EU-UN cooperation in peacekeeping and crisis management

SUMMARY

In April 2015, the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General's report focusing on the partnerships, concerning peacekeeping operations, between the UN and regional organisations set the goal of 'moving towards partnership peacekeeping'. This goal was set in a world characterised by violent conflict, growing demand for peacekeeping and a proliferation of multilateral actors engaged in various crisis management, conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding activities.

Since 2003, the European Union (EU) and UN have strived to strengthen their strategic partnership in peacekeeping and crisis management. More than a decade later, the EU and UN are cooperating systematically at strategic and operational levels, with consultation and coordination mechanisms now established. But challenges remain with regard to joint strategic planning, division of labour, joint reviews and coordination of exit strategies, amongst others. However, there are possible new prospects for strengthened cooperation between the EU and UN, as both are reviewing their strategic visions (a new European security strategy is in the works, while the UN is revising its peace operations and peacebuilding architecture). The European Parliament has encouraged the EU to support UN peacekeeping, and to cooperate with the UN in strengthening the peacekeeping capacities of regional organisations, particularly the African Union.

The briefing focuses on EU-UN cooperation regarding missions managed by the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations, thus does not address the UN's political missions.

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Premises for UN-EU cooperation in peacekeeping and crisis management

Growing demand and (new) challenges for UN peacekeeping

Since 1948, when the UN established its first peacekeeping operation in the Middle East (the UN Truce Supervision Organisation), there have been a further 70 UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) around the world.[1] Currently, the UN has in place 16 PKOs, engaging more than 124 000 personnel.[2] Most are deployed in Africa (over 87% of uniformed UN peacekeepers), but they are also in the Middle East, Europe, Asia and the Americas.

Since the 1990s, the number of missions and of deployed personnel has increased, while mission mandates have become more robust and multifaceted.[3] And the need for UN peacekeeping is likely to continue. Moreover, recent studies concluded peacekeeping does work: UN PKOs are found to reduce both the amount of violence during a conflict and the duration of the conflict; they help contain the conflict from spreading to neighbours and reduce the risk of it recurring. In addition, the conflict-reducing effect is greater the more the UN is willing to spend on peacekeeping (the annual budget for UN peacekeeping is less than US$8.5 billion, or less than 0.5% of global military spending), and the stronger the mandates provided.

On the other hand, UN peacekeeping faces a series of challenges, including new ones such as the changing nature of conflicts (e.g. transnational and unconventional threats), and coping with a wider range of mandated tasks for PKOs. Moreover, while the need for peacekeeping continues, the UN has difficulties in sustaining its current missions. Its peacekeepers are also confronted with ever more complex crises and are called upon to intervene in situations where there is 'little peace to keep'. Furthermore, there is no UN standing force and, since the fiascos of UN peacekeeping in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s, the organisation has generally avoided peace enforcement. Therefore, to respond to the complexity of contemporary conflicts, the UN is dependent on troops from its members and on modern, high-tech capabilities, including new technologies, all underpinned by strong engagement from UN members.

Evolution of a concept: global-regional cooperation

The UN's failure to prevent mass atrocities in the 1990s prompted mistrust of Western and other states towards the UN, and their relative withdrawal from UN peacekeeping. However, gradually, regional organisations started to develop their own crisis management and peacekeeping capacities, also driven by the necessity of burden-sharing. Despite adding a certain level of complexity and risk of overlap between the efforts of various actors, this increased involvement of regional and sub-regional organisations in peacekeeping and crisis management, in line with the principles of the UN Charter, has generally been welcomed. In particular, it has been viewed as an opportunity to draw upon the comparative advantages of each organisation in order to fill a range of roles in solving crises and tackling post-conflict challenges.

Experts have thus underlined the evolution of peace operations 'towards modularity, multidimensionality and integration of different peacekeeping actors', into 'hybrid peace operations'. A certain institutionalisation of partnerships between international organisations that have developed conflict-management tasks became necessary in practice, as they got involved simultaneously in the same conflict settings. Also, cooperation between regional organisations and with the UN has been induced by the comparative advantages of each (i.e. resources, capabilities, legitimacy), as well as by growing awareness that 'no single organisation can effectively address increasingly complex, multifaceted peace and security challenges on its own'. According to the UN

Secretary-General (UNSG), the relationship between the global level (UN) and regional and sub-regional organisations (e.g. EU, African Union, League of Arab States, OSCE, NATO, OIC, OAS, etc.) could be comprehensively framed and strengthened to usher in an era of 'partnership peacekeeping', mobilising the resources and comparative advantages of various organisations for the common goal of peace and security. This builds on the concept of **global-regional partnerships** that has evolved through UN peacekeeping reform and increased attention from the UN Security Council (UNSC) and General Assembly to the role of regional organisations in maintaining peace and security.

