Signed by the USA and the Soviet Union on 26 May 1972
Entered into force: October 1972
Amended by protocol in 1974
The Treaty requires the two parties not to construct a national strategic anti-ballistic missile system, and severely limits the development and deployment of defensive missiles.
The issue of antiballistic missile defence systems was brought back onto the agenda of arms control discussions towards the end of 1993 after a long break, and this time in a new form. The discussions concerned the inspection and deployment of new defence systems, theatre missile defence and anti- tactical ballistic missiles (TMD and ATBM) which were intended to intercept ballistic missiles, and whose deployment would have created a let-out to the Treaty provisions, rendering them a dead letter.
Discussions centred in particular on the distinction between theatre ballistic missiles and strategic ballistic missiles, since the ABM treaty limited only the latter, even though no absolutely clear technical distinction has yet been drawn between the two categories.
In the 1970s ABM systems were not taken very seriously in the USA since they were not thought capable of providing effective defence against a massive attack. They have since been accorded an important place once again in Russo-American nuclear arms reduction talks.
On the American side, then, since the end of the Cold War, the analysis of potential threats has been geared towards regional conflicts and the proliferation of ballistic missiles throughout the world. Currently some 15 countries have such missiles, while by the year 2000 this number could easily have risen to 20, including quite a few of the USA's 'adversaries'. From the American point of view the most 'high risk ' countries include Iran, Iraq, North Korea and Syria, and even though these countries cannot attack American territory directly (since they have no intercontinental missiles) they can still represent a threat to allied states in Europe and the Middle East or to American troops abroad. With this in mind, the Clinton administration has undertaken to ensure that all troops and allies are provided with a TMD system, allocating an investment of $22 bn for this purpose up to the year 2001.
In the case of Russia, regional conflicts are also considered the main priority, given that they have the potential to involve the Russian Federation and neighbouring states. Unlike the USA, Russia has never ruled out the possibility of developing ATBM nuclear defence systems, but, just as in the Soviet period, very little is known about the Russian TMD programmes. This is the result of a long tradition of secrecy and lack of democracy in the political system which does not permit parliamentary control over defence expenditure or normal access to information on military questions.
The reassessment of anti-ballistic defence systems by the USA and Russia has once more raised the question of interpreting the ABM treaty. The Treaty's rationale was to reduce gradually the two super- powers' antiballistic missile defence systems so as to leave them open to retaliatory nuclear attacks and at the same time to define each side's destructive capacity. This kind of strategic relationship should in principle have ruled out a pre-emptive nuclear strike aimed at disarming the other side and reducing the damage caused by retaliatory action.
The USA and Russia were opposed to a unilateral interpretation of the treaty, and proposed on several occasions various options for drawing a distinction between theatre defence systems and strategic defence systems, they did not, however, arrive at a compromise solution. This is an extremely important question, since the development of TMD either in Russia or in the USA could blur still further the distinction between strategic and tactical systems.
The Russians maintain that any TMD system capable of intercepting missiles with a range in excess of 1000km implicitly possesses an ABM type strategic capacity. The uncontrolled development and procurement of such systems could also paralyse the implementation of provisions under the START II Treaty, particularly as regards Russia.
According to a number of experts, Russian and American programmes to develop TMD systems and the reductionist interpretations proposed for the ABM Treaty seem exaggerated in relation to the potential threat they might theoretically have to counter. It might be thought that the USA intended to make progress in the field of TMD systems in order to retain the option of deploying ABM defence systems in future(1), whereas the Russian state probably has major worries about potential attacks on its territory from the Middle East and South-East Asia.
It does in fact seem to be Russia which is most interested in maintaining the Treaty(2), partly because the modernization of its defence system would have a significant impact on its budget. It is however clear that while there is a clear need to have more modern and advanced TMD systems following the proliferation of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons, the substance and scope of the ABM Treaty also needs to be clarified, or even the Treaty to be revised.
(1) This interpretation is confirmed by the debates in Congress which followed the presentation of the plan on the ballistic missile defence system drawn up by Defence Secretary William Perry and his Under-Secretary Paul Kaminski. The programme and the set of recommendations stress the significance of
(2) The Russian delegate at the Geneva Conference on disarmament, Grigory Berdennikov, claimed