12.1.2017

NATIONAL PARLIAMENT REASONED OPINION ON SUBSIDIARITY

Subject: Reasoned opinion of the Senate of the Kingdom of the Netherlands on the proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB)

Under Article 6 of the Protocol (No 2) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, national parliaments may, within eight weeks of the date of transmission of a draft legislative act, send the Presidents of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission a reasoned opinion stating why they consider that the draft in question does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity.

The Senate of the Kingdom of the Netherlands has sent the attached reasoned opinion on the above proposal for a directive to Parliament.

Under Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, the Committee on Legal Affairs is responsible for matters relating to compliance with the subsidiarity principle.
ANNEX

The President of the European Commission  
Mr Jean-Claude Juncker  
B-1049 Brussels  
Belgium

Date: 21 December 2016  
Subject: Reasoned opinion on EU proposals (COM(2016) 683), (COM(2016) 685) and (COM(2016) 687)  
Our ref.: 160408u

Dear Mr Juncker,

In accordance with the prescribed procedure, the Senate of the States-General has checked the following proposals for compliance with the principle of subsidiarity:

- Proposal for a Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) (COM(2016)683)¹;

In doing so, the Senate has applied Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union and Protocol 2 to the Treaty of Lisbon on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.

I am writing this letter to inform you of the position taken by the Senate of the States-General. Identical letters have been sent to the European Parliament, the Council and the Netherlands Government.


The parliamentary parties, which have reached this opinion by majority vote, provide the following reasons for their view on the subsidiarity and proportionality of the proposals in question:

¹ See dossier E160043 at www.europapoort.nl  
² See dossier E160044 at www.europapoort.nl  
³ See dossier E160046 at www.europapoort.nl  
⁴ This is the view of the following parliamentary parties: the VVD (13 seats), CDA (12 seats), PVV (9 seats), SP (9 seats), ChristenUnie (3 seats), PvdD (2 seats), SGP (2 seats) and 50Plus (2 seats).  
⁵ This is the view of the following parliamentary parties: the VVD (13 seats), CDA (12 seats), PVV (9 seats), SP (9 seats), ChristenUnie (3 seats), PvdD (2 seats), SGP (2 seats) and 50Plus (2 seats).  
⁶ This is the view of the following parliamentary parties: the VVD (13 seats), CDA (12 seats), PVV (9 seats), ChristenUnie (3 seats), SGP (2 seats) and 50Plus (2 seats).
Common Consolidated Tax Base CCCTB (COM(2016)683)

The proposal for a directive that is the predecessor of the two proposals for directives on a Common Corporate Tax Base and a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base was critically assessed by the Netherlands Government in 2011. At that time, this assessment led to the conclusion that the proposal did not comply with the subsidiarity principle. The present proposals for directives will require further study in the course of the procedure they must still complete. The issues are wide-ranging and the consequences for government revenues are not sufficiently clear. A majority of the Senate agree with the government that the proposal does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity. The opinion reads as follows:

‘The government considers that the principle of subsidiarity is not complied with. It does not see any necessity for the consolidation and redistribution of profits to be arranged at European level. Agreements about transfer pricing (which differ from this allocation ratio) already exist within the OECD.’

In addition, a majority of the Senate consider that the proposal does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity for the following reasons:

- There is no reason why consolidation should be made mandatory within the EU for groups with a turnover above EUR 750 million.
- No benefits for the internal market have been demonstrated, as agreements on transfer pricing already exist within the OECD.
- The European Commission’s impact assessment is based on unrealistic assumptions (namely that 16 countries, including the Netherlands, will raise their corporate tax rate).
- The risk that this will ultimately result in reduced corporate tax revenue in the Netherlands is too great.
- The link with countering tax avoidance is too far-fetched.
- The proposal does not provide for a minimum rate of corporate tax, say 20%.

In addition, a majority of the Senate consider that the proposal does not comply with the principle of proportionality for the following reasons:

- The proposal is unduly complex and will result in complicated implementation (coexistence of three systems).
- The allocation ratio works to the detriment of a country such as the Netherlands which specialises in trade and services (turnover, fixed assets, combination of a wage bill and number of employees).
- Agreements about transfer pricing on the basis of which profits are allocated already exist within the OECD.

Common Corporate Tax Base - CCTB (COM(2016) 685)

A majority of the Senate agree with the government that the proposal does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity. The opinion reads as follows:

‘The government considers that the principle of subsidiarity is not complied with. It can endorse the aims of this proposal, namely strengthening the internal market, creating a business-friendly environment within the EU and tackling tax avoidance. However, the

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7 Parliamentary Papers II 2016-2017, 34 604, no. 4, p. 11.
proposals are of little if any help in achieving this objective. The Commission states that a common corporate tax base to strengthen the internal market can only be adopted at EU level. In the government’s view, it is not apparent from the proposals that a European solution would have added value for all parties involved in this issue. Having a partially optional system means that the authorities must operate two different corporate tax systems rather than one and has clear drawbacks for the effectiveness of implementation. Moreover, the anti tax avoidance directive adopted during the Dutch Presidency of the EU has already brought about a significant degree of harmonisation at the Member State level and the Member States with the aim of preventing abuse. The anti-abuse measures comparable to those in the anti tax avoidance directive are repeated in the CCTB proposal. The other measures in the CCTB proposal are of little if any help in achieving this objective. It is therefore questionable whether and, if so, to what extent this proposal provides additional ways of tackling abuse.8

A majority of the Senate have the following additional reasons for holding that the proposal does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity:

- The aims of creating a more business-friendly environment for investment within the EU and strengthening tax avoidance are not met.
- The EU’s anti tax avoidance directive will itself produce the desired harmonisation of the tax base (largely through implementation of part of the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) package of measures).
- The proposal undermines the Dutch concept of taxable profit, limits the participation exemption and ends the innovation box (tax relief for innovation).
- The proposal unnecessarily goes further than the OECD (BEPS) package.

A majority of the Senate consider that the proposal does not comply with the principle of proportionality for the following reasons:

- The proposal is unduly complex and will result in complicated implementation (coexistence of three systems).
- The temporary and limited possibility for transferring losses may encourage the artificial importation of losses from other EU Member States.

Proposal for a Directive on hybrid mismatches with third countries (COM(2016) 687)

The proposal for a Directive on hybrid mismatches with third countries is basically intended to tackle aggressive forms of tax avoidance, but may also possibly affect structures of importance to the creation of employment in the Netherlands and the attractiveness of the Netherlands as a country in which to set up business, particularly for American companies. A majority of the Senate consider that the proposal does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity and mention the following specific reasons:

- The proposal undermines the Dutch taxation system.
- The proposal goes further than intended by the OECD.
- The proposal creates a situation where tax is levied (or tax relief denied) although the value is added in a third country. It is there that tax should be levied. This puts non-EU companies that wish to operate in the internal market at a competitive disadvantage.

8 Parliamentary Papers II 2016-2017, 34 604, no. 4, p. 11.
Lastly, a majority of the Senate consider that the proposal does not comply with the principle of proportionality for the following reasons:

- A global approach (OECD-BEPS action point 2) would be preferable.
- The proposal is extremely disadvantageous for the Netherlands (in particular as regards investments by American companies plus concomitant employment).
- It would be better to first wait and see what tax policy is pursued by the incoming US administration as there is a real chance that hybrids may be less attractive in the future from an American perspective.

For these reasons, a majority of the Senate of the States-General consider that the proposals for a directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) (COM(2016) 683), for a directive on a Common Corporate Tax Base (CCTB) (COM(2016) 685) and for a directive on hybrid mismatches with third countries (COM(2016) 687) conflict with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.

The Speaker of the Senate of the States-General

A. Broekers-Knol