

**9 December 2016**

*China's WTO accession in 2001 was a major step for China's integration into global trade and for the further internationalisation of the WTO trading system. It considerably boosted global trade and China's rapid economic rise, with the country's share in global exports rising from 5.9 % in 2003 to 12.7 % in 2014, and in global imports from 5.4 % in 2003 to 10.5 % in 2014. But this has also spurred trade imbalances with its major trading partners such as the EU and the USA, in turn fuelling trade frictions. China's involvement in WTO trade disputes, notably in the field of trade remedies, is to a large extent linked to its stringent accession commitments which were the price for its WTO membership. These provisions have catered for concerns about the disruptive potential of China's WTO membership given the specificities of its political, economic and legal system. But they have also set a precedent for country-specific rule-making in the WTO and have been the source of China's perception of holding 'less-than-equal' status in the WTO. China has used the WTO legal channel with increasing sophistication to challenge specifically, although not exclusively, these tailor-made rules.*

### [China's WTO accession 15 years on: Taking, shaking or shaping WTO rules?](#)

*Briefing, Gisela Grieger, December 2016*

11 December 2016 marks the 15th anniversary of China's accession to the WTO. In 2001, China not only agreed to extensive market access commitments but also to substantial non-reciprocal rules obligations. But contrary to initial widespread fears of China triggering a disruptive flood of WTO cases, the country has acted predominantly as a rules-taker rather than a rules-shaker. China has to a large degree assimilated the standard rules of the multilateral trading system and has accepted compulsory WTO adjudication as a means of settling trade frictions. While its 'acquiescent approach' to the WTO trading system identifies China as a status quo power, it has at the same time adopted a strong revisionist posture in its diplomatic, economic and legal fight against its treatment as a non-market economy (NME) in the area of trade remedies. In WTO multilateral negotiations China has so far punched well below its weight by taking a backseat rather than a leadership role. In WTO plurilateral negotiations domestic resistance to reforms in sensitive areas has been crucial to China's absence from the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA). Past US opposition was key to its non-participation in negotiations on the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA).

### [Why China's public procurement is an EU issue](#)

*At a Glance, Gisela Grieger, December 2016*

China's public procurement market is huge, but largely untapped by EU companies, since access to it is restricted by laws, regulations and policies favouring domestic over foreign goods and services. Although China's public procurement policy is inconsistent with the WTO's General Procurement Agreement (GPA), the EU cannot legally challenge it, while China is not a GPA party. When China became a WTO member in 2001, it committed itself to joining the GPA, and became a GPA observer in 2002. Since 2007 it has submitted several accession offers which have shown gradual improvements, but have been deemed insufficient by GPA members in terms of their coverage of sub-central level entities and state-owned enterprises. Government procurement is not part of the EU-China negotiations on a future comprehensive investment agreement (CIA).

### [Calculation of dumping margins: EU and US rules and practices in light of the debate on China's Market Economy Status](#)

*In-depth analysis, Laura Puccio, May 2016*

This paper looks at the differences in the methods for calculation of dumping margin and in particular normal values in investigations against exporters in a market economy and against exporters in non-market economies (NMEs), showing the possible implications of the options considered for China beyond 2016. It then focuses on the differences in the EU and US approaches towards NMEs, and uses empirical analysis to see how different methodologies are used in investigations against China, revealing the current restrictive stance of the Commission in applying market economy treatment to Chinese firms.



## Further reading

### [China: Economic indicators and trade with EU](#)

Infographic, Gisela Grieger and Giulio Sabbati, June 2016

### [Major EU-China antidumping cases](#)

Briefing, Gisela Grieger, May 2016

### [State-owned enterprise \(SOE\) reforms in China: A decisive role for the market at last?](#)


Briefing, Gisela Grieger, May 2016

### [Granting Market Economy Status to China: An analysis of WTO law and of selected WTO members' policy](#)

In-depth analysis, Laura Puccio, November 2015


## More in the [Graphics Warehouse](#)

China's WTO case load from 2002 to November 2016



Data source: Author, based on [WTO](#) data.  
Graph: Christian Dietrich, EPRS

China's WTO case load by main WTO agreement invoked



Data source: Author, based on [WTO](#) data.  
Graph: Christian Dietrich, EPRS

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