Signed: 13 January 1993
Entry into force: 29 April 1997
Duration: unlimited
This convention comprises a total and permanent ban on the preparation, production, storage and use of all chemical weapons, and stands out among multilateral treaties on disarmament and security from various points of view including its scope, the length of its negotiations and most of all its inspection system. Following the general enthusiasm which the Convention raised, there was every reason to believe that it would be ratified speedily and would enter into force in the near future. This did not prove to be the case. The delays which overcame the general enthusiasm were caused principally by the complexity of administrative and bureaucratic procedures for applying the national measures to carry out the requirements of the Convention.(1). The Convention on Chemical Weapons is a very detailed and technical document, and this can lead to additional difficulties for states which are not particularly expert in chemical weapons.(2).
One other source of delay was the creation of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), whose main task is to monitor the proper application of the Convention by the states which have ratified it. The emergence of control and verification mechanisms and procedures was made more complicated by the fact that some agreements incorporated in the Convention are the result of political compromises made during the final stages of negotiations.
The Convention is designed and structured in such a way as to make it impossible for a state to use or threaten to use chemical weapons. To that end it prohibits the development, production, acquisition, storage, holding and (direct or indirect) transfer of chemical weapons. It also provides that the presence of this type of weapons and of the infrastructures for their production should be declared, that these declarations should be confirmed or verified at international level, and that either the weapons or the establishments in which they are produced should be destroyed, under international supervision, within ten years from the entry into force of the Convention(3).
The process of eliminating these weapons is supposed to begin within two years from the entry into force of the Convention. 1% of the stock of weapons is to be destroyed within three years, 20% within 5 years , 45% within seven years and the remainder within 10 years. The order of destruction does not distinguish between different types of chemical weapons, and this has elicited criticism from some countries which would have preferred to see the most toxic weapons destroyed first.
Unlike the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which distinguishes between two categories of states - nuclear and non-nuclear - with different rights and obligations, the CWC places all states on an equal footing both as regards prohibitions and as regards inspection and control mechanisms. One extremely important and rather innovative feature is the system for the control and checking of the implementation of provisions under the Convention. Although no international agreement can really be 100% verifiable, the Convention includes the most elaborate and most complete control system so far in existence.
One very important and often under-estimated feature is the fact that the Convention also represents, taken as a whole, a major instrument of non-proliferation. Firstly the control mechanisms it introduces form an adequate tool for the observation of various situations throughout the world, including the trade in chemicals and the industrial activities related to this sector. Secondly it provides for the limitation and restriction of trade with countries which have not signed the Convention, with a view to banning such trade altogether once the Convention enters into force.
Currently 160 states have signed the Convention, and now that it has been ratified by 65 countries (since Hungary did so on 31 October 1996) it can enter into force after 180 days, that is on 29 April 1997. The Convention has already been signed, inter alia, by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, though of these only France and the United Kingdom have so far ratified it. All the Member States of the EU have ratified the Convention except Belgium and Luxembourg, which should do so shortly.
During the 20 years of negotiations which have been necessary to reach a conclusion to this agreement, a major role has been played by the USA and the Soviet Union (Russia) which, thanks to their technical progress and commitment have often been in a position to propose numerous solutions to the most thorny questions of chemical weapons and inspections. Having said that, these two major powers, which also have the largest chemical arsenals in the world, have not yet ratified the Convention. This is an important issue to be overcome if these two countries' non-participation is not to jeopardize the very existence of the Convention. It will be very difficult for the other states parties to the Convention to authorize inspections and accept the constraints of the Convention if they know that these requirements do not apply to the USA and Russia(4).
The attitude of the USA and Russia has been, and remains, extremely important for the future of the Convention. In 1994 several hearings took place in the American senate on the matter of ratification, and it was thought that an agreement would soon be reached. In the end the speeches and meetings came to nothing. The main worries behind the cautious American attitude related to Russia and its capacity to meet the obligations contracted with the USA when it signed the bilateral agreement on the destruction of chemical weapons, and to intelligence concerning the development of a new chemical weapons programme. To these reservations we must also add the opposition of those who thought the Convention did not go far enough in the list of substances it prohibits, or in the monitoring of the production and storage of dangerous substances.
The American Congress began a debate on ratification of the Convention, which was scheduled for 15 September 1996. On 12 September a majority in the Senate adjourned ratification because of persistent disagreements. In Russia all discussions on this subject were postponed owing to the general elections in December. It is clear that once Russia and America have ratified, the others should follow suit rapidly. Any significant delay would encourage further proliferation by the development of new types of weapons and would affect the political momentum to prohibit such weapons(5).
The USA is currently destroying a large proportion of its chemical weapons reserves in the Pacific. Russia, which has expressed doubts about American chemical weapons elimination techniques, is faced with financial and technical difficulties in the storage of its reserves with a view to destroying them once the Convention has entered into force. Under the terms of the Convention, this should begin within two years.
(1) For example, although Australia was well ahead in the terms of the procedures needed for ratification even before it signed the Convention, it still needed 16 months before it eventually ratified it.
(2) The delay in the ratification can be caused by: a) the modifications and adjustments at national level proving more complicated than expected; b) scepticism on the value of ratification expressed by countries with small chemical industries; c) existence of other more important national priorities; d) decision not to ratify before the USA and Russia have done so.
(3) The Convention does not have satisfactory provisions covering herbicides. The definition of chemical weapons as set out in the agreement does not include toxic chemical substances which may cause damage to plant species.
(4) The countries which have not signed the Convention can be divided into four groups: the most important group - politically and in terms of the number of states - is undoubtedly the Middle East, where several countries adjoining Israel have made their participation in the CWC conditional on Israel's accession to the NPT. A second group is formed by the states which emerged from the collapse of Yugoslavia. The third group consists of North Korea, and the fourth and last group is made up of those small countries, mostly island states, which have no interest in the Convention in view of their difficult economic or political situation.
(5) cf. the statement by Mr Ian R Denyon, Executive Secretary of the OPCW Preparatory Committee, before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, on 16 October 1995.