10

резултат(и)

Дума(и)
Вид публикация
Област на политиките
Автор
Ключова дума
Дата

European Stability Mechanism – Main Features, Instruments and Accountability

11-10-2019

This document presents the main features of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), including governance, capital structure and funding sources, main lending instruments, as well as its oversight and accountability framework. It also reviews recent proposals and contributions on the possible evolution of the ESM. This note is regularly updated.

This document presents the main features of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), including governance, capital structure and funding sources, main lending instruments, as well as its oversight and accountability framework. It also reviews recent proposals and contributions on the possible evolution of the ESM. This note is regularly updated.

Finalisation of Basel III post-crisis reforms

12-12-2017

This note is mainly based on documents published by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) on 7 December 2017 under the header Finalising Basel III post-crisis reforms, namely the High-level summary of Basel III reforms and the full text of the reforms. EGOV has previously published a briefing specifically on the role of the BCBS.

This note is mainly based on documents published by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) on 7 December 2017 under the header Finalising Basel III post-crisis reforms, namely the High-level summary of Basel III reforms and the full text of the reforms. EGOV has previously published a briefing specifically on the role of the BCBS.

Precautionary recapitalisations: time for a review

29-08-2017

This note provides a summary of 4 expert papers assessing the role of precautionary recapitalisation in the Banking Union.

This note provides a summary of 4 expert papers assessing the role of precautionary recapitalisation in the Banking Union.

The Implementation of Bail-In in Recent Resolution and State Aid Cases

07-07-2016

Since 1 January 2016 it is mandatory under the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) to bail-in shareholders and creditors for a minimum amount of 8% of total liabilities before any funds from the Single Resolution Fund may be injected into a bank under resolution. A number of national competent authorities therefore triggered the resolution of weak banks before the deadline of 31 December 2015. However, since 2013 EU State aid rules have imposed (the "2013 Banking Communication") that subordinated ...

Since 1 January 2016 it is mandatory under the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) to bail-in shareholders and creditors for a minimum amount of 8% of total liabilities before any funds from the Single Resolution Fund may be injected into a bank under resolution. A number of national competent authorities therefore triggered the resolution of weak banks before the deadline of 31 December 2015. However, since 2013 EU State aid rules have imposed (the "2013 Banking Communication") that subordinated creditors contribute to the maximum extent (bail-in) to the restructuring of State-aided institutions. All the resolution cases presented below and approved by the European Commission have complied with the State-aid requirement to bail-in subordinated creditors.

Should the Marketing of Subordinated Debt Be Restricted/Different in One Way or the Other? What to Do in the Case of Mis-Selling?

18-03-2016

Bail-in can potentially lead to enhanced market discipline and lower use of public finances only if its application is credible and stringent. This requires that the holders of bail-in able debt have the capacity of absorbing losses but also that the application of bail-in does is consistent with financial stability. Sophisticated investors have typically a larger financial capacity than unsophisticated investors but they are also more reactive to information and/or imposition of losses and are therefore ...

Bail-in can potentially lead to enhanced market discipline and lower use of public finances only if its application is credible and stringent. This requires that the holders of bail-in able debt have the capacity of absorbing losses but also that the application of bail-in does is consistent with financial stability. Sophisticated investors have typically a larger financial capacity than unsophisticated investors but they are also more reactive to information and/or imposition of losses and are therefore more likely to generate runs and systemic risk. In contrast, retail investors are slower movers and as such they constitute a more stable source of funding. As a result, we do not advocate the ban of the sale of subordinated debt to retail investors. Rather, it is crucial that the rules concerning the marketing of these products are appropriately designed and their implementation is supervised by competent authorities.

Външен автор

Elena Carletti and Donato Masciandaro

Should the Marketing of Subordinated Debt Be Restricted/Different in One Way or the Other? What to Do in the Case of Mis-Selling?

17-03-2016

An important prerequisite for the efficiency of bail-in as a regulatory tool is that debt holders are able to bear the cost of a bail-in. Examining European banks’ subordinated debt we caution that households may be investors in bail-in able bonds. Since households do not fulfil the aforementioned prerequisite, we argue that European bank supervisors need to ensure that banks’ bail-in bonds are held by sophisticated investors. Existing EU market regulation insufficiently addresses mis-selling of ...

An important prerequisite for the efficiency of bail-in as a regulatory tool is that debt holders are able to bear the cost of a bail-in. Examining European banks’ subordinated debt we caution that households may be investors in bail-in able bonds. Since households do not fulfil the aforementioned prerequisite, we argue that European bank supervisors need to ensure that banks’ bail-in bonds are held by sophisticated investors. Existing EU market regulation insufficiently addresses mis-selling of bail-in instruments.

The Implementation of Bail-In in Recent Resolution Cases

22-02-2016

Since 1 January 2016 it has become mandatory under the BRRD to bail-in shareholders and creditors for a minimum amount of 8% of total liabilities before any SRF fund be injected into banks under resolution.

Since 1 January 2016 it has become mandatory under the BRRD to bail-in shareholders and creditors for a minimum amount of 8% of total liabilities before any SRF fund be injected into banks under resolution.

Capital Shortfalls in SSM Banks: How Much Progress Has Been Made?

05-10-2015

The 2014 Comprehensive Assessment by the ECB identified and made public capital shortfalls at 25 major European banks. The banks concerned were required to submit a capital plan to the ECB and the national Competent detailing how the capital shortfall would be filled. Capital plans were to be implemented within six resp. nine months after 26 October 2014. Now that this time has passed, we examine the progress made by the banks required to take action. We also evaluate how far the Comprehensive Assessment ...

The 2014 Comprehensive Assessment by the ECB identified and made public capital shortfalls at 25 major European banks. The banks concerned were required to submit a capital plan to the ECB and the national Competent detailing how the capital shortfall would be filled. Capital plans were to be implemented within six resp. nine months after 26 October 2014. Now that this time has passed, we examine the progress made by the banks required to take action. We also evaluate how far the Comprehensive Assessment achieved its objectives.

Външен автор

Thomas Breuer

Capital Shortfalls in SSM Banks: How Much Progress Has Been Made?

04-10-2015

On 26 October 2014, the European Central Bank (ECB) published the results of the comprehensive assessment that comprised both an asset quality review (AQR) as well as a stress test. Banks that have shown capital shortfalls after the assessment had up to 9 months the close the capital gap. In this paper, we investigate whether actions taken by banks have resulted in noticeable reactions in capital markets. Evidence suggests that banks with shortfalls made some progress during the months after the ...

On 26 October 2014, the European Central Bank (ECB) published the results of the comprehensive assessment that comprised both an asset quality review (AQR) as well as a stress test. Banks that have shown capital shortfalls after the assessment had up to 9 months the close the capital gap. In this paper, we investigate whether actions taken by banks have resulted in noticeable reactions in capital markets. Evidence suggests that banks with shortfalls made some progress during the months after the comprehensive assessment. However, banks that passed might actually be riskier than expected based on the official results from the ECB. Quantitative Easing (QE) by the ECB makes it difficult to interpret market prices due to inflation in asset prices and decrease in risk premia.

Banking Rescue Measures in EU Member States - Compilation of Briefing Papers

15-01-2009

Compilation of briefing papers analyzing "Banking Rescue Measures" in EU Member States by ECON's panel of financial services experts.

Compilation of briefing papers analyzing "Banking Rescue Measures" in EU Member States by ECON's panel of financial services experts.

Външен автор

Didier Davydoff ; Christos Vl. Gortsos ; Hungarian Institute for Training of Bankers ; Marco Lamandini ; Richard Pratt ; Anne Sibert ; Jane Welch

Предстоящи събития

Партньори

Поддържайте връзка

email update imageСистема за уведомления по електронна поща

Системата за предупреждение по електронна поща, която изпраща най-новата информация пряко на вашия електронен пощенски адрес, Ви позволява да следите всички личности и събития, свързани с Парламента. Това включва последните новини от членовете на ЕП, информационните служби или експертния център Think Tank.

Системата е достъпна отвсякъде на сайта на Парламента. За да се абонирате за получаване на съобщенията от Think Tank е нужно само да впишете своя електронен пощенски адрес, да изберете темата, която ви интересува, да посочите колко често да Ви бъдат изпращани (ежедневно, седмично или месечно) и да потвърдите своята регистрация като кликнете върху линка, който ще получите по електронната поща.

RSS imageRSS потоци

Не пропускайте нищо от сведенията или актуализациите на сайта на Европейския парламент благодарение на нашия RSS поток.

Моля, кликнете на линка по-долу, за да конфигурирате потока.