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Monetary Policy in an Era of Low Average Growth Rates

29-11-2018

Economic growth in the euro area has been sluggish since the onset of the global financial crisis of 2008. While some of this sluggishness reflected cyclical patterns, ongoing weak productivity growth and demographic factors point to slow average growth rates for the euro area in the coming decades. This will most likely translate into a lower equilibrium real interest rate. The ECB should follow the Federal Reserve in providing estimates to the public of average nominal interest rate it expects ...

Economic growth in the euro area has been sluggish since the onset of the global financial crisis of 2008. While some of this sluggishness reflected cyclical patterns, ongoing weak productivity growth and demographic factors point to slow average growth rates for the euro area in the coming decades. This will most likely translate into a lower equilibrium real interest rate. The ECB should follow the Federal Reserve in providing estimates to the public of average nominal interest rate it expects to set over the long term and that this is likely lower than average rates during the pre-crisis era. The ECB should continue advocating for growth-boosting structural reforms but should also consider advocating for higher immigration levels to improve Europe’s demographic profile and growth potential.

Ārējais autors

Professor Karl Whelan

Financing bank resolution: An alternative solution for arranging the liquidity required

21-11-2018

Liquidity in resolution is one of the unresolved elements of the Single Resolution Mechanism. Currently, with the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and the Eurosystem, there are two potential sources of liquidity in resolution, which both have clear limitations in use and amounts. Straightforward solutions to give the SRF and/or Eurosystem more firepower in resolution go against the main objectives of the resolution mechanism (i.e. breaking the sovereign-bank nexus and avoiding use of taxpayers’ money ...

Liquidity in resolution is one of the unresolved elements of the Single Resolution Mechanism. Currently, with the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and the Eurosystem, there are two potential sources of liquidity in resolution, which both have clear limitations in use and amounts. Straightforward solutions to give the SRF and/or Eurosystem more firepower in resolution go against the main objectives of the resolution mechanism (i.e. breaking the sovereign-bank nexus and avoiding use of taxpayers’ money). This paper proposes an ECB liquidity facility with an SRF-guarantee as an alternative solution for banks in resolution. The funds available should be broadly sufficient to address potential liquidity needs for resolution tools. The proposed solution primarily requires agreement on the ESM-backstop for the SRF, a firmer commitment for (possible) future contributions for the SRF as well as a change to the current emergency liquidity assistance or introduction of a new dedicated Transitional Liquidity Assistance by the Eurosystem.

Ārējais autors

W.P. De Groen, CEPS

Abundant Liquidity and Bank Lending Activity: an Assessment of the Risks

14-09-2018

This paper assesses the risks facing the euro area banking system, as it returns to normal financial conditions without ECB support. In the first part we argue that risks to bank lending mainly stem from the transmission of external monetary policy effects that may not be aligned with ECB policies. The second part of the paper therefore offers some ideas on the need to moderate spillover effects from outside monetary policies or events. We also review how far new prudential policies, regulatory measures ...

This paper assesses the risks facing the euro area banking system, as it returns to normal financial conditions without ECB support. In the first part we argue that risks to bank lending mainly stem from the transmission of external monetary policy effects that may not be aligned with ECB policies. The second part of the paper therefore offers some ideas on the need to moderate spillover effects from outside monetary policies or events. We also review how far new prudential policies, regulatory measures and/or policies can be used to mitigate those unfavourable risks. This document was provided by Policy Department A at the request of the Economic and Monetary Affairs.

Ārējais autors

Andrew HUGHES HALLETT

Central Bank Communication at Times of Non-Standard Monetary Policies

14-09-2018

Communication is an important monetary policy tool, as central banks can use it to manage the expectations of economic agents. Communication becomes even more important in times of non-standard monetary policies due to increased levels of uncertainty and the introduction of new policy tools. In this paper, we summarise the literature on central bank communication in times of non-standard monetary policies, with a particular focus on forward guidance. This document was provided by Policy Department ...

Communication is an important monetary policy tool, as central banks can use it to manage the expectations of economic agents. Communication becomes even more important in times of non-standard monetary policies due to increased levels of uncertainty and the introduction of new policy tools. In this paper, we summarise the literature on central bank communication in times of non-standard monetary policies, with a particular focus on forward guidance. This document was provided by Policy Department A at the request of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee.

Ārējais autors

Lukasz JANIKOWSKI, Andrzej RZONCA

When Communication becomes the Policy

14-09-2018

Non-standard policy measures are intended to work via financial markets. Their effectiveness thus depends on how ECB communication affects the expectations of market participants far into the future. Communication has become as important as the details of the policy measures itself. The success of communication is often measured by short term market reactions, increasingly using advanced statistical techniques to interpret them. But this ‘policy making by the markets’ lacks a strong anchor because ...

Non-standard policy measures are intended to work via financial markets. Their effectiveness thus depends on how ECB communication affects the expectations of market participants far into the future. Communication has become as important as the details of the policy measures itself. The success of communication is often measured by short term market reactions, increasingly using advanced statistical techniques to interpret them. But this ‘policy making by the markets’ lacks a strong anchor because financial markets often anticipate policy and the assessments of investors change all the time, often independently of monetary policy actions. This document was provided by Policy Department A at the request of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs.

Ārējais autors

Daniel Gros

Excess Liquidity and Bank Lending Risks in the Euro Area

14-09-2018

Low interest rates and excess liquidity in the euro area, which exceeded €1,900 billion in September 2018, might create financial stability risks. We clarify the notion of excess liquidity and highlight that its current level is primarily the result of European Central Bank asset purchases. Overall, we conclude that financial stability risks in the euro area are low, but increased home bias and housing prices necessitate full attention from macroprudential authorities. Monetary policy tools are anyway ...

Low interest rates and excess liquidity in the euro area, which exceeded €1,900 billion in September 2018, might create financial stability risks. We clarify the notion of excess liquidity and highlight that its current level is primarily the result of European Central Bank asset purchases. Overall, we conclude that financial stability risks in the euro area are low, but increased home bias and housing prices necessitate full attention from macroprudential authorities. Monetary policy tools are anyway ill-suited to fostering financial stability objectives. This document was provided by Policy Department A at the request of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee.