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Single Resolution Mechanism - Main Features, Oversight and Accountability

16-07-2019

One of the key lessons learned from the financial crisis in 2007-2008 is that in order to reduce the direct and indirect costs of bank failures for national governments, one has to have a credible framework in place to deal with banks’ failures, including clear rules as to the allocation of losses and the conditions attached to the use of common resources, to provide strong incentives for taking measures of precaution in good times and minimise losses in times of crisis. To that end, Europe has put ...

One of the key lessons learned from the financial crisis in 2007-2008 is that in order to reduce the direct and indirect costs of bank failures for national governments, one has to have a credible framework in place to deal with banks’ failures, including clear rules as to the allocation of losses and the conditions attached to the use of common resources, to provide strong incentives for taking measures of precaution in good times and minimise losses in times of crisis. To that end, Europe has put together a framework for resolving banks in difficulties. That framework is the Single Resolution Mechanism, headed by an European agency, the Single Resolution Board (SRB), based on Regulation 806/2014 and comprising all national resolution authorities of the Member States participating in the Banking Union.

Amending capital requirements: The 'CRD-V package'

15-04-2019

In December 2018, the European Parliament and the Council (the co-legislators) reached a political agreement on the legislative proposals amending the current Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation (the 'CRD-IV package'), which establish the prudential framework for financial institutions operating in the EU. The amendments to the package implement the most recent regulatory standards for banks, set at international level ('Basel III framework'). They also address some regulatory shortcomings ...

In December 2018, the European Parliament and the Council (the co-legislators) reached a political agreement on the legislative proposals amending the current Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation (the 'CRD-IV package'), which establish the prudential framework for financial institutions operating in the EU. The amendments to the package implement the most recent regulatory standards for banks, set at international level ('Basel III framework'). They also address some regulatory shortcomings and aim to contribute to sustainable bank financing of the economy. Parliament is due to vote on adopting the proposals during the April II plenary session.

Recent measures for Banca Carige from a BRRD and State Aid perspective

15-02-2019

On 8 January 2019, Banca Carige’s temporary administrators issued a press statement setting out some initiatives they have taken to secure the future of the bank. This briefing contains background information on the case of Banca Carige and links the initiatives taken to respective legal requirements stemming from the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the rules for State Aid (SA).

On 8 January 2019, Banca Carige’s temporary administrators issued a press statement setting out some initiatives they have taken to secure the future of the bank. This briefing contains background information on the case of Banca Carige and links the initiatives taken to respective legal requirements stemming from the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the rules for State Aid (SA).

Loan servicers and buyers and recovery of collateral

29-11-2018

The two IAs accompanying the proposal are similar in the knowledge base underpinning the work and the quality of data and sources. However, there seem to be qualitative differences in the way research, analysis and consultation activities were presented. In this respect, the IA on secondary markets has more room for improvement than the one on the out-of-court enforcement procedure The latter complies more fully with the Better Regulation Guidelines, for example in terms of analysis of effectiveness ...

The two IAs accompanying the proposal are similar in the knowledge base underpinning the work and the quality of data and sources. However, there seem to be qualitative differences in the way research, analysis and consultation activities were presented. In this respect, the IA on secondary markets has more room for improvement than the one on the out-of-court enforcement procedure The latter complies more fully with the Better Regulation Guidelines, for example in terms of analysis of effectiveness and efficiency, quantification, attention to social impacts and impacts on SMEs.

Financing bank resolution: An alternative solution for arranging the liquidity required

21-11-2018

Liquidity in resolution is one of the unresolved elements of the Single Resolution Mechanism. Currently, with the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and the Eurosystem, there are two potential sources of liquidity in resolution, which both have clear limitations in use and amounts. Straightforward solutions to give the SRF and/or Eurosystem more firepower in resolution go against the main objectives of the resolution mechanism (i.e. breaking the sovereign-bank nexus and avoiding use of taxpayers’ money ...

Liquidity in resolution is one of the unresolved elements of the Single Resolution Mechanism. Currently, with the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and the Eurosystem, there are two potential sources of liquidity in resolution, which both have clear limitations in use and amounts. Straightforward solutions to give the SRF and/or Eurosystem more firepower in resolution go against the main objectives of the resolution mechanism (i.e. breaking the sovereign-bank nexus and avoiding use of taxpayers’ money). This paper proposes an ECB liquidity facility with an SRF-guarantee as an alternative solution for banks in resolution. The funds available should be broadly sufficient to address potential liquidity needs for resolution tools. The proposed solution primarily requires agreement on the ESM-backstop for the SRF, a firmer commitment for (possible) future contributions for the SRF as well as a change to the current emergency liquidity assistance or introduction of a new dedicated Transitional Liquidity Assistance by the Eurosystem.

Parlamendiväline autor

W.P. De Groen, CEPS

Banking Union Indicators

15-11-2018

This briefing provides an overview on the key risk indicators that have been selected so far by the Euro-group to assess progress in risk reduction in the Banking Union. Those indicators form part of the ongoing discussions to find an overall agreement ahead of the Euro Summit planned for December 2018. This briefing will be updated regularly, based on publically available information, with a view to highlighting trends in risk reduction.

