Partially Self-Financed EU Agencies and the Principle of Fee Setting

14-03-2014

This study examines the budget structure and cost allocation, fee determination as well as treatment of surpluses/deficits and potential financial reserves of the partially selffinanced EU agencies (i.e. the agencies which carry out public tasks for the EU and provide services to clients from industry and are not co-financed by national public authorities), namely the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) and the European Medicines Agency (EMA). The study identifies and analyses the characteristics of the two mutually exclusive approaches – the “assigned revenue model” (case of EASA) and the “universal budgeting model” (case of ECHA and EMA) – as well as the consequences of each model. Furthermore, the study discusses the potential for extending self-financing of EU agencies.

This study examines the budget structure and cost allocation, fee determination as well as treatment of surpluses/deficits and potential financial reserves of the partially selffinanced EU agencies (i.e. the agencies which carry out public tasks for the EU and provide services to clients from industry and are not co-financed by national public authorities), namely the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) and the European Medicines Agency (EMA). The study identifies and analyses the characteristics of the two mutually exclusive approaches – the “assigned revenue model” (case of EASA) and the “universal budgeting model” (case of ECHA and EMA) – as well as the consequences of each model. Furthermore, the study discusses the potential for extending self-financing of EU agencies.