27

eredmény(ek)

Szó/szavak
Kiadványtípus
Szakpolitikai terület
Kérdésfeltevő
Dátum

Amending capital requirements: The 'CRD-V package'

15-04-2019

In December 2018, the European Parliament and the Council (the co-legislators) reached a political agreement on the legislative proposals amending the current Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation (the 'CRD-IV package'), which establish the prudential framework for financial institutions operating in the EU. The amendments to the package implement the most recent regulatory standards for banks, set at international level ('Basel III framework'). They also address some regulatory shortcomings ...

In December 2018, the European Parliament and the Council (the co-legislators) reached a political agreement on the legislative proposals amending the current Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation (the 'CRD-IV package'), which establish the prudential framework for financial institutions operating in the EU. The amendments to the package implement the most recent regulatory standards for banks, set at international level ('Basel III framework'). They also address some regulatory shortcomings and aim to contribute to sustainable bank financing of the economy. Parliament is due to vote on adopting the proposals during the April II plenary session.

EMU Reform and the New Normal for Monetary Policy: Challenges and Perspectives

29-11-2018

This paper assesses the scope for monetary policy in the euro area as it returns to normal financial conditions without support from easy money but with a financial stability objective (whether legislated or not). We find that both financial stability and traditional monetary objectives can be achieved without one limiting the achievement of the other because, in the new normal, the ECB can use new policy tools derived from the regulatory metrics required under the post-crisis macro-prudential framework ...

This paper assesses the scope for monetary policy in the euro area as it returns to normal financial conditions without support from easy money but with a financial stability objective (whether legislated or not). We find that both financial stability and traditional monetary objectives can be achieved without one limiting the achievement of the other because, in the new normal, the ECB can use new policy tools derived from the regulatory metrics required under the post-crisis macro-prudential framework. Whether they offer large improvements depends on how a clear mandate for financial stability is defined and whether coordination with traditional monetary or fiscal policies is needed. Risks to monetary policy in the new normal are mainly external and depend on the transmission of monetary policies not aligned with ECB policies. This document was provided by Policy Department A at the request of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee.

Külső szerző

Andrew HUGHES HALLETT

Financing bank resolution: An alternative solution for arranging the liquidity required

21-11-2018

Liquidity in resolution is one of the unresolved elements of the Single Resolution Mechanism. Currently, with the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and the Eurosystem, there are two potential sources of liquidity in resolution, which both have clear limitations in use and amounts. Straightforward solutions to give the SRF and/or Eurosystem more firepower in resolution go against the main objectives of the resolution mechanism (i.e. breaking the sovereign-bank nexus and avoiding use of taxpayers’ money ...

Liquidity in resolution is one of the unresolved elements of the Single Resolution Mechanism. Currently, with the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and the Eurosystem, there are two potential sources of liquidity in resolution, which both have clear limitations in use and amounts. Straightforward solutions to give the SRF and/or Eurosystem more firepower in resolution go against the main objectives of the resolution mechanism (i.e. breaking the sovereign-bank nexus and avoiding use of taxpayers’ money). This paper proposes an ECB liquidity facility with an SRF-guarantee as an alternative solution for banks in resolution. The funds available should be broadly sufficient to address potential liquidity needs for resolution tools. The proposed solution primarily requires agreement on the ESM-backstop for the SRF, a firmer commitment for (possible) future contributions for the SRF as well as a change to the current emergency liquidity assistance or introduction of a new dedicated Transitional Liquidity Assistance by the Eurosystem.

Külső szerző

W.P. De Groen, CEPS

How to provide liquidity to banks after resolution in Europe’s banking union

14-11-2018

Banks deemed to be failing or likely to fail in the banking union are either put into insolvency/liquidation or enter a resolution scheme to protect the public interest. After resolution but before full market confidence is restored, the liquidity needs of resolved banks might exceed what can be met through regular monetary policy operations or emergency liquidity assistance. All liquidity needs that emerge must be met for resolution to be a success. In the euro area, this can only be done credibly ...

Banks deemed to be failing or likely to fail in the banking union are either put into insolvency/liquidation or enter a resolution scheme to protect the public interest. After resolution but before full market confidence is restored, the liquidity needs of resolved banks might exceed what can be met through regular monetary policy operations or emergency liquidity assistance. All liquidity needs that emerge must be met for resolution to be a success. In the euro area, this can only be done credibly for systemically important banks by the central bank. We discuss how to establish guarantees against possible losses in order to allow liquidity provisioning in times of resolution.

Külső szerző

Maria Demertzis, Inês Gonçalves Raposo, Pia Hüttl, Guntram Wolff (Bruegel)

Abundant Liquidity and Bank Lending Activity: an Assessment of the Risks

14-09-2018

This paper assesses the risks facing the euro area banking system, as it returns to normal financial conditions without ECB support. In the first part we argue that risks to bank lending mainly stem from the transmission of external monetary policy effects that may not be aligned with ECB policies. The second part of the paper therefore offers some ideas on the need to moderate spillover effects from outside monetary policies or events. We also review how far new prudential policies, regulatory measures ...

This paper assesses the risks facing the euro area banking system, as it returns to normal financial conditions without ECB support. In the first part we argue that risks to bank lending mainly stem from the transmission of external monetary policy effects that may not be aligned with ECB policies. The second part of the paper therefore offers some ideas on the need to moderate spillover effects from outside monetary policies or events. We also review how far new prudential policies, regulatory measures and/or policies can be used to mitigate those unfavourable risks. This document was provided by Policy Department A at the request of the Economic and Monetary Affairs.

Külső szerző

Andrew HUGHES HALLETT

Post-crisis Excess Liquidity and Bank Lending

14-09-2018

With the Asset Purchase Program, the European Central Bank has supplied significant amounts of liquidity into the financial system starting from 2015, resulting yet into a new upswing in excess liquidity. The expanded asset purchase programme (APP) program broadly coincided with further cuts in the ECB’s deposit facility rate, which currently stands at -0.4%. Against this background, this note assesses the ECB policy of negative rate on the deposit facility and discusses the associated risks in the ...

With the Asset Purchase Program, the European Central Bank has supplied significant amounts of liquidity into the financial system starting from 2015, resulting yet into a new upswing in excess liquidity. The expanded asset purchase programme (APP) program broadly coincided with further cuts in the ECB’s deposit facility rate, which currently stands at -0.4%. Against this background, this note assesses the ECB policy of negative rate on the deposit facility and discusses the associated risks in the context of an excess liquidity overhang for the euro area, including risk-appetite for banks. This document was requested by the European Parliament's Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs.

Külső szerző

Corrado MACCHIARELLI

Excess Liquidity and Bank Lending Risks in the Euro Area

14-09-2018

Low interest rates and excess liquidity in the euro area, which exceeded €1,900 billion in September 2018, might create financial stability risks. We clarify the notion of excess liquidity and highlight that its current level is primarily the result of European Central Bank asset purchases. Overall, we conclude that financial stability risks in the euro area are low, but increased home bias and housing prices necessitate full attention from macroprudential authorities. Monetary policy tools are anyway ...

Low interest rates and excess liquidity in the euro area, which exceeded €1,900 billion in September 2018, might create financial stability risks. We clarify the notion of excess liquidity and highlight that its current level is primarily the result of European Central Bank asset purchases. Overall, we conclude that financial stability risks in the euro area are low, but increased home bias and housing prices necessitate full attention from macroprudential authorities. Monetary policy tools are anyway ill-suited to fostering financial stability objectives. This document was provided by Policy Department A at the request of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee.

Külső szerző

Zsolt DARVAS, David PICHLER

The effects and risks of ECB collateral framework changes

16-07-2018

During the crisis, the ECB modified its collateral framework to face increased liquidity needs of commercial banks. This has taken two forms: the minimum required rating for different classes of assets has been reduced and the haircut associated to these assets has evolved conditional on the default risks of these assets. The benefits in terms of cushioning a liquidity crisis and enhancing monetary policy transmission have most probably exceeded the costs in terms of riskier central bank balance ...

During the crisis, the ECB modified its collateral framework to face increased liquidity needs of commercial banks. This has taken two forms: the minimum required rating for different classes of assets has been reduced and the haircut associated to these assets has evolved conditional on the default risks of these assets. The benefits in terms of cushioning a liquidity crisis and enhancing monetary policy transmission have most probably exceeded the costs in terms of riskier central bank balance sheet and potential capital losses. This document was provided by Policy Department A at the request of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee.

Külső szerző

Christophe BLOT, Jérôme CREEL, Paul HUBERT (Sciences Po – OFCE)

ECB non-standard-policies and collateral constraints

16-07-2018

Collateral constitutes an indispensable lubricant for the financial system. Government bonds constitute the most important source of collateral, for use in inter-bank and repo transactions. But, the vast bond buying program of the ECB in the context of the Public Sector Purchase Programme has not led to any collateral scarcity. Banks still hold very large amounts of sovereign bonds and they have ample other collateral should they want to borrow more from the ECB for ‘standard’ monetary policy operations ...

Collateral constitutes an indispensable lubricant for the financial system. Government bonds constitute the most important source of collateral, for use in inter-bank and repo transactions. But, the vast bond buying program of the ECB in the context of the Public Sector Purchase Programme has not led to any collateral scarcity. Banks still hold very large amounts of sovereign bonds and they have ample other collateral should they want to borrow more from the ECB for ‘standard’ monetary policy operations. Banks tend to use less liquid assets as collateral with the ECB, but this does not mean necessarily more risk for the ECB for which liquidity is not important. This document was provided by Policy Department A at the request of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs.

Külső szerző

Daniel GROS, Willem Pieter de Groen (CEPS)

ECB non-standard monetary measures, collateral constraints and potential risks for monetary policy

02-07-2018

This paper takes a wide view of nonstandard measures in difficult situations. We explore how, and to what extent, prudential metrics written into the new prudential and surveillance regulations can be used as policy instruments. The paper does not try to reach a judgment on which measures will work best. Instead we explore how these policies work; why they depend on high quality collateral/assets; what happens if policymakers are driven to expand the bounds of “sufficient quality or liquidity”; how ...

This paper takes a wide view of nonstandard measures in difficult situations. We explore how, and to what extent, prudential metrics written into the new prudential and surveillance regulations can be used as policy instruments. The paper does not try to reach a judgment on which measures will work best. Instead we explore how these policies work; why they depend on high quality collateral/assets; what happens if policymakers are driven to expand the bounds of “sufficient quality or liquidity”; how new credit risks arise and for whom. Some of these risks are quite subtle, implicit or indirect. But they all reduce the effective-ness of the measures in question (a transmission problem). As a result, they require larger interventions to reach certain target values (a feasibility question, given the side effects). Thus, the new prudential regulation regimes offer several nonstandard policy instruments. But they depend of the availability of high quality and liquid collateral/assets. Poor collateral makes nonstandard measures less effective. Less credit and less cheap credit will be offered due to the increasing credit risks. This document was provided by Policy Department A at the request of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee.

Külső szerző

Andrew Hughes Hallett, Paul Fisher

Partnerek

Kövessen minket!

email update imageE-mailen küldött friss hírek

Az elektronikus előrejelző rendszer, amely közvetlenül az ön elektronikus címére küldi a legfrissebb információkat, lehetővé teszi, hogy figyelemmel kísérjen a Parlamenttel kapcsolatban álló minden személyt és eseményt, többek között a képviselőkre vonatkozó legfrissebb híreket, az információs szolgáltatásokat vagy a Think Tanket.

A rendszer mindenütt hozzáférhető a Parlament weboldalán keresztül. Ahhoz, hogy bejelentkezzen és megkapja a Think Tank értesítéseit, elég, ha megadja elektronikus címét, kiválasztja a témát, amely érdekli, megadja a gyakoriságot (naponta, hetente vagy havonta), valamint rákattintva az e-mailban küldött hivatkozásra, megerősíti jelentkezését.

RSS imageRSS-hírfolyamok

Az RSS csatorna segítségével ne maradjon le a Parlament weboldalán közölt semmilyen információról vagy a frissítésekről.

Csatornája beállításához kattintson az alábbi hivatkozásra.