This briefing provides an overview on the key risk indicators that have been selected so far by the Euro-group to assess progress in risk reduction in the Banking Union. Those indicators form part of the ongoing discussions to find an overall agreement ahead of the Euro Summit planned for December 2018. This briefing will be updated regularly, based on publically available information, with a view to highlighting trends in risk reduction.

The financing of bank resolution - who should provide the required liquidity?

14-11-2018

This paper addresses two distinct yet interconnected problems. The first is whether the provision of Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) on an individual bank basis should be centralised within the European Central Bank (ECB) and the second is whether existing liquidity financing arrangements are fit for the role. The paper argues that ELA centralisation would not require Treaty amendment and that a liquidity backstop is needed. However the latter cannot be provided by the ECB due to the prohibition ...

This paper addresses two distinct yet interconnected problems. The first is whether the provision of Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) on an individual bank basis should be centralised within the European Central Bank (ECB) and the second is whether existing liquidity financing arrangements are fit for the role. The paper argues that ELA centralisation would not require Treaty amendment and that a liquidity backstop is needed. However the latter cannot be provided by the ECB due to the prohibition of monetary financing and other Treaty and EU law requirements. The choice of the EU entity which should be entrusted with the specific mandate will largely depend on the characteristics the facility would take. The paper considers such characteristics and analyses which authority may best fit that role. The paper also suggests that a well-structured facility could have a positive broader macroprudential impact, and that a fine balance needs to be struck between the risk of moral hazard and the beneficial effect this facility may have on market confidence.

Parlamendiväline autor

Costanza A Russo Rosa M. Lastra, Queen Mary University of London

How to provide liquidity to banks after resolution in Europe’s banking union

14-11-2018

Banks deemed to be failing or likely to fail in the banking union are either put into insolvency/liquidation or enter a resolution scheme to protect the public interest. After resolution but before full market confidence is restored, the liquidity needs of resolved banks might exceed what can be met through regular monetary policy operations or emergency liquidity assistance. All liquidity needs that emerge must be met for resolution to be a success. In the euro area, this can only be done credibly ...

Banks deemed to be failing or likely to fail in the banking union are either put into insolvency/liquidation or enter a resolution scheme to protect the public interest. After resolution but before full market confidence is restored, the liquidity needs of resolved banks might exceed what can be met through regular monetary policy operations or emergency liquidity assistance. All liquidity needs that emerge must be met for resolution to be a success. In the euro area, this can only be done credibly for systemically important banks by the central bank. We discuss how to establish guarantees against possible losses in order to allow liquidity provisioning in times of resolution.

Parlamendiväline autor

Maria Demertzis, Inês Gonçalves Raposo, Pia Hüttl, Guntram Wolff (Bruegel)

Abundant Liquidity and Bank Lending Activity: an Assessment of the Risks

14-09-2018

This paper assesses the risks facing the euro area banking system, as it returns to normal financial conditions without ECB support. In the first part we argue that risks to bank lending mainly stem from the transmission of external monetary policy effects that may not be aligned with ECB policies. The second part of the paper therefore offers some ideas on the need to moderate spillover effects from outside monetary policies or events. We also review how far new prudential policies, regulatory measures ...

This paper assesses the risks facing the euro area banking system, as it returns to normal financial conditions without ECB support. In the first part we argue that risks to bank lending mainly stem from the transmission of external monetary policy effects that may not be aligned with ECB policies. The second part of the paper therefore offers some ideas on the need to moderate spillover effects from outside monetary policies or events. We also review how far new prudential policies, regulatory measures and/or policies can be used to mitigate those unfavourable risks. This document was provided by Policy Department A at the request of the Economic and Monetary Affairs.

Parlamendiväline autor

Andrew HUGHES HALLETT

Excess Liquidity and Bank Lending Risks in the Euro Area

14-09-2018

Low interest rates and excess liquidity in the euro area, which exceeded €1,900 billion in September 2018, might create financial stability risks. We clarify the notion of excess liquidity and highlight that its current level is primarily the result of European Central Bank asset purchases. Overall, we conclude that financial stability risks in the euro area are low, but increased home bias and housing prices necessitate full attention from macroprudential authorities. Monetary policy tools are anyway ...

Low interest rates and excess liquidity in the euro area, which exceeded €1,900 billion in September 2018, might create financial stability risks. We clarify the notion of excess liquidity and highlight that its current level is primarily the result of European Central Bank asset purchases. Overall, we conclude that financial stability risks in the euro area are low, but increased home bias and housing prices necessitate full attention from macroprudential authorities. Monetary policy tools are anyway ill-suited to fostering financial stability objectives. This document was provided by Policy Department A at the request of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee.

Parlamendiväline autor

Zsolt DARVAS, David PICHLER

Eelseisvad üritused

01-10-2019
Health threats from climate change: Scientific evidence for policy-making
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