Chapter VIII of the UN Charter: Regional Arrangements

The 1945 UN Charter already acknowledged the positive role of regional organisations in supporting international peace and security. Chapter VIII on Regional Arrangements (Articles 52-54) provides the basis for cooperation between the UN and regional organisations in the maintenance of international peace and security, in line with the principles of the UN Charter. Regional 'arrangements or agencies' can take action for the peaceful settlement of local disputes, encouraged by the UNSC, and enforcement action authorised by the UNSC. They must keep the UNSC fully informed of their activities in the area of peace and security.

UN peacekeeping reviews and the issue of global-regional partnerships

The 1992 'An Agenda for Peace' marked the emergence of the concept of global-regional partnerships. The UNSG underlined then the potential for cooperation between the UN and regional organisations/arrangements in the areas of preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peace-making and post-conflict peacebuilding. The 1995 Supplement to the Agenda for Peace pointed furthermore to five options for such cooperation: **consultation** (formal and informal); mutual **diplomatic support** in peacemaking efforts; **operational support** from regional organisations to UN peacekeeping missions, and vice-versa; **co-deployment** (missions deployed in parallel in the same area); and **joint operations** whereby the UN and the regional organisation share staffing, financing and direction. In 2005, the Secretary-General's report In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all advocates the 'establishment of an interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities' which would allow the UN to cooperate with regional organisations in predictable and reliable partnerships. The 2010 New Horizons process, building on the 2000 Brahimi report, mentions partnerships with regional organisations among issues needing improvement, in light of interoperability difficulties experienced in several parallel, hybrid or bridging operations conducted by the UN, AU and EU.

Since 2006, the UNSG has regularly reported on the issue of global-regional partnerships, and cooperation with regional organisations. The UNSG's 2015 report mentioned several avenues for reinforcing global-regional partnerships in peacekeeping:

- Strengthening formal and informal mechanisms of engagement at **strategic level**, including through a clearer methodology for consultation between the UNSC and its regional and sub-regional counterparts, in view of a better division of roles in response to a crisis; more rapid decision-making and an optimal use of resources;
- Cooperating on **planning** at each phase of the response to a crisis;
- Gradually **harmonising policies and standards** (e.g. pre-deployment standards and training; greater understanding of each other's policies and more systematic sharing of lessons learnt).

Importantly, a **review** of UN peacekeeping started in June 2014. Based on the June 2015 report of the High-Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations, tasked to carry

out this reflection, the UNSG gave his recommendations for reforming UN peace operations and for strengthening the global-regional partnership (inter alia, institutionalising the key relationships, better use of regional organisations' capabilities, and better burden-sharing with regard to supporting the AU in Africa).

UN Security Council activities in support of cooperation with regional organisations
The **UNSC** started in 2003 to hold thematic debates on regional organisations regularly. A focus on Africa became evident and, since 2007, the UNSC and its AU counterpart – the Peace and Security Council – have held annual meetings. Later, the UNSC and the EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC) also started to meet informally.

In 2005, the UNSC adopted UNSC Resolution 1631 (2005), its first resolution on regional organisations. Several UNSC resolutions have since addressed cooperation between the UN and regional organisations, particularly UN-AU relations. UNSC Resolution 2167 (2014), on regional organisations and peacekeeping, is the most recent on the topic. It recognises that cooperation between the UN and regional and sub-regional organisations can improve collective security, while reaffirming the UNSC's primary responsibility in maintaining international peace and security. The resolution also expresses support for enhancing the peacekeeping role of regional organisations, and calls for more coherence and coordination of efforts. Finally, it welcomed improved cooperation at strategic level between the UN and several regional organisations (the AU and the EU included) and stressed the need to improve cooperation at operational level (e.g. joint lessons learnt exercises, pre-deployment joint planning and joint mission assessment processes, enhanced sharing of information and best practices, etc.).

