BRIEFING

European Parliament

The economy and coronavirus: Weekly Picks

This paper provides a summary of recent analyses of the economic and budgetary effects of the coronavirus, the preparations of the next European Council on the recovery instrumnets, the German Presidency priorties in the area of ECOFIN and of some policy recommendations made in the public domain to mitigate the negative economic effects of the pandemic.

Latest economic estimates for the Euro Area

According to the European Commission Summer 2020 Interim Economic Forecast, due to the fact that the lifting of lockdown measures is proceeding at a more gradual pace than assumed in the Spring Forecast, the impact on economic activity in 2020 is projected to be more significant than anticipated. A string of indicators suggests that the euro area economy has operated at between 25% to 30% below its capacity during the period of the strictest confinement.

Figure 1. EU economic forecast map for 2020



Source: European Commission.

As a result, the Commission has revised downwards its growth forecasts from spring and currently projects that the euro area economy will contract by 8.7% in 2020 and grow by 6.1% in 2021, as compared to a contraction of 7.7% (2020) and growth of 6.3% (2021) projected in Spring for the euro area. **See Annex** for a comparison of Commission Summer (July), Spring (May) and Winter (February) 2020 forecast for EU Member States.

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Table 1. Projections of Selected Euro Area indicators

	COM July 2020 (November 2019)			IMF June 2020 (October 2019)			ECB June 2020 (December 2019)			OECD June 2020 (November 2019)		
	2019	**2020**	**2021**	**2019**	**2020**	**2021**	**2019**	**2020**	**2021**	**2019**	**2020**	**2021**
GDP Growth (%)												
Euro area	1.2	-8.7	6.1	1.3	-10.2	6.0	1.2	-8.7	5.2	1.3	-11.5	3.5
	(1.1)	(1.2)	(1.2)	(1.2)	(1.4)	(1.4)	(1.2)	(1.1)	(1.4)	(1.2)	(1.1)	(1.2)

Sources: European Commission (COM)'s Economic Forecast Autumn 2019 and Summer 2020; IMF World Economic Outlook, June 2020 update and October 2019; ECB Staff Macroeconomic projections June 2020 and December 2019; and OECD Economic Outlook, June 2020 and November 2019. Note: Forecasts by the four institutions have different "cut-off" dates and are made under different sets of assumptions about policies and underlying economic and financial assumptions and conditions.

Given the unusual **uncertainty surrounding** economic projections, this updated forecast continues to be based on a number of critical assumptions. Most importantly, it is assumed that containment measures in the EU will be gradually further lifted and no major second wave of infections will trigger new generalised restrictions. However, continued social distancing measures are factored in with repercussions on sectors requiring interpersonal contact. The fiscal and monetary policy measures credibly announced up to the cut-off date are expected to support the recovery and prevent large-scale bankruptcies and layoffs. Still, insolvencies and employment losses across Member States are likely to occur. At the global level, the still rising rate of infections, particularly in the US and emerging markets, has deteriorated the global outlook and is expected to act as a drag on the European economy.

Risks surrounding the growth projections continue to be severe and interconnected, leaving the balance of risks still tilted to the downside. The major risk is a new wave of infections which would falsify one of the key assumptions of this forecast. More permanent scars from the COVID-19 induced economic shock represent another major risk as, e.g. more widespread employment destructions and corporate insolvencies would lead to a slower recovery. There are risks to the stability of financial markets and a danger that Member States may fail to sufficiently coordinate national policy responses. The absence of a deal on the relationship between the EU and the UK as of 2021 remains an important risk (currently, the future relations between the EU and the UK are based on a purely technical assumption of status quo in terms of their trading relations). On the upside, the Commission's proposal Next Generation EU, which cannot be reflected in the baseline until it is adopted by co-legislators, could give a sizable impulse to the EU economy, particularly in 2021.

Preparations of the European Council on 17-18 July 2020

On 8 July, the European Parliament hold and exchange of views with the President of the European Council in advance of the summit on 17-18 July. The President of the European Council explained the on-going negotiations among Member States. He stressed that there are a number of areas of agreement (to focus on regions and sectors most affected, to discuss jointly the MFF and the recovery facility and on the need for an "unprecedented response") but also pointed to areas of disagreement, notably, the allocation criteria and of grants to Member States financed through EU loans.

President Michel identified a number of subjects that would feature in the upcoming discussions: (a) the size of the MFF and rebates; (b) the size of the recovery facility; (c) the grant dimension of the recovery facility and the balance between grants and loans; (d) the static nature of the allocation criteria (where he pointed to discussions around alternative and more dynamic allocation criteria); (e) conditionality namely, the link to the rule of law and the green agenda; (f) frontloading of the MFF and (g) timing of payments, commitments and repayments of loans (where he hinted that the Commission timeline might need to be antecipated).

On own resources, one of the priority issues for Parliament, Mr. Michel underlined that discussions were held around ETS and a plastic waste tax but also on digital and financial taxation, whilst mentioning that flexibility in cohesion and agriculture is also an important topic for some Member States. He also committed to ensure Parliament would be involved.

Mr. Michel announced he would be proposing a negotiation box by the 10 July and proceed negotiations within the Council. He outlined his three main objectives: fostering convergence, resilience and transformation (green and digital agendas).

On behalf of the Commission, Vice-President Šefčovič underlined in his opening speech, as concerns the EP demand for an agreement on new own resources for the EU in paralell with the MFF discussions, the following: '*new own resouces will support our shared objectives and will help us to repay what we borrow for the Next Generation EU without compromising the funding of our future programmes and, while we take big steps forward in the coming weeks in agreeing on the proposals already on the table, we can take a giant leap when we set out new proposals next year. We will soon put forward a road-map for these extra sources, a road-map how to achieve these new own resources…*'. He also underlined that the European Parliament "*plays and will continue to play a vitally important role*" in the recovery and MFF process.

For a short overview of the Commission proposal for a recovery instrument and new EU own resources, see previous Weekly Picks of 15 June 2020.

Some recent estimates on EU fiscal positions

Report by the European Fiscal Board

On 1 July 2020, the European Fiscal Board (EFB) published an assessment of the fiscal stance appropriate for the euro area in 2021.

The Board noted that "The current crisis provides a perfect example of why the euro area fiscal stance matters. In normal times the aggregation of country-specific fiscal recommendations provides a good basis for evaluating an appropriate fiscal stance in the euro area as a whole. In very difficult times, however, simply following EU fiscal rules does not necessarily amount to a fiscal stance that ensures an appropriate balancing of sustainability and stability considerations for the euro area as a whole; this was clearly observed in the wake of the sovereign debt crisis and is also evident now.".

Against such background, the key messages of the EFB are the following:

- For 2021, the EFB recommends providing further fiscal support. In 2020, containment measures to fight the Covid-19 pandemic have triggered an unprecedented recession in the euro area. Governments have adopted discretionary fiscal measures to support the economy, estimated at around 3¼ % of GDP, on top of automatic stabilisers of close to 5% of GDP. Recent announcements by Germany and France could push the discretionary stimulus of national governments in 2020 to 4% of euro area GDP or more.
- Most of the discretionary support measures are projected to be discontinued in 2021, leaving a considerable gap compared to the growth path expected in early 2020. This calls for an extension of discretionary fiscal support at the national level next year, underpinned or complemented by the initiatives launched at EU level.
- Activation of the so-called general escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact was fully justified. For greater effectiveness and credibility, the activation should have provided indications on the timing of and conditions for exit or review. Clarifications should be offered in spring 2021 at the latest. In the current context it would not be advisable to use the growth rate of real GDP when considering the end of a severe economic downturn; using a pre-crisis level of real GDP of the euro area and the EU as a reference would make more sense.
- Budgetary plans for 2021 offer an opportunity to give a more dynamic orientation to fiscal support among euro area countries. Priority should be given to government investment and growth-enhancing government expenditure more generally. It should differentiate across countries, taking

into account the underlying situation and making good use of existing as well as upcoming instruments at the EU or euro area level.

- The Covid-19 pandemic underscored once more the difficulties of managing large shocks with hardly any joint elements, most importantly without the EU having a central fiscal capacity allowing it to borrow a meaningful amount of funds on the market. Recent initiatives such as SURE and the Recovery Instrument go in the right direction when it comes to heading off the crisis, but should eventually be replaced by or morph into a permanent EU fiscal instrument so the EU can respond to severe shocks in a timely fashion.

European Commission's overview of the 2020 Stability and Convergence Programmes

On 6 July 2020, European Commission's services (DG ECFIN) published an overview of the 2020 Stability and Convergence Programmes of EU Member States and an assessment of their implications for the euro area's fiscal stance. The below key results focus on 2020, since the figures for 2021 are particularly uncertain and because of a lack of 2021 data in the Stability and Convergence Programmes:

Growth

Nearly all Member States project a sharp recession in 2020, while the outlook for 2021 is much more uncertain. In most Member States, these forecasts were prepared or endorsed by national independent fiscal institutions. By and large, the Commission and Member States forecast similarly sized contractions in 2020, with only Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, the Netherlands and Romania projecting markedly more optimistic growth outcomes in 2020 than the Commission. In 2021, both the Commission and Member States expect a return to positive GDP growth, subject to a gradual abating of the pandemic in the second half of 2020. However, there is exceptional uncertainty surrounding the timing and size of the expected rebound, and several countries did not present growth forecasts for the next year (Bulgaria, Germany, France, Poland, Portugal and Romania). In response to this uncertain and severely negative economic outlook, European households have significantly increased their precautionary savings.

Nominal public budget balance

The unprecedented fiscal policy response to the pandemic will cause public deficits to rise sharply in 2020. In addition to support delivered by the automatic stabilisers, European policymakers provided swift fiscal support of magnitude much higher than during the global financial crisis. As a result, Member States predict the aggregate general government deficit to surge from 0.6% of GDP in 2019 to 7.4% of GDP in 2020, with headline deficits increasing in all countries. Record deficits of more than 8% of GDP are foreseen in one third of Member States (Estonia, Spain, France, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia). The Commission forecasts an even bigger aggregate deficit of 8.5% of GDP in 2020, in particular due to a markedly different projection for the Netherlands: a deficit of 6.3% of GDP versus the authorities' forecast of a surplus of 1.1% of GDP (based on a pre-pandemic macroeconomic scenario).

Euro area fiscal stance

The Commission 2020 spring forecast projects the euro area fiscal stance to be strongly supportive in 2020. It amounts to 3¾ pps. of GDP based on the expenditure benchmark methodology and 3¼ pps. of GDP according to the change in the structural balance — levels not seen in the past 20 years. The aggregation of the 2020 stability programmes points to a similar fiscal stance for the euro area. The supportive stance in 2020 is essentially the result of the sizeable fiscal measures taken by Member States in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Public debt

Reversing its declining trend since 2015, government debt is projected to increase sharply in 2020. The aggregated debt-to-GDP ratio is projected to rise substantially, reaching a new peak of around 103% in the euro area and almost 96% of GDP in the EU, according to the Commission 2020 spring forecast. Debt-to-GDP ratios will exceed 100% of GDP in Belgium, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus and Portugal. The debt projections in the Commission 2020 spring forecast are closely in line with those presented in the SCPs.

Focus on a study: The role of fiscal rules in relation with the green economy

At the request of ECON, EGOV and PolDepA commissioned external experts papers on the role of the fiscal rules in relation with the green economy. The first of such papers, by Professor Van den Noord, was published on 7 July 2020.

The Author centres his investigation in three strands - (a) the repercussions of green investment for government budgets, deficits and debt; (b) the available flexibility in the fiscal rules to accommodate these repercussions; and (c) the implications for fiscal governance – including coordination, surveillance and enforcement. Professor Van den Noord notes that *"Specifically, triggering large-scale "green public investment" projects in the pursuit of more ambitious climate goals may provide timely demand impetus to economic recovery. In the longer run, greening the economy will make growth more sustainable, by creating a better and more secure environment for businesses to thrive as the economy is transformed in a more climate-friendly direction. However, fiscal resources to green the economy unavoidably compete for scarce resources with other legitimate policy goals, now and in the future, and therefore should be employed cautiously. Insofar as the planned green investment effort involves government budgets, the EU fiscal framework is more relevant than ever.".*

In his study, he concludes that sufficient flexibility is available in the fiscal framework to accommodate the call on government budgets from the European Green Deal but suggests a number of avenues to ensure scarce fiscal resources and competing priorities are made compatible, whilst noting that "*Since sustainable public finances can never be achieved when climate risks undermine economic activity in the long run, these need not be conflicting objectives*.". His recommendations evolve around the following points:

- Putting the emphasis of fiscal action on loans, equity injections and guarantees, as opposed to grants and subsidies, for instance, as it would "*add room for manoeuvre to fund part of the green investment bill through debt issuance within the fiscal rules*"; if squeezing other public spending or raising taxes is nevertheless necessary, high "*leverage*" of the green investment needs to be atteined;
- Using the governments' National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs) as a basis for evaluating whether the flexibility clause can be used, and ensuring such plans indicate which part of the projects would be funded by the national governments and where these would appear in the general government account (for properly assessing the impact of green investment within the fiscal framework). Additionally, the NECPs timetable and format would need to be adjusted to better provide the input needed for the Stability and Convergence Programmes. The latter, in turn, need to be explicit on the fiscal and economic impact of the European Green Deal, so as to allow assessing the consistency of the NECPs and the Stability and Convergence Programmes and take action if deemed necessary;
- Feeding into the country-specific Medium-Term Budgetary Objectives (MTOs) the impacts of those plans to lockin the positive climate effects once the General Escape Clause – in force since March 2020 – is lifted.

Professor Van den Noord concludes that the "*COVID-19 outbreak will leave a legacy of high levels of public debt, in many cases exceeding the 60% reference value by wide margins, in addition to as yet unknown contingent liabilities. This makes for an extremely challenging backdrop for achieving the objectives for green investment set by the European Green Deal insofar as these involve government budgets*.". Nevertheless, his policy recommendations aim at conciliating the relevant objectives: sustainable public finances, quality of public investment, recovery and growth and green public investment.

Germany Council Presidency priorities in the area of ECOFIN

*Business activities and company structures have changed dramatically as a result of the digital transformation and the COVID-19 pandemic is posing additional challenges. Europe's **tax policy** must be modern and innovative in order to continue to promote Europe's economic strength and safeguard Member States' tax revenues.*

The tax burden must be distributed fairly and transparently to this end. The OECD is currently drafting reform proposals that are intended to address in an effective manner the tax challenges arising from the digital *transformation and which comprise the introduction of a minimum global effective tax rate. Following the conclusion of negotiations, we want to press ahead with implementing the results in the EU. We are also committed to the introduction of a financial transaction tax at European level. The increasing mobility of citizens, businesses and wealth requires Member States' tax authorities to work together in order to simplify taxation. It is with this in mind that we want to revise the directive on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation. One of the aims behind this is to tackle tax evasion in an effective manner. We will also step up efforts to fight money laundering and terrorist financing.*

*In the current crisis situation, measures to contain the pandemic as well as to restore the full functioning of Europe's societies and economies are rightly the focus of our attentions. As soon as the economic conditions permit this, the **budget policy in the Member States** should be geared once again to the medium-term achievement of forward-looking budgets as this is key to the stability, resilience and growth prospects of the economic and monetary union. In reviewing the Stability and Growth Pact, the primary focus should therefore be on the viability of public finances with a view to ensuring the required room for manoeuvre in crisis situations.*

*We want to deepen the **capital market union** in order to promote capital market-based financing and to further integrate the European capital market and make it more competitive at the international level. The aim here is to improve financing of the real economy as well as strategic investments. We support the continued development of the **banking union** in order to increase the stability of the financial system and to strengthen the European single market.*

*The advancing **digitalisation of the financial services** sector offers opportunities for new business models, products and providers. However, this is bound up with risks and is leading to profound changes in the market, thus rendering regulatory adjustments necessary. With the creation of a digital financial market union, we want to dismantle existing barriers to cross-border digital financial services in order to remain competitive internationally. We want to support the work in the context of the digital finance strategy announced by the Commission as well as the regulatory proposals on such areas as krypto assets in order to help strengthen the sovereignty of Europe's financial market.*

For an overview of the draft agendas for Council meetings, during the German Presidency), please see here.

Policy recommendations in the public domain: Some recent picks

B. McWilliams, S. Tagliapietra, G. Zachmann - Greening the recovery by greening the fiscal consolidation (8 July 2020):

The response to the COVID-19 crisis comes at a pivotal moment for the EU in its own efforts to address the climate crisis. To the greatest degree possible, governments must direct such revenues to stimulus policies that boost depressed economies whilst contributing towards the transition to a zero-carbon economy. However, it is unrealistic to expect that governments are able to explicitly green all (or even most of) stimulus policies. A range of priorities, not least providing an immediate and sizeable boost to the economy, will compete with the green objective. The experiences of 2008-2009 show that much stimulus spending is likely to be based on boosting demand within existing economic structures, rather than pursuing aggressive supply-side reform. This is where the concept of a 'green consolidation' will be fundamental to ensure a truly green recovery. Where explicit greening is not possible, implicit greening can be achieved by adjusting market expectations to a future world of higher carbon prices. Carbon pricing has long been the economist's favoured tool for reducing carbon emissions. However, given the current circumstances, an EU strategy of effective stimulus measures today, while allowing increases in future carbon prices to play the role of greener-in-chief, appears more attractive than ever.

J. Hassler, P. Krusell, M. Ravn, K. Storesletten - Economic policy under the pandemic: A European perspective (7 July 2020):

The responses to Covid-19 have had direct economic consequences of historic proportions. The column discusses the nature of the shock and the challenges for economic policy in Europe in the current and next phases of the crisis. In addition to outlining some basic principles for guiding domestic economic policy, it also calls for clear communication of policy to minimise uncertainty, for cooperation across countries along several dimensions, and for a clear and unified strategy in the management of national debts. Concretely, the authors are proposing to raise a bigger fund to avert debt crises and give the receiving governments more say in how to use the funds, rather than tying them to specific industrial policies with long-run goals. Economic science does not offer a recipe for who should eventually service this debt. It is a political question whether it should be shouldered jointly by all countries or ultimately borne by the countries in need. In any case, the transfers should be accompanied by conditionality aimed at reforms achieving more efficient tax collection and better functioning economies. During the European debt crisis ten years ago, a major problem was policy uncertainty (over whether countries would be bailed out, and so on). This time, the stakes are higher because the debt burden has risen and Europe's populations are older. It is imperative to avoid repeating past mistakes.

C. Altomonte, A. Coali, G. Ottaviano - EU recovery plans should fund the COVID-19 battles to come; not be used to nurse old wounds (6 July 2020):

In its proposed Recovery Fund, the European Commission uses allocation criteria mainly linked to infection rates and past economic performance. To foster an efficient economic rebound post COVID-19 crisis, the authors propose instead to allocate funds through a forward-looking approach based on specific industrial and economic structure of EU regions. A 'forward-looking' approach to evaluating the potential economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, based on indicators of the exposure to internal (EDRI) and external (IDRI) disruption risk, can lead to very different outcomes than those implied by standard metrics such as past economic performance or exposure to contagions. Therefore, in order to tailor a more consistent and effective allocation of EU recovery money, policymakers should consider the intrinsic differences of EU regions in terms of industrial and employment structures, because such differences are going to determine the future local impact of the COVID shock.

M. A. Muñoz - Macroprudential policy and COVID-19: Restrict dividend distributions to significantly improve the effectiveness of the countercyclical capital buffer release (3 July 2020):

According to the evidence, banks in the euro area are particularly reluctant to cut back on dividends during economic recessions. That is, the bulk of the adjustment in the face of negative shocks that hit bank profits is borne by undistributed net income. This column argues that this pattern can notably exacerbate the impact of a negative supply shock such as the COVID-19 pandemic on bank lending and economic activity. Using a macro-banking DSGE model calibrated to quarterly data of the euro area economy, it concludes that restricting dividend distributions has the potential to significantly improve the effectiveness of the countercyclical capital buffer release in ensuring that banks keep funding households and firms during the COVID-19 crisis. Due to the different mechanisms through which the two macroprudential instruments operate, restricting dividend distributions when a negative supply shock (arguably, the category of shocks within which COVID-19 falls) hits the economy has the potential to be particularly effective in complementing the release of the CCyB as a means to ensure that banks continue to provide funds to households and firms during the economic slowdown.

M. Schularick, S. Steffen, T. Tröger - Bank capital and the European recovery from the Covid-19 Crisis (24 June 2020):

European banks are trading at substantial discounts to their book value in markets. A substantial gap exists in particular with respect to US banks. Such weak capitalization levels pose a risk to a quick recovery from the COVID-19 crisis. The authors make the case for a precautionary recapitalization of European banks. They estimate a substantial capital shortfall across different scenarios, spanning from 60 bn euros to 600 bn euros. Higher capital ratios would not only provide valuable insurance against further economic shocks from a second wave but would also prepare the ground for a quick recovery, supporting the stimulus measures taken by governments. Yet recapitalization is a precondition, not a substitute for the reorganization of the European banking sector whose profitability remains low. They discuss the principles on which this recapitalization should be built. First, it should be done at the European level to avoid the sovereign-bank doom loop. Second, it should apply to all banks, including healthy ones. Healthy banks would be allowed to repay the money after passing a stringent stress test. Third, the only European institution that is currently in a position to provide the necessary funds for the recapitalization is the ESM. Instead of stripping the ESM of its ability to directly recapitalize European banks, this capacity should be strengthened.

For an overview of some previous EGOV Regular Picks:

- The economy and coronavirus - Weekly Picks - 01/07/2020
- The economy and coronavirus - Weekly Picks - 15/06/2020
- The economy and coronavirus - Weekly Picks - 04/06/2020
- The economy and coronavirus - Weekly Picks - 19/05/2020
- The economy and coronavirus - Weekly Picks - 12/05/2020
- The economy and coronavirus - Weekly Picks - 04/05/2020
- The economy and coronavirus - Weekly Picks - 27/04/2020
- The economy and coronavirus - Weekly Picks - 15/04/2020
- The economy and coronavirus - Weekly Picks - 06/04/2020
- The economy and coronavirus - Weekly Picks - 30/03/2020

- Banking Union: Corona crisis effects - Calendar week 24- June 2020
- Banking Union: Corona crisis effects - Calendar week 22- June 2020
- Banking Union: Corona crisis effects - Calendar week 20 - May 2020
- Banking Union: Corona crisis effects - Calendar week 17 - April 2020
- Banking Union: Corona crisis effects - Calendar week 15 - April 2020

For an overview of the latest EU/EA level measures proposed or taken to mitigate the economic and financial effects of the pandemic, please see this regularly updated document.

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This document is available on the internet at: www.europarl.europa.eu/supporting-analyses

Annex 1. Recent European Commission projections for real GDP growth

	Summer 2020 forecast		Spring 2020 forecast		Revisions (Summer 2020 compared to Spring 2020 forecast)		Revisions (Summer 2020 compared to Winter 2020 forecast)
	2020	**2021**	**2020**	**2021**	**2020**	**2021**	**2020**
BE	-8,8	6,5	-7,2	6,7	-1,6	-0,2	-9,8
DE	-6,3	5,3	-6,5	5,9	0,2	-0,6	-7,3
EE	-7,7	6,2	-6,9	5,9	-0,8	0,3	-9,8
IE	-8,5	6,3	-7,9	6,1	-0,6	0,2	-12,0
EL	-9,0	6,0	-9,7	7,9	0,7	-1,9	-11,3
ES	-10,9	7,1	-9,4	7,0	-1,5	0,1	-12,4
FR	-10,6	7,6	-8,2	7,4	-2,4	0,2	-11,9
IT	-11,2	6,1	-9,5	6,5	-1,7	-0,4	-11,6
CY	-7,7	5,3	-7,4	6,1	-0,3	-0,8	-10,3
LV	-7,0	6,4	-7,0	6,4	0,0	0,0	-9,6
LT	-7,1	6,7	-7,9	7,4	0,8	-0,7	-9,5
LU	-6,2	5,4	-5,4	5,7	-0,8	-0,3	-8,8
MT	-6,0	6,3	-5,8	6,0	-0,2	0,3	-10,2
NL	-6,8	4,6	-6,8	5,0	0,0	-0,4	-8,1
AT	-7,1	5,6	-5,5	5,0	-1,6	0,6	-8,5
PT	-9,8	6,0	-6,8	5,8	-3,0	0,2	-11,5
SI	-7,0	6,1	-7,0	6,7	0,0	-0,6	-9,7
SK	-9,0	7,4	-6,7	6,6	-2,3	0,8	-11,6
FI	-6,3	2,8	-6,3	3,7	0,0	-0,9	-7,4
EA	**-8,7**	**6,1**	**-7,7**	**6,3**	**-1,0**	**-0,2**	**-9,9**
BG	-7,1	5,3	-7,2	6,0	0,1	-0,7	-10,1
CZ	-7,8	4,5	-6,2	5,0	-1,6	-0,5	-10,0
DK	-5,2	4,3	-5,9	5,1	0,7	-0,8	-6,7
HR	-10,8	7,5	-9,1	7,5	-1,7	0,0	-13,4
HU	-7,0	6,0	-7,0	6,0	0,0	0,0	-9,8
PL	-4,6	4,3	-4,3	4,1	-0,3	0,2	-7,9
RO	-6,0	4,0	-6,0	4,2	0,0	-0,2	-9,6
SE	-5,3	3,1	-6,1	4,3	0,8	-1,2	-6,3
EU	**-8,3**	**5,8**	**-7,4**	**6,1**	**-0,9**	**-0,3**	**-9,7**
UK	-9,7	6,0	-8,3	6,0	-1,4	0,0	-11,1

Sources: European Commission (COM)'s Economic Forecast Winter 2020, Spring 2020 and Summer 2020