcement of European Union action in the field of Human rights"
· Council report (ECOFIN) on Economic policy coordination; review of instruments and experience in Stage 3 of EMU
· Council report (ECOFIN) on reinforced tax policy cooperation
· Council report (ECOFIN) on the fight against fraud
· Joint Employment report
· Council report on employment guidelines in 2000
· Commission Recommendation for Council recommendations on the implementation of Member States' employment policies
· Council recommendation on the implementation of Member States' employment policies
·Commission communication: Proposal for Guidelines for Member States' Employment policies 2000
· Council report: Strategy for integrating environmental aspects and sustainable development into energy policy
· Council report on Transport and Environment
· Council report: Integration of environmental protection and sustainable development into the Internal Market policy
· Council report: Integrating sustainable development into the industry policy of the European Union
· Council report: Strategy on the environment integration and sustainable development in common agriculture policy established by the Agriculture Council
· Integration of environment in the Community's d evelopment policies
· Commission report on integrating environment and sustainable development into Community policies
· Commission coordinated report on environmental indicators
· Commission communication on the global evaluation of the 5th action programme for the environment
· Commission report on Better Law Making 1999, including subsidiarity
· Report on the finalisation and evaluation of the Action Plan on Organised Crime
· European Union Action Plan on Russian Organised Crime: Basic Principles
· European Strategy against Drugs (2000-2004)
· Commission report on safeguarding current sport structures and maintaining the social function of sport within the Community framework
(1) See doc. SN 2139/99.
© European Parliament: 1999