The most recent UNSC open debate on regional organisations took place in August 2015. UNSC members concurred that the nature and complexity of the current threats to peace and security (e.g. piracy, terrorism, transnational organised crime and health crises) demanded strengthened cooperation between global, regional and sub-regional levels. The responsibility for peace and security is increasingly shared, and efforts must be mutually reinforcing: the UN supports organisations in solving regional problems, while regional organisations contribute to UN peace efforts by offering the UN required civilian and military capacities as well as political support. Nevertheless, despite significant progress, many challenges remained, in terms of a shared vision and understanding, of necessary capacities and of ensuring 'the predictability, sustainability and flexibility' of financing of UNSC-mandated peacekeeping operations conducted by regional organisations, among others. Some of the proposals put forward at the debate referred to better burden-sharing, complementarity and coherence between global and regional levels, focus on conflict prevention, the creation of a common operational culture through training and guidance, devising a comprehensive approach by supporting justice and security sector reform (SSR), a common goal of protecting civilians, support for capacity-building of regional organisations, as well as predictable financing.

The UN-EU strategic partnership in peacekeeping and crisis management

The EU and the UN refer to each other as key partners, and their cooperation covers a wide range of policies and issues: humanitarian aid, development, promotion of human rights, democracy and rule of law, climate action, as well as conflict resolution and peace-building. In the field of crisis management and peacekeeping, cooperation between the two organisations has been increasingly institutionalised since 2003.

The EU and the UN as 'natural partners'

The EU and UN have been depicted as 'natural partners' due to a certain convergence of norms and values, complementary political interests and operational interdependence. Both organisations share a wide range of **norms and values**, and the overarching goal of a peaceful world. On the EU side, the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) and the 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS underline the principle of 'effective multilateralism' (a rule-based international order with effective international institutions) as a key objective of EU external action. Both documents stress the EU's commitment to cooperate and coordinate with the UN: 'Strengthening the UN, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority.' Importantly, the EU Treaties base the EU's external action on the principles of the UN Charter (Articles 3 and 21 TEU). Moreover, like the UN, the EU has been stressing the importance of prevention and comprehensiveness: while the EU has developed the comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises, the UN has underlined the need for 'an integrated approach' across policy areas and at various levels. Speaking before the UNSC in March 2015, Federica Mogherini, the EU's High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP) reconfirmed the EU's strategic partnership with the UN as a key relationship, and emphasised the importance of global-regional partnerships: 'Multi-layered partnerships – under the guidance of the UNSC... – will be the only possible foundation of the future global security agenda.' Furthermore, the EU priorities for the (ongoing) 70th UN General Assembly underline the importance given by the EU to Chapter VIII of the Charter, EU support for the new paradigm of 'partnership peacekeeping' and the need for strong trilateral cooperation (EU-UN-AU) in Africa.

For its part, the UN recognises the EU as one of its most important regional partners in peacekeeping, together with the African Union. While the AU's peacekeeping capabilities still need support, including from the EU and UN, the EU has managed to develop a broad crisis-management agenda, including conflict prevention, mediation, peacekeeping as well as post-conflict stabilisation. Following the establishment of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP, previously the ESDP), the EU has engaged in crisis-management activities outside its territory, aimed at 'peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security' (Article 42(1) TEU) in line with the UN Charter. It completed 17 CSDP missions and operations and has in place another 17 CSDP civilian missions and military operations on three continents, with a wide range of mandates (e.g. military training, capacity-building, counter-piracy, rule of law and security sector reform, border assistance, etc.) and deploying over 5 000 civilian and military personnel. Like UN PKOs, the majority of these missions have been in Africa and, in many cases, they have operated in parallel to UN PKOs or to AU missions.

Both organisations also have **complementary interests**: the UN can offer legitimacy for the EU's crisis management activities and its global security ambitions, while EU Member States can provide the capabilities the UN needs for peacekeeping. The EU's Battlegroups (rapid reaction force) are particularly sought after, with UN representatives having repeatedly made a case for exploring scenarios for their use (most recently by UN Under Secretary-General, Hervé Ladsous, at the informal meeting of EU Defence Ministers in September 2015). Other capabilities the EU could put at UN disposal are informational and situational awareness, logistics and enablers, such as helicopters or counter-IED.

Finally, both organisations have become aware of the need for **operational** cooperation in the field, as EU CSDP operations have often deployed to countries with a UN

peacekeeping or peace-building presence. In recent years, the two organisations have cooperated on the ground in Mali, Central African Republic, Somalia, RD Congo and Afghanistan. The EU also proved its potential in acting as a bridging mechanism until the UN took over. Importantly, the EU and its Member States contribute around 37% of the funding for UN peacekeeping. The EU and UN also cooperate on strengthening conflict prevention tools and mediation. And in 2013, they collaborated in supporting the OPCW-UN Joint Mission for removing and destroying chemical weapons stockpiles in Syria.

The EU-UN strategic framework on crisis management
The foundations of the strategic partnership
The EU-UN partnership[4] in the field of crisis management and peacekeeping was truly established in September 2003, when the EU and the UN issued their first Joint Declaration on EU-UN cooperation in Crisis Management. The Joint Declaration came in the context of the first instances of cooperation on the ground in 2003, namely in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) where the EU Police Mission (the EU's first CSDP mission) took over the policing mandate from the UN International Police Task Force, and in RD Congo where the EU deployed one of its first military operations (Artemis). The EU was the first organisation to sign a cooperation agreement with the UN.

In June 2007, a new Joint Statement on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management was adopted. It recognised the progress achieved and tried to expand the cooperative arrangements, particularly in areas such as support to African peacekeeping and cooperation on police, rule of law and security sector reform; regular high-level political dialogue and exchanges of views between UN and EU officials; systematic UN-EU joint lessons learnt exercises, etc. Moreover, practical cooperation in the field developed with parallel deployments and sequential missions in RD Congo and Chad. Nevertheless, the actions defined in the Joint Statement were not fully realised. One example is the ongoing discussion on the EU Battlegroups. Although the Joint Statement mentioned the EU Battlegroups as an option for rapid intervention, at the request of the UNSC, the EU decided not to grant the UN's request for an EU intervention in Congo in 2008. In fact, the EU has not to date used the Battlegroups.

Established interinstitutional mechanisms
Following the 2003 Joint UN-EU Declaration, a permanent joint consultative mechanism was established: the **EU-UN Steering Committee**, tasked with assessing options for cooperation on planning, training, communication and exchanging best practices. The **UN-EU High-Level Political Dialogue** was established in 2013 to enhance structural political dialogue. The UNSC meets annually with the EU's Political and Security Committee, and holds regular meetings on UN-EU cooperation with the UN Secretary-General and the HR/VP. **Liaison Offices** were also set up: currently the EU Delegation to the UN ensures this function, and in 2011 a UN Liaison Office for Peace and Security (UNLOPS) representing the three UN Departments responsible for peace operations and political missions (Department for Peacekeeping Operations, DPKO; for Political Affairs, DPA; and for Field Support, DFS) was set up in Brussels. Finally, the UN-EU Desk to Desk dialogue on conflict prevention (in the DPA remit) includes UN and EU staff.

The operational framework for coordination
The 2012-2014 Plan of Action to enhance EU CSDP support to UN peacekeeping
Attempting to revitalise and operationalise the partnership, in 2012 the EU adopted the Plan of Action to enhance EU CSDP support to UN peacekeeping which aims at implementing six clusters of priority actions defined in a previous document: Actions to

enhance EU CSDP support to UN peacekeeping of November 2011. The timeline for implementation was two years. The main actions are summarised below. Clusters **C** and **D**, together with efforts under cluster **A**, have been UN priorities.

Table 1 – Summary of Actions to enhance EU CSDP support to UN peacekeeping

Clusters	Actions (2012-2014)	Explanations
A	Clearing House and Bundling Member States' contributions	Identifying EU civilian and military capabilities that could be put at the UN's disposal. The Clearing House implies the EU could coordinate contributions from Member States to UN peacekeeping;
B	EU providing an EU component to a UN operation (modular approach)	Developing an EU concept for situations of EU force deployment under UN flag or subcontracting to the EU specific tasks of the UN mission (e.g. establishing field hospitals) or providing niche capabilities (SSR, DDR, rule of law, border management);
C	EU autonomous civilian deployment in support of UN	Creation of policy frameworks on autonomous EU deployments in support of the UN and establishing modalities for coordination in different cases: parallel deployments, takeovers (EU takes over from a UN operation), EU military bridging operations ahead of UN operations;
D	EU autonomous military deployment in support of UN	
E	Strengthen assistance to regional organisations	Defining joint EU-UN coordination efforts to assist other regional organisations, in particular the AU;
F	Cross-cutting areas	Establishing technical arrangements on cooperation in **capability development** (e.g. providing support to the UN Civilian Capacities Initiative, civilian expertise to UN missions in niche areas and making the EU's Goalkeeper software environment available to the UN), **doctrine development** (developing interoperable doctrines and concepts), **training and exercises** (minimum training standards and common pre-deployment standards), **lessons learnt** (exchanging information on the respective lessons learnt processes); Concluding a **general framework agreement** on operational aspects (provisions on the status of personnel, participation modalities in operations, chain of command, financial arrangements, etc.) and upgrading the level of **exchange of classified information** with the UN (currently a UN-EU permanent administrative arrangement allows sharing of classified information up to 'EU restricted' level).

Source: Actions to enhance EU CSDP support to UN peacekeeping of 24 November 2011.

Implementation of the 2012-2014 Plan of Action
The **implementation** of the Plan of Action has been assessed as uneven. On the one hand, coordination on planning has improved, with greater information exchange, more awareness about the other organisation's planning and operational structures, as well as increased mutual confidence. In April 2014, the UN and the EU agreed on **modalities for 'Coordination during the planning of UN missions and EU civilian missions and military operations'** (actions C and D). These replaced the 2008 'Guidelines for Joint UN-EU planning applicable to existing UN field missions'. The **modalities** focus on parallel operations and include principles and practical measures for cooperation throughout the assessment and planning phases of the respective operations of the EU and UN. In particular, the **practical measures for cooperation** contain guidelines on maintaining contacts and exchanging information at secretariat level; on establishing common strategic planning assumptions and objectives, as well as discussing division of labour, synergies and complementarities with the other organisation; creating a logistical support framework in cases of parallel missions; liaising and coordinating on public communication issues; and coordination on the ground. The guidelines also encourage

the EU and UN to conduct joint assessment missions when possible, or to share the results of each organisation's assessments. Coordination on transition/termination of missions is recommended, and both organisations are encouraged to conduct joint 'after action' reviews (AAR). The guidelines need to be **revised by mid-April 2016**. They were successfully applied in the planning of EUFOR RCA and EUCAP Sahel Mali.

On the other hand, limited progress has been achieved with respect to identifying EU Member States' capabilities to put at the UN's disposal. Despite positive examples such as the increased assistance of some EU Member States to the UN mission in Mali, and the EU bridging operation in Central African Republic, there is no political consensus on establishing an EU mechanism to manage capabilities for UN support (the clearing house). Due to EU states' preference to deal bilaterally with the UN, contrary to the Action Plan, the EU decided in April 2014 not to provide the UN with a list of EU Member States' capabilities potentially available for the UN. The UN had already sent a capability needs list to the EU (a recent version was issued in September 2015), hoping to get a commitment on the provision of needed 'critical enablers'. Moreover, the 'modular approach' has not yet been applied, with no EU component in UN missions.

Strengthening the strategic partnership: priorities for 2015-2018
Consultations were held throughout 2014 for the development of a new Action Plan. The document **'Strengthening the UN-EU strategic partnership on peacekeeping and crisis management: Priorities 2015-2018'** – still under discussion in the Council – identifies strategic areas for deepening the EU-UN cooperation in the next years:

Table 2 – Summary of draft EU-UN Priorities 2015-2018

| Strategic areas	Objectives/Actions
Rapid Response	Elaborating modalities for facilitating CSDP autonomous deployment in support of UN missions or as bridging force and continuing work on the use of EU Battlegroups;
Support to the AU and closer trilateral cooperation UN-EU-AU	Support the African Peace and Security Architecture, including to the African Standby Force and African Capacity for Immediate Response, and support to training and capacity-building to AU and African TCCs;
Facilitating EU Member States' contributions to UN peacekeeping	Continuing engagement with EU Member States for the provision of niche capabilities, critical enablers, modern technologies and uniformed personnel, and identifying a support role for the EEAS;
Cooperation in the areas of Rule of Law and SSR	Exchanging compatible impact assessment methodologies or launching a mapping study of UN and EU support efforts to SSR, etc.
Information and analysis exchange	Maintaining regular exchanges of analysis; finalising the arrangement for exchange of classified information between the EEAS and the UN; sharing outcomes of Strategic Reviews or lessons learnt as appropriate;
Finalisation of the framework agreement on support and logistics	Facilitating the conclusion of Field Specific Agreements relating to mutual support in-theatre and to the hand-over of equipment and facilities by the UN to an EU mission and vice versa. The Council authorised the opening of negotiations on 16 March 2015;
Follow-up to the EU Plan of Action	Continue implementation of actions to be completed: opening the Goalkeeper platform to the UN; adopting Modalities for coordination during the conduct of operations etc.

Source: Strengthening the UN-EU strategic partnership on peacekeeping and crisis management: Priorities 2015-2018', draft, March 2015.

UN-EU cooperation on the ground

Between 2003 and 2012, the EU had 15 missions and operations involving cooperation with the UN. Currently, the EU and the UN are operating in parallel in Mali, the Central African Republic (CAR), RD Congo, Somalia, Kosovo and the Middle East.[5] Cooperation on the ground has evolved notably since the first EU missions and operations in 2003 – the EU Police Mission BiH taking over from the UN police mission, and the military operation Artemis in RD Congo (June-August 2003), requested by the UN to support its mission there (MONUC). Yet, at the end of operation Artemis, the European contributors refused to 're-hat' some of their forces as UN 'blue helmets' and no European state participated in the UN force that took over Artemis. The subsequent military operations, EUFOR RD Congo (July–November 2006), which, like Artemis, complemented MONUC, and EUFOR Tchad/RCA (January 2008-March 2009), which was a military bridging operation to the UN Mission to CAR and Chad (MINURCAT), were generally assessed as successful in terms of EU-UN cooperation on the ground and at the highest political level. However, a series of political and operational problems were also evident: due to divergent national interests, reluctance of EU Member States to get involved and to contribute troops to the operations (France was the main promotor of and contributor to the operations), shortage of EU operational capabilities and interoperability problems, and slow EU decision-making, but also problems resulting from persistent differences between the organisational cultures, practices and procedures of the EU and UN. On the other hand, these experiences provided valuable lessons for future collaboration.

Figure 1 - Ongoing UN PKOs and EU CSDP missions and operations

Sources: EEAS and UN PKO factsheet, 31 August 2015. NB: The map represents only the UN PKOs and excludes the UN's political missions (if included, the map would also show parallel EU and UN missions in Afghanistan, Libya and Somalia). 'Current personnel' includes uniformed and civilian personnel.

Significant progress has ensued on the ground after the EU Action Plan and the mutually agreed modalities on planning. Mali, CAR and Somalia have been cited as 'excellent examples of the comprehensive and complementary nature of the UN-EU partnership '. In **Mali**, the UN mission MINUSMA saw increased participation of uniformed personnel

from 11 EU states,[6] as well as the provision of helicopters, transport aircraft, intelligence experts and special forces. The EU also has a military training mission in the country (EUTM Mali) launched in February 2013, and a civilian SSR mission (EUCAP Sahel Mali) launched in January 2015. Experts consider that EU-UN coordination with regard to EUCAP Sahel Mali was very good: coordinated planning, reciprocal liaison officers, consultations on the division of labour between the EU mission and UN police.

In the **CAR**, EUFOR RCA (April 2014-March 2015) has provided a successful example of a military bridging operation authorised by the UNSC. Its objective was to secure the environment in Bangui until the UN mission (MINUSCA) could assume full responsibility for the area. The EU replaced EUFOR RCA in March 2015 with a military advisory mission (EUMAM RCA) to assist CAR authorities with SSR, in particular reform of the armed forces. The EU had also provided support through the African Peace Facility to the AU mission in CAR (MISCA), which handed over to MINUSCA in September 2014. In **Somalia**, both the UN and EU have supported logistically and financially the AU mission in the country (AMISOM, established in 2006), and all three organisations cooperated in designing a security strategy for Somalia. Currently, the EU has three missions in Somalia and the Horn of Africa: EUTM Somalia (military training), EUCAP Nestor (capacity-building) and EUNAVFOR Atalanta (counter-piracy operation).

EU-UN-AU trilateral cooperation

The UN and the EU have supported AU efforts in peacekeeping, as all three organisations have a stake in improving peacekeeping in Africa. AU cooperation with both organisations is a key aspect of the continent's peace and security architecture. The UN remains the AU's most important partner for conducting peace operations in Africa, as it provides legitimacy to AU-led interventions and support packages for missions undertaken under UN mandate. The EU sustains AU peacekeeping and the AU Peace and Security Architecture through its civilian and training missions, and through the African Peace Facility. For 2014-2016, the EU increased African Peace Facility funds from the initially allocated €750 million to €900 million. The EU and UN also provide coordinated support to the AU multi-annual SSR capacity-building programme.

Persistent limitations to EU-UN cooperation in peacekeeping

Over more than a decade, the EU and the UN have significantly strengthened their cooperation in crisis management. Nevertheless, a series of limitations and challenges to the partnership persist. Some impediments to inter-organisational cooperation are said to be caused by divergent interests and preferences of member states, by collective action problems or lack of capabilities, as well as by conflicting procedures of both organisations, or even turnover of staff, affecting institutional memories. Furthermore, some experts consider the partnership as asymmetric and reflecting the gap between 'what the UN wants and what the EU is willing to offer.'

Planning
Coordination on planning has improved considerably, with increased information exchanges and awareness of the need for coordination from both sides. The creation of the EEAS and its planning directorate has also helped communication with UN counterparts. However, cooperation is said to be conditional on a convergence of views at the political level on risk assessment, strategic priorities and division of tasks, which impacts on mandates. Coordination was difficult when there was disagreement over mandates. Furthermore, some constraints arise from differences in organisational cultures and planning rules (more decentralisation and autonomy on the UN side, more political control in the EU case), as well as obstacles to the exchange of information and

the difficulty in defining a general pattern for cooperation to apply to diverse missions. Finally, there is scope for better coordination on exit strategies, on sharing of lessons learnt and joint AARs. A joint AAR on the military bridging operation in CAR is under way.

Training

Further work is needed to improve cooperation on training, which has been rather unstructured: for example on common pre-deployment training standards (on SSR, gender, human rights etc.) and common training modules (on policing, however, the Strategic Guidance Framework now informs all training modules).

Capabilities

One significant limitation to EU-UN cooperation is the persistent UN capability gaps the EU and its Member States could fill: regular troops, and also rapid reaction forces (Battlegroups) or specialised/enabling capabilities. However, with the exception of UNIFIL in Lebanon, and also UNDOF in the Golan Heights and UNFICYP in Cyprus,[7] EU states provide low numbers of troops to UN operations. The uniformed personnel contribution of EU Member States is around 5% of total UN military and police personnel.[8] There are several reasons for this: European mistrust toward UN command and control structures, lack of experience with UN peacekeeping practices, increased focus on the EU's own CSDP missions and wish to preserve autonomy of decision-making and conduct over operations, as well as visibility concerns. Despite the promises of the 2012-2014 Action Plan, neither the modular approach nor the clearing house mechanism has been put into practice (see above). Moreover, the Action Plan clarified that it did not commit the EU or Member States towards the UN, and that EU states have the final say on the use of their resources. On the other hand, some limits in this area relate to the UN, which only recently established a strategic force generation capacity (the Strategic Force Generation Planning Cell). Also, the UN still needs to improve the support it offers to European forces when they deploy. In any case, experts underline there are lasting constraints for 'the return of Europe to UN peacekeeping', including pressure on national budgets. However, UN peace operations could acquire greater importance for the EU's security, as its external borders are in turmoil. The contributions of Sweden and the Netherlands to MINUSMA, and the new pledges at the 2015 UN peacekeeping summit are positive steps in advancing the partnership.

The 2nd Summit on UN Peacekeeping

On 28 September 2015, US President Barack Obama chaired the second UN Peacekeeping summit. The US has been pushing for increased European participation in UN PKOs, although the US itself lags behind in troop contributions, with only 80 uniformed personnel. At the summit, some 40 000 troops and other critical capabilities (40 helicopters, 15 engineering companies, 10 field hospitals etc.) were pledged, and a commitment from China to create an 8 000-strong standby force for rapid deployment to UN missions.[9] Among EU Member States, Italy's pledges are notable: a helicopter squadron, an engineering company and a specialised infantry battalion. The UK promised 300 troops for the South Sudan mission and 70 specialised troops for the AU-led mission in Somalia. Other EU states made few pledges.

The European Parliament's role

The EP has regularly made recommendations to the Council on EU priorities for the UN General Assembly (e.g. in 2013 and 2014). The 2014 EP resolution called on the EU to provide the necessary support (technical, financial, capabilities) to UN PKOs and to cooperate in supporting regional organisations strengthen their capacities in peacekeeping, conflict prevention and resolution. The EP is due to vote in November

2015 on a [report](#) on the Role of the EU within the UN (Paavo Väyrynen, ALDE, Finland).[10] On conflict management, the report adopted by the AFET committee calls for further [developing](#) the UN's prevention and mediation capabilities, and for 'more precise mandates and clear exit strategies' for peace operations'. It also encourages Member States to provide substantial support to peace-building and peacekeeping operations and advocates strengthening EU-UN operational cooperation in crisis management.

Main references

[Partnering for peace: moving towards partnership peacekeeping](#) / Report of the UN Secretary-General, S/2015/229, 1 April 2015.

Publication results from the [EU-UN Partnerships Initiative](#) / EUISS and ZIF Berlin.

Endnotes

1   Peacekeeping is one of the tools used by the UN for preventing and solving conflicts, alongside conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement and peacebuilding, as defined by the 2008 document ['United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: principles and guidelines'](#). Peacekeeping is an activity designed to preserve peace, when fighting has been halted, and traditionally it involved observing of cease-fires and separation of forces following conflict. In time, peacekeeping started to overlap with other conflict management activities and a new generation of 'multi-dimensional' UN PKOs emerged, usually relying on a mix of military, police and civilian capabilities to support the implementation of a peace agreement. These PKOs have wider mandates than traditional PKOs and can also provide initial support for some post-conflict peacebuilding activities. Yet, three principles continue to characterise UN PKOs: consent of the parties, impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate. Besides PKOs, the UN also [deploys](#) political missions engaged in conflict prevention, peacemaking and post-conflict peace-building, managed by the [UN Department for Political Affairs](#).

2   According to data as of 31 August 2015, there are more than 106 000 uniformed personnel from 122 countries and around 18 000 civilian personnel and UN volunteers in UN peacekeeping missions around the globe.

3   The majority is also pointing to the dangers PKOs are facing in increasingly hostile settings and to rising peacekeeper casualties. A recent [study](#) rejects this view, concluding that PKOs 'have not become significantly more dangerous, at least not in terms of fatalities.' The number of [fatalities](#) in all UN PKOs since 1948 reached 3395 in August 2015.

4   Already in 2001, the European Council [decided](#) to 'reinforce political dialogue and strengthen cooperation between the EU and the UN' and [adopted](#) a set of guiding principles for the EU in its cooperation with the UN.

5   Only the UN PKOs are considered, so excluding the UN's 11 [political and peacebuilding missions](#).

6   More than 850 uniformed [personnel](#); the Netherlands and Sweden make up together 90% of the EU Member States' uniformed contribution to MINUSMA.

7   In September 2015, [EU Member States](#) contributed most troops and police to UNIFIL (3537), to MINUSMA (825); UNFICYP (524), UNDOF (159) and UNTSO (75).

8   As of 30 September 2015, the [top ten EU contributors](#) of uniformed personnel were: Italy (1191); France (912); Spain (620); Netherlands (583); Ireland (386); Finland (337); UK (291); Sweden (261); Austria (196); Germany (181). EU Member States' contribution of uniformed personnel to UN missions has [fluctuated](#) over time: from almost 30% of all UN personnel in 1995, it dropped in 2010 to 8.3%, and since 2013 was maintained at around 5%.

9   2015 Leaders' Summit on UN Peacekeeping /Weed M. C, Blanchfield L., CRS, 5 October 2015.

10 See also [Boosting the EU's role in the United Nations](#)/ Bentzen N., EPRS At a glance note, November 2015.

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