A Fiscal Capacity for the Eurozone: Constitutional Perspectives

15-02-2019

This in-depth analysis, commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the AFCO Committee, considers from a constitutional perspective the introduction of a fiscal capacity for the Eurozone. After explaining the constitutional asymmetry of Economic & Monetary Union, and surveying several recent proposals to establish a fiscal capacity, the in-depth analysis explains in comparative perspective how other federal unions by aggregation such as the United States and Switzerland are endowed with centralized fiscal stabilization tools and discusses how such a fiscal capacity could be established in the Eurozone, considering issues of legal bases, governance and accountability, as well as possible windows of opportunities to introduce it post-Brexit.

This in-depth analysis, commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the AFCO Committee, considers from a constitutional perspective the introduction of a fiscal capacity for the Eurozone. After explaining the constitutional asymmetry of Economic & Monetary Union, and surveying several recent proposals to establish a fiscal capacity, the in-depth analysis explains in comparative perspective how other federal unions by aggregation such as the United States and Switzerland are endowed with centralized fiscal stabilization tools and discusses how such a fiscal capacity could be established in the Eurozone, considering issues of legal bases, governance and accountability, as well as possible windows of opportunities to introduce it post-Brexit.

External author

Federico Fabbrini, Professor of EU Law at Dublin City University (DCU) and Founding Director of the DCU Brexit